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Um, I can almost understand this. Can you develop it more? — tim wood

Yes, well the rationale is that given that languages utilize extensively the use of concepts to talk about various issues, like space or time or physics, then I surmise that by appealing to T-schemas, that a user of language would be better able to understand concepts with regards to what can be rendered or said truthfully about a concept in a language (atomic sentences).

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Well, the aim here is to have a rendering or model of language that aligns with truth of concepts and what I imagine "archetypes" in understanding concepts as truthful. This whole use as meaning from Wittgenstein's family resemblance and language games is kinda something I wanted to see disambiguated from a Tarskian view on semantics...

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As far as I can tell, the OP is asking if Tarski's T-Schemas can be used to develop better LLMs, ones that do not come out with false statements, since they are constrained to produce statements that are actually true.

How does that work?

Loooks to be two very different things. To get anywhere would have to show how T-sentences could be used here. And T-sentences do not make use of atomic sentences, but of translated sentences. The p in <"p" is true iff p> does not need to be atomic.

Think it's all too vague.

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LLMs have no contact with reality, but are themselves textual artefacts. They never touch the ground but are free-floating in the sea of language. There's nothing like banging your head against a brick wall for convincing you of its solidity; likewise spades hitting 'bedrock'. They know not whereof they speak, having as yet no senses of anything that is not language and image. Therefore their talk is all talk and no trousers.

Like intellectuals, you cannot trust them further than they can throw you.