indicates nothing except that you are lacking in skills of critical thinking. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see why you're bringing insults into it, I'm not calling you stupid.

From a Bayesian perspective, evidence for a belief Q is information that increases the probability assigned to Q. Keep in mind that evidence isn't proof, evidence is just a shift in probabilities.

So take Q to be the statement "mental processes are physical processes". Now, the two pieces of information I listed before - the chemical effect on mental processes, and the early foray into AI that we're witnessing - I think pretty reasonably raise the probability of Q, compared to what Q would be given the opposite observations. Opposite observations being, a hypothetical world in which chemically altering the neuronal environment DOESN'T affect thinking, and in which simulating neurons in a computer DOESN'T produce a machine that can solve problems, pass the turing test, and generate internal models of the data it interacts with.

I don't think I'm lacking in anything intellectually when I say, the observations we have are evidence. I welcome you to disagree with me and tell me why, but I request that you leave the insults out next time.

What do you mean by "substantiated" if not proven? — Janus

I was taken it to mean "evidenced". An unsubstantiated claim is a claim without any evidence.

I was taken it to mean "evidenced". An unsubstantiated claim is a claim without any evidence. — flannel jesus

Two things which "seem" to be different must be proven to be the same before they can be accepted as being the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah well I agree with you that it's OBVIOUS that "proof" in the strong sense of the word is out of the picture here. So if he means that... well, he shouldn't.

I can't imagine what the weak sense of the word would be in this connection...'seems most plausible given the evidence we do have perhaps'...?

ignoring what MU is saying, I googled "meaning of unsubstantiated", and google tells me "not supported or proven by evidence".

"proven" there is in the loose sense of the word, because I think we both agree that it's not within the jurisdiction of evidence to "prove" things in the strong sense of the word proof - the strong sense like is employed in classic logic.

Evidence supports things, or it doesn't. And sometimes, you can have evidence on both sides of a question, right? Did Bob kill this person, or someone else? Well here's some evidence Bob killed her, here's some evidence Bob didn't.

So yeah, when it comes to evidence, "proof" is... kind of beside the point, which is why I like to think about it in bayesian terms.

:up:

What do you mean by "substantiated" if not proven? Scientific theories, much less philosophical claims, cannot be proven. Your apparent demand for absolute certainty (proof) leads if the logic is followed consistently to absolute skepticism. In that case just forget about claiming anything at all that is not analytically true or tautologous. — Janus

Scientific theories are proven through experimentation. To "substantiate" is to provide solid grounds for a claim. All science is proven (substantiated) in that way, or else it does not qualify as "science". Ideas which "seem plausible" do not qualify as science because these ideas are unsubstantiated, not proven by experimentation. The phrase "seem plausible" refers to an individual's attitudinal approach to the ideas rather than the soundness of the ideas. Therefore to accept such ideas, because they "seem plausible", is to demonstrate a lack of the philosophical skill known as critical thinking. To scoff at critical thinking, characterizing it as "absolute skepticism" demonstrates a significant attitudinal problem.

So take Q to be the statement "mental processes are physical processes". Now, the two pieces of information I listed before - the chemical effect on mental processes, and the early foray into AI that we're witnessing - I think pretty reasonably raise the probability of Q, compared to what Q would be given the opposite observations. Opposite observations being, a hypothetical world in which chemically altering the neuronal environment DOESN'T affect thinking, and in which simulating neurons in a computer DOESN'T produce a machine that can solve problems, pass the turing test, and generate internal models of the data it interacts with. — flannel jesus

This is irrelevant, and fails as an argument. Probabilities are only meaningful when there are assigned values, and there are no values assigned in this case. Take the probability of Q to be .0000001%, and the information you provided raises the probability of Q to .0000002%. Do you honestly believe that we ought to accept Q as true, now that the probability of Q being true has been doubled?

An unsubstantiated claim is a claim without any evidence. — flannel jesus

"Substantiated" implies solid evidence, well-grounded reliable evidence. "Evidence" is fundamentally subjective, as the result of judgement, and the evidence must be judged as credible. There is no such thing as "a claim without any evidence" because the claim itself is evidence. What is important is how the evidence is judged. In the preceding example, the .0000001% probability of Q must be based in some type of real evidence or else it would just be a case of arbitrarily claimed evidence. If further evidence raises the probability to .0000002%, this does not constitute credible evidence of the truth of Q. Therefore despite there being at least two bits of evidence for the claim of Q, the judgements of flannel and Janus, Q remains as unsubstantiated because these two lack in the capacity of critical thinking.

Do you honestly believe that we ought to accept Q as true, now that the probability of Q being true has been doubled? — Metaphysician Undercover

I literally said you don't have to accept it as true. It has evidence, whether you accept it as true or not.

Sounds good. It's just the word "seeming," which so often implies a lesser way of comprehending experience. But I understand that's not how you're using it.

….when they are examined from the outside, scientifically….
— J

Surely you realize the contradiction. To do anything scientifically is merely to do something in a certain way, but no matter what way it is done, it is still only a human that does it.
— Mww

This would only be a contradiction if we accept a very stringent definition of "objective" as meaning something like "untouched by human perception and thought." — J

I meant the contradiction to refer to examining from outside. No examination by a human is ever done from the outside, but always and only from the inside, re: himself. We examine the outside; we do not examine from the outside. Hence the contradiction.

"Doing something in a certain way" is, sorry, not nearly enough of a description — J

Agreed. The point being, it is we that does whatever it is that’s being done.
—————-

There's no required way to reduce either the mental or the neural to each other. — J

True, but the problem….problem here indicating reason’s aptitude for putting itself between a rock and a hard place….being there is, as yet, no possible way to reduce either to each other.

Imagine, if you will (in best Rod Serling impersonation)….the guy’s Nobel acceptance speech, after proving mental events are reducible to brain states in universal one-to-one correspondence (you know, scientifically speaking), concluding with the fact that for all recorded history of human thought….there never was exactly any such thing.
(Sigh)

- :up:

No examination by a human is ever done from the outside, but always and only from the inside, re: himself. — Mww

I might be missing the deeper point here. Couldn't we just as well say that every examination by a human (of anything external) must be done from the outside? "Inside/outside" is relative to whichever point of view we adopt. I can say, "I'm examining this turtle from the outside" meaning "outside the turtle," or "I'm examining this turtle from the inside" meaning "inside myself." Both are true, though the latter is far less common. But perhaps you could say more about why this seems important.

All I meant, in this context, was that it takes more than "being inside a human being" or "whatever we do is done by us" to establish a meaningful sense of subjectivity.

True, but the problem….problem here indicating reason’s aptitude for putting itself between a rock and a hard place….being there is, as yet, no possible way to reduce either to each other. — Mww

Right. I know I make this analogy a lot, but imagine trying, pre-Einstein, to explain how energy and mass are related. If the concepts you need just haven't been discovered yet, you can't get very far.

"Inside/outside" is relative to whichever point of view we adopt. — J

Isn’t there only one point of view, when examining, scientifically?

I might be missing the deeper point here. — J

If there was one, it’s that the subject, having always been first and foremost, isn’t anymore.

:cool:

The phrase "seem plausible" refers to an individual's attitudinal approach to the ideas rather than the soundness of the ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Evidence" is fundamentally subjective, as the result of judgement, and the evidence must be judged as credible. There is no such thing as "a claim without any evidence" because the claim itself is evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

You contradict yourself, so nothing more need be said.

I'd like to see that claimed contradiction. Where can I find it?

Since drafting this OP a month ago, I've re-visited some of the references I gave at the outset. Looking at the SEP and IEP entries again, it is clear that they exemplify the very philosophical 'flattening' (or reification) that the OP set out to address. Both articles frame substance largely in terms of object-like things or building blocks, reducing a metaphysical distinction to a kind of proto-materialism or object-property schema.

For example, the SEP entry describes Aristotle’s Categories as follows:

The primary substances are individual objects, and they can be contrasted with everything else – secondary substances and all other predicables – because they are not predicable of or attributable to anything else. Thus, Fido is a primary substance, and dog – the secondary substance – can be predicated of him.

This framing presents substance as nothing more than individual objects, like particular dogs - or even stones or marbles, we would be entitled to think —whic is an oversimplification that loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. Again, it is nearer to think of it as what of being it is, than what kind of object. And there's a difference!

The IEP entry reinforces this flattening by presenting substance as either “object-like” or as the “building blocks of reality”:

In its first sense, ‘substance’ refers to those things that are object-like, rather than property-like. For example, an elephant is a substance in this sense, whereas the height or colour of the elephant is not. In its second sense, ‘substance’ refers to the fundamental building blocks of reality. An elephant might count as a substance in this sense. However, this depends on whether we accept the kind of metaphysical theory that treats biological organisms as fundamental.

Here, substance is again reduced to either discrete objects or material constituents, and offered as a theoretical choice between animals, their properties, or their particles. What is entirely missing is Aristotle’s insight of substance as the unity of form and matter, not just an object plus its properties, nor mere stuff underlying observable traits.

Both examples illustrate a deeper historical forgetting: the tendency to read ancient metaphysical concepts through the lens of modern object-oriented thinking, as if philosophy has always been about cataloguing things and their properties (although perhaps understandable, considering that the whole discipline of taxonomy arguably begins in Aristotle). But what this overlooks is the ontological weight of the original inquiry—the question of what it means to be at all, and the recognition that being appears in degrees, or has modes of actuality, not as interchangeable objects or parts.

This 'flattening' of metaphysical language reflects a broader historical drift in the understanding of philosophy itself. As Pierre Hadot has shown, ancient philosophy was not primarily the classification of entities or the cataloging of phenomena. Rather, it was tied to a transformative way of being—a way of orienting one’s life toward what truly is, through contemplative insight and existential practice. Theoria existed in support of praxis.

For Plato and Aristotle, metaphysics was not a matter of debating which kinds of objects “count” as substances, but inquiry into what it means for something to be—to become aware of the intelligible natures that make reality coherent and meaningful.

…..loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. — Wayfarer

“…. substance is the permanence of the real in time….”

Sight regained?

…. substance is the permanence of the real in time…. — Mww

The only permanent thing is change. There is no substance - only process or relations. Things only appear to persist in time because of our limited perception of time. We cannot perceive change happening over millions or billions of years but it is happening. The universe is expanding last time I checked. What is it that is expanding? Is space a substance?

There is no substance - only process or relations — Harry Hindu

If you read the OP, the point is that the meaning of substance in philosophy is not 'an unchanging material', but that is how it has come to be (mis)interpreted.

“…. substance is the permanence of the real in time….” — Mww

'Some things will never change' ~ Steely Dan, 'Kid Charlemagne'.

If you read the OP, the point is that the meaning of substance in philosophy is not 'an unchanging material', but that is how it has come to be (mis)interpreted. — Wayfarer

And my point is why use the term, "substance" when there is a better term to use - "process"? If what you really mean is "process" when using the term, "substance" then just use "process".

And my point is why use the term, "substance" — Harry Hindu

The term οὐσία (oiusia) is an Ancient Greek noun, formed on the feminine present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimí, meaning "to be, I am", so similar grammatically to the English noun "being". There was no equivalent grammatical formation in Latin, and it was translated as 'essentia' or 'substantia'. Cicero coined "essentia" and the philosopher Seneca and rhetorician Quintilian used it as equivalent for οὐσία, while Apuleius rendered οὐσία both as "essentia" or "substantia". In order to designate οὐσία, early Christian theologian Tertullian favored the use of "substantia" over "essentia", while Augustine of Hippo and Boethius took the opposite stance, preferring the use of "essentia" as designation for οὐσία. — Ouisia, Wikipedia

In the long run, 'substantia' became the English 'substance', but again, it developed a different meaning over time, to denote 'a material with uniform properties'. It is that meaning which I claim in the OP is a very misleading translation for the original term, 'ousia', which is nearer in meaning to 'subject' that what we think of as 'substance'.

The use of 'process' as in 'process philosophy' is a much later arrival, associated with the philosopher Whitehead, in the early 20th century. However, 'process' doesn't really map easily against either 'ousia' or 'substantia'.

There’s an important distinction that often gets glossed over in discussions of philosophy, especially when dealing with early modern or classical sources. That is, the difference between substance in the philosophical sense, and substance in everyday usage. — Wayfarer

Is there a difference between process in the philosophical sense and process in the everyday sense?

In the long run, 'substantia' became the English 'substance', but again, has a different meaning to 'a material with uniform properties'.

The use of 'process' as in 'process philosophy' is a much later arrival, associated with the philosopher Whitehead, in the early 20th century. However, 'process' doesn't really map easily against either 'ousia' or 'substantia'. — Wayfarer

Sounds to me like our understanding has evolved since the Greeks, and some terms are no longer relevant. Does either 'ousia' or 'substantia' map easily against reality as we now understand it (with relativity, QM, etc.), as opposed to how the Greeks understood reality?

Does either 'ousia' or 'substantia' map easily against reality as we now understand it (with relativity, QM, etc.), as opposed to how the Greeks understood reality? — Harry Hindu

Obviously, there are vast differences between ancient and modern, and we know an enormous amount more than did they, in a scientific sense. That is not at issue. The motivation for the original post, though, was a specific confusion arising from a misunderstanding of a key idea, which is still relevant despite all of that. That anyway is the argument spelled out in the OP.

This framing presents substance as nothing more than individual objects, like particular dogs - or even stones or marbles, we would be entitled to think —whic is an oversimplification that loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. Again, it is nearer to think of it as what of being it is, than what kind of object. And there's a difference! — Wayfarer

I think the point Aristotle was making is that particularity is what substance is, in the primary sense. What an individual object actually is, is a unique peculiar form, which is proper only to itself, (the law of identity). This uniqueness, which is a feature of spatial temporal existence, is what constitutes "substance" in the primary sense. In the secondary sense, "substance" is the primary species, what kind of thing it is. Commonly, in modern philosophy Aristotle's primary substance, along with the law of identity, are overlooked as superfluous, and identity is assigned to what we say about the thing (secondary substance), rather than what the thing actually is, in itself, a unique individual with a form of its very own.

What an individual object actually is, is a unique peculiar form, which is proper only to itself, (the law of identity). — Metaphysician Undercover

I appreciate the clarification about particularity, but I think this risks reading Aristotle through the modern, objective point of view to which we are encultured. In the Categories and Metaphysics, Aristotle’s paradigm examples of 'substance' are not objects like stones or marbles, but beings—plants, animals, and humans. They are beings that possess their own internal principles of organization, growth, and change—what Aristotle calls form and actuality. Hence again the fact that the original term was 'ouisia'. He's asking about what beings are - not what objects are.

This suggests that Aristotle’s notion of primary substance is not bare particularity or mere “thisness” in the sense of counting objects in space-time, but the actuality of a being as the kind that it is. In that sense living beings, not material objects, are Aristotle’s typical examples of 'subjects' (rather than 'substances'!)

Obviously, there are vast differences between ancient and modern, and we know an enormous amount more than did they, in a scientific sense. That is not at issue. The motivation for the original post, though, was a specific confusion arising from a misunderstanding of a key idea, which is still relevant despite all of that. That anyway is the argument spelled out in the OP. — Wayfarer

What I'm asking is how does either notion of substance compliment what we currently know scientifically and vice versa. The conclusions we reach in all domains of knowledge (philosophy and science) should not contradict each other. Is there a difference between the way we describe a substance philosophically and how we might describe it scientifically?

In the scientific context, the term substance refers to pure matter alone, consisting of only one type of atom or one type of molecule.

I appreciate the clarification about particularity, but I think this risks reading Aristotle through the modern, objective point of view to which we are encultured. In the Categories and Metaphysics, Aristotle’s paradigm examples of 'substance' are not objects like stones or marbles, but beings—plants, animals, and humans. They are beings that possess their own internal principles of organization, growth, and change—what Aristotle calls form and actuality. Hence again the fact that the original term was 'ouisia'. He's asking about what beings are - not what objects are. — Wayfarer

For Aristotle, every individual, every particular, (what we call an object), consists of matter and form. The composite is an instance of primary substance. You'll notice that he doesn't only talk about living beings, but also things like bronze statues. I think you are applying unwarranted restrictions to Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Do you really call other persons and animals objects? That’s precisely my point—the term object is misleading in this context. (And as a historical note, the first instances of the term 'objective' only begin to appear in the early 17th century, well after Aristotle.)

You also mention bronze statues. But Aristotle clearly distinguishes artifacts from organisms, noting that artifacts have external causes—they are shaped by something other than themselves—whereas living beings have internal principles of form and change. That’s why Aristotle’s paradigm cases of ousia are living beings, not mere products or constructions (or objects, as such).

You say I’m applying unwarranted restrictions to Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Fair enough. But I’d suggest that you may be reading Aristotle through a modern, objectively-oriented lens, one that did not obtain in his milieu, and does not do justice to the ontological depth conveyed by his original terminology.