This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

The basic difference is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be. — Janus

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be." — Leontiskos

That last sentence does not even make sense. It looks nothing like what I've been saying. Try pushing your reading skills a bit harder. Or if you are deliberately trying to distort what I've been saying then cut out the sophistic bullshit and try doing some decent reasoning.

Lol - You're changing the subject again, just like you did <here>. You made a claim about "the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion," and now you're playing dumb, pretending that no such claim was made. You are equivocating, talking about differences between other things than the original topic (i.e. different kinds of faith).

That last sentence does not even make sense. — Janus

No shit. Why don't you remedy that incoherence?

Or it you are deliberately trying to distort what I've been saying then cut out the sophistic bullshit and try doing some cogent reasoning. — Janus

The sophistic bullshit is all yours, darling. My post shows it all. Ante up and do some real philosophy. :roll:

You made a claim about "the basic difference about faith in science and faith in religion — Leontiskos

Yes, I did that, so why not attempt to address that instead of pretending that I said something purportedly encapsulated in a nonsense sentence?

Here is the claim again in case you find you have the resources to address it:

If you are asking the difference between science and religion, then I would say science is predominantly evidence-based and religion is wholly faith based — Janus

What I say there is clear. If you think it is not correct, then say why. I'm losing patience.

I pointed you to this question:

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

What was I asking you? What claim of yours elicited that question of mine? Go back and have a look. :roll:

Evasion after evasion. It seems that when it comes to discussion you have little faith of the good variety. If you cannot offer anything even vaguely cogent then I'll waste no more time.

- That's fucking shameful, man. :down:

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

The basic difference is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be. — Janus

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be."

I'm not following that. — Leontiskos

-

• Janus: This is the basic difference between apples and bananas.
• Leontiskos: What is the basic difference?
• Janus: The basic difference is that carrots are orange whereas peas are green.
• Leontiskos: So you are saying, "The basic difference between apples and bananas is that carrots are orange whereas peas are green." I'm not following that.
• Janus: *Implodes into multiple posts of complete nonsense*

(This is a pretty standard conversation with an anti-religious person, or in Janus' case, a person who holds an anti-religious position. Even answering for their own claims becomes far too burdensome.)

:roll:

The reason the anti-religious folks are struggling so much is this. They want to define faith as some form of irrationality or some form of belief sans evidence, and yet there is no reputable source which corroborates such a pejorative definition of 'faith'. They want to win their anti-religious argument with a mere definition, and yet there is no good reason to accept their definition. In fact if we want to know what some word means, we set about doing things that the anti-religious folks here refuse to do. The reputable lexical sources are abhorrent to them because those sources don't toe the line of their agenda.

claims that critics bring a hostile definition of faith into the debate. But religious tradition itself prizes faith most where reason gives out — when fear, torture, or death provide every ground to recant. Faith is celebrated precisely because it defies evidence and reason under pressure. The critics aren't inventing a pejorative meaning; they're taking religion at its own word.

He has failed to address this. He has indeed failed to address much of anything, preferring to denigrate those with whom he disagrees, rather than to engage with them. See the discussion with over the last few pages.

I'm afraid I have to agree with you. has mounted no argument to support the contention that religious beliefs are evidence-based or logic-based, and has, I now believe willfully, distorted the arguments of those who are posing the hard questions, apparently because he has no answer for them. All in all, a very poor showing on his part, demonstrating a total lack of good faith.

Yep

There is plenty of space for a richer rejoinder, along several lines. My attempt...

1. Faith is not believing without evidence so much as believing without conclusive proof. This is a common argument, along the lines of @Tom Storm's plane, somewhat downplayed. We do believe things without conclusive proof - arguably religious belief fits here.

2. Faith is a reasonable response to a sort of evidence that is different to the evidence seen in science. It's arguably a reasonable response to existential shock - the surprise that there is something rather than nothing; or to ethical problems, giving a reason for what one does with one's life.

3. Faith concerns trust and loyalty, rather than belief. More of what we do rather than what we think.


Something like that. There are counters to each, of course, and no doubt counters to those counters.

But that's not what we see here.

I'm afraid I have to agree with you. ↪Leontiskos has mounted no argument to support the contention that religious beliefs are evidence-based or logic-based, and has, I now believe willfully, distorted the arguments of those who are posing the hard questions, apparently because he has no answer for them. — Janus

Did I start a thread on the defense of faith against New Atheist types? Nope. This is a thread about the meaning of faith, and when folks like Tom or yourself offer definitions without any arguments or reasons, you are not doing philosophy. The fact that the petitio principii includes psychologically incoherent assumptions makes it even worse. "Leontiskos has the burden of proof to show that faith is not irrational," is not a real argument. It is similar to your unfalsifiability sophistry. Arguing against such is pointless. Accepting their question-begging burden of proof would be insane.

Besides, you know full well that what you are engaged in <here> is bullshit. I'm sad to see you engage in that sort of thing, given that you are capable of more.

(I'm sure Banno is doing his standard troll gig. I have him on ignore as I've said.)

This agrees with what I was saying, so I am confused as to what you are critiquing of mine. A purely faith-based belief would, indeed, be one which is purely based off of trusting an authority; but, as I noted before, this is very rare in practical life. Most of the time we have a little of both faith and non-faith mixed up in the belief.

I find this account GPT gave to be fitting in terms of the resources it has available and its current ability to "reason". It is right that faith arises when there isn't certainty and necessarily so because every instance of trust in another as a source of truth is inherently to verify something through a means which one cannot deduce the truth therefrom; however, this is also true of some non-faith based beliefs: it can be the case that one verifies through a means that does not require trust in another and yet the verification method does not necessitate the conclusion (e.g., performing an experiment, examining the condition of a car oneself as an expert, etc.).

The strength of my theory is that, unlike yours, it accounts for all the main uses you had GPT outline by providing the precise definition which can be found hazily in each. Even with people who use 'faith' in the sense of 'a belief of which there is no evidence to support it', this oftentimes is convertible to 'a pure act of trusting an authority that something is true' which is perfectly coherent with my definition.

Ok, but what do you take 'faith' to be? Do you not have a precise definition? If not, then it seems like you are just working with vague intuitions you have.

Okay, then it seems I misunderstood what you said.

As I see it it's very simple. I said science is predominately evidence based and religion is purely faith-based. The first claim at least is uncontroversial, so I don't need to argue for that.

Religion is based on scripture and personal anecdote, and I cannot see how scripture and personal anecdote could constitute reliable evidence for the existence of God, or miracles performed by founders etc. So, if you disagree then you need to provide convincing evidence and argument to support the contention that scripture does provide good evidence for such beliefs.

As far as I am concerned if you cannot do that there is nothing further to be said. And note again I'm not saying there is anything wrong with people having faith where there is no evidence, so I'm not even sure what your beef with what I have been saying is..

I generally hold that “faith” isn’t a useful term outside of the religious use. But I see that perhaps my position here is unorthodox. For me it’s about a reasonable confidence given empirical results of flight. There is no need for faith.

Yes, I understand where you are coming from; as I used to also be in a similar mindset. After all, this is what the new atheism movement has produced throughout our culture (and, to fair, it is a response to poor argumentation and reasoning which common theism has offered). The layman theist tends to emphasize ‘faith’ as juxtaposed to ‘belief’ or ‘knowledge’ and brings it up mostly when they are referring to what is really ‘a high degree of faith of which this belief is based on’; and, naturally, the layman atheist latches onto this disposition and becomes the counter-disposition, equally flawed and vague, that ‘faith’ is a useless concept which only refers to blind belief that only makes sense within the context of religion.

Most of the time when I hear a layman theist and atheist debate, I think they both are getting at something that is correct but the ideas are malformed and malnourished; and each’s consciousness is developed parasitically on the other: their view is worked out through a response to the other’s view.

However, if we challenge ourselves to rise above these futile disputes and ask ourselves “what is ‘faith’?”, I think we find that it really is about trust in an authority; and we all do have beliefs that are conceived out of high concentrations of faith. For example, imagine you have a friend, Bob, who throughout your entire life has only been honest with you, even when there were grave consequences for telling the truth, and you are about to put your hand in a bucket of liquid that you think is water because you have some chemical on your hand that is burning your skin. Imagine Bob yells at you that this ‘harmless water’ is really some dangerous liquid which will spontaneously combust with the chemical on your hand if you put it in. Imagine, because of the urgency to get the chemical off your skin (to avoid further pain and damage) you cannot reasonably test nor verify directly what this liquid is in the bucket and you don’t have time to sit down and hear an elaborate spiel about how Bob knows it will combust. Would you put your hand in or trust Bob and find some other way to get the chemical off? I would bet you would trust Bob, given his serious track record of honesty; and this belief that the liquid will harm instead of help would be an act of pure faith. Is this pure faith irrational? I don’t think so; because the evidence to support having that pure faith, in this case, adds up. Bob always tells you the truth and has even has commonly done it when he knew he would get in serious trouble for doing so; and he never lies even to make a practical joke. This seems to be a rational and smart move to trust Bob when making this quick judgment call.

...but what do you take 'faith' to be? Do you not have a precise definition? — Bob Ross

I'll try again. Any "precise" definition of a complex term will miss some of that term's common uses. Hence, no such definition can capture the full use of the term.

Instead, we might map out the extent of the term, seeing what is usually included, what is excluded, and when and why. Think of this as mapping out the family resemblance involved, and as an empirical exercise, and certainly not some vague personal intuition.

Alternately, we might stipulate a definition, in which case others might stipulate a different definition, and no progress is made. And in addition, any stipulated definition will omit some of the uses to which the term is put, or leave itself open to counter-instances.

So in place of a definition, we might look for a map of the use of the term, which is what the ChatGPT exercise is a first go at. It is not a definition. Hence,

How does this help? Well, your account was that faith involves trust in an authority. If this were so, then we might expect to find "trust" and "authority" amongst the main words found. While "trust" is there, "authority" isn't. — Banno

I asked if "authority" occurs anywhere...

Yes, it occurred once — in the definition of teachings: "Ideas or principles taught by an authority."
So "authority" appeared, but only once, and not as a central term connected directly to faith itself — it was in the background of "teachings," which is itself only one aspect of the larger picture. — ChatGPT

While your definition may capture one aspect of faith, it does not exhaust the meaning of faith as such. "Trust" and "belief" can operate without explicit reference to an authority. It seems you are stipulating a typical case (e.g., religious faith) and treating it as the essence, while ordinary usage is broader and looser.

I said science is predominately evidence based and religion is purely faith-based. — Janus

No, you said, "This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion," and that's what I asked about. The question is and has always been about the difference between faith in science and faith in religion. You keep evading it.

I don't see that we are talking about linguistics, but rather about the logics of different kinds of faith. — Janus

ChatGPT identified three "clusters" in the use of "faith": faith as trust in persons or things; faith as adherence to doctrines or beliefs; and faith as moral commitment or fidelity. There are grounds here to think that the theist and the atheist may be talking past each other if the theist is focused on faith as moral commitment or fidelity while the atheist focuses on adherence to doctrines or beliefs. Much of this thread might be seen as along these lines.

Authority is relevant to faith as adherence to doctrines or beliefs, but not so much to the two other clusters.

Another Austinian tool is to consider when a concept goes astray. Three infelicities for faith as trust in a person or thing are misplaced trust, hollow trust and pretend trust. For faith as adherence to doctrines or beliefs, we have false, shallow and divided faith. For faith as moral commitment or fidelity, we have broken faith, conditional faith and misapplied faith.

It offered the following tabulation:


I then asked about faith under duress. It replied that speech acts reveal their character most clearly when they are tested, and that "Keeping faith" under easy conditions tells us little; under duress, the act's full force or failure becomes visible. It then offered:

Austin might put it this way:
"The full import of the performative 'I have faith' is often only completed, or sometimes annulled, by later conduct under pressure." — ChatGPT

A couple of observations. Firstly that this is a fairy competent application of the sort of method Austin advocated for understanding concepts. But this sort of linguistic analysis is perhaps something at which one might expect an LLM to excel. Secondly, it's clear that "Faith proves itself — or reveals itself as fake — when it costs something." If we are looking for a way to differentiate faith form trust or belief or commitment, this must be at last part of it.

If science is predominantly evidence-based then we have faith in it because we assume that the evidence is valid, has been examined rigorously and the scientific reports accurately based on actual observations. For example, if we learn in chemistry that adding sodium to water leads to an exothermic reaction which may even boil the water, we can do the experiment ourselves. Or for a more mundane example, if we believe there is a city called Paris, but have never been there, we assume that all the photos, and reports are true and that there really is a city called Paris. We know we can go there and check because there are flights to Paris. There is always an element of faith or trust if you prefer that word, but the faith or trust seems to be the most reasonable response.

You haven't attempted to address the claim I made that scriptural testimony is not evidence for anything. Scriptures are stories the truth of which we have no way of determining. And if they claim miracles then we have good reason to doubt them. I've explained what evidence I think there is for science. now it's up to you to explain how scripture could constitute evidence or else admit that it's entirely faith-based. If you fail to address that I'm not going to respond again.

You distort what I say to try to make it look incoherent and then when I point out your error you refuse to acknowledge it and keep repeating the same demands for explanation of something I haven't claimed. You did the same in the other thread where I was not claiming that anything was absolutely unfalsifiable but rather that certain theories and claims seem to be such, given that in our present state of knowledge we cannot imagine what could possibly falsify them. What an irony it is that you accuse me of evading.

You [...] keep repeating the same demands for explanation of something I haven't claimed. — Janus

"Leontiskos has demanded an explanation for X, but I have not claimed X."

What is X? What is this thing you speak about? Please tell me. :roll:

I'm actually getting pretty tired of your dishonesty of late. Why don't you either tell me what X is or else just admit how silly your last page of posts has been.

Perhaps we have a beautifully apt demonstration of bad faith in Leon's posts. Bad faith is an insincere performative, the mere pretence of engaging in a discussion while not committing, shown by a failure to address the comments made by yourself, @Tom Storm, or I - a dishonest act from the start — a performance for show rather than a true binding.

Or is it just Leon collapsing under pressure? While true faith is confirmed under pressure, bad faith is exposed.

and, naturally, the layman atheist latches onto this disposition and becomes the counter-disposition, equally flawed and vague, that ‘faith’ is a useless concept which only refers to blind belief that only makes sense within the context of religion. — Bob Ross

But it doesn't even make sense there. For example, Janus implies that <People have faith in authorities who they have no reason to believe are credible>. That whole idea is incoherent, and it underlies these New Atheist-type arguments.

The paradox of these fringe debates is that the atheist who is infallibly certain that religious faith is irrational cannot be engaged rationally (and that level of certitude almost always results in them refusing to give arguments for their thesis in the first place). On the other hand, the 99% of people who can be engaged rationally do not hold that religious faith is foundationally or definitionally irrational. Therefore you can't ever argue about whether religious faith is irrational, because the tiny percentage of militant atheists are dogmatic and unwilling to offer arguments, whereas the rest of humankind doesn't hold to the thesis in question at all. So it's pointless with either group.

Were they able to unfold their reasoning, we would see that the rational error that such atheists or quasi-atheists generally make is to conflate subjective grounds/evidence with objective grounds/evidence. They effectively mean to say, "Well I admit he has reasons to believe, but they aren't good reasons." Thus the argument is little more than <If I don't think his reasons are good reasons, then he is irrational or he is believing without evidence>. But if the atheist were honest he would admit that the believer does have evidence; he would just say that it isn't good evidence. Yet this merely begs the question since the whole issue is about whether the evidence/reasons are good or bad.

I have limited access to internet at the moment, but there is a famous miracle (of Fatima?) where the sun stood still, or moved backwards for a time, or was blotted out for a time, or something like that. The idea is something like this, "The prophet predicted abnormal activity of the sun to occur at such-and-such a time. That activity occurred. Therefore the prophet is truly in contact with a higher power." (This is an example of how we vet someone's abilities, and the logic is much broader than prophecy or foretelling.)

The atheist will say something like, "Yes, they believed they saw the sun behave abnormally, and therefore they had 'evidence' that the prophet was a true prophet, but it was not good evidence, because they should have [reasoned the way I reason about such phenomena]." Or in other words, "Well I admit he has reasons to believe, but they aren't good reasons."

The philosophical and scientific problem with the atheist's approach is that there is nothing principled or rigorous about his method. Legitimate epistemological theories have identifiable criteria. "If I think it's a poor reason then it's a poor reason," is not a legitimate epistemological theory. An atheist can certainly hold the belief that, "All religious beliefs are based on insufficient evidence," but there is nothing philosophical, scientific, or rigorous about this assertion/dogma.

More simply, the militant atheist is too vain to admit that there are rational beliefs which he would nevertheless disagree with, and it is literally impossible to argue with someone who can never admit that something he disbelieves believe might be rational. Incidentally, this is why there is a strong correlation between militant atheists and unintelligence, and this in turn is why their professional colleagues ask them to pipe down lest onlookers begin to perceive the whole field as being possessed of such unintelligence.

Or is it just Leon collapsing under pressure? While true faith is confirmed under pressure, bad faith is exposed. — Banno

I wondered about that too. Your aphorism seems very apt.

Yes, I understand where you are coming from; as I used to also be in a similar mindset. After all, this is what the new atheism movement has produced throughout our culture (and, to fair, it is a response to poor argumentation and reasoning which common theism has offered). The layman theist tends to emphasize ‘faith’ as juxtaposed to ‘belief’ or ‘knowledge’ and brings it up mostly when they are referring to what is really ‘a high degree of faith of which this belief is based on’; and, naturally, the layman atheist latches onto this disposition and becomes the counter-disposition, equally flawed and vague, that ‘faith’ is a useless concept which only refers to blind belief that only makes sense within the context of religion. — Bob Ross

Nicely written. I don't really have a problem with this. When I have debated God with others it is usually fundamentalists so my approach is perfectly adequate for those purposes. Those arguments are just about creating larger conversations through the smash and grab of polemics. Of course it's not philosophy and it doesn't need to be. The sophisticated religious people I know (who are generally Catholic clergy) would never use faith as a justification and they are often suspicious of Christians who reference faith. For reasons you have described.

I've been an atheist since the 1970's. In relation to the New Atheists - I haven't read their works. I have little interest in Harris, Dawkins or Hitchens. Was Dennett one too? Actually I read God is not Great - Hitch was a polemicist. And we need that. But I'm not really a customer. My atheism was informed by various freethinkers prior to 1990 and by reading Christians like Bishop Shelby Spong, Richard Rohr and David Bently Hart and others. For me atheism isn't a positive claim that god doesn't exist. It is simply that I am not convinced. To me belief in God is similar to a sexual attraction - you can't help who you are drawn to. The arguments in my experince generally come post hoc.

Most of the time when I hear a layman theist and atheist debate, I think they both are getting at something that is correct but the ideas are malformed and malnourished; and each’s consciousness is developed parasitically on the other: their view is worked out through a response to the other’s view. — Bob Ross

Another nicely expressed and accurate assessment.

I would bet you would trust Bob, given his serious track record of honesty; and this belief that the liquid will harm instead of help would be an act of pure faith. Is this pure faith irrational? I don’t think so; because the evidence to support having that pure faith, in this case, adds up. — Bob Ross

I have to confess I am not good with thought experiments. I would say here that faith isn't a great word for what's happening - I would say that I have a reasonable confidence in Bob's judgments because he has empirically demonstrated himself as reliable over many years. A more poetic expression for this could be "faith in" but I don't see the need to use it myself and it lacks precision.

However if Bob said to me, 'wash your hands in this water and you will be cured of any cancer because the water has been impregnated with a new anti-cancer vaccine', I would not accept his word because the claim requires much more than trust. It is an extraordinary claim. I might even avoid touching the water because it might well have something in it that is not safe. An unusual claim like this would come with warning bells.

To be honest, this discussion of faith has me thinking that my use is mostly ok and when I am talking with someone who says they have it on faith that homosexuals are corrupt, I can safely tell them that they are using faith as a justification for bigotry and for a lack of evidence. This is not the same as saying all examples of faith are inadequate, nor is it an attempt to say religious people are deluded.

Doesn't it seem problematic that your conception of "ought" makes it impossible to develop a single example of it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No; I don't think so. That's the point of what I'm calling out in this Ethical thinking. There literally isn't a conception of ought that isn't highly problematic for someone who claims ethical truth. It doesn't exist on my view, so I couldn't even begin to provide an example of same. I'm trying to say you can't either, i guess. I did give an example on my terms though, so If that's what you're saying - you literally quoted one? Unsure, given your reply here.

It's a strange definition of "ought" that can be divorced from value — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's a definition of 'ought' which relies on value. I just do not accept there are any objective values to be found. Therefore, no 'ought' which is not beholden to it's speaker's values specifically can be found either. We simply don't lay out the value to which our "ought" is in pursuit when we speak about our proposed oughts.

"Vehicle #2 is the better one." — Count Timothy von Icarus

(following comments pertinent to this whole example/discussion section)

You are simply not telling me the part of ".... as a family/commuter vehicle. It is less likely to break down, and it is more likely to achieve your goal with some efficiency and economic spark (as opposed to #1, anyway))" in your response. So, when I come back and say "you haven't told me why i ought to choose it" that's highly disingenuous. The implicature in your response couldn't be other than you are trying to help me achieve the goal i told you about with the economic assumption added, reasonably, on the fly. I don't need to ask that question. Anyone who did either forgot what they asked, or is being difficult.

If x is best, then from the perspective of ethical decision-making x is most choice-worthy, which means x ought to be picked. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To me, "best" is absolutely meaningless here. What is that referring to? I essentially agree with the form here, but "best" is not the right way to arbitrate imo, without the preceding value against which to make that judgement. And there, we have subjective value as the only possible source for that judgement (again, setting aside Divine Command and similar revelatory external systems to which only adherence matters).

But then you say you believe in "objective values," — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can you point this out? I do not. I may have misspoken, but the position is that I absolutely reject objective values, intellectually. They are no where to be found, and I can't even find a coherent reason for thinking they exist.
But intuitively I cannot get away from the proposition they must be here somewhere to be found which I take to be a psychologically evolutionary thing. I hope that clarifies. I do not believe in object values. At all.

However, once there is agreement on such values, the question of what one ought to do, given those values, becomes tractable...

Only within the group in agreement at the time the agreement/s subsist. As soon as you disagree with the value, that becomes impossible yet again, for the members disagreeing. Those agreeing have their work cut out for them - much like cultists (I tend to think this is the basis for cults. And the fact that objective values can't be found, the basis for most of their dissolution).

If "rational" is reduced to "nothing but discursive (linguistic/formal) ratio," as it so often is in modern thought, then virtually nothing can be known rationally. When I say that Goodness can be sought and known as such, I do not mean "entirely in the context of discursive (linguistic) reasoning." Definitions of knowledge that focus exclusively on discursive justification are extremely impoverished. They are particularly deficient for ethics, where "knowing by becoming" (e.g. Boethius' Consolation) is very important. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I just reject these contentions. "goodness" cannot be found by becoming Good without first defining that Good in its own terms. That is a cat chasing it's tail, looking for it's mother. If your position is truly the above, then you're describing exactly what I see as an ethical system - but you're omitting the priors (values) that actually get anyone to "good" (i think!).

See below: — Count Timothy von Icarus

This, down to where you tag me again I cannot make much of unfortunately. Not that there's nothing interesting there, but it seems to me this is someone using words like 'good' 'become', "knowledge" , "knowing" and several others in ways that are entirely alien to me and don't give me any sense of what's being got at. Seems new agey type ranting. Those words seem to rest on literally nothing that could elucidate them in situ, and as I understand these sorts of positions, they rely on some kind of "self-evident" aspect of the concepts in play. I think I reject these in terms of a discussion about Ethics of hte kind we're having. Its some cool poetic stuff, but I am not seeing anything as regards some justification for an "ought" that isn't entirely in line with my own, so far

However, is it the only natural end? Does human happiness and flourishing consist solely in staying alive? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Obviously not. But it is the only 1 or 0 choice we have that i can see. The only possible "this or that, and there's one right answer" type thing. Then again, i've been truly suicidal and I am not particularly happy I didn't follow through. It's neutral to me, because that was the 'correct' move at the time given my values. So I'm not entirely convinced this is a particularly interesting example anymore, but it does do something different like you say.

For instance, the bee will sacrifice itself (quite gruesomely) for the good of the hive in pursuit of its ends — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a non-rational, and arguably non deliberative being. Are we wanting to conflate them? Bees don't, assumably, have ethical systems. They simply react.

In terms of the "metaphysics of goodness," it is ends that make things more fully "one." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Similarly insensible to me as the quoted passages. This seems to be uses of words that can't do anything in the phrases they're used in (what is "one" doing here?)

I guess at-base I want to know why you think human deliberation is somehow totally askance from other physical things. We are just aggregates of forces, after all - the emergence of deliberation doesn't seem all that relevant to metaethics - it seems an accident.

human ends (happiness/flourishing), and human excellences (virtues) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Precisely the type of incoherent phrases I cannot understand in the ways we wanted to me.

When we say "ought" in an ethical context, we mean "I ought to do this if I hold certain values and wish to achieve them." — J

Yes. That is my position, in basic form.

it doesn't help generate an ought. — J

I agree. I may have misspoken if I was objecting to this earlier.

I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them. — J

Could you elucidate? I've been looking for something of that order for two decades.

Is it clear to you that it's even an ethical statement? — J

No, it's a moral one. It's about culpability. Ethics is prior, as I understand it, to actualizing a moral position.

Would an ethical subjectivist need to challenge that, do you think, and argue that the feeling is just that, a feeling, and doesn't point beyond itself? — J

I think so, and that is roughly my position on it.

You think what is of personal value cannot be universalized or objectified further — J

Not so. Your further comment essentially brings up what I think the next step is. Which is just justification, not actually coming to any moral view.

*sigh* Ah well. I just disagree with you man - not that deep. I've laid out arguments, you've failed to have me stray from them and that's how things work when you have competing views (and, arguably, talk directly past each other as it seems on review).
You see it otherwise. Ok, that's your take. So be it. Onward... Hopefully we can continue to come together in other threads nevertheless.

I've done my best to canvas replies and see if there's a good way to respond. If I've missed anything someone wants comment on, please do tell. I am rushing through these pings before leaving work.

- I don't know that you've provided me with many arguments, but I think you are short on time and I am glad to see you offering Count Timothy arguments and reasons in this post. So, fair enough.

To be clear, the reason I wanted you to consider and answer (3) is as follows:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments)
2. Our moral judgments are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3. We respect these evaluations, or at least some of them
4. Therefore, ought-claims have force
5. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary

It's a definition of 'ought' which relies on value. I just do not accept there are any objective values to be found. Therefore, no 'ought' which is not beholden to it's speaker's values specifically can be found either. — AmadeusD

So suppose your wife tells you, "You shouldn't have done that," or, "You should do this," and suppose you respect her evaluation (i.e. 3). What follows is (4): ought-claims have force for you.
(I think what you are more truly opposed to are categorical/exceptionless norms.)

That's a fairly big step. You, Michael, and others claim that you don't think people are being coherent when they make ought-claims. I would point out that something which is incoherent or non-existent cannot have force, and yet ought-claims do have force; therefore they cannot be incoherent or non-existent.

Now you might say, "Sure, my wife's ought-claims have force for me, but that doesn't make them objective or even universal. Either she knows my own values well enough to counsel me, or else we self-consciously share a set of values upon which we reason together. Either way the objectivity needn't extend beyond the two of us." That's a fair answer, but I would contend that you and your wife are also potentially open to the suggestions and advice of every other person on Earth, and that this would be odd if there were not some sort of value-continuity between the two of you and other people. That is, ought-claims of others who do not know you at all and who therefore do not know your idiosyncrasies and "arbitrary" values nevertheless have force for you (even if that force is quite small or is merely potential and defeasible). Hence the point about food: there are all sorts of values that everyone holds in common, and the general "oughts" which flow from these common values will also be common.

To give a concrete example, suppose you travel to a foreign city and begin to drink water from a drinking fountain. Someone warns you not to drink the water. Whether or not you accede to their suggestion, you give it due consideration. Now I don't know why you would give a perfect stranger's ought-claim due consideration if all values are arbitrary. Instead I would say that, like the food example, the stranger knows and shares one of your own values even though he does not know you, and this is why his ought-claim is worthy of consideration.

5. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary — Leontiskos

and

ought-claims have force for you. — Leontiskos

No. My wife's assessment of x is worthy of my consideration, because statistically, it has been beneficial practically speaking, or has stroked my ego in some way that makes me "enjoy" hearing what she has to say. There's nothing about hte "ought" part that I care about. If she says "you shouldn't have done that" I don't give a shit. What I want to know is "why are you telling me?"
My wife and I are married because we share values and appreciate each other's point of view (to the degree of perhaps altering each other's values, and at times, that is shared - but definitely not always). That is not, in any way, to say I care what my wife thinks i should do at any given time. It is an hilarious coincidence that we rarely violate each other's expectations in this way. And we do, castastrophicly at times. We just brute accept it on the basis neither of us means any harm.

The reason old mate in the foreign country's "Don't drink the water" might be worthy of consideration is the factual situation of his familiarity with something I am not familiar. He might also want me to dehydrate. It doesn't matter, because the facts lead me to think "Maybe this guy/gal knows something I don't". Where's the "ought" coming into this?

So I see both of those quoted notions as non sequiturs given the above. There is nothing in our respecting other people's evaluations the makes that motivators anything but arbitrary (at base). They will, in all cases, rely on personal values. And we reject the vast, vast majority of them unless they reflect our own in which case pure ego is at play.

It seems you've just left out which values my wife and old mate are adhering to in their "ought" statements. If they aren't shared, why would I have any interest? If they are shared, then it boils down to "I agree with myself, through you".

Hence the point about food: there are all sorts of values that everyone holds in common, and the general "oughts" which flow from these common values will also be common. — Leontiskos

I don't think 'common' helps in the argument against my claim of "no true oughts". It just means lots of people agree on some oughts. That's fine. Is the suggestion here that if several people agree on a value, it is no longer arbitrary? This setting to one side that I imagine most examples you could proffer are not moral.

I also reject the notion that anything incoherent cannot have psychological force. That is patently untrue. Maybe that explains our disagreement?