No, I just had in mind the idea that "wisdom" cannot be vacuous or apply to everything equally.

Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have some determinant content or else philosophy, the love of wisdom, would be the "love of nothing in particular."

So:

...in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. So, considering that you are also ruling out: "I have truth," in virtue of what are you ruling out all those views which, according to you, "don't go?" What's the standard? Apparently it cannot be truth. Is it wisdom?

If it's wisdom, it would have to be something. Otherwise "anything goes." But then what is wisdom, or any other criteria that you'd liked to recommend, that stops "everything from going?"

I think the key recognition that should be made is that philosophy is the love of wisdom, not the love of knowledge or the love of truth. One might believe the pursuit of truth or knowledge is the wisest path of all, but to believe that is a particular philosophy that can be challenged. What this might mean is that the acceptance of beliefs that are untrue might be wiser to hold. — Hanover

I'm intrigued. I spend a lot of time thinking about how to think about these sorts of things -- meaningful beliefs that are false, sometimes to the point that their falsity isn't exactly the point.

In fact, I was going to enter the recent essay contest with a thesis along these lines, but I was given too much time and never got around to it. Yes, too much time results in a lack of urgency and lack of effort ultimately for some.

Knowing that the next challenge is due July 1, 2025.

But my point would be that religion and I'm sure all sorts of beliefs fall into the category of not being valid upon a purely logical analysis, but I wonder what comfort one has upon their death bed for having had a firm committment to miserable truth as opposed to having chosen a more joyous path, filled with magical wonder and profound meaning and purpose in every leaf fluttering in the wind. Which sort of person is more wise is the question.

I'm not sure I'd put it in terms of one's death bed, but I would put it in terms of one's happiness. If believing a false belief, such as "Ice cream is good, and it's so good that anyone who says otherwise probably hasn't figured out the truth of it's goodness" makes a person happy, and it doesn't hurt anyone, including themself, then by the hedonic metric that belief is not only acceptable, but good.

There is an irony here in that many of the "great names" do this to each other. Nietzsche is obviously offender #1, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I see what you mean, except . . . I really did mean "the barest glimpse," i.e., people who've read a little bit of K or A or W in a class and feel themselves to be experts. Nietzsche acquitted himself rather better than that, wouldn't you say?

(I especially enjoyed his critique of Wittgenstein. :wink: )

It's an interesting framing because I think sophia would have implied something like knowledge (maybe "gnosis" is better). "Wisdom" has taken on a much more amorphous meaning in English, more "practical," less "theoretical."

I don't think wisdom can ultimately mean "believing what makes you happier though." I know you weren't necessarily implying that. I think praxis is part of wisdom, but so is theoria. That is, the sage knows why he acts. And not just from a narrow, self-interested point of view.

That's a crucial difference. I think this has to be the case, because we seek wisdom, in part, because of the sort of self-determination, self-government, and liberty it brings. It's a liberty from ignorance, in a sense, but not really in terms of gaining "episteme" (scientific-like knowledge). Plus, I think wisdom also implies having overcome weakness of will, such that one knows what to do, why one should do it, and then actually does it, even if it means drinking the hemlock.

While world-building is part of philosophy, so is the skeptics. — Moliere

Absolutely true. We need at both to make a science of knowing the world, and more than science to know really people.

But the skeptics seem to be arguing you only need skepticism. Or only admit “perhaps” there is more to philosophy. I disagree. It’s not “perhaps”; it is certainly more than the skeptic that is doing proper philosophy.

There is room in experience, and can be reasons, and necessity to mistrust the mistrust. Even to trust the senses and learn from doing, and to learn without analyzing. There’s more. We should make leaps at times and analyze what’s been done later. We must analyze it later, to be rigorous scientists, but the skeptic should thank the metaphysician more often for giving them some content to play with.

No, just the idea that "wisdom" cannot be vacuous or apply to everything equally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's whole worlds between what is vacuous and what is determinate. That seems to be our point of difference. Those worlds are were we find the unknown, the unknowable, the mysteries and mystical, as well as scientific method and myth.

If it's wisdom, it would have to be something. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are treating "wisdom" here as an individual, and making an existential instantiation? That is,
∃(x) (x is wisdom) ⊃ (a is wisdom) were "a" is a new individual constant.

That's inconsistent with your claim that wisdom is not a thing:

"Something in particular," not "some particular thing." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hmm. But if wisdom is not a thing, we can't make the inference that it is a determinate thing.

Otherwise "anything goes." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This just doesn't follow.

But then what is wisdom — Count Timothy von Icarus

And again, asking this supposes that there is a sequence of sentences such that their conjunct sets out all and only what is wise and excludes all that is not wise.

And there need not be any such conjunction of sentences.

Instead, what we might do is map out how we find people using the word "wisdom" in various situations, noting the similarities and differences and so developing an open map of the ways the word functions in our community.

A much more involved and interactive task than thinking up a definition in the comfort of your armchair.

Along the way, we might develop some understanding of why not just anything is wise.

Is that so hard an alternative to grasp?


(added: Just to be clear, I am here playing along with the idea that we could set "wisdom" in syllogisms in this way, in order to show that in doing so we must treat wisdom as something it is not.)

If believing a false belief, such as "Ice cream is good, and it's so good that anyone who says otherwise probably hasn't figured out the truth of it's goodness" makes a person happy, and it doesn't hurt anyone, including themself, then by the hedonic metric that belief is not only acceptable, but good. — Moliere

Anyone-who-says-otherwise clauses tend to have the potential to hurt someone down the road. (Aside: My first thought: "Why can't they just enjoy ice cream?" My second thought: "It's possible the believe makes someone happy precisely because they don't like icecream." Beliefs and their consequences are a messy, messy topic.)

and I'd say you can't have one without the other, really. — Moliere

Right, which turns out to be a problem for an OP that wants to prefer one over the other.

While world-building is part of philosophy, so is the skeptics. Pyrrho comes to mind here for me as a kind of arch-nitpick, with a moral cause to justify it even so it fits within that ancient mold of philosophy as a life well lived, even. — Moliere

First, I would point back to the twins. Again, one's activity is parasitic and one is not. Philosophy does not exist without those who construct, but it does exist without those who deconstruct. Therefore deconstruction is not as fundamental to philosophy as construction; falsity not as central to philosophy as truth.

Picking-nits is very much part of philosophy, and one need not have a replacement answer -- "I don't know" is one of those pretty standardly acceptable answers in philosophy. Aporetic dialogues having been part of philosophy as well. — Moliere

I don't think it is plausible to combine "nitpicking" with "aporia." Aporia requires more than nitpicking.

I think this thread was partially motivated by my emphasis on something represented in my bio, "And don't just say why [he's wrong]; say what you think is right" (Hopko). I think it is incorrect to try to place nitpicking on a par with providing constructive alternatives. "It takes a plan to beat a plan." The Monty Python argument skit is apropos, where someone engaging in sheer contradiction believes that they are engaging in argument, or in our case, philosophy.

When someone is doing the Monty Python thing their telos is a kind of agonstic opposition, and this is not yet philosophy. Of course, there is a very significant difference between these two options:

• "After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I utterly refuse to try to say what I think is alternatively right."
• "After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I am open to trying to constructively work out a better option."

"I don't know" could represent the first or the second. The Monty Python thing is a comical instance of the first.

Yeah, it's messy in-fact. Just presuming some hedonic calculus, and supposing a belief that is false did not harm anyone then that calculus, unless for some other reason that's hedonically relevant, then believing that belief is good.

Not that one ought to do so -- maybe one ought to do something else. Maybe there's a better good out there, like "figuring out the truth" that's more satisfying than believing a false belief.

First, I would point back to the twins. Again, one's activity is parasitic and one is not. Philosophy does not exist without those who construct, but it does exist without those who deconstruct. Therefore deconstruction is not as fundamental to philosophy as construction; falsity not as central to philosophy as truth. — Leontiskos

I'd make the case that the builders need the critics -- else you get backbad arguments.

I'd make the case that the builders need the critics -- else you get back arguments. — Moliere

Even on your premises, it remains true that bad arguments are better than nothing at all. The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. So I think my thesis stands.

This is related to what I said to you here:

Okay, interesting. Such negatives are pretty slippery. I won't speak to practical prohibitions, but, "This is false," is an incredibly difficult thing to understand. Usually we require, "This is true" + PNC in order to arrive at a judgment of falsehood. I am not at all convinced that a falsehood can be demonstrated directly. — Leontiskos

Just as the critic lacks parity with the builder, so too does falsehood lack parity with truth. "This is false," presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. This is why your fundamental approach to knowledge based on judgments of falsehood is mistaken:

In a lot of ways I think of knowledge as the things I know are false -- don't do this, don't do that, this is false because, this is wrong cuz that... — Moliere

Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.

I'd make the case that the builders need the critics — Moliere

Speaking roughly, it's just myth-making until the critique begins - then it can be doing philosophy.

When someone is doing the Monty Python thing their telos is a kind of agonstic opposition, and this is not yet philosophy. Of course, there is a very significant difference between these two options:

"After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I utterly refuse to try to say what I think is alternatively right."
"After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I am open to trying to constructively work out a better option."

"I don't know" could represent the first or the second. The Monty Python thing is a comical instance of the first. — Leontiskos

I think it really could be the case that some questions' correct answer is "I don't know"; why does one need a guess to say "I don't know"?

I'd say that would require some sort of shared assumptions about how to make inferences, and the like.

But I find "I don't know" to be a far more productive realization, because it'll lead me to something else. Keeping in mind our lack of knowledge -- no matter how much we learn -- is how we learn more.

So I'd put in a defense for the skeptics that don't know -- they don't have to in order to say whether or not that they know.

Now, you don't have to teach anyone, either. A more curious student than an obstinant skeptic is a lot more rewarding for the teacher, most of the time.

But I think it's important to maintain the ability to say "I don't know", and reassess our beliefs because of our ability to make errors, or at least miss some things.

Bad arguments are better than nothing at all — Leontiskos

Why?

The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. — Leontiskos

But the critics can criticize themselves!

They have no need of builders -- once you're curious enough to be a philosophical skeptic you will not have any need of a philosophical builder ever again. You'll be busy tearing down your own buildings, finding their flaws, rebuilding, finding their flaws, rebuilding. . . . or just stop building and see where things go. The Pyrrhonic skeptic, at least, has no need of the builders. Beliefs are the thing to be combatted.

Just as the critic lacks parity with the builder, so too does falsehood lack parity with truth. "This is false" presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. This is why your fundamental approach to knowledge based on judgments of falsehood is mistaken: — Leontiskos

Well, for the analogy to hold. . .

Though if this be the analogy I'd just say truth and false form a dyad: You don't understand the one without the other.

Well, categorically speaking, myth-making is part of philosophy though, right?

I'd say there'd have to be some kind of "reasonable", whatever that amounts to, way to include myth-making in philosophy. Not all myth-making, but Plato is the immediate myth-maker that comes to mind there.

I would rather say we should try to interpret people as they themselves do, but trying to save their ideas from their own interpretation is also a great philosophical art. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's plenty good enough for me. So what we'd like to see a lot less of, both on TPF and in general, is the sort of interpretation -- if I can even call it that -- that recasts someone's view as "but what you're saying really comes down to . . ." or "but that's the same as ___ [fill in label of disliked philosophy]" and then draws a very negative and unintended conclusion. Such an approach is the opposite of "saving an idea from their own [poor] interpretation"; it actually strives for that poor interpretation and then insists that the speaker now must interpret it that way too.

Now suppose I ask, "What kind of question is that?" I'm genuinely interested in your answer; for what it's worth, mine is, "It's a philosophical question" — J

I don't think wisdom can ultimately mean "believing what makes you happier though." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm intrigued. I spend a lot of time thinking about how to think about these sorts of things -- meaningful beliefs that are false, sometimes to the point that their falsity isn't exactly the point. — Moliere

Yes, I see I've sparked some interest by pointing out the Americanist of philosophies, that unprincipled notion of pragmatism. The hell with rigorous principles. Let's get shit done.

"James’s central thesis is that when an option is live, forced and momentous and cannot be settled by intellectual means, one may and must let one’s non-rational nature make the choice. One may believe what one hopes to be true, or what makes one happiest;"

https://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/pucourse/phi203/will.html#:~:text=James's%20central%20thesis%20is%20that,a%20sharp%20disagreement%20with%20Clifford.

It's not so simple as to suggest you can create falsity in light of truth, but working through the criteria:

First, the evidence must be inconclusive. You can't just will to believe you're the king of the world. So, something like God would be an example.

Second, it must be what he calls "live," meaning it has to be something you can accept as true. If the belief is so alien to your nature, then you simply can't will to believe it.

Third, it must be forced in that you will choose necessarily and live by the consequences of your choice. That is, you will either believe in God or not, and the way your life goes from the there will be affected.

Fourth, it must be momentous. The decision will impact your entire existential orientation.

Note how it puts the will into belief. A not so subtle move. You are in charge of your beliefs. Accepting that radical notion as true opens many doors.

If we're not careful, this is going to turn into a wrangle about the correct definition of "philosophy." NOOOooooo! :groan:

myth-making — Banno

How about theorizing?

Because who really needs to waste time critiquing a myth?

Your bias is showing again.

So I guess it is a philosophical question!

Haha. That's what I'm trying to avoid -- it's worthwhile to note that there are definitely aesethetic differences. And something about Plato is that he doesn't just myth-build, but rather the myths are there for a point: To train the untutored mind to begin to study the forms, which are surely not so literal as the texts say.

At least, that's a charitable way of putting it, while avoiding that question: "What is philosophy?" -- just note "however we justify it, it's philosophy in some way because Plato did it" Now would that fit into the builder side or the critical side, or both? It seems both to me. And which we would want to emphasize in Plato is whatever our preference for reasoning is -- narrative or myth or what-have-you that's greater than human experience, or taking apart how it is we do these things.

I think the greatest philosophers end up doing this -- Kant's a good example there where he manages to sort of fit both categories whichever which way we may want to put the categories.

So for the critical philosopher that doesn't seem to be a problem, to me. It's almost like you'd expect that in some way instead. So it's easier to render these as a sort of aesthetic, and some philosophers manage to express themselves in both . .. modes?

The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. — Leontiskos

But the critics can criticize themselves! — Moliere

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point.

"This is false" presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. — Leontiskos

Though if this be the analogy I'd just say truth and false form a dyad: You don't understand the one without the other. — Moliere

Then provide a response to my argument. Provide an example where "this is false" presupposes no truth, and explain why "this is true" presupposes falsehood.

But I think it's important to maintain the ability to say "I don't know", and reassess our beliefs because of our ability to make errors, or at least miss some things. — Moliere

Sure, but dissection is not the same as saying, "I don't know."

But I find "I don't know" to be a far more productive realization, because it'll lead me to something else. — Moliere

Exactly. It is productive. "I don't know," leads precisely to building. "I know that you are wrong," (dissection) is an opposite of, "I don't know."

Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.

In a lot of ways I think of knowledge as the things I know are false -- don't do this, don't do that, this is false because, this is wrong cuz that... — Moliere

It is one thing to call something wrong because it is incoherent or invalid. These are process problems - like, “you don’t follow the rules” or “that doesn’t make sense”.

But it is another thing to say “you are wrong because that doesn’t exist”. That is a positive assertion highlighting something that does in fact exist (namely, the landscape surrounding the hole you just carved where that thing you said doesn’t exist was supposed to be). Analytic skeptics can’t say someone is wrong about what exists, just whether their manner of speaking is coherent or valid.

Once you are talking about what exists, you need a metaphysician.

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point. — Leontiskos

That's not true. Suppose you hire someone to build you a house. You don't know how to build the house, but your criticism is important to how the builder proceeds.

Now the builder could tell you "Look, if that's what you want, I'm telling you you aren't going to get a house, it will collapse" -- but the person would still be justified in their claim that they don't know how to build a house.

Then provide a response to my argument. Provide an example where "this is false" presupposes no truth, and where "this is true" presupposes falsehood. — Leontiskos

There's one solution to the liar's paradox which says there is no problem -- "This is false" is straightforwardly read as a false sentence, and not true.

For the other I'd point to our previous discussion on the dialetheist's solution to the liar's paradox where the solution is to recognize that the liar's sentence is both true and false.

Now, that's just co-occurrence to demonstrate a dyad between the two to the standards you laid out. But I think that "...is true" and "...is false" presuppose one another to be made sense of. That is, there is no "...is true" simpliciter, but rather its meaning will depend upon the meaning of "...is false", and vice-versa.

So there is no prioritizing one over the other.

Banno, I asked:

...in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. So, considering that you are also ruling out: "I have truth," in virtue of what are you ruling out all those views which, according to you, "don't go?" What's the standard?

It's a question. Surely you have some criteria in mind. I just offered wisdom as an example.

You are treating "wisdom" here as an individual, and making an existential instantiation? That is,
∃(x) (x is wisdom) ⊃ (a is wisdom) were "a" is a new individual constant.

That's inconsistent with your claim that wisdom is not a thing:

You are once again conflating "something" and "some thing." You seem to be making the same mistake you accused Plato of re the Forms. Yet my point is merely that a vacuous term (or one that is indeterminately mutable) cannot be the criteria for "what goes," (i.e. which "narratives" are accepted) else "anything goes." This is merely the observation that if a term applies equally to everything, it lets everything in. If the term is meaningless, then it cannot keep anything out. If it is unlimited in its mutability, then it can let anything in.

I'm not going to respond to the rest because it's the same mistake.

Instead, what we might do is map out how we find people using the word "wisdom" in various situations, noting the similarities and differences and so developing an open map of the ways the word functions in our community.

But if "wisdom" were the standard by which "not anything goes" and wisdom judges between "narratives," then this would effectively be an appeal to the democratization of knowledge, no? What is true is what the many believe?

Except that, for terms like beauty, wisdom, true, good, etc., you would also end up encountering many mutually contradictory theories.

It seems obvious that this would be a poor method for trying to inquire into many terms. For instance, if you want to understand "quantum indeterminacy," you ask the physicist, not the many; if you want understand "pseudoexfoliation glaucoma," you ask the opthalmologist, not the many, etc. Nor did these people come to know what they know by asking the many, but rather the opthalmologist studies eyes, the historian studies history, etc.

But it is another thing to say “you are wrong because that doesn’t exist”. That is a positive assertion highlighting something that does in fact exist (namely, the landscape surrounding the hole you just carved where that thing you said doesn’t exist was supposed to be). Skeptics can’t say someone is wrong about what exists, just whether their manner of speaking is coherent or valid. — Fire Ologist

Why not?

Suppose a person who is skeptical about some things existing and not skeptical about other things existing -- so not the Cartesian scenario, but a little less grand.

Once you are talking about what exists, you need a metaphysician.

Maybe.

Though it's hard to believe when lots of people understand their environment well enough to get along in it -- I can't deny that there's a pull to the realist case, especially if we have no need of metaphysics whatsoever.

It's so easy to navigate that it's hard to theorize. Surely we must know something about what exists, even if we don't study philosophy at all.

Surely we must know something about what exists — Moliere

Like “I think, therefore, I am.” Or have I already said too much?

Like “I think, therefore, I am.” Or have I already said too much? — Fire Ologist

I actually wonder if that'd qualify... I'm not sure.

I was more thinking insofar that we weaken our requirements for knowledge so that the skeptical problems become irrelevant then in a very common sense way it seems to me that the mechanic knows cars -- a mixture of know-that/know-how that in some way connects the mechanic to the economic sphere such that they can take care of thems they need to.

I'd be more inclined to say we don't need to know the cogito, but we do need to know enough about some trade to live.

So we know something, surely -- but the devil is in the details.

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point. — Leontiskos

That's not true. Suppose you hire someone to build you a house. You don't know how to build the house, but your criticism is important to how the builder proceeds.

Now the builder could tell you "Look, if that's what you want, I'm telling you you aren't going to get a house, it will collapse" -- but the person would still be justified in their claim that they don't know how to build a house. — Moliere

I asked you what a critic is supposed to criticize if there is no builder, and in response you pointed to a critic who criticizes a builder. Do you see how you failed to answer my question?

This began when I said that if there are no builders then there can be no critics, and you responded by saying that in that case the critics would just criticize themselves. So again, your example of a critic who criticizes a house-builder is in no way an example of critics criticizing themselves, sans builders.

There's one solution to the liar's paradox which says there is no problem -- "This is false" is straightforwardly read as a false sentence, and not true.

For the other I'd point to our previous discussion on the dialetheist's solution to the liar's paradox where the solution is to recognize that the liar's sentence is both true and false.

Now, that's just co-occurrence to demonstrate a dyad between the two to the standards you laid out. But I think that "...is true" and "...is false" presuppose one another to be made sense of. That is, there is no "...is true" simpliciter, but rather its meaning will depend upon the meaning of "...is false", and vice-versa.

So there is no prioritizing one over the other. — Moliere

There is no prioritizing truth over falsity because of some obscure gesturing towards the Liar's Paradox?

I'm just asking you to give me an example of an assertion of falsehood which presupposes no truths. Can you do that?

"John wrote 2+2=5 on his paper. Bill said that his answer was false. But no truth needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false."

Something like that. Something straightforward. An example.


You seem to be saying that without a counterfactual understanding of falsehood there can be no claims of truth, and without a counterfactual understanding of truth there can be no claims of falsehood. That's fine, but it doesn't establish parity. I am saying that every claim of falsehood presupposes at least one actual truth, but not so with claims of truth. I am saying that if Bill does not know some truth then he cannot say the answer is false. So even if there is parity on the counterfactual consideration, there is still a lack of parity on the consideration I have presented.

Just to be clear, I like the two ways to philosophize thesis.

I just don’t give analytic dissection the priority. We need to assert, and then dissect. Whatever is left is truth about the world.

There is very little truth about the world that has survived the dissection. But I see it.

Banno and Count seem to be arguing what wisdom is.

Well it is not error or nonsense, and it is not a ham sandwich. So it is something. And I see it is worth scrutinizing to try to define better.

I just don’t give analytic dissection the priority. We need to assert, and then dissect. — Fire Ologist

Right. Chronologically and logically, assertion precedes dissection. :up: