I was rather thinking the mere discussion of presupposed existential reality was Hume-ian, which may be considered half-Kantian.

Only the subject, by and for his conscious thinking self alone, does the full, strong, transcendental Kant.

Only the subject, by and for his conscious thinking self alone, does the full, strong, transcendental Kant. — Mww

This sentence doesn't make sense. Otherwise :up: :smile:

Alright, sure. I just think those things come from a brain that has evolved able to infer abstract structure in the information it gets from the environment. There is a kind of pluralism in the sense that depending on how the brain relates to the environment, different information appears on its sensory boundary and so different structures are inferred. Like say if you are looking at an object from different angles and it looks different. — Apustimelogist

Ok. The problem for me, however, is to explain from a purely physicalist point of view why there are these 'structures' in the first place.

For the world to intelligible imo just means that it has structure. To say the world has structureis just to say something like: there is stuff in it and it is different in different places, which is kind of trivial. — Apustimelogist

Not just that. It also means that the 'stuff' behaves in a certain manner and so on. And this 'order'/'strucure' is such that it can be understood (maybe only in part, but the point remains) by a rational mind.

Furthermore, it seems to me that intelligibility also conveys meaning. And I am not sure meaning is something you can explain in purely physical terms. For instance, the meaning of the word 'word' is difficult to explain just in physical terms. But, again, I assume that if one accepts that intelligibility is just a 'fact', then, also the associated meaning is assumed to be a 'fact'. I don't see both of them as trivial. But I think we have to agree to disagree here.

Yes, this doesn't make sense to me. If we can fit coherent models to reality, even if they turn out to be erroneous after some limit, it would suggest they capture some subset of the intelligible structure (at the very least intelligible empirical structure) of reality. This just happens to be embedded in a model whose wider structure is erroneous. — Apustimelogist

:up: I guess that the negation of this isn't 'impossible' but it doesn't seem plausible.

Not too sure what form the problem is supposed as having, but at first glance:
So if the ordered world of experience arises from the interaction between the mind and representations of the external domain….the problem disappears? — Mww

No, actually, I meant that from a Kantian perspective it's just difficult to explain, without assuming the intelligibility of the 'external world' (in the thing-in-itself), how the empirical world 'arises'. Of course, one might think to leave this unexplained, as perhaps the most consistent forms of transcendental idealism do.

For instance, Schopenhauer argued that the 'thing in itself' must be 'one' because plurality arises in the empirical world. That is, the will, according to him, as the thing-in-itself wasn't characterized by the properties that categories understand. But IMO this is self-contradictory. First of all, if the thing-in-itself is one, then, it can be understood by the concept of 'unity'. Secondly, he tried to explain how plurality arises by saying that it is 'imposed' on the will by the mind. But the minds are many, not one. So, at the very least Schopenhauer either had to say that plurality was ultimately an illusion (as in Advaita Vedanta, if you are familiar) or that the minds (and, therefore, plurality) are ontologically distinct from the will (while dependent on it). In both cases, however, I would say that Schopenhauer had to resort to 'pre-Kantian metaphysics' (either by denying the reality of plurality or by affirming it one must make a metaphysical statement). I don't think that this is 'bad'. But on this he was inconsistent.

IMO Kant was more careful here. He tried to assert nothing about the 'noumenon'. But, again, it is difficult to me to see transcendental/epistemic idealim as a stable position, especially in practice.

That which is mind-independent cannot be represented. With respect to Kant’s view alone, reality is not mind-independent, by definition hence by methodological necessity, the content of which remains represented not by the cognitive faculties, but sensibility. From which follows the ordered world of experience arises from that which is always truly presented to the mind, and from that, appearances to the senses are not merely assumed, but given. — Mww

I agree that 'reality' for Kant is not mind-indepedent if by reality we mean 'empirical reality'. In my post I didn't make a distinction between cognitive faculties and sensibility, which was wrong in terminology from a Kantian perspective. I do believe, though, that sensibility is also cognition (and IMO 'cognition' as generally understood shares some analogies with 'sensibilities'). If we want to stick to Kant's terminology, however, ok.

Anyway, the point is that within transcendental idealism you have an ordered, intelligible empirical world that is related to a mind. It seems evident - albeit we can't have a 'total certainty' - that this 'empirical world' is the result from an interaction between the subject and the 'external world' and the latter might be unknowable. But even if it is unknowable, the 'best guess' is that it somehow must have a structure/order that allows the 'arising' of the 'empirical world'.

Frankly, I still don't see how transcendental/epistemic idealism avoids the pitfall of 'epistemic solipsism', which might in a sense 'correct', in the sense that we have no 'certain knowledge' of anything outside us and 'the world as it is represented by us'. But I am my misgivings when this is taken to mean that we can't know anything about the 'thing in itself'.

From whence, then, does the interface arise? If the represented world of experience is all with which the human intellect in general has to do, there isn’t anything with which to interface externally, interface here taken to indicate an empirical relation. And if the only possible means for human knowledge is the system by which a human knows anything, the interface takes on the implication of merely that relation of that which is known and that which isn’t, which is already given from the logical principle of complementarity. Does the interface between that out there, and that in here, inform of anything, when everything is, for all intents and purposes, in here? — Mww

I am not sure about the point you make in this paragraph. The interface is the 'empirical world' itself, which is ordained by cognitive and sensitive faculties. The point is that the 'interface' is supposed to be a representation of something 'outside' of our minds which never 'appears' in the interface itself. Can we avoid an epistemic solipsism, however, if we deny that we can say anything about that 'something'.

Empirical/experienced world, and the variated iterations thereof, is a conceptual misnomer, though, I must say, a rather conventional way of speaking, not fully integrating the development of the concepts involved. That, and the notion of “intelligibility of the world”. Which sorta serves to justify why the good philosophy books are so damn long and arduously wordy. — Mww

Intelligibility of the world merely means that the world has a structure that can be 'understood' in terms of some conceptual categories, principles and so on. That is, that it has a structure that can be 'mirrored' to some conceptual order.

Not sure however what is your point about empirical/experienced world. It is IMO a somewhat clear concept to me. It is the world as it appears to a given mind.

There were no sensations in the universe before life came into being. — Relativist

Not sure if you understood Bradley's argument and similar. The point is: can you conceive a world that has absolutely no relation to 'sentient experience'?
Remember that our knowledge certainly starts from our experience. If we don't experience we don't know. And the point here is that we can't conceive anything except withing the framework of your experience and the mental faculties that 'make sense' of it.

This seems to entail abandoning our innate sense of a world external to ourselves. If one really believed this, why wouldn't one stop interacting with the world we're allegedly imagining? Why eat? Why work? — Relativist

It depends on the 'ontological idealist'. Ontological idealists of this kind, for instance, are generally not solipsists and they would affirm that there is something outside our minds: other minds and their mental contents. So, perhaps, while there is no 'material' world, there is still something external of us and, in fact, there are still other minds with which/whom can interact.

Understanding can only be from our perspective (it's like a non-verbal language - a set of concepts tied directly to our perceptions), but that doesn't mean it's a false understanding. And it has proven to be productive — Relativist

Right but this doesn't undermine neither idealism (epistemic or ontological) nor the argument that Bradley makes. There might be some kinds of sentient experience that we can't know but are in principle knowable.

Ironically, epistemic idealists would actually assert in a rather strong manner that our understanding can only be from our perspective. Certainly, a metaphysical physicalism asserts something 'more' than what empirical idealists claim we can know.

It is a necessary fact that survival entails successful interaction with the external world. Our species happened to develop abstract reasoning, which provided a "language" for making sense of the world- a useful adaptation. There may very well be aspects of the world that are not intelligible to us. Quantum mechanics is not entirely intelligible -we have to make some mental leaps to accept it. If there's something deeper, it could worse. — Relativist

I disagree that QM isn't intelligible. The predictions are certainly intelligible. The problem is with the interpretation. But, after all, even in newtonian mechanics there are various things that are matters of interpretation (such as how to understand 'forces').

Anyway, you are still asserting that there is intelligility without explaining it. That is, the very fact that evolution happened in a way that is intelligible to us means, to me, that the world is intelligible. 'It makes sense' that, say, language and reasoning allow us to adapt in a very flexible way to our environment. And this suggests that the world is intelligible (at least partly). My point is: why is it so? can we understand the 'structure' in purely physical terms?

Exactly. We can consider a universal by employing the way of abstraction: consider multiple objects with a property in common, and mentally subtract the non-common features. This abstraction is a mental "object", not the universal itself. — Relativist

Ok, thanks for the clarification. I am myself not sure if 'universals' are concepts or not.

What IS ontologically fundamental? Isn't it a brute fact? Even if it is mathematical, it's a brute fact that it's mathematical, and a brute fact as to the specific mathematical system that happens to exist. — Relativist

Well, at a certain point explanations do stop. Agreed. But IMO physicalism stops before the time. That is, I think that the intelligibility of the physical world has an explanation. Not that we can explain everything.

A physicalist perspective is that we abstract mathematical relations which exist immanently. There are logical relations between the pseudo-objects (abstractions) in mathematics, and logic itself is nothing more than semantics. — Relativist

So, the 'law of non-contradiction' is semantics?

Anyway, I believe that intelligibility also implies meaning ('making sense'). So, that's another reason why I don't understand how to explain (without assuming it from the start and leaving it de fact unexplained) how a purely physical world is intelligible.

Ok. The problem for me, however, is to explain from a purely physicalist point of view why there are these 'structures' in the first place. — boundless

I suspect that I don't understand what you mean.

It also means that the 'stuff' behaves in a certain manner and so on. — boundless

Sure, but I don't think that is any novel step from what I just said. To understand that behavior is then effectively just to be able to predict what happens next in some context. There's nothing special about that. A brain can do that in virtur of its physical properties regarding neurons.

Furthermore, it seems to me that intelligibility also conveys meaning. — boundless

Yes, meaning is just more prediction. Nothing different, nothing special.

For instance, the meaning of the word 'word' is difficult to explain just in physical terms. — boundless

The meaning of 'word' just comes from its associations with other aspects of our experiences which become apparent in how we use the word 'word'. Nothing more than prediction.

I guess that the negation of this isn't 'impossible' but it doesn't seem plausible. — boundless

What do you mean?

Most in fact, naturalism being one of them. Pretty much anything except materialism and idealism respectively. — noAxioms

Naturalism generally explicitly denies anything 'supernatural' (there is nothing outside the 'universe' or the 'multiverse'). Unless it is something like 'methodological naturalism' I don't see how it is metaphysically neutral.

I am aware of this wording, but have never got it. How can a perspective not be first person by the thing having the perspective, even if it's a tree or a radio or whatever? Sure, it might not build a little internal model of the outside world or other similarities with the way we do it, but it's still first person.

An internet intelligence might have thousands of points of view corresponding to widespread input devices. That's not a single perspective (just like our own isn't), but again, it's still first person. — noAxioms

Well, I believe we would disagree here about what is a 'first-person' perspective (see our discussion about 'perspectives' before). Anyway, the 'third-person perspective' is said to more or less be equivalent to a view from anywhere that makes no reference to any perspective.
I guess that you would say that there can't be any true 'third-person perspective', though.

I kind of lost track of the question. Classify the ontology of the first and third person ways of describing what might be classified as an observer? — noAxioms

I meant: is it dualistic to assume that there is indeed consciousness and 'the material world' and none of them can be reduced to the other with the proviso, however, that any of them are 'ontologically fundamental'?

OK, I can go with that, but it implies that 'stuff' is primary, interaction supervenes on that, and laws manifest from that interaction. I think interaction should be more primary, and only by interaction do the 'things' become meaningful. Where the 'laws' fit into that hierarchy is sketchy. — noAxioms

I actually agree with that. 'Stuff' requires both interactions and laws/regularities of how these interactions happen. You can't have 'stuff' before interactions and regularities, which both seem more fundamental (after all, every-thing in this world seems to be relational in some way...).

Depending on one's definition of being real, I don't agree here. A mind-independent definition of reality doesn't rely on describability. By other definitions, it does of course. — noAxioms

Well, is it interesting, isn't it? I believe that, say, someone that endorses both materialism and scientism would actually tell you that the world is 'material' and totally describable. It would be ironic for him to admit that this implies that is not 'mind-independent'.
I am open to the possibility that something mental is fundamental also because of this: if the 'physical world' truly has a structure that is describable by concepts and must have such a structure, then, it seems that 'something mental' is fundamental.

Anyway. If, in order to be mind-independent a definition of reality must not rely on describability would not this mean that, in fact, we can't conceive such a definition of reality?

My answer would be that the in-itself—the world as it is entirely apart from any relation to an observer—cannot be said to be non-existent. Of course something is, independently of our perception of it. But precisely insofar as it is independent of any possible relation to perception or thought, it is beyond all predication - hence, also, not really 'something'! Nothing can truthfully be said of it—not that it is, nor that it is not, for even non-existence is itself a conceptual construction.

In this sense, and somewhat in line with certain strands of Buddhist philosophy, the in-itself is neither existent nor non-existent. Any claim otherwise would overstep what can be justifiably said, since even the concept of "existing" or "not existing" already presupposes a frame of conceptual reference that cannot be meaningfully applied to what is, by definition, outside such reference. (The proper attitude is something like 'shuddup already' ;-) ) — Wayfarer

Yes, I would say that this is a possibility and perhaps it is the most consistent one if one accepts epistemic idealism. The 'in itself' is 'beyond concepts'. If this is so, then, it's not nothing because, if it would be nothing then, well, we could not experience anything. It can't be 'something' in the sense that it isn't something that we can conceive.

My problem with this is the following. If the 'in-itself' is so 'beyond concepts' it would imply IMO that, ultimately, the plurality is illusory. Either all reduces to 'one' (as in Advaita) or to 'neither one nor many' (as non-dualism is conceptualized in Buddhist schools). It just seems that we can, say, speak of 'boundless that is writing' but, in fact, there is no 'boundless' and the whole thing is illusion-like. If one wants, instead, to assign some reality to us and the world it seems to me that one must assume that the 'external world' has some intelligible structure. So IMO if one wants to follow the epistemic idealism model to its inevitable conclusions, then, it seems to me that, ultimately, one must say that selves, minds, the external world are illusion-like (not completely equivalent to illusions, perhaps, because when all that is ordered in conceptual representation is removed it's isn't true that nothing remains...). To be fair, some who say that the 'in itself' is beyond concepts accept just these things, so it's not a criticism, I guess. I am just not persuaded by these views.

IMO many empirical/transcendental idealists underestimate the implications of their model (I think that you do not BTW).

I suspect that I don't understand what you mean. — Apustimelogist

Well, I believe that it's simply becuase for you it is a fact that needs no explanation. So, you don't see a problem (perhaps I am the one that sees a problem where there is none. But I am not persuaded by that).

Yes, meaning is just more prediction. Nothing different, nothing special. — Apustimelogist

Not sure about this. Let's say you encounter the words "one way" in a traffic sign. How is that 'prediction'? It seems to me that here meaning is not predictive.

The meaning of 'word' just comes from its associations with other aspects of our experiences which become apparent in how we use the word 'word'. Nothing more than prediction. — Apustimelogist

Do you believe that, say, fictional stories (like, say, fantasy novels) are still 'predictions'? How is that so? They are certainly meaningful, but I am not sure that we can say that their meaning are instances of predictions.

What do you mean? — Apustimelogist

I meant that if the world is completely devoid of intelligible structure it might still be possible for us to make good predictions. It just doesn't seem plausible. It would seem to me an incredible amount of 'luck'. I can't, however, exclude with certainty that possibility.

Anyway, you are still asserting that there is intelligility without explaining it. — boundless

Here's where I explained it to Wayfarer:

what we take to be "the external world" is already shaped through our cognitive apparatus.
— Wayfarer

I agree. I've referred to this as innate, basic beliefs that are nonverbal. Arguably, these beliefs are PROPERLY basic: a product of the world as it is. If we are the natural product of the world, then of course it would produce beings with cognitive structures that enable successful interaction - so they would at least be FUNCTIONALLY accurate. The more closely this internal image of the world is to the actual world, the more flexible and adaptable the animal. When we compare ourselves to other animals, that's exactly what we see.

I am borrowing the concept of a PROPERLY basic belief from Alvan Plantinga, who uses the term to argue that theism is rational. He suggests that a God who wants to have beings that know him would instill an innate sensus divinitatus into them, by which they would know him and recognize what is true about him. This innate knowledge of God is basic (not learned), and it is basic "in the proper way" - produced by means that would be expected to produce it. This is not a proof of God (that would be circular reasoning), but rather a defense of the reasonableness of theism - that is contingent on there being such a God. If there is such a God, it means it's perfectly rational to believe in him. If there is not such a God, then belief in God is irrational (the alleged sensus divinitatus doesn't actually exist).

Analagously, if there is a world that produces living beings through natural processes, those beings would require a functionally accurate means of interacting with it - and the MORE accurate the internal picture of that world, the more flexible and adaptable the life forms. Similarly to Plantinga, this is not a proof, but it's a consistent and coherent theory that is rational to believe, even though it might be false.

And if I'm right that this is a basic belief (whether PROPER or not), then it's rational to maintain it unless defeated, and irrational to deny based on the mere possibility that it is false. — Relativist

we can't conceive anything except withing the framework of your experience and the mental faculties that 'make sense' of it. — boundless

This is unarguably true, but it doesn't imply the framework represents a false account. Consistent with evolution, it's plausible that our mental faculties came into being in order to interact with the world that we perceive and "make sense" of. Were these faculties to deceive us, we wouldn't have survived- so it is reasonable to maintain our innate trust in these faculties. Perfectly fine to keep the truism in mind, and adjust our inferences, but extreme skepticism seems unwarranted.

I acknowledge that I'm being speculative about the role of evolution - so (in isolation) this doesn't undercut idealism. But it does support the coherence of realism.

It depends on the 'ontological idealist'. Ontological idealists of this kind, for instance, are generally not solipsists and they would affirm that there is something outside our minds: other minds and their mental contents. So, perhaps, while there is no 'material' world, there is still something external of us and, in fact, there are still other minds with which/whom can interact. — boundless

Sounds like unwarranted skepticism- denying our innate sense of the external world on the basis that it's possibly false. Mere possibility is not a defeater of the innate beliefs the idealist was born with!

Right but this doesn't undermine neither idealism (epistemic or ontological) nor the argument that Bradley makes. There might be some kinds of sentient experience that we can't know but are in principle knowable. — boundless

This still relies on mere possibility. This is like a conspiracy theorist who comes up with some wild claim which he clings to because it can't be proven wrong. Only this is worse because there's no evidence to support the hypothesis.

So, the 'law of non-contradiction' is semantics?

Anyway, I believe that intelligibility also implies meaning ('making sense'). So, that's another reason why I don't understand how to explain (without assuming it from the start and leaving it de fact unexplained) how a purely physical world is intelligible. — boundless

Yes, the law of contradictions is semantics: it applies to propositions, not directly to the actual world.

How can it be that the physical world can produce physical beings that make sense of the world? The survival advantage explains the causal context. Can something physical experience meaning? I can't prove that it can, but it seems plausible to me. If you're inclined to think it cannot, then what would you propose to account for it? The problem you have is that you need to make some wild assumptions about what exists to account for it - and then I'd ask if those assumptions are truly more reasonable than physicalism?

Well, I believe that it's simply becuase for you it is a fact that needs no explanation. So, you don't see a problem (perhaps I am the one that sees a problem where there is none. But I am not persuaded by that). — boundless

I don't understand what you mean by the idea that structure of the world needs explaining. Its like asking why there is anything at all, which is a question not resolved by any perspective.

Not sure about this. Let's say you encounter the words "one way" in a traffic sign. How is that 'prediction'? It seems to me that here meaning is not predictive. — boundless

Its entirely prediction. You see the words, you infer the kinds of behaviors you expect to see in that context and act appropriately. Words and meaning is about association which is just what anticipates a word, what comes after a word, what juxtaposes words - that is all I mean by prediction. prediction is just having a model of associations or relations between different things. Like a map that tells you how to get between any two points. Fictional stories are included. Everything we do is included.

I think I have provided one, but that you're not interested in it, — Wayfarer

You haven't provided an overall metaphysical framework. When I asked, you said: "As to whether I advocate a metaphysics, it’s a notoriously difficult subject."

What is called 'reality' is not merely physical, but always shaped by mind. So, therefore, mind is truly a fundamental constituent of what we understand as reality, but in a transcendental rather than objective sense. — Wayfarer

A word is needed that refers to what actually exists. "Reality" seems the word to use. To claim reality is shaped by the mind, or is a constituent of reality (beyond the beings that have minds) is a rather drastic assumption based on pure conjecture.

Physicalism is not a falsifiable hypothesis. It's a philosophical view of the nature of reality. The central problem with physicalism is, as Schopenhauer says, that it seeks to explain what is the most immediately apparent fact, namely, the fact of one's own conscious experience, in terms of a hypothetical substance namely matter, the real nature of which is conjectural and uncertain. — Wayfarer

To me, it seems absurd to refer to matter as a "hypothetical substance", as if it's worth entertaining that it is unreal. Absurd, because it's unwarranted to believe matter to NOT be an actual substance. It seems a futile attempt to wipe our cognitive slate clean.

Any metaphysical theory - any ontology, will necessarily be "conjectural and uncertain" - it's neither verifiable nor falsifiable. That's a good reason to reserve judgement. But if that's what one is going to do, it's inconsistent to then embrace something wild that is even MORE conjectural and detached from anything we know about the world. MN takes the smallest leaps from the things we know.

As we've discussed, and you acknowledge, physicalism doesn't and probably cannot explain the nature of mind or consciousness, yet when we come to this point, that inconvenient fact is disregarded.

I said this is like trying to explain hurricane behavior using quantum field theory. There's nothing about hurricane behavior that warrants believing there to be some ontologically emergent properties or features that magically appear somewhere in between QFT and meteorology.

That post defends a perspectival form of philosophical idealism, arguing that mind is foundational to reality—not in the sense that the world is “in” the mind, nor that mind is a kind of substance, but that any claim about reality is necessarily shaped by mental processes of judgment, perception, and understanding. — Wayfarer

As I've said, it makes perfect sense to note that our PERCEPTION of reality (our image of the world) is shaped by these mental processes, but it's an unwarranted leap to claim that REALITY ITSELF is shaped in this way.

the world as known arises through the unifying activity of consciousness, which science has yet to fully explain and indeed generally tends to ignore. — Wayfarer

This sounds more reasonable than the claim that "mind is foundational to reality". But the question remains: where does this lead? I have no problem agreeing with what you said here, but how should that influence our efforts to understand the world? Our understanding will NECESSARILY be from our own perspective.

Mind independence is true on an empirical level as a definite matter of fact. But the problem with methodological naturalism, is that it wishes to extend mind independence to reality as a whole, to make a metaphysic out of it. — Wayfarer

You complained about problems with scienticism, which I pointed out is addressed with metaphysical naturalism. Then you choose to dismiss metaphysical naturalism (MN). MN demonstrates that there is no need to propose magic to explain the world. What would be the warrant to propose some UNnatural component (or foundation) of the world?

It tries to make a metaphysical principle out of empirical methodology. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. There's nothing empirical about MN. You're conflating scientism with MN.

Of course it does! As you've mentioned John Bell — Wayfarer

Not knowing the context, it sounds like he's referring to strict determinism as being unviable -contrary to Einstein's insistence on determinism. QM is fully deterministic - it conforms exactly according to a Schroedinger equation. The indeterminism arises when interacting with something beyond the quantum system. This is where multiple interpretations of QM step in to explain what is occurring - and these explanations are essentially metaphysical, with the same problems that any metaphysical theory has: unverifiable and unfalsifiable. No interpretation is really inconsistent with MN, unless you choose to treat consciousness as something special and magical to begin with.

As noted in the Nobel Committee's award statement, their findings suggest that "quantum mechanics cannot be replaced by any local hidden-variable theory," implying that the properties of particles are not predetermined but are defined only upon measurement. — Wayfarer

Are you conflating determinism with MN? QM is fundamental science; it is telling us something about the material world, not telling us there's something immaterial or magical.

doesn’t the idea that particles lack definite properties prior to observation strike at the very core of ‘mind-independence’? — Wayfarer

Not in the least. It shows that there are complementary properties, and that this complementarity is fundamental. The recognition that there are complementary properties is a testament to our ability to identify aspects of reality that are inconsistent with our natural prespectives - the perspectives that idealists seem to consider too constraining to grasp reality as it is.

To me, it seems absurd to refer to matter as a "hypothetical substance", as if it's worth entertaining that it is unreal. Absurd, because it's unwarranted to believe matter to NOT be an actual substance. It seems a futile attempt to wipe our cognitive slate clean. — Relativist

Metaphysics is first philosophy, it starts from first principles. Descartes started his famous meditation on Cogito with exactly that 'wiping the slate clean'.

Go back to the passage I was alluding to:

All that is objective, extended, active — that is to say, all that is material — is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But ...all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time. — Arthur Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation

Now, if you consider any material object - the computer you're looking at now, the desk it's sitting on, the keyboard you're typing on: 'all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time.'

You might explain the sense in which this is mistaken.

There's nothing empirical about metaphysical naturalism. You're conflating scientism with MN. — Relativist

You refer to 'facts of science' in defense of metaphysical naturalism, and specifically to reject anything perceived as inconsistent with modern science (teleology, qualia, formal and final causation, to mention a few.) You admit that physicalism doesn't really accomodate or explain the nature of mind. But then, when pressed about that, you say, that metaphysical naturalism is not science, even though it apparently relies on scientific ontology. Pardon me for so saying, but it seems a little disengenuous.

The indeterminism arises when interacting with something beyond the quantum system. This is where multiple interpretations of QM step in to explain what is occurring - and these explanations are essentially metaphysical, with the same problems that any metaphysical theory has: unverifiable and unfalsifiable. No interpretation is really inconsistent with MN, unless you choose to treat consciousness as something special and magical to begin with. — Relativist

Why the need for 'interpretations' at all? Why has the problem come up? You can't deny that debates over the meaning of quantum mechanics have been boiling ever since it was discovered. If there was a definitive explanation, then what were the arguments about, and why are they ongoing? Why was this thread created? Why does it ask 'does anyone support mind-independent reality'? Why did Einstein feel obliged to ask the question about the moon existing? You're not addressing any of those questions.

It just seems that we can, say, speak of 'boundless that is writing' but, in fact, there is no 'boundless' and the whole thing is illusion-like. If one wants, instead, to assign some reality to us and the world it seems to me that one must assume that the 'external world' has some intelligible structure. — boundless

Recall the koan, 'first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is.' 'First, there is a mountain' refers to before training, before initial awakening, the state of everyday acceptance of appearances. 'Then there is no mountain' refers to the state of realisation of inter-dependence/emptiness and the illusory nature of appearance. 'Then there is' refers to the mature state of recognising that indeed mountains are mountains, and rivers are rivers, but with a balanced understanding.

Not too sure what form the problem is supposed as having….
— Mww

I meant that from a Kantian perspective it's just difficult to explain (….) how the empirical world 'arises'. — boundless

Ahhhh, gotcha.

….one might think to leave this unexplained, as perhaps the most consistent forms of transcendental idealism do. — boundless

Kant’s T.I. does just that, to my understanding anyway. As in his statement that the proud name of ontology must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding, which is to say it is useless to inquire of the being of things, or indeed their possible nature, when there is but one a posteriori aspect of any of those things for our intellect to work with, and consequently supplies the rest from itself.

The empirical world doesn’t ‘arise’’; it is given, to the extent its objects are our possible sensations.
—————-

the point is that within transcendental idealism you have an ordered, intelligible empirical world that is related to a mind. — boundless

Would it be the same to say, within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding?

I can’t get behind the notion of an intelligible world, is all. Just seems tautologically superfluous to call the world intelligible, or to call all that out there an intelligible world, when without our intelligence it would be no more than a mere something. Just because we understand our world doesn’t mean the world is intelligible; it, more judiciously, just means our understanding works.

Anyway, thanks for getting back to me. I’m kinda done with it, if you are.

Of course something is, independently of our perception of it. But precisely insofar as it is independent of any possible relation to perception or thought, it is beyond all predication - hence, also, not really 'something'! Nothing can truthfully be said of it—not that it is, nor that it is not, for even non-existence is itself a conceptual construction. — Wayfarer

You've contradicted yourself. Non-existence may indeed be merely a conceptual construction, but when it comes to existence, it is the idea of existence which is a conceptual construction, not existence itself. This is where you confuse yourself.

I can’t get behind the notion of an intelligible world, is all. Just seems tautologically superfluous to call the world intelligible, or to call all that out there an intelligible world, when without our intelligence it would be no more than a mere something. — Mww

To say the world is intelligible just is to say that intelligences can make sense of it; which they patently do. Something can be intelligible, even if there are no intelligences to make sense of it, just as something can be visible even if no one sees it.

Metaphysical naturalism (MN) provides a metaphysical context for what we know about the world. Of course, any metaphysical theory should be consistent with what we know, but the strength of naturalism is that it depends the fewest assumptions. The basic assumptions of MN are not derived scientifically (as scientism would require)- they are a product of conceptual analysis - just like any other metaphysical system must do. — Relativist

However, if you drill down, the basis of the 'conceptual analysis' turns out to be scientific. If you discarded scientific cosmology, atomic physics, evolutionary theory, and so on, what would be left of 'metaphysical naturalism'? And, for that matter, isn't 'metaphysical naturalism' oxymoronic insofar as naturalism is generally defined in opposition to metaphysics?

Qualia are a problem, but can be rationalized as illusions. — Relativist

What is at issue inthis rather glib statement? What's hiding behind these words?

'Qualia' is an item of academic jargon intended to denote 'the qualitative aspects of experience' - the 'what it is like'-ness of seeing, smelling, touching, experiencing - of being, in short. So in what sense are qualia 'a problem'? They're a problem for physicalism, because physicalism claims that what is real must be objectively measurable, which these qualitative states are not. Physicalism recognises only atomic, molecular, and chemical reactions that can analysed in quantitative terms within the framework of mathematicized science. 'Qualia', the qualities of existence, are 'a problem' only insofar as they can't be accomodated within that framework. So they need to be 'rationalised as illusions'. Meaning that the qualities of experience, how it feels to be human, need to be rationalised away. But an illusion can only be an artefact of consciousness. One may have delusions about consciousness, but it's not possible that consciousness itself is an illusion.

You haven't provided an overall metaphysical framework. — Relativist

To do so would require probably another long post, but essentially, I try to combine elements of traditional metaphysics (Christian and Indian) with phenomenology whilst also keeping within the outlines of evolutionary science and cosmology. I see the evolution of life in terms of the manifestation of intelligence, through which the Universe becomes aware of itself. So life and human life in particular, are not the products of chance, but neither necessarily the products of an external 'intelligent designer'. 'What is latent', as one lecturer put it to me, 'becoming patent'.

In Buddhist philosophy, the source of suffering is attachment (or clinging) to what is transient and ephemeral revolving around ego-centred consciousness. The aim of philosophy is release from those attachments, known in Eastern philosophy as liberation or mokṣa, whereas the absence of insight into that is to be ignorant of the causal chain that drives existence. Much more could be said, but that's the general drift of the metaphysical framework as I understand it.

Yeah, yeah, I know. Those gawdamn language games, right? All a guy’s gotta do is open his mouth and he’s stuck in one. Or, what’s worse, a guy opens his mouth and somebody else accuses him of being stuck in one.

Be that as it may, our intelligence makes sense of things; the manifold of sensible things is conceived as reducible to an intelligible world. All well and good, except the world possibly contains things that make no sense, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is irrational, or, the intelligible world of sensible things for some members of it, is not the experience of others, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is merely contingent.

And when you consider the fact that, for us anyway, there is but one world of things….period, and there is only one single method available for making sense of it….period, it seems pretty bold to say the one is intelligible when it’s exactly the same method in play by which things make sense on the one hand, and, conceives the reduction of the manifold of sensible things to a descriptive world, on the other.

And to nickel-and-dime this even further, what of consciousness, which in the Good Ol’ Days used to represent the manifold of all sensible things, of all those things of experience. For some reason or other it was seen as fit to extract the internal, subjective, empirical content of experience represented by consciousness, and move it to the external objective empirical content of a logically constructed compendium represented by “world”.

But, hey, just between you ‘n’ me ‘n’ the fence post, the internal subjective, empirical content of consciousness can’t be extracted, which makes the conceived reduction to an intelligible world….you know….tautologically superfluous. And furthermore, while both the intelligible world and consciousness contain that of which sense has been or can be made, consciousness cannot contain any of that of which no sense can be made, while it remains impossible to know whether the intelligible world contains such things or not.
—————-

Oh man. Don’t even get me started on the visibility of the unperceived. (Grin)

Here's where I explained it to Wayfarer: — Relativist

Ok, thanks for the clarification. But note, that, however one can still say that we have been proven wrong in our assumptions many times, even by science itself. It's obvious, for instance, the Sun and the stars revolve around us.
Of course, the existence of a 'physical world' is something more fundamental than the motion of celestial objects but the point is interesting regardless.
Furthermore, note that even the most radical of the ontological idealist often assumes that the minds interact. So, even for them, there is an external world. It's just very, very different from what we tend to think.

So, I'm not sure if your argument here is compelling. But I agree that denying the 'physical' seems to much of a stretch. But this isn't something that all ontological idealist do anyway. Neither neoplatonists nor Hegel nor classical theists (if we consider them as 'idealist') deny the existence of the 'physical'.
Berkeley and Bradley apparently did but ontological idealism is a very wide spectrum.

This is unarguably true, but it doesn't imply the framework represents a false account. Consistent with evolution, it's plausible that our mental faculties came into being in order to interact with the world that we perceive and "make sense" of. Were these faculties to deceive us, we wouldn't have survived- so it is reasonable to maintain our innate trust in these faculties. Perfectly fine to keep the truism in mind, and adjust our inferences, but extreme skepticism seems unwarranted. — Relativist

But note that, however, pragmatism doesn't imply truthfulness. For instance, it is useful for me to 'know' that the Sun rises in the east and sets in the west even if, in some sense, it's false. So, even if I believe that the Sun truly revolves around the Earth this can be still an useful belief for me.
That said, of course, unwarranted skepticism can be dangerous. So, the best might be to not claim 'sure knowledge' and be open to revision of one's own beliefs, especially those that we can't have 'direct access' to a verification or falsification.
I would say that, however, the existence of an external, partially intelligible physical world is a reasonable belief to be mantained. But I do not claim certainty about this.

This still relies on mere possibility. This is like a conspiracy theorist who comes up with some wild claim which he clings to because it can't be proven wrong. Only this is worse because there's no evidence to support the hypothesis. — Relativist

I see what you mean but Bradley's argument is at least different in character. While I don't buy the conclusions it is still interesting. Saying that it's like a conspiracy theory is a disservice to it.
IMO it raises interesting questions also about the nature of the 'physical', even when we assume that it is real.

Yes, the law of contradictions is semantics: it applies to propositions, not directly to the actual world.

How can it be that the physical world can produce physical beings that make sense of the world? The survival advantage explains the causal context. Can something physical experience meaning? I can't prove that it can, but it seems plausible to me. If you're inclined to think it cannot, then what would you propose to account for it? The problem you have is that you need to make some wild assumptions about what exists to account for it - and then I'd ask if those assumptions are truly more reasonable than physicalism? — Relativist

Again, I can even agree with this. But note, that 'meaning' seems something that relates to mind. So, if meaning is something that relates to the physical too (and, in fact, it is something fundamental), it would seem that the 'physical' is not that different from the 'mental'. In other words, we land to a physicalism that seems not to far from a panpsychism (or at least quite open to the 'mental').

I don't understand what you mean by the idea that structure of the world needs explaining. Its like asking why there is anything at all, which is a question not resolved by any perspective. — Apustimelogist

I disagree, unless you think that existence involves intelligibility (which is something that classical metaphysics asserts but I'm not sure physicalists generally would say). In any case, if you assume that the world is intelligible and its existence must be intelligible too, then it would be meaningful to ask if the world is contingent or not contingent and discuss the consequences of such statements.

Its entirely prediction. You see the words, you infer the kinds of behaviors you expect to see in that context and act appropriately. Words and meaning is about association which is just what anticipates a word, what comes after a word, what juxtaposes words - that is all I mean by prediction. prediction is just having a model of associations or relations between different things. Like a map that tells you how to get between any two points. Fictional stories are included. Everything we do is included. — Apustimelogist

I'll need to think about this. This is also because it includes things that I would never classify under the term 'prediction'. Not saying that you are wrong in calling that way.

Recall the koan, 'first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is.' 'First, there is a mountain' refers to before training, before initial awakening, the state of everyday acceptance of appearances. 'Then there is no mountain' refers to the state of realisation of inter-dependence/emptiness and the illusory nature of appearance. 'Then there is' refers to the mature state of recognising that indeed mountains are mountains, and rivers are rivers, but with a balanced understanding. — Wayfarer

Well, appearances are not negated but they must be recognized as 'mere appearances'. So, the 'mountain' seems to be an entity but, in fact, it isn't. But this doesn't mean that the there is no 'appearance of a mountain'. The mountain is illusion-like. So, I guess that one might attach some ontological status to the 'mountain' but it is very tenuous.

Anyway, as you know, most Buddhist schools regard the 'self' as illusion-like/mere appearance. Of course, there are various strands of Buddhist thought. I believe that Madhyamaka and Yogacara come close to transcendental idealism. But, in both case, both the 'self' and the 'world' (and thus every thing) are illusion-like, mere apperances. When all conceptual constructs are removed, 'what remains' is neither 'something' nor 'nothing' (because, after all, apperances cannot be negated).

In Advaita, the reasoning is similar but Advaitins affirm that recognizing the apperances as 'mere appearances' actually leads one to the conclusion that only Brahman is real. It's no chance that IIRC that both Advaitins and Madhyamikas argue that the when we anlyse the world correctly, we come to the conclusion that no thing ever arose. For the Advaitin this means that there is, ultimately, only the unarisen Brahman. For the Madhyamika, ultimately, both oneness and plurality don't apply - 'Suchness' is not a unity, nor a collection of things but not even nothing. Our concepts do not apply (Kant would IMO say that we can't know if they do not apply or they do...).

Nowadays I am less persuaded by these views even if I am still very fascinated by them. I do believe that multiplicity is real. Even if we and the things in the world are ontologically dependent, it isn't true that we and them are ultimately illusion-like. We maintain our identity as distinct from what is not us. And the distinction is real.

Kant’s T.I. does just that, to my understanding anyway. As in his statement that the proud name of ontology must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding, which is to say it is useless to inquire of the being of things, or indeed their possible nature, when there is but one a posteriori aspect of any of those things for our intellect to work with, and consequently supplies the rest from itself. — Mww

Ok, thanks!

The empirical world doesn’t ‘arise’’; it is given, to the extent its objects are our possible sensations. — Mww

But, in fact, it does, right? Before I was born, for instance, the empirical world that I am now cognizing didn't really exist. If there was a point in time that my mind didn't exist, then, given that the empirical world is not 'independent' from it, it would seem that the empirical world arose. So, it seems to me that the question is worth asking.

If there is no answer to that question is either because we can't know it or becuase there is, indeed, no answer because, perhaps, what is 'beyond' the empirical world cannot be known conceptually.

Would it be the same to say, within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding? — Mww

The problem is that even asking this question and assuming that we can, indeed, answer it seems to go beyond transcendental idealism. A consistent transcendental idealist IMO would simply say: "I cannot answer this question".

I can’t get behind the notion of an intelligible world, is all. Just seems tautologically superfluous to call the world intelligible, or to call all that out there an intelligible world, when without our intelligence it would be no more than a mere something. Just because we understand our world doesn’t mean the world is intelligible; it, more judiciously, just means our understanding works. — Mww

I disagree. If we say that the world is intelligible we are saying something non-trivial. That is, it has a structure/order that can be grasped by our faculties of understanding.
The empirical world of transcendental idealism can be grasped because it is constructed by the mind via sensibility and other mental faculties. On the other hand, if the 'external reality' is intelligible, we are saying that it has a structure that is graspable. This structure/order is not imposed by the mind but it's 'there'.

So, I would say that it is an explanation of why our understanding works not just a mere recognition that it does.

Anyway, thanks for getting back to me. I’m kinda done with it, if you are. — Mww

Thanks to you too! I hope I clarified a bit more.

Now, if you consider any material object - the computer you're looking at now, the desk it's sitting on, the keyboard you're typing on: 'all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time.'

You might explain the sense in which this is mistaken. — Wayfarer

Sure. It seems to conflate the object (the existent that we naturally believe we are perceiving) with the perception of the object. It's perfectly fine to draw attention to the perception process, but I object to blurring the distinction. It's unclear what is meant by coming "under the forms of space, time and causality". Is this just a reference to our cognitive interpretation? Is there some reason to think space, time, causality, and spatial extension are all imaginary?

I don't understand what is being referred to as "relatively present". Is it the perception? Is the actual object? I can't tell if this is nit-picking what "the present" is (the act of perception takes a bit of time).

In general, the whole quote appears to be applying hyperskepticism to perception - which I think entails hyperskepticism about everything. Am I misinterpreting that?

You refer to 'facts of science' in defense of metaphysical naturalism, and specifically to reject anything perceived as inconsistent with modern science (teleology, qualia, formal and final causation, to mention a few.) — Wayfarer

Consider a hypothetical metaphysical theory that was inconsistent with the "facts of science". I feel strongly that such a theory has been falsified by those facts. I use the scare-quotes because all facts of science are tentatitve- because they are falsifiable, but they are nevertheless the best available explanation for the phenomena they concern - and it would be foolish to just assume they're false, in order to embrace the metaphysical theory. A metaphysical theory needs to be consistent with everything we "know" about the world ("know" in the sense that we have a body of well-supported information).

You had claimed Metaphysical Naturalism "tries to make a metaphysical principle out of empirical methodology". Aristotelean 4-causes is not methodology, it's an analytical framework - a paradigm. It's a paradigm that modern science doesn't use - although material and efficient causes are consistent. Modern science uses a different paradigm, and its methodologies are based on this - but the paradigm is not methodology. That's a conflation. Why shouldn't MN start with the modern, successful paradigm? Why assume teleology? Why treat the form of something as a "cause", in a sense similar to an efficient or material cause? Is some fact of the world otherwise left unexplained?

You included qualia in your list. Neither science nor MB denies that qualia are something in need of explanation.

You admit that physicalism doesn't really accomodate or explain the nature of mind. ...

What I've said is that there are aspects of mind that physicalism doesn't now adequately explain. That honest assessment doesn't entail the existence of something nonphysical, and besides - you admitted physicalism wasn't falsified.

But then, when pressed about that, you say, that metaphysical naturalism is not science, even though it apparently relies on scientific ontology. Pardon me for so saying, but it seems a little disengenuous

Scientific ontology? Theoretical physics does discover things that exist, and seeks to account for them in terms of something more fundamental, so it's ontology. It's also part of the uncontroversial facts of the world that any metaphysical theory would need to be consistent with (idealist skepticism notwithstanding).

So yes, MN accepts the conclusions of modern science- but it is flexible enough to accommodate the tentative nature of those conclusions. And MN does use a paradigm fully consistent with science. Do you have a better one? I've asked for this, and you've indicated it's both difficult and out of the scope of your interests.

So I don't get why you'd think I was being disingenuous. The space between science and MN is small, but that's a point in its favor - parsimony. You denigrated the relevance of parsimony, but you offered no alternative means of evaluating a metaphysical theory. You seem to be reacting to the fact that MN dispenses with some traditional metaphysics - but this misses the point. That's a main reason why a comprehensive metaphysical theory was needed - much of metaphysical theory was inconsistent with physicalism. That fact is a feature, not a bug.

any claim about reality is necessarily shaped by mental processes of judgment, perception, and understanding. — Wayfarer

I've never disputed that. You haven't answered my question about this: how should that influence our efforts to understand the world?

Contrary to the dominant assumptions of physicalism and metaphysical naturalism, which treat the physical world as ontologically basic and knowable through objective science, this essay argues that all knowledge of the world is always already structured by the perspective of a subject. This does not mean denying the empirical reality of a world independent of any particular mind, but rather recognizing that mind is the condition of the intelligibility of any objective claim. — Wayfarer

Physicalism does assume the world is physical, top to bottom - so it fits "ontologically basic". Provide some reason to think this is false, beyond the mere possibility that our cognitive processes are delivering a false picture.

Sure, our knowledge of the world is shaped by our perspective. So what? What are the relevant implications? I've explained why I believe perceptions of any organism would provide a functional view of the world - survival requires it. And I proposed that the more congruent the worldview is to actual reality, the more adaptible it is. There's good evidence we have a more accurate view of the world than other animals, in certain respects.

You seem skeptical of our perceptions, but provided no reason for it other than by noting the processing involved and that there's a distinction between our cognitive image of the world, and the actual world. I assume that you nevertheless trust your perceptions as you drive home and select your meals. You haven't identified a problem with my "properly basic beliefs" account. So please explain why anyone should reject their perceptual world-view.

Qualia are a problem, but can be rationalized as illusions.
— Relativist

What is at issue in this rather glib statement? What's hiding behind these words? — Wayfarer

These issues: 1) we have subjective experiences that we label as "qualia". 2) There is no fully satisfactory physical account of them. 3) The absence of a fully satisfactory account of qualia does not falsify physicalism. 4) I have pondered the problem myself, and came up with the idea that qualia (their nature-what they feel like) may simply be mental illusions. Consistent with representationalism, they are still representations of something (e.g. pain represents damage) but the nature of pain- the feeling itself, is otherwise unaccounted for. Their nature seems manufactured by our central nervous system, and manifest as they do in our consciousness. That was my personal hypothesis, and then I later discovered that some physicalist philosophers had developed the same illusionist idea. It's still the best answer I have at present for a physicalist account, and it demonstrates that physicalism is not falsified by qualia. Nevertheless, I doubt any non-physicalist would embrace the theory.

You've now accused me of being "glib" and "disingenuous", both of which are insulting. Please try and be polite.

Why the need for 'interpretations' at all? Why has the problem come up? You can't deny that debates over the meaning of quantum mechanics have been boiling ever since it was discovered. If there was a definitive explanation, then what were the arguments about, and why are they ongoing? Why was this thread created? Why does it ask 'does anyone support mind-independent reality'? Why did Einstein feel obliged to ask the question about the moon existing? You're not addressing any of those questions. — Wayfarer

Do you disagree that explanations are metaphysics and unfalsifiable? An interpretation is needed because the ontological implications of QM conflict with our natural world-view. As I said, the fact that we've been able to grapple with this is a testament to our abilities to consider theory that is inconsistent with our perceptual world-view. I assume asked about the moon to highlight a perceived folly with the notion that consciousness is a factor in measurement. You may not think that notion is folly, but I'm with Einstein on this one - even though I do think "God" throws dice. Why are debates ongoing? because the matter hasn't been settled, and probably can't be - it's a philosophical question, and as you know - philosophers can't settle much of anything. Someone who believes reality is fundamentally mind-dependent can interpret it in a manner consistent with that view (I have no objection to doing this)- but doing so doesn't constitute a reason to believe reality actually IS mind-dependent - it's not a reason to think it likely.

Regarding the question posed by the title of this thread: the question seems to imply that we ought to reject the existence of mind-independent reality. Should we all do that? I certainly don't think so. Should anyone do that? I am still waiting for someone to give a good reason for doing it. You've only identified some reasons for a degree of skepticism, but haven't explained how this is more than mere possibility.

*edit* I overlooked this:

However, if you drill down, the basis of the 'conceptual analysis' turns out to be scientific. If you discarded scientific cosmology, atomic physics, evolutionary theory, and so on, what would be left of 'metaphysical naturalism'? — Wayfarer

State-of-affairs ontology, immanent universals, law realism, truthmaker theory, and the entailments of all these. IOW, it would be 100% intact.

And, for that matter, isn't 'metaphysical naturalism' oxymoronic insofar as naturalism is generally defined in opposition to metaphysics?

I gave you a definition from Blackwell that fits. Other definitions don't fit. If you don't like using the label, we can call it something else, but recognize it stands as a mutually exclusive alternative to theories you would likely label "metaphysics".

I disagree, unless you think that existence involves intelligibility (which is something that classical metaphysics asserts but I'm not sure physicalists generally would say). In any case, if you assume that the world is intelligible and its existence must be intelligible too, then it would be meaningful to ask if the world is contingent or not contingent and discuss the consequences of such statements. — boundless

This is just going in loops I can't follow
A physicalist would say that you can describe how a brain does what it does in understanding the world virtue of physical processes by which it works and interacts with other physical processes.

This is also because it includes things that I would never classify under the term 'prediction'. — boundless

Don't think about it as prediction then. Its just about models or maps that tells you where things are in relation to others. My use of the word "predict" is clearly an idiosyncracy that comes from its appearance in neuroscience where I would give it a slighlty more general meaning.

Ok, thanks for the clarification. But note, that, however one can still say that we have been proven wrong in our assumptions many times, even by science itself. It's obvious, for instance, the Sun and the stars revolve around us. — boundless

Of course, but it's rational to maintain a belief before it's disproven, and its irrational to reject something just because it's logically possible that it's false. This latter is my issue with idealism, per my understanding of it.

So, I'm not sure if your argument here is compelling. — boundless

It wasn't an argument to show idealism is false. I was just showing that it is rational to deny idealism. I'm struggling to find a rational reason to deny mind-independent reality exists. The only reasons I've seen so far is because it's possible. That's not a good reason. There's loads of possibilities - many of which conflict with one another. Surely it's at least POSSIBLE that mind-independent reality exists - so what's the reasoning that tips the scale away from that?

But note that, however, pragmatism doesn't imply truthfulness....the existence of an external, partially intelligible physical world is a reasonable belief to be mantained. But I do not claim certainty about this. — boundless

I agree that we can't be absolutely certain. And while I also agree that pragmatism doesn't imply truth, my impression is that idealists interact with the world pragmatically (they eat, sleep, piss, work, raise kids...) - and if so, this seems like cognitive dissonance. Why get out of bed, if they truly believe mind-independent reality doesn't exist? If they aren't walking the walk, it makes me think they're just playing an intellectual game (perhaps casting a middle finger at reality, a reality that places relatively little value on a PhD in Philosophy: "F__k you! You don't even exist! Nya Nya!).

IMO it raises interesting questions also about the nature of the 'physical', even when we assume that it is real. — boundless

The issues raised with perception and the role of our cognitive faculties are definitely worth considering. But how should influence our efforts to understand the world beyond acknowledging the role of those cognitive faculties?

note, that 'meaning' seems something that relates to mind. So, if meaning is something that relates to the physical too (and, in fact, it is something fundamental), it would seem that the 'physical' is not that different from the 'mental'. In other words, we land to a physicalism that seems not to far from a panpsychism (or at least quite open to the 'mental').

Exploring the nature of "meaning" is a worthwhile philosophical endeavor, and it seems to me that it's entirely within the scope of the mind. That's because I see its relation to the external word as a matter for truth-theory: what accounts for "truth"? I'm a fan of truthmaker theory, which is just a formalized correspondence theory: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in reality (what it corresponds to, is the truthmaker).

All well and good, except the world possibly contains things that make no sense, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is irrational, or, the intelligible world of sensible things for some members of it, is not the experience of others, in which case the reduction to an intelligible world is merely contingent. — Mww

Right, it's not as though we can claim that the world is absolutely intelligible―to claim that would be to claim that we know everything there is to know about the world. We could never reasonably claim that, given that we could never know that we had got it all.

As to others interpreting things differently, I think that is understandable given that the world of things is more complex than we can imagine, offering an almost infinite variety of things to be noticed and understood. In other words there are many ways to make sense of things, and to make sense of things is to make them intelligible.

I don't buy the idea that that is an arbitrary process entirely governed by the mind― it seems far more reasonable to think that the things constrain our ways of making sense of them as much as the nature of our brains does, and that we are blind to both of these constraining influences. This is what I have referred to as the pre-cognitive conditions that govern our cognitive sense-making.

And when you consider the fact that, for us anyway, there is but one world of things….period, and there is only one single method available for making sense of it….period, it seems pretty bold to say the one is intelligible when it’s exactly the same method in play by which things make sense on the one hand, and, conceives the reduction of the manifold of sensible things to a descriptive world, on the other. — Mww

Where do you get the idea that there is only one single method available for making sese of the one world of things? I'm not even sure what that means, but if you can say that there is but one world of things it would seem that you have made sense of it. As to there being but one single method available for making sense of things, I don't think that is supportable. I mean, what is this purported method?

Also, if I understand what you are saying correctly, you seem to be conflating method with world.

But, hey, just between you ‘n’ me ‘n’ the fence post, the internal subjective, empirical content of consciousness can’t be extracted, which makes the conceived reduction to an intelligible world….you know….tautologically superfluous. — Mww

Do you believe there is an internal, subjective, empirical content of consciousness? I don't know what that even means. How could you know about such a thing?

I don't think it's that complicated―it just seems undeniable that we find ourselves in a world which makes sense to us, by and large―not completely, to be sure―we are not omniscient.

….the empirical world that I am now cognizing…. — boundless

Do you see the difference in that, and this: the world of my cognition. The empirical world you are now cognizing must be the same world I am now cognizing, else there must be as many empirical worlds are there are cognizers, which is absurd. The world of your, or my or anyone’s, cognition, on the other hand, is singular and private. If you were to say the world of your cognition did not exist before you were born you’d be correct without equivocation, but the empirical world of my cognition remains existent and unaffected.
————-

If there was a point in time that my mind didn't exist, then, given that the empirical world is not 'independent' from it, it would seem that the empirical world arose. — boundless

We haven’t yet agreed the world, or reality, whichever, is mind-independent? I should hope we have, in which case, if in any time your mind didn’t exist the existence of a world is irrelevant, and for the time in which your mind does exist…..it doesn’t but suffice it to say you have one…..the world was already there awaiting your perception. Or, which is the same thing, the world is given, in order for you to even have perceptions for your mind to work on.

You might say the magnitude of the world’s composition, or maybe the relations between various constituents of it, arises in direct proposition to your experiences.
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…..(mighten it be that) within, or under the conditions of, e.g., transcendental idealism, an ordered, intelligible representation of our empirical world is constructed, in relation to our understanding?
— Mww

A consistent transcendental idealist IMO would simply say: "I cannot answer this question". — boundless

If a set of conditions is described in a philosophical methodology, he who holds with the rational power of such method damn well better be able to answer any question predicated on it. In fact, T.I does describe a cognitive method in which a construction of this sort does relate to our understanding.

What the T.I. advocate cannot answer, is whether or not the method actually represents the way the human cognitive system works, and indeed, with respect to cognitive science proper, it is far from it.

The gist of the first Critique is, basically, one shouldn’t worry so much about the answers he can’t get, but more the questions he wouldn’t even have asked if only he’d thought about it a bit more.
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If we say that the world is intelligible we are saying something non-trivial. That is, it has a structure/order that can be grasped by our faculties of understanding. — boundless

Yeah, but that exact same world is unintelligible to other beings, or has a structure/order grasped differently by other intelligent beings. So where does the structure/order actually come from, when different intelligences grasp the exact same thing in different ways?

The common rejoinder is that it isn’t the exact same thing. A bug’s world is different from a fish’s world. But that’s not really the case, is it. The world from a bug’s perspective is different than the world from a fish’s perspective, but the world itself, is what it is regardless of either. Same with all other beings, I should think, or there comes mass contradictions.

Havin’ fun yet?

It (Schopenhauer's analysis) seems to conflate the object (the existent that we naturally believe we are perceiving) with the perception of the object. It's perfectly fine to draw attention to the perception process, but I object to blurring the distinction. It's unclear what is meant by coming "under the forms of space, time and causality". Is this just a reference to our cognitive interpretation? Is there some reason to think space, time, causality, and spatial extension are all imaginary? — Relativist

Space and time are not imaginary, but nor are they properties of things in themselves. They are forms of intuition—that is, they belong to the structure of experience, not to things independently of experience. They're part of the conditions under which anything at all can appear to us as an object. In that sense, they are functions of cognition—not invented by the mind, but intrinsic to how the mind makes sense of what it receives.

Your objection seems to come from a position that assumes we can somehow stand outside both perception and object, as if we could compare “the thing as it is” with “the thing as it appears.” But that’s precisely what Schopenhauer—and before him, Kant—insists we cannot do. We never encounter the object “in itself”; we only ever encounter appearances—ideas, in Schopenhauer’s terms—which are already presented in accordance with the structures of mind: space, time, and causality.

Take any object you perceive—your keyboard, for instance. Its mass, extension, color, and hardness are all sensory qualities that correspond to your perceptual categories of sight, touch, etc. Its function as a tool corresponds to a conceptual framework you've learned and internalized. All of that—sensation plus interpretation—is what Schopenhauer means by “idea.”

The object as such is not separate from the idea; it is the idea, for us. This is not a denial of reality, but a statement about how reality appears, and through what structure it becomes meaningful to us at all. To ask what the object is “apart from” all that is to ask what the object is apart from any consciousness of it —an intelligible question perhaps, but one with no experiential content.

This insight—that every object is already shaped by the structures of perception and understanding—later became a stepping-off point for phenomenology which built on this by exploring how the world is always "given to" consciousness, and how even our sense of objectivity is conditioned by the intentional structures of experience.

And that continues into phenomenologically-informed cognitive science today—especially in enactivism and embodied cognition. These approaches recognize that perception isn’t a passive mirror of a ready-made world, but an active synthesis of sensorimotor patterns, embodied engagement, and context-sensitive understanding. The world, as experienced, is always co-shaped by the organism's mode of being.

So this is not just a metaphysical musing—it’s part of a serious and ongoing philosophical effort to understand how experience, meaning, and cognition are bound up with the structure of appearance itself.

Anyway, as you know, most Buddhist schools regard the 'self' as illusion-like/mere appearance. Of course, there are various strands of Buddhist thought. I believe that Madhyamaka and Yogacara come close to transcendental idealism. But, in both case, both the 'self' and the 'world' (and thus every thing) are illusion-like, mere apperances. When all conceptual constructs are removed, 'what remains' is neither 'something' nor 'nothing' (because, after all, apperances cannot be negated). — boundless

the Dharmakaya is nevertheless real - but never to be made the subject of dogmatic belief. But that is definitely another thread (or forum!)

I don't buy the idea that that is an arbitrary process entirely governed by the mind…. — Janus

…then it becomes rather difficult to explain knowing things.

…..it seems far more reasonable to think that the things constrain our ways of making sense of them…. — Janus

Yes, the only proofs, the checks and balances, for the sense we make of things, resides in the things.

….and that we are blind to both of these constraining influences. — Janus

We can’t be blind to the one insofar as we are the ones directly engaged with it, but I’d agree we’re at least partially blind to the checks and balances ordained by Nature, at least before the fact. She’ll certainly let us know all about it post hoc, though.
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Where do you get the idea that there is only one single method available for making sese of the one world of things? — Janus

Toss-up between parsimony and pure logic? All else being given, all humans have a common cognitive mechanism, whatever that may be, and all humans direct that mechanism in the same general direction concerning the same multiplicity of objects. Everybody starts out ignorant, subsequently thinks for himself and learns through experience.

As to there being but one single method available for making sense of things, I don't think that is supportable. I mean, what is this purported method? — Janus

HA!!! You’re lookin’ for me to say something irrevocably Kantian, huh? Only a dope wouldn’t grant transcendental idealism as the singular most powerful explanatory doctrine regarding the human cognitive modus operandi, dammit!!! Get with the program already, jeeeeezz.

Yeah, well…that ain’t right, is it. The single method available to humans in general, is whatever method the human brain uses. All metaphysical theory is speculative gap-filler for the absence of empirical knowledge, the intention of which is to express to oneself a priori, in the least self-contradictory way, that for which he hasn’t, and is unlikely to obtain, the slightest empirical clue.

I mean, there’s gotta be a reason virtually every human ever, agrees with each other with respect to the most obvious natural conditions. Again, all things considered, no human on Earth ever fell up; no human with sufficient experience ever took a stop sign to mean don’t bother stopping, and never mind those trite absurdities like 1 + 1 might not equal 2.
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Do you believe there is an internal, subjective, empirical content of consciousness? I don't know what that even means. How could you know about such a thing? — Janus

Could just call it memory. Only difference is memory is all and only empirical representational content, re: totality of experience, whereas consciousness is the totality of all our representations, experiential and purely abstract, re: a priori.
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I don't think it's that complicated―it just seems undeniable that we find ourselves in a world which makes sense to us…. — Janus

Nahhhh, it isn’t that complicated. But we humans….some of us….are inclined to make it so, sometimes, for whatever reason. And yeah, it does seem undeniable we understand our environment, at least enough to survive in it and at most enough to learn from it.