Do you really believe anyone thinks it is good to be miserable? — Janus

Yes, absolutely. And why not?

It seems it is your assertion that misery could be considered good, that is out of step and is merely "your conception". — Janus

That's not a problem, because unlike you I never made any assertions on behalf of humanity.

Christianity, as a universal religion, must speak to all people and cannot be elitist. It must present its insights through parables and imagery accessible to the widest possible audience. — Wayfarer

An insurmountable flaw, in my opinion. You can't be a philosopher if you're not prepared to say "I am right and everyone else is wrong".

I'm not making claims about humanity but about most people.All I can think if you really believe many people think it is good to be miserable is that you live your life with eyes closed.

How did I get into the world? Why was I not asked about it and why was I not informed of the rules and regulations but just thrust into the ranks as if I had been bought by a peddling shanghaier of human beings? How did I get involved in this big enterprise called actuality? Why should I be involved? Isn't it a matter of choice? And if I am compelled to be involved, where is the manager—I have something to say about this. Is there no manager? To whom shall I make my complaint?

Your post reminds me of this quotation from Kierkegaard. Did you have it in mind when you wrote it? (I don't have a proper reference, but found it included in Kierkegaard - AZ Quotes)
Kierekegaard is criticizing the argument, not because it is invalid or unsound, but because it is inappropriate. We are thrown into the ongoing world. Approaching it from our beginning in this way displays the arrogance of a new-comer turning up in a community and criticizing it without taking the time or effort to understand it. Or, at least, something along those lines. I don't think this is a slam-dunk, conclusive answer, but might at least us to be a bit more suspicious of the idea that the traditional problem of evil is a slam-dunk argument against anything that a believer can recognize.

Christianity, as a universal religion, must speak to all people and cannot be elitist. It must present its insights through parables and imagery accessible to the widest possible audience. — Wayfarer

This is one possibility - that Christianity, like other religions, cannot be understood as philosophy, but as a different kind of enterprise, directed at persuading us to adopt a way of life, and a culture, rather than a collection of doctrines. Its project and its methods are not those of philosophy. Perhaps the philosophical problem of evil is perfectly correct, so far as it goes. But then it misses the point of the religious practice, creating a God quite different from the God of philosophy.

I'm not making claims about humanity but about most people.All I can think if you really believe many people think it is good to be miserable is that you live your life with eyes closed. — Janus

You are right, of course. But people do sometimes suggest that being miserable can have good consequences. "What does not kill us makes us stronger".
The paradox here is that Christianity, like other religions, needs to make us feel that we are miserable wretches, in order to create the opportunity for God's intervention to save us from our misery. Evil is not an optional extra here, but an essential part of the project.

How did I get into the world? Why was I not asked about it and why was I not informed of the rules and regulations but just thrust into the ranks as if I had been bought by a peddling shanghaier of human beings? How did I get involved in this big enterprise called actuality? Why should I be involved? Isn't it a matter of choice?

Choices made a long time ago. Also known as karma.

Isn't it a matter of choice?

I guess it's a matter of this quartet: Random, Causality, Logic, Math. You don't exist before you start to exist. You can only decide when you are there, but then it's too late.

At first I thought you were saying that "suffering is bad" is a priori true. Then I thought you were saying "suffering is bad" is a universally held belief. Now it seems you saying "most people think suffering is bad" which is a trivial and irrelevant claim.

While this process [of interpreting powerful altered states in metaphysical terms] may indeed be of phenomenological interest, it cannot be held to yield any propositional truth, and so could be of no help for metaphysics. — Janus

Again, this might be true. But whether it's true is a philosophical question. It seems to me that discussing that question is neither apologetics nor phenomenology, but plain old epistemology, wouldn't you say? As such, shouldn't it be a respectable activity for a philosopher?

Perhaps what you're saying is that you believe you have independent and solid grounds for insisting that only propositional truths can be helpful in metaphysics -- and moreover, that religious discourse can't supply them. I bet you can guess what I'm going to say next! :smile: : This may be true, but whether it's true requires . . . more philosophy.

When you {plural} use the word "God" are you referring to A) the triune God of Christianity, one aspect of whom is a person capable of empathizing with human suffering? Which may be an attempt to reconcile the "notion of justice" with an omniscient abstract God, incapable of suffering . Or B) to the omnipotent (necessary & sufficient) God of Spinoza, which is the non-personal force of Nature, that is no respecter of persons, hence dispenser of impartial natural justice (it is what it is)? — Gnomon

I was referring to the three omnis: omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. The Chrisitan conception of God is of a loving personal God, one who cares for all his creatures. The nature of His creation (assuming just for the sake of argument that there were such a creator God) belies the conception that God could be all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful. It a pretty easy to understand inconsistency which keeps getting glossed over by believers.

Spinoza's critique of that conception of God can be found in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and a trenchant critique it is. His own conception of God grew out of that critique. Needless to say, Spinoza's God has no concern for humanity or anything else. — Janus

That third "omni" is the problem. As the Jews learned over centuries of divine tough love, Omniscience & Omnipotence are not compatible with Empathy & Sympathy. Omni love would be more like Artificial Intelligence*1. Modern humans can "fall in love" with computers, and the computers are programmed by humans to express their "care & concern" for the person with benevolent words*2. But computers & Gods, lacking biological bodies & motivating hormones, are presumably incapable of feeling love, in the human sense.

So, that's why I think the Christian triune God-concept had an emotional advantage over the abstract unitary deity of the Torah. It reintroduced a physical concrete element that the prophets of Yahweh had attempted to banish for generations. A heroic, half-human, half-god messiah was more like the pagan demi-gods, Aeneas, Bacchus, & Hercules : More inspiring & sympathetic characters, for people to admire and aspire to. The addition of an immanent Holy Spirit added an element of practical magic to the mix. So, Christianity hit all the right notes at a time when both Roman and Jewish gods were fading in popularity.

The three-in-one Christian god-head is still popular among the masses, but waning with the intelligentsia, who are more impressed by rational evidence than by emotional myths. That's why I think A.N. Whitehead's update of Spinoza's nature-god is more appropriate for the 21st century. Spinoza referred to his Ultimate Substance as "God", and Whitehead used the same term for his Ultimate Principle of Progressive "Concretion" (evolution).

For my own philosophical purposes, I tried to find a different label for the creative Process that evolved a world of Life & Mind from an initial burst of Cosmic Energy. But that only led to mis-understandings. So, like them, I sometimes use the G-word, because it is the best known term for the Ultimate Cause that is creating a meaningful world from scratch. Yet, I see no reason to complain to omnipotent Nature for succor, to relieve the sufferings caused by both Nature and Culture. :smile:


*1. A Psychologist Explains Why It’s Possible To Fall In Love With AI
https://www.forbes.com/sites/traversmark/2024/03/24/a-psychologist-explains-why-its-possible-to-fall-in-love-with-ai/

*2. Humans sometime express benevolent feeling in "little loving lies" : Fleetwood-Mac

I’ve met some Catholics, particularly among the Missionaries of Charity, who seemed to believe that misery is a sign of special blessing from God. They wouldn’t say that suffering is good in itself, but they regarded it as a form of grace and they do venerate it. Possibly a sign that the miserable are active participants in the suffering of Jesus. — Tom Storm

Right, given that we already find ourselves thrown into a world of potential suffering, then actually encountering suffering may be considered to be the only way to learn to come to terms with it. Of course they also presume reward in the afterlife for the pious.

At first I thought you were saying that "suffering is bad" is a priori true. Then I thought you were saying "suffering is bad" is a universally held belief. Now it seems you saying "most people think suffering is bad" which is a trivial and irrelevant claim. — goremand

If you had understood what I've been saying you would have seen that the fact that most people consider suffering to be bad is not irrelevant to the argument against the Churches' traditional conception of God, and the God presented in the Old Testament. I'm not going to spoon-feed you further. If you want to critique what I've said then go back and read it, quote what I've said and say precisely where you think it's wrong if you disagree.

Again, this might be true. But whether it's true is a philosophical question. It seems to me that discussing that question is neither apologetics nor phenomenology, but plain old epistemology, wouldn't you say? As such, shouldn't it be a respectable activity for a philosopher?

Perhaps what you're saying is that you believe you have independent and solid grounds for insisting that only propositional truths can be helpful in metaphysics -- and moreover, that religious discourse can't supply them. I bet you can guess what I'm going to say next! :smile: : This may be true, but whether it's true requires . . . more philosophy. — J

I agree that all of what you cited are fitting problems for philosophy. But I also think that ever since Kant, Hegel notwithstanding, it has been obvious that the traditional idea that one could arrive at metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is, if not impossible, at least impossible to verify.

That third "omni" is the problem. — Gnomon

Yes the three Omni-God is inconsistent with human ideas of goodness and justice, ened of story. So something has to give. Either God would have liked to create a perfect world free of suffering but was unable to do so, or didn't realize what he had done in creating the world, or else such a god simply does not exist in which case there is no "problem of Suffering".

The three-in-one Christian god-head is still popular among the masses, but waning with the intelligentsia, who are more impressed by rational evidence than by emotional myths. That's why I think A.N. Whitehead's update of Spinoza's nature-god is more appropriate for the 21st century. Spinoza referred to his Ultimate Substance as "God", and Whitehead used the same term for his Ultimate Principle of Progressive "Concretion" (evolution). — Gnomon

Sure but Spinoza, probably out of not wishing to offend the religious authorities even further than he already had and out of his belief that the masses need a personal conception of God anyway, spoke in terms of "Deus sive Natura", where he could have simply spoken of natura. An impersonal God offers no comfort, and Spinoza did not believe in any afterlife.

Choices made a long time ago. Also known as karma. — Wayfarer

Sure, Isn't the concept of karma precisely intended to reconcile the apparently random distribution of good and evil into the mora/ethical order? It may succeed psychologically, but does it stand up philosophically?

I guess it's a matter of this quartet: Random, Causality, Logic, Math. You don't exist before you start to exist. You can only decide when you are there, but then it's too late. — Quk

That seems to me one of the points that Kierkegaard is exploiting here. It is completely inappropriate to review our situation in life as if it were a holiday that we booked and which is not meeting our expectations. If we don't like where we are in life, it's no good trying to complain to the Manager.

At first I thought you were saying that "suffering is bad" is a priori true. Then I thought you were saying "suffering is bad" is a universally held belief. Now it seems you saying "most people think suffering is bad" which is a trivial and irrelevant claim. — goremand

This discussion seems to me to have suffered from an ambiguity about whether suffering can be justified or not. Some suffering may have a justification (a beneficial effect), in which case, it might be classified as not suffering, but something else. "Suffering" would then be only "unjustified suffering" and that, it seems to me, can only not be understood as a Bad Thing by someone who doesn't understand what suffering is. To put the point another way, suffering is a Bad Thing unless it is justified.

The three-in-one Christian god-head is still popular among the masses, but waning with the intelligentsia, — Gnomon

I may have the wrong end of the stick, but I have the impression that the difference between the God of the masses and the the God of the philosophers goes all the way back to Xenophanes in the earliest years of philosophy in Ancient Greece.

Right, given that we already find ourselves thrown into a world of potential suffering, then actually encountering suffering may be considered to be the only way to learn to come to terms with it. Of course they also presume reward in the afterlife for the pious. — Janus

Perhaps the problem here turns on the difference between recognizing suffering and coming to terms with it. Philosophy emphasizes recognizing it; religion is primarily concerned with coming to terms with it.

Perhaps the problem here turns on the difference between recognizing suffering and coming to terms with it. Philosophy emphasizes recognizing it; religion is primarily concerned with coming to terms with it. — Ludwig V

Are you suggesting that it is (only?) through religion, and not through philosophy that we can come to terms with suffering?

Sure, Isn't the concept of karma precisely intended to reconcile the apparently random distribution of good and evil into the mora/ethical order? It may succeed psychologically, but does it stand up philosophically? — Ludwig V

Karma is really a kind of watershed between Eastern and Semitic religions. It must entail one or another kind of reincarnation or rebirth, if karma is to have consequences beyond this existence (and if it doesn’t then it’s a very shallow idea). I’ve discussed it many times on this forum, and I get Western culture is averse to the idea of karma and rebirth, it’s culturally taboo. But I remain open to it. I will add, though, that I despise the popular idea that karma is used to explain or rationalise misfortune or imply blame or retributive justice. It is only ever beneficial as what Kant would have described as a ‘regulative principle’, something to guide one’s own actions.

Are you suggesting that it is (only?) through religion, and not through philosophy that we can come to terms with suffering? — Janus

It depends what you call philosophy and what you call religion. Boethius (and many others in his time) certainly thought that philosophy could provide consolation. How would you classify his attempt? Ancient philosophers seem mostly to have been confident that philosophy can help us to cope with suffering. But since the scientific revolution, that project seems to have been more or less abandoned and so left to religion (where humanism would count as a religion).

I do want to high-light the difference between two projects, but I don't want to over-simiplify it.
Consoling someone in distress is not the same project as someone analysing the causes of that distress, even though the two projects play into each other.

This is not something I have thought through, but something I am working out.

Karma is really a kind of watershed between Eastern and Semitic religions. ..... It is only ever beneficial as what Kant would have described as a ‘regulative principle’, something to guide one’s own actions. — Wayfarer

It is indeed a watershed. I don't rule out the possibility that there may be more interesting interpretations availble that might make more sense to a Western person like myself. But I don't feel competent to discuss them. The regulative principle idea does seem to have possibilities.

I will say that the narrow conception of moral responsibility at work in much Western moral discourse seems to me just as much of a myth as the (naive) doctrine of karma. On the other hand, there are many Biblical quotations about the sins of the father being visited on the children.

The principle exists in the NT, ‘as you sow’ - but in Christian doctrine I think it is defrayed by Christ’s atonement. But it’s a very deep question.

But it’s a very deep question. — Wayfarer

It is sad how often it is the deep questions that get postponed. This one is so deep that I have no idea how to approach it.

I'm not going to spoon-feed you further. — Janus

I think the way you write is muddled and this just tells me you have limited interest in clarification.

quote what I've said and say precisely where you think it's wrong if you disagree. — Janus

Okay:

Misery cannot but be bad according to <the human conception of goodness>. — Janus

I take this to be saying that humanity has a single agreed-upon definition of goodness, and that misery is bad according to that definition. I think that is obviously false. For example, there are people who think that it is good for sinners to suffer. They think this not because they are irrational, but because they have a different idea of goodness than you do.

This discussion seems to me to have suffered from an ambiguity about whether suffering can be justified or not. Some suffering may have a justification (a beneficial effect), in which case, it might be classified as not suffering, but something else. "Suffering" would then be only "unjustified suffering" — Ludwig V

A person who believed this would have to be committed to saying there is no suffering in hell, which is a statement I don't believe I've ever heard. And I mean "hell" as in fire and brimstone, people wailing in pain etc. Imagine looking at that and saying "no suffering detected".

I agree that all of what you cited are fitting problems for philosophy. But I also think that ever since Kant, Hegel notwithstanding, it has been obvious that the traditional idea that one could arrive at metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is, if not impossible, at least impossible to verify. — Janus

Good. And starting with Kant, and the relation of metaphysics to human knowledge, would be a sensible program. We could take a sounding on what is indeed possible, both to know and/or to verify. My only quibble: If the conclusion here is obvious, as you say, one wonders why the debate has nonetheless gone on with vigor for so long -- i.e., you may be right, but not obviously right.

The principle exists in the NT, ‘as you sow’ - but in Christian doctrine I think it is defrayed by Christ’s atonement. But it’s a very deep question. — Wayfarer

Yes -- the reconciliation of justice with mercy. I may be wrong, but I get a flavor of this in some versions of Buddhism as well. The bodhisattva deserves to be released from the wheel of dharma -- that would be just. But they choose to show mercy on unenlightened beings by returning to help them.

When you {plural} use the word "God" are you referring to A) the triune God of Christianity, one aspect of whom is a person capable of empathizing with human suffering? — Gnomon

I think I may have been unclear using the word “justified”. I meant accounted for.

With whatever conception of God there is that fits the all-good-powerful-knowing God of the argument, I am asking why is it we can’t account for all the pain and suffering if there is such a God, but we can account for it without God? Why is it we are fine adjudging “An all-good God would not want there to be any suffering let alone all of the gratuitous suffering, but nature needs there to be all of this suffering in order for it to function at all.’ ??

My answer: we don’t know God; we can’t say “an all-powerful God would be able to prevent all suffering, or an all-good God would not want there to be any suffering.” Those who accept the Problem of Evil argument and conclude there must not be such a God are willing to leave suffering as it is and move on to continue their lives in the presence of no-God, but unwilling to live those lives as justifiable in the presence of God.

Basically, God must be a jerk if he doesn’t immediately end suffering as it might arise (or before suffering), but more likely, God must not even exist. OR, we maybe don’t understand God at all. AND therefore, the argument proves/means nothing.

With whatever conception of God there is that fits the all-good-powerful-knowing God of the argument, I am asking why is it we can’t account for all the pain and suffering if there is such a God, but we can account for it without God? Why is it we are fine adjudging “An all-good God would not want there to be any suffering let alone all of the gratuitous suffering, but nature needs there to be all of this suffering in order for it to function at all.’ ?? — Fire Ologist

Strangely, most people in the world do believe in some kind of god-concept, as an explanation for basic existence. Yet, they strive to appease the mythical mercurial ruler of the world, because they know that as bad as things are, it could get worse. For Christians, that "worse" is The Worst : eternal suffering in Hell. So despite the routine woes of life in God's creation, the long-suffering victims sing the praises of their redeemer, who will reward them with The Best : eternal bliss in Heaven. This reminds me of the old saying "justice delayed is justice denied".

As you said, Nature seems to inherently "need" (require) both positive & negative variables. This dichotomy goes back to the nature of Energy (causation) : it "works" by alternating between Hot & Cold, More & Less, Pain & Pleasure, Life & Death. These up & down variations are inherent in the cycles of Space-Time. So, we tend to view impersonal Nature non-judgmentally as "it is what it is", but we judge a personal God, capable of Love & Hate, in terms of Good vs Evil. Making God vs Devil a necessary adjustment to the monotheistic ideal.

That's why Spinoza's God/Nature was described as impersonal : it omits the Good/Evil judgements, and stoically accepts the Pain/Pleasure dimension as simply Natural. It's the same Paradise-failed reality, viewed from different perspectives, and with different expectations : differing accounting methods. :smile:

Sure but Spinoza, probably out of not wishing to offend the religious authorities even further than he already had and out of his belief that the masses need a personal conception of God anyway, spoke in terms of "Deus sive Natura", where he could have simply spoken of natura. An impersonal God offers no comfort, and Spinoza did not believe in any afterlife. — Janus

Yes. I think the world was "created" in some sense : Big Bang. But the creation could only be considered intentional in the sense that purposeful, intentional creatures have emerged from the progressive evolutionary process. So, the Bang must have had the potential for purpose. Hence, the Cosmos can be viewed as personal & purposeful in that self-aware & motivated beings inhabit the Earth, and soon learn to take care of themselves.

Yet, when humans are born, they are weak, ignorant, and needy. So, they cling to mother for sustenance and comfort. Consequently, even as adults we often feel the need for soothing solace from another similar being. Unfortunately, other mature --- but sometimes cranky --- humans, with problems of their own, may be less inclined to mother weepy grown-up strangers. Therefore, the wishful notion of a supernatural parent capable of unconditional love, and power to fix broken things, is understandable.

That's why I don't discuss emotion-suppressing and myth-busting rational philosophy with members of my own family, who still feel the need for a more personal & caring I-Thou relationship than Spinoza's natura can offer. :smile:

PERSONAL COMFORT & CONSOLATION

With whatever conception of God there is that fits the all-good-powerful-knowing God of the argument, I am asking why is it we can’t account for all the pain and suffering if there is such a God, but we can account for it without God? Why is it we are fine adjudging “An all-good God would not want there to be any suffering let alone all of the gratuitous suffering, but nature needs there to be all of this suffering in order for it to function at all.’ ?? — Fire Ologist

This belief seems easy enough to parse. Isn’t it the case that if there is no god and no meaning then needless suffering actually makes sense? It’s what you’d expect to see in a world with no inherent purpose - struggle, chaos and suffering, But if creation is about genius design and magnificent order and if God cares for us and wants a relationship with us, then suffering by apparent design does not make much sense. It seems contradictory. This is a convincing idea. Of course if your God is an abstraction, a recondite, ground of being type deity, then one would be less likely to have any expectations of the ‘material world’. And no doubt theology can explain away anything.

The three-in-one Christian god-head is still popular among the masses, but waning with the intelligentsia, — Gnomon
I may have the wrong end of the stick, but I have the impression that the difference between the God of the masses and the the God of the philosophers goes all the way back to Xenophanes in the earliest years of philosophy in Ancient Greece. — Ludwig V

Yes, rational philosophers have always felt less need for the personal touch of anthro-morphic gods. But analytical mathematician/statistician & probability theorist Blaise Pascal, argued that, although we can't be sure the God of theologians even exists, we would be wise to bet on the "house" to win.

He also decried the feckless God of philosopher Spinoza, who can do no more than what happens mechanistically in Nature. And the majority of humanity seems to agree with him. Strangely, some of Pascal's fellow Catholics, believed so sincerely in the infinite reward-pot after death that they were willing to cut short their mortal coil, and go all-in. How can austere reason compete with such popular passion, and long-term thinking? :smile:

PS___ Ironically, Pascal might be surprised to learn that modern science views Nature as statistical instead of mechanical. Does that mean that we are all playing the odds. Does that imply a gambling god? One who does not predetermine the path of nature?

The statement "nature is statistical not mechanical" is a philosophical perspective often debated in physics, suggesting that the universe operates on a probabilistic, rather than deterministic, basis. This perspective is often tied to the idea of quantum mechanics, where measurements are probabilistic rather than having a predetermined outcome.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=nature+is+statistical+not+mechanical

Good. And starting with Kant, and the relation of metaphysics to human knowledge, would be a sensible program. We could take a sounding on what is indeed possible, both to know and/or to verify. My only quibble: If the conclusion here is obvious, as you say, one wonders why the debate has nonetheless gone on with vigor for so long -- i.e., you may be right, but not obviously right. — J

Note that i haven't said that the discovery of universal metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is obviously impossible, but that it is obviously impossible to demonstrate that what has been purportedly discovered is truly a discovery and not simply an imagining. I wonder how, and hence if, we could ever go about demonstrating such a thing. As far as I can tell it remains, and always will remain, a matter of faith. I'm always ready to be corrected on that.

So, the Bang must have had the potential for purpose. — Gnomon

That would only seem to hold if you take the so-called laws of nature to be fixed and immutable from the beginning. Peirce didn't think that, and as far as I remember from studying Whitehead quite long ago, nor did he.

Misery cannot but be bad according to <the human conception of goodness>.
— Janus

I take this to be saying that humanity has a single agreed-upon definition of goodness, and that misery is bad according to that definition. I think that is obviously false. For example, there are people who think that it is good for sinners to suffer. They think this not because they are irrational, but because they have a different idea of goodness than you do. — goremand

A weak response. You continue to ignore context and try to shift the blame for your poor comprehension onto a purported lack of clarity. I haven't said that no one ever thinks it is good for someone else to suffer. Of course they may think that but that only strengthens my argument: they think it is good for the evil or hated person to suffer as punishment, because they understand that suffering is bad for the one who deserves punishment.

I have always been talking about good and suffering per se. The fact that suffering to some degree might be good for the athlete; "no pain, no gain" does not weaken my argument because this, as well as punishment thought of as reformatory is always already in the context of the world that contains suffering we find ourselves in.

The theological notions of heaven and hell also demonstrate my point. Heaven is the desirable place of no suffering and hell the most feared place of endless suffering. Buddhism too, has as its aim the ending of all suffering for all beings. Religions in general have as their aim in one form or another salvation from suffering; which only goes to show that suffering, misery is universally considered to be, as such, bad.

So, the idea of a perfectly good and loving, all-knowing and all powerful being as the creator of this world is incompatible with the realities of this world, as it follows logically that he could have created a perfect world of no suffering for his creatures for the start. That has been the thrust of my whole argument and your strawmanning and throwing in of red herrings has done nothing to weaken it.

It depends what you call philosophy and what you call religion. Boethius (and many others in his time) certainly thought that philosophy could provide consolation. How would you classify his attempt? Ancient philosophers seem mostly to have been confident that philosophy can help us to cope with suffering. But since the scientific revolution, that project seems to have been more or less abandoned and so left to religion (where humanism would count as a religion).

I do want to high-light the difference between two projects, but I don't want to over-simiplify it.
Consoling someone in distress is not the same project as someone analysing the causes of that distress, even though the two projects play into each other.

This is not something I have thought through, but something I am working out. — Ludwig V

I take philosophy to be primarily about how best to live. I guess the question is as to whether we need consolation or whether we need to come to terms with our condition. Would coming to terms with our condition, in the sense of being able to be at peace with it without expecting anything greater to be on offer to count as consolation? Or should we consider only a promise in some form or other, of some more perfect life to come, as we find in the various religions, to count as consolation?

The bodhisattva deserves to be released from the wheel of dharma -- that would be just. But they choose to show mercy on unenlightened beings by returning to help them. — J

There are two ways in which someone can take rebirth after death: rebirth under the sway of karma and destructive emotions and rebirth through the power of compassion and prayer. Regarding the first, due to ignorance negative and positive karma are created and their imprints remain on the consciousness. These are reactivated through craving and grasping, propelling us into the next life. We then take rebirth involuntarily in higher or lower realms. This is the way ordinary beings circle incessantly through existence like the turning of a wheel. Even under such circumstances ordinary beings can engage diligently with a positive aspiration in virtuous practices in their day-to-day lives. They familiarise themselves with virtue that at the time of death can be reactivated providing the means for them to take rebirth in a higher realm of existence. On the other hand, superior Bodhisattvas, who have attained the path of seeing, are not reborn through the force of their karma and destructive emotions, but due to the power of their compassion for sentient beings and based on their prayers to benefit others. They are able to choose their place and time of birth as well as their future parents. Such a rebirth, which is solely for the benefit of others, is rebirth through the force of compassion and prayer. — H H The Dalai Lama, How Rebirth Takes Place

It depends what you call philosophy and what you call religion. Boethius (and many others in his time) certainly thought that philosophy could provide consolation. How would you classify his attempt? Ancient philosophers seem mostly to have been confident that philosophy can help us to cope with suffering. But since the scientific revolution, that project seems to have been more or less abandoned and so left to religion (where humanism would count as a religion). — Ludwig V

Very thoughtful observation. In the pre-modern world, philosophy and religion had a kind of common boundary, you might say, and quite a porous one, at that. I've sometimes thought that the role of philosophy is to 'drop you at the border', so to speak - after that, you're on your own! That, anyway, was very much the ethos of (neo)Platonism with its emphasis on contemplative illumination.

But this is where naturalism hems us in, so to speak. Insofar as we are simply another species, thrown up by the blind watchmaker, then the best we can do is one or another form of stoicism, soldiering on, coping, perhaps in the manner of Camus' Sisyphus ('It's hell, but lets keep smiling.') Or do whatever we can to ameliorate suffering and prolong life by whatever scientific means possible.

But all of the classical philosophies held to there being a higher truth, with philosophy being the manner of ascent to it. And in ascending to it, not simply ameliorate suffering, but to rise above it, to transcend it, to a realm of no-more-suffering.

I'm gloomily contemplating the idea that one of the underlying cultural problems around all of this was, in fact, created by Christian culture itself, in that the way it developed inadvertantly demolished the idea of the 'scala natura' and the idea of higher truth, that being deemed elitist and in contradiction of the universal salvation offered to all who would believe. In that way, it negates philosophy in favour of mere Christianity - leave your intellect at the door please. (Perhaps why Immanuel Kant, required to lead a formal procession of his students to Church on Sundays, would stop outside.)

But this is where naturalism hems us in, so to speak. Insofar as we are simply another species, thrown up by the blind watchmaker, then the best we can do is one or another form of stoicism, soldiering on, coping, perhaps in the manner of Camus' Sisyphus ('It's hell, but lets keep smiling.') Or do whatever we can to ameliorate suffering and prolong life by whatever scientific means possible. — Wayfarer

I've stated this a while ago, but I see a the big fundamental division between a cozy unified "oneness", and a cold eternal "separateness". The "naturalism", represents an artificial (at best) unification whereby maybe we can say, in theory, we are all a form of "matter/energy", or in the case of living organisms, all "organic matter", or some such. But this is cold comfort for those seeking something more substantial. So you have the notion of a spiritual/mystical/soul/mind that is "behind the physical", that is really a unified metaphysical thing. And this thing manifests itself in all the entities- and thus the entities are all examples of the Maya of the principium individuationis.

Why the Maya then? Why not just the unification itself?

To answer that, you can propose several things. One is that the world is actually not limited, but boundlessly infinite, and that every manifestation of world exists. This is one existence- one with various amounts of suffering and individual entities.

This really doesn't do much, but just adds an infinite Baroque quality to existence.

Why if it is tailor-made for this way of things, rather than just one contingent universe of an infinite set, is it tailor made for this or that? Then we have notions that any Logos-principle is itself a limiting factor. If it is not limiting, then it was simply one of a number or infinite variety. Why this Logos?

Why not all unification? Why not no suffering?

The answers become ways to justify this or that notion to make people feel better for a bit, or so it seems.

So you have the notion — schopenhauer1

So long as it remains notional, it is impotent. It requires an engagement beyond the word-processing department, so to speak.

A person who believed this would have to be committed to saying there is no suffering in hell, which is a statement I don't believe I've ever heard. And I mean "hell" as in fire and brimstone, people wailing in pain etc. Imagine looking at that and saying "no suffering detected". — goremand

You are quite right. But it seems to me, nonetheless, that there are important differences between the suffering of those who are in hell because they have sinned and the suffering of those like Job, who have done nothing wrong. It is the latter's suffering that cries out for a justification, or at least an explanation. Don't you think?

Yes -- the reconciliation of justice with mercy. I may be wrong, but I get a flavor of this in some versions of Buddhism as well. The bodhisattva deserves to be released from the wheel of dharma -- that would be just. But they choose to show mercy on unenlightened beings by returning to help them. — J

That's very good of them. What puzzles me is that mercy is so often represented as a kind of get-out-of-jail-free card that is handed out more or less at random to those who don't deserve it. How is this a good thing? Surely, it can only work if the suffering of unenlightened beings is undeserved. But if that's the case, their suffering is not just.

I take this to be saying that humanity has a single agreed-upon definition of goodness, and that misery is bad according to that definition. I think that is obviously false. For example, there are people who think that it is good for sinners to suffer. They think this not because they are irrational, but because they have a different idea of goodness than you do. — goremand

I don't think that there is a single agreed-upon definition of a good life for human beings. But there is sufficient agreement for us to understand that those who have different definitions disagree with each other, which requires a background of agreement.

although we can't be sure the God of theologians even exists, we would be wise to bet on the "house" to win. — Gnomon

I've always wondered what God would make of someone who only obeyed the commandments as an insurance policy. Wouldn't that be a species of pretending to accept them?

I take philosophy to be primarily about how best to live. — Janus

Well, yes. But then philosophy is in direct competition with religion - or, maybe, religion is a species of philosophy for those who don't grasp the point, or importance, of reason.
What people don't seem to face up to that even asking that question presupposes a complex conceptual structure which needs to be in place to enable potential answers to be articulated and evaluated.
I also have serious difficulty that our problem is in any way articulated as a list of options on a menu, from which we choose. Who writes the menu? Perhaps we live as we must and the only question is how far we can mitigate the down-sides that turn up in every item on on the menu.

You continue to ignore context and try to shift the blame for your poor comprehension onto a purported lack of clarity. — Janus

I think when there are issues of miscommunication, there is no fact of the matter on whether the speaker or listener is at fault, and debating it is usually a waste of effort. I'm sorry if you think I am being dense, but I hope you don't think it's on purpose.

Of course they may think that but that only strengthens my argument: they think it is good for the evil or hated person to suffer as punishment, because they understand that suffering is bad for the one who deserves punishment. — Janus

There is something here I am not getting. Are you saying good and bad are necessarily a matter of perspective? I don't think theists are committed to believing that, but let's just say that you are right.

Then, from Gods perspective it might be good when people suffer. And since his opinion is the only one that matters, it's irrelevant how many people think it is "bad for them". The world could still be a 100% perfect place according to God, the arbiter of everything. Where is the contradiction in believing this?

Of course, acknowledging this as a feeble mortal might require letting go of your own intuitions or feelings about what is good or bad, is that what you think is irrational?

But it seems to me, nonetheless, that there are important differences between the suffering of those who are in hell because they have sinned and the suffering of those like Job, who have done nothing wrong. It is the latter's suffering that cries out for a justification, or at least an explanation. Don't you think? — Ludwig V

Yes and no. The specific purpose is different, but they are both cases of God putting his stamp of approval on the suffering, which is the relevant point. It's "good suffering". And yes it does "cry out for justification", but that is what the Job story is supposed to give us.

I don't think that there is a single agreed-upon definition of a good life for human beings. But there is sufficient agreement for us to understand that those who have different definitions disagree with each other, which requires a background of agreement. — Ludwig V

Disagree with each other over what? The definition of a word?