I believe it was the philosopher Simon Blackburn who said that even the idealist philosophy professor adopts realism the moment they leave home in the morning. — Tom Storm

Once, in Karl Popper's living-room, I asked him why he rejected it (Kant's idealism), whereupon he banged his hand against the radiator by which we were standing and said: 'When I come downstairs in the morning I take it for granted that this radiator has been here all night' - a reaction not above the level of Dr Johnson to Berkeley ('kicking the stone'). — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

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t’s not clear to me that the discontinuity between the classical and quantum worlds is as profound as you, and I assume most others, think it is. — T Clark

The point I was making is that, during the heyday of modern physics, it was widely believed that the methods of the new sciences—which, of course, are no longer new to us—offered a universal framework for natural philosophy. This framework rested on the precise mathematical description of physical bodies, grounded in the laws of motion and Cartesian coordinate geometry.

As an historical heuristic, I would mark this era as spanning from the publication of Newton's Principia in 1687 to the Fifth Solvay Conference in 1927. That conference, in many ways, pulled the rug out from under the feet of the scientific realism that had been assumed in the modern perspective. The Solvay Conference is the line between the modern period proper, and the beginning of post-modernism in philosophy and culture. It’s a large claim, I know, but one that can be supported with ample documentation—both from within the scientific tradition and from philosophy of science.

During the modern period, physics was regarded as paradigmatic for science generally, indeed even for philosophy, hence physicalism and all that it entails. Postmodernism blurs all the boundaries considerably.

I think that the use of mathematics in physics actually undermines the materialist project. — boundless

As do I. Hence the interminable wrangling in academic philosophy over the reality of number.

One metaphysical position does not, can not, address all of reality. We need to use different ones in different situations.
— T Clark

I don’t know if I agree with that. — Fire Ologist

If I had to list the five beliefs that best represent my understanding of philosophy, of reality as understood by humans, this would be one of them. If you don't buy it, there's not much more to say. You certainly aren't alone.

I am making the grossly imprecise observation that if materialism was correct, — Fire Ologist

Here's what Collingwood wrote about absolute presuppositions which are, roughly, metaphysical positions:

Absolute presuppositions are not propositions. This is because they are never answers to questions; whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions. — R.G. Collingwood

I recognize he's not the clearest of writers but it comes down to this - metaphysical positions are not true or false, therefore materialism is not true. You've already indicated you don't find this idea convincing.

I’m not a materialist. My brother is real. His atoms will never explain, or be useful to demonstrate, his sense of humor. — Fire Ologist

I'm sometimes a materialist, sometimes not. Depends on what I'm doing. One size metaphysics does not fit all.

I'm not sure anyone on this site actually defends materialism as a full-blown worldview, though they may draw from some of its strands and influences. — Tom Storm

My argument is not so much against a commitment to materialism, but rather to any all-encompassing metaphysical system. It does seem to me that most people on the forum see one particular metaphysical system as right and all the rest as wrong. Do you disagree with that.

What seems more prevalent today is a commitment to methodological naturalism - the stance that scientific inquiry should proceed without invoking supernatural explanations - rather than metaphysical naturalism, which asserts that only natural, physical entities and processes exist. The former reflects a pragmatic stance, informed by an awareness of the limits of what can be known, the latter is a stronger ontological claim, one that is itself subject to philosophical scrutiny. — Tom Storm

This makes sense to me. It set me thinking... Don't tell anyone else I said this, but I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. It's not what is real, it's where and how do we look.

My argument is not so much against a commitment to materialism, but rather to any all-encompassing metaphysical system. It does seem to me that most people on the forum see one particular metaphysical system as right and all the rest as wrong. Do you disagree with that. — T Clark

Yes, that's hwo I read you as well. Agree.

Don't tell anyone else I said this, but I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. — T Clark

It's an intriguing idea.

My own tentative view is that we do not access reality directly, nor can we claim any definitive knowledge of what reality ultimately is. What we encounter instead are multiple realities, each intelligible through particular conceptual frameworks or perspectives. The pursuit of a single, foundational, unifying reality strikes me as superfluous in that it overlooks the plural and interpretive nature of our engagement with the world.

To systematically exclude sound and smell is to abandon a motive of "common sensibles." — Leontiskos

Seems to me they were excluded for a practical reason - sounds and smells don't generate easily measurable properties. — T Clark

That's right, and the motive for "easily measurable properties" is different from the motive for "common sensibles." Hence my point.

My own tentative view is that we do not access reality directly, nor can we claim any definitive knowledge of what reality ultimately is. What we encounter instead are multiple realities, each intelligible through particular conceptual frameworks or perspectives. The pursuit of a single, foundational, unifying reality strikes me as superfluous in that it overlooks the plural and interpretive nature of our engagement with the world. — Tom Storm

You have summarized the fundamentals of my personal metaphysics.

:up:

multiple realities, each intelligible through particular conceptual frameworks or perspectives — Tom Storm

It's the view Nelson Goodman defends in Ways of Worldmaking, and one consequence I found particularly appealing is that it puts you in a position to take seriously sciences which are not physics. Goodman argues that "reduction" is basically a myth, with no known exemplars. (It is true that physics constrains chemistry, which constrains biology, which constrains ethology, which constrains anthropology, but no one really thinks ― and there's no reason to think ― you could "explain" traditional religious practices in West Africa in terms of physics.) There is, on the contrary, no real reason for treating other sciences as "second class citizens" that might someday qualify as the real deal if you can show how they are consequences of physics.

The alternative is to believe that there is only ever one thing to say, and anyone not saying that is wrong. But rather than see divergence as disagreement, it's possible in many cases to realize that it's only another perspective being offered. "But look at it this way ..." doesn't have to imply disagreement. Knowledge production is a communal enterprise.

There is, on the contrary, no real reason for treating other sciences as "second class citizens" that might someday qualify as the real deal if you can show how they are consequences of physics. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you think it is appropriate to treat certain disciplines as paradigmatic sciences, such as physics or geometry? Along the same lines, would the pedagogue be equally justified in starting with any discipline they like, if they wish to teach their pupil about scientific reasoning?

Do you think it is appropriate to treat certain disciplines as paradigmatic sciences, such as physics or geometry? — Leontiskos

I don't really understand the question. "Appropriate" in what sense?

Along the same lines, would the pedagogue be equally justified in starting with any discipline they like, if they wish to teach their pupil about scientific reasoning? — Leontiskos

I don't understand this question either. "Justified" in what sense?

Truly don't know what you're getting at here.

I don't really understand the question. "Appropriate" in what sense? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm just asking if you think some disciplines are more paradigmatically scientific than other disciplines (including especially those disciplines that tend to be dubbed 'sciences').

I don't understand this question either. "Justified" in what sense? — Srap Tasmaner

You're a teacher. You have a student. You want to teach them about scientific reasoning. Will one discipline provide a better starting point than another discipline, or not?

Thanks everyone for the kind words. I will try to respond in more detail later.



Well, the bridge between the two is that our understanding of mathematics, at least initially, comes from our sense experiences of the common sensibles. This is true developmentally (we teach kids to count with beans, we teach them geometry with wooden triangles, etc.), but it is also true historically that this is how mathematics was conceived (as magnitude and multitude). Shifts, like the redefinition of mathematics in terms of "games" is a relatively recent development.

Essence versus existence seems like another reason. The ontic structural realist still needs to give some account of why some math 'exists' and some doesn't, or else seemingly be committed to an incredibly bloated ontology where Boltzmann Brains (or some variant) and "random universes" would vastly outnumber people with coherent lives (as opposed to randomly generated memories).

...or not. "Every Thing Must Go" seemed comfortable with just leaving this unexplained:

What makes the structure physical and not mathematical? That is a question that we refuse to answer. In our view, there is nothing more to be said about this that doesn’t amount to empty words and venture beyond what the PNC allows. The ‘world-structure’ just is and exists independently of us and we represent it mathematico-physically via our theories.

This makes sense to me. It set me thinking... Don't tell anyone else I said this, but I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. It's not what is real, it's where and how do we look.

If there are no true ontological positions, in virtue of what are some methodological positions true (or false)?

Goodman argues that "reduction" is basically a myth, with no known exemplars

There is thermodynamics → statistical mechanics, often offered up as the paradigmatic example, but there are very few examples that even fit that standard. Reductionism does not have a sterling track record, that's for sure, but it's also unfalsifiable, so it hasn't been "ruled out" either.

The alternative is to believe that there is only ever one thing to say, and anyone not saying that is wrong. But rather than see divergence as disagreement, it's possible in many cases to realize that it's only another perspective being offered. "But look at it this way ..." doesn't have to imply disagreement. Knowledge production is a communal enterprise.

I don't think this is true. Actually, I think bolded is generally a strawman of objections to pluralism (and it is one that gets hauled out on this site with extreme regularity). A rejection of pluralism re metaphysical foundations and ontological truth (we could say, a refusal to jettison to principle of non-contradiction), is not a blanket refusal to countenance some degree of relativism, contextualism, perspectivism, pluralism in descriptions, etc. Indeed, I think virtually every philosopher allows for some degree of cultural/historical relativism, some degree of contextualism (e.g. the truth value of "it is raining right now") etc.

Varieties of "aletheiatic monism" need not (and normally do not) need to claim that there "is only ever one thing to say," or appeal to the "One True..." (always in caps!). There can be many ways to express truth from many disparate angles. Different true descriptions might be more or less useful in different contexts.

Rather, what the monist says is that not every description is correct, that not all "things to say" are true, and that truth does not contradict truth (barring unclear terms, equivocation, or a lack of proper distinctions). That is, something cannot be both true and not-true, correct and not-correct, without qualification. All truthful descriptions then, will share some sort of morphism.

The monist can agree that "but look at it this way..." need not imply disagreement. However, they can also recognize substantial disagreement. Such disagreements might deal in matters of fact, and thus have reason as their arbiter (as opposed to power relations).



Right, given "we encounter... multiple realities," as a starting premises, "the pursuit of a single, foundational, unifying reality" would be superfluous. Perhaps? Do the different realities share anything in common? Or are there as many realities as possible assertions?

I want to say, because people don’t appreciate Aristotle.

The reason for so very, very many problems in modern philosophy... :rofl:

Perhaps? Do the different realities share anything in common? Or are there as many realities as possible assertions? — Count Timothy von Icarus

What they might share, I guess, is us working hard to make sense. We do cherish our overarching models and unified field theories. But I’m not especially concerned by notions of infinite regress if that’s where we end up.

I'm just asking if you think some disciplines are more paradigmatically scientific than other disciplines — Leontiskos

What if we left out "paradigmatically" in your question: are some disciplines "more scientific" than others? If you take "discipline" reasonably broadly, the obvious answer is "yes": writing poetry, for instance, is a discipline that, for the most part, does not even aspire to be scientific. Are you asking if some sciences are "more scientific" than others? Is physics more scientific than biology? Is biology more scientific than sociology?

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. It's clearly possible to make up an answer, to make a long list of characteristics of "science" and then count how many boxes each discipline checks. I think most of the natural sciences check whatever boxes you might come up with, and it wouldn't be surprising if the social sciences checked fewer, but it doesn't seem like a helpful exercise. It suggests that there is a difference due to the domain, when it's the approach that matters.

Will one discipline provide a better starting point than another discipline, or not? — Leontiskos

I think not in principle ― not on account of something "especially scientific" about any given field ― but for pedagogical reasons, probably so. What would the students already have some familiarity with? What would most engage their attention? What would give them opportunities to participate and see for themselves ― to, in a fundamental sense, do science themselves?

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? Suppose you wanted to teach science and chose to begin with "the science of beauty", for instance ― how far would you get? I expect most of us would agree, not very far, but I don't think we have to dismiss the idea out-of-hand: why not explore and see if the process itself reveals the limits of what we can do here? ― Maybe this is the right point to mention that Goodman, in particular, insists that literature and the arts are not competing with the sciences and are not failing to meet a standard that is set by the natural sciences, but offer alternative frameworks for knowledge. (The word "knowledge" looks slightly odd there, but he would probably be fine with it.)

I don't know ― is any of this in the ballpark of what your were looking for?

us working hard to make sense — Tom Storm

That's a lovely point.

I wonder too if there's a general view that some disciplines, like physics and chemistry, are considered the “real” sciences, while others, like sociology or psychology, are dismissed as “soft sciences,” or even not science at all by some polemical voices.

I recall the philosopher Susan Haack having some interesting things to say about the so-called “scientific method.” In her view, the principles of good inquiry, like respect for evidence and critical reasoning, apply not just to natural sciences but also in fields like law and journalism. She argues that science is not one method, nor is it a fundamentally different way of thinking from other forms of disciplined inquiry.

My own tentative view is that we do not access reality directly, nor can we claim any definitive knowledge of what reality ultimately is. What we encounter instead are multiple realities, each intelligible through particular conceptual frameworks or perspectives. The pursuit of a single, foundational, unifying reality strikes me as superfluous in that it overlooks the plural and interpretive nature of our engagement with the world.
— Tom Storm

You have summarized the fundamentals of my personal metaphysics. — T Clark

:100: :up:

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. — Srap Tasmaner

I ask in order to try to erect a second erroneous extreme within which to situate the question. So that rather than saying, "Monism bad; pluralism good," we can begin to identify two errors and then try to find a mean between them. I think this is helpful in understanding things, such as science. It also gives different perspectives or considerations their due in a way that a one-dimensional approach cannot. And even where we fail to find common ground, that too is helpful. Maybe you will disagree with my answers to the questions I asked.

What if we left out "paradigmatically" in your question: are some disciplines "more scientific" than others? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, that's workable, although I will revisit the difference below.

If you take "discipline" reasonably broadly, the obvious answer is "yes": writing poetry, for instance, is a discipline that, for the most part, does not even aspire to be scientific. Are you asking if some sciences are "more scientific" than others? Is physics more scientific than biology? Is biology more scientific than sociology? — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is helpful to consider all disciplines, but I did add an elliptical comment in an edit, in which I tried to emphasize those disciplines that are generally seen as scientific. So yes: both questions are on the table.

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. It's clearly possible to make up an answer, to make a long list of characteristics of "science" and then count how many boxes each discipline checks. I think most of the natural sciences check whatever boxes you might come up with, and it wouldn't be surprising if the social sciences checked fewer, but it doesn't seem like a helpful exercise. It suggests that there is a difference due to the domain, when it's the approach that matters. — Srap Tasmaner

So you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences, but that's not because natural sciences differ from social sciences, but rather because, "it's the approach that matters."

Is that what you are saying? And when you say it's the approach that matters, are you saying that we approach the natural sciences differently than we approach the social sciences (and that this is not due to a difference between the two sciences)?

I think not in principle ― not on account of something "especially scientific" about any given field ― but for pedagogical reasons, probably so. What would the students already have some familiarity with? What would most engage their attention? What would give them opportunities to participate and see for themselves ― to, in a fundamental sense, do science themselves? — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, and therefore it seems like you would say that if the students are equally familiar or unfamiliar with all of the "scientific" disciplines, then neither one discipline nor another would be a more appropriate starting point for the pedagogue?

For Aristotle (and myself) it is not right to disentangle the domain from the approach. Put differently, the reason we approach different things differently is because they are different things. The reason we approach physics differently than mathematics is because of the difference between physics and mathematics. Similarly, if humans were equally familiar with the various objects and methods of each of the sciences, then the pedagogue could start wherever he likes, but the crucial point is that humans are not equally familiar with all domains of study. Note that this is not an idiosyncrasy depending on the student, for there will be commonalities between all students and all humans. For example, Aristotle thinks mathematics or physics is a much better starting point for humans than political philosophy, and that this has to do with the objects of study as they relate to the human mode of being and development.

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? Suppose you wanted to teach science and chose to begin with "the science of beauty", for instance ― how far would you get? I expect most of us would agree, not very far, but I don't think we have to dismiss the idea out-of-hand: why not explore and see if the process itself reveals the limits of what we can do here? ― Maybe this is the right point to mention that Goodman, in particular, insists that literature and the arts are not competing with the sciences and are not failing to meet a standard that is set by the natural sciences, but offer alternative frameworks for knowledge. (The word "knowledge" looks slightly odd there, but he would probably be fine with it.) — Srap Tasmaner

Right. Classically science pertains to natural realities and artifice pertains to man-made realities. In that way science pertains to knowledge (scientia) and artifice pertains to know-how (praxis). And then each would also include the specific ordered body of knowledge/know-how as well as the learning involved. So classically aesthetics is the science of beauty.

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? — Srap Tasmaner

At this point it depends a great deal on what we mean by "science." In what way might an Aristotelian say that mathematics (or physics) is more scientific than political philosophy? Probably in the way that mathematical reasoning is more certain than political reasoning, and that our mathematical knowledge possesses more certitude than our political knowledge. At least on that criterion mathematics will be more scientific, but on other criteria it need not be. Similarly, Aristotle will chastise the political philosopher or the metaphysician for desiring the same degree of exactitude and certitude that is available in mathematics; and yet given that mathematics possesses this greater degree of exactitude and certitude, it forms a better introduction to the very notions of inference and knowledge. It's a bit like starting a student reading with big letters rather than small letters.

This hearkens back to my original point about paradigmatic sciences, and what is paradigmatically scientific is a bit different than what is most scientific. Presumably Aristotle would say that something like geometry is paradigmatically scientific, but not most scientific.

Why do you suppose the modern holds that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences?

I don't know ― is any of this in the ballpark of what your were looking for? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, thanks. :up:

If there are no true ontological positions, in virtue of what are some methodological positions true (or false)? — Count Timothy von Icarus

First of all, I specifically asked @Tom Storm not to tell anybody about this.

Also, I tossed this out as an impulse. I’m not at all certain I even believe it is a useful way of thinking about things.

From what I’ve seen of your posts, I don’t think you really think this is a very interesting idea. I think you think of metaphysics more strictly than I do.

To answer your question, I can boil water in a kettle or I can put it in a cup and heat it in a microwave. Is one of those methods true and the other false?

First of all, I specifically asked Tom Storm not to tell anybody about this. — T Clark

I’m indiscreet.

(It is true that physics constrains chemistry, which constrains biology, which constrains ethology, which constrains anthropology, but no one really thinks ― and there's no reason to think ― you could "explain" traditional religious practices in West Africa in terms of physics.) — Srap Tasmaner

But physicalism will nevertheless insist that traditional religious practices, whether African or other, will depend on causes which ultimately supervene on the physical. A physicalist might agree that the anthropological description of the culture is true on a different level to the physical, while still insisting that all of the factors are still ultimately physical or reducible to the physical. In fact, physicalism is obliged to believe that.

The Stanford entry on physicalism has it that 'the general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don’t deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social, or mathematical nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are physical, or at least bear an important relation to the physical.'

As to why physics, in particular, is paradigmatic for the other sciences, and philosophy generally. Physics, historically, became paradigmatic not because it was declared so a priori, but because it achieved an extraordinary degree of mathematical formalism, predictive power, and empirical confirmation. From Newton to quantum mechanics, physics has yielded universal laws, often with breathtaking precision, and this led to the belief that any successful science should strive for the same kind of mathematical rigor and explanatory depth. This was not merely an aesthetic preference; it was assumed that to really know something was to be able to describe it in physical terms.

Allied with this development were the ontological implications of Cartesian dualism, which sharply distinguished between res extensa—matter, extended in space and measurable—and res cogitans—mind, the domain of thought and subjectivity. The success of science in predicting and manipulating the physical world proceeded without any clear account of how mind could interact with matter. As technology advanced without reference to mental causes, it became increasingly natural to treat mind as a kind of epiphenomenon, a “ghost in the machine.”

None of this is meant as an apology for physicalism, but it does help explain why it became so dominant in contemporary intellectual culture. The extraordinary effectiveness of physical science cast a long shadow, and many came to believe that anything real must ultimately be physical—or reducible to the physical.

My own tentative view is that we do not access reality directly, nor can we claim any definitive knowledge of what reality ultimately is. — Tom Storm

I would make the claim that philosophy is concerned with the nature of being, rather than reality in the scientific or objective sense, which is nowadays such a vast subject that nobody can possibly know more than one or two aspects of it. And also that this is a philosophically meaningful distinction although not often mentioned in Anglo philosophy (while it's fundamental to Heidegger, as I understand it.)

Given that perspective, the question is, how to come to have insight into the nature of being - not how to understand how the strong force is or why it works.

Of course, the only people I see claiming that science is one unified method, and the inarguably superior epistemic method, are online atheists in the thrall of scientism.


This just perpetuates the myth of the Positivist Uniqueness of Science, that science and science alone has some privileged form of insight that sets it apart from other ways of knowing. But no such holy grail exists - testability, falsifiability, experiment, repeatibility etc. all have shortcomings, or exlcude some form of inquiry that is indeed scientific.

AFAIK no one has a viable solution to the demarcation problem as of now.

I would make the claim that philosophy is concerned with the nature of being, rather than reality in the scientific or objective sense, which is nowadays such a vast subject that nobody can possibly know more than one or two aspects of it. And also that this is a philosophically meaningful distinction although not often mentioned in Anglo philosophy (while it's fundamental to Heidegger, as I understand it.) — Wayfarer

Ok. I think this makes sense, though I’m using the term ‘reality’ loosely here. Isn’t it the case that what you’re really talking about is some kind of ultimate concern, or a hierarchy of meaning within this understanding of being?

we do not access reality directly, — T Clark

I agree with that. Except maybe the reality associated with our own existence. But that’s a small, lonely piece of being.

, nor can we claim any definitive knowledge of what reality ultimately is. — T Clark

This itself is knowledge.

I think we have knowledge. I think some of it is absolute, but that as an honest scientist, we should be skeptical of its absoluteness. But as a person, interacting with other people, we claim absolute knowledge between each other all of the time. Otherwise in all disagreements we should all be saying “you might be right” and in all agreements we should all be saying “we might both be wrong” but people are not so agreeable as that at all.

What we encounter instead are multiple realities, each intelligible through particular conceptual frameworks or perspectives. — T Clark

That sounds like one reality.

Multiple encounters and perspectives and frameworks keep it interesting, as does reality itself keep us interested. But why leap to the conclusion that some kind of wall separates one reality from another, when the distinction could be seen as two different ways into the same forrest?

I think Wittgenstein and Aristotle and Heraclitus and Empedocles, and Hegel and Kant, and Nietzsche, were having one conversation about one thing. They are all trying to say the same thing. I ask between Witt and Aristotle, why do you each say it so differently?

If change is all there is and is absolute, whatever we say about the many things changing before our many eyes will be burned up and lost to the change. So if “reality” is whatever we say about changing things, there are so many realities there may as well be none (and you may as well hold that “what we encounter instead are multiple realities.”) But if that really is the case, if as Heraclitus says, “all is change”, I find the concept “multiple realities” to be an equivocation on the word “reality” and that what is really meant and distinguished here is that “the one reality is change, always changing.”

I want to say, because people don’t appreciate Aristotle.

The reason for so very, very many problems in modern philosophy... :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

It really is a shame.

I think it is all because religion aligns with him and today academics refuse to align with religion, Aristotle is simply not understood.

The man was a badass. He should be as revered in the history of science as he was by religion. Francis Bacon picked up the baton after Aristotle started the race. All of those before Aristotle were running qualifying heats, but Aristotle organized all of it into science.

From what I’ve seen of your posts, I don’t think you really think this is a very interesting idea.

Quite the contrary, I'm quite interested on a number of fronts. First, I'm interested to see if such views can avoid essentially democratizing truth or, more to the point, reducing it towards something like "might (physical or political) makes right."

I'm also interested in such views' rise in popularity as a historical phenomena. When the positivists began attacking metaphysics, I hardly think post-modern pluralism was the goal they had in mind.

Nor is this a view of truth that would be embraced by classical liberal theorists, nor by most influential 20th century liberals. Rawls, Popper, or Berlin, for instance, cannot embrace the sort of "aletheiatic pluralism" often advocated for on TPF and other places without radically undermining their own claims; yet these voices are often called upon go support liberalism and pluralism.

Hence, I do wonder if it is a sort of progression from the 1970s that has gone underappreciated, i.e., that "modern liberalism" has been abandoned for "post-modern liberalism" without people paying much attention. That's certainly the claim of some theorists, and that the dangers herein only began to become apparent to many when the political right also adopted the post-modern stance, leading to all sorts of concerns about a "post-truth" world. So, with the Fuenteses of the world we advance from "my body, my choice," to "your body, my choice," and from "my truth, my choice," to "your truth, my choice." But, if the (language) community decides truth and justice, then he who asserts his rule over the community does make such decisions, and does so justly.

Of course, ideas like "we decide what is true" are likely to be much more appealing when one feels that one is part of the empowered majority, and that "history" is on one's side, which is certainly how progressive vanguard intellectuals tended to see themselves. I do suspect that the bloom will continue to fall off the rose in this respect, particularly as the forces of reaction have finally begun raising siege works around the Ivory Tower in a gambit to enforce their truth. Notably, as this has happened, appeals to Madame Reason, and Truth (capital!) from those quarters have suddenly grown much louder than they have been in decades.

To answer your question, I can boil water in a kettle or I can put it in a cup and heat it in a microwave. Is one of those methods true and the other false?

I'm not sure what this example is supposed to demonstrate. Surely one can explain how both heat water. Is the idea that truth is just getting the result you want?

How does this play out for the assertion of a distinct "Aryan physics" as set against a degenerate "Jewish physics?" Or a "socialist genetics" as set against "capitalist genetics?"

That sounds like one reality.

Right, if all realities (plural) intersect and are accessible to us, then they are, in some way, one reality. Whereas, if we are each locked in our own reality, the result is solipsism.

Now, for a reality versus appearance distinction to make sense, to have any real content, there has to be something other than appearance. If we face nothing other than a pleroma of appearances, then it would seem that appearance must simply be reality. But if multiform appearances are reality, then I don't see how this doesn't lead to the Protagorean conclusion that whatever we think is true, is.

There are many problems here, not least that, as Plato has Socrates point out in the Theatetus, this makes it impossible to be wrong, which makes philosophy worthless.

If change is all there is and is absolute, whatever we say about the many things changing before our many eyes will be burned up and lost to the change. So if “reality” is whatever we say about changing things, there are so many realities there may as well be none (and you may as well hold that “what we encounter instead are multiple realities.”) But if that really is the case, if as Heraclitus says, “all is change”, I find the concept “multiple realities” to be an equivocation on the word “reality” and that what is really meant and distinguished here is that “the one reality is change, always changing.”

If all things are mutable and subject to change then the proposition: "all things are mutable' is itself subject to
becoming false.

Note that Heraclitus himself avoids this with an appeal to the Logos.

I would make the claim that philosophy is concerned with the nature of being, rather than reality

Yes, good point.

this (multiple realities) makes it impossible to be wrong, which makes philosophy worthless. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is why I pointed out:

in all disagreements we should all be saying “you might be right” and in all agreements we should all be saying “we might both be wrong” — Fire Ologist

Luckily for we philosophers, reality pushes back against such worthless debate.

I agree with that. Except maybe the reality associated with our own existence. But that’s a small, lonely piece of being. — Fire Ologist

I guess we're on the same page except I don't see "the reality associated with our own existence" as small or lonely. I think it's half of everything. The world is half out there and half in here. This is one of the primary insights I've gotten from my participation in philosophy. I recognize that many or most people don't see it that way.

, nor can we claim any definitive knowledge of what reality ultimately is.
— T Clark

This itself is knowledge.

I think we have knowledge. I think some of it is absolute, but that as an honest scientist, we should be skeptical of its absoluteness. But as a person, interacting with other people, we claim absolute knowledge between each other all of the time. Otherwise in all disagreements we should all be saying “you might be right” and in all agreements we should all be saying “we might both be wrong” but people are not so agreeable as that at all. — Fire Ologist

Yes, agreed, we have knowledge. Is some of it absolute? To me "absolute" means without uncertainly at least in this context. I don't know anything without uncertainty and I suspect you don't either.

Multiple encounters and perspectives and frameworks keep it interesting, as does reality itself keep us interested. But why leap to the conclusion that some kind of wall separates one reality from another, when the distinction could be seen as two different ways into the same forrest? — Fire Ologist

There is no wall between different aspects of reality, but there is a wall between different aspects of how we think about that reality. Physics and my family are both parts of reality, but I don't generally use the same words to describe them.

science is not one method, nor is it a fundamentally different way of thinking from other forms of disciplined inquiry. — Tom Storm

I tend to think what matters most is that the enterprise is self-correcting, and it achieves that by being plural. The replication crisis is a great example of the scientific community's capacity to discover and address its own shortcomings.

you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences — Leontiskos

I was trying not to say that, in fact, because any such list, with the intent of creating a scale of "scientificity", would be tendentious. Maybe it's silly, but it seems to me in some ways physics is easier than biology, which is easier than sociology. There are all sorts of issues of complexity and scale and accessibility (comparative ability to observe and measure). The story of physics itself moves from easy-to-make observations and measurements and relatively simple theories to very-hard-to-make observations and theories that are so complex their interpretation is open to debate.

Roughly, I'm trying to say that I think it's a mistake to identify science with the methods that worked for the low-hanging fruit.

the reason we approach different things differently is because they are different things. The reason we approach physics differently than mathematics is because of the difference between physics and mathematics. — Leontiskos

That's quite interesting. Mathematics is particularly troublesome, but I want to defend the view that there are approaches to the study of atoms and mountains and lungs and whale pods and nation states that are all recognizably scientific and scientific because of some genuine commonality, despite the differences which are unavoidable given the differences among these phenomena. That commonality might be more "family resemblance" than "necessary and sufficient conditions," but I lean strongly toward the mechanism of communal self-correction being required. I guess we could talk a lot more about all this.

I'm going to hold off talking about pedagogy, but I'm glad you brought it up, because I think "learning" (as a concept at least) should be far more central to philosophy. This is my 30,000-foot view of science, and why I mentioned the importance of specifiable plans for further investigation above: science is a strategy for learning. That's the core of it, in my view, and everything else serves that, and anything that contributes to or refines or improves the process is welcome.

The man was a badass. — Fire Ologist

Except he got it completely wrong on women. I always wonder if these misogynist ancient philosophers ever actually talked to women.