Maybe more plainly, we speak of what is indeterminate and what is determinate.

And I agree there are worlds (or at least the world) that sits between these poles. — Fire Ologist

But is this right? Are "determinate" and "indeterminate" poles, or are they contradictories? If they are poles, then they are like the North Pole and the South Pole. If they are contradictories then they are like, "black" and "not black" where there is nothing in between.

Now if you think "determinate" and "indeterminate" are poles, then what is an example of an intermediate between the two? What is "the Equator" to these two poles? What is neither determinate nor indeterminate? It looks to me that they are contradictories, not poles (contraries), and therefore there is no intermediate.

I think @Count Timothy von Icarus' point is a bit like Aristotle's point that the archer must have a target. He must be aiming at something. If someone is said to have knowledge, then it must be knowledge of something. It would make no sense to say, "He is a very knowledgeable man." "About what?" "Nothing at all!" It is correct to say that our endeavors must have some aim, some goal (and therefore some determinate content). Either we are aiming at something or we are not aiming at anything; either the field of study has some determinate content or else it has no determinate content. That's the idea.

@Banno is again falling into that strawman strategy where he answers a question that is not being asked:

Why must wisdom "have some determinate content"? There's the idea again that if it has no "determinate content" then it is nothing, but that doesn't follow. The assumption is that without determinacy—without clear, specifiable content—“wisdom” is vacuous. But this is not a necessary conclusion. The leap from indeterminacy to meaninglessness is unwarranted. — Banno

@Count Timothy von Icarus spoke about "determinate content." @Banno pulled another of his bait-and-switches and substituted, "Clear, specifiable content." @Count Timothy von Icarus would surely agree that content which is not perfectly clear and specifiable need not be wholly indeterminate, but that is not at all what he was talking about. He was talking about a bare minimum of determinacy, in the sense that there must be some goal that the archer is aiming at, no matter how diffuse or subtle. @Count Timothy von Icarus is using determinate/indeterminate as a contradictory pair, for this is precisely what his argument requires. To interpret him as enunciating a contrary (or polarity) is ignoratio elenchus.

Tim's objection, so far as I can make sense of it, is that if we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then the concatenation of sentences contains a contradiction and anything goes. — Banno

Lol. This is some wild mischaracterization. It would be great for you to quote @Count Timothy von Icarus to try to substantiate this very strange reading.

Count Timothy von Icarus is using determinate/indeterminate as a contradictory pair — Leontiskos

Exactly!

Thanks for your help. :lol:

Exactly!

Thanks for your help. :lol: — Banno

Some here seem to have a prejudice against the very notion of contradictory pairs. For example:

There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you. I will keep trying to understand it, but no luck so far. — J

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Either the animal has eyes or else it doesn't."

This is not "all or nothing reasoning." It is called the principle of non-contradiction. Why does @J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes?

Some here seem to have a prejudice against the very notion of contradictory pairs. For example: — Leontiskos

Others have an obsession with the same.

Determinate/indeterminate is not a contradictory pair. Many things are partially determined. Borderline concepts - "baldness"; mathematical forms such as $0^0$; quantum states which are determinate in probability, indeterminate in value.

See if you can reply to these examples, rather than indulging in personal insults.

See if you can reply to these examples, rather than indulging in personal insults. — Banno

Like calling someone obsessive, like this?:

Others have an obsession with the same. — Banno

It's impressive how you squeeze hypocrisy into even the smallest posts. :wink:

Determinate/indeterminate is not a contradictory pair. Many things are partially determined. Borderline concepts - "baldness"; — Banno

Determinate/indeterminate could be read as a contradictory pair or a contrary pair. The point is that @Count Timothy von Icarus was obviously using it as a contradictory pair, which he even clarified. To be fair, @Fire Ologist introduced the determinate/indeterminate pair, not Count. Here is an example of what Count said:

Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have some determinant content or else... — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Some" determinate content. So your examples of things which are "partially determined" all count as having some determinate content.

The vegan will ask, "Are there some animal products in this food, or not?" It's fairly clear that there are only two options here. This comes with the territory of the word, "some."

So, can we agree that sometimes determinate/indeterminate are not contradictories?

And that not every situation is reducible to a binary?

And that there is a place for some nuance?

And maybe, that wisdom might sometimes not have a determinate content?

(and yes, I admit I hit you back first. )

So, can we agree that sometimes determinate/indeterminate are not contradictories? — Banno

All words have a semantic range. The question asks how the words are being used within a context or argument. @Count Timothy von Icarus's "some determinate content" vs. "no determinate content" is clearly a binary. Don't you agree? Or do you think it is impossible for him to make that distinction between some and none?

And maybe, that wisdom might sometimes not have a determinate content? — Banno

Again, the equivocation looms. Wisdom never has no determinate content. It may have semi-determinate content, but semi-determinate content involves some determinate content.


This is how the conversation might have been expected to proceed:

• @Count Timothy von Icarus: Do you think the term wisdom has some determinate content, or do you think it doesn't have any determinate content?
• @Banno: I would of course admit that it has some determinate content.
• Count Timothy von Icarus: So what determinate content do you believe it has?
• Banno: Regardless of what I think, I could be wrong, for I am not infallible.
• Count Timothy von Icarus: I agree, but that's beside my point. If you agree that it has determinate content then what determinate content do you think it has? In your opinion?
• ...

Count Timothy von Icarus's "some determinate content" vs. "no determinate content" is clearly a binary. Don't you agree? — Leontiskos

Sure. And in setting this up as a binary, he already forecloses on the possibility of it not being a binary. He presumes what was to be shown. That's why @J fairly suggests he account is uncharitable.

Sure. And in setting this up as a binary, he already forecloses on the possibility of it not being a binary. He presumes what was to be shown. That's why J fairly suggests he account is uncharitable. — Banno

Again:

Why does J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes? — Leontiskos

This form looks like a binary: "Either some X is Y or else no X is Y." If you or @J think that @Count Timothy von Icarus is setting up a false binary (a false dilemma), then you have to provide an argument for why the binary does not hold. Specifically, you have to demonstrate the third option. Surely you agree that some logical distinctions are in fact binary? That not everything is non-binary?

You yourself appeal to contradictory binaries at times:

"Qualia" are either a something about which can share nothing, or they are the subject of the common terms we already use to talk about our experiences. — Banno

(and yes, I admit I hit you back first. ) — Banno

Saw this edit. Appreciate that. :up:
Allow me then to say that I was quick on the trigger at the beginning of this thread. Of course, I feel like we've been around this merry-go-round too many times by now. I anticipated it moving in this very direction, namely "monism."

Why does J continually fail to answer such questions? — Leontiskos

To my eye, J is providing comprehensive answers. But the folk he is talking to do not see that there is a problem with their questions, rather than with J's answers. That is, J has been providing examples of where the binary does not hold, but this has gone unrecognised.

Further, why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does?

A step back. Look at your example of this discussion being like shooting an arrow - to shoot well, you need a target. But that assumes that there is a target, that we already have the conclusion. Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. We might reach agreement on fitting this bit you made in with the bit I made, and work together towards something satisfactory to us both.

Why need we presume the conclusion?

That is, J has been providing examples of where the binary does not hold — Banno

Okay. I would love for someone to point me to the place where @J provided a third option.

Further, why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does? — Banno

I think the form of @Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his , "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary.

A step back. Look at your example of this discussion being like shooting an arrow - to shoot well, you need a target. But that assumes that there is a target, that we already have the conclusion. — Banno

It assumes we have some kind of target, but it does not assume that we have the conclusion. If that were true then the archer having a target would be the same as the archer having a bullseye.

Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. — Banno

But I think we must have a target for our construction. We must have some aim at what we are intending to construct, however vague.

We might reach agreement on fitting this bit you made in with the bit I made, and work together towards something satisfactory to us both. — Banno

We could negotiate in deciding what to aim for and what to construct. That's pretty common. We'd still have a target, individually and jointly.

Why need we presume the conclusion? — Banno

To presume the conclusion is post hoc rationalization. An aim and a bullseye are not the same thing.

You're far too good a rhetorician not to recognize the difference in tone between my version and yours . But it's not worth squabbling over

Sure, but you're objecting to the tone, not the content. But the tone is intentional because I am trying to show a problem here, which is that your standard seems to presume that people always know when they are being "reasonable" or are arguing in good/bad faith. I think it's obvious that they don't though. For example, all the scientists working for cigarette companies or Big Oil probably don't all sit down to their work and think "time to go do some bad faith science to get paid," (although I am sure some do). They will claim they are thoughtful and operating within a practice, and some of them will believe this. So too for political bias in the sciences. And that's why you need concrete standards and principles to point to, and not just:

If you engage in a practice consistently and thoughtfully, you know reasonableness in that practice when you see it, usually

But in retrospect, I probably shouldn't have done it because it's resulted in you not responding to any of the substantive points, e.g., conflicts over jurisdiction between different subject matter areas, the issue of "pseudosciences" (which are still practices with committed adherents), political bias in disciplines, or my most basic point, which is that, by your own standards, your own epistemology can "correctly" rejected.

Count T, I just don't know how many different ways I can try to say it. If you, or anyone, puts forward a position within some practice, and I know you and respect you, I'm going to assume that you do so with far better reasons than "bare personal preference." If people went around declaring their "bare personal preferences" with others in the practice, in short order no one would talk to them. Hasn't that been your experience as well, in whatever projects you've engaged in over the years? This is the "absolute-or-arbitrary" bogeyman again.

Exactly my point, so then it isn't the case that it's just...

One person's "incredibly vague" is another person's "good enough to be going on with." And of course this applies at the level of disciplines as well -- lots of variance in how much precision is needed for a given subject.

..but rather there are some standards by which opinions are to be taken seriously or not, and it is not merely that "one person's "incredibly vague" is another's 'good enough'."

I mean, consider the context here. I said: "I think the epistemic standards you've laid out are too vague, here is why," (the prized dissection). Can you see how a response of: "well one person's 'vague' is another's "good enough,"' simply renders the position impervious by default?

Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying, "How could I possibly be wrong?" Rather, the usual attitude is, "This is how it seems to me. Profs X and Y have said similar things, Profs V and W offer some counter-evidence, and draw different conclusions. OK, here's why I think X, Y, and me are in the right on this. Let's discuss." I know you think that out of such a discussion we would get a clear, criteria-based, permanent answer -- and I don't deny this sometimes happens, but not often. And yet, mirabile dictu, some tentative consensus may be reached, and the practice goes on.

Sure, and this would be a fine rebuttal to me if I had claimed that your narrative doesn't have anything to do with how good discourse might progress. But I didn't say that. I didn't say it got nothing right. I said it wasn't tight enough to define good discourse on its own.

So, from the top, consider this:

One of your premises is that there are no standards that will apply across all areas of knowledge (or presumably a wide area like "all of science"). We cannot point to criteria or principles that will determine valid criteria across different areas. Is that fair?

Yet many (if not most) epistemologists think that they make valid claims about all of human knowledge, i.e. claims that apply to other disciplines and not just epistemology and epistemologists themselves. Many (if not most) philosophers of science think that they make valid claims about the whole of the sciences, and each science in particular, not just "philosophy of science." They think they have justifiable criteria for deciding issues of jurisdiction, or overlapping areas of authority. They think they have ways to identify science and pseudoscience. Not all of them do, but many do. These are professional philosophers acting in a practice who are thoughtful about their conclusions.

Thus, they hit all your criteria for producing a correct narrative. Yet many of them embrace a position that contradicts your own. They do think they have some principles or criteria that apply across either all human discourse or at least the sciences, or at least formal argument.

Hence, we seemingly have a "correct narrative" that contradicts your own. I don't see how your response cannot be self-refuting if it can allow that it is sometimes correct to reject it.

So, now, what are the options? As far as I can see:

A. "Yes, my standards allow for my own standards to be "correctly" refuted and contradicted, but that's no problem?"

Or:

B. "No, those particular philosophers are incorrect, and I am correct."

If it's B, then you need some additional criteria for why they are incorrect. But, by definition, you will be introducing new criteria for "epistemology generally" or for "philosophy of science generally," and I'm not sure if that wouldn't also contradict your previous position, unless you want to say that: "there are standards for epistemology, but these don't actually apply for other disciplines that involve questions of knowledge but only to epistemology," or that there are "standards for philosophy of science, but these don't actually apply for individual sciences, but only to philosophy of science itself." But if you take that route, then you are still saying that those epistemologists and philosophers of science are incorrect despite holding thoughtful positions developed within a practice, that have (or at least at times have had) relative consensus.

That seems problematic to me.





In what post did I advance this "argument?"

My point was about the standards allowing for self-refutation, and seemingly allowing for contradictions. Indeed, if the principle of non-contradiction cannot be specified as a general epistemic principle then it seems obvious that contradiction is allowed. I didn't claim to identify a contradiction, merely the fact that denying PNC means denying PNC. Presumably, it follows that if one denies the PNC, one is allowing contradictions, particularly when it is very easy to generate examples using those criteria where thoughtful people operating within a practice will contradict one another.

I think the form of Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. — Leontiskos

I would love for someone to point me to the place where J provided a third option. — Leontiskos

He is providing examples of where the binary does not hold. That is different to pointing to places where there is a third option. See . Note 's response. Consider what it is they are agreeing on.

I think the form of Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. — Leontiskos

I don't see how what you say here forms an argument. I do not see why Tim's statement implies anything about burden of proof. Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary.

It assumes we have some kind of target, but it does not assume that we have the conclusion. — Leontiskos

That's not how it looks to me. It looks more as if you have reached a conclusion and are looking for an argument that will hit it.

But I think we must have a target for our construction. — Leontiskos

Not my experience in curriculum development or in building co-design. Indeed it seems to me that the cases in which we share a "target", beyond a vague agreement as to the direction we might head, are rare. Have you ever been in a conversation were what was at issue was, what will we do? Not all inquiry is about hitting a known mark; sometimes, it’s about discovering what might be worth doing or understanding together. That’s a different model—less like archery, more like building without a blueprint.

In what post did I advance this "argument?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

All of them.

Indeed, if the principle of non-contradiction cannot be specified as a general epistemic principle then it seems obvious that contradiction is allowed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And yet non-classical logics are coherent. Non-classical logics, such as paraconsistent logics, do allow for contradictions without collapse, and they are mathematically coherent and well-developed.


Added: Here, explain to me where the following goes astray:

Tim's objection, so far as I can make sense of it, is that if we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then the concatenation of sentences contains a contradiction and anything goes. — Banno

Be charitable.

All of them.

I don't think I suggested anything remotely like this. Is this in reference to wisdom? The point I made there was very simple: a contentless, vacuous term cannot be used as a criteria that keeps anything out because it applies equally to everything.

You're the one who turned your misunderstanding into all sorts of different theses.

And yet non-classical logics are coherent. Non-classical logics, such as paraconsistent logics, do allow for contradictions without collapse, and they are mathematically coherent and well-developed.

Ok. It still seems problematic to me if various scientific or historical claims are allowed to directly contradict one another and yet be equally "correct narratives." Consider: "CO2 emissions do and do not increase global temperatures," or "Osama Bin Laden was and wasn't the mastermind of 9/11." Or for philosophy, "we can and cannot know the external world exists."

Now, before you go off into claims of "infallibility," I am not saying that we always know the answer in such disputes, or that both positions might not be well supported. I am saying that claims like: "Bin Laden was the leader of the 9/11 attacks" and "he was also not involved with them at all," should indicate that at least one cannot be true (obviously some sort of resolution through finer distinctions or an identification of an equivocation not withstanding).

I don't think I suggested anything remotely like this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok. So I've misunderstood you.

So explain to me what is in error here:

Tim's objection, so far as I can make sense of it, is that if we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then the concatenation of sentences contains a contradiction and anything goes. — Banno

Let's focus on this in the hope of reaching some agreement.

I am saying that claims like: "Bin Laden was the leader of the 9/11 attacks" and "he was also not involved with them at all," should indicate that at least one cannot be true — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok. Is there a problem in allowing this to be undecided?

Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary.

This statement?

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?

But this is a misreading. I did not write "either each narrative is true/correct or it is false,' or even "either each narrative is true/correct or it isn't." I am saying, "if not everything goes," (i.e. if not all statements are true/valid/correct), then you need some reason for why not all statements are true/valid/correct, else the choice is arbitrary.

It doesn't say anything about the statements being binary. In saying "not anything goes," you have already admitted that some narratives "don't go." My only point here is that if you decide that some narratives "don't go," you need some reason for that decision, else it is arbitrary.

The point is merely that there cannot be a blanket denial of any principles/criteria/reasons.

So then we reach: "but the principles/criteria/reasons are different in every instance." My question then would be: "if they are different in every instance, in virtue of what are they good criteria/principles/reasons?" The denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in the obvious way that a total denial of all reasons/principles does, but I am not sure how it keeps arbitrariness out either. In virtue of what does one know the right reasons/principles for each instance, if they are always different?

What do you mean by undecided? Do you mean "we don't know" or do you mean "Bin Laden was neither the mastermind of 9/11 nor not the mastermind of 9/11." I think the latter in this example is clearly farcical.

Either OJ Simpson really killed his wife or he didn't. It's possible we can never know, or never know with certainty. Some historical facts are not accessible. That doesn't mean Nicole Simpson was stabbed and hacked up by "no one in particular" is an option.

Whatever. Seems to me that just repeats the same error.

Both.

If we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then do we have a contradiction?

Treat them as seperate cases, if you like.

Whatever. Seems to me that just repeats the same error.

So a decision made for no reason at all isn't arbitrary?

"It isn't 'anything goes.' Why don't some things go you ask? I can offer no reason/principle/criteria to justify why some things don't go."

It's an error to call that arbitrary?

If we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then do we have a contradiction?

What's an example of an "undecided" historical or scientific fact? If I think of a murder trial for instance, this suggests to me that no one killed the victim found stabbed repeatedly, or that no one in particular killed them, which seems absurd.

What's an example of an "undecided" historical or scientific fact? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Either OJ Simpson really killed his wife or he didn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That'll do. If we allow it to remain undecided, does a contradiction follow?

Banno, you obviously know the answer to the question, you're using the correct term. It isn't claiming that it is both true and false (contradiction), but is a violation of LEM. However, in this particular instance, the violation of LEM is absurd.

I mean, what's the point here re epistemology? Because some systems exist that ignore LEM it we should consider the possibility that it is neither true nor false that OJ was the person that killed his wife? Or that it is neither true nor false that she was murdered?

but is a violation of LEM. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How?

Over to you again. Explain how allowing a sentence to be undecided violates the LEM.

Maybe begin by explaining which version of the LEM you would use.

This by way of a request for clarification.

I mean, what's the point here re epistemology? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can no doubt see where I am going.

We agree that if we allow a contradiction, a statement that is both true and false, in propositional logic with a binary truth assignment (true or false), anything goes.

But if we instead allow a statement to have an undecided value, there is no contradiction and it does not follow that anything goes.

Well, in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not necessarily. We might not be denying a position, and not affirming it, but leaving it undecided.

But if we instead allow a statement to have an undecided value, there is no contradiction and it does not follow that anything goes. — Banno

Interesting and simple. Could it be argued that this is avoidance of a kind?

We'll see.

So far as epistemology goes, it's the equivalent of saying "I don't know". If that's avoidance, maybe.

"I don't know" might be seen as antithetical to a philosophy that can explain everything. So presumably has more in common with dissection than discourse.

ok. Setting epistemology aside, I prefer ‘I don’t know’ to a lot of options people jump onto - idealism, psychophysical parallelism, god…

First, the obvious:

Not necessarily. We might not be denying a position, and not affirming it, but leaving it undecided.

This is still saying some positions aren't true/correct. To say "all positions are true or undecided, and at least some are undecided" is still saying that not every position is true.

You can no doubt see where I am going.

Yes, but I don't get the relevance at all. What's the point?

"Ha, gotcha! My epistemology doesn't say "anything goes," because it actually says that while no one can ever be wrong, it's also not true that everyone is always right."

First, this is still "anything goes," as far as I can tell. If you cannot ever tell anyone else they are wrong, that is an epistemology that is too weak. It also relies on the idea that no narratives/statements are ever either correct or incorrect, i.e. that LEM never applies. But it hardly follows that because not everything is binary, absolutely nothing is.

Consider: "Sure, I don't think you're wrong about the fact that putting mercury in kid's lunches is good for them and will improve their grades, but I think it is neither true nor false that putting mercury in kid's lunches is a bad idea, so we shouldn't do it." Saying something has a truth value gap, or is not truth apt, does not produce strong warrant.

An epistemology that can dismiss no positions as wrong is too weak, and I think this is fairly obvious. "I don't think x is either true or false," doesn't produce strong warrant for action. Further, if you cannot reject any position then consider that even if I had said: "all statements are either true or false," you would not be able to say to me "that's incorrect," but rather only "it is neither true nor false that all statements are binary in this way." And yet to tell someone, "you're wrong about that statement, it is neither true or false," is to tell them they are wrong, not that they are neither right nor wrong. You'd find it quite impossible to defend this solution while actually keeping to it.

And note, you are equivocating on "undecided" when you say "I don't know," is the same thing as "undecided." You clearly know this on some level, because you know what the term means in the formal context. For instance, your reply here likens "undecided" to merely any pronouncement of one's own lack of knowledge. But I have to imagine you don't really think that accepting LEM is declaring oneself infallible. Most philosophers, for most of history, accepted LEM, even radical skeptics. For instance, by your definition here, the Goldbach Conjecture could be deemed "undecided," because it isn't proven, and yet that would obviously be an equivocation on the term "undecided," switching between its formal and informal meaning.

The case, for @Tom Storm's edification, that corresponds to the notion "undecided" in denying LEM would not be: "I don't know the answer to 'idealism, psychophysical parallelism, god…,'" but rather "these positions are neither true, nor false." In some sense then, it isn't modest. It claims to know something about the truth value of the statement in question.

Second, this entire conversation is a non-sequitur, because my point was that @J's standards allowed for judging their own refutation to be correct, and clearly opened the door for affirming contradictory positions as "correct." I never said "each narrative is either correct or incorrect." Depending on how one uses "correct," descriptions/narratives can obviously be more or less correct. The Doctrine of Transcendentals allows that things can be, in an important sense, more or less true. I've already corrected you on this above. See:

So a decision made for no reason at all isn't arbitrary?

"It isn't 'anything goes.' Why doesn't something go you ask? I can offer no reason/principle/criteria to justify why some things don't go."

It's an error to call that arbitrary?

Now if you're going to disagree with that, by all means. I never made the point you're ascribing to me.

Lastly, the OJ Simpson example is absurd. Do you agree? Can you come up with a non-absurd example? Statements about future contingents would be at least something stronger. But if one wants to argue that LEM doesn't apply to future contingents, it does not thereby follow that LEM doesn't apply in cases where ignoring it leads to absurdity. Indeed, ignoring material logic entirely and applying an exclusion of LEM to the whole of human inquiry, to all subjects, seems to itself be a universal principle of the sort you are denying exists.