if you think "determinate" and "indeterminate" are poles, then what is an example of an intermediate between the two? — Leontiskos

I think Count Timothy von Icarus' point is a bit like Aristotle's point that the archer must have a target. He must be aiming at something. If someone is said to have knowledge, then it must be knowledge of something. — Leontiskos

Why must wisdom "have some determinate content"? There's the idea again that if it has no "determinate content" then it is nothing, but that doesn't follow. The assumption is that without determinacy —without clear, specifiable content—“wisdom” is vacuous. But this is not a necessary conclusion. The leap from indeterminacy to meaninglessness is unwarranted. — Banno

I see determinate things and indeterminate things, so there is a quality to each and they are more like poles. Like determinacy and indeterminacy are properties of some thing before it is known and during which we inquire about it (like wisdom).

And the Aristotle example is helpful. We must be aiming at some thing, but to the extent we are not sure what that thing is, or don’t know all there is to know about that thing, that thing has some indeterminacy to it.

But Banno is wrong because we can’t even identify or determine something specific, like “wisdom”, if it does not have something determinate to it. Count is right to say that, from the very start of the target practice, wisdom must have something determinate to it or we may as well be talking about “stupidity” or “my shoes”. There must be some determinacy before we make any meaningful move toward some particular or something specific and not vacuous.

Again, the equivocation looms. Wisdom never has no determinate content. It may have semi-determinate content, but semi-determinate content involves some determinate content. — Leontiskos

Yes.

Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. — Banno

If you are both working towards agreement. If you are both working towards the same final result. If you are “working together.” That would be a fine interpretation to me.

An example of working together would be you saying to Count, “I see your point, there must be something determinate in the mix here.”

The fact that we switch from one analogy to you better analogy before expressly agreeing on the value of the first analogy, shows you trying to frame things, like you don’t like the framing. Why is that? Why do we need a better analogy? Because that could mean people are still at cross purposes and not working together.

The case, for Tom Storm's edification, that corresponds to the notion "undecided" in denying LEM would not be: "I don't know the answer to 'idealism, psychophysical parallelism, god…,'" but rather "these positions are neither true, nor false." In some sense then, it isn't modest. It claims to know something about the truth value of the statement in question. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I was merely making a joke. I figured they are 'neither true nor false' would be the official line.
P ∨ ¬P and not ¬⊢ P ∨ ¬P. or something like that.

Yet many (if not most) epistemologists think that they make valid claims about all of human knowledge, i.e. claims that apply to other disciplines and not just epistemology and epistemologists themselves. Many (if not most) philosophers of science think that they make valid claims about the whole of the sciences, and each science in particular, not just "philosophy of science." They think they have justifiable criteria for deciding issues of jurisdiction, or overlapping areas of authority. They think they have ways to identify science and pseudoscience. Not all of them do, but many do. These are professional philosophers acting in a practice who are thoughtful about their conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The situation you're describing seems accurate to me. There's a great deal of disagreement among epistemologists and philosophers of science about criteria, and to what extent a robust realism about science would make those criteria obligatory. And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing.

Thus, they hit all your criteria for producing a correct narrative. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where it goes wrong. I've said nothing about correct narratives, have I? I've talked about reasonableness, and what seems true, and making a good case for a position, and trying to identify criteria or stances that will be helpful in a particular practice. But I don't think any of this is going to produce an obviously correct narrative about something, unless you're willing to qualify that by saying, "correct as best we can tell; good enough to be going on with; good enough so that the next folks who disagree will have a clear target."

Yet many of them embrace a position that contradicts your own. They do think they have some principles or criteria that apply across either all human discourse or at least the sciences, or at least formal argument. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed they do.

Hence, we seemingly have a "correct narrative" that contradicts your own. I don't see how your response cannot be self-refuting if it can allow that it is sometimes correct to reject it.

So, now, what are the options? As far as I can see:

A. "Yes, my standards allow for my own standards to be "correctly" refuted and contradicted, but that's no problem?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The troublesome word is again "correctly." I think what you're imagining is a kind of meta-conversation in which some issue about epistemological standards could be put to rest for all time, and one version deemed correct. I don't believe this happens. I believe philosophers (and scientists) come to points of agreement, are better able to frame their disagreements, and then move on. In a way, philosophy is a bad example, because its abstract nature allows the "unresolved conflict" aspect to be highlighted. In a more concrete actual practice, we see the consensus-driven model in constant operation, and able to produce perfectly satisfactory results. I think in the human sciences generally there is a great toleration for unresolved questions and disagreements, and very little belief that some day, some way, all these ways of interpretation will be put aside in favor of a single correct version. As for hard science, I have to rely on the discussions by others, but something similar seems to be in play, though possibly there's more hope for an ultimate TOE -- don't know if that's still on the table these days.

So in light of this, if I may, let me revise your A: "My standards allow for disagreement and lack of acceptance, and they recognize that those who disagree may believe they have refuted and contradicted them -- just as I believe my own position is stronger -- but neither of us is in a position to say whether this in fact has been done. It's 'no problem' in the sense that the practice will go on regardless; it's certainly a problem, a good one, in the sense that such disagreements often motivate the next moments in the dialectic of a practice."

I guess an issue here might be "correct/incorrect" as another over-simplified binary. Again, I have to pose the obvious question: If a view about science or epistemology can be shown to be correct, as you mean it, why has this not ended the discussion? How is it possible that the debate is still vigorous?

Well, yes. If your commander gives an order, you are thereby under an obligation, even if you do not follow that order. — Banno

The obligation is created when you signed up for the military - obligating you to follow your commander's intentions - not when the commander speaks. The commander is just informing you of his intentions.

That's right. When I say "Hello" to someone walking towards me on the mountain path, I'm not informing them that we intend to start a conversation. I'm too focused on getting up the mountain and don't really want a chat. — Banno

Now you're moving the goalposts. In the situation where one says, "Hello" to strike up a conversation, what I said still holds.

I can say, "Hello!" when it appears that someone does not hear or understand what I'm saying - to get their attention. Your example appears to be one where you simply want someone to acknowledge your existence and you theirs.

Yes. We say "They ignored my greeting". — Banno

In other words, they did not want to converse with you or acknowledge your existence.

Are you saying all behaviour must be explained algorithmically? I won't agree. — Banno

I wasn't saying anything. I was asking if there are reasons to get married or scratch your nose.

I think the form of Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his ↪statement, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary. — Leontiskos

Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary. — Banno

I will come back to the rest of your post, but dude, really? You think that when says, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," he is saying that all statements are binary? How does that follow in the least? This strikes me as an unbelievable level of mischaracterization. If I say, "Either all X is Y, or else not all X is Y, and this statement is a binary," I am not therefore claiming that every statement is a binary.

You are still reading it as, "Either all narratives are [negative contrary/pole], or else all narratives are [positive contrary/pole]," despite the fact that this has been clarified multiple times. To say, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," is the same as saying, "Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]." Anyone who accepts the PNC must accept that as a binary.

We're 14 pages into the thread and @Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:

• Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• (Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.)

He has been stonewalled by you and @J, not for any logical missteps, but rather because his first premise is, “all or nothing,” and apparently according to some special rule he is not allowed such a premise (despite the fact that the premise is nothing more than an application of the principle of non-contradiction - it is not "all or none," but rather, "some or none"). The stonewalling is moral and rhetorical in nature, “I can’t believe that you would engage in this all-or-nothing sort of reasoning!”

It’s a bit like going to a basketball game, and as soon as the first team team tries to dribble the second team cries “foul!” Then for the next twenty minutes the second team argues that dribbling is not allowed. The kicker is that the first team is accused of being “uncharitable” for trying to dribble the ball. On the contrary, I would submit that the level of patience and charity that Count Timothy has with you guys is mind-boggling! :yikes:

Are you going to allow his argument a hearing, or not? Is (p ∨ ~p) a permissible premise? Because if @Count Timothy von Icarus is not allowed to use (p ∨ ~p), then I can’t imagine what will happen when he says something controversial. If he is not allowed to dribble, then I can’t imagine what will happen when he tries to shoot. :zip:

This is why I effectively , "There is very little evidence that @Banno and @J are interested in playing basketball at all."

The troublesome word is again "correctly.

I had considered you to be laying out criteria for correctness there because you wrote:

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc.

And then gave your overarching standards for those reasons. The context for this was that I pointed out that if someone declares that their epistemology is not "anything goes," but then says they can give absolutely no reasons for when something "doesn't go," they have offered an obviously unsatisfactory response.

If you're denying these as standards then we're back to: "my epistemology is not "anything goes,' but I can give no explanation of why some narratives 'don't go.'" Or "my reasons for denying some narratives are sui generis in each instance." How does this keep arbitrariness out?

I think what you're imagining is a kind of meta-conversation in which some issue about epistemological standards could be put to rest for all time, and one version deemed correct. I don't believe this happens. I believe philosophers (and scientists) come to points of agreement, are better able to frame their disagreements, and then move on.

I'm not. This seems like yet another attempt to set up a false dichotomy between declaring oneself infallible and having any epistemic criteria at all. But there are many fallibilists and yet very few who subscribe to "there are no epistemic principles" or "epistemic criteria are sui generis in every instance." Indeed, I would guess virtually none, because both of those positions have obvious problems.

The idea is that there are better or worse epistemic principles. That doesn't mean we necessarily know them or know them with certainty. The denial that there are better or worse epistemic principles would seem to allow for arbitrariness, for how would it keep it out?

In a more concrete actual practice, we see the consensus-driven model in constant operation, and able to produce perfectly satisfactory results. I think in the human sciences generally there is a great toleration for unresolved questions and disagreements, and very little belief that some day, some way, all these ways of interpretation will be put aside in favor of a single correct version. As for hard science, I have to rely on the discussions by others, but something similar seems to be in play, though possibly there's more hope for an ultimate TOE -- don't know if that's still on the table these days.

This is the same false dichotomy.

I guess an issue here might be "correct/incorrect" as another over-simplified binary. Again, I have to pose the obvious question: If a view about science or epistemology can be shown to be correct, as you mean it, why has this not ended the discussion? How is it possible that the debate is still vigorous?

See above. I never said it was a binary. I said that if one claims that one's epistemology is not "anything goes," then not all narratives can be equally correct. But if not all narratives are equally correct then in virtue of what is this judgement made? Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness.

Likewise, if one claims one's standards are always different in each instance, then presumably the meta-standard by which they judge standards appropriate in each instance is also different in each instance. And the meta-meta-standard will also be unique in each instance. And so on. If this is not arbitrariness, it certainly cannot keep arbitrariness out. For by what metric would any standard be deemed poor in any particular instance?

We're 14 pages into the thread and Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
(Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.) — Leontiskos

Note that @J's response is to continually try to restrict the domain to so-called " narratives":

Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying... — J

And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing. — J

Instead of acknowledging @Count Timothy von Icarus' obvious point that, "Some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.," @J time and again says, "No, because everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing." Or else, "No, because every narrative within the subset of reasonable narratives must be deemed reasonable."

@J continually fails to answer the questions, fails to stay on topic, and instead recites tautologies. The obvious answer to @J is, "Yes, everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing. But not everyone deserves a hearing, and you yourself do not grant everyone a hearing."

Put differently, there are two theses:

• 1. Every professional philosopher [deserves a hearing].
• 2. Everyone [deserves a hearing] (including everyone on TPF).

Which thesis is @J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).

Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same.

See above. I never said it was a binary. I said that if one claims that one's epistemology is not "anything goes," then not all narratives can be equally correct. But if not all narratives are equally correct then in virtue of what is this judgement made? Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A terminological point...

There are "binaries" involved in your approach. Namely, disjunctions utilizing a contradictory pair. I feel as if we almost need to return to Aristotle's explanation of the difference between a contradictory pair and a contrary pair...

[1] Either every narrative is correct, or else every narrative is incorrect.

[2] Every narrative is either correct or incorrect

[3] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else not all narratives are equally correct

[3a] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else some narratives are unequally correct

[4] Either one can give reasons for their standards, or else their standards are open to arbitrariness

[3], [3a], and (arguably) [4] utilize contradictory pairs, and they are the binaries that @Count Timothy von Icarus is reliant upon. [1] and (arguably) [2] utilize contrary pairs, and they are the strawmen that @J is reliant upon. But all five are presented as binaries, namely as two-place disjunctions with an exclusive-or. We need to avoid letting the word "binary" become yet another pejorative term conveying emotion rather than substance. Or if that's all it has become, then we should not use it if we want to do real philosophy.

See: Square of Opposition

That makes sense. I was thinking "binary" in terms of 2, because this seems to be the objection.

I might add:

5. If one claims standards are wholly unique in every instance then one cannot keep arbitrariness out.

That's a little trickier. But 5 is obviously false as a descriptive claim. To use the example of economics given earlier, it is not the case that economists use different epistemic standards for every question. They do not complete peer review by judging each submission by entirely different standards. And so too for philosophy of science and epistemology.

This gets at one of the unaddressed issues, which is identifying pseudoscience.

And the idea that standards are wholly different in each instance is at odds with the idea that authoritarianism is always inappropriate in epistemology or that only reasonable narratives need be considered.

Also, if you want to make an appeal largely to "reasonableness," this would suggest something like a virtue epistemology (which would be my preference in many respects). But a virtue epistemology has to have virtues, the virtues cannot be different in every instance. And virtues presumably have to be virtues for some reason. Normally, intellectual virtues are considered virtues because they keep false judgements out and help someone attain to truth.

Looking over your conversation, I think this may be worth focusing on:

So then we reach: "but the principles/criteria/reasons are different in every instance." My question then would be: "if they are different in every instance, in virtue of what are they good criteria/principles/reasons?" The denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in the obvious way that a total denial of all reasons/principles does, but I am not sure how it keeps arbitrariness out either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is asking two good questions -- though first, I'll say again that I don't think the target statement ought to be framed in terms of criteria that are different in every instance. When I posted about this, I talked about different sorts of criteria, more or less keyed to the practice in question. But within a practice, I don't think we need a rethink every single time. The sort of criteria involved will usually do for a host of different problems.

The first question is, "Granted these (allegedly) different sorts of criteria, is there something in virtue of which they are the good/appropriate criteria in each case?" I think the answer is yes and no. There is not "something" -- presumably on a meta-level of discourse -- that allows us to say that any given criterion is qualified to function. But there are certainly facts within the discipline which will suggest to us what such criteria might be, including previous success in advancing the discipline and provoking exciting new questions.

What I think may be a stumbling block here for @Count Timothy von Icarus is the idea that a practice could ever have been successful at all without the sort of agreement on first principles that he has in mind, or at least could have done a lot better with the principles clearly in mind. And here -- you knew I would say this! -- there is no one response to this. Some disciplines may lack success precisely because of insufficient attention to criteria for evaluation and judgment; others may do fine; and most, I think, are somewhere in the middle, carrying on with "doing their thing" while often engaging in robust debate about what principles are to guide them. But it's a good, interesting question.

The second question arises from accepting the idea that "the denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in [an] obvious way," as compared to rejecting principles tout court. So we want to know, "But how does this keep arbitrariness out?"

Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way."

Now this kind of response will be unsatisfactory if one really believes that all reasons are obligatory, as someone like Christopher Pincock does. That view entails that, while a proponent of epistemic stance voluntarism thinks they have good reasons, they really don't. Now we can see how a different interpretation of "arbitrary" makes a big difference. If "arbitrary" means "not based on any particular correct reasons," then yes, "being arbitrary" is pretty much what everyone has to be, who doesn't accept the allegedly correct, meta-principle-based reasons. They just don't realize it! But that seems like a very question-begging usage.

It will also be unsatisfactory if one insists that words like "good" and "unfounded" and "doing fine" and "success" need meta-level explanations before the practice can get off the ground. The idea here would be that I must really have some principles in mind, and I'm hiding behind bland, undefined terms like "reasonable," "well-founded," etc. so as to avoid saying what they are, or else acknowledging that I don't know. But again, the appeal is to examine the practice itself. Any discipline is going to be able to offer some working criteria for what is well- and badly-founded argument or evidence within that discipline. So, in the abstract, I can't lay out a one-size-fits-all definition of what a term like "reasonableness" must mean (other than the obvious strictures on what it doesn't countenance), but maybe @Banno and @Count Timothy von Icarus could agree on a sample discipline or practice to examine, and see what they could learn.

I see determinate things and indeterminate things, so there is a quality to each and they are more like poles. Like determinacy and indeterminacy are properties of some thing before it is known and during which we inquire about it (like wisdom). — Fire Ologist

Sure, and that way of viewing it is understandable. I probably should have avoided the words "determinate" and "indeterminate," given that @Count Timothy von Icarus did not make that distinction.

And the Aristotle example is helpful. We must be aiming at some thing, but to the extent we are not sure what that thing is, or don’t know all there is to know about that thing, that thing has some indeterminacy to it.

But Banno is wrong because we can’t even identify or determine something specific, like “wisdom”, if it does not have something determinate to it. Count is right to say that, from the very start of the target practice, wisdom must have something determinate to it or we may as well be talking about “stupidity” or “my shoes”. There must be some determinacy before we make any meaningful move toward some particular or something specific and not vacuous. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that's right. "Possessing some determinacy vs. possessing no determinacy," is an either/or, not a matter of poles, and this is surely what Count was saying.

The fact that we switch from one analogy to you better analogy before expressly agreeing on the value of the first analogy, shows you trying to frame things, like you don’t like the framing. Why is that? Why do we need a better analogy? — Fire Ologist

Yes, this is a very good question. And I would add that (p ∨ ~p) is in no way a controversial claim, nor is it controversial that this represents a binary. When one's interlocutors are particularly stubborn one is forced to appeal to very uncontroversial premises. When they deny even these very uncontroversial premises, there is very little else that can be done.

That makes sense. I was thinking "binary" in terms of 2, because this seems to be the objection. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That makes sense.

I might add:

5. If one claims standards are wholly unique in every instance then one cannot keep arbitrariness out. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good. If a standard is not generalizable then it is not a standard at all. This relates to the connection between a particular and a universal.

That's a little trickier. But 5 is obviously false as a descriptive claim. To use the example of economics given earlier, it is not the case that economists use different epistemic standards for every question. They do not complete peer review by judging each submission by entirely different standards. And so too for philosophy of science and epistemology.

This gets at one of the unaddressed issues, which is identifying pseudoscience.

And the idea that standards are wholly different in each instance is at odds with the idea that authoritarianism is always inappropriate in epistemology or that only reasonable narratives need be considered. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is all eminently true. I would say that there are so many problems with @J's view that it is a veritable cornucopia of error. Given this, it is important to start with one or two things, and to keep them simple.

If one really wants to try to engage a sophist, it becomes important to establish and then continually re-establish the ground rules. You effectively have to say, "Would you like to play a game?" "Sure." "How about basketball?" "Okay." "And do you accept that we are allowed to dribble when playing basketball?" "Sure, I will agree to that." "That we are allowed to pass?" "Okay." "And to shoot?" "Yes, I suppose I will agree to that."

• "Do you want to engage in a discussion where we ask each other questions, and then answer those questions honestly and to the best of our ability?"
• "Do you want to engage in a discussion where we don't contradict ourselves, and where we do not renege on past claims without informing our interlocutor that we have reneged?"

For @J this would be a pertinent ground rule:

• "Do you want to engage in a discussion where we ask each other questions, and then we honestly answer the questions that are being asked rather than answering questions that have not been asked? And that if we refuse to answer a question, then we must be forthright and tell our interlocutor that we refuse to answer the question, and why we refuse to answer the question?"

It seems to me that @J does not want to engage in that sort of discussion.


This sort of thing can save a lot of time and energy, even though it shouldn't be necessary for those who are "serious." For example, I could have substituted these three lines for my entire conversation with @Moliere earlier in the thread:

"Do you want to engage in a discussion where we are not allowed to happily contradict ourselves?"
"No, I don't."
"Okay. Thanks for letting me know ahead of time. :up:"

Either OJ Simpson really killed his wife or he didn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That'll do. If we allow it to remain undecided, does a contradiction follow? — Banno

Note here that Banno is offering a binary. "Either a contradiction follows or else a contradiction does not follow."

Now if I were Banno I might , "[Why think it is a binary?] Why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does?"

But I'm not Banno, so what I say is, "A contradiction does not follow." Supposing I were undecided about OJ Simpson's guilt, a contradiction would not follow.

---

He is providing examples of where the binary does not hold. That is different to pointing to places where there is a third option. See ↪J. Note ↪Srap Tasmaner's response. Consider what it is they are agreeing on. — Banno

I read that post carefully, even before you referenced it. I don't see him doing that. Can't you spell it out in your own words? What is the putative binary and what is the reason why it does not hold?

I don't see how what you say here forms an argument. I do not see why Tim's statement implies anything about burden of proof. — Banno

Above you make the implicit claim, "Either a contradiction follows or else it doesn't." Is it more reasonable that I accept that this is a binary, or that you must provide an argument for why it is a binary? Who has the burden of proof here with respect to the question of whether your statement represents a binary? After all, if your putative binary is not a real binary then it represents a false dichotomy.

That's not how it looks to me. It looks more as if you have reached a conclusion and are looking for an argument that will hit it. — Banno

I concede that if we are doing that then we are engaging in post hoc rationalization, which is impermissible. So now we have our agreed and negotiated rule, namely, "Post hoc rationalization is impermissible." This is a kind of target insofar as we are jointly aiming away from post hoc rationalization. We are agreeing that post hoc rationalization is bad, and we have placed post hoc rationalization "beyond the pale" or "beyond debate." Without doing this sort of thing we will not be able to progress at all.

In this case we have a common rule and two different aims. Or one aim that is shared and two aims that are not shared. But there is a second shared aim, namely the aim of determining whether I have or have not in fact committed a post hoc rationalization. So here is a map of these aims, considered as sets:

• Banno's aims: {to demonstrate that Leontiskos is involved in post hoc rationalization; to determine whether Leontiskos is engaged in post hoc rationalization; to abide by the rule which says that post hoc rationalization is impermissible}
• Leontiskos' aims: {to demonstrate that Leontiskos is not involved in post hoc rationalization; to determine whether Leontiskos is engaged in post hoc rationalization; to abide by the rule which says that post hoc rationalization is impermissible}

Without a shared aim we cannot truly be doing something together, and all aims have some level of determinateness. In this micro-case that shared determinateness is represented by the second and third elements of each set, which are of course shared elements. (Note that we could still engage the practice without that third element, but in that case we would merely be pursuing speculative knowledge rather than also pursuing practical knowledge. The current sets are practical precisely because if Banno were to succeed in his demonstration, then by the agreed rules Leontiskos would be required to abandon his post hoc rationalization. The conclusion bears on the future actions that Leontiskos will be bound to.).

(Note too that we are truly involved in these three aims, even if we are not going to devote an entire or separate discussion to them. These three aims are ingredient in what we are doing right now, in this thread.)

In any case, my point was that having a target and shooting an arrow into the bullseye are two different things. To have a target is not to have succeeded. It is not to have finished. It is to have begun.

Not my experience in curriculum development or in building co-design. Indeed it seems to me that the cases in which we share a "target", beyond a vague agreement as to the direction we might head, are rare. — Banno

A vague agreement is a target. Understanding this is crucial in order to understand the position of myself and @Count Timothy von Icarus.

That’s a different model—less like archery, more like building without a blueprint. — Banno

"We are going to build something," is also a target. In that case the target is building something. When my nephew takes out his wooden blocks he already has a vague target, even if he doesn't know what he will build. He knows he wants to build something.

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

if someone declares that their epistemology is not "anything goes," but then says they can give absolutely no reasons for when something "doesn't go," they have offered an obviously unsatisfactory response. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, if "their epistemology" concerns some actual field of study or practice. The more abstract this gets, the harder it is to generalize about what "goes."

then we're back to: "my epistemology is not "anything goes,' but I can give no explanation of why some narratives 'don't go.'" Or "my reasons for denying some narratives are sui generis in each instance." How does this keep arbitrariness out? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good question, which I hope my earlier reply to you and @Banno addressed.

The idea is that there are better or worse epistemic principles. That doesn't mean we necessarily know them or know them with certainty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes! And the crucial thing I want to add is that "knowing them" must occur in a context. There are, I believe, genuinely varying epistemic stances to take, some of which may be better or worse for different circumstances -- but can't we get rid of the specter of arbitrariness? The differences among stances are not going to resemble one person saying "direct realism" and the other saying "I like ice cream cones, so only ice cream!" There will be reasons for the differences, argued case by case among intelligent people. If we fail to agree, that doesn't mean we are in utter darkness about what makes a good epistemic stance.

Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suppose that's true, but I keep wondering who are these people who give no reasons for their standards. Is there some particular instance or debate that you have in mind? And is there no way to remove the threat of arbitrariness by offering the standards in context?

For by what metric would any standard be deemed poor in any particular instance? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good question (though "metric" may be pre-judging what's needed). By all means, the best way to look at this kind of question is to choose a particular instance. Sorry again about musicology, if that's not your thing!

And is there no way to remove the threat of arbitrariness by offering the standards in context? — J

Seems like “in context” is meant to do the same work as “in truth, or absolutely”, all of these to avoid arbitrariness.

But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying).

But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements.

And I do see the looming problem of “if context doesn’t avoid arbitrariness, but the absolute does, how do we know what is truth or not?”

However, to me, the first step in solving a problem is admitting it. Arbitrariness is no use to anyone - how do we avoid it?

(We should almost crack open some champagne here. Any arbitrary champagne will do, but it absolutely has to have alcohol in it.)

As far as I can tell, there has to be an understanding of whether or not we will ever defeat arbitrariness without absolutes and truths, but I think the question can be framed as, “can a context do the work of an absolute”?

I don’t think so.

Whether we ever find absolute truth, whether we get there with a particular, single absolutely true statement about an objective world, is another question, but if we start all these inquiries seeking only statements grounded in context, I think it is clear that we will never get there, by design.

The first question is, "Granted these (allegedly) different sorts of criteria, is there something in virtue of which they are the good/appropriate criteria in each case?" I think the answer is yes and no. There is not "something" -- presumably on a meta-level of discourse -- that allows us to say that any given criterion is qualified to function. — J

But there are such criteria,* and you have already identified one. You have identified the criterion of good/appropriate. "Good" is precisely a "meta-criterion," if you like. And again, if 'good' has no meaning then your first sentence is nonsensical.

There are characteristics that every discourse has in common, and one is the notion of goodness and badness of contributions (which is also why your mathematics-authoritarianism is incoherent). Every discourse utilizes this notion of what is good and bad, and the meaning of 'good' from one discourse to another is not entirely equivocal. If it were entirely equivocal then we would not be able to use the same word in each discipline.

Much of this may go back to your quandary about the elusive meaning of 'good'.

• @J: "I don't think there is one normative criterion that can be applied to each discourse."
• "Don't you think that every discourse has certain things in common? Like that they are comprised of humans trying to do stuff?"
• @J: "Sure, but I don't see how that gives us a single normative criterion."
• "Well there is common normative ground among every human who tries to do stuff. Namely that they call success at what they are trying to do 'good' and failure 'bad'."
• @J: "Sure, and it is true that every discourse utilizes the notions of good and bad, but those notions are too unspecific to serve as common criteria."
• "Why are they too unspecific? They are normative criteria and they are common to all disciplines. It looks like they must be common criteria. Unless you want to say that anything which could count as common criteria by definition cannot be sufficiently specific. But what are your grounds and rationale for what is to count as "sufficiently specific"? It looks like you are begging the question by ruling out any possible common criteria by fiat. Common criteria will by definition be unspecific. To look for common criteria that are specific is to look for a contradiction. It is to look for a genus qua genus that is a species qua species. It is to look for something that is at the same time and in the same way both general and specific.

* They are precisely the Medieval convertibles.

But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” — Fire Ologist

Trouble is, these same questions can be asked of the allegedly absolute standards: "By virtue of what do you determine this standard to be absolute?" and "Can you be wrong about what you're calling absolute?", to which I would add, "How would you know you were wrong?"

Your context-specific questions are entirely appropriate too. My suggestion throughout this discussion has been that the "by virtue of what" question is going to require some appeal to a particular practice in addition to whatever overarching criteriological standards you want to put forth.

I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO.

But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying). — Fire Ologist

Good point. We could say, "If the contexts are just gerrymandered, then why think their various modes of practice are respectable or coherent?" If the contexts are not merely gerrymandered, then there must be some reason why one context requires one mode of practice and another context requires another mode of practice.

But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements. — Fire Ologist

Similarly: Is arbitrariness bad in every context, or only in some contexts? This whole conversation is shot through with overarching context-predications. "Arbitrariness" is one such example.

However, to me, the first step in solving a problem is admitting it. Arbitrariness is no use to anyone - how do we avoid it? — Fire Ologist

If we all agree that arbitrariness is beyond the pale, then it looks like we're all "authoritarians" who ultimately deny arbitrariness a hearing.

I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO. — J

It's no coincidence that @J thinks we "do not need to worry about" all of the crucial parts of the discussion. He should ask himself if arbitrary explanations are considered bad in all disciplines, or only in some. He should ask himself whether his dictum, "We must always recognize that we could be wrong," is true in all disciplines or only in some. If there are no overarching standards, then surely it is false to say that we must always recognize that we could be wrong.

This is still saying some positions aren't true/correct. To say "all positions are true or undecided, and at least some are undecided" is still saying that not every position is true. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your comment was:

Well, in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. Now you want to change that to if a statement is ruled out, it is not true. That is a shift in your position, a partial and begrudging acknowledgement of some of what has been said here, so we will count it as a positive move.

If you cannot ever tell anyone else they are wrong... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course we can sometimes tell when a statement is wrong. Nothing in what I or J has said says otherwise. So what you say here is way off.

Again, the point is the logical one, that we can say of a statement that it is true, and we can say that it is false, and thirdly sometimes we can say that we don't know it's truth value, and that doing so does not, as your statement quoted above implies, lead immediately to "anything goes".

I'll bold that, becasue it seems to keep being forgotten.

And so much of what you say after that is irrelevant, and misleading. It's just not what has been suggested.

If we are to continue this discussion, it might be kind of you to at least acknowledge the logical point bolded above. Then we might have a common ground. If you think there is an error in the logic, set it out. If, for instance, you think it violates LEM, set out how you understand LEM and how it is violated.

I was merely making a joke. — Tom Storm

We don't do those. This is serious.

:wink:

Tim's reply makes quite a few assumptions. His reply is that we must assign "these positions are neither true, nor false". But that's not so. We have the option of not assigning a truth value at all.

Now this is exactly what Kripke does in his paper on truth. He begins by explicitly not assigning a truth value to any statement in his system; then assigning "true" to the tautologies; and "true" or "false" to other sentences as they are interpreted. The result is a set of true and false sentences and a set of sentence with no truth value.

The advantage is that liar sentences - "this sentence is false" - are never assigned a truth value. Quite clever, really.

Another interesting aspect is that assigning truth values becomes a process.

And yes, it is legitimate to think of these as the ones for which the truth value is unknown. That's just using Kripke's system to modal epistemic issues.

Glad that you are reading along.

The case, for Tom Storm's edification, that corresponds to the notion "undecided" in denying LEM would not be: "I don't know the answer to 'idealism, psychophysical parallelism, god…,'" but rather "these positions are neither true, nor false." — Count Timothy von Icarus

That ain't so, for the reasons given in my reply to Tom, above.

Your habit of removing the automatic link on a quote - what's that about?

I don't know if OJ killed his wife or not. I've not paid the case much attention, not having much interest in the biography of self-entitled 'mercan celebrities. It's your example, not mine.

I am happy to work with whatever example you might choose, becasue it is the logic that is at issue. Choose another.

And again, your use of LEM needs explanation.

Glad that you are reading along. — Banno

Trying to, but I know as much about logic as I do about genetic engineering.

Thus, they hit all your criteria for producing a correct narrative.
— Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where it goes wrong. — J

Yep.

Usually I find myself arguing against idealism or antirealism, but here I find myself against Tim's excessive realism.

There are various arguments that could be deployed against realism here, if it were to be explicitly expressed.

I've explicitly shown how Tim's reply is dependent on an invalid argument. Several times. I'm not sure there is more to be said.

Cheers. Others know even less about logic, but post their opinion anyway.

Kripke's account leads to forms of antirealism, with which I am not overly happy. So I'm not offering it as an absolute answer here - just as an example that shows the problem with Tim's attempt to equate not knowing something with not knowing anything.

Kripke's account leads to forms of antirealism, with which I am not overly happy. So I'm not offering it as an absolute answer here - just as an example that shows the problem with Tim's attempt to equate not knowing something with not knowing anything. — Banno

Do you think such an approach is one that assumes theism and some of the philosophical scaffolding which supports it?

It's odd, isn't it, to be arguing in a philosophy forum for the validity of saying "I don't know".

Odd that such an stance should need any defence at all.

I think praxis is part of wisdom, but so is theoria. That is, the sage knows why he acts. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you're denying these as standards then we're back to: "my epistemology is not "anything goes,' but I can give no explanation of why some narratives 'don't go.'" Or "my reasons for denying some narratives are sui generis in each instance." How does this keep arbitrariness out? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe the sage doesn't consciously know why he acts. There are many things we 'know', but can't really explain why we act in a certain way, like say riding a bike or playing an instrument. If living wisely is a praxis too why should we expect an explanation for it not to be arbitrary, or anything goes?

This is the assumption that isn't justified, that everything first must be understood consciously, in terms of universals, before we can be said to know anything.