One idea here in the medieval context is that, because we only ever encounter finite goods, the will is always underdetermined. Thus, there is always a "choice factor" in our pursuits — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I think that's right.

A closely related point, made by many authors, is that the masses do not reason in the way that philosophers reason. For example, whereas a philosopher would uphold liberalism on intellectual grounds, the masses will tend to uphold liberalism on volitional grounds. They tend to view liberalism as good, not as true (although liberalism may not be the best example since some of the proponents such as Rawls eventually admitted that their own grounds are largely volitional). The same argument could be made for something like the existence of God, and it is worth recognizing how the philosophers—or else those with more direct knowledge—lead the way and the masses follow in their wake.

When push comes to shove, @J is a volitional reasoner. He wonders if we should avoid truth-claims because they are immoral. @Banno is starting to lean in that direction as well, as can be seen by his recent post/diatribe against "authoritarianism." The first thing I would say here is that this is okay, so long as they recognize what they are doing. J has certainly begun to recognize it and he has a less intellectualist bent than Banno, but Banno is more schizophrenic, vacillating between intellectualism and will-based assent.

That juncture between the intellect and the will when it comes to assent is a neuralgic point which seems to underlie a lot of the instability of these discussions. The great boon of a doctrine about how assent relates to both intellect and will, such as the Medieval doctrine, is that it allows us to think more carefully and countenance more honestly those assents of ours which are strongly volitional. So I think @Hanover has put his finger on something important with his William James' quotes.

I think this goes too far. There are at least some things that can be known as good vis-á-vis human nature, particularly ceteris paribus, and if the good is more choice-worthy than the bad, then we have a clear intellectual line to the preferability of at least some habits, i.e., the virtues (intellectual and moral). But I'll certainly grant that this does not apply to every case, and is not without difficulties in particular applications. Nor do I think this suggests the absolute priority of the intellect in the pursuit of virtue, in that the appetite for knowledge, including knowledge about what is truly best, always plays a role. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and when we think about the intellect/volition problem in specifically "moral" terms (in the modern sense), the question immediately arises, "Is the good communicable and universally binding, in the way that the true is?" This is probably a large part of @J's concern. He worries that objective claims of goodness lead to imposition and coercion.

Although I haven't looked at this problem in awhile, it seems clear to me that the intellect and the will are tightly knit, and that the true is good. The difficulty is the reversal, namely the claim that the good is true. Can we say that what is good is also what is true? How does the convertibility in that direction work? Although the mushroom case is interesting, nevertheless the will is only a motive for knowing that truth, not a proper grounds for the truth. Thomists lean towards intellectualism, so it is natural that I have more difficulty with this direction.

I do think that James creates criteria to limit the amount the will allows one to create one's own reality, — Hanover

Yes, that's fair and I noticed you pointing that out.

but I do think there is merit to the position that the will is a dominant force in one's life, enough so that it can significantly change one's outlook and perspective. It's especially noticable on website like this, where I often detect an over-riding sense of doom, this idea that if you don't accept a certain pessimism, then you're looked upon as blissfully ignorant. And the point is that it's not ignorance. It's a choice. — Hanover

Interesting. I noticed it when I joined. Now I take it for granted. :grin:

What's not an aside is that everyone's personal beliefs form their worldview, which is what I think the OP doesn't address as closely. What it actually addresses is the fact that there are two ways of philosophizing within the analytic tradition, and some do it rigorously and some do it sloppily.

...

When we truly have different views of the world (i.e. not a shared view), then rejection of the results brought about by the tools of other traditions isn't inconsistent. If my world is not conducive to examination by an atomic microscope, it doesn't bother me what results it might show. — Hanover

I think that's well said.

When I wrote the post you are responding to I had no internet, and was working from memory. When I revisited the actual conversation I realized that your quotes from James were fairly conservative. My impression was that James at times went farther than that, but maybe that is incorrect.

I am wary of bringing up Pascal's Wager, but an argument similar to it could help illustrate a more "pragmatic" option:

"Belief in God will make me happy. Disbelief in God will make me unhappy. Therefore I choose to believe in God."
"Do you believe it is true that God exists?"
"Yes."
"Why?"
"Because it will make me happy." — Option 1

Now compare this to something more conservative:

"I saw that belief in God would make me happy, therefore I investigated the issue and was persuaded, on intellectual grounds, that God truly does exist."
"Do you believe it is true that God exists?"
"Yes."
"Why?"
"Because of sound arguments. But I investigated the arguments in the first place because I was searching for happiness." — Option 2

Now those are merely two approaches, and there are doubtless countless others, including in between.

But the funny thing is that many if not all of us really do seem to hold to assents based on something like option 1. Many if not all of us are involved in assents that, were we to trace back the justificatory structure when asked why we hold them, we would have to admit, "Because it is good to so believe," or, "Because what is believed is good/desirable/choice-worthy." For example, "Do you think the tornado is going to hit your house?," or, "It's late and she hasn't come home yet. Do you think your wife is cheating on you?" It strikes me as implausible that a negative answer to such questions is purely intellectual, and does not strongly involve one's desire for what is good.* ...Eventually we will want to ask what extent of volition is rationally permissible, if any.

(Obviously the Analytic temptation here is to make a distinction between two different senses of the question about the tornado or the adultery, but in reality those two putative senses really do seem merged and melded together.)


* Curiously, Aquinas singles out one form of assent as, "to incline to one side yet with fear of the other." The tornado or adultery questions represent that variety of assent. We could also give examples where there is volition and uncertainty but not necessarily any fear, such as, "Do you think the sun will come out tomorrow?"

But I do think that deductive, foundationalist philosophies run a higher risk of being trapped in a method that, for structural reasons, cannot see a different viewpoint as anything other than a deductive mistake or misunderstanding. — J

That's the thesis, and you haven't defended it. You've just imputed bad ("authoritarian") motives wherever you like. I was hoping for more from that post of yours. Note that if you are actually looking for structural phenomena that predispose towards authoritarianism, then mathematics is certainly authoritarian! Do you think mathematics is authoritarian? Because two people can't have different answers and both be correct, or both be mathematically validated?

Now let's take music. Is musical creativity authoritarian? Does it preclude objection? I admit it's not clear just what that might mean, but something like: Is there a right and a wrong way to write music, are some musics intrinsically beautiful, apart from context, and others not? etc. Surely not, because creative work is not deductive. You can't start from some axioms and work out what's going to be great music. — J

This is more strained reasoning. "Surely not"? Almost everyone agrees that some sounds are not music; some music is more musical; some music is more beautiful; and some music is more objectionable. So if we use your own criterion of "intersubjective agreement," then music is "authoritarian" (according to your curious definition). The reason John Williams was given the score for Harry Potter instead of you or I is because John Williams is a better musician, who produces better music. Similarly, anyone with even a vague familiarity with music is capable of creating a shit piece of music, that everyone will agree is shit. So the idea that there are no criteria for good music is obviously false.

Surely not, because creative work is not deductive. — J

"Creative work is not deductive, therefore there is no right or wrong way to make music, and no good or bad music." That's a wild non sequitur.

The whiplash that your post produces occurs because there are no real inferences utilized in order to arrive at your conclusions about "deductive reasoning," or, "authoritarianism." You have some conclusions in search of an argument. Your beginning was promising insofar as you tried to identify an authoritarian pole (mathematics) and a non-authoritarian pole (music), but after that it went downhill.

Note your argument:

1. Any discipline in which quality is measurable is authoritarian
2. In mathematics the quality of contributions is measurable
3. Therefore, mathematics is authoritarian

This conversation reminded me of a passage from D.C. Schindler's the Catholicity of Reason that focuses on the major presumptions made by those who, out of "epistemic modesty" set hard limits on reason.

First, he responds to the idea that we never grasp the truth, the absolutization of Socratic irony as the claim that "all we know is that we don't know anything (absolutely)."

[Here], the scope is universal: one expresses a general reluctance to claim truth, “absolute knowledge,” in any particular instance. But note: this stance implies that the question of whether or not one’s ideas, in one case or another, are true in fact is, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant. The phrase “all intents and purposes” is particularly appropriate here because the stance willy-nilly absolutizes pragmatism.

But there is an outrageous presumption in this: if pursuing the question of truth requires one to venture, as it were, beyond one’s thinking to reality, dismissing this question means resolving not to venture beyond one’s own thinking as one’s own, which is to say that one keeps oneself away from the world and in one’s own head [or perhaps language game] — which is to say, further, that one absolutizes one’s own ego over and against God, reality, others, whatever it may be, all of which is equally irrelevant to that ego.

What reason does one have for dismissing the question of truth and suspending one’s judgment? While it could turn out in a particular case or another that suspending judgment is prudent, there can in fact be no reason at all for a universal suspension of judgment, insofar as accepting a reason as true requires suspending this suspension. It follows that this suspension is strictly groundless; it is a wholly arbitrary a priori, which claims preemptively that no statement will ever have a claim on one’s judgment without obliging oneself to listen to and consider any given statement. It may be that one opinion or another that one happens to hold is in fact true, but the suspension of judgment neutralizes its significance for me qua truth, again for no reason. I thus absolve myself of all responsibility: if I make no claim on truth, then truth never has a claim on me.

pg.24

The second idea he addresses is a sort of "bracketing" out of "epistemic humility."

The second alternative above, namely, that I claim knowledge about things in a delimited area, but make no judgment one way or the other regarding anything outside the limits, is at least apparently less presumptuous than the first, ironically because it does indeed admit that some of its knowledge is true.

The difficulty is in fact twofold. On the one hand, as we observed at the outset of this chapter, one can set limits in the proper place only if one is already beyond those limits, which means that to the extent that self-limitation is strictly a priori, and not the fruit of an encounter with what lies outside of oneself [or language], the limitation is an act of presumption: one is acting as if one knows what one does not in fact know. On the other hand, and perhaps more profoundly, to allow oneself judgment on one side of a boundary and at the same time to suspend judgment on the other side is to claim — again, in an a priori way, which is to say without any sufficient reason — that what lies on the other side does not in any significant sense bear on my understanding of the matter or matters lying on this side. But of course to make this claim without investigation and justification is presumptuous.

It does not in the least do to insist, “But I am limiting my claims only to this particular aspect!” because this begs the very question being raised here...

For example, one might isolate economics from politics as a closed system in itself, which is evidently misleading insofar as the “agents” of economic transactions are living members of communities whose choices inevitably reflect in a significant way the nature and structure of those communities. Perhaps less obviously, but with analogous implications, one might also separate politics from philosophical anthropology, anthropology from metaphysics, or metaphysics from theology. The problem will be there whenever one isolates a part from the whole in a way that excludes the relevance of the meaning of the whole to the meaning of the part, which is to say that one fails to approach the part as a part, i.e., as related to what is greater than it, and so one (presumptuously) makes it an absolute in itself.

To avoid this presumption, one might first seek to attenuate one’s insistence on knowledge within the delimited sphere in light of one’s ignorance of the larger whole, which would seem to acknowledge at least in principle the significance of that whole. But in fact this is a retreat into what we showed above to be the greatest possible presumption, namely, the universal suspension of judgment. The only way to avoid the dilemma is in fact to achieve actual knowledge about the whole...

pg. 24-26

...ironically, the more one insists on modesty in science, the more “impenetrable” one makes it, i.e., the more one makes it an absolute in itself and so unable to be integrated into a larger whole. To set any absolute limit not only keeps reason from exceeding a boundary, it necessarily also keeps anything else from getting in.

pg. 28

This is, of course, not to suggest there is no benefit to setting things aside. And we can still respect Aristotle's advice that we should not expect explanations to be more precise than the subject matter warrants. But it does point out a way appeals to humility become totalizing.

Perhaps it also explains the tendency of theorists to want to go beyond claims of mere skepticism, and to instead claim that the whole of being or intelligibility must be contained within the limits of humility they have set.

I think such remarks are self refuting and mischaracterise both mathematics and philosophy by falsely implying that they are separate language games. — sime

How would you group mathematics and philosophy into the same language game?

I'd say they are different in the sense that math is a science, and sciences differ from philosophy. That may not be enough to claim a separate language game, though -- it'd depend upon how we want to talk about language games.

Right, reason becomes trapped in the disparate fly-bottles of sui generis language games. Man is separated from being, either by the mind, or later by language. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I tend to think that Wittgenstein's intent, at least, is to lead the fly out of the bottle. Noticing that a language game contains one way of looking at that whole world outside it is what I draw from that metaphor.

He is like the separated lover who can never reach his other half in the Symposium. Language, the sign vehicle, ideas, etc. become impermeable barriers that preclude the possibility of union, rather than the very means of union.

Well that fits with my sympathies. Along with...

Doing philosophy is a human endeavour. While it reaches for glory and joy, it stands in mud, puss and entrails. :wink: — Banno

Once one consummates philosophy I believe it ceases to be a certain kind of philosophy, at least -- and sometimes it becomes a science or something else rather than what philosophers care about.

But the philosopher is one who reaches for the erotic, rather than consummates it.

What it actually addresses is the fact that there are two ways of philosophizing within the analytic tradition, and some do it rigorously and some do it sloppily. Those who are rigorous allow beliefs to fall as logic requires. Those who are sloppy maintain their views regardless of where they are contradicted, using analytic systems when it benefits their biases and ignoring the problems when it doesn't. — Hanover

I don't think the two ways are unique to the analytic tradition. At least I'd use Kant as a mixer between the two ways, and Hegel as the world-builder.

In early modern philosophy I find it hard to find another comparison for the critical grump. Hume leaps to mind but I'm wondering if that would not count as a continental since he's from across the aisle, when I'd say he's part of the Enlightenment tradition which seems to count as continental to my mind.

Bit of a shame your post came at the bottom of a page, as it seems to me to deserve quite a bit of attention.

The closure we're talking about is methodological. Popper perhaps set the standard for understanding method, with his discussion of the logic of falsification. Popper showed how to compare the logic of different methods. His apostle, Watkins, wrote a very good piece which was the subject of a thread of mine a few years ago. His article, Confirmable and influential metaphysics, contrasts the logic of some differing approaches to acquiring knowledge. I think we can use this approach here.

I began a long post outlining Watkins' approach, but you may be familiar with it already, and can always read his article if you are interested.

What's relevant here is the way in which some theories, by virtue of their logical structure alone, can be neither falsifiable nor confirmable. So, "All ravens are black" can be falsified, by presenting a raven that is not black. Other theories an be confirmed: "There are white swans" is confirmed by presenting a white swan. Notice that this is a result of their logical structure - U(x)(f(x)⊃g(x) for the former, ∃(x)(f(x) ^ g(x)) for the latter. Any theory with that form will also be either falsifiable or confirmable.

Other theories are neither confirmable nor falsifiable. Some, because they are immunised against either by their structure: "The dragon is invisible to those who do not believe" - if we cannot see the dragon, then it's becasue we do not have sufficient belief, not becasue there is no dragon. Or "Every event has a sufficient cause" - a favourite around here. Consider, if we happen across an event that on the face of it does not appear to have a cause, we cannot conclude that it has no cause - the cause may be hidden from us for some reason. And, since it does not specify what counts as a cause, neither can we find every cause for every event, confirming the theory.

Such theories have a group of specifiable logical structures that prevent criticism. "That style of philosophising is structured to preclude objection."


Now lets' go back and consider Tim's

apprehension comes prior to judgment — Moliere

This is a haunted universe doctrine because it:

• Posits a mythical, inaccessible epistemic layer,
• Relies on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments (dualist structure, immediacy of the given),
• Functions to foreclose critique and legitimate authority,
• And encourages a methodology of closure rather than open-ended dialogue or triangulation.

It presents itself as methodologically innocent, but is in fact haunted by an entire metaphysics—of mind, knowledge, and reality. And once that haunting is seen, the claim can no longer function as a neutral starting point.

@Moliere is rightly sceptical. If someone claims to judge righty without prior apprehension, the comeback is that they had not noticed their prior apprehension; the theory is unfalsifiable. And for any judgement, the prior apprehension remains unspecified; the theory is unverifiable.

The take away here is that the logical structure of a doctrine can shield it from critique. And I hope you will agree that this is not a good thing.

More to come.

You cannot answer the question: "in virtue of what does 'anything not go' given we have already said that we do not possess the truth? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Have you stopped beating your wife?

No, I won't answer your question.

I made "I have all and only the truth" a claim of hubris. This is not the same as "

you were the one who made "I have truth" a claim of hubris — Count Timothy von Icarus

The bit were you said

I won't respond to the rest, because it's all based on this misreading.

So where to from here?

Let's take math. — J

Maths doesn't close itself off in the way I'm suggesting. Consider potential closures: ' 'There can only be one line through a given point that is parallel to another line". But what if we just suppose that there can be more than one? What happens? Well, Hyperbolic geometry. "You can't have the square root of a negative number"? But what if we just imagine that there is one, and call it "i"? A complete and coherent and quite magnificent geometry. Mathematics is not closed to contradiction, to criticism, to what is contrary to it.

Now let's take music. — J

There's a well-documented path from field songs to Blues to Rock, but it's a path seen by looking backwards, not forwards. Again, music is not closed to novelty and contradiction and looking forward it is not possible to see what comes next - which is why it is such fun.

But I do think that deductive, foundationalist philosophies run a higher risk of being trapped in a method that, for structural reasons, cannot see a different viewpoint as anything other than a deductive mistake or misunderstanding. — J

Yep. And we might add that we can map out what it is about them that makes them this way. Hence my previous remarks about Popper and Watkins. But that's one example amongst many. I was surprised to learn from @Jamal's thread that Adorno has a similar approach... I must get back to that and give it more consideration.

This might also relate to . Seems to me that part of what is missing, if critique is absented, is a lack of what might in information theory be called a feed-back mechanism, a reflexivity, that is needed for improvement.

There are a few things that could be said here about fossilised medieval doctrines. Best not.

I can say that philosophy has shown me that there may be realms of experience beyond the discursive. That's not to claim that philosophy has talked about them. — J

Well said. Me, too. But I can't say more. :wink:

As an example of the monolithic style of thought I'd say Hegel takes the cake. — Moliere

Fair. the genesis of analytic philosophy was arguably the rejection of British Hegelianism... all in good keeping with the motion of the Dialectic, of course...

Well, naturally, I'd never dream to counter the phenomenologist which can see all of time-thought in the moment of the absolute...

The analytic tradition was merely the next necessary moment in the push towards Absolute Freedom.

Especially on the point of some newer members coming in with a ToE — Manuel

Thanks - yes, but that aspect of the OP has been sidelined. I'm intrigued by the apparent way in which criticism of a suggestion is seen as impolite...

Shouldn't it be seen as doing a great curtesy?

The analytic tradition was merely the next necessary moment in the push towards Absolute Freedom. — Moliere

Indeed.

Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own @Tobias, of course.

Brilliant post.

Why is it so hard for some to see that not every statement has assertoric force? Or that a negative statement may have assertoric force? Puzzling, from a psychological point of view.

These are excellent quotes from D. C. Schindler both here and in your previous post. :up:
I will have to look into him more closely.

I don't think these folks understand how completely they are destroying the philosophical enterprise and the things they believe they are saving. On the other hand, there is also a thread of misology that has erected this so-called "epistemic humility" as its god, and cares not what happens.

See also:

The choices are "monism" or "pluralism," where the common individualistic rule is that argument and contention is not permitted. — Leontiskos

What happens is that there is a dichotomy set up between "monism" and "pluralism," where both share the premise that the individual is immune to rational influence. The "monistic" individual is immune via his own "authoritarianism," whereas the "pluralistic" individual is immune via pluralism. They are two sides of the same coin, and both undercut the notion of truth, transcendence, and the ability to influence one another via rational considerations.

The critic criticizes themself. They don't have to learn how to build in order to do that. — Moliere

So the critic is actually a builder? That's your solution? "Critics don't need any builders, because they are builders too!"

You are conceding my point, namely that builders are necessary. You've merely conceded it by magically making the critic a builder. You are not contesting my point that critics cannot exist without builders.

Note too that in the past you have claimed that, "This sentence is false," is an example of a sentence that is both false and true simultaneously. So in that case it fails the criterion of presupposing no truths. If you now want to change your analysis to say that it involves falsity but no truth (and therefore does not violate the LEM after all), then that looks like an ad hoc attempt to try to answer my challenge. The Liar's Sentence can't be true and false when you want to disprove the LEM, and then merely false when you want to object to a claim about the primacy of truth. Changing your mind in this ad hoc way is unprincipled reasoning. — Leontiskos

I don't see it as unprincipled when I'm directly telling you why I'm thinking what I'm thinking. I think we really can use different metrics at different times -- different solutions to the Liar's Paradox are valuable to know. There isn't a single way to respond to the Liar's Paradox as evidenced by the philosophical literature on the Liar's Paradox. There are times when dialethia are appropriate and times when the simple logic of objects is appropraite. — Moliere

This is nonsense, Moliere. :roll:

• Leontiskos on Tuesday: The LEM holds.
• Moliere on Tuesday: No it doesn't, because the Liar's Sentence is both true and false at the same time. So the LEM doesn't hold.
• Leontiskos on Wednesday: Truth has a primacy over falsehood.
• Moliere on Wednesday: No it doesn't, because the Liar's Sentence is false but not true. So truth doesn't have a primacy.
• Leontiskos on Thursday: You just contradicted yourself. The Liar's Sentence can't be true on Tuesday and not-true on Wednesday, depending on what proposition your passions want to contradict.
• Moliere on Thursday: No, I can switch back and forth like that. No big deal!

You are showcasing the incoherence of extreme skepticism, where your goal is just to contradict people, Monty Python-style, with no regard for your own incoherence and self-contradictions. This is a prime example of someone who is not interested in real philosophy; who won't even shy away from the fact that they contradict themselves without shame. You are apparently content to flip-flop back and forth like this for all eternity, so long as you are able to contradict everything at once. Good luck with that approach! Really - it will destroy you.

Have you stopped beating your wife?

Banno, is asking you, "how does your system not lead to 'anything goes?'" really a leading question ? You cannot offer any answer to this? How is it even leading?

I made "I have all and only the truth" a claim of hubris. This is not the same as "

Well, you see my confusion, you didn't write: "I have all and only the truth," but rather "I have truth."

Hubris, to presume on has access to the one true narrative. That, and a certain deafness. One might cultivate a sustained discipline of remaining open to what calls for thought. One might work with others on developing a coherent narrative while not expecting to finish the job. Something to sit between "I have the truth" and "Anything goes".

I was reading this charitably as suggesting a standard other then truth because otherwise, as it seems you did intend it, it's a sort of hyperbolic strawman dichotomy. I mean, what is the point of setting up a dichotomy between declaring oneself omniscient and infallible and epistemic nihilism? Who exactly do you intend to critique here? It's like saying: "well, it's silly to love Hitler, good governance is somewhere between Hitlerism and complete anarchy." Ok. Not many people are claiming otherwise.


But if "not anything goes," then how is one not making a claim to a "true narrative?" Apparently certain narratives can be definitively excluded. In virtue of what are they excluded and why isn't this exclusion hubris?

Second, either all true narratives avoid contradiction or they don't. If they don't contradict each other, then they are, in a sense, one. If they do contradict one another, you need some sort of criteria for when contradiction is allowed (which all serious dialtheists try to provide) because otherwise, if contradiction can occur anywhere, then "everything goes" (and doesn't go).

Thanks, . I was writing a longish response, only to have it deleted whiel refreshing multiple windows. Bugger.

It was a list of the various points you made, and how I agreed or disagreed. The upshot was that I pretty much agreed with all you said, except for a few thigns.

Not everything we do with words is communication, if communication is understood as the transfer of information. We also command, ask, promise, and so on. To be clear, I do not see how these can be reduced to just the transfer of information, and also, if they were, it would be very inefficient to talk about them in those terms.

And not every word is either a noun or a helper word.

Generally, it seems to me that you are setting out much the same sort of approach as is found in the Tractatus, an approach that needs to be superseded for the same reasons that that book was superseded by the Investigations

Which is the same as saying that the program was written incorrectly and/or is handling input that is was not designed to handle. — Harry Hindu

Or, perhaps, the solution is not algorithmic.

When we truly have different views of the world (i.e. not a shared view), then rejection of the results brought about by the tools of other traditions isn't inconsistent. If my world is not conducive to examination by an atomic microscope, it doesn't bother me what results it might show. — Hanover

There might be a Scotsman lurking here...

At the risk of oversimplifying, best I make explicit that I did not deny having a world view, nor suggest that having a world view was a bad thing. I said that my worldview is incomplete, and that this is a good thing, since it allows for improvement, whereas those who have complete word views have no such luxury.

So back to the Scotsman. Is it that we truly have different world views when and only when we reject the results brought about by the tools of other traditions?

Otherwise, how do we tell that we truly have different world views?

The danger is that “different worldview” becomes a way of immunizing one’s beliefs from critique—you only truly have a different worldview if you reject mine outright. But there's that Scotsman, no?

, The relation between language games is a central problem here.

Feyerabend was all set to do his Doctorate under Wittgenstein, who unfortunately up and died, forcing him to settle for Popper. Whole fertile acres of philosophical discourse lost to fate.

If Language games are incommensurable, all sorts of problems ensue. So I think we have to go with Davidson here, and reject the idea of incommensurability in such things.

D.C. Schindler might be my favorite philosopher currently putting out regular material (and he puts out a lot). I will say though that he has a tendency to sometimes be a bit too polemical on some issues, which I'm afraid might turn some people off. He also tends to be fairly technical, although I've only found his first book on Von Balthasar to be really slow going.

What's interesting here is that he makes a similar critique of liberalism vis-á-vis political theory. In claiming skepticism about a host of issues (including everything related to any real human telos), liberal theory ends up taking up an absolutized stance on these issues that is far from neutral, and involves many impositions. Yet it doesn't make these impositions based on positive claims that can be challenged through public debate, but rather bases these impositions on an appeal to ignorance, which essentially makes the position unchallengeable (or at least, defendable using an arbitrarily heavy burden of proof to shut down opposition).

Since one can always find at least some reasons to question and deny almost any position, particularly in something as high level as politics, the skeptic can always defend their skepticism by appeals to ignorance and humility. And they can just set the bar for evidence warranting any positive counter position incredibly high, since on their view, they don't have to prove anything because they are only claiming ignorance and a position that follows from it (whether liberalism even follows from such skepticism is another matter; arguably, "might makes right," follows instead).

Of course, this skeptical justification doesn't mean that liberalism recommends a state that doesn't impose much on the individual, families, churches, corporations, etc. Quite the opposite; the state becomes omnipresent. In the progressive liberal vision, there state is ubiquitous, and in many formulations of conservative liberalism, the state is still ubiquitous in order to ensure that the market can be even more all-encompassing. And obviously, liberals generally also want education, civic culture, etc. based around their ideology.

I guess part of the problem is that proper humility still involves a mean. There can be modesty that isn't prudent. Pusillanimity is a vice, as is senselessness. We would hardly applaud a doctor who didn't treat a patients' cancer out undue skepticism about the diagnosis. That there is an ideal level of skepticism that is prudent, and that it is often a vice when considering the practical sciences, where the needs of action are always immediate and bad actors on the move, is partly what is at issue.

Part of the thinking that went on before posting here was a rejection of those very terms, and the selection of 'discourse' and 'dissection', in the hope of leaving behind the baggage of the term "analytic". And don't mention "continental". — Banno

Yes, the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' of course do carry philosophical baggage. That said I would say "dissection" is synonymous with 'analysis' and discourse is always a putting together of ideas which would count as synthesis.

Anyway a mere terminological point should not matter.

as 180 Proof points out that philosophical practice cannot be neatly categorized in a strictly binary manner.
— Janus
Again, I'm happy with that, but still think the distinction worth some consideration. — Banno

Right, I agree the distinction is a valid one and is useful.

I suppose it's a balancing act, if you (or anybody) are harsh to all these enlightened posters, then less people might be willing to engage. But it can help the odds of conversations retaining a high quality, but that's not guaranteed either.

It's annoying more than anything because of the "I know Something you will never see" attitude, but, whatever.

Banno, is asking you, "how does your system not lead to 'anything goes?'" really a leading question ? You cannot offer any answer to this? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep.

Here's were this line of reasoning spits off from the thread:

Hubris, to presume on has access to the one true narrative. That, and a certain deafness. One might cultivate a sustained discipline of remaining open to what calls for thought. One might work with others on developing a coherent narrative while not expecting to finish the job. Something to sit between "I have the truth" and "Anything goes". — Banno

See if I have this right. I've said "it's not the case that anything goes". You understand this as implying that there must therefore be, amongst the Great List of statements, those that go and those that don't. And that further, if we know that there are some that go and some that don't, there must be a criteria for sorting the Great List in this way. And you chide me for not setting out that criteria.

How's that? Is that along the lines that you propose?

If so, then here's the presumption: that there is indeed such a Great List. That's why the question is leading. That Great List is the presumptive Theory of Everything. What I'm questioning is, why must we make that presupposition? Why not, instead of a Great List, a series of short lists, each perhaps consistent within itself?

And this, looking around, seems to be what we do have. Discrete areas of expertise, either unrelated to each other, or addressing the same things in different ways.

We can model this approach more formally. The supposition of the Great List is that there is a series of sentences, the conjunction of which is The Truth. G={A & B & C & D...} and so on, until the Truth be known.

Your question to me is, we know that for some sentence, say C, C is either in the Great List, or it isn't. It can' t both be in the Great List and not in the Great List. And Banno, from what you have said, it seems that it is both in the Great List and not in the Great list, from which it follows that anything goes.

It's a valid point. But it presumes that the list is a series of conjuncts. What if instead it were a disjunction of conjuncts? What if, instead of {A & B & C & D...} we had {(A & B & C & D) v (A & B & ~C)...}? Since (C v ~C) is true, {(A & B & C & D) v (A & B & ~C)...} can also be true.

This alternative list contains no contradiction.

Now this is but an outline, and there is much left to do. But I hope perhaps it shows you why I can't give you a direct answer.

Right, I agree the distinction is a valid one and is useful. — Janus

Good. I'm pleased with the attention it has garnered. Yes, 'dissection' is pretty much 'analysis' but I went with the former both in order to leave behind some bagage, and to take advantage of the alliteration.

Some folks don't - perhaps can't - get it

Sometimes you have to walk away.

There is also philosophy as the study of the history of ideas, not necessarily as a tendentious attempt to find authoritative confirmation for the enquirer's own beliefs, but just for its own sake.
— Janus

It is a pleasure unto itself, and this is enough to justify one's activity in doing philosophy.

But then I think when we do that -- read philosophy for its own sake (and here I only mean the sorts of names that frequently come up within a particular culture's practice of philosophy) -- we see there's more than just two ways to do philosophy.

Naturally I want to progress by way of example, so something that comes to mind is Spinoza's Ethics where we have a logic derivation of. . . everything? And on the other hand we have Hume as the nitpicker.

In more modern times I might contrast David Chalmers with Daniel Dennett. — Moliere

Right, for me the great philosophers' ideas and systems have aesthetic value. They present us with novel ways to think about things―and they are admirable just on account of their sustained complexity of inter-related ideas.

As to Chalmers and Dennett―the latter seems to me by far the more imaginative philosopher. I also see Hume as an immensely creative thinker and not at all a mere "nitpicker".