By contrast, the gradual development of beings, somewhere in an old. vast universe, with the capacity for intentional behavior, but considerably more limited powers to act, seems considerably more plausible.

But God might be one of these beings, with powers which seem unlimited from our tiny perspective.

Let's step back a bit. The question I was responding to was, 'is there good reason to believe teleology'? So to address that we need to clarify exactly what that means. (This could easily become a 5000 word essay, but I'll try to keep it brief as possible.)

The way I addressed the question of teleology was in the context of the emergence of the Galilean-Newtonian-Cartesian worldview (a.k.a. 'the scientific revolution'). It is here that the notion of telos or purpose was rejected in favour of mechanistic model, the understanding that the totality of the universe can be understood solely in terms of matter (since Einstein 'matter-energy') acting in accordance with natural laws over aeons of time. This is what gives rise to all phenomena, undirected by anything like a higher intelligence or divine intellect.

Background - teleology at the time of the scientific revolution had been intertwined with concepts from Aristotelian physics, such as 'natural place', and, in turn, with the Ptolmaic geocentric cosmology. This was superseded by Galileo and Newton's modern understanding of physics in terms of mass, velocity, intertia etc. So teleology was rejected, along with Aristotelian notions of final and formal causation (which also has major implications.) And that medieval conception of causation was bound up with the early modern conception of a 'divine architect' and 'ideas in the mind of God'.

Whereas, the way you phrase the question falls into what I see as a false dichotomy: either accepting the naturalist, mechanistic account or holding to a creationist or 'intelligent design' cosmology. This is precisely the predicament that the cultural dynamics of Western culture engineered for itself. (Karen Armstrong's 2009 book The Case for God lays this out very clearly.)

Whether we call this a "God", a trascendental oversoul, or anything else, it strikes me as a rather extreme assumption to think that such a being just happens to exist uncaused. By contrast, the gradual development of beings, somewhere in an old. vast universe, with the capacity for intentional behavior, but considerably more limited powers to act, seems considerably more plausible. — Relativist

I would suggest looking at telos differently, rather than in terms of a Grand Design presided over by a cosmic architect/engineer (which seems to me like God created in the image of man).

Recall that I said that physics begins with abstraction: this is the key point. Galileo's physics starts with the division of primary and secondary qualities, the primary qualities being those that can be both expressed and measured in mathematical terms, the fundamental ground of mathematical physics, which has grown so astoundingly since Galileo's day. How things appear to us, by contrast, is relegated to the 'secondary qualities' which are intrinsically subjective in nature. (Notice this is a re-statement of the ancient philosophical quandry of 'reality and appearance'.)

But what does that leave out? Already, intentionality and purpose have been excluded from the reckoning, as one of the grounding assumptions of the model. Physicalism' insists that in reality there are no purposes or intentionality - these are relegated to the personal or subjective domain. Whereas, in actuality, all of us, as human beings, and every single organism, are animated or driven by purposeful and intentional actions. The idea that the universe is 'devoid of meaning' is, therefore, a judgement: even the scientist studying the motions of planets has some aim in mind, if only just to understand. So this is the false dichotomy I'm refering to.

Consider the following, from philosopher of biology, Steve Talbott:

The physicist wants laws that are as universal as possible, true of all situations and therefore unable to tell us much about any particular situation — laws, in other words, that are true regardless of meaning and context. So far as a physical law is concerned, once we know it, every subsequent observation merely demonstrates something we already knew: the law will yet again be obeyed. This requires a severe abstraction from the presentational richness of the phenomenal world, which presents us at every moment with something new. Such abstraction shows up in the strong urge toward the mathematization of physical laws.

Nothing ever goes wrong with the physical laws that were operative in the system, but any given causal relation can always be sabotaged by a contextual change.

In biology a changing context does not interfere with some causal truth we are trying to see; contextual transformation is itself the truth we are after. Or, you could say: in the organism as a maker of meaning, interfering is the whole point! The ongoing construction and evolution of a context, with its continually modulated causal relationships, is what the biologist is trying to recognize and do justice to. Every creature lives by virtue of the dynamic, pattern-shifting play of a governing context, which extends into an open-ended environment. The organism gives expression, at every level of its being, to the unbounded because of reason, the tapestry of meaning... — Steve Talbott, What Do Organisms Mean?

So that is at least the direction in which an answer should be sought. Notice that it doesn't deny the efficacy of physical laws and physical causation, but recognises the inherent limitations of those principles when applied to a broader context, that being actual existence.

It seems to me "intentionality and purpose are left out" simply because there is no objective evidence that supports leaving them in any account of how the world has become what it "appears to us" to be. Like qualia, "telos" doesn't explain anything scientists endeavor to explain. Camus points out, I think reasonably, that the world might have a 'fundamental or universal purpose' but by virtue of scale we humans are almost certainly too small or ephemeral to recognize and grasp it. The Sisyphusean challenge is for each one of us to strive to live purposefully in spite of being ignorant or unsure of whether the world itself has any purpose. Or we can live in denial, fetishizing hand-me-down fairytales, myths, superstitions, theodicies, woo-of-the-gaps metaphysics or baroque mysticisms (re: e.g. Ernest Becker's 'terror management, immortality projects').

false dichotomy: either accepting the naturalist, mechanistic account or holding to a creationist or 'intelligent design' cosmology. — Wayfarer

I would suggest looking at telos differently, rather than in terms of a Grand Design presided over by a cosmic architect/engineer (which seems to me like God created in the image of man). — Wayfarer

I don't see that the dichitomy I described is a false one. Even after reading your post, and a good bit of the Talbot article, I could see nothing that implies this to be false. Rather, you and Talbot seem to be arguing for using "teleology" as an epistemological paradigm for describing living things and their interactions. Sure, I see the utility for better understanding biological systems. But this wouldn't negate what I said, in terms of a metaphysical teleology.

Am I misunderstanding ?

Such a God would not be the ground of being.

. Rather, you and Talbot seem to be arguing for using "teleology" as an epistemological paradigm for describing living things and their interactions. Sure, I see the utility for better understanding biological systems. But this wouldn't negate what I said, in terms of a metaphysical teleology. — Relativist

I appreciate your thoughtful response. You're right to say that there's a distinction between using teleology as an epistemological paradigm—i.e., as a way of understanding living systems—and asserting it as a metaphysical principle embedded in the structure of reality. But I think that very distinction deserves closer scrutiny.

The heart of the issue is this: Can we adequately account for living systems—and by extension, consciousness and agency—without appeal to any notion of purpose, directionality, or normativity? Or put differently: Is it plausible to treat teleological concepts as mere heuristics or metaphors, while denying their ontological basis?

When Talbott (and others like Thompson, Varela, Deacon, and Jonas) emphasize the meaningfulness, normativity, and goal-directedness inherent in organisms, they're not merely saying "this is a useful model." They're pointing out that organisms actually behave in ways that cannot be made intelligible in purely mechanistic terms. As soon as you describe a cell as regulating its internal state, or an animal as foraging, you're already invoking purpose-laden language—language that tracks something real in the nature of life.

So when you say my post didn't show your dichotomy to be false, I would say: the dichotomy between materialism and creationism is false precisely because there is a third option: namely, that telos is a real feature of life, but not in the anthropomorphic sense of an external designer with a blueprint. Instead, it emerges as a kind of immanent normativity—a principle of self-organization and purposiveness intrinsic to living systems themselves.

I've been reading Hans Jonas 'Phenomenology of Biology'. Jonas argues that life is the phenomenon that gives rise to value and meaning—not because it was pre-ordained by a deity, but because the very act of being alive entails a concern for continued existence, a directedness toward goals (however basic), and an interpretive relationship with the environment. That's not "epistemological teleology" in the narrow sense—it’s a recognition that teleological structures are built into the logic of life itself.

And once we admit that—even provisionally—then perhaps the modern exclusion of telos (and with it, qualities like value, intention, or meaning) from our ontology is not just a simplifying abstraction, but a serious (even catastrophic) omission.

And as Hans Jonas powerfully argues, since the ascent of mechanistic materialism, life and consciousness have become anomalies—features of reality that no longer fit within the explanatory framework that modern science inherited from Galileo and Newton. The success of mechanistic models in physics came at the cost of excluding precisely those qualities that constitute living, experiencing beings: purposiveness, value, and meaning. Materialism has to treat these as secondary effects or emergent illusions, but never as basic features of reality.

To return to your point: I agree that "intent" in the conscious human sense requires a subject capable of forming and acting on reasons. But perhaps that's an evolved expression of something more basic: the kind of intrinsic normativity that characterizes even the simplest organisms. That doesn’t entail an uncaused divine being—it entails rethinking what kind of ontology is required to make sense of life itself.

They're pointing out that organisms actually behave in ways that cannot be made intelligible in purely mechanistic terms. As soon as you describe a cell as regulating its internal state, or an animal as foraging, you're already invoking purpose-laden language—language that tracks something real in the nature of life.
...They're pointing out that organisms actually behave in ways that cannot be made intelligible in purely mechanistic terms. — Wayfarer

Intelligibility means making sense of things, so it still seems to be (just) an epistemological paradigm.

Is it plausible to treat teleological concepts as mere heuristics or metaphors, while denying their ontological basis? — Wayfarer

My questions:
Why assume an ontological basis for the epistemological paradigm?
How do you account for it without a "God" (a being who acts with intent)?

...language that tracks something real in the nature of life. — Wayfarer

But it's "real" only in the sense of it being an accurate description of phenomena in terms we can understand given our capacities and limitations.

Should intelligibility be assumed? Surely the world isn't necessarily intelligible.

perhaps the modern exclusion of telos (and with it, qualities like value, intention, or meaning) from our ontology is not just a simplifying abstraction, but a serious (even catastrophic) omission. — Wayfarer

It's catastrophic only if it's false. Teleonomy accounts for much of the perceived teleology. What I haven't seen is a justification for believing there is ontological teleology. It seems a guess, just like physicalism is a guess - but physicalism strays very little from the known. You deny it entails a God, but it seems to entail something nearly as far-fetched.

My question is: why assume an ontological basis for the epistemological paradigm? — Relativist

Because we are the phenomenon. We're not observing from a point outside life—we are living, embodied beings whose actions, thoughts, and values are suffused with purpose and normativity. That’s not just how we talk about life; it’s how we live it.

As already argued, physicalism arises from a methodological abstraction, intended for modeling inert matter (something it does very well!) It achieves explanatory power by systematically bracketing out qualities like meaning, value, and purpose. But this comes at a cost: these are not incidental features of life—they are constitutive of it. So when physicalism tries to "explain" life, it ends up trying to reconstruct the very things it had to exclude to get started. That’s the core of Jonas' argument: life and consciousness are not anomalies to be explained away—they’re clues to what physicalist ontology has left out.

How do you imbed this into an ontological theory of what actually exists? — Relativist

Start with the modest but radical move of taking the phenomena of life seriously, not as illusions or surface features, but as real indications of the nature of reality. The burden of proof doesn't rest solely with those who insist that life exhibits intrinsic purposiveness. The burden also falls on those who deny it—especially when their models can’t account for meaning, agency, or value except by explaining them away.

Should intelligibility be assumed? — Relativist

Science—and philosophy—both presuppose that the world is intelligible. Even raising the question of whether it should be assumes a rational order that allows the question to be posed in the first place. So rather than doubting intelligibility, the more pressing issue is: what kind of ontology can account for the fact that intelligibility is possible at all?

If physicalism treats intelligibility as an accidental byproduct of blind processes, then it risks undermining the rational basis of its own claims. This concern is related to what some have called the argument from reason (C.S. Lewis) or the evolutionary argument against naturalism (Alvin Plantinga): namely, that if our minds are solely the product of non-rational forces, we have little reason to trust their capacity for reason—including our belief in physicalism itself.

How do you account for it without a "God" (a being who acts with intent)? — Relativist

Understanding the nature of intent—or “God’s will,” if you like—is one of the most vexed questions in both theology and philosophy. Literalist religious frameworks often interpret history as a kind of script written in advance, culminating in divine intervention and final judgment. That’s not what I’m suggesting.

But it’s also not the only way to approach the idea of cosmic purpose or intelligence.

I lean toward what might be called a naturalistic philosophy of religion—if that isn’t too paradoxical. A good example is Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos (and Nagel, notably, doesn't write as a theist). He speculates that “each of our lives is a part of the cosmic process of the universe gradually waking up and becoming self-aware.” That’s not a doctrine, but a philosophical gesture toward an alternative vision—one in which mind and value are not intrusions into a meaningless cosmos, but intrinsic to its unfolding.

Yes, it’s vague when stated like that—but vagueness here may be appropriate considering the scale and subtlety of the question. What matters is that it opens a conceptual space between mechanistic materialism and supernatural intervention. It suggests that intentionality and consciousness may be expressions of something deeper in the fabric of reality, not inexplicable anomalies.

Such a God would not be the ground of being.

Not necessarily. Let me explain it by describing a cosmogony in which the ground of being for an individual being is the body of a greater being and the body of that individual is the ground of being for a lesser being.

Just look at a human, it is a colony of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of cells. For each cell that human may be perceived as the ground of being. Likewise the being of the planet, or the biosphere, or Gaia, is the ground of being for the human. And by extension, for Gaia the galaxy is the ground of being. This has to be seen through the prism of an idealism where the Individual being on this scale, or hierarchy experiences a world commensurate with their position, or level of development in the hierarchy. That for a human the experience of the cell, or Gaia is inconceivable, because it is an entirely different set of circumstances, which are only intelligible to the being on that level in the hierarchy.

In this cosmogony the human world of physics and science is not everything that is, it is only a description of the experience on our level of the hierarchy. On the other levels, it would be inconceivable because they experience an entirely different set of circumstances.

a cosmogony in which the ground of being for an individual being is the body of a greater being and the body of that individual is the ground of being for a lesser being. — Punshhh

This is the opposite of what is meant by a metaphysical ground. See this. A complex object is grounded in its composition, not the reverse.

Apologies, I missed your first post addressing this, the other day;

IMO, the philosophical accounts do not point to a God of religion. There may very well be a ground of being, but the big question is: does it exhibit intentionality? If not, then it points to a natural ground of being, not a god.

Is there a good reason to believe the ground of being acts intentionally? IMO, the only reason one might think so, is that teleology requires it - so the question becomes: is there good reason to believe teleology? I haven't seen one.

So this indicates to me that a ground of being is “ the very source and foundation of all existence.”(wiki)
Or the role played by a god (in an Abrahamic religion), ie created everything, creating the ground on which we walk. Not a metaphysical ground.

The post you linked to here seemed to be discussing things about infinite regression.

This is the opposite of what is meant by a metaphysical ground. See this. A complex object is grounded in its composition, not the reverse.

I’m only using ground in the terms you used it in the post I replied to.

What I haven't seen is a justification for believing there is ontological teleology. It seems a guess, just like physicalism is a guess - but physicalism strays very little from the known. — Relativist

:up: :up:

So this indicates to me that a ground of being is “ the very source and foundation of all existence.”(wiki)
Or the role played by a god (in an Abrahamic religion), ie created everything, creating the ground on which we walk. Not a metaphysical ground. — Punshhh

The Bible doesn't depict its God in this way, but modern Christian philosophers accept the "ground of being" of philosophy, because there is just one God (Yahweh).

The post you linked to here seemed to be discussing things about infinite regression. — Punshhh

Right. There's either an infinite regression of ever-smaller parts/of causes/ of explanations - or there is a foundation of all these - the ultimate ground.

I’m only using ground in the terms you used it in the post I replied to. — Punshhh

Then you misunderstood something I said.

Because we are the phenomenon. — Wayfarer

We are one phenomenon. The other 99.99999999...% of the universe needs to fit into the ontology.

meaning, value, and purpose... are... constitutive of [life]. So when physicalism tries to "explain" life, it ends up trying to reconstruct the very things it had to exclude to get started. — Wayfarer

Chemistry brackets out quantum field theory. Meteorology brackets out fluid dynamics. Functional entities interact with their functional environments. The fact that the study of science is divided into disciplines doesn't imply reductionism is false, so I don't consider your point to be at all problematic.

life and consciousness are not anomalies to be explained away—they’re clues to what physicalist ontology has left out. — Wayfarer

Explained away? Explanatory gaps are...gaps. Indeed, they are rationalized, but that isn't explaining them away. The gap isn't a "clue" to anything other than possibilities. You can plug in some explanation - even immaterial ones, and you can't be proven wrong, but I'm skeptical you can justify embracing anything specific - there's no basis to exclude anything.

Start with ... taking the phenomena of life seriously,... as real indications of the nature of reality. The burden of proof doesn't rest solely with those who insist that life exhibits intrinsic purposiveness. The burden also falls on those who deny it—especially when their models can’t account for meaning, agency, or value except by explaining them away. — Wayfarer

"Burden of proof" applies to efforts to sway opinion. The only objective "burden" is to justify one's beliefs. There' a lot of room for people with contrary justified beliefs to disagree,

I believe materialism is justified on the basis that it provides the best explation for all the uncontroversial facts of the world. Best in terms of answering more questions, and in terms of parsimony. Parsimony is a good reason to deny what is superfluous.

Accounting for meaning, agency, and value isn't that problematic, other than the complexity of a reductive account. Qualia are more problematic, but because they are causally efficacious, the only real issue with them is the nature of their presentation to the mind. I acknowlege this as an explanatory gap.

If physicalism treats intelligibility as an accidental byproduct of blind processes, then it risks undermining the rational basis of its own claims. This concern is related to what some have called the argument from reason (C.S. Lewis) or the evolutionary argument against naturalism (Alvin Plantinga): namely, that if our minds are solely the product of non-rational forces, we have little reason to trust their capacity for reason—including our belief in physicalism itself. — Wayfarer

I strongly disagree. Plantinga's argument is fatally flawed. In order to survive, every organism needs a functionally accurate perception of its environment to successfully interact with it. Primitive rationality is exhibited when animals adapt there hunting behavior when necessary, doing things that work instead of those that don't. The evolution of abstract reasoning would have been an evolutionary dead end leading to extinction, if it worsened our ability to interact with the environment.

Yes, it’s vague when stated like that—but vagueness here may be appropriate considering the scale and subtlety of the question. What matters is that it opens a conceptual space between mechanistic materialism and supernatural intervention. — Wayfarer

Vagueness is an explanatory gap. The conceptual space you allude to is extremely wide - and it therefore suggests that no one conceptual guess is better than another, so no specific choice can be justified.

Materialism's narrower explanatory gap could similarly be treated as a conceptual space into which one could insert some more limited immaterial elements, if one is inclined. Similarly, nothing specific can be justified. So I'm fine with the narrow gap materialism provides.

It suggests that intentionality and consciousness may be expressions of something deeper in the fabric of reality, not inexplicable anomalies.

It's a gap, and it opens up a large space of possibilities. Something "deeper" is possible. Something in addition is also possible. How do you justify any specific assumption in the possibility space? I'm suspicious of jumping to egocentric/anthropocentric conclusions, whereas it sounds like you consider this a virtue.

Because we are the phenomenon.
— Wayfarer
We are one phenomenon. — Relativist

The discussion is about the phenomenon of life, and about how physicalism omits some of its fundamental characteristics. Reductionism may be effective and useful in many scientific disciplines, but that doesn’t ameloriate its shortcomings when applied to philosophy. The ‘explanatory gap’ and the ‘problem of consciousness’ both refer to that shortcoming.

I believe materialism is justified on the basis that it provides the best explation for all the uncontroversial facts of the world. — Relativist

It is justifiable in respect of material phenomena over which science demonstrates considerable mastery. But this discussion has been what it leaves out - what happens when the methods of science are applied to questions of philosophy.

[1] In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.
[2] And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.
[3] And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.

King James Bible.

It looks like a ground of being to me.

it strikes me as a rather extreme assumption to think that such a being just happens to exist uncaused.

(from your post that I responded to)
I’m not aware of people claiming the “God” is uncaused. They say God is eternal.

By contrast, the gradual development of beings, somewhere in an old. vast universe, with the capacity for intentional behavior, but considerably more limited powers to act, seems considerably more plausible.

(From your post that I responded to)

But in such a vast universe the gradual development of eternal beings* who can create grounds of being may be just as likely.

Right. There's either an infinite regression of ever-smaller parts/of causes/ of explanations - or there is a foundation of all these - the ultimate ground.

(From your last reply to me)

There is no escape from infinite regression, this is a peculiarity of human thought, there is no plausible likelihood that infinity can be considered external to the human mind. So this whole preoccupation with infinity is a human preoccupation around this peculiarity. It’s turtles all the way down remember.

“ultimate ground” (isn’t this what the book of Genesis describes above) seems like wishful thinking aswell. It seems more plausible that there are no ultimate grounds out there, only relatively ultimate grounds. That this also recedes into eternity, seems much more plausible to me.

Also where you say plausible, presumably this is plausible to our limited minds which are designed to operate in this physical world we find ourselves in. So there is a kind of implicit bias there.

* by eternal, I am not suggesting any infinities, just a state or position outside or within, our observable reality, or something inconceivable to us.

Plantinga's argument is fatally flawed. In order to survive, every organism needs a functionally accurate perception of its environment to successfully interact with it. Primitive rationality is exhibited when animals adapt there hunting behavior when necessary, doing things that work instead of those that don't. The evolution of abstract reasoning would have been an evolutionary dead end leading to extinction, if it worsened our ability to interact with the environment. — Relativist

:up: :up:

AI "Telos" is a Greek word that generally means end, purpose, or goal. In philosophy, particularly in Aristotle's philosophy, it refers to the final cause or ultimate purpose of something. In a Christian context, telos can refer to God's ultimate plan and purpose for humanity. It's also the root of the modern term "teleology," which is the study of purposiveness or the aims of objects. AI

Telos doe not necessarily mean that a specific particular form or species was Intended. If the mechanism is nature and the process is evolution or cosmology, the sole purpose or goal might be creativity, diversity, novelty. It may have the same appeal as when we all watched the ants in our ant farm create pathways or colonies, or the AI art exhibit at the MOMA after being fed images of human art creates its own continuously unique new forms. (reminiscent of a few twilight zone episodes).
Darwin ""There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved."

Physical mathematics are not reality they are idealizations, approximations, abstractions, no satellite will over find its target or place without being able to make in course corrections because reality is just too complex. This is the fallacy of misplaced concreteness mistaking our working theories for reality).

It seem very unfortunate that the colors we perceive, the sounds we hear, the thoughts we think and the experiences that we have should be considered less real than our measurements on electrons, and other external abstractions. We are part of nature, our perceptions are part of nature. Dividing the world into primary qualities (supposedly real) and secondary qualities (supposedly mere physic imaginative additions to reality) is the "artificial bifurcation of nature" a fundamental flaw in both scientific and philosophical thought.

Dividing the world into primary qualities (supposedly real) and secondary qualities (supposedly mere physic imaginative additions to reality) is the "artificial bifurcation of nature" a fundamental flaw in both scientific and philosophical thought. — prothero

I am very astonished that the scientific picture of the real world around me is deficient. It gives a lot of factual information, puts all our experience in a magnificently consistent order, but it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and eternity. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously. — Erwin Schrodinger, Nature and the Greeks

Although there are those who take them deadly seriously.

In order to survive, every organism needs a functionally accurate perception of its environment to successfully interact with it. Primitive rationality is exhibited when animals adapt there hunting behavior when necessary, doing things that work instead of those that don't. The evolution of abstract reasoning would have been an evolutionary dead end leading to extinction, if it worsened our ability to interact with the environment. — Relativist

That criticism betrays a misunderstanding of the argument from reason. Obviously organisms must respond adaptively to their environment in order to survive. But that’s a long way from showing that evolution accounts for rationality of the kind required for abstract thought and language or theoretical science. Evolution selects for adaptive advantage, and plenty of species have been successfully adapted for millions of years without any ability to reason.

The behavior of crocodiles, cockroaches, and even mammals reflect functional intelligence—what works pragmatically—but that’s not the same as rational insight, which is the ability to perceive and evaluate logical relations among ideas.

More to the point, if we reduce reason to adaptive success—if it’s “just what works” in evolutionary terms—then we undermine the normative authority of reason itself. After all, reason doesn’t just describe what we do—it tells us what we ought to believe, based on validity, coherence, and evidence. But if reason is just a tool of survival, why trust it in matters beyond basic survival? Why trust it to tell us the truth about consciousness, the universe, or even evolution itself?

As far as ethics is concerned:

I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt, Anything but Human

And as for reason:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion

That is why the veracity of reason presupposes a deeper concordance between mind and world than can be understood solely in terms of adaptive fitness. Neo-darwinian biology is many things, but an epistemology, it ain't.

The behavior of crocodiles, cockroaches, and even mammals reflect functional intelligence—what works pragmatically—but that’s not the same as rational insight, which is the ability to perceive and evaluate logical relations among ideas.

More to the point, if we reduce reason to adaptive success—if it’s “just what works” in evolutionary terms—then we undermine the normative authority of reason itself. After all, reason doesn’t just describe what we do—it tells us what we ought to believe, based on validity, coherence, and evidence. But if reason is just a tool of survival, why trust it in matters beyond basic survival? Why trust it to tell us the truth about consciousness, the universe, or even evolution itself? — Wayfarer

If there isn’t one already, we probably need a whole thread just on the status of reason. The argument made by Nagel seems to treat reason as something almost magical, something that exists outside of nature and therefore can't be a product of the natural world and its processes. But wouldn’t you have to demonstrate that logic and mathematics are not natural, constrained, and context-bound systems? Isn't it the view of phenomenology that reasoning is grounded in the structures of experience, in how the world appears to us through perception, intention, and context? This is highly specialised and beyond the expertise of most of us.

Science—and philosophy—both presuppose that the world is intelligible. Even raising the question of whether it should be assumes a rational order that allows the question to be posed in the first place. So rather than doubting intelligibility, the more pressing issue is: what kind of ontology can account for the fact that intelligibility is possible at all?

If physicalism treats intelligibility as an accidental byproduct of blind processes, then it risks undermining the rational basis of its own claims. This concern is related to what some have called the argument from reason (C.S. Lewis) or the evolutionary argument against naturalism (Alvin Plantinga): namely, that if our minds are solely the product of non-rational forces, we have little reason to trust their capacity for reason—including our belief in physicalism itself. — Wayfarer

All very interesting and well described. I notice you wrote "risks undermining" not "undermines" why isn't it a slam dunk? I thought it was your thesis that meaning can only exist if there is some form of guarantee for all meaning - a transcendent source. You often seem to maintain that there needs to be a higher-order purpose for any kind of purpose at all to be possible? But I may have this wrong.

The fact that we can ask questions or construct models doesn't guarantee that the world is inherently intelligible in the absolute sense. Our frameworks of understanding might simply reflect the cognitive and pragmatic structures we’ve evolved, not the deep structure of reality itself. Intelligibility might be a projection of mind rather than a property of being. So the salient question is not what ontology makes intelligibility possible, but whether our sense of intelligibility is anything more than an anthropocentric artifact. Can this even be answered?

This probably brings us to domains like mathematics, where some argue its famous uncanny effectiveness demonstrates a deeper connection to reality. But whether this points to a transcendent order or simply reflects the structures we project onto the world remains an open question. I also doubt we can answer this question right now.

And reason? Is it a conduit to something beyond the human, a reflection of objective order, or merely a contingent adaptation, evolved to navigate the constraints of our particular reality, and perhaps of only provisional use? Isn’t it the view of phenomenology that reasoning is grounded in the structures of lived experience, how the world shows up for us through perception, intention, and context? It’s a complex perspective and likely beyond the grasp of most of us without specialised training.

I don’t have the answers to any of this, but I remain a kind of doubting Thomas. I find it difficult to see why meaning must be grounded in necessity or guaranteed by something absolute. Could it be that humans are unrealistically impressed by reason, treating it as the highest or even only valid form of understanding? But reason is just one tool among many, and has limited use. It struggles with emotions, ambiguity, and subjective experiences. It's clear that no logical argument can fully capture grief, happiness, aesthetic appreciation, or empathy. I wonder if we overestimate its power, forgetting that perhaps it evolved for survival, not for solving metaphysical puzzles or guaranteeing truth.

The argument made by Nagel seems to treat reason as something almost magical, something that exists outside of nature and therefore can't be a product of the natural world and its processes — Tom Storm

I have previously started threads on this very topic. There's a constellation of arguments referred to as the argument from reason. There are several versions. One is associated with C S Lewis, elaborated by Victor Reppert. Another is Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism. The passage from Nagel is from his essay Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion which we've discussed previously.

Very briefly, the argument from reason states that reason is the capacity to grasp ground and consequent relations - because of this, then that must be the case. The argument is that the nature of causation in this context is different from the material causation upon which naturalism is grounded.

So, yes, I think there's a good argument that reason is not a product of the kinds of naturalistic causation that science generally assumes. Indeed, Darwin himself hinted at perplexity over this fact, writing 'With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.' My view is that when h.sapiens gained the capacity to perceive causal relationships, which was bound up with the evolution of language, abstract thought, and the understanding of symbols, our intelligence realised horizons of being that were not perceptible to our simian forbears. It is only that capacity which can be properly said to perceive truly.

So - magical? Well, I think not, but something even greater in some respects. I think when the ancients discovered the power of reason they discovered an intoxicating power which we have since begun to take for granted. This is very much the topic of the excellent TPF essay Dante and the Deflation of Reason.

Isn't it the view of phenomenology that reasoning is grounded in the structures of experience, in how the world appears to us through perception, intention, and context? — Tom Storm

Phenomenology is not empiricism. While it begins with lived experience, it doesn’t reduce reason to perceptual inputs or behavioral adaptations. Especially in Husserl’s later work, phenomenology becomes explicitly transcendental, concerned with the a priori structures of subjectivity—those conditions that make intentionality, perception, and reasoning possible in the first place.

So yes, perception, intention, and context are crucial—but they don’t explain the faculty of reason. They are, rather, the field in which reason operates, and which reason must itself interrogate. What phenomenology uncovers is that reason is not merely derived from experience; it's already operative in how experience is constituted (which is what 'transcendental' meant for both Kant and Husserl.)

I thought it was your thesis that meaning can only exist if there is some form of guarantee for all meaning - a transcendent source. You often seem to maintain that there needs to be a higher-order purpose for any kind of purpose at all to be possible? — Tom Storm

I wouldn’t say meaning requires a “guarantee” in the strong sense—that seems too ambitious. But if reason genuinely grants insight into truths that hold necessarily, or in all possible worlds (as traditional logic and metaphysics have claimed), then that would seem to indicate a level of cognition that is categorically distinct from the reflexive or instrumental intelligence of non-rational animals (or technicians ;-) ).

Isn’t this precisely why the classical tradition held reason to be the distinguishing feature of human nature? Not because humans are “smarter” in an evolutionary sense, but because we’re capable of grasping truth as such, not just what works.

I realize this sounds unfashionable to modern ears—perhaps even reactionary. As John Vervaeke wryly observed, "what unites all of postmodernism is hatred of Plato.” But Plato’s point still stands: if we can know what is true, just, or good in itself, then our rational capacities open onto something more than contingent adaptation—they reveal a dimension of meaning that is not merely made, but discovered.

Could it be that humans are unrealistically impressed by reason, treating it as the highest or even only valid form of understanding? — Tom Storm

Far be it from a philosopher to defend the soveriegnty of reason :yikes:

Could it be that humans are unrealistically impressed by reason, treating it as the highest or even only valid form of understanding? But reason is just one tool among many, and has limited use. It struggles with emotions, ambiguity, and subjective experiences. It's clear that no logical argument can fully capture grief, happiness, aesthetic appreciation, or empathy. I wonder if we overestimate its power, forgetting that perhaps it evolved for survival, not for solving metaphysical puzzles or guaranteeing truth. — Tom Storm

:up: :up:

Idealists tend to put the cart before the horse forgetting, as you say, or denying (E. Becker) that 'truth' presupposes (pre-cognitive pragmatics, or the enactive context, of) 'survival' ... to which reason at minimum is adapted (i.e. embodied = instantiated).

I’m not aware of people claiming the “God” is uncaused. They say God is eternal. — Punshhh

Google "Kalam Cosmological Argument" - a "first cause" argument for God. Yes, they universally believe God is eternal: existing at all times, past and future.

There is no escape from infinite regression, this is a peculiarity of human thought, there is no plausible likelihood that infinity can be considered external to the human mind. So this whole preoccupation with infinity is a human preoccupation around this peculiarity. It’s turtles all the way down remember — Punshhh

You're wrong. An infinite series of causes is avoided by assuming a first cause. An infinite series of layers of reality is avoided by assuming a bottom layer. These are what metaphysical foundationalism is all about.

It seems more plausible that there are no ultimate grounds out there, only relatively ultimate grounds. That this also recedes into eternity, seems much more plausible to me. — Punshhh

That's a personal choice. But here's the issue: an infinite series exists without explanation: each individual cause is explained by a prior cause, but the series as a whole is unexplained.

where you say plausible, presumably this is plausible to our limited minds which are designed to operate in this physical world we find ourselves in. So there is a kind of implicit bias there. — Punshhh

Our limited minds are the only minds we know exist, and we are utilizing these minds to speculate and judge the nature of existence. Is there more than this physical world? It's possible, but there's no way to know. So we speculate and apply reason. Different people accept different answers. No one can be proven right or wrong.

Interesting as always. Not sure I am convinced, however

Far be it from a philosopher to defend the soveriegnty of reason :yikes: — Wayfarer

Questioning the limitations of reason seems a legitimate function of philosophy. Kant seemed to think so. Poststructuralist thinkers also engage in this kind of critique. I know they aren’t everyone's bag, but they are philosophers nonetheless. Is doing this a performative contradiction? Not necessarily. Examining reason’s limits through reason itself is a kind of reflexive inquiry, not a total rejection.

that 'truth' presupposes (pre-cognitive pragmatics, or the enactive context, of) 'survival' ... to which reason at minimum is adapted (i.e. embodied = instantiated). — 180 Proof

Oh, that's nicely put. I find this very intriguing

What phenomenology uncovers is that reason is not merely derived from experience; it's already operative in how experience is constituted (which is what 'transcendental' meant for both Kant and Husserl.) — Wayfarer

Sure, but reason might be derived from experience through a particularly structured cognitive apparatus which has limitations. Isn’t that a point Kant makes? I’m no Kantian, but doesn’t Kant discuss transcendental illusions (systematic errors built into our reasoning) and emphasise that humans face clear limits in how reason can be used? His writing is dull beyond measure and impossible for me to follow properly.

A classic example is found in some religious thinking, that God is the first cause or a necessary being. Kant sees this as a mistake built into the way human reason works. Our reason naturally looks for ultimate answers, but it goes too far when it treats these ideas as if they were things we could actually know. Since we only gain knowledge through experience, and God is beyond all possible experience, we can't claim to know such things through reason alone.

Kant lists a series of such flaws in reasoning, which seem to be built into the structure of how we think.

There’s a short and interesting article on transcendental illusion here:

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805210/39727/excerpt/9780521039727_excerpt.pdf

Obviously organisms must respond adaptively to their environment in order to survive. But that’s a long way from showing that evolution accounts for rationality of the kind required for abstract thought and language or theoretical science — Wayfarer

I wasn't trying show that evolution necessarily accounts for rationality, I was identifying the glaring flaw in Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). ,

"The EAAN argues that the combined belief in both evolutionary theory and naturalism is epistemically self-defeating. The argument for this is that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then the probability of having reliable cognitive faculties is low, which then destroys any reason to believe in evolution or naturalism in the first place, as the cognitive faculties one used to deduce evolution or naturalism as logically valid are no longer reliable."

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism

So - magical? Well, I think not, but something even greater in some respects — Wayfarer

This is what I see as an enormous problem in your position. It depends on uncritically accepting the existence of magic (or "something even greater"). I've seen no justification for this other than arguments from authority (the ancients had this view) and arguments from ignorance (physicalism's explanatory gap). You will disagree with this characterization, so I ask that you (if you choose to respond) that you explain your justification, for whatever it is that you believe, in positive terms- without reference to what philosophers have said.

Google "Kalam Cosmological Argument" - a "first cause" argument for God. Yes, they universally believe God is eternal: existing at all times, past and future.

Yes, I’m familiar with the argument.
Putting the use of infinity to one side for a moment. A God which is eternal, existing at all times, past and future, is in no way infinite. As I said I am treating eternal as very big so to speak, but not infinite. But rather as beyond a horizon, beyond which it is indistinguishable from the infinite.

You're wrong. An infinite series of causes is avoided by assuming a first cause. An infinite series of layers of reality is avoided by assuming a bottom layer. These are what metaphysical foundationalism is all about.

Thanks for the link, I’ll have a deeper look.
Although, I would suggest that saying I’m wrong is a bit hasty. I am suggesting that infinity only exists as a concept, a concept in the mind of humans. Applying that to reality (external to that mind) is a bit tenuous.

That's a personal choice. But here's the issue: an infinite series exists without explanation: each individual cause is explained by a prior cause, but the series as a whole is unexplained.

Yes, I know, but I don’t see us explaining it using philosophy (logic), but rather that entertaining it is rather like looking at one of those Escher paintings of stairs going up and joining themselves lower down due to a trick of perspective. I know it may have uses in logic and maths, but when applied to existence it just throws up absurdities.

Our limited minds are the only minds we know exist, and we are utilizing these minds to speculate and judge the nature of existence. Is there more than this physical world? It's possible, but there's no way to know. So we speculate and apply reason. Different people accept different answers. No one can be proven right or wrong.

I agree that no one can be proven right or wrong. But as to the question of is there more than this physical world. I would think it highly unlikely that there isn’t. Simply because in the grand scheme of things, we are insignificant and our newly found powers of reason have only worked with what we have found in front of us when we each came to be in this world. It would be rather grandiose for us to conclude that this that we see before us is all there is.

I am treating eternal as very big so to speak, but not infinite — Punshhh

Is "existing at all times" consistent with your view? This would preclude a caused object from existing eternally.

saying I’m wrong is a bit hasty — Punshhh

This statement was wrong: "There is no escape from infinite regression". I provided the escape- an epistemic reason a person might reject an infinite regress. You apparently aren't persuaded by this, and that's fine - because the "escape" is not a proof of impossibility.

I am suggesting that infinity only exists as a concept, a concept in the mind of humans. — Punshhh

I agree, but it is a useful concept.

as to the question of is there more than this physical world. I would think it highly unlikely that there isn’t. Simply because in the grand scheme of things, we are insignificant and our newly found powers of reason have only worked with what we have found in front of us when we each came to be in this world. It would be rather grandiose for us to conclude — Punshhh

I agree there is likely to be more to reality than we can possibly observe or infer through physics. However, it seems to me that we can't justify believing in anything specific that is beyond that which is accessible - other than the fact you stated.

Is "existing at all times" consistent with your view? This would preclude a caused object from existing eternally.

No this not my view. My view is open ended, that we are trying to address things which can’t necessarily be understood by our brand of rationality, or that can be demonstrated, conceptually, or in principle from the limited knowledge pool of human knowledge. So when I say eternity, I mean beyond the horizon of our knowledge, or what we can say about it.

This statement was wrong: "There is no escape from infinite regression". I provided the escape- an epistemic reason a person might reject an infinite regress. You apparently aren't persuaded by this, and that's fine - because the "escape" is not a proof of impossibility.

I don’t know enough about foundationalism to reply. But I find the escape to be accepting an apparent paradox. That there is an uncaused, or ultimate ground. That uncaused is unexplainable, just like an infinite regression is unexplainable.

However, it seems to me that we can't justify believing in anything specific that is beyond that which is accessible - other than the fact you stated.

I don’t see a need to justify hypothetical scenarios, but I am interested in them. As much as a means of breaking free of the shackles of rational thought on the issue. Or as a means of contrasting, or shining a light on how our knowledge is blind to things about our existence. I don’t think belief is useful here because it’s an issue of hypotheticals, in the knowledge that none of it is verifiable (outside personal experience).