First, I didn’t think you could understand me, so why bother. — Fire Ologist

And yet here you are.

Second, There are fifty things prior to my posts with Leon that you didn’t respond to. — Fire Ologist

Again, if you want me to respond, link my name. A common courtesy. I'll not be going over your posts looking to see if you ask me something. You are not that interesting.

Third, Seems muddle-headed for you expect courtesy from me. — Fire Ologist

I agree. Seems I erred in expecting curtesy from you.

Fire, I honestly havn't been able to follow most of what you wrote. I gave it a go. It didn't work. I'll leave you to it.

I honestly havn't been able to follow — Banno

:rofl: I know! That is so you! But thanks for saying it again.

4. Anything which is based on the irrational is bad — Leontiskos

That’s rather out of the blue. I think there are many many things, like love for instance, which are irrational and good.

- Generally love would be seen as non-rational, not irrational; independent of reason but not contrary to reason.

First, we do not need to have at hand the essence of some thing in order to talk about it. See the "mum" example given previously. We use words with great success without knowing the essence of whatever it is they stand for. Demonstrably, since we can talk about faith wiothout agreeing on the essence of faith.

Thinking we can't use words unless we first fix their essence is muddle-headed. — Banno

I think a child that successfully uses “mum” must necessarily have the essence of their mum. It’s just not a very developed concept.

If we can identify something we must have some conception of it and couldn’t that conception, however simple or complex, be considered the essence of it? Our concepts or essences may not align well, of course.

It's a tempting thought, but what exactly does having the concept "mum" amount to, apart from being able to tell mum from Aunty Jean and getting her to come by calling her name and so on? Some neural net, perhaps, that is active when one thinks of 'mum'? Or a form of "Mumness"?

What is it to "have the essence" of mum, beyond what one does?

If we can identify something we must have some conception of it... — praxis

What is it to have "some concept of it" beyond being able to identify it?


And essences are a bit different to concepts...

- :100:
You are enunciating the actual idea (as opposed to the common strawman). Good to see that happening. :up:

Ah yes, going back a step.

3. Faith is irrational — Leontiskos

I don’t think anyone would say it’s inherently irrational.

I don’t think anyone would say it’s inherently irrational. — praxis

See for example and the claims that began this part of the thread.

What is it to "have the essence" of mum, beyond what one does? — Banno

I’m thinking that pretty much all a child has is the essence of mum. No words or definitions. Mum may mean security, nourishment, and the like, on an instinctual or just ‘feel good’ level.

I don’t get it. Tom doesn’t claim that faith is inherently irrational in that post or the couple of subsequent posts.

"Belief without evidence" and "We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence" seem like pretty standard claims of irrationality.

If you don't see faith as irrational that's great, but anti-religious folks tend to view faith as irrational.

I’m thinking that pretty much all a child has is the essence of mum. No words or definitions. Mum may mean security, nourishment, and the like, on an instinctual or just ‘feel good’ level. — praxis

Something like that is perhaps correct. The babe understands the essence of mum, but not yet the details.

Is that the same use of "essence" as that of the Philosophers hereabouts? "that which makes a thing what it is and not another", or whatever?

I don’t get it. Tom doesn’t claim that faith is inherently irrational in that post or the couple of subsequent posts. — praxis

Some examples of faith are likely irrational. I provided examples earlier, such as the belief that black people or women are inferior. I've heard such views regularly expressed by theists, both Christian and Islamic, and I would say they don't have good reasons, so they are justifying a prejudice through faith.

No doubt some theists will hold that this is not the real use of faith or religion, but I wonder if this is a No True Scotsman fallacy. It seems to me that there's really no belief that one can't justify using an appeal to faith. As I wrote before, I have a friend who is a Catholic priest, and he often quips that faith is the last refuge of a scoundrel - with apologies to Dr. Johnson.

I also disagreed with the idea which many hold, that catching a plane is equivalent to believing in God, in terms of both being "faith-based" decisions. Having reasonable confidence in something based on evidence is different from having faith in things that are unseen.

That said, it's clear that the word "faith" has multiple meanings and holds different significance for different people. The religious bigots will always accuse atheists of being unphilosophical and polemical and wrong about faith and that's simply how these discussions go. I don't think religious people or "theists" are bad or stupid or delusional. Well, some obviously are... but so are some atheists.

Now whether it is reasonable to believe in God just on faith, I don't know. I would need to understand what this is supposed to mean.

Setting some criteria of relevance, to me, is a sibling to just saying there is such a thing as a definition. — Fire Ologist

More like a second cousin, I'd say, but I understand you. :wink: Again, though, let's keep in mind whether the "such a thing as a definition" is meant to refer to our innocuous, stipulated-for-the-purposes-of-discussion definition, or something more permanent and indisputable. Because the question of relevance can be similarly discriminated. Biologists are clear on their criteria of relevance for discussing and defining "tiger" in the second sense. We philosophers are not, when it comes to terms like "faith" -- again, excluding silly limit-case examples.

Is that the same use of "essence" as that of the Philosophers hereabouts? "that which makes a thing what it is and not another", or whatever? — Banno

Of course not, I would say it’s intuitive and that we all have intuitive assessments of things and the intuitive sense is foundational. Knowledge, analysis, and philosophizing can shape our intuitions and allows increased manipulation but the intuition is always there.

"Belief without evidence" and "We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence" seem like pretty standard claims of irrationality.

If you don't see faith as irrational that's great, but anti-religious folks tend to view faith as irrational. — Leontiskos

See Tom’s last post above.

I’m anti-religious and view faith as non-rational, though there are clearly many instances of irrational religious faith.

whether the "such a thing as a definition" is meant to refer to our innocuous, stipulated-for-the-purposes-of-discussion definition, or something more permanent and indisputable. — J

With respect to what is a definition, the only difference to me between the stipulated version, and the more permanent, to me, is a matter of degree. The stipulated version is likely weak, vague, minimally helpful, easily used imprecisely, and/or just bad (or accidentally good but need further investigation). The more permanent version is closer to useful and reflective of the thing defined.

It’s a question of degree, not some sort of difference in kind, between a stipulated definition or a more solid definition. So it’s all the same thing - a definition.

If we define “faith” as “not corned beef” we have a sort of silly limit case. But that’s the whole ballgame. We have a clear bright line between at least two things. We have a definition shaping up. We know a difference. If we want to look further at “corned beef” we should not look towards “faith”. That is to be treated as absolute, “indisputable, and permanent.”

This is just wildly unhelpful if trying to say anything more about either faith or corned beef.

This silly limit provides no good definition to either thing; but because I know “not faith” tells me something about “corned beef”, further investigation might bring me to a deli as opposed to a church. By the time I am pointing to “pastrami” and to “corned beef”, seeing where they overlap and where they differ, now my definition of corned beef might be starting to approach the essence of some thing. I’m much closer to something permanent and indisputable that might actually also function (use) to allow for communication to happen.

The stipulated definition isn’t innocuous in my view. It’s just likely a poor definition of the two things on either side of the limit, and, if still interested in discussing either of those two things, this limit needs further scrutiny and revision and detailed observation and wording that enables communication about those two things.

And now I realize I haven’t had a Reuben in months. What is “travesty”?

See Tom’s last post above. — praxis

He's changed his view. My point was that there are people who see faith as irrational, such as Tom (before he changed his view) and Bertrand Russell. I suppose if Tom Storm and Bertrand Russell were the only two people who ever thought faith was irrational, then there is no longer anyone who thinks that. :wink:

I’m anti-religious and view faith as non-rational, though there are clearly many instances of irrational religious faith. — praxis

Okay.

I’m anti-religious and view faith as non-rational, though there are clearly many instances of irrational religious faith. — praxis

The problem with these conversations is that if you can't say what X is, then you are not allowed to say that X is Y. So if you can't say what faith is, then you are not allowed to say that faith is rational or irrational or non-rational. And if you can't say what religion is, then you are not allowed to say that religion is rational or irrational or non-rational. None of the anti-religious in this thread have actually ventured to say what faith is,* and that's an enormous philosophical problem for those who are making claims about faith.

For example, suppose someone says that cars are bad. I ask what they mean by 'car'. Now if they refuse to answer, then their statement is meaningless, and that is the state of this thread. But suppose they answer, "A long-distance transport vehicle with four wheels and an internal combustion engine." I respond, "Are there any electric vehicles that are cars?" They adapt their claim, "Cars are neither good nor bad, but there are many instances of bad cars."

Now if they want to do philosophy they have to specify what makes a car good or bad, and why some cars are bad, and whether this has to do with cars per se or some extraneous factor. So they might say, "Everything which pollutes is bad; Internal combustion engines pollute; Therefore, cars with internal combustion engines are bad." That's what the anti-religious are required to do if they want to engage in philosophy.

* In the sense of a definition

It’s painfully obvious that faith is the most abused aspect of religion, isn’t it?

That's what the anti-religious are required to do if they want to engage in philosophy. — Leontiskos

In what sense do you think this is a requirement?

It’s painfully obvious that faith is the most abused aspect of religion, isn’t it? — praxis

Tell me what you mean by 'X' and I'll tell you what I think about 'Y'.

Martin Buber writes of two types of faith:

The Hebrew Emunah, which involves an I-Thou/personal relation between human and the divine. E.g. Abraham has emunah in God.

The Greek pistis, which involves an I-It/impersonal relation. For example, Christians have pistis in Jesus' resurrection.

It would be beneficial to the discussion to clarify these points.

Let’s say for now that X = trust.

Then I would say that trust is the most abused aspect of life, and that religion is part of life.

Martin Buber writes of two types of faith — BitconnectCarlos

I have read Buber on this in part. I tend to think he makes too much of the difference, but it would be worth discussing. Is the text publicly available?

Then I would say that trust is the most abused aspect of life, and that religion is part of life. — Leontiskos

More generally I’m inclined to say that power is the most abused aspect, though in society power amounts to influence and that includes a degree of trust. For the religious that degree of trust or faith offers enormous influential power, and as we all know, power corrupts.

In other words:

1. Power accompanies trust
2. Power corrupts
3. Religion involves more trust than non-religion
4. Therefore, at least insofar as trust is concerned, religion is more corrupted or corruptible than non-religion

This is a coherent argument. My issue is with the premise that dynamics of trust are necessarily corrupt, due to power. I have no qualms with the conclusion that religion is more corruptible on account of trust, but I simply don't see that where there is trust there is corruption. Trust is one of the most important and beneficial dynamics in human life. It is not straightforwardly connected with corruption.

Religion, as with all high things, results in the best and the worst ("corruptio optimi pessima"). If we strike trust from the record we handicap ourselves in both directions, and some may prefer that.

Trust can be earned or given blindly. What is the value of giving it blindly?