Is the idea just physical? That's the point at issue. The physical reductionist says yes; the idealist - mental reductionist - says the physical is just the mental - @Wayfarer does this sometimes. I'm suggesting that they might well be the same thing under two different descriptions, two ways of speaking rather than two substances.

Information content can be measured physically - that is where Landauer comes in - but that is only because there are agreed conventions of what constitutes meaningful information in the first place.
— Wayfarer
:lol:

What's meaning, if not what what is done with the information? Meaning here is just another term for use.

And use is physical. It involves actual processes that produce measurable physical effects in the world. — Banno

You’re reducing Wittgenstein to a slogan.

Meaning is not just “use” in the reductive physical sense of mechanical interaction or behavioral output. Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning operates within language games, forms of life, and shared human practices — none of which can be captured in the vocabulary of physics (and incidentally, as you well know, Wittgenstein detested 'scientism' and presumably physicalism as an aspect thereof.)

The entire discipline of semiotics — from Peirce to Eco to contemporary biosemiotics — is concerned with signs and sign-relations, not with particles and forces. A sign refers to something; it stands for something else — and that referential function is not something describable in physical terms alone. There is no law of physics that tells you whether “dog” means a four-legged mammal, or whether it’s someone’s last name.

You’re not seeing the meaning for the words.

You’re reducing Wittgenstein to a slogan. — Wayfarer

Not I. Don't look to the meaning, look to the use.

The trouble is that the topic is waffle, and specifically it is waffle because it tries to mix two different types of language games - the physical and the intentional.

The trouble is that the topic is waffle, and specifically it is waffle because it tries to mix two different types of language games - the physical and the intentional. — Banno

You're saying the intentional is not physical.

it is waffle because it tries to mix two different types of language games - the physical and the intentional. — Banno

Waffles are breakfast. Make sure you use real maple syrup.

There's an obvious solution to this problem. Dualism. I.e., if you want to avoid that sticky sappy stuff.

You're saying the intentional is not physical. — Patterner

No. I'm suggesting that they might be about the same things, under two different descriptions.

Make sure you use real maple syrup. — Metaphysician Undercover

Damned right!!!

No. I'm suggesting that they might be about the same things, under two different descriptions. — Banno

I like the idea, but don't see how it can be. Can you explain? I suspect you have been doing that, but, if so, I haven't caught on. I am but an egg.

No. I'm suggesting that they might be about the same things, under two different descriptions.
— Banno
I like the idea, but don't see how it can be. Can you explain? I suspect you have been doing that, but, if so, I haven't caught on. I am but an egg. — Patterner

Suppose the psychological language we use in talking about intentionality consists of metaphors which map roughly to different sorts of physical activity occurring in our brains.

I see it as rather analogous to seeing the elements of C++ as metaphors for what goes on phyiscally in the hardware of a machine running C++ code. (In case that helps.)

That's a start. more like, consider a bit of code compared to a description of what happened in physical terms in the chips of your phone. These two descriptions describe the same thing. They are not metaphors. And we can look at it in terms of intentionality rather than physics and code...

If you have access to Philosophical Investigations, read form §118 through to about §130, but instead of thinking about it in terms of perception, think in terms of understanding or conceptualising. Then conceptualising something is not to arrive at a static mental image or predefined set of attributes, but a dynamic process that involves engaging with rules, practices, and contexts in a flexible way.

But this is waffle, syrup or no, and needs plenty more sorting.

conceptualising something is not to arrive at a static mental image or predefined set of attributes, but a dynamic process that involves engaging with rules, practices, and contexts in a flexible way. — Banno

All physical in nature? Reducible to physics? Able to be replicated in silicon? Oh, I see - 'anomalous monism'. Physicalism with whatever ad hoc admissions that need to be made to accomodate the non-physical nature of intentionality and interpretation. Slick!

I have a suggestion for why 'anomalous monism' even seems plausible. It has to do with history of ideas. Western philosophy devised 'substance dualism' and then defined mind as a 'thinking thing'. That was susceptible to the 'ghost in the machine' criticism. So, there is no ghost - only the machine, which is what any serious or sober thinker must accept. But then, if there seem to be things which the mechanist or physicalist paradigm can't accomodate, we'll call that an 'anomaly', and carry on regardless.

Am I warm?

These two descriptions describe the same thing. — Banno

They do not describe the same thing though, that's why they are different. To conclude that they do describe the same thing requires further premises or assumptions which need to be judge for truth or falsity, to determine how sound that conclusion would be.

Psychological state or personal experience cannot be ground for objective knowledge. — Corvus

Personal experience can be a solid ground to conclude that the experience is coherent. Our experiences when we are dreaming are mostly incoherent while they are always coherent when we are awake.

As far as 'substance dualism' is concerned, for Descartes, mind (res cogitans) and matter (res extensa) are of completely different kinds. The soul, res cogitans, is immaterial and lacking in extension (physical dimensions) but is capable of reasoning and thinking. — Wayfarer

To me, the mind is the substance with the ability to experience and cause the object only. The mind has the ability to freely decide as well when it faces options too. The mind does not have the ability to reason or think. It perceives the content of the object. The content of the object however is very rich in the case of humans, it could be a form of perceptions, feelings, thoughts, etc. Perception, feelings, thoughts, etc. are due to physical processes in the brain. The mind does not have direct access to the neural processes in the brain but the object. The object and brain are directly interacting. It is through this interaction that the object can mediate between the brain and the mind. The mind is mainly an observer but it can intervene when it is necessary, for example when there is a conflict of interest between thoughts, feelings, etc.

Matter occupies space but is devoid of intelligence. — Wayfarer

Matter occupies space but what we call intelligence is due to neural processes in the brain.

The problem for substance dualism is explaining how non-extended incorporeal intelligence interacts with non-intelligent corporeal matter. Descartes suggest that this was via the pineal gland, but it is generally agreed that this is unsatisfactory and it remains an outstanding problem for substance dualism. — Wayfarer

The mind does not have any physical extension but to my understanding can present in different locations of the brain by moving very fast. The mind directly perceives and causes the object. The object either is affected by the brain or affects the brain. It is through these interactions that the mind can indirectly affect the brain or be affected. As I mentioned before the object is a very light substance so it can only affect the brain very slightly. This affection however can lead to a significant change in neural processes when there are options or in other words the brain is in an undecided state.

I'm sorry to say that you're not demonstrating a clear understanding of the questions you're raising, and so I have nothing further to add at this time. — Wayfarer

I tried my best to explain things to the best of my understanding. Please let me know what you think.

You say that experience is coherent because the object is coherent, but at the same time you accept that coherence is given from the subject. Which implies redundancy. Object coherence is no longer a criterion for inferring dualism of subtances, since that criterion is found in both subject and object don't You think? — JuanZu

My argument has two parts: 1) In the first part I argue in favor of the object that carries information and is coherent from the experience and 2) In the second part I argue in favor of the mind given the fact that the object cannot directly perceive its content, the information which is coherent. I am not arguing that coherence is given from the mind. The mind just perceives coherence in the experience.

Personal experience can be a solid ground to conclude that the experience is coherent. Our experiences when we are dreaming are mostly incoherent while they are always coherent when we are awake. — MoK

What do you mean by "coherent"? Can you explain "coherence" and "being coherent"?

The vagueness of "substance" is apparent in the discussion in this thread. — Banno

I already defined the substance in several posts. By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties or abilities.

There's the Bundle theory to dal with - if substance is what "holds" properties, what difference is there between substance and a bundle of properties? — Banno

The bundle theory suffers from the problem of compresence of the properties.

What is it that makes one substance different from another - and again, if it's just the properties they accept, why not just deal in terms of those properties? — Banno

Because those are the substances that interact with each other. This interaction is due to the properties of the substances.

And the problem I focused on, how is it that different substances are able to interact? — Banno

The substances interact with each other through the forces.

What do you mean by "coherent"? Can you explain "coherence" and "being coherent"? — Corvus

By coherent I mean that our experiences when we are awake are consistent. Take the example of my experience of the cup of tea. It is where I expect it. It does not appear or disappear. Etc. Quite oppositely, our dreamy experiences are not always coherent. Things appear and disappear. Etc.

By coherent I mean that our experiences when we are awake are consistent. — MoK

Not sure if your account on coherence is correct or not. My understanding of coherence is that when P is true, Q cannot be untrue, and vice versa. In this relation, P and Q are coherent.

From the point of view, your use of coherence seems to be wrong, and misleading, which directed you to the misunderstanding.

Not sure if your account on coherence is correct or not. My understanding of coherence is that when P is true, Q cannot be untrue, and vice versa. In this relation, P and Q are coherent. — Corvus

No, I don't mean that.

From the point of view, your use of coherence seems to be wrong, and misleading, which directed you to the misunderstanding. — Corvus

You are the only person who is trapped in P1. Other people understood P1 and asked other questions. To be honest I don't know how I can help you. Perhaps others can help you.

I am not arguing that coherence is given from the mind. The mind just perceives coherence in the experience. — MoK

Then you are contradicting yourself. Since before you had said that the brain, the subject, the experience made of what the senses give us something coherent. And you did so by denying that you were talking about a tabula rasa.

You are the only person who is trapped in P1. Other people understood P1 and asked other questions. To be honest I don't know how I can help you. Perhaps others can help you. — MoK

I wasn't asking for help. You seem to be distorting the facts.
I was just pointing out on the wrong use of the concepts. Because of the misconception and misunderstanding of the concept in P1, the rest of the arguments seem to be unclear and muddled.

Not sure if your account on coherence is correct or not. My understanding of coherence is that when P is true, Q cannot be untrue, and vice versa. In this relation, P and Q are coherent.
— Corvus
No, I don't mean that. — MoK

That's what I read from the philosophical text books. Not making it up from the thin air.
Clarification on the concepts is part of the philosophical investigation and analysis.

Then you are contradicting yourself. Since before you had said that the brain, the subject, the experience made of what the senses give us something coherent. — JuanZu

I didn't intend to argue for the brain in this thread since that is the third substance and I don't have any argument for it now. I just commented on the brain since people asked for the mind and body interaction. The picture including the brain is simple: We have the brain, the object, and the mind. The brain in the case of perception receives sensory input and processes it. The object and the brain are interacting with each other so the object is affected by processes in the brain. The mind then perceives the object and experiences the content of the object namely Qualia.

And you did so by denying that you were talking about a tabula rasa. — JuanZu

I don't understand why you are talking about tabula rasa. Our experience of course has texture so-called Qualia.

I wasn't asking for help. You seem to be distorting the facts. — Corvus

I don't think that I am distorting the facts.

I was just pointing out on the wrong use of the concepts. — Corvus

People apparently understand what I mean by the coherence in the experience so I don't think that I am using the concept wrongly.

That's what I read from the philosophical text books. Not making it up from the thin air.
Clarification on the concepts is part of the philosophical investigation and analysis. — Corvus

I mean if X, my cup of tea has a location, is the case that only X is the case and Y, Z, etc. which refer to my cup of tea having other locations are not the case.

I don't think that I am distorting the facts. — MoK

Just keep denying blindly whatever has been countered, forwarded or pointed out, is not philosophical argument.

People apparently understand what I mean by the coherence in the experience so I don't think that I am using the concept wrongly. — MoK

So whatever the majority believes is the truth? :roll:

I mean if X, my cup of tea has a location, is the case that only X is the case and Y, Z, etc. which refer to my cup of tea having other locations are not the case. — MoK

Your seeing a cup in a location is a subjective visual experience. It has no truth value. It is just a perception. When you make up a statement "I see a cup.", it can be true or false, depending on the fact there is someone else witnessing the cup, heard your statement and agreeing with your statement. It is only true on that instance. Otherwise, it is a meaningless self talk or monologue, with no value of truth or falsity.

In contrast, a statement such as "A bachelor is an unmarried man." or "1+1=2" has truth value with no need for anyone witnessing or agreeing.

Just keep denying blindly whatever has been countered, forwarded or pointed out, is not philosophical argument. — Corvus

Huh?

So whatever the majority believes is the truth? :roll: — Corvus

Why don't you ask people for help? Why don't you open a thread on "our experiences are incoherent"? We have been through this in this thread and your thread to a good degree. I don't see a point in repeating myself.

Your seeing a cup in a location is a subjective visual experience. It has no truth value. It is just a perception. When you make up a statement "I see a cup.", it can be true or false, depending on the fact there is someone else witnessing the cup, heard your statement and agreeing with your statement. It is only true on that instance. Otherwise, it is a meaningless self talk or monologue, with no value of truth or falsity. — Corvus

Could you give an example of something coherent or incoherent?