On the substance dualism

MoK

Here, I provide a short argument for substance dualism based on the fact that experience exists and is coherent.

P1) Experience, the subject, is a conscious event that is informative and coherent
C1) So, there must be a substance, the object, that contains the information and is coherent#1
P2) The object cannot directly perceive its content, the information#2
C2) So, there must be another substance, the mind, that perceives the object and apprehends the subject
C) Therefore, we are dealing with the substance dualism (From C1 and C2)

#1 C1 follows since the experience does not have the capacity to be coherent on its own, given its definition. Therefore, we need a substance that contains the information and is also coherent.
#2 The object can indirectly perceive its content, and that requires another substance to perceive the information and change accordingly, such that the object can then perceive the content of another substance. The content of another substance must be the same as the content of the object, though. This requires two conscious substances and is complex, so we prefer the simpler model; please see C2.

I just noticed that the subject is a term used for experiencer whereas in the above argument, I used it as a synonym for experience. To avoid this confusion I change the above argument slightly in the following form:

P1) Experience is a conscious event that is informative and coherent
C1) So, there must be a substance, the object, that contains the information and is coherent#1
P2) The object cannot directly perceive its content, the information#2
C2) So, there must be another substance, the mind, that perceives the object and apprehends the experience
C) Therefore, we are dealing with the substance dualism (From C1 and C2)

#1 C1 follows since the experience does not have the capacity to be coherent on its own, given its definition. Therefore, we need a substance that contains the information and is also coherent.
#2 The object can indirectly perceive its content, and that requires another substance to perceive the information and change accordingly, such that the object can then perceive the content of another substance. The content of another substance must be the same as the content of the object, though. This requires two conscious substances and is complex, so we prefer the simpler model; please see C2.

flannel jesus

I want to follow this thread but I don't care to have a debate about it - I don't think it would be productive. I think P2 probably needs more detail, and the leap to C2 is unjustified from the preceding premises. I very much doubt I'm in a position to either convince or be convinced, and I don't forsee the ensuing conversation to be enjoyable or enlightening, so I'm going to watch.

180 Proof

↪MoK

A conclusion does not follow from a single statement but from an argument (i.e. string of valid inferences). Make an argument.

MoK

↪180 Proof

C1 and C2 follow from P1 and P2 respectively, each is a form of Modus Ponens.

bert1

A conclusion does not follow from a single statement — 180 Proof

Not usually but it can do. e.g. "Water is wet and wobbly. Therefore water is wet." Not very interesting admittedly, but it is an inference.

180 Proof

e.g. "Water is wet and wobbly. Therefore water is wet." — bert1

That's a tautology, nothing implicit is made explicit (i.e. new information is not learned / concluded after the "therefore").

↪MoK

Assertions without argument are just as easily dismissed without argument. Try again.

bert1

That's a tautology, nothing implit is made explicit (i.e. nothing new is learned after "therefore"). — 180 Proof

It's an example of the &-elimination rule, a valid inference in the simple sentential logic I did ages ago.

I don't think it's a tautology, it's not saying exactly the same thing twice. Even if it were it could still be an inference. You can conclude that "Jim is bald" from "Jim is bald". Only a dick philosopher would actually say that of course.

But I agree it's uninformative.

Corvus

C1 and C2 follow from P1 and P2 respectively, each is a form of Modus Ponens. — MoK

You seem to be misunderstanding what Modus Pones is, and how it works.
MP is in the form of,
P -> C
P
C

You must demonstrate and prove why P is the case, before concluding C. You cannot just say something as P, and just because you said P, C follows from P. There is no relevance or any logical consequences or entailment between P and C in your statements. In that case, you cannot come to conclusion C from P.

MoK

↪Corvus

Which premises, P1 or P2, do you have a problem with?

Corvus

↪MoK

Both. I don't have problem. Just pointing out the problem in the statements.

MoK

↪Corvus

Which one would you like to discuss first? And I didn't say that you have a problem!

Corvus

P1 or P2, do you have a problem with? — MoK

And I didn't say that you have a problem! — MoK

You did.

What are the relevance between P1) and C1)? How does C1) derive from P1)?

#1 C1 follows since the experience does not have the capacity to be coherent, given its definition. Therefore, we need a substance that contains the information and is also coherent. — MoK

This conclusion doesn't have logical consequence from P1), and sounds ambiguous in its claim.

MoK

You did. — Corvus

I said: "Which premises, P1 or P2, do you have a problem with?". I was referring to the premises rather than you.

What are the relevance between P1) and C1)? How does C1) derive from P1)? — Corvus

First, we have to agree on two things: 1) Our experiences are coherent, and 2) This coherence cannot be due to the experience itself since the experience is merely a conscious event. If we accept these two, then we realize that there must be a substance that the experience is due to hence C1 naturally follows from P1.

Corvus

I said: "Which premises, P1 or P2, do you have a problem with?". I was referring to the premises rather than you. — MoK

You should have said "Which premises are problematic?" rather than "P1 or P2, do you have a problem with?" Your sentence was then not communicating your original intention or idea.

1) Our experiences are coherent, — MoK

Our experience is not always coherent. Some are, and some are not. So, it is already unclear from the start.

Corvus

This coherence cannot be due to the experience itself — MoK

The coherence must be from our reasoning.

If we accept these two, then we realize that there must be a substance that the experience is due — MoK

What is the substance in your experience? We don't see or know anything about a substance in our experience. We know about the content of experience, not a substance.

MoK

Our experience is not always coherent. Some are, and some are not. So, it is already unclear from the start. — Corvus

Our experiences, excluding our thoughts, are always coherent. Just look around and give me an example of a single experience that is not coherent. Reality is coherent hence our experiences too.

MoK

The coherence must be from your reasoning. — Corvus

I am not interested in reasoning here. The reasoning could be right or wrong. What I am interested in is reality as we experience it.

What is the substance in your experience? We don't see or know anything about a substance in our experience. We know about the content of experience, not a substance. — Corvus

I don't have direct access to the substance, the object here. I am arguing in favor of it. I have direct access to my experiences only.

Corvus

What I am interested in is reality as we experience it. — MoK

In that case, it is nothing to do with coherence. You cannot claim coherence from experience when you are not interested in right or wrong. Something is coherent if it makes sense. Making sense is possible when something is reasonable.

I don't have direct access to the substance, the object here. I am arguing in favor of it. I have direct access to my experiences only. — MoK

What is the substance? Would it be objects in your experience? Why use the word substance? The word substance is not clear in the context.

Banno

P1) Experience, the subject, is a conscious event that is informative and coherent
C1) So, there must be a substance, the object, that contains the information and is coherent#1 — MoK

Might be an existential generalisation: Experience is "informative and coherent" therefore something is "informative and coherent"

Experience is coherent, therefore something is coherent.

The object cannot directly perceive its content — MoK

...is pretty obtuse. However, a thermostat "perceives" the temperature, it's content. If the information is not "perceived" by the thermostat then it could not turn on the heater. And here's the rub; if substance dualism is correct, and there are two different substances, then the problem becomes how they interact. If mind is a seperate substance to body, how is it that a body can be perceived by a mind, and how is it that a mind can change a body?

I am not interested in reasoning here. — MoK

Then there is no more to be said.

I don't think it's a tautology, it's not saying exactly the same thing twice. — bert1

In logic a tautology is a statement that is true by it's logical form, such as (A&B)⊃B.

bert1

In logic a tautology is a statement that is true by it's logical form, such as (A&B)⊃B. — Banno

Oh fair enough. I'm wondering if I was taught slightly different stuff from others.

Banno

↪bert1

It's perhaps not much used in computational logic. A tautology is what is true under any consistent substitution, and so regardless of the assignment of truth values.

But yes, B does follow from A & B, as you said. Hence my reading of P1 as an existential generalisation, another inference from a single line. From f(a) we can infer ∃(x)f(x).

But I'd understand

↪180 Proof

to be referring to the rest of the supposed argument, which is problematic.

Wayfarer

P1) Experience, the subject, is a conscious event that is informative and coherent
C1) So, there must be a substance, the object, that contains the information and is coherent#1
P2) The object cannot directly perceive its content, the information#2 — MoK

I think I can see what you're trying to prove here, but it's very garbled. The first three terms, 'experience, subject, conscious event' are all very philosophically thick terms that by themselves have been subject to volumes of literature. Conjoining them in such a dense sentence doesn't do justice to their meaning.

So, is 'the subject' an 'event'? I would think not, because 'events' exist in time, they have a discrete beginning and end. Subjects of experience are different from events on those grounds in that they are persistent through time and even through changes of state. Experiences are undergone by the subject, and they are coherent insofar as the subject is able to integrate them with their previous experiences, so that we know how to interpret the experience.

Notice that 'Substance' in philosophy has a completely different meaning than it does in regular discourse. Generally 'substance' is a 'material with uniform properties' (e.g. a liquid substance, a metal substance etc). In philosophy, the word has a different meaning. It was introduced as the Latin 'substantia' in translation for the Greek 'ousia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being' or 'subject'.

In many discussions of 'substance' in philosophy, this distinction is lost, leading to the question of what kind of 'substance' the mind might be, which is an absurd question. It is the fatal flaw in Cartesian dualism, one which Descartes himself could never answer. The mind is not a 'thinking thing' in any sense other than the metaphorical. Reducing it to a 'thinking substance' is an absurdity. (This is why Aristotle's matter-form dualism retains a plausibility that Cartesian dualism never exhibited.)

As for the translation of 'ousia', see Joe Sachs' IEP entry on Aristotelian Metaphysics.

a word designed by the anti-Aristotelian Augustine to mean a low and empty sort of being turns up in our translations of the word whose meaning Aristotle took to be the highest and fullest sense of being. Descartes, in his Meditations, uses the word substance only with his tongue in his cheek; Locke explicitly analyzes it as an empty notion of an I-don’t-know-what; and soon after the word is laughed out of the vocabulary of serious philosophic endeavor. It is no wonder that the Metaphysics ceased to have any influence on living thinking: its heart had been cut out of it by its friends. — Aristotle's Metaphysics, IEP

However, a thermostat "perceives" the temperature — Banno

Notice the scare quotes. Obviously the reaction of a thermostat to the environment is just that - an energetic reaction which can be described entirely in physical terms. But is absent the semiotic or interpretive dimension that characterises the most rudimentary forms of organic life. In other words, it is never intentional.

Banno

Notice the scare quotes. — Wayfarer

They were certainly intended. Few words are as loaded, especially in these fora, as "perceive". You again make the mistake of assuming there is a ghost in the machine, and then pretending you have demonstrated it.

The basic problem for substance dualism remains - explaining how the ghost interacts with the machine.

Wayfarer

You again make the mistake of assuming there is a ghost in the machine, and then pretending you have demonstrated it. — Banno

Obviously you wrote that before you read my remarks above my response to you, which explicitly describes the flaw with the idea of the 'ghost in the machine'. Have another go.

Banno

↪Wayfarer

I glanced at it, thought it irrelevant and moved on. It remains that, for the OP, explaining the interaction of ghost and machine is problematic.

Wayfarer

It remains that, for the OP, explaining the interaction of ghost and machine is problematic. — Banno

Which is why I took the trouble of explaining it (not that I expect the explanation to be understood by the poster to whom it was addressed, but you might get it.)

Banno

↪Wayfarer

Perhaps I am too used to disagreeing with you to notice when we agree. But

Obviously the reaction of a thermostat to the environment is just that - an energetic reaction which can be described entirely in physical terms. — Wayfarer

This does not rule out that the reaction of a mind to the environment is just that - an energetic reaction which can be described entirely in physical terms. A reaction that might also and equivalently be described in terms of intent. Hence my response, that the supposed dualism remains undemonstrated.

Wayfarer

This does not rule out that the reaction of a mind to the environment is just that - an energetic reaction which can be described entirely in physical terms — Banno

But that's the whole point of 'intentionality'. Minds of all kinds - organisms of all kinds - display attributes which are *not* reducible to physical terms, as they are semiotic in nature (which I learned from Apokrisis.) To say that they are 'describable in physical terms' means that they can be accounted for solely in terms of physical laws - which is physicalism.

And what about the reaction of a thermostat, or of iron to oxygen, requires an explanation in terms of 'intentionality'? So, now you're not a physicalist, but a panpsychist! Make up your mind-substance.

Banno

And what about the reaction of a thermostat, or of iron to oxygen, requires an explanation in terms of 'intentionality'? — Wayfarer

Unplug the thermostat from the heater, and drop the temperature - the thermostat tries to turn the heater on, but can't... (a description in terms of intent, not physics)

That "Minds of all kinds display attributes which are *not* reducible to physical terms" is exactly the issue in contention.

The two descriptions - physical ind intentional - are not mutually exclusive. That your body is flooded with oxytocin does not mean you are not in love. I'll bold that for emphasis - both can be true at the very same time, and indeed probably are.

It's not required. Btu it can still be true.

Wayfarer

Unplug the thermostat from the heater, and drop the temperature - the thermostat tries to turn the heater on, but can't... (a description in terms of intent, not physics) — Banno

'Tries' here is clearly metaphorical. What actually happens is, nothing. The events do not trigger the response. Nothing has 'tried' to do anything.

Banno

Tries' here is clearly metaphorical — Wayfarer

Rubbish. It's sending the signal, but there is no heater connected that can respond. It is trying, but can't.

That description is quite clear, quite diagnostic of the problem, and not a metaphor.

On the substance dualism

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions