A nice corrective to 'all or nothing' authoritarian thinking!

A rather facile response! As with the arts, where quality, although it is recognizable to the tutored eye, is impossible to strictly define, so with phenomenological accounts derived from intelligent, unbiased reflection on human practices and experience.

A rather facile response! — Janus

To what part?

I thought it was all that was needed.

…is impossible to strictly define... — Janus

Not one single, tiny definition?

I’m with you. I meant that quotation from the Sutta as a support for what you were saying as I thought it very relevant. But then, the reason I brought in that academic paper on ‘the unconditioned’ was to try and build a bridge between that discourse and analytical philosophy.

The problem is that discourse about 'the unconditioned' is inextricably bound up with theology in Western culture. That is because so much of neo-platonism, which had a framework for that discourse, became absorbed into theology by the Greek-speaking theologians. As a consequence, in secular culture, there is a taboo against this framework of discourse, on the grounds of its association with religion. I think that is the dynamic behind a lot of this debate.

there is a taboo against this framework of discourse, on the grounds of its association with religion. I think that is the dynamic behind a lot of this debate. — Wayfarer

I agree. The unconditioned is probably the most analytic way of referring to what was formerly often called “God,” or the “transcendent” or “the One” with a capital O. The word has the least baggage, but I agree, it’s all taboo now.

Metaphysics sympathizers are always suspect. The hidden agenda must be religion or authoritarianism, or a closed system of everything. All for excluding, othering.

J asked me seriously how I actually function. Banno thinks I am a terrible person.

I just think the idea of “the truth” is a good one. So is the idea of “the good” as in “a good idea”. I want to be able to say “that is good” to another person and mean it. Not just mean “I think that is good”, but simply know and say “that is good”. I think we can. I’m not sure we can often, but once is enough for me to have hope for more and make all of this bickering actually meaningful. (There I go again…)

One of my reference works might be of interest to you in this regard Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. Thomas Nagel is an analytical philosopher who is also a critic of reductionism.

Cool. I’ll check it out. Thanks

I'm not changing the subject. I explained why my judgement is completely sound according to @J's criteria of being thoughtful and grounded in practice, and I know soundness when I see it, and this is a sound conclusion.

How can you dismiss my thoughtful conclusion as invalid? That seems like it would be the authoritarian demand that your standards trump everyone else's. But I've been at least as thoughtful and involved in practice as you have, and so that's nonsense. At best, and at worst, we must both be right. And so this amorphous, weak standard clearly must clearly "let in everything" as I conclude it does, and "not let in everything" as you conclude it does. Both are equally valid conclusions, since both can be arrived at by thoughtful individuals engaged in practice, according to the standard adopted for this particular question. To deny this would seem to require a reversal: the claim that there are criterion for selecting criterion. Yet if they aren't both valid conclusions, in virtue of what is one wrong and why isn't this standard authoritarian?

So I can hardly be wrong here. Indeed, that we are both right, that the standard does and doesn't let everything in, only further strengthens my conclusion.

Have you never demanded “absolutely not!” — Fire Ologist

Do you ever say “never”? — Fire Ologist

Honestly, IRL, you never shine light on the absolute with certain authority? — Fire Ologist

I have to smile, because "never" is once again an all-or-nothing option, implying that if I sometimes do, I have contradicted myself! To which I can only reply, "Sure I do, sometimes, but not other times."

Do dolphins have a language that is so different to ours that we cannot recognise it as such? Good question. I do not know the answer.

But you are not a dolphin. — Banno

I think there's much to discuss about "form of life." Maybe the topic for another thread one day, but it seems central yet not well explained (at least for me).

And when you are not looking up to the heavens, when you get hungry or cold, and look instead to what is going on around you now, then we may find agreement, and maybe work together to build a fire and cook some food. — Banno

Philosophy generally is what you only do on a full stomach, a luxury reserved for the few.

Kosher, I presume? — Banno

Glatt.

"never" is once again an all-or-nothing option — J

Is it always and only an all or nothing option, or only some of the time?

I have to smile, because you still haven’t directly addressed Count’s question, or any of the meager substance of my post.

Just admit it, either all narratives are acceptable or they aren’t, and if they aren’t, want could possibly ground that? Saying they are and they aren’t depending on the reason doesn’t address the question. Because then what criteria allows you to say that??

Metaphysics takes a leap involving hypothesis based on assumption. Hegel had hubris claiming he saw the Absolute and giving it a capital “A”.

But I also see hubris in Wittgenstein. He made a similar mic drop move, but from the opposite pole. — Fire Ologist

Good post overall.

I want to highlight this from it because it looks important to me.

I think we can all accept that one of the general lessons of philosophy is that hubris is to be avoided -- not necessarily for the causes of virtue, but at least for the causes of not looking stupid ;)

And I think I see your assessment here as a way of adding a second dimension to the distinction so as to have four categories -- World-builders/Dissectors and Hubris/Humility.

With the former I think I'd say these are categorical, not evaluative, descriptions.

But with the other I'd say these are evaluative, and to give a nod to Aristotle I think the mean between them would be where goodness lies. One can be too proud or too humble, and we can think of extreme examples to make the point, but there is a kind of practiced back-and-forth in philosophical dialogue where sometimes we make the assertion and sometimes we take it back or think there's something else there.

And really I think that's more of a choice we make case-by-case. The extremes are there as a warning, but the mean remains rather undefined.

this is the middle-ground position that I'd recommend — J

I'm still catching up on the thread, but fwiw I want to express my appreciation of this series of posts of yours, and throw my support behind your views, to no one's surprise I expect.

If I wanted to formalize it a bit, I might say that we're not advocating the abandonment of criteria tout court; useful, meaningful criteria (of value, of truth, et bloody cetera) are both local and modifiable. Local here meaning capturing as much of the context of their application as needed. (A question like "Is this a good car?" has no answer or too many without context.) Modifiable meaning that if your criteria can't evolve or aren't open to challenge or debate, you're doing it wrong.

And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty -- which will attack even what I'm saying here, "Are criteria always and everywhere like this? Then you're contradicting yourself!" -- should just be ignored as juvenile. This is not how serious people think. It's like lecturing Jerome Powell after taking Econ 101.

Anyway, some nice posts @J.

Saying they are and they aren’t depending on the reason doesn’t address the question. Because then what criteria allows you to say that?? — Fire Ologist

So, the endless regress problem. What do you see as the way out of that?

some nice posts — Srap Tasmaner

Very kind, thanks. I keep thinking that there is some way of making this clearer in the abstract, but maybe not. Perhaps you have to examine some real practice or issue, understand how the participants do in fact make their judgments and discuss the results, and then . . . perhaps the "absolute criteria" problem would just be seen through, as it should be, in most cases. (Note escape clause -- not even avoiding absolute criteria is always an absolute criterion. :smile: And this is not a heinous contradiction, but just a report on how we do most things.)

Sure.

But that's not all there is going on here. A command also creates of an obligation, a question seeks a reply. That's more than just a transfer of data. — Banno

You seem to be conflating intent with the intended outcome. You can intend to create an obligation for someone to stop when you say, "Stop!" but when they don't did you actually create an obligation? Could you even say that you conveyed any information? Maybe you did and the listener heard you clearly and understands what you want them to do, but the other is under no obligation - ever - to respond in the way you intend. You might need to convey more information, like holding a gun to their head, for them to respond as you intend. The same goes for intending to receive a reply. Just look at many of the conversations on this forum where someone asks a question that is ignored or answered in a way that the questioner did not intend. In these cases, there was an intent, and information was conveyed, but no obligation was created and no reply was received, so how can you say that an obligation was created when one wasn't?

"hello". It doesn't name a greeting, it is a greeting. And I know you will object to this, saying it names an intent to greet or some such. But it doesn't name an intent to greet. It greets. — Banno

I've addressed this one with you before, but your response was that you simply didn't like what I was saying.

Would you consider, "Hello" informative? Are you informed of something when someone says, "Hello"? If you are, then what is it that you are informed of? What does it refer to? — Harry Hindu

["Hello"] is a scribble or sound used to point to the start of communication, similar to how computers establish "handshakes" with each other across a network before they actually begin the transfer of data over the network. When the computers are finished with transferring data, they close the connection in a way that is similar to saying "goodbye". These sounds/scribbles that we make are pointing to the opening and closing of an exchange of information. — Harry Hindu

They are informing the other that we intend to start a conversation (exchanging information) with them and when we intend to stop exchanging information.

"Hello" greets except when it doesn't. If you say, "Hello" to someone and they ignore you, did you greet them? If the other refuses to participate in the "game" do you have a "game"?

Marriage? Scratching your nose? — Banno

Are you saying that you don't have reasons to get married or scratch your nose?

Well, Witt’s approach is air tight

Is it? I don't think Wittgenstein's philosophy is presuppositionless. Its style (both early and late), does not make its presuppositions clear, but we can infer them from what must be assumed to make arguments like the rule following argument from undetermination go through. These require certain ideas about warrant and knowledge. Quine is helpful here because he makes similar arguments from underdetermination, but is much more explicit about what is needs to be presumed to make them go through. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I spoke too fast. I should have said “pretty air tight” (because everything with Wittgenstein in a general sense has to have blurry edges).

And I should have just said, Wittgenstein made some valid points that I can work with. Wittgenstein to me, speaks of the How. He applies flux to the flux with rigor. He’s Heraclitus post highly developed math and logic. He yielded a rigorous analytic tool. Even though that would bother him to hear, that’s the best I can make of him.

None of it really tells you about the world. It applies its method to tell you what the world is not, and what language doesn’t say. It’s the hammer and the tuning fork smashing metaphysics. When it is used to catch a fallacious argument, it proves its value.

But in the end, Witt is for the backroom experts who refine the product. The front room produces what I (and most people) need from philosophy and speak of the What and the Why. These should be subjected to Witt’s How-to-speak, but serve a different purpose and have their own substance regardless of the confusions and clarifications.

I agree Witt isn’t air tight. I think that is why he had to admit, once you see his world view, you have to throw world views away, and that is a contradiction; you need a worldview in order to see that you never really had a worldview, and that is the new worldview.

So I was wrong.

We are all in the midst of identifying the prior, the presuppositions, asserting something that is merely supposed, and maybe even finding what is just posed. Wittgenstein gave up on all of that and stayed in his box where only language could be used to suppose other words. He just did it pretty well.

So, the endless regress problem. — J

Sort of. More like the “why don’t you just answer the question” problem.

What do you see as the way out of that? — J

The truth. Something absolute. Something not arbitrary. Something said about the world, and not just about the speaker.

I’m not afraid of the big bad authoritarian tyrant, as long as he is telling the truth.

What is truth?

Call x the determinate, and y the indeterminate, and z the mixture.
We live in, and are, z - a mixture in motion.
Because z is mixed with the indeterminate, z is more akin to x, the indeterminate. The indeterminate is the dominant gene, so to speak. The indeterminate poisons everything it touches turning determination into a best guess. — Fire Ologist

Exactly. Once you declare that there is some aspect of the universe that is random, or indeterminate, then you've create a dualistic problem of trying to explain why there are so many things that are determined.

It seems to me that mixing the determinate and the indeterminate would be like "mixing" water and oil. Or, that the indeterminate is a projection of one's ignorance and trying to use the indeterminate as a tool to understand a deterministic universe would create the problems you cite. Dualism just causes more problems than it solves.

the only answer so far comes from J and is: "it's a different criterion in each instance and you sort of 'know correctness when you see it,' but it also involves being thoughtful." This seems to me to be incredibly vague, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, that's not a very charitable paraphrase, but let it stand. It's hard to draw general conclusions here, isn't it? One person's "incredibly vague" is another person's "good enough to be going on with." And of course this applies at the level of disciplines as well -- lots of variance in how much precision is needed for a given subject.

I still think the Chakravartty - Pincock debate in the "Epistemic Stances . . ." thread is an excellent place to look at this question. There, the topic is hard science, which might be more familiar to you than musicology -- I probably shouldn't have picked such a specialized example. Have a look!

What is truth? — frank

Truth:
To pry into this great question I would start by saying two things:
1. An example of one truth is like this: there is this person who calls himself Frank on TPF and who asks “what is truth.” That is an example of the truth. As a statement, it is a statement about the world, an actual world with an actual Frank in it apart from me who said this truth.
2. If truth can be defined in endless different ways then I would assert, there is no such thing as truth. This second statement isn’t a definition either, but it shows you that the one’s defining things, don’t get to be the arbiters of what is truth. Truth is about the world, not merely the speaking stating it.

Should we bother to go on, here in this thread?

How is it uncharitable? I copied and pasted the phrases. I get that we don't always "know it when we see it," but we sometimes do. (Yet such a claim seems hard to challenge whenever it is made). What would you change?

One person's "incredibly vague" is another person's "good enough to be going on with." And of course this applies at the level of disciplines as well -- lots of variance in how much precision is needed for a given subject.

Sure, that's exactly my point. This is an appeal to bare personal preference. My argument is specific enough for me, how could it possibly be wrong?

If you want to say that my interpretation that "your standard is so vague that 'anything goes,'" is invalid, in virtue of what is it invalid? I've approached it thoughtfully, others agree with me, and I approached it within a practice. Indeed, there seems to be consensus among those who share my practice that this is so. What else more is there to say? What's the objection?

Maybe your standard implies "anything goes" for some philosophies and epistemologies and not others? So we're both right... and both wrong. But that we're both right and wrong would seem to demonstrate exactly my point.

Further, there is the issue that people frequently disagree about what constitutes proper fields of discourse and real distinctions in subject matter (e.g. "Jewish physics"). Presumably there is a higher level discipline, philosophy of science and epistemology, for adjudicating these disputes. But if that's the case, then there would be higher level criteria vis-á-vis lower level criteria and standards of proper warrant that applies across disparate fields. The criterion for determining that "Aryan physics" is not a valid field with its own unique criteria has to come from outside Aryan physics itself, because according to Aryan physics, it is a valid discipline, and the larger realm of physics (called by them "Jewish physics") has no authority over it.

Truth is about the world, not merely the speaking stating it. — Fire Ologist

What specifically about the world?

The point isn't that our existing criteria are everywhere universal, certain, and immutable. It's that they have to be criteria. But I think this framing of "absolute criteria" is a red herring. My critique of these standards is from the lens of epistemology, and surely epistemology has some standards. If I reject J's standards, it does not seem that, by his standards, it would be possible to reject my rejection. Perhaps we would both be right, but that's exactly the problem in my view.

Second, are you suggesting that epistemology is wholly sui generis for each subject matter? Something like the hermetically sealed magisterium or Latin Averroism?

If not, then then obviously there is something the same vis-á-vis all epistemic situations. If they are sui generis, then you have all the problems of the hermetically sealed magisterium, i.e. that it allows for contradictions, and that what actually constitutes a "hermetically sealed magisterium" will vary according to each discipline, such that some disciplines will make claims on others, but those disciplines will reject those claims and declare themselves sui generis and hermetically sealed. And indeed, there is no reason this shouldn't trickle down to the level of individuals.

If each discipline is allowed to have its own definition of its reach, criterion, and subject matter, we can hardly object to the fact that, historically, and I would imagine even today, most epistemologists think what they are saying applies to all knowledge claims and all instances of warrant. It takes the whole of human knowing as its subject matter.


To give an example: is it valid to have a distinct "feminist epistemology?" What about a French or White epistemology? Can there be an Aryan physics with its own standards as set against Jewish physics? Or a capitalist genetics as set against a Marxist genetics?

Those are all real world examples justified by professional philosophers within a practice. Some were extremely consequential; the differing genetics led to famines that killed large numbers of people. But they were unique standards for a particular problem set developed within a practice by thoughtful people.

So where exactly is the error in those cases? Or was there one?

And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty -- which will attack even what I'm saying here, "Are criteria always and everywhere like this? Then you're contradicting yourself!" -- should just be ignored as juvenile. This is not how serious people think. It's like lecturing Jerome Powell after taking Econ 101.

If one knows one is giving the appearance of contradicting oneself then wouldn't it make sense to explain why the distinction is not truly contradictory, or why contradiction is not a problem? I'm not sure if a preemptive ad hominem amounts to much there.

Criteria obviously do vary by subject matter. And so does specificity and certainty. I don't think anyone has argued that they don't. But in virtue of what is this variation appropriate? Presumably, it isn't "anything goes." That's the question. What settles epistemic disputes? What determines when a field is a pseudoscience? Saying: "well standards vary by subject matter" doesn't address the issue that people disagree about standards and what constitutes unique subject matter. It's a non-non-sequitur

So you admit there is a world we are both talking about?

What specifically about the world? — frank

Specifically, something, any thing, in it or about it, like for instance, ‘Frank the poster is posting.’

A fact is an example of the truth.

This is why this thread is so good. Now we are forced to ask “what is truth?”

When you ask me “what is truth”, do you mean “what is knowledge” or “how do we know” or do you mean “what is real” or do you mean “what is”?

Any which way, either all narratives are true or they aren’t, if you know what I mean, Frank.

So you admit there is a world we are both talking about? — Fire Ologist

I assume so.

When you ask me “what is truth”, do you mean “what is knowledge” or “how do we know” or do you mean “what is real” or do you mean “what is”? — Fire Ologist

You said:

I’m not afraid of the big bad authoritarian tyrant, as long as he is telling the truth. — Fire Ologist

Is truth a property of statements? Or is it a property of the world? Or what?

Is truth a property of statements? Or is it a property of the world? Or what? — frank

Should we start another thread?

“Property”?

Truth is said in statements or known in subjects and is about what is. Correspondence is part of it. Alignment of subject to object. Coherence and validity is part of this. Being is part of this. Identity and unity will be issues.

This is me avoiding the question. Truly.

So I bet you know enough to get back to this thread. If you feel you’ve made a point by me not simply defining truth, then ok. I don’t feel like this is on point.

We never resolved the earlier issue of whether discursive metaphysics comes first to provide the content that the analytic dissector can then dissect. Then we never resolved the issue of whether all statements are true or not.
Now we want to see if we can define truth together as friends over a cup of coffee?

The OP was a great set up for a for an important question. — Fire Ologist

Well, see:

Let's pretend for a moment that the OP is not another diatribe against your bogey of “monism.”... — Leontiskos

Banno is constantly making threads and posts that amount to, "Monism is authoritarian, and I won't say what I mean by 'monism' or 'authoritarianism'." It's propaganda in that none of it is amenable to argument. Indeed, it positively resists philosophical argument by mischaracterizing all of the views at each point, for example by pretending adversaries are championing "infallibility." Beyond that it likely violates the forum rule against evangelization.

Let's pretend for a moment that the OP is not another diatribe against your bogey of “monism.”... — Leontiskos

Banno is really passive aggressive. It’s hard when you are so smart like him to put up with us, so he builds up that anger I guess. Just joining in the discussion with the other psychologists around here.

I am pretending Banno is not really a part of the world of this thread. That’s called deluding myself, but, he is enabling me, which is nice. All the benefit of his thoughts and easy to ignore all the baggage. Count takes the heat.

At least until it will all crash and burn….

What settles epistemic disputes? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We do. By talking. Sometimes negotations fail, though.

I don't think there's one way it happens. What settles a philosophical dispute? Isn't the volume of words on this site alone enough to demonstrate that there is no such settling, once and for all?

I think this is where the notion of research programs, or paradigms, or traditions plays an important role. But I think that this paring down of a problem is -- necessarily -- going to block out many things of concern. There is simply an overabundance of being, a constant overflowing of language such that language is always catching up, at a distance. And because there's so much in relation to our abilities we will necessarily have to focus in on some part of the infinite whole. We've been doing this since we could pass on knowledge through oral traditions. We have no say in what came before, only a valuable inheritance which, as it was then so it is now, is constantly in dispute.

But even this valuable inheritance is too much for us to comprehend -- even it is infinite in relation to one person's ability. And in order to learn a tradition or research program or paradigm one must listen to those who are doing the practice. These are what I'd call the a priori assumptions which define a practice, if we want to put it into philosophical language at least. There may have been someone for whom it was a posteriori, but for us who inherit what came before it's quite literally a priori, and often the way these things are taught they are taught such that we just have to accept them as true in order to move on.

That's a good habit for learning within a tradition.

I think that the negotiations fail more often not simply because we've been habituated to this teacher-student model by the practice, and then when we encounter someone whose different from us that habit kicks back in. But here we are equals talking about ideas, and not teacher-students or student-teachers, except insofar that we acknowledge such a relationship. For example, @Banno has helped me understand Davidson and Wittgenstein -- without his efforts on these fora I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have cracked that nut on my own.

Not to say I have a superior interpretation or something -- I just mean I finally got to the meat and felt like I understood something of what he was getting at.

And, really, I can say that about lots of philosophers and fellow posters here. So it's not like we can't learn outside of the teacher-student relationship.

But it takes some mutual respect and understanding that the other person, no matter how crazy they may sound, probably did arrive at their views by some philosophical process, and really the best we can do is tease out what that sequence of thoughts are.

But the dispute will, likely, continue beyond us -- it's a dispute we had no hands in creating, and here it lives on through us, so I doubt we're going to stop it here.