And I guess all I can do here is point to the basic liberal principles of accepting the differences that make no difference. If someone wants to be referred to as "they", why not just oblige? And were it makes a difference, to seek accomodation before violence.

And of course there is much, much more to say here. — Banno

Having more to say is better than having nothing to say, so cheers to that.

Good. I'm pleased with the attention it has garnered. Yes, 'dissection' is pretty much 'analysis' but I went with the former both in order to leave behind some bagage, and to take advantage of the alliteration. — Banno

I've noticed that several posts in this thread speak of having a "narrative" as-if it's a bad thing, like fiction or myth. Is "dissection" or "analysis" of a philosophical Narrative different from literary Criticism? In philosophy, how is a Narrative different from having a self-examined philosophical Position or personal Worldview, in which all parts of the story are integrated by a central principle or core value? I suppose it's that core belief (e.g. God) that critics attempt to seek out and dissect. Does analytical revelation of that Core Value determine whether the Narrative is True or False, Good or Bad? Or is the critic's worldview the deciding factor? :smile:


Philosophical Narrative :
Many philosophers argue that our sense of self is shaped by the narratives we construct about our lives. According to some philosophers on Oxford Academic, our personal identity is not a fixed entity but rather a narrative we continually revise and refine.
#. Narrative can play a crucial role in ethical reflection, helping us understand moral dilemmas and evaluate actions by considering their narrative consequences or their alignment with certain ethical frameworks.
#. Narrative analysis is a method used to examine the structure, content, and function of narratives in various contexts, including literature, history, and everyday life.
#. Narratives can shape our perceptions of reality, influencing how we understand events, people, and ourselves.
#. Daniel Dennett, while not strictly a narrative philosopher, uses the concept of the "narrative self" to explain how we construct a sense of self through the stories we tell.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophical+narrative

:smile: Thanks for listening.

You can’t say there is nothing absolute if you want to avoid saying the validity of any narrative is arbitrary. Some goal post must become fixed before the arbitrary is avoided. — Fire Ologist

Nah. There can be many good reasons for something -- hence not arbitrary -- without requiring that any of them be absolute. The infinite regress of "justifications for justification" doesn't apply to this question. If there is no "fixed goal post," all this shows is that the reasons are not certain or absolute. But I don't require either one.

What is it with this fascination with "either absolute or arbitrary"? Do you really think and act that way IRL? Not being snarky, I'm actually curious.

What is it with this fascination with "either absolute or arbitrary"? Do you really think and act that way IRL? — J

Maybe. Or should I say maybe not.

Does that answer the question?

It had me reaching for the antiseptic... to whip down the furniture.

I think Banno has said most of what I would want to say about that... — J

Thanks for that.

I want to be clear that, in contrast to your much more interesting response, I think there is a formal fallacy in the argument on which Tim relies. I'd hoped to show him the problem with the Great List account, but apparently he can't see it there.

An inability to present a complete system of justification does not entail the impossibility of a partial, situated, local justification.

That there are mathematical conjectures for which we do not have a proof does not entail that there are no mathematical proofs. Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that we cannot give good reasons for rejecting this narrative, and accepting that one.

From the absence of a universal criterion, Tim concludes that no valid judgment can be made. That doesn't follow.

The infinite regress of "justifications for justification" doesn't apply to this question. — J

It’s not about justification. You didn’t answer the question.

Edit:
Count: Is that blue or not?
J: Well it’s not green.
Fire: Is not green, blue or not?
J: No.

- :up:

Tagging @Count Timothy von Icarus -- In case you missed it, click on @Banno's post.

:up:

But as you so eloquently say, we do find ourselves putting the pieces of our history together in a narrative. This is an inevitable consequence of living a reflective life. This may be a sort of mythologising, a sense-making that to a large extent sits outside critical appraisal, at least by it's author. — Banno

In my youth, I had little exposure to Philosophy outside of Theological argumentation. As a Post-religion adult though, my "reflective life" was mostly Science-based, until the Great Recession and subsequent Retirement gave me time for impractical philosophizing. Triggered by a perplexed comment from a quantum physicist --- "it's all information!" --- I was motivated to create my own personal worldview (mythology), based mostly on key concepts from Quantum Physics and Information Science.

I call that "narrative" a mythology because A> I am not a scientist, and B> my narrative goes beyond the evidence for a something-from-nothing beginning. Both of those limitations left me vulnerable to harsh criticisms by those who revere classical science and abhor transcendent narratives. But I see no reason why theoretical philosophy must be limited by the empirical rules of science. For example, Aristotle, whose writings were mostly based on empirical observations, reasoned from the obvious imperfections & contingencies of Nature that, logically, there must be something like an Ideal Source of creation & causation*1.

Since I have no colleagues to censor my personal myth, I depend on this forum for "outside critical appraisal". Some of that criticism has been bulldozer fault-finding --- showing me where I need to patch the myth --- and some has been holistic & constructive. I am not the hero of my unfinished myth, but it does put my little life into a wider perspective. :smile:


*1. Aristotle's first cause argument, also known as the unmoved mover argument, posits that everything in the universe that undergoes change must have a cause, and that this chain of causes cannot extend infinitely backward. Therefore, there must be a first cause, an "unmoved mover," that initiates all motion and change without itself being moved by anything else. This first cause, according to Aristotle, is God, according to some interpretations.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+first+cause+argument
Note --- Logically, the First Cause cannot itself be an effect of a prior cause. So, some view the Big Bang as a Secondary Cause, which leaves open the question of "what caused the Bang?" Of course, nobody knows the answer to that, but like Aristotle, we can reason beyond what is now known, to speculate on the First and Final Cause. Unless, of course, that going-beyond seems critical of someone else's mythical Narrative.

Do we die on the hill of a metaphor? — Moliere

If Banno's categories of "dissector" and "discourser" are just "metaphor," and all dissectors are also discoursers and all discoursers are also dissectors, then what in the world do you think the thread is even about? When I contrast the builder with the destroyer (and you recast that as the builder and the critic), it makes no sense to respond by claiming that the destroyer is a builder. You can't distinguish builders from critics and then turn around and say that there is no difference, because the critics are builders, too. If there is no difference then why in the world would we make the distinction in the first place!?

It is more rigorous to speak this way as a matter of course, even when we are not explicitly comparing and contrasting builders with critics:

A doctor builds a house, not qua doctor, but qua housebuilder, and turns gray, not qua doctor, but qua dark-haired. On the other hand he doctors or fails to doctor qua doctor. But we are using words most appropriately when we say that a doctor does something or undergoes something, or becomes something from being a doctor, if he does, undergoes, or becomes qua doctor. — Aristotle, Physics I.8

Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that we cannot give good reasons for rejecting this narrative, and accepting that one. — Banno

If you were to remove the words, "final infallible," then you would be offering a real argument instead of a strawman. But I understand why you and @J won't abandon the strawmen. It would put you in a tough spot. It would put you face to face with the arguments being offered, and therefore with the problems of your strange position.

To assess a narrative and judge it good or bad requires a standard. To assess a narrative and accept or reject it requires a standard which one takes to be somehow definitive or elevated. If there are no such definitive or elevated standards, then rejection is never permissible. We would never say, "This does not fulfill some (arbitrary) standard, therefore it is to be rejected." To reject something requires judging that it fails to fulfill some definitive or elevated standard. To judge that it is beyond the pale.

If Banno's categories of "dissector" and "discourser" are just "metaphor," and all dissectors are also discoursers and all discoursers are also dissectors, then what in the world do you think the thread is even about? — Leontiskos

Ways of looking at, or doing, philosophy.

When I contrast the builder with the destroyer (and you recast that as the builder and the critic), it makes no sense to respond by claiming that the destroyer is a builder. You can't distinguish builders from critics and then turn around and say that there is no difference, because the critics are builders, too. If there is no difference then why in the world would we make the distinction in the first place!? — Leontiskos

To note two ways to philosophize.

You wanted to claim that the builders are superior to the destroyers.

Thus far -- which is a usual approach for me to philosophical disagreement -- I've maintained that both ways of philosophy are good. So my disagreement has only been against your notion that the builders are superior to the other side, whatever that happens to be. (And surely you can see how "building" is a metaphor, yes?)

↪Banno Tagging Count Timothy von Icarus -- In case you missed it, click on @Banno's post. — Moliere

Elsewhere @Banno considers such behavior to be "talking about others behind their back." What would happen if we held him to his own standards? The question that resonates throughout the thread. :wink:

, .

Very down to earth posts.

In my usage, a narrative has a truth value - it sets out how things are, or at least it sets out how they are supposed to be. A narrative ought be consistent, and truth matters.

A myth, in contrast, is neither true nor false, but shows something. It's truth value is irrelevant.

Narratives are not bad things, unless they are taken to be beyond criticism.

In a sense the OP is offering a demarcation criterion, for separating philosophy from religion or fiction. It's that philosophy involves this conscious and wilful exposure of the narrative to dissection.

If we follow this approach, then any narrative on offer is open to criticism, and so there can be no "final" narrative; at least, if there is one, a narrative that is beyond critique, that's an end to doing philosophy.

So philosophy is a process, and not a narrative.

Your approach, of taking transcendental leaps from mundane science, is always going to be open to philosophical criticism. But that does not make it not worthwhile... indeed, that's what we are doing. There's glory in the process, not just in the result.

So keep going.

I don't usually read Leon's posts. The last few show why. When faced with a counter argument, he doesn't address the criticism, but instead insults the critic.

From the absence of a universal criterion, Tim concludes that no valid judgment can be made. That doesn't follow.

You keep tacking on things like "universal," "absolute," "infallible." I asked for any criterion, which was allegedly a "leading question."

And the only answer so far comes from @J and is: "it's a different criterion in each instance and you sort of 'know correctness when you see it,' but it also involves being thoughtful." This seems to me to be incredibly vague, and seems to open the door to declaring oneself justified, or others unjustified, whenever one feels like it, just so long as one considers oneself thoughtful. That is, it seems open to authoritarianism.

I don't recall you agreeing to any criterion though, no? Can one be provided?

I want to be clear that, in contrast to your much more interesting response, I think there is a formal fallacy in the argument on which Tim relies. I'd hoped to show him the problem with the Great List account, but apparently he can't see it there.

I find this to be a very authoritarian position. Apparently you think that unless someone uses a form from your Great List of Valid Arguments they are creating a "fallacy." This is an inappropriate demand for completeness vis-á-vis argumentation. How can you know the entire list of valid arguments and when they apply in each instance? What's the criterion for this?

Now look, I thoughtfully considered that argument. It's consistent with my habit of practice, which is robust. I know good argument when I see it, and that argument is definitely one of them. Others agree!

You want to impose your One True Standard of Argument on us with your authoritarian List of what is valid, but I think there is a happy mid-point between declaring oneself infallible and in possession of the One True List of Valid Arguments and not allowing just any argument at all. I don't allow just any argument. I don't make just any argument. I try to only accept or make just those arguments that, per the case in question, would be justifiably valid according to my practice. But this is one of those cases. I have been thoughtful. My argument is valid here, not fallacious!

In my usage, a narrative has a truth value - it sets out how things are, or at least it sets out how they are supposed to be. A narrative ought be consistent, and truth matters.

Interesting. So is truth a criterion for accepting narratives? Do true narratives contradict one another?

Speaking of the determinate is where the speaking corresponds directly with the spoken about. It is also like the apriori, the axiom. Or for believers in myth, it is the truth, the absolute. The fixed. The permanent and unchanging. The eternal. The ground.

The indeterminate is the unknowable-in-itself. It’s psuedo-determinate when known as ‘nothing’ or the ‘vacuous’, but then, that may just be a language trick where we have ‘determined nothing’. It is unformed. It can’t exist and is all around us, and in us, allowing for mystical/mythical (maybe meaningless) statements like this one. — Fire Ologist

I feel I can mention a verse from the early Buddhist texts in this context. Partially because it is so succinct, and also because Buddhism, especially of the type represented in these (Pali) texts is resolutely non-theistic in its outlook, so this is not an attempt to smuggle God into the picture.

There is, monks, an unborn — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated. If there were not that unborn — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated, there would not be the case that escape from the born — become — made — fabricated would be discerned. But precisely because there is an unborn — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated, escape from the born — become — made — fabricated is discerned. — Nibbāna Sutta

So this 'unborn, unmade, unfabricated' is a fortiori also 'the unconditioned'. And I think there's an abyss in the current philosophical lexicon, where something corresponding to 'the unconditioned' used to dwell. I think in the Western cultural context, this is associated with God, so post death-of-God, the unconditioned has been banished from respectable philosophical discourse, except by way of hints and aphorisms. Perhaps also it is subject to what Alan Watts decscribed as a taboo (in his last work The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who you Are.) There's a kind of gentleman's agreement as to what is considered a suitable topic for philosophical discourse, and of this, 'we must be silent' (or else :brow: )

I have found a relevant (and open access) academic paper on this topic -that is The unconditioned in philosophy of religion Steven Shakespeare,. where he argues that 'the unconditioned' badly needs to be rehabilitated and re-situated. I have still not fully assimilated this paper, but as he engages with and situates his discussion in relation to the broader analytical tradition, others might find it a useful resource.

This looks to me as if you would avoid the issue rather than address it.

I would suppose that we might find a point of agreement at least in preferring valid arguments to invalid ones. But from what you've just said here, my preference for validity seems to you to be a kind of personal quirk—a peccadillo.

I gather that's meant as some sort of rhetorical flourish, but you lost me in there.

Again, it seems to me that there is a structural flaw in your response; that it depends on a logical fallacy, which I have attempted to set out for you. But I can't make you see it.

@Count Timothy von Icarus — maybe we could take a step back. You said you didn’t make use of a “Great List.” But don’t you think there are true statements—and that, taken together, these tell us about what is real?

This question is a trap, of course.

I find this to be a very authoritarian position. Apparently you think that unless someone uses a form from your Great List of Valid Arguments they are creating a "fallacy." This is an inappropriate demand for completeness vis-á-vis argumentation. How can you know the entire list of valid arguments and when they apply in each instance? What's the criterion for this?

Now look, I thoughtfully considered that argument. It's consistent with my habit of practice, which is robust. I know good argument when I see it, and that argument is definitely one of them. Others agree!

You want to impose your One True Standard of Argument on us with your authoritarian List of what is valid, but I think there is a happy mid-point between declaring oneself infallible and in possession of the One True List of Valid Arguments and not allowing just any argument at all. I don't allow just any argument. I don't make just any argument. I try to only accept or make just those arguments that, per the case in question, would be justifiably valid according to my practice. But this is one of those cases. I have been thoughtful. My argument is valid here, not fallacious! — Count Timothy von Icarus

Too good. :lol:

I don't usually read Leon's posts. — Banno

As a sophist it behooves you to avoid them.

When you say something silly and another person points it out, apparently you think you can just rely on a rhetorical flourish, "You're not infallible! I can't believe you think you're infallible!" Failing that, you claim that there is no such thing as a justifiable standard for sophistry or anything else, so obviously you can't be engaged in sophistry!

Just imagine the real philosophy that might occur if not for all of these elementary threads.

What makes an argument valid? Isn't the idea you've advocated for in the past a sort of unrestricted logical pluralism based on what we deem useful? But I do not find it useful for me to embrace any logic where my argument isn't valid here, and it is surely valid in at least some.



I'm not even sure what this "Great List" is supposed to be. Propositions as abstract platonic objects? The options for understanding truth are not limited to early and late analytic philosophy. Early analytic philosophy has the dubious honor of being the new Cartesian substance dualism, only rolled out so that people can knock it down and declare their particular theory the victor by process of elimination.

What is it with this fascination with "either absolute or arbitrary"? Do you really think and act that way IRL? Not being snarky, I'm actually curious. — J

I didn’t mean to not directly answer your question here. My non-answer “maybe” was actually meant to demonstrate something. I was trying to demonstrate that any arbitrary string of words surely would not answer you and that you, like all people who speak, rely on some absolutes just to follow along the conversations. I almost answered “Finland” but you’d have to really respect me to work out I was trying to respect your question with that answer. So I said “maybe”, which people often say, but os just as indeterminate and arbitrary.

What is it with this fascination with "either absolute or arbitrary"? Do you really think and act that way IRL? Not being snarky, I'm actually curious. — J

We are in the ocean, swimming in indeterminate arbitrariness. That is the ubiquitous ground - drowning, to seek footing. If you are really asking me about “either absolute or arbitrary” IRL, what I wade through is almost entirely arbitrary, but not only that, as once in a while, I touch the ocean’s bottom, brush the shoreline, and stand still for as long as I can.

And you call what I’m saying “either absolute or arbitrary”. IRL, at every step I try for the absolute. If ever possible, I invoke it. Whenever I can, I fix it, or grab hold of it. Once in a while, I catch it. I think the last time was 2022.

The question I have for you is, how do you avoid it? Have you never demanded “absolutely not!” Maybe to someone saying “you know Trump is a good guy who loves all races and respects all women.” Do you never say “I am absolutely certain” about anything? Never? Do you ever say “never”? Do you never pause and force others to “wait, now is not the time. Wait for me to tell you.” Honestly, IRL, you never shine light on the absolute with certain authority? Are you never like a tyrant at all? How do you survive in this world if not?

Sometimes, when you say “you are wrong” I am certain you were absolutely right to say that, because you are clearly a smart person.

I can say this about you, because I don’t believe all is arbitrary. Most of life may be, but not all of it.

Count said:
“Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't.”

That is a simple enough assertion. Maybe you wouldn’t say that but it seems straightforward to me. Either everyone gets to say “this is true” about whatever they want or they don’t.

Count then asked:
“If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?”

What determines which narrative must be rejected?

You answered:
“Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort”

So what is your answer? Either all narratives are acceptable or not? You say some are for one reason, some are for another reason.

Does that mean all narratives are acceptable depending on the reason?

Or maybe some narratives are rejected after all, because you haven’t finished answering, since you only mentioned some?

I tried to ask if you were finished answering and gave the last word on all narratives. You said no, but that left me wondering then “if some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?”

Just imagine the real philosophy that might occur if not for all of these elementary threads. — Leontiskos

I love it when Banno, actually talks philosophy. I don’t even need any humility, although that would be nice.

I love this thread. The OP was a great set up for a for an important question.

I just answered a thread about someone’s incredulity about how I get along in life, as if any of us have any idea who or what each other is or does or says when not doing this little thing of ours.

There are probably 10,000 people in the long history of humanity who give any shit about anything we say here. We are the tiny captive audience.

We should all appreciate each other more.

This crap is fun for me.

Wish I didn’t also have wear a helmet.



Wait, Banno stopped reading my posts too.



Bueller use the word “unconditioned” in a sentence today? Bueller?

What makes an argument valid? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not much to do with utility. Each formal system has it's own definition. Which logic is your account valid in, then? I was using prop calculus.

Why are you asking? Is it that you think you and I might have such differing accounts of validity that an argument that is valid for you is not valid for me?

Can you see why, to me at least, this change of topic might look a little bit like an avoidance strategy?

I'm not even sure what this "Great List" is supposed to be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's apparent. Hence, my

But don’t you think there are true statements—and that, taken together, these tell us about what is real? — Banno

And I think there's an abyss in the current philosophical lexicon, where something corresponding to 'the unconditioned' used to dwell. I think in the Western cultural context, this is associated with God, so post death-of-God, the unconditioned has been banished from respectable philosophical discourse, except by way of hints and aphorisms. — Wayfarer

God is a survivor.

We throw God out and we are left with the exact same world.

He just won’t die no matter how hard we try.

And that is literally true for some of us.

But don’t you think there are true statements, and that, taken together, these tell us about what is real? — Banno

I’ll bite.

Yes, there are true statements. Some of them, are about some things, in the world.

I don’t know about “taken together, these tell us about what is real.” “Taken together” and “real” scare me a bit.
I’d say, taken together they tell us something about what is real.

I understand you want to hear from Count.

But I’ll give you true statement about the world that tells us something about what is real.

There is wisdom in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

Or maybe, there is wisdom about the essence of language itself in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, but it is really hard to infer.

And that is literally true for some of us. — Fire Ologist

No doubt, but the point I was labouring, was the concept of 'the unconditioned' and its place in philosophical discourse.

There's a kind of gentleman's agreement as to what is considered a suitable topic for philosophical discourse, and of this, 'we must be silent' — Wayfarer

Honestly, here on Banno’s thread, and he’s not talking to me anymore, I’m kind of afraid to bring up anything close to God. I don’t want that to be how we fly off an otherwise hopeful encounter.

But I was also still agreeing with you in my own weird way.

The Buddhist text kind of reflects what I said here (I think, slightly):

I wouldn’t know anything of the indeterminate whatsoever, without the determinate. And I certainly know the fact of the indeterminate, so I must therefore know the fact of the determinate. — Fire Ologist

I think they both allude to a kind of inference of the positive (unborn-unmade/ determinate) from the negative (born-made/ indeterminate).

(But that is applying to the Buddhist text, and to my quote, the “positive and negative” to sort of align them, which may not actually do justice. Luckily, I can call it mystical and get away with it? :brow: )