What makes something a social construct is that it is made of society, not by society. The artificial river enables a certain structure of human relations, and that structure of relations is a social construct, not the river itself. — unenlightened

I want to take one more shot at this.

The human custom of swimming for recreation is a pattern of human behaviour; but swimming requires something to swim in, and what you swim in is not a human, but a body of water, either natural or manmade. (Those things, we might say, also have a role in the "language-game" of swimming.)

If you want to modify the human custom of swimming in some way, you could act either on people's behaviour or on the the non-human part of the custom. Both are part of the practice, so changing either will change the practice. You could also act on people's behavior by physically stopping them from swimming, or by changing their intentions to the degree that you can, by command or entreaty, etc.

There is a similarity between, say, draining and backfilling the local swimming hole, and physically stopping people from swimming there. Neither address the intentions of people. To address the intentions of people, rather than their ability to act on their intentions, you would talk to them or engage in some other symbolic action. Talking to a swimming hole does not change the swimming hole.

Building a fence around the swimming hole doesn't stop people from wanting to swim; in fact, it recognizes that they do. But after 350 years of not swimming, the fence probably wouldn't be needed anymore. Without the physical practice to sustain it, the custom of swimming, and the beliefs and intentions that went with it, would wither away. But they could come back.

The human custom of swimming for recreation is a pattern of human behaviour; — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure what your point is. There's nothing I want to disagree with in what you say, but since you don't mention social constructs...

Ok, I'll play with it a little. Say there is a little tribe living by a river. And perhaps they have an area designated for washing and swimming that everyone uses, and then another area where they do fishing. or grow watercress or something. And perhaps there is a sacred place where no one goes except to make offerings to the Crocodile God on Crocodile Day. One might at this point say that the river has been socially constructed into functional divisions - the river itself being undivided.

So Dr Tasmaner rolls up one day, and after looking around, goes to the elders and says, " Look, you need to change things around so that where you grow your watercress is upstream from where you bathe, because you are polluting the water, and then you get liver fluke in the watercress, and that is why you are all ill." You might persuade them, or you might not.

So a place is given a (social) meaning and a function - the bathing place. This matches the meaning and function of money, or the meaning and function of skin colour. How the meaning and function can be changed is for sure a matter either of physical necessity no more water or no more access, or of social change by persuasion that Jesus condemned bathing except of feet, or whatever.

So what's the conceptual problem?

So what's the conceptual problem? — unenlightened

Sorry, I didn't mean to give the impression I was disagreeing with you.

I feel like there's more to say on this topic, but I don't like anything I wrote today, so I'll get back to you.

Hey Un!...

I'd like to talk about the following snippet taken from the OP. I've skimmed over the thread looking for others to address my concerns, but there's always a chance I missed it. My apologies if that's the case.

You wrote:

One must surely want to say that there are facts of human nature if only that they are social constructers that are not, or not entirely social constructs.

I wonder...

Every answer hinges upon the notion of fact.

If facts are states of affairs, then certainly there are states of affairs involving human nature that are not rightfully called "social constructs".

States of affairs are not existentially contingent upon our awareness. Being a social construct most certainly is.

Yes, indeed. Hopefully we do not need to argue about the notion of fact here. But a reasonable example that one could use is that of sex and gender. Where babies come from is something we do not need to speculate about, and cannot legislate. But Apart from such interesting and important matters, what is a man, and what is a woman are very debatable and largely subject to the construction we put upon them. And as Streetlight referenced elsewhere, the behaviour mandated by such constructions in turn affects the physiology in terms of hormone levels at least.

Arguing about the notion of fact is pointless. I find it much better to grant the notion - whatever it may be - and then put it to the test by virtue of consistent use.

Gender is a hot topic, for sure...

Have we all but eliminated the determining factor(s), which used to be 'X' and 'Y' chromosomes?

Have we all but eliminated the determining factor(s), which used to be 'X' and 'Y' chromosomes? — creativesoul

I am so old that I can remember when the facts of chromosomes were not known. In those days the determining facts were genital not genetic. And they determined which public convenience you could use, and what kind of hairstyle you could sport. These days, and consult the guidelines for confirmation, it is not homosexuals and blacks that are rejected from society, but homophobes and racists. The determining facts are political.

That which is existentially contingent upon language, and that which is not.

Isn't that a central consideration?

If something is not existentially contingent upon language, then it most certainly cannot be sensibly said to be a social construct, despite the fact that our awareness of it's existence requires written language.

Social constructs are all subject to individual, familial, cultural, and/or historical particulars.

How we talk about things is language. What we talk about is not always.

That which is existentially contingent upon language, and that which is not.

Isn't that a central consideration? — creativesoul

I think it's important, but... R D Laing come to mind, with his talk about rules that include a rule that the rules cannot be talked about. No one actually tells you what you have to do if you have these chromosomes/genitals, and it is somewhat improper to do so outside the consulting room or the academy. Talk is only half of communication - there is show as well as tell.

Communication is 55% body language and I think 30% tone. The rest is words. So says the required seminar.

There can be heavy cultural influence as well. The consequences for crossing established lines could be death or that you become a holy person. Depends on your culture and era.

Not sure I follow you Un...

What I'm getting at, I suppose, is that the notion of social construct is far too vague to be useful. At least, it seems that way to me. If it is underwritten by thought/belief that we cannot get 'beneath' language, it seems that it would be all the more so inclined to arrive at a set of all sets. That is, if we cannot distinguish between our talk and what we talk about in some way or other which allows us to know the differences between our reports and what we're reporting upon, then everything ever spoken and/or written is a social construct.

I think an older critique talked about maps and territories...

Seems to me that much of what's problematic revolves around one particular social construct... moral/ethical thought/belief. To be clear, my notion of that includes any and all situations where there are codes of behaviour and/or considerations involving what's counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought/belief and/or behaviour.

Your example of the watercress and liver fluke is perfect.

How do we further discriminate between differing sets of moral belief? By what standard of 'measure'?

What I'm getting at, I suppose, is that the notion of social construct is far too vague to be useful. At least, it seems that way to me. If it is underwritten by thought/belief that we cannot get 'beneath' language, it seems that it would be all the more so inclined to arrive at a set of all sets. That is, if we cannot distinguish between our talk and what we talk about in some way or other which allows us to know the differences between our reports and what we're reporting upon, then everything ever spoken and/or written is a social construct.

I think an older critique talked about maps and territories... — creativesoul

I like vague. The vagueness of a screwdriver is such that everyone uses one to open tins of paint, and some of us us it to stir the paint too. Yet it also has the precision that one can fit the hinges of a door with it (once you've cleaned the paint off the end).

You know those city centre maps with a little label on "You are here"? How do they know? It is because the map is fixed in the territory, so if you are reading the map you are where the map is. These days, everyone has a marauder's map that constantly updates itself with its own location, and tells you where you are on the move. It's magic.

But less of this 'we', and 'our talk' here, because in the original sense, you are part of my territory rather than my map. Indeed you are too ephemeral to even appear on my map, and I bump into you unexpectedly here and there. At best there is a vague region marked in hope and ignorance 'Here be creative souls'. Rather, as nations are marked on 'political' maps that become in a few years out of date, and therefore historical, like a map of the Roman Empire. In the long run, the territory is changing, the continents drift, and nothing is fixed. You are here - for now.

Our talk changes the world. Our maps change the world, and they are part of the world and so cannot be absolutely distinguished. Think of town planning policy and its associated maps. They describe and also ordain. Yet a builder has the advantage over a philosopher, that he knows well to build according to the map, but on the territory; there is no confusion in his mind.

Sorry, I seem to be in poetic mode this morning; am I making any sense?

Making perfect sense Un. You've laid much the same groundwork for my own rejection of the objective/subjective dichotomy. A.J. Ayer put it like this:We are both objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and ourselves.

Still, it seems that culling out what counts as a social construct cannot be done with a single incision. Earlier you wrote "of the society" and not "by"...

Not sure I understand that.

Earlier you wrote "of the society" and not "by"...

Not sure I understand that. — creativesoul

Odd, isn't it, how one can have the simplest idea in one's head, yet find that other people have difficulty with it? Earlier, I used the example of an ant colony, which is literally made of ants in relationships behaving thus and so, identifying friend and foe, serving the queen, foraging nest building. and all these relationships, habits, hierarchies, constitute social constructs and are quite literally made of ants. I contrast this with an anthill, which is a complex structure made by ants and for ants but is not made of ants but of dirt.

The simplest example of a social construct would be a mating pair - a construct of two elements and one function. And then it develops in complexity with mating rituals, nest-building, and offspring, and so on. The nest is made of twigs, the mating pair is made of birds behaving towards each other.

Our nest is our computer network and the forum software, engineered stuff, but the forum itself is a social construct; it is us in structured relationships.

I missed that example. Evidently I skimmed more than I realized.

:-|

So, it seems that this criterion for social construct is one of basic elemental constituency, and yet it doesn't follow typical physical/nonphysical guidelines. Nor does it seem to be able to be determined by things like existential contingency.

An ant colony is made of ants, so it is a social construct. An ant hill is not made of ants, so it is not a social construct.

Where does language sit in this?

Is that one of the things that cannot be absolutely distinguished?

Another way to think about 'construction' - to crib a wonderful formulation from Stanley Cavell - is that it bears not upon a thing's being so, but upon it's being so. Or, in different words yet again, "An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field ... What is denied is not that such objects exist ... but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence." (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy).

Nice Street...

It seems that that points to an existential contingency. Namely, the one I've been working through for nearly a decade. That which is existentially contingent upon language and that which is not. However, that is too simple because the former is too broad in and of itself to be useful.

It also skirts around the efficacy that one's worldview has, which is basically what all the fuss about conceptual schemes was about, in addition to Witty's the limits of one's language is the limits of one's world.