Sorry. Posted prematurely by accident.

Space and time are not imaginary, but nor are they properties of things in themselves. They are forms of intuition—that is, they belong to the structure of experience, not to things independently of experience. They're part of the conditions under which anything at all can appear to us as an object. In that sense, they are functions of cognition—not invented by the mind, but intrinsic to how the mind makes sense of what it receives. — Wayfarer

So...your view is that space and time are entirely mind-dependent. Is this a premise, or can you provide reasoning that entails this? Needless to say, I don't buy it.

How do you account for the past, before any human-like intelligence existed?

Your objection seems to come from a position that assumes we can somehow stand outside both perception and object, as if we could compare “the thing as it is” with “the thing as it appears.” — Wayfarer

My position (which is not what my objection is) is that we are part of the world, that are sensory perceptions deliver a reflection of that world which is interpreted by our cognitive functions in a way that is congruent to reality. From this foundation, our abstract reasoning has enabled us to identify more aspects to reality than our senses deliver (e.g. composition, relations, laws, natural history). We "make sense" of all of this through these cognitive faculties, and this entails casting these derived facts in a fashion congruent to our noetic structure (which is partly innate and partly learned). So we aren't "standing outside" perception, but we can abstractly grasp aspects of reality that are beyond our perceptions.

I would view "the thing as it is" to be the thing's composition, its intrinsic properties, and its relations to other objects. Among those relations is the way it's related to it's material and efficient causes. What I have just outlined is a "state of affairs". Are we missing something? Possibly, but my position is rational to believe unless it's either rationally defeated or an alternative explanation can be shown to be superior.

We never encounter the object “in itself”; we only ever encounter appearances—ideas, — Wayfarer

Indeed, we are encountering appearances - specifically, what our senses deliver to us, and the sense we make of those appearances (e.g. the colors, angles, etc) - but it is the object itself that appears that way to us - so we are indeed encountering the object itself. Why would you, or Schopenhaurer deny that we are actually encountering the actual object? This seems an unwarranted skepticism. My view is that we are PERCEIVING aspects of the actual object, and if this is being denied, I'd like to understand the justification for denying that.

Of course, our perceptions aren't necessarily delivering the object's intrinsic properties, but some of the actual properties are reflected to us in our perceptions. Example: color is not an intrinsic property of an object, it's a quale that gives us the capacity to discriminate, but it's physically accounted for by the wavelengths of light that are reflected from the surface. Through analysis, we are able to identify aspects of the object that do constitute intrinsic properties. Example: we might identify mass as an intrinsic property of an object. Further analysis reveals that mass may not be fully an intrinsic property, but rather - a consequence of interactions with the Higgs field. I only mention this to point out that much of what we know is tentative and subject to revision. But at each stage, we're identifying a best guess at what the object actually is - at least in some respects. A degree of skepticism is appropriate because all scientific "knowledge" (body of accepted facts) is tentative. Feel free to add an element of skepticism on the basis that our foundational starting point (our perceptions and cognitive faculties) is a step removed, but then I ask: what's the value of doing this, other than as an intellectual nod to possibility? Why treat it as tentative, like we do scientific knowledge, when there is zero chance of correcting it?

This insight—that every object is already shaped by the structures of perception and understanding—later became a stepping-off point for phenomenology which built on this by exploring how the world is always "given to" consciousness, and how even our sense of objectivity is conditioned by the intentional structures of experience.

I agree, and this is 100% consistent with everything I said. It would be absurd to ignore the role of our senses and cognitive apparatus.

So this is not just a metaphysical musing—it’s part of a serious and ongoing philosophical effort to understand how experience, meaning, and cognition are bound up with the structure of appearance itself. — Wayfarer

Again, I 100% agree. Did you think I'd disagree? Do you think any of this is inconsistent with state-of-affairs ontology, law realism, immanent universals or truthmaker theory? It's not.

So...your view is that space and time are entirely mind-dependent. — Relativist

I wouldn’t say that space and time are “entirely mind-dependent” in the sense of being subjective or personal. I’m not saying they’re imaginary or arbitrary, nor that they vary from person to person. What I’m proposing is in line with the Kantian (and later phenomenological) insight that space and time are conditions of appearance—they are the framework within which any object can appear to us at all, not features of things as they exist independently of experience. That is the sense in which they're not mind-independent.

Why? Because we never encounter any object that is not extended in space and persisting or changing through time. But we never experience space or time themselves apart from the objects and events that are given in them. Time and space are preconditions of experience, but not themselves objects of experience.

A degree of skepticism is appropriate because all scientific "knowledge" (body of accepted facts) is tentative. Feel free to add an element of skepticism on the basis that our foundational starting point (our perceptions and cognitive faculties) is a step removed, but then I ask: what's the value of doing this, other than as an intellectual nod to possibility? Why treat it as tentative, like we do scientific knowledge, when there is zero chance of correcting it? — Relativist

Here, I’d say the value isn’t in treating our foundational perceptual and cognitive framework as "tentative" in the same way we treat scientific hypotheses—after all, as you say, we can't "revise" the basic conditions of human cognition. But acknowledging their conditional or constructed nature serves a different philosophical purpose: it helps us see the limits of objectivity, and opens space for deeper inquiry into the nature of reality and experience.

Kant’s insight—and I think Schopenhauer, Husserl, and even parts of quantum theory echo this—is that the very things we take for granted (space, time, causality, objecthood) are not absolute givens, but conditions for appearance. We can’t “correct” them from the outside, but we can come to understand how they frame everything we think and perceive, and that’s not trivial.

Why bother? Because once you see that the world we experience is not the world-in-itself, but the world as it appears under certain cognitive conditions, you begin to notice how easily we mistake models for reality, conceptual constructs for independent facts, and contingent frameworks for absolutes. That has enormous implications—not only for metaphysics, but for ethics, consciousness, and our place in the cosmos.

In short, it’s not about revising cognition—it’s about cultivating the humility to see that reality might be deeper than what any model or theory can capture. That’s not idle skepticism—it’s philosophical maturity.

What I’m ultimately taking issue with is the pretense of objectivity in philosophy, especially where it has been co-opted by scientific materialism or physicalism. This worldview treats the human being as simply another object among objects, to be analyzed in the same terms as stars, stones, or synapses:

What does modern science have to say about the nature of man? There are, of course, all sorts of disagreements and divergencies in the views of individual scientists. But I think it is true to say that one view is steadily gaining ground, so that it bids fair to become established scientific doctrine. This is the view that we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms. — D M Armstrong, The Nature of Mind

That is, as an object.


But philosophy cannot honestly sustain this stance. The human subject is not just an object within the world, but also the condition for any world appearing. Scientific objectivity depends on observation, and observation presupposes a subject—a standpoint, a perspective, a consciousness. To then treat that subject as if it were just another measurable object is to erase the very ground from which all measurement arises.

This is not a rejection of science, but a rejection of a metaphysics that forgets its own conditions. It’s requirement to recover the truth that human beings are not reducible to what objective methods can say about them, because those methods themselves emerge from the activity of human understanding.

And physicalism, to put it in the Australian vernacular, has that entirely arse-about :-)

Honestly, I find this time and space stuff meaningless. I don't understand what you actually mean by it or what implication has for anything at all in any possible way.

Contrast it for instance with the quantum stuff about perspective-dependence. That actually has information in it because quantum theory is telling you that system behavior actually depends on measurement in some way which can be demonstrated mathematically and empirically. So there is an actual concrete implication for this; there is a graspable fact of the matter about what this means, even if someone chooses to interpret these empirical facts differently.

I have absolutely no idea what kind of implication or difference to anything with regard to what you are saying about space and time. I want something that is actually tangible like in the quantum case so I know what you mean by this. And I don't think relativity is relevant.either because that has nothing to do with human cognition. The fact that clocks can read different times due to the effects of gravity after having been put on different plane journeys has nothing to do with human cognition. In one post you talked about people using different units of measurement, but I don't really see how these implications either. Some people use inches, aome use cm; so what? 1 inch = 2.5cm.

I don't understand what you actually mean by it or what implication has for anything at all in any possible way. — Apustimelogist

Have you ever studied any philosophy of science—Kuhn, Polanyi, Feyerabend, that sort of thing?

Yes, some.

Can you see any connection between philosophy of science and what I’m attempting to argue for? Because I’m not talking about science.

I'm talking specifically about your Kantian space and time stuff:

e.g.

What I’m proposing is in line with the Kantian (and later phenomenological) insight that space and time are conditions of appearance—they are the framework within which any object can appear to us at all, not features of things as they exist independently of experience. — Wayfarer

I wouldn’t say that space and time are “entirely mind-dependent” in the sense of being subjective or personal. I’m not saying they’re imaginary or arbitrary, nor that they vary from person to person. What I’m proposing is in line with the Kantian (and later phenomenological) insight that space and time are conditions of appearance—they are the framework within which any object can appear to us at all, not features of things as they exist independently of experience. That is the sense in which they're not mind-independent. — Wayfarer

I agree that space and times are conditions of appearance, and the framework within which objects appear to us (through our senses), and establishes the cognitive anchor by which we evaluate the object. But that doesn't imply there is no ontology to time or space. I won't make a rash judgement at to what that ontology is, but my sense is that this ontology applies both to ourselves and to the object we're perceiving: we're on the same moving train of time and space that the objects are. Why think otherwise? Why think this has the potential for introducing additional error? And if it does have that potential, how should it affect our analysis?

we never experience space or time themselves apart from the objects and events that are given in them — Wayfarer

We nevertheless can reason abstractly about this - consider the relation of time to whatever we're analyzing. Once again, my issue is that is that, even though agnosticism about this could be warranted, what's the usefulness - unless it suggests some direction for analysis?

Here, I’d say the value isn’t in treating our foundational perceptual and cognitive framework as "tentative" in the same way we treat scientific hypotheses—after all, as you say, we can't "revise" the basic conditions of human cognition. But acknowledging their conditional or constructed nature serves a different philosophical purpose: it helps us see the limits of objectivity, and opens space for deeper inquiry into the nature of reality and experience. — Wayfarer

This seems like the same tentativeness as any other unverifiable/unfalsifiable aspect of philosophy. That's neither condemnation nor praise. But I agree with everything you said about cultivating humility, but not so much here:

What I’m ultimately taking issue with is the pretense of objectivity in philosophy, especially where it has been co-opted by scientific materialism or physicalism. This worldview treats the human being as simply another object among objects, to be analyzed in the same terms as stars, stones, or synapses: — Wayfarer

What you consider the "pretense of objectivity" is, to me, just applying a consistent perspective from which to evaluate the world. We all have one, with varying degrees of commitment to the assumptions. But because no assumption is necessarily true, we shouldn't apply those assumptions dogmatically - we could be wrong. I think this is close to what you're going for with your call for humility.

Regarding Armstrong suggesting that humans are objects. In his ontology, they are. That doesn't mean they're JUST objects. We value other humans, the artistic creations of humans, and we value animals and the environment - these values don't disappear for those of us who believe humans are objects. (Regarding Armstrong: although he was a committed atheist, he respected religion. He said, "I have the greatest respect for it. I think it may be the thing that many people need, and it enshrines many truths about life. But I do not think it is actually true.")

It’s requirement to recover the truth that human beings are not reducible to what objective methods can say about them, because those methods themselves emerge from the activity of human understanding.

Just because our methods emerge from our understandings doesn't mean we aren't reducible, but this shouldn't be a threatening proposition - because it doesn't erase our values or the feelings we have.

I wouldn’t say that space and time are “entirely mind-dependent” in the sense of being subjective or personal. I’m not saying they’re imaginary or arbitrary, nor that they vary from person to person. What I’m proposing is in line with the Kantian (and later phenomenological) insight that space and time are conditions of appearance—they are the framework within which any object can appear to us at all, not features of things as they exist independently of experience. That is the sense in which they're not mind-independent. — Wayfarer

You are making an unwarranted leap here. The fact that things always appear to us in space and time, that space and time are, in Kantian terms, "pure forms of intuition" does not entail that they are merely forms of intution.

Kant makes this leap when he refers to space and time as "pure" forms of intuition. The tendency of his thinking is shown in the "pure". Why not merely the 'forms of intuition'?

Kant says we perceive things, and that this requires that there be things to be perceived or as he calls them "things in themselves". Why not then space and time in themselves?

Regarding Armstrong suggesting that humans are objects. In his ontology, they are. That doesn't mean they're JUST objects — Relativist

But it does. That is exactly what it means. His profession of respect for religion is out of civility. But, he says, understand that it is subjective, comforting for those who believe it, but not true.

What you consider the "pretense of objectivity" is, to me, just applying a consistent perspective from which to evaluate the world. — Relativist

A perspective which includes a number of presuppositions, mainly drawn from science (despite your denials) or at least from natural philosophy. Hence why I say 'metaphysical naturalism' is self-contradictory - naturalism has generally defined itself in opposition to metaphysics.

Just because our methods emerge from our understandings doesn't mean we aren't reducible, but this shouldn't be a threatening proposition - because it doesn't erase our values or the feelings we have. — Relativist

The underlying belief is that mind is the product of physical causes - and Armstrong says it! - which I'm saying forgets or fails to realise that mind is the pre-condition of an analysis of causes. That is why Schopenhauer says 'materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself.' (Why to I keep quoting Schopenhauer? Because he was an articulate advocate of philosophical idealism. There are aspects of his philosophy I don't agree with, but he puts this point with clarity and force.)

I'm talking specifically about your Kantian space and time stuff — Apustimelogist

It is not my invention. You can find the source text here. Suffice to say, Kant is very difficult to read, and I claim no mastery of his books. But just take the first paragraph in that section:

1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation à priori. Without this presupposition we could not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and the same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession.

The other passage that was introduced earlier in this thread was from the Aeon Magazine article on the Einstein-Bergson debate on time, specifically:

To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time.

Bergson appreciated that we need the exactitude of clock time for natural science. For example, to measure the path that an object in motion follows in space over a specific time interval, we need to be able measure time precisely. What he objected to was the surreptitious substitution of clock time for duration in our metaphysics of time. His crucial point in Time and Free Will was that measurement presupposes duration, but duration ultimately eludes measurement.

The tendency of his thinking is shown in the "pure". — Janus

Why does Kant say that space and time are 'pure intuitions'?

2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phenomena. Time is therefore given à priori. In it alone is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled. ...

4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception, but a pure form of the sensuous intuition

By calling them pure forms of intuition, Kant is emphasizing that space and time are structural features of human sensibility, not features of reality as it is in itself. They are not merely psychological or subjective in the personal sense, but transcendentally subjective—conditions without which we would have no coherent experience at all. ( You could credibly use the term 'transpersonal' in place of 'transcendental' in this context i.e. 'true for all subjects'.)

Bottom line in all of this is there is no time without mind. If you sputter and gesticulate and point to the 'vast aeons of time that existed before sentient beings came along', there is still mind there.

It's yours.

//and that, for now, is that.//

By calling them pure forms of intuition, Kant is emphasizing that space and time are structural features of human sensibility, not features of reality as it is in itself. They are not merely psychological or subjective in the personal sense, but transcendentally subjective—conditions without which we would have no coherent experience at all. ( You could credibly use the term 'transpersonal' in place of 'transcendental' in this context i.e. 'true for all subjects'.)

Bottom line in all of this is there is no time without mind. If you sputter and gesticulate and point to the 'vast aeons of time that existed before sentient beings came along', there is still mind there. — Wayfarer

That space and time are merely structural features of human sensibility does not follow from their being structural forms of sensibility ― it simply does not follow that they are not features of reality in itself. If we define reality as it is in itself as being completely apart from human cognition, then the only valid conclusion is that we can know nothing at all about reality as it is in itself. And that means that we have no warrant to claim that it is the human mind alone which produces space and time.

Your last sentence is nothing more than a tendentious interpretation of the situation. It doesn't follow that what is real can only be what we experience and think, even if we accept that what is real for us can only be what we experience and think. Your reasoning here is invalid.

In any case science shows us beyond reasonable doubt that much existed prior to humans, so the conclusion that without mind there is no time and space (which amounts to saying there is nothing) is an unwarranted and indeed a very implausible claim. You say "there is still mind there"―perhaps you meant there was still mind there because the observation that there is mind there in all our sayings and doings is a trivial truism, and is irrelevant to what we are discussing.

If you are claiming there was still mind there are you suggesting the existence of a universal mind or "mind at large" as Kastrup would have it? If you were suggesting that, then at least your position would be coherent and consistent, if not plausible. Without that it amounts to hand-waving.

A perspective which includes a number of presuppositions, mainly drawn from science (despite your denials) or at least from natural philosophy. Hence why I say 'metaphysical naturalism' is self-contradictory - naturalism has generally defined itself in opposition to metaphysics. — Wayfarer

Yes, of course there's a number of presuppositions - it's a complete metaphysical system. As I keep telling you, the outline of the system (state of affairs ontology, immanent universals, law realism, truthmaker theory) has no dependency on known science - but it's consistent with science, and indeed it accepts scientific facts as true. How is that a problem, other than the tentative nature of scientific knowledge that scientists and philosophers agree is there? You don't have to accept physicalism. I gather it's because you want there to be more. That's fine. I'm not trying to convince you to settle for it. But personally, I don't need anything more. I'm sufficiently open-minded to know there may very well be more. I expect there IS more to reality than the analyzable portion, but the possibilities are endless -and I see no objective means of picking some to embrace. Phsyicalism is minimalist, but also the most secure BECAUSE it minimizes the speculative leaps. That's its appeal to me. You want more, but accept that not everyone feels that way.

That is exactly what it means. His profession of respect for religion is out of civility. But, he says, understand that it is subjective, comforting for those who believe it, but not true — Wayfarer

I think he was being sincere, but you can think whatever you like. If you're interested, here's the full interview. He says a little more about it, but not much.

The underlying belief is that mind is the product of physical causes - and Armstrong says it! - which I'm saying forgets or fails to realise that mind is the pre-condition of an analysis of causes. — Wayfarer

Armstrong's dead. I'm alive, and I do accept that the mind is a pre-condition for analyzing causes. But that does not falsify the theory that the mind is a product of the physical. You have admitted that physicalism is not falsifiable, so why do you keep treating these notions as if they do falsify it?

Bottom line in all of this is there is no time without mind. I — Wayfarer

You've provided no justification for that claim. Here's an unobjectionable alternative: the human perception of time would not exist if there was no mind. It's something of a tautology, but it's unwarranted to claim that our perception of time does not reflect something ontological. Remind me again how youo view the body of knowledge about natural history: the big bang, planet formation, abiogenesis, evolution, etc - the conventional wisdom is that this reflects a past time in which there were no minds. What do you accept, and what do you deny about this? Cast your answer in a way that's consistent with "there is no time without mind".

the human perception of time would not exist if there was no mind. It's something of a tautology, but it's unwarranted to claim that our perception of time does not reflect something ontological. — Relativist

Your use of 'something ontological' simply means, you believe that time is real in a sense outside of any cognition of it. Even that usage is questionable. 'Ontology' refers to kind of being, or alternatively, a method for categorising types of substance or systems. What I really think you're saying is 'mind-independent'. I might agree that our perception of time reflects something real, but whatever that real is, it might well be outside of time - which we would have no way of knowing without measurement.

Consider this passage from science writer Paul Davies:

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

'The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that'. Do you know, incidentally, who Andrei Linde is? He's a Russian-American cosmologist and astrophysicist who is one of the authors of 'cosmic inflation' theory. He is interviewed by Robert Lawrence Kuhn of Closer to Truth on this point, which you can review here.

He's making the point that I'm making, and that Bergson makes, and Kant makes - time exists as an inextricable basis of our cognitive apparatus. That doesn't make it 'merely subjective' - from within that apparatus, we are able to measure time objectively and with minute accuracy, but that doesn't negate the necessity of their being a system of measurement nor a mind to measure it.

Physicalist philosophy projects that functionaity outward onto what you think is the existing world, the world as it would be without you are anyone in it, but you're viewing it through the VR headset that is the brain.

Regarding Armstrong suggesting that humans are objects. In his ontology, they are. That doesn't mean they're JUST objects
— Relativist

But it does. That is exactly what it means. His profession of respect for religion is out of civility. But, he says, understand that it is subjective, comforting for those who believe it, but not true. — Wayfarer

This raises an interesting point. If Armstrong says religion is not true, which one is he referring to, or is he referring to all of them? By true do you think Armstrong means literally or objectively true or something else? There are many different metaphysical pictures offered by the different religions―can they all be literally or objectively true?

I don't even claim that none of them are literally or objectively true― for all I know one of them might be, even though it seems most plausible. My claim is merely that religious beliefs cannot be demonstrated to be true, that there is no evidence for the truth of any of them, unless you were to count authority as evidence, and we all know that arguments from authority are invalid in a philosophical context.

My claim is merely that religious beliefs cannot be demonstrated to be true, that there is no evidence for the truth of any of them — Janus

‘Positivism is a philosophical approach that emphasizes the importance of observable, measurable phenomena and empirical evidence in gaining knowledge, generally rejecting claims that cannot be verified by scientific methods. It asserts that true knowledge comes from sensory experience and that knowledge is built through rigorous, objective research, separating the researcher from the subject.’

Also, I'm not saying that Armstrong should believe in religion, but I will say that materialist philosophy of mind rejects certain philosophical beliefs or attitudes that are characteristic of religious philosophies, generally - chief amongst them the immaterial nature of mind or the subject. The point about materialist philosophy of mind - Armstrong, Monod, Dennett, etc - is that only what is objectively real is considered real.

I do recognise the conflict between the philosophical outlook I'm trying to understand and convey, and philosophical naturalism, and I'm not shying away from that.

I know very well what positivism is, and I don't agree with it in toto, as I've said many times, so what kind of response is that? Is it another attempt to dismiss what I say by insinuating that it is merely positivism? If so, you should know that is not the way to conduct a discussion.

Knowledge claims in general, if sound, are backed by intersubjectively corroborable evidence that the unbiased should be convinced by. I have no problem with people adhering to religions even though they are not being backed by such evidence, provided they have the honesty to admit that they are not backed by such evidence.

I believe that Jackson Pollock is a much better painter than Andy Warhol, but I don't pretend to be able to provide evidence for that. The situation with aesthetics is similar to the situation with metaphysics, and by extension, religion. I believe that the arts are capable of evoking altered states of consciousness, but I have only my own experience to back that belief, so I would never presume to argue for it, because arguments demand evidence and without it they are empty.

I do think that phenomenological analysis carries weight, even though it does not provide strictly observable evidence. We can reflect on our experience and generalize its characteristics, and I see linguistic philosophy as a kind of phenomenology based on reflection and analysis. But I cannot see how any phenomenological analysis provides any evidence for metaphysical claims.

But I cannot see how any phenomenological analysis any evidence for metaphysical claims. — Janus

It’s not that phenomenology provides evidence for metaphysical claims in the empirical sense, but rather that it reframes the whole question of metaphysics. Kant’s Critique was a critique of dogmatic metaphysics, but in doing so he introduced a transcendental metaphysics—one concerned with the conditions of the possibility of experience.

Phenomenology continues this line by grounding inquiry in intentionality—the structure of consciousness as always directed toward something—and in doing so, it opens a path to exploring meta-physical dimensions of existence without relying on the old ontological categories. It may not use the traditional metaphysical lexicon, but it’s still engaged in a metaphysical project: clarifying how being, meaning, and world come to presence for consciousness.

Phenomenology's ambit of inquiry is human experience and as such it says nothing about metaphysics, unless you mean that the metaphysical possibilities we can imagine are part of human experience which of course they are.

So Kant's reflections and analysis concerning the conditions which always accompany experience and without which we cannot imagine experience are again only concerned with human experience and judgement and not with anything beyond that.

Sure, consciousness is always directed at something; that is almost a tautology because to be conscious is to be conscious of something, but again that tells us nothing about any reality beyond consciousness if we deny that what we are conscious of is not what is, and so on that assumption it tells us nothing about metaphysics, since metaphysics has always purported to be about reality as such and not merely reality for us.

As far as I know the truth is that we cannot tell how "being meaning and world" come to consciousness, we can only tell how being, meaning and world seem to us. We have good reason to believe that something is going on which is completely prior to cognition, but we have no way of discovering what is, if we do not allow that the discoveries of science are showing reality, because any discovery would be within cognition not outside it. The only guide we have to such matters is cognitive science―the science of perception, since we are, in vivo, blind to whatever is prior to or happens outside of cognition.

Your use of 'something ontological' simply means, you believe that time is real in a sense outside of any cognition of it. Even that usage is questionable. 'Ontology' refers to kind of being, or alternatively, a method for categorising types of substance or systems. What I really think you're saying is 'mind-independent'. I might agree that our perception of time reflects something real, but whatever that real is, it might well be outside of time - which we would have no way of knowing without measurement. — Wayfarer

Correct: I think time is mind-independent. From my point of view, calling it "real" is vague. My best guess would be that it's a relation between events, where events are states of affairs. Relations are ontological - constituents of states of affairs. That's why I labelled it ontological. But I didn't want to be this specific because IMO, there's no definitive view I'm willing to even tentatively commit to. But it seems contradictory to think time is "outside of time".

When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

This is consistent with the Page-Wooters mechanism, which I find fascinating (I recommend reading the abstract at the link).

He's making the point that I'm making, and that Bergson makes, and Kant makes - time exists as an inextricable basis of our cognitive apparatus — Wayfarer

Here's an article Linde wrote. He's speculating about a mysterious connection between time and mind. By contrast, the Page-Wooters experiment I linked you to demonstrates an actual passage of time being experienced by the "clock" within the quantum system while externally there's no passage of time. The internal clock isn't conscious, so the passage of time isn't associated with mind - it's just a matter of being within the system.

Who knows where any of this will lead. Linde suggests it's possible some link to consciousness will be found, but that remains to be seen. I understand why his speculation appeals to you and Kuhn.

we are able to measure time objectively and with minute accuracy, but that doesn't negate the necessity of their being a system of measurement nor a mind to measure it. — Wayfarer

Given that you would agree that the universe had a history before any organism observed it, this is just meaningless. Absolutely no need to conflate one's subjective sense of time and what clocks measure.

‘This dichotomy (of the Page Wooter mechanism) underscores the relational aspect of time in quantum mechanics: the experience of temporal evolution is contingent upon the observer’s interaction with the system. Such findings resonate with philosophical perspectives that consider time not as an absolute backdrop but as emerging from the interplay between observer and system.’

Agree?

Given that you would agree that the universe had a history before any organism observed it, this is just meaningless. — Apustimelogist

‘Before’ is a concept. See this explanation..


‘I referred to his view qua idealist that, really, there was no world per se before the first perceiver, but also that science is correct in investigating ancient history, i.e. the world before perceivers. How could both of these claims be true? This is a general problem that idealism must address.’

Thanks for the 'nothing' reply. Even if you incorrectly interpret my comments as positivistic, that doesn't excuse you from addressing the arguments, which you make no attempt to do. It seems we're truly done. I won't waste any more time attempting to discuss anything with you.

‘I referred to his view qua idealist that, really, there was no world per se before the first perceiver, but also that science is correct in investigating ancient history, i.e. the world before perceivers. How could both of these claims be true? This is a general problem that idealism must address.’ — Wayfarer

Again, with the example of quantum observer-dependence, you can point to actual theoretical, empirical consequences. That is what I want to see. I don't see the same kind of tangible consequence here, just someone choosing to use words in an unnecessarily mysterious way: e.g. "that there was no world per se". Imo, the veracity of time might be doubted when there are contradictions, irresolvable disagreements, false predictions. I get the impression that we don't really have those problems regarding what a clock measures; I don't see what is changed by noting 'time' is a concept. A concept is part of a model, and what is being modelled is a world that behaves independently of us.

So, really, you’re demanding empirical evidence for a philosophical criticism of empiricism. I’d like to oblige, but there’s no such thing, I’m afraid

Such findings resonate with philosophical perspectives that consider time not as an absolute backdrop but as emerging from the interplay between observer and system.’

Agree? — Wayfarer

Yes, but how does this differ from confirmation bia?

the Dharmakaya is nevertheless real - but never to be made the subject of dogmatic belief. But that is definitely another thread (or forum!) — Wayfarer

Yes! Anyway, I believe that strictly carried through empirical idealism leads either to an Advaita-like system (there is only one Reality) or to a Madhyamaka-like one (there is neither-one-nor-may ultimate realities, but ultimate reality is wholly beyond concepts).
Also, I don't think that it is a chance that these systems posit (at least as provisional truths) a beginningless mental continuum. If that is the case, there is no problem of explaining how the mind and the empirical world 'arose' in the first place.

This is just going in loops I can't follow
A physicalist would say that you can describe how a brain does what it does in understanding the world virtue of physical processes by which it works and interacts with other physical processes. — Apustimelogist

I agree, we are talking about each other. But IMO this is because we start from different principles.

To you it's 'granted' that physical phenomena have 'regularities'. It's just the way it is. I understand your poisition. To me, however, it isn't granted. It's a mystery that 'cries' for an explanation (which in turn might 'cries' for another and so on).

Don't think about it as prediction then. Its just about models or maps that tells you where things are in relation to others. My use of the word "predict" is clearly an idiosyncracy that comes from its appearance in neuroscience where I would give it a slighlty more general meaning. — Apustimelogist

Ok. I am actually not sure, however, how this isn't going to the assumption that 'meaning' is something fundamental in the physical. If that is the case, it seems to me that the 'mental' is somehow fundamental (at least as a fundamental aspect of physical reality as some panpsychist affirm)

Of course, but it's rational to maintain a belief before it's disproven, and its irrational to reject something just because it's logically possible that it's false. This latter is my issue with idealism, per my understanding of it. — Relativist

OK. I see your point. But IMO, you are conflating the belief with an 'external world' in generale and a 'physical world' in particular. I would say that abandoning the second is certainly counter-intuitive and probably incorrect but not necessarily 'irrational'. I would say that if one denies the existence any kind of external reality (solipsism) or affirms that, at most, there might be something else but we do not interact in any way with that is irrational.

It wasn't an argument to show idealism is false. I was just showing that it is rational to deny idealism. I'm struggling to find a rational reason to deny mind-independent reality exists. The only reasons I've seen so far is because it's possible. That's not a good reason. There's loads of possibilities - many of which conflict with one another. Surely it's at least POSSIBLE that mind-independent reality exists - so what's the reasoning that tips the scale away from that? — Relativist

I honestly believe that you are underestimating Bradley's argument. If knowledge about the 'physical world' is empirical, it is true IMO that, in fact, what is directly known to us are sensations and perceptions (i.e. sensations organised within a conceptual framework). It seems to me that he is right that we can't conceive anything 'physical' with no relation with the 'world of experience'.

Of course, there is a stretch from this observation to flatly deny the existence of the 'physical world'. But, anyway, if you are not a naive realist, you would agree that 'the world we experience' is, in fact, a mental construction of sorts. In which case, an external 'physical' world would be somethin we haven't direct access to and we have no way to verify if it is really 'there' or not (assuming that knowledge at least comes from experience). The (strictly) 'ontological' idealist would say that the 'fact' that we imagine that the 'external physical world' in terms of the 'world of experience' is a reasonable reason to deny that there is something different from either minds and mental contents. The epistemic idealist would say that the same 'fact' leads us to the conclusion that we can't know anything about such a 'world' (note that Kant, in my understanding, rejected traditional metaphysics because he thought that it could not give us true knowledge... not sure about what he would say to someone who asserts that he doesn't claim to have certain knowledge but confident, but not certain, beliefs...).

Personally, I don't think that Bradley's argument is decisive or anything like that. But, certainly, it is not something to be overlooked.

I agree that we can't be absolutely certain. And while I also agree that pragmatism doesn't imply truth, my impression is that idealists interact with the world pragmatically (they eat, sleep, piss, work, raise kids...) - and if so, this seems like cognitive dissonance. Why get out of bed, if they truly believe mind-independent reality doesn't exist? If they aren't walking the walk, it makes me think they're just playing an intellectual game (perhaps casting a middle finger at reality, a reality that places relatively little value on a PhD in Philosophy: "F__k you! You don't even exist! Nya Nya!). — Relativist

Again, I respectfully disagree. If there is something external from us and we interact with that - even if not physical (and that's the point) - then it is still meaningful to interact with the world pragmatically.

To make a hopefully helpful analogy, let's assume that in the future we will be able to develop a technology that enables us to create a Matrix-like virtual reality or a shared dream, where pleasant and painful sensations are experienced. It would be foolish to, say, cause to oneself painful sensations for no 'higher' reason even if these sensations happpen in that virtual reality or shared dream.

What do you think about this?

(Another possible reason: in my past lucid dreams I would still experience pain even if I was aware of being in a dream. It would be foolish to me to experience pain for no higher reason even in that 'fully internal' experiences, let alone if I a know that I do interact with something and/or someone external)

The issues raised with perception and the role of our cognitive faculties are definitely worth considering. But how should influence our efforts to understand the world beyond acknowledging the role of those cognitive faculties? — Relativist

Sorry, I don't understand your question. Or how it relates of the topic of the discussion we are having.

Exploring the nature of "meaning" is a worthwhile philosophical endeavor, and it seems to me that it's entirely within the scope of the mind. That's because I see its relation to the external word as a matter for truth-theory: what accounts for "truth"? I'm a fan of truthmaker theory, which is just a formalized correspondence theory: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in reality (what it corresponds to, is the truthmaker). — Relativist

Ok! As I said in my previous post, however, to me if there is an intelligible and 'meaningful' external physical reality 'cries' for an explanation (which might 'cry' to another one). I really do understand, however, if one doesn't see that 'need for an explanation'.

Anyway, I do respect your view. But IMO assuming that universals inhere to reality lead to at least some form of panpsychism where the 'mental' is an essential aspect of the fundamental physical reality (and, hence, a fundamental, ultimate aspect of reality itself). Personally, this is because I believe that universal are best understood as concepts and I do have difficulties to understand them in other ways.