Before you properly analyze this argument first imagine a universe in which nothing whatever exists. Would that be preferable to the universe we know? (And bear in mind, as far as science can detect, the non existence of a universe ought to be far more likely than the alternative.)

To state that God is the greatest being imaginable is to state up front that God is imaginary. Surely an existing god would be greater than the limits of our imagination.

I don't think you got the argument right. I don't think it was built around imagination like that. Try to restate it.

The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion, St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists—can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I'm thinking conceive = imagine

Am I wrong still? What's the difference between ''conceive'' and ''imagine''?

Before you properly analyze this argument first imagine a universe in which nothing whatever exists. Would that be preferable to the universe we know? — Wayfarer

That's a good question. I've been thinking is existence greater than nonexistence? It seems to me that the answer won't be a unanimous ''yes'' or ''no''.

For the sake of my argument let's assume it is greater to exist. But how does this impression (existence is greater) cause something to exist? There simply is nothing reasonable that can take me from my preference of x to the existence of x.

1. God is the greatest being imaginable

"

Doesn't saying God is a "being" beg the question, since the word "being", implies existence.

Alternately, you could say the idea of God has existence, but I doubt that human thought could confer any existence, beyond its own thoughts.

(And bear in mind, as far as science can detect, the non existence of a universe ought to be far more likely than the alternative.)

My understanding is that non-existence at the quantum level is inherently more unstable than existence, and since the universe does exist, then how could "..;the non existence of a universe ought to be far more likely than the alternative" hold?

Doesn't saying God is a "being" beg the question, since the word "being", implies existence. — Cavacava

That's interesting but ''being'' here seems to a broader term than that which your objection depends on. In the argument ''being'' means both those which exist in reality and those which exist in imagination. So, there's no question begging as the argument flows from the being in imagination to the being in reality.

The sentence "God is the greatest being imaginable" when formalized looks something like:
"There exists the greatest being (entity) imaginable and is called God.". In the first premise you assume that God exists, why bother proving its existence?

edit: This argument contains a lot of controversial topics from logic. Descriptions or using existence as a predicate are a few of them.

The description "greatest being" isn't particularly informative. It would help if this was a little better defined. So let's say that to be the greatest being is to have properties A, B, C, and D. Premise 4 suggests that existence is one of these properties (say property A). For the sake of argument, let's assume that properties B, C, and D are omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. We can then rephrase premise 1 as "God is the being who I can imagine to be existent, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent".

But then let's look at premise 4 again. You say that if there is no being who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and existent then you can imagine a being greater than God? But from 1) that's to say that you can imagine a being who is greater than the being you imagine to be existent, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. So what are this greater being's properties? Presumably also existence, omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence? So this "greater" being is actually imagined to be identical to God, and so it doesn't make sense to claim it greater. Premise 4 is wrong.

Thanks for your comment.

The sentence "God is the greatest being imaginable" when formalized looks something like:
"There exists the greatest being (entity) imaginable and is called God.". In the first premise you assume that God exists, why bother proving its existence? — Meta

No, existence in premise 1 is in imagination. So, no petitio principii fallacy.

I agree to some extent. However premise 1 is God (omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent - OOO) and ''exists'' only in imagination.

In premise 4, the greatest being is the OOO God BUT this time, it exists for real.

I agree to some extent. However premise 1 is God (omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent - OOO) and ''exists'' only in imagination.

In premise 4, the greatest being is the OOO God BUT this time, it exists for real. — TheMadFool

None of this addresses the logic of my argument. You defined God as the greatest being imaginable, and implied that existence is a necessary property of the greatest being imaginable. So you've defined God as a thing that exists (and has other properties, such as omnipotence, say). But this is the same definition of your supposed greater-than-God being, which means it's not greater than God at all, but identical to God.

Of course, if you just want to define God as something that's only imagined to exist, and doesn't really exist, as you seem to have done here, then that God doesn't really exist is true by definition, and so your argument fails.

The argument is not formalized. When you try to formalize it you will see the problems I mentioned. By saying "God is the ..." you assume God exists (not in your imagination but in your logic).

I think you would like this ontological argument:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof

then how could "..the non existence of a universe ought to be far more likely than the alternative" hold? — Cavacava

Have a listen to this TED talk, if you have 13 minutes.


Harry Cliff, by the way, is not a crank, he is employed at the LHC. This talk addresses the so-called 'naturalness problem'. The basic drift is, given what is known about physics, the Universe seems immensely unlikely.

I've been thinking is existence greater than nonexistence? It seems to me that the answer won't be a unanimous ''yes'' or ''no''. — TheMadFool

A note on 'being' - I think ontological arguments descend from The Parmenides. There is the intuition that 'being' in the broadest sense is a real good, and that non-being or non-existence is an imperfection or lack. The problem is however that 'being' is conceived of on a higher level than 'this or that being' - being is 'what is', the reality which includes everything (including the observer). 'What is', is actually the best way of expressing it.

The question 'does reality exist'? is a meaningless or even a stupid question. When we ask about 'the existence' of something, we generally consider things that exist, but might not, or things that don't exist, like unicorns. But whether any particular thing exists or not, presupposes that we are asking a question, and that presupposes that existence and non-existence are possible states; in other words, it presupposes reality. 'Reality' is presumed by every utterance or proposition. So it cannot not exist. (Nowadays, we take that reality to be 'the cosmos' described by science, which is the instinctive stance of naturalism, on the basis that we suppose that the 'testimony of sense' reveals reality; the ancients did not necessarily agree.)

In the first premise you assume that God exists, why bother proving its existence? — Meta

In other words, it's a question-begging or tautological argument - which is quite true! Such arguments were not intended as deductive proofs or rhetorical devices, but as exercises in intellectual edification for the faithful; the medievals never would presume that God's being can be established by logic alone, in fact that would border on heresy in their eyes. The first requirement was faith, then afterwards the various 'proofs' were contemplated.

But this is the same definition of your supposed greater-than-God being, which means it's not greater than God at all, but identical to God. — Michael

1. God is the greatest being imaginable [premise]
4. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God (a greatest being who exists)

Difference between the Gods:

God in 1 exists only in the imagination
God in 4 exists in both imagination and the real world

God in 4 is greater because it exists in the real world.

Yes formalizing in predicate logic is problematic. However, sentential logic formalization is possible; as I've done.

Reality' is presumed by every utterance or proposition. So it cannot not exist. — Wayfarer

I agree every proposition presupposes reality but existence can't be presupposed. Existence/nonexistence need evidence.

I can imagine God riding a pink unicorn. This is greater than not riding one. Therefore God rides a pink unicorn.

If one accepts your argument then he has to accept that God rides a pink unicorn. Basically for a lot of predicates P(G) is greater than not P(G) therefore P(G) is true.

So either we don't accept the argument or we accept it, but then we can prove weird things.

1. God is the greatest being imaginable [premise]
4. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God (a greatest being who exists)

Difference between the Gods:

God in 1 exists only in the imagination
God in 4 exists in both imagination and the real world — TheMadFool

When you imagine the greatest being, do you imagine that being to exist? If so then there is no conceptual difference between the God you imagine in 1 and the super-God you imagine in 4.

Remember that your argument rests on being able to imagine a greater being, and so the only thing that matters is the content of your imagination. In both the cases of the God in 1 and the super-God in 4, the content of your imagination is a thing that exists, is omnipotent, is omniscient, is omnibenevolent, and so on.

↪noAxioms

The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion, St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists—can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists
— Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I'm thinking conceive = imagine

Am I wrong still? What's the difference between ''conceive'' and ''imagine''? — TheMadFool

I stand corrected. It really was about an imaginary or conceptual god.
From a strictly logical standpoint, the argument seems to fall apart since it references an existing god, and the nonexisting one does not meet the criteria specified. In effect, the argument seems to say that if God doesn't exist, he wouldn't be God, and the conflict stated isn't conflicting at all.

From a modal logic point of view, a world in which there is this god would be consistent, and a world in which there is not this god is also consistent. The argument seems to be a simple tautology. St Anselm tried to argue that the later world is inconsistent there because the nonexistent god did not meet the existing-god requirement.

So either we don't accept the argument or we accept it, but then we can prove weird things. — Meta

You're right. It can be used to prove weird things. But is weirdness, alone, a good enough refutation? I mean, aside from the weird conclusions we can derive from such reasoning, does the argument also prove God's existence? Is it a sound argument?

If I understand you correctly, there's no difference between

1. God that exists in imagination
And
2. God that exists in imagination AND the real world

Why do you say that?

I can imagine a horse. It may or may not exist in the real world. If it doesn't then it exists only in the imagination. If it exists in the real world, then it exists both in imagination AND the real world. Do the two horses not differ? According to you there's no difference. But there is - one is purely imaginary and the other is real, in the usual sense of the word.

the argument seems to say that if God doesn't exist, he wouldn't be God — noAxioms

Yes, I think that sums it up quite well. Is it true?

The argument seems to be a simple tautology. — noAxioms

Can you please explain how?

If I understand you correctly, there's no difference between

1. God that exists in imagination
And
2. God that exists in imagination AND the real world

Why do you say that? — TheMadFool

I'm saying that the God you imagine in 1 is identical to the super-God you imagine in 4. In both cases you imagine a thing to really exist.

I can imagine a horse. It may or may not exist in the real world. If it doesn't then it exists only in the imagination. If it exists in the real world, then it exists both in imagination AND the real world. Do the two horses not differ? According to you there's no difference. But there is - one is purely imaginary and the other is real, in the usual sense of the word.

But you're saying that you can imagine a being greater than God. So the only thing we should be looking at is what you're imagining. And in both cases you're imagining a supremely powerful, existing thing. It's not like when asked to explain the God you imagine in 1 your response is "I'm imagining this powerful thing that exists only in my imagination".

This is why you need to not use the term "greatest being" and instead spell out the relevant properties. It makes things much clearer. What are the properties of the greatest being imaginable? Omnipotence, omniscience, existing in the real world and not just imagination, etc. So the thing you're imagining in 1 is imagined to be omnipotent, omniscient, and to exist in the real world and not just imagination. And the thing supposedly greater than God that you're imagining in 4 is imagined to be omnipotent, omniscient, and to exist in the real world and not just imagination. But you're just imagining the same thing as you were in 1.

You argument itself is valid in sentential logic. So you have proven the existence of God. But wait!
I can also prove the existence of God:
1. axiom: God exists. q.e.d

In practice the point of these types arguments is to persuade others to believe in God and accept the religion of the speaker. This is why religious people seldom use this onthological argument. (Because of the weird consequences I just mentioned which will contradict the Bible and stuff)
We have to go deeper and use predicate logic and a formal language to test the "deeper" validity of the argument.

This argument, however is just a fine little naive piece of logic. And even weirder: it is contradictiory imo. Let P(x) mean x is so great that you can't even imagine how great he is. Now P(x) is greater than not P(x) so P(G). But if you can't imagine the greatness of God then you have a contradiction because you stated at the beginning that you can imagine God. So the statements in (naive) predicate logic are inconsistent, you can prove that God exists and you can prove that God does not exist.

Let me clarify even more why we need predicate logic here:
1. premise: I'm a human being
2. premise If I'm a human being then I have 8 eyes and 8 legs.
3. conclusion: I have 8 eyes and 8 legs

This is a perfectly valid argument however we need predicate logic and knowledge about human beings to know that is in fact invalid. Anselm's argument is the same.

The first requirement was faith, then afterwards the various 'proofs' were contemplated. — Wayfarer

One can say this IS the religious position.

The first requirement was faith, then afterwards the various 'proofs' were contemplated.
— Wayfarer

One can say this IS the religious position. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps, but that doesn't necessarily entail fideism - the idea that everything is dependent on belief. I think faith can be quite considered, not necessarily a matter of literalism or clinging to belief. In fact the scholastics were quite fastidious in their logic. But to argue that the very notion of 'God' is a meaningless concept - a pink unicorn, or a human with eight eyes - it doesn't to justice to the argument so much as simply trivialise it. Which also amounts to a statement of belief; namely, that belief in God is absurd.

Certainly there ought to be no compulsion to believe anything whatever, but to consider the argument properly, at least it ought to reflect something of the intended meaning of the original argument.

I think you're right. The God in premise 1 has to exist to be the greatest being imaginable.

If that's so, premise 4 becomes: If God exists AND God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God.

Add to that premise 3: I can't imagine a being greater than God

We get (by modus tollens): Either God exists or God does not exist.

Not the conclusion I was hoping for.

Thanks.

This is a perfectly valid argument however we need predicate logic and knowledge about human beings to know that is in fact invalid. Anselm's argument is the same. — Meta

The problem with using predicate logic is

1''Existence'' isn't a predicate.

G = God is the greatest being imaginable, would require g = God, I = is the greatest being imaginable. So G = (Ex)Ix. That would be assuming what we want to prove.

2. There's no way of properly distinguishing, at least as required by the argument, between existence in imagination and existence in the real world.

U = Unicorns are imaginary creatures, would require C = is an imaginary creature. So U = (Ex)Cx and that is saying ''something exists that doesn't exist.

So what is your conclusion?

Predicate logic can't unpack the argument. Anyway I think the argument is flawed in many ways, as can be seen from the posts. Thanks

Heh, that's a neat counter-argument. I don't think I've come across it before.

Thanks. Although I guess if I've thought of it then someone smarter has already done so. ;)

1. God is the greatest being imaginable [premise]
2. If God is the greatest being imaginable then I can't imagine a being greater than God [premise]
3. I can't imagine a being greater than God [Conclusion A from 1 and 2 modus ponens]
4. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God (a greatest being who exists) [premise]
Therefore
5. God exists [Conclusion B from 3 and 4 modus tollens] — TheMadFool

This seems to show that the greatest being can only be imagined.

BTW, what do you mean by "greatest"? "Greatest" is a subjective term. For some, God is egotistical, contradictory, and immoral.

BTW, what do you mean by "greatest"? — Harry Hindu

Well, what do you think Anselm meant by ''greatest''? To keep things simple, let's say by ''greatest'' we mean embodying all that is good.

Just so you know @Michael has already found a nice big hole in the argument

If I understand you correctly, there's no difference between

1. God that exists in imagination
And
2. God that exists in imagination AND the real world

Why do you say that?
— TheMadFool

I'm saying that the God you imagine in 1 is identical to the super-God you imagine in 4. In both cases you imagine a thing to really exist. — Michael

This is why you need to not use the term "greatest being" and instead spell out the relevant properties. It makes things much clearer. What are the properties of the greatest being imaginable? — Michael

I think I can produce a version of the ontological argument that avoids both of these objections, viz:

Premise 1: A being that is beneficent and exists is more beneficent than a being that does not exist.
Inference 1: If God does not exist, he is not the most beneficent being possible.
Premise 2: God is the most beneficent being possible.
Conclusion: God exists.

Notes:
Premise 1 is supposed to be obviously true, on the grounds that a being that does not exist would have zero beneficence (i.e. would do no good at all).
Inference 1 supposedly follows from premise 1.
Premise 2 is supposedly true by definition.
The conclusion follows from inference 1 plus premise 2.

I would be interested to hear other people's views on this. Personally I would claim that the argument fails because premise 1 is false. The reason I think it is false is that Premise 1 is equivalent to this:

A being that does not exist is less beneficent than a being that is beneficent and exists.

and this is false. It is false because a being that does not exist is the same thing as nothing, and 'less beneficent than a being that is beneficent and exists' is a property, and nothing cannot have properties.

If I am right about this, then I think it shows that there must be an error in any version of the ontological argument in which a comparison is made between a God who exists and a God who is effectively nothing. The God who is effectively nothing may be described in the argument as being imaginary, or existing only in the mind, or whatever, but these descriptions are merely alternative ways of saying that in place of an existent God, there is nothing. So all such versions of the argument effectively depend on attributing a property to nothing, and since nothing cannot have properties, they must all fail.

Comments, anyone?

Consider this argument:

Premise 1: A being that is rich and exists is richer than a being that does not exist
Inference 1: If X does not exist, he is not the richest being possible
Premise 2: X is the richest being possible.
Conclusion: X exists.

Clearly there's a problem with inference 1, and so perhaps premise 1 (as you say). If we assume that life exists only on Earth then Bill Gates is the richest being that exists. But is he the richest being possible? Of course not. We could hypothesise a person with twice his wealth, even though that person doesn't exist.