I said science is predominately evidence based and religion is purely faith-based

This isn't really true if we are talking about the scientific beliefs the average person has. The average person cannot verify or at least has not verified themselves the vast majority of what is the scientific body of knowledge: it is by-at-large mainly faith in the scientific institutions that make people believe. E.g., when we hear about how black holes work, we don't verify any of that ourselves in any meaningful sense: we trust the source that is telling us because we find the scientific institution and the expert-at-hand credible. Whereas with math or logic, e.g., if one understands the axioms and formulas then they don't have to take the mathematician or logician's word for it: they can a priori verify it from their armchairs.

Likewise, religion is not purely faith-based: it is predominantly faith-based for most of the average people out there.

For both, they require mostly evidence for or against trusting the source of knowledge for the claims.

The bit of truth that I think you are conveying, in imprecise terms, is that science tends to involve purported evidence that has less speculation in it and more empirical grounds; but still this is controversial. I would argue that the arguments for God's existence are more certain than a theory determinable through the scientific method because they involve reasoning about the necessary consequences of the existence of things which are presupposed in science to begin with. E.g., the argument from change derives God's existence from change which is presupposed for the scientific method: there is no experiment one can perform to verify that every effect has a cause.

Banno, I am not asking for a historical account of what faith means; and I understand you seem to take a pluralist account of faith. I am wondering what you think faith means, if not just as it relates to the kind of faith in question in our beliefs about the world around us. We can't make headway if you won't commit to some meaning of the word faith.

Let me grant you that there are N valid definitions of faith: which one, out of the N, would you say pertains most closely to what we are discussing and what definition does it have? Is the kind of faith in science a different type of faith than in religion?

I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them.
— J

Could you elucidate? I've been looking for something of that order for two decades. — AmadeusD

That would be a good challenge for me. I'll try. Give me a few days.

People still arguing about this? It seems pretty simple to me faith is an overcoming of some lacking in knowledge, and uncertainty, with a blank check that bridges an abyss, regardless of truth.

The reason old mate in the foreign country's "Don't drink the water" might be worthy of consideration is the factual situation of his familiarity with something I am not familiar. He might also want me to dehydrate. It doesn't matter, because the facts lead me to think "Maybe this guy/gal knows something I don't". Where's the "ought" coming into this? — AmadeusD

So when a complete stranger warns you not to drink the water, you don't see any 'ought' involved in this?

They will, in all cases, rely on personal values. — AmadeusD

I don't believe anyone has claimed that moral judgments do not rely on values. This is a big part of your ignoratio elenchus.

If they aren't shared, why would I have any interest? — AmadeusD

Exactly, but you do have interest, and therefore according to your own reasoning here your interest indicates a shared value. The fact that you think a complete stranger has a shared value with you shows that the values of complete strangers are not arbitrary.

Is the suggestion here that if several people agree on a value, it is no longer arbitrary? — AmadeusD

Yes. I am claiming that <If the ought-claim of a complete stranger has force for you, then values are not arbitrary>.

You might say, "I and everyone else on Earth share the value of wanting to avoid poisonous water, but that value is still arbitrary. Everyone on Earth may share the value, but that does not make it non-arbitrary."

I don't see a need to enter into the debate on universal vs. objective. My point is that at least some values are shared by all humans, and this is all that is required for morality to exist. If this were not true then the complete stranger's warning would have no force for you. But it does have force for you, and therefore it is true that there are fundamentally shared values.

So when a complete stranger warns you not to drink the water, you don't see any 'ought' involved in this? — Leontiskos

A bit loaded (not on purpose). On my conception of an "ought", yeah, sure. But its an empirically descriptive ought, not a moral one. "If you want to not get a tummy bug, you ought not drink the water (based on several assumptions)" Nothing moral here, in my view.
On your terms, though, where an 'ought' is moral, ipso facto (from what I can tell.. If that's wrong, sorry) then no, not at all. I'm not seeing any ought. This isn't meant to be rude, but I did ask you to point out where it is. I cannot see it beyond a mechanistic if/then.

values — Leontiskos

personal, subjective values. No fallacy here, my man. You are just not quite grasping what I'm saying. Obviously, any non-religious ethical system is based on 'values'. But they are arbitrary as far as "moral" goes. I take it you think you've beaten this by showing food helps us survive. It sure does. That is not moral, on my view so takes me no closer to understanding what your contention is, really.

shows that the values of complete strangers are not arbitrary — Leontiskos

No, it doesn't, as far as I am concerned/can tell. Would you be able to tell me how that makes it non-arbitrary? It would also be arbitrary for me to take on that person's advice. If they had said "go ahead, drink the water" the case remains the same.

Yes. I am claiming that <If the ought-claim of a complete stranger has force for you, then values are not arbitrary> — Leontiskos

This seems a total non sequitur (think I've pointed that out before). Cannot understand how this is the case... What's going on for you there?

That would be a good challenge for me. I'll try. Give me a few days — J

Nice, thank you!
Your final paragraph does not make sense to me, due to hte above positions.

I am wondering what you think faith means, — Bob Ross

I dunno, Bob. I've given you much more about what I think faith means than just a five word definition. I've also shown how faith is at its most apparent when challenged. But you seem discontent.

So one last time, faith involves trust, adherence to a belief, and commitment, and is shown most clearly when the faithful are under pressure.

If you can't work with that, then so be it.

It's pretty clear that "faith" doesn't apply to belief in science in the way you suppose it does.

Here's a nice tabulation from ChatGPT:


Seems pretty clear to me. There's a big difference in what one is doing, in each case.

I cannot see it beyond a mechanistic if/then. — AmadeusD

But it's not a mechanistic if/then. More precisely, it's not a hypothetical imperative. He didn't say, "Don't drink the water if you don't want to get sick." He said, "Don't drink the water." Or, "Don't drink the water because you don't want to get sick." I am envisioning the stranger who is telling you what to do, which is why I spoke explicitly about non-hypothetical ought-judgments. If we wanted to be pedantic, we could have him tell you, "Even though we are complete strangers, I know what you value, and therefore you ought not drink the water." You could respond, "You have no idea what I value. All values are arbitrary - what the Christian values has nothing to do with what the Muslim values," and go on to ignore him and drink the water. But you don't do that. Think about the fact that you don't do that!

(What he delivers to you is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment, which I explain in detail <here>. Also see my first paragraph <here>, which anticipates what you've now done.)

I take it you think you've beaten this by showing food helps us survive. It sure does. That is not moral — AmadeusD

Saying, "That is not moral" doesn't mean anything if you can't tell us what the word 'moral' in your sentence is supposed to mean. In fact I have said precisely what I mean by 'moral':

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments) — Leontiskos

...and it is clear that the non-hypothetical ought-judgments of complete strangers still have force for us. The word "moral" is completely unnecessary, and given the way people in this thread want to use that word while refusing to say what they mean by it, it perhaps should be left out of the discussion.

No, it doesn't, as far as I am concerned/can tell. Would you be able to tell me how that makes it non-arbitrary?

[...]

This seems a total non sequitur (think I've pointed that out before). Cannot understand how this is the case... What's going on for you there? — AmadeusD

Did you read the rest of the post? Here it is again:

You might say, "I and everyone else on Earth share the value of wanting to avoid poisonous water, but that value is still arbitrary. Everyone on Earth may share the value, but that does not make it non-arbitrary."

I don't see a need to enter into the debate on universal vs. objective. My point is that at least some values are shared by all humans, and this is all that is required for morality to exist. If this were not true then the complete stranger's warning would have no force for you. But it does have force for you, and therefore it is true that there are fundamentally shared values. — Leontiskos

You might say, "I and everyone else on Earth share the value of wanting to avoid poisonous water, but that value is still arbitrary. Everyone on Earth may share the value, but that does not make it non-arbitrary."

I don't see a need to enter into the debate on universal vs. objective. My point is that at least some values are shared by all humans, and this is all that is required for morality to exist. If this were not true then the complete stranger's warning would have no force for you. But it does have force for you, and therefore it is true that there are fundamentally shared values. — Leontiskos

I'm sympathetic, but this is patently false.

If I want to die, I might very well seek out poisonous beverages.

I have elsewhere argued at some length about the reasonableness of assuming that anyone you come across desires to continue living, absent evidence to the contrary. But it's still an assumption. I wouldn't call it an "arbitrary" assumption, anymore than I would call the desire to continue living "arbitrary". But neither would I call either of them universal, because they plainly are not.

So happy to see you, Srap. :up:

My point is that the ought-claims of complete strangers have force for us, and this jibes with your claim about the "reasonableness of assuming." I don't think my universality claim needs to be exceptionless in order for my conclusion to be valid.

It would help me to know where you think we disagree with regard to the more central moral premises, here. I want to make sure that we don't end up quibbling over a minor point.

(Short on time, sorry if that is an inadequate response.)

I don't believe @Banno or @Janus are even attempting to give a clear definition of what faith is. Instead, they are using notions without clarifying what the idea of it is that we should use for the discussion. I agree that anyone that believes faith is belief despite the evidence is deploying a straw man of theism: I am just not sure if they are even committing themselves to that definition.

Ok, let's roll with it **rolls up sleeves**:

So one last time, faith involves trust, adherence to a belief, and commitment, and is shown most clearly when the faithful are under pressure.

Believing, e.g., that black holes exist depends, at least in part, on trusting the scientists that are purporting those facts; so it is, in part, faith-based. No?

Ok. Can you understand how from were I stand that looks insincere? I've given a substantive account of the nature of faith, over several posts and using a method that has a strong philosophical pedigree, and you simply refuse to engage with it.

Why should I bother to chat with you further?

My point is that the ought-claims of complete strangers have force for us — Leontiskos

What do you mean "us", kemosabe?

If you think black holes do not exist, what do you do next?

Do you explain, predict, and revise, Investigate the objection, and use Assertive/testable claims? Then you are doing science.

DO you express loyalty, identity, hope, defend against the objection, and use declaratives, commissives, and performatives? Then that's not science.

Now go back and look at this:

I don't believe Banno or @Janus are even attempting to give a clear definition of what faith is. Instead, they are using notions without clarifying what the idea of it is that we should use for the discussion. I agree that anyone that believes faith is belief despite the evidence is deploying a straw man of theism: I am just not sure if they are even committing themselves to that definition. — Bob Ross

Which is it? What are the speech acts involved here? Science or faith?

Those arguments are just about creating larger conversations through the smash and grab of polemics

This is fair to a certain extent: I get what you mean, but I do think it is the philosopher’s duty to try to rise the conversation to a level of ample clarity.

I've been an atheist since the 1970's. In relation to the New Atheists - I haven't read their works.

To be fair, ‘New Atheism’ doesn’t forward particularly new ideas; but it has made quite a bit of them notorious around these parts. A lot of what you have been saying is straight out their old text book, although I understand you are not intending it that way.

For me atheism isn't a positive claim that god doesn't exist. It is simply that I am not convinced

I would say this is agnosticism (viz., the suspension of judgment about a proposition); whereas atheism, traditionally, is the belief there are no gods.

To me belief in God is similar to a sexual attraction - you can't help who you are drawn to

I would say, even if this is true to some extent, it is irrelevant to theology. Either one has good reasons to believe God exists or not.

The arguments in my experince generally come post hoc.

That is fair: most people do operate this way, and Nietzsche calls it the Ass arriving most beautiful and brave.

I would say that I have a reasonable confidence in Bob's judgments because he has empirically demonstrated himself as reliable over many years

Having this reasonable confidence in Bob is trust—no? You trust him. Right?

However if Bob said to me, 'wash your hands in this water and you will be cured of any cancer because the water has been impregnated with a new anti-cancer vaccine', I would not accept his word because the claim requires much more than trust. It is an extraordinary claim

There’s a lot to unpack here; but the most important note I would make is that you are suggesting that some claims cannot be validly believed through trust in an authority; and to me anything in principle is on the table. If there are sufficient reasons to trust the authority, then one should believe it; and if there isn’t, then one shouldn’t. However, to say that some claims are “extraordinary” (which is straight out of Hitchens’ playbook btw) that cannot be, even in principle, verified other than through a belief devoid of trust—well, I don’t know what that kind of claim would look like.

The reason you might not put your hands in the water (given your version of the thought experiment) is that you don’t believe Bob is qualified properly for you to trust him in this regard. Imagine, e.g., Bob was an expert—certified—doctor that pioneered this new anti-cancer vaccine and was ultra-truthful (like before in my version of the hypothetical): would you trust him then?

when I am talking with someone who says they have it on faith that homosexuals are corrupt, I can safely tell them that they are using faith as a justification for bigotry and for a lack of evidence.

This doesn’t make any sense on multiple different levels.

Firstly, if they have it on valid faith, in principle, then it would be warranted to believe it; and you are implying it would be irrational for them to.

Secondly, homosexuality, traditionally, being immoral has nothing to do with corruption per se: it has to do with a person practicing in alignment with a sexual orientation that is bad; and it is bad because it goes against the nature qua essence of a human.

Thirdly, saying it is bigotry and that there is a lack of evidence to support homosexuality as being immoral just begs the question. For me, for example, I do think there is good evidence to support homosexuality as a sexual orientation as being bad and practicing it as, subsequently, immoral.

This isn't really true if we are talking about the scientific beliefs the average person has. The average person cannot verify or at least has not verified themselves the vast majority of what is the scientific body of knowledge: — Bob Ross

Yes, but they have every reason to believe that the currently accepted canon of scientific knowledge is based on actual observation, experiment and honest and accurate reporting by scientists. That this is so is evidenced by the great advances in technologies we see all around us.

Likewise, religion is not purely faith-based: it is predominantly faith-based for most of the average people out there.

For both, they require mostly evidence for or against trusting the source of knowledge for the claims. — Bob Ross

The source of knowledge for established science is observation and experiment. What is the source of knowledge for religion?

We can rightly trust that the scientists have done the observing and experimenting, and we can rightly trust that the religious authorities have done the reading and studying of the religious texts. The question is as to what is the source contained in the religious texts if not faith in revelation? Would you call that knowledge? Would you say it is based on evidence or logic?

For me, for example, I do think there is good evidence to support homosexuality as a sexual orientation as being bad and practicing it as, subsequently, immoral. — Bob Ross

Really? And what is the good evidence you refer to?

Secondly, homosexuality, traditionally, being immoral has nothing to do with corruption per se: it has to do with a person practicing in alignment with a sexual orientation that is bad; and it is bad because it goes against the nature qua essence of a human. — Bob Ross

Is that your "evidence"? That being homosexual is a bad orientation because it goes against the "nature qua essence of a human"? Are you an expert on human nature and the essence of being human, Bob? You don't think that might be a tad presumptuous?

I think you mean it doesn't appeal to you, and that's fine. It's the next step of universalizing what doesn't appeal to you personally where you go wrong.

It's been sad to watch your thinking going downhill, Bob.

I would say this is agnosticism (viz., the suspension of judgment about a proposition); whereas atheism, traditionally, is the belief there are no gods. — Bob Ross

False. We've been through this, but the etymology doesn't quite allow for this.

"A-gnostic" means "no knowledge". It is the position that we cannot know whether or not God exists. Atheist is literally A-theism. "no theism". That's literally it. In any case, i set out months ago why your use of the word is unhelpful. Not your fault - lots of people think that. But it is the reason these silly debates occur. I am not trying to blow smoke up my own arse - i gave a table that covers the etymology, use and the four possible positions very well.

"strong atheism" seems to be a modern invention to allow people to make the anti-theist claim you want to roll into atheism. I reject. Anti-theism is anti-theism. Not atheism.

What do you mean "us", kemosabe? — Srap Tasmaner

I gave the argument in <this post>, and particularly in the final paragraph. Give that a read and let me know if I am incorrect in claiming that, "you give it due consideration."

"Don't drink the water if you don't want to get sick. — Leontiskos

Perhaps learning about conversational implicatures might help you along here? "because i assume you don't want to get sick" is the only plausible furthering of your suggestion, I think.

I am envisioning the stranger who is telling you what to do — Leontiskos

That is not at all clear, and if that's baked into your examples you're hiding the ball the whole way through. At no stage was it clear I was being commanded to do anything in either example. I am being remonstrated with, at best. If my response was "I don't care, I am happy to get sick" then the entire thing falls apart.

But you don't do that. Think about the fact that you don't do that! — Leontiskos

I literally did do this when I was in Egypt, so I don't quite know why you would make such a blatantly unsupportable claim?

(What he delivers to you is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment — Leontiskos

Nope. That's what you think, and are not convincing me of. That's fine.

In fact I have said precisely what I mean by 'moral' — Leontiskos

That's fine. I've already told you that "ought" need be unpacked there, and you've not done it other than to circle back to "that's morality!". I disagree. You're not doing what you think here - just letting me know you have a differing view. Though, I also see the question in this, so:

Morality: The debate between right and wrong.

It is not "right" not to poison oneself with foreign water and more than it's "right" to eat an apple over an orange. You need an actual reason to make that move to "optimal" which is also, not moral, on these terms. I think you are incorrectly describing morality. And we're allowed different conceptions.

and it is clear that the non-hypothetical ought-judgments of complete strangers still have force for us. — Leontiskos

can. Again, totally unsupportable by anything but your intuition to this effect. Fine. i don't share it, nor does my experience support my assent.

There's also the issue of "some" being the more reasonable version, and the discussion of why those "some" and in what circumstances those "some" appear to us as forceful would reveal the underlying arbitrary values one is simply ignorant of in the decision-making process because they are so well-trodded we need not re-assess them every time we come into a new decision to be made (probably true for morality on my terms also). If one has a moral deliberation, rather than personal heuristics, every time one encounters a decision to be made (on either of our conceptions) then we would get precisely no where. One must make their moral principles known, and then embody them - not discuss them - to be effective. The justification is internal. Obviously.

Did you read the rest of the post? — Leontiskos

Yep. Question remains :) I do, now, understand we could almost certainly not come to terms on this matter.

That is not at all clear, and if that's baked into your examples you're hiding the ball the whole way through. — AmadeusD

How was I hiding the ball? I said it at the very outset:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments) — Leontiskos

You've misrepresented the argument by interpreting a moral judgment as a hypothetical ought-judgment. I agree: if the argument is misrepresented in that way then it is invalid. But the argument was never about hypothetical imperatives.

I literally did do this when I was in Egypt, so I don't quite know why you would make such a blatantly unsupportable claim? — AmadeusD

So you are telling me that when you were in Egypt someone told you not to drink the water, and you did not give their utterance any (due) consideration? Their utterance had no force on your decision process?

Nope. That's what you think, and are not convincing me of. That's fine. — AmadeusD

I'm not sure what you are supposed to be arguing here. Are you claiming that it is impossible for a complete stranger to tell you not to drink water?

That's fine. I've already told you that "ought" need be unpacked there, and you've not done it... — AmadeusD

But I have done it, namely in the thread that I have referenced multiple times.

I think you are incorrectly describing morality. — AmadeusD

As I've said, I have no use for the word "morality." You can't even say what you mean by it, so I see no point in using it.

can. Again, totally unsupportable by anything but your intuition to this effect. Fine. i don't share it, nor does my experience support my assent. — AmadeusD

The thesis you seem to be proposing is this: <Sometimes the non-hypothetical ought-judgment of a complete stranger has force for me, and sometimes it doesn't>.

Is that accurate or not? If not, please tell me what you are saying when you say, "Can."

Having this reasonable confidence in Bob is trust—no? You trust him. Right? — Bob Ross

In so far as the evidence affords. But there’s a limit.

However, to say that some claims are “extraordinary” (which is straight out of Hitchens’ playbook btw) that cannot be, even in principle, verified other than through a belief devoid of trust—well, I don’t know what that kind of claim would look like. — Bob Ross

It’s 1980’s Carl Sagan, I think. New Atheism is just packaging the free thought arguments of earlier times.

If someone says they have a puppy at home I would have no reason to doubt this. But it could be untrue. However is someone says they have a dragon at home I’m going to need robust evidence. That’s all I am saying. For the most part, the more extraordinary the claim the more important the quality of that evidence is.

Firstly, if they have it on valid faith, in principle, then it would be warranted to believe it; and you are implying it would be irrational for them to. — Bob Ross

Valid faith? Are you saying faith is uneven? How does one determine which faith claim is valid and which one is not?

I would say this is agnosticism (viz., the suspension of judgment about a proposition); whereas atheism, traditionally, is the belief there are no gods.
— Bob Ross

False. We've been through this, but the etymology doesn't quite allow for this.

"A-gnostic" means "no knowledge". It is the position that we cannot know whether or not God exists. Atheist is literally A-theism. "no theism". That's literally it. In any case, i set out months ago why your use of the word is unhelpful. Not your fault - lots of people think that. But it is the reason these silly debates occur. — AmadeusD

Yes. I don’t believe in gods. Doesn’t mean I know there are no gods. Most atheists today distinguish between a belief claim and a knowledge claim. Some are more certain about particular gods such as Zuess or Yahweh.

How was I hiding the ball? — Leontiskos

I think I was quite clear:

telling you what to do — Leontiskos

is not clearly imbedded in the example. I understand your following (in this post) justification for why I should have assumed this - my point is that your example doesn't rise to that level. I'm unsure that's a tractable issue.

I agree: if the argument is misrepresented in that way then it is invalid. — Leontiskos

Ok, so in this case we agree. We are just seeing different things.

But I have done it, namely in the thread that I have referenced multiple times. — Leontiskos

I understand that you think this. I am unsure what else to say. It was inadequate to me.

You can't even say what you mean by it — Leontiskos

What the fuck dude????:

Morality: The debate between right and wrong. — AmadeusD

"right" and "wrong" are definitely arbitrary in the sense you want to use them to support a moral system of the type piecemeal described here. If you sense of "right" and "wrong" is essentially goal-oriented in the sense that any old goal can give us a moral "right" then that's fine, and exactly how I've described my views. If it's something else, I may need some help.

Is that accurate or not? — Leontiskos

Roughly, yes, as the Egypt example (of which I confirm your description) would show, in some degree. Sometimes people will, upon context, prove forceful in terms of my valuing their opinion. This is still not getting me toward a moral decision, as I see it. How could it be "wrong" for me to ignore old mate? Given I didn't get sick, I can't see even a post hoc way to get there. I am now back to supremely enjoying this exchange, fwiw.

:up:

is not clearly imbedded in the example. I understand your following (in this post) justification for why I should have assumed this - my point is that your example doesn't rise to that level. I'm unsure that's a tractable issue. — AmadeusD

Okay, but it's an important issue. If we don't mean the same thing by 'morality' then we will be talking past each other.

Ok, so in this case we agree. — AmadeusD

Sure.

What the fuck dude????: — AmadeusD

Sorry, my bad.

Morality: The debate between right and wrong. — AmadeusD

"right" and "wrong" are definitely arbitrary in the sense you want to use them to support a moral system... — AmadeusD

I don't find this a helpful definition. This is because instead of one ambiguous term ('morality'), we now have two ('right' and 'wrong'). You yourself immediately put the two key terms of your definition into scare quotes, which is bad news for us if we want a precise definition.

Again, I have been talking about non-hypothetical ought-judgments. An example of this is, "Do not drink that water!"

I think we need a clearly defined subject if we are to discuss it. I think "non-hypothetical ought-judgments" are very clearly defined. I wrote an entire OP on the subject. I don't think, "The debate between right and wrong," is clearly defined, and therefore I don't think we can have a discussion about it until it is further clarified.

Let me give the argument again:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments)
2. Our moral judgments are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3. We respect these evaluations, or at least some of them
4. Therefore, ought-claims have force
5. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary — Leontiskos

Let me clarify the argument a bit and also dispense entirely with the word 'morality':

1c. We all make non-hypothetical ought-judgments (NHs for short - plural)
2c. Our NHs are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3c. These evaluations are themselves NHs
4c. We respect these evaluative NHs, or at least some of them
5c. Therefore, at least some evaluative NHs have force
6c. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary

5c is really my primary conclusion. I realize that this argument will be difficult to follow if one does not understand what an NH is, and that understanding will require looking at the thread where I lay it out.

Supposing you want to disagree, you have a few options here:

1. Decide that the conclusions pertain to 'morality' and then dispute the argument
2. Decide that the conclusions do not pertain to 'morality' and then agree with the argument
3. Decide that the conclusions do not pertain to 'morality' but then dispute the argument anyway

Let me give an example using the water case:

A) You decide to drink water, raising it to your lips (1c)
B) A complete stranger tells you not to drink the water (2c, 3c, 5c)
C) You decide not to drink the water, or at the very least you give the stranger's utterance due consideration (4c)

Note that by giving the stranger's utterance due consideration you "respect it." One need not agree with an evaluative NH in order to respect it. Hopefully that example helps illustrate the argument, even if you want to say that you would not give the stranger's utterance due consideration.

The validity of 5c is really the crux, and I don't claim that I have given sufficient argumentation for it, but I also don't want to do too much work in a single post. The sense of 5c crucially requires that we understand what an NH is, and that we do not conflate a non-hypothetical ought-judgment with a hypothetical ought-judgment. Again, this terminology is explained in my thread.

Roughly, yes — AmadeusD

Okay, good. Your thesis is very close to 5c, so that's good. Perhaps I need more reasoning to justify 5c; perhaps I need more reasoning beyond 5c to reach a substantial conclusion; and perhaps the argument is sufficient as it stands.

I am now back to supremely enjoying this exchange, fwiw. — AmadeusD

Glad to hear it.

Okay, but it's an important issue. If we don't mean the same thing by 'morality' then we will be talking past each other. — Leontiskos

Yeah, definitely. I think we have been to some degree. Initially it was grating, but now I see it clearly, it's interesting and revealing :)

until it is further clarified. — Leontiskos

That's fair. And I think if that clarification were universalizable, we wouldn't be having this discussion.
But my conception is a generally accepted take, not just mine (it is hte first dictionary definition, and what Google's AI throws out)

That said:

"There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions, even within philosophy."

Two forms are given. We may be speaking about two distinct uses of the same word. Mine is definitely descriptive. I use "morality" to describe the systems by which groups co-operate. It is observational, and not "moral" in the normative sense. It just is what people do to get on with each other. No need for any kind of objective or actual value. Just agreed behavioural norms and boundaries (though, obviously, at some point htis will boil down to values. The problem is there are no homogeneous societies** of that kind other than cults).

"descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct endorsed by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior

whereas I think you may be using a proscriptive/normative form:

"normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be endorsed by all rational people."

I suppose at base, **I don't think version 2 obtains in the real world - we just talk about hypothetical imperatives of that kind. Kant wakes from his slumber...

5c is really my primary conclusion. — Leontiskos

I understand. I even (to some degree) agree. I just don't think this butters your bread, I guess. Fwiw, I wrote this before reading the following "option" table. So, there we go LOL.

Perhaps I need more reasoning to justify 5c; perhaps I need more reasoning beyond 5c to reach a substantial conclusion — Leontiskos

I think either could be true, but I see a much bigger problem. On what basis are you justifying that conclusion as a moral one? How can it be "right" or "wrong" particularly when you cannot(or don't, i'm unsure) sufficiently define those terms? I fully agree that ambiguity of those terms is a problem - in fact, I think it's fatal.

Yeah, definitely. I think we have been to some degree. Initially it was grating, but now I see it clearly, it's interesting and revealing :) — AmadeusD

Yes, but I would say the impasse is alive and well. :razz:

Two forms are given. We may be speaking about two distinct uses of the same word. Mine is definitely descriptive. — AmadeusD

Okay, but you've defined morality as, "The debate between right and wrong," and I'm not sure how a debate could be descriptive. In fact I don't really understand how the word morality is supposed to refer to a debate at all. But these are your definitions, so I leave them to you. I've dropped the word 'morality' entirely from my argument.

it is hte first dictionary definition — AmadeusD

According to what dictionary?

whereas I think you may be using a proscriptive/normative form — AmadeusD

Yes, my definition of an NH is certainly normative. That's true.

I think either could be true, but I see a much bigger problem. On what basis are you justifying that conclusion as a moral one? How can it be "right" or "wrong" particularly when you cannot(or don't, i'm unsure) sufficiently define those terms? I fully agree that ambiguity of those terms is a problem - in fact, I think it's fatal. — AmadeusD

That's your definition, not mine. As I said, I don't know what you mean by 'right' and 'wrong', so if your definition is to be meaningful you would need to spell that out. Here is what I said:

Supposing you want to disagree, you have a few options here:

1. Decide that the conclusions pertain to 'morality' and then dispute the argument
2. Decide that the conclusions do not pertain to 'morality' and then agree with the argument
3. Decide that the conclusions do not pertain to 'morality' but then dispute the argument anyway — Leontiskos

Now apparently you want me to decide whether my conclusions pertain to your definition of "morality." I can't really do that, given that I don't know what you mean by 'right' and 'wrong'. I would suggest that you read the OP where I explain what a non-hypothetical ought-judgment is, and then try to figure out if it relates to your own concept of morality (whatever that concept is). I stopped using the word 'moral' in my argument in this thread (if we can't agree on what a word means then why would we use it at all?), but in my OP I do use that word and explain what I mean by it. If you have a special desire to use the word m-o-r-a-l in our conversation, you could look there for an alternative definition. Nevertheless, I make no use at all of the words "right" and "wrong" in that OP. I myself don't see why any of the three words are necessary at all, especially if we are using them equivocally between us.

If you do decide on option #2 or #3 and say that my argument does not pertain to 'morality', then I would expect at least a syllogism with a middle term that looks something like: <Morality requires X; Your argument omits X; Therefore your argument does not pertain to morality>. Note that you might be tempted to say, <Morality requires the words "right" and "wrong"; Your argument omits the words "right" and "wrong"; Therefore your argument does not pertain to morality>. The problem with this would be that I still don't know what you mean by "right" and "wrong", and I can't imagine why an argument would be required to include the five-letter tokens r-i-g-h-t and w-r-o-n-g.

Your claim is that "x is best" never implies "do x," — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the only recourse for @J is to say that the decision to do nothing at all does not count as a decision, or equivalently, that the claim, "x is best (among all options)" is not taking into consideration the option where one does nothing.

J would then be saying something like <"x is best" never implies "do x" because I might choose to do nothing at all>.

The response to this objection is to simply note that the decision to do nothing is itself a decision. The error here is very closely related to the conflation between a non-hypothetical ought-judgment and a hypothetical ought-judgment where, despite the evidence, the moral non-realist will claim that every piece of advice is merely hypothetical. For example, the moral non-realist wants to say, "Sometimes people will say that the Toyota is the best car to buy if I want to buy a car, but they will never simply tell me that I should buy a Toyota. They will never tell me, 'This is what you should do, all things considered.'" (They will never speak the following words non-hypothetically: "Don't drink the water!")

What's really interesting about this is that the moral non-realist claims that morality is not real, and yet he must ultimately change reality itself in order to hold this position, namely by changing all the patent instances of non-hypothetical ought-judgments into hypothetical ought-judgments. He must pretend that all advice is only intended hypothetically, even his own advice, and even his own advice to himself.

Relatedly:

Acts and regrets are non-hypothetical

Following in the footsteps of Philippa Foot, many are accustomed to claim that morality is merely a matter of hypothetical judgments, or that non-hypothetical judgments are rare.⁵ To give an indication of how gravely mistaken this opinion is, consider the fact that acts and regrets are all non-hypothetical... — Leontiskos

You think that to be a human generates an automatic interest in a single best way to live -- or, perhaps, that it's impossible for a human not to want the best way to live, however misguided they may be. Would that it were so! — J

This is a misreading. @Count Timothy von Icarus is saying that humans will choose what they deem best, not that humans will choose what Count deems best. You are the one who is apparently committed to the (contradictory) idea that humans will not choose what they deem best.

Words like "good," "bad," "best," "worst," "desirable," "undesirable," etc., do not function ad unum (towards one thing). That's why we argue about what is best even without disagreeing on whether we ought to choose the best. If we did not agree that we ought to choose the best then there would be no point in arguing about what is best. This goes hand in hand with your misunderstanding of the choice-worthy.

I don't know what you mean by 'right' and 'wrong' — Leontiskos

No one does. That's my entire point lol.

Okay, but you've defined morality as — Leontiskos

Again, not really. This is a widely accepted conception of morality. It is what people talk about when discussing morality. Given the first reply above this one, it seems pretty clear that either morality doesn't exist or you and I are trying to talk about something else, in some sense. So, I find it quite hard to discuss on the basis of well, I conceive Morality as X (you are still talking about morality, despite the claim to have dropped it... there would be no discussion here if you weren't) and that is something other than "right" and "wrong". If you wish to change the concept of morality to be more logically acceptable, sure, that's fine, and I have no real argument against that position - but my experiences tell me you are simply wrong about how these types o utterances affect people.

According to what dictionary? — Leontiskos

Oxford Languages, Cambridge and several AI models.

This seems to get close to what you're wanting to do here, but i still note phrases like this:

"obligatory concerns with others’ welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns."

These will never be universalizable. So I think you cannot have your cake (about psychological morality, as it were) and still think it can be universalizable or unassailable. If we're both essentially saying that this is the case, we're good. I can't quite grasp where your commitment is in terms of the applicability of your system - seems you want it to apply to everyone, without fail and not susceptible to empirical considerations.

That's your definition, not mine — Leontiskos

Again, no, it's not, really. This is what the sum total of my experience of moral discourse (and several courses) has taught me. For me, 'morality' functions as something else precisely because I think this conception is fatally flawed (as noted earlier):

How can it be "right" or "wrong" particularly when you cannot(or don't, i'm unsure) sufficiently define those terms? I fully agree that ambiguity of those terms is a problem - in fact, I think it's fatal. — AmadeusD

I couldn't possibly hold a view i've noted has a fatal flaw, could I?

you want me to decide whether my conclusions pertain to your definition of "morality." — Leontiskos

Nope. I am simply pointing out that your conception is not at all what people consider when they speak about morality. For this reason, I find it completely inapt to be held under that label as something intended to be interpersonal.

I would suggest that you read the OP where I explain what a non-hypothetical ought-judgment is, and then try to figure out if it relates to your own concept of morality — Leontiskos

I've done this. It doesn't. I've been at rather extreme pains to point out why I think that conception is both functionally a bit silly, and not what you claim it to be. Being wrong, on my part, wouldn't mean I haven't given those answers.

I make no use at all of the words "right" and "wrong" in that OP — Leontiskos

Which is why the above. I have been insufficiently clear that this was a motivator, but I found it to be pretty obvious in our exchanges, that I am lambasting your jettison of those terms, and then further lambasting your use of NHO as some kind of "universal" replacement whcih I thnk it is not.

I myself don't see why any of the three words are necessary at all — Leontiskos

Because this is precisely what people mean when they speak about morality. "That's immoral!" means "that's wrong" or bad. And that's clearly an emotional plea. That's another conversation though..

he problem with this would be that I still don't know what you mean by "right" and "wrong", and I can't imagine why an argument would be required to include the five-letter tokens r-i-g-h-t and w-r-o-n-g. — Leontiskos

I'll reverse this section, because it is extremely important to notice that these words are required if you want to talk about morality about actions. That is literally what morality is - the discussion of right and wrong actions. Even your take imports that to ignore a NHO would be 'wrong'. You don't use that word, but without it you have no basis to claim any kind of coherence between the theory and actual actions. We can simply kill ourselves, and there's no valence to it.
I agree with the problem in terms - but those terms, being so ambiguous, are a fatal flaw in there being a stable concept of morality beyond this (which anyone with half a brain can understand the intent of, even without decent definitions. We all conceive those words clearly for ourselves). If you are trying to entirely overhaul the concept of morality to fit something people do not usually talk about under that head, so be it. Its just not in any way convincing to me and doesn't seem to pertain to anything one would normally consider moral. Not sure why you're trying to avoid that word, though. It is hte basis of what we're discussing after all..

<Morality requires X; Your argument omits X; Therefore your argument does not pertain to morality> — Leontiskos

It requires a concept of right and wrong. Yours doesn't even attempt one, other than a potentially hidden 'right' in following what you deduce to be an 'ought'. But that is tautological.

No one does. That's my entire point lol. — AmadeusD

So you want to criticize people who use the words "right" and "wrong," because you think the words are meaningless. And then when I avoid using these words that you deem to be meaningless, you criticize me for not using them? It seems like you've erected a game where I lose by default even before I begin.

This is a widely accepted conception of morality. — AmadeusD

What "conception"? You yourself claim that your definition of morality is meaningless, and therefore there is no conception. If it is not meaningless, then you should tell me what the conception is.

Given the first reply above this one, it seems pretty clear that either morality doesn't exist or... — AmadeusD

Again, in order to determine whether something exists one must explain what they are talking about. If you say, "Morality is about right and wrong and I have no idea what right and wrong mean," then we have no candidate which could exist or not exist.

Oxford Languages, Cambridge and several AI models. — AmadeusD

So <here> is the Cambridge entry, which is publicly accessible. It says nothing about debates and nothing about "wrong," although the word "right" does occur in a few entries. So it looks like your definition does not come from Cambridge dictionary, unless you are using an older version?

I couldn't possibly hold a view i've noted has a fatal flaw, could I? — AmadeusD

What is its fatal flaw? That it doesn't mean anything?

I don't generally find it useful to argue other peoples positions for them, but I did that here:

With that said, there are more productive ways to approach such difficulties. First we define morality as that which pertains to rational action, at which point we can try to relate various subdivisions: categorical/exceptionless moral norms, non-hypothetical ought-judgments, weighted moral values or "ceteris paribus rules," and hypothetical imperatives. The tendency among our moral anti-realists is to reduce moral norms to the first subdivision: categorical/exceptionless norms, probably because this is the most potent kind of moral norm. Its potency also makes it the hardest to justify, and therefore it is understandable that someone who reduces all of morality to the most potent variety of morality also comes to the conclusion that morality itself is impossible to justify, and that morality is therefore little more than a pipe dream.

[...]

(This is to say that the definition which eludes J and AmadeusD is bound up with categorical/exceptionless moral norms. The idea is that morality is really about rules which admit of no exceptions (and this flows simultaneously from both Kant and divine command theory). The exceptionless character of the rules makes them autonomous, sovereign, untethered to any ulterior considerations, particularly prudential ones. To give a reason for an exceptionless rule is almost inevitably to undermine the exceptionlessness of the rule itself. It's not an unworthy puzzle, and I think it comes down to the same issue of ratiocination vs intellection. ...And nevermind the fact that J's pluralism will balk at the idea of intellection, even though his mystical "metanoia" is quite similar to it.) — Leontiskos

So presumably you want to say that something is moral if it is obligatory, and that this means that it must be done. On this view a moral norm is therefore a categorical/exceptionless norm.

But the problem here is making that first subdivision the whole of morality. In everyday life it just isn't. For example:

Because this is precisely what people mean when they speak about morality. "That's immoral!" means "that's wrong" or bad. — AmadeusD

First note that the claim, "That's [inadmissible]" is a NH, and every negative NH entails the claim, "You should not do that." Thus, "Note that a non-hypothetical judgment is not the same thing as a categorical imperative. We could say that all categorical imperatives are non-hypothetical judgments, but not all non-hypothetical judgments are categorical imperatives" ().

Now suppose someone becomes a vegetarian because they don't want to cause animal suffering. Nevertheless, one day they are starving and they find a live mouse caught in a live trap. They eat the mouse to stay alive and yet nevertheless continue to consider themselves a vegetarian. Your view is apparently that in order for them to hold the norm, "It is immoral to eat meat," they must wield that norm as a categorical/exceptionless norm. But this is a strawman. It's not how morality is viewed in real life. In real life if a vegetarian allows certain exceptions to their rule this does not disqualify their vegetarianism from being of a moral nature.

You have not been able to say what you mean by morality (or by "right" and "wrong" - the words you use to define morality). So I've offered you a definition, namely one that pertains to categorical/exceptionless norms. You might claim that this is not your definition of morality, but I can hardly be faulted at this point for providing you with a definition, given that you have continually failed to give a clear definition yourself. This definition of morality is incomplete. It is not colloquially adequate. If it were colloquially adequate then the vegetarian in question would not be acting morally in admitting exceptions, but everyone thinks they are acting in a morally-infused manner even if they admit exceptions.

If you want to reduce non-hypothetical ought-judgments (a.k.a. NHs) to categorical/exceptionless norms, you could do it even though it requires a bit of bastardizing. We could construe the vegetarian eating the mouse as saying, "Given the unique circumstances I am in, one should categorically/exceptionlessly eat the mouse, even though one should not eat the mouse in alternative circumstances." Again, this is in fact conflating two different subdivisions of morality, but someone who is intent on categorical/exceptionless norms might want to try to construe it that way.

I'll reverse this section, because it is extremely important to notice that these words are required if you want to talk about morality about actions. That is literally what morality is - the discussion of right and wrong actions. Even your take imports that to ignore a NHO would be 'wrong'. You don't use that word, but without it you have no basis to claim any kind of coherence between the theory and actual actions. We can simply kill ourselves, and there's no valence to it. — AmadeusD

I am not following this, and I am especially curious to know what your third sentence is supposed to mean.

The language problem here is generalizable:

• Amadeus: You are not talking about X.
• Leontiskos: Well, what do you mean by 'X'?
• Amadeus: By 'X' I mean 'Y and Z'.
• Leontiskos: Okay, but what do you mean by 'Y' and 'Z'?
• Amadeus: I don't know what I mean by 'Y' and 'Z'? {NB: 'right' and 'wrong'}
• Leontiskos: If you don't know what you mean by 'Y' and 'Z' then your critique is not meaningful. In that case you are literally saying, "You are not talking about [the I-know-not-what]."

So many of the recent discussions on TPF have hinged on the burden of proof. You are basically saying that you don't know what morality (or else right/wrong) means, and that I have the burden of proof to explain what it means. I then say, "Okay, I will just avoid that word altogether," and you object. That is the especially problematic objection on your part. If someone knows what they mean by a word, then they don't need to use that word. And if someone wants to object, then they must be able to say what they mean by the words contained within their objection.

I agree with the problem in terms - but those terms, being so ambiguous, are a fatal flaw in there being a stable concept of morality beyond this (which anyone with half a brain can understand the intent of, even without decent definitions. We all conceive those words clearly for ourselves). If you are trying to entirely overhaul the concept of morality to fit something people do not usually talk about under that head, so be it. Its just not in any way convincing to me and doesn't seem to pertain to anything one would normally consider moral. — AmadeusD

I don't think you can claim that you "conceive of the words clearly" while simultaneously being unable to say what you mean by them. The whole crux here is that you do not conceive of the words 'right' and 'wrong' clearly.

Not sure why you're trying to avoid that word, though. It is hte basis of what we're discussing after all.. — AmadeusD

No real discussion is merely about words. The token m-o-r-a-l-i-t-y is not the basis of our discussion. Discussions are about concepts, and a token with no attached concept is not a word at all. The I-know-not-what is not a basis for anything, for it has no content.

It requires a concept of right and wrong. — AmadeusD

Wrong: "Not correct" (Cambridge)

On that definition the non-hypothetical ought-judgment, "Do not drink the water!" is a claim about what is wrong/incorrect. ...But now you will want to say that it is about wrong but not about "moral wrong," and the whole circle will repeat itself...