A very nice essay, it is a good read as a critique of libertarianism. For me it is a bit parochial of course, because the holes in liberarianism are so glaringly obvious. To that extent, the essay would benefit from a bit more focus on some of thee arguments. It sometimes tries to do too much in a short text. I also do not know if all the protagonists are well chosen. Jordan Peterson is an academic and to the best of my knowledge also inspired by Christian teaching. I have no idea if the other too really have a 'worldview'. They argue for certain things, but I would not take their arguments as a sign that a certain political ideology is incoherent. For instance that Trump argues for tariffs is not a sign that libertarianism is incoherent, it is a sign that Trump does not embrace it to the fullest extent.

It sees the social world not as the ground of freedom but as its main obstacle. Institutions are not tools of liberty but threats to it. What this view overlooks, and what the next sections explore, is the extent to which individuality is socially and historically formed and how real freedom depends on shared conditions, not their absence. — Moliere

This statement for instance lacks nuance. Also a libertarian loves the social world because where else can she or he practice trade? Also liberarianism contains within it the concept of recognition. The shape of that recognition takes the shape of the free individual contracting with the other free individual. Through the contract the other as an owner is recognized. I say specifically 'as an owner' because that is what the other is, an owner of possessions, of herself, her labour, etc. Within the contract both parties affirm their being owners in their bartering with each other. Institutions must exist but to the extent that they enable this recognition and not compromise it. It actually comes worryingly close to the classical conception of the individual in private law, the indivdual as a bundle of rights. That conception is I think flawed, you think so as well, but in the context of the essay it merits some more treatment.

At the same time it elevates figures who use public power for private gain and disguises domination as freedom.
The ideology enables policies that weaken safety nets, disenfranchise the vulnerable and concentrate power in unaccountable hands. It fosters political apathy and strengthens demagogues who promise freedom while dismantling its foundations. The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox is not just a contradiction. It is a script for democratic decline disguised as moral clarity. — Moliere

It enables it, but more by accident. Its ideal is the world as a market place where each of the participants realize their inner being, namely as contracting parties, rights wielders.

2.2 Liberty Through Coercion
Trump’s trade war illustrates liberty asserted through force. Tariffs and trade barriers, classic interventions, are reframed as tools of sovereignty and pride. That self-described libertarians embrace them shows how flexible freedom becomes. What matters is not principle but the actor. Coercion becomes liberty if used by the right person. Hierarchy is acceptable if it matches their ideals. — Moliere

If Nozick is consistent it does not. In fact, libertarianism might well argue for rather wholesale redistribution based on a large trajectory of coercive trades. The people you take issue with are bad libertarians, but making an example out of a weak opponent does feel a bit 'straw manish'.

2.4 Justice That Begins After the Crime
Nozick’s justice assumes holdings are legitimate if acquired justly, with a vague nod to rectifying past injustice. In practice, this clause is ignored. The theory becomes a cover for inequalities rooted in historical theft. Property is treated as legitimate unless clearly stolen. This conceals injustice rather than addressing it. — Moliere

Here too, Nozick could counter this. 'Real existing libertarianism' pans out this way but that does not necessarily harm the theory. My qualm would be with its unreflective acceptance of the notion of property and its defense of it. I believe the case for property rests on the fact that one 'mixes one's labour' with a good. However, if that is the case the good owns the person mixing just as much, because if it is a mix, who says only one party acquires the right to do with the good as she pleases? The problem with libertarianism is that it lacks awareness of ecology. You also treat this in your essay strongly, but sometimes a bit too cursory for me. I think two ideas within libertarianism merit further discussion, individual autonomy and its concept of 'the other'. As your correctly argue, both of these doctrines in liberarianism are deeply flawed I think, but why is a nice question.

I am sure that most would agree that the individual is sovereign and institutions are suspect. Institutions were created for the benefit of the individual. The individual is not there for the benefit of the Institution. — RussellA

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. — RussellA

The view of Mr. Mill here is absurd. The first counterexample pertains to children. You do feel it is ok for a parent to restrain a child when he considers crossing the road do you? Yes you do. You might object, 'but they are not individuals yet!', sure but in all kinds of settings, old age, psychological ailment, physical impairment, we allow others to make decisions for individuals. And that's okay; it's good when you prevent a friend from jumping in front of a train, really!

The second counterexample pertains to criminal law. If we consequently follow Mill we cannot punish, say a war criminal, if there is no danger of recidivism. Many war criminals led perfectly normal lives afterwards; should they really not be deprived of their liberty?
I make this point not just to quibble with Mr. or Mrs RusselA here, but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. Just like in many other contexts in which the word 'sovereignty' is used, in the context Mill uses it too, it is but a fiction. We are not sovereigns. That is the whole point of the essay and the point so sadly missed by libertarians.

One more reflection @Benkei. The essay is a great read as it is, but it would be even stronger I think if you consistently first examine doctrines of libertarianism and then tie them to the three figures. First find doctrines in libertarianism that you see as conceptually incoherent or as justifying the undue exercise of power, and then trace them to Musk/Trump/Peterson to show out how they play out in practice.

I am thinking for instance about the idea of the first appropriation and the Lockean proviso: 'take what you want but leave enough and as good to others to take likewise'. This may work in a world of infinite natural resources and a finite amount of human beings, but we have realized we live in a world of finite resources with infinite (human) beings if you take future generations into account.

It seems that in the essay you sometimes employ this strategy, but sometimes also go to libertarianism based on what these three do. By the way I think that for a more comprehensive history also Ayn Rand must be mentioned and the influence she wielded through US think tanks. I find it fascinating how a philosophical theory not taken seriously at all in Europe may be so influential in the US. That is not to bash the US, the reverse is also true, Europeans have doctrines that Americans find utterly bollocks, but, interestingly, ostensibly rather similar people can differ so much about what constitutes s strong political theory.

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes. — Tobias

It depends what is meant by "Institution".

I am sure many parents would sacrifice their lives for the institution of their family, and if they did would be revered as heroes.

However this is not the meaning of institution as used by the author in this essay. The author is referring to institutions as large, complex, highly formalized bodies with immense power. For example, in the European context, bodies such as the European Union.

We focus on three figures: Elon Musk, Donald Trump and Jordan Peterson. Though differing in style and domain all present the image of a self-legitimating individual opposed to collective authority. Yet each depends on immense institutional power. Musk benefits from public subsidies and corporate scale, Trump commands state machinery and nationalist rhetoric, Peterson draws authority from platforms and institutional critique.

I am sure that no one would sacrifice their lives for the institution of the European Union, and if they did, would be more derided than revered.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay. — RussellA

The institutions mentioned in the essay are as diverse as the (federal) state, the corporation and academia. None of the three people discussed though, draw any power from the European Union :grin: These institutions that wield immense power themselves are also dependent on institutions. The corporation for instance is dependent on law, the state on a form of nationalism and academia on the notion of education. Each of the three institutions shape modern life and hence 'wield immense power'. You think the European Union is suspect, but you claim all institutions are suspect, that is simply too unnuanced of a claim, so needs qualification.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay. — RussellA

Equally fascinating as off topic, so I will not go into it much. Funny that you have such a beef with the EU though it is nowhere to be found in the essay. From what perspective do you approach the EU? Is it public policy, or law, or economics? The EU is also not a monolithic entity, so do you focus on the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice? Or do you think the fault lies in the EU constitution, which comprises the Treaty, its annexes and court judgements such as Van Gent & Loos and Costa Enel? All these are actually institutions in their own right and wield power. We can discuss them in a separate thread. This small break down just goes to show one simply cannot escape institutions, just like one cannot escape gravity.

but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. — Tobias

That radical individualism may in practice be unworkable doesn't make it a paradox. It is no more a paradox than Icarus' attempt at flight using a pair of wax wings made by his father Daedalus.

Even if it might be an incoherent decision to follow radical individualism in one's daily life, this does not mean that radical individualism as a political philosophy is incoherent.

Suppose we take the quote by John Stuart Mill as an example of a liberal or libertarian position. It may well be a simplification of his position, as it is just one quote.

However, it seems that the author of the essay is not attacking radical individualism in itself, but rather is attacking the hypocrite who purports to be a radical individualist, yet in fact does not believe in it.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom. By examining its philosophical roots and public champions we expose a paradox at its core: the celebration of liberty through authoritarian means.

John Stuart Mill is not a hypocrite who purports to be a liberal but in practice does not believe in liberalism.

The institutions mentioned in the essay are as diverse as the (federal) state, the corporation and academia. None of the three people discussed though, draw any power from the European Union — Tobias

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power.

This is not a problem particular to the USA.

That radical individualism may in practice be unworkable doesn't make it a paradox. It is no more a paradox than Icarus' attempt at flight using a pair of wax wings made by his father Daedalus. — RussellA

If a philosophy is in practice unworkable, it may mean that its assumptions are flawed. If the idea that we are sovereigns is in practice unworkable, that may be because there are some mysterious mechanics at work preventing us from realizing our true selves, or it may simply mean we are not individual sovereigns. You may like it to be the case, but then your theory is a moral theory, about which values institutions should incorporate. Why you would like to accept it is beyond me though.

However, it seems that the author of the essay is not attacking radical individualism in itself, but rather is attacking the hypocrite who purports to be a radical individualist, yet in fact does not believe in it. — RussellA

I agree with you there and therefore I advise turning it around. Find problematic, counterintuitive or incoherent notions within the theory and then focus on how they shape the thoughts of notable figures. Otherwise your assertion that the essay uses straw man reasoning is correct.

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power.

This is not a problem particular to the USA. — RussellA

No, hypocrisy is not particular to the USA, but that does not prove or disprove anything, right? :chin: There is less of a following for radical individualism in Europe, though, so also public figures will not as easily espouse it. It is an interesting observation, maybe, but that does not seem to add or detract anything from the essay.

If a philosophy is in practice unworkable, it may mean that its assumptions are flawed. — Tobias

Yes, but that does mean that an unworkable philosophy must be a paradox.
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Find problematic, counterintuitive or incoherent notions within the theory and then focus on how they shape the thoughts of notable figures. — Tobias

Exactly, that is what the essay should have done.
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There is less of a following for radical individualism in Europe — Tobias

I'm not so sure. There are plenty of hippy communes in Europe who could be called radical individualists. They renounce the power structure of institutions and the constraints these institutions put on their lives.

For example, there is the "free town" of Christiana in Copenhagen. It was founded in 1971 by a group of anarchic squatters and artists who took over an abandoned military base and proclaimed it a “free zone”.

Radical individualism is a coherent political theory that can work in certain contexts.

Yes, but that does mean that an unworkable philosophy must be a paradox. — RussellA

No, but it is an indication that there might be paradoxes or incoherences within the theory. That is why I urged to focus on those theoretical inconsistencies.

I'm not so sure. There are plenty of hippy communes in Europe who could be called radical individualists. They renounce the power structure of institutions and the constraints these institutions put on their lives. — RussellA

Yes, but they seldom embrace notions of unbridled private property, quite the contrary. The libertarian conception of the individual extends to the assertion that self-ownership entails ownership of the fruit of one's labour. Hippy ideology, if there is such a thing, is indeed individualistic but has a less thick conception of the self.

For example, there is the "free town" of Christiana in Copenhagen. It was founded in 1971 by a group of anarchic squatters and artists who took over an abandoned military base and proclaimed it a “free zone”.

Radical individualism is a coherent political theory that can work in certain contexts. — RussellA

That might well be true, but that shifts the terms of the debate right? Also Benkei did not attack all forms of radical individualism, but a specific libertarian variation of it, if I understand correctly. As for Christiana, I would be interested to see how the inhabitants view their community. I have an inkling that they reject interference by the Danish state and what they perceive to be its oppressive structures. I wonder if they extend that rejection to the notion that community itself plays no part. There must be sociological research on it, but little time to really dive into it.

No, but it is an indication that there might be paradoxes or incoherences within the theory — Tobias

Radical individualism is a coherent political philosophy that may work in certain contexts and not in others.

It may work in a hippy commune of a dozen people living in the woods, but is unlikely to work if 100 million people in the USA decided to adopt it.

I am still missing where the paradox is.
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The libertarian conception of the individual extends to the assertion that self-ownership entails ownership of the fruit of one's labour. — Tobias

The essay is about radical individualism.

Has a connection been made between radical individualism and libertarianism.
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Also Benkei did not attack all forms of radical individualism, but a specific libertarian variation of it, if I understand correctly. — Tobias

He seemed to attack all forms of it.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom.

Lol. If anything, Christiana is a functioning illustration of how liberty is sustained by shared norms, internal constraints and community accountability.

He seemed to attack all forms of it. — RussellA

Correct but I do go out of my way defining its key characteristics; so if there's someone out there calling something "radical individualism" but doesn't meet the 5 core observations, it is not "radical individualism" as treated here. Obviously, I have independent points against each core observation so any belief resting on any of those five observations is immediately suspect.

↪Tobias Lol. If anything, Christiana is a functioning illustration of how liberty is sustained by shared norms, internal constraints and community accountability. — Benkei

Well possible. I have no idea how people do things in Christiana. I would like to know what radical indivdualism actually means. If it is simply a belief that 'my' existence precedes community existence, then it may be that certain hippy communities conform to that notion. I still think the notion, also in that very imprecisely defined form is incoherent.

I am still missing where the paradox is. — RussellA

Well, one of them is for instance the idea of a shared meaning of the word 'radical individualist'. If I tell you I am a radical individualist, you can only know what I mean if we share the same discursive understanding. Such understanding does not come about out of nowhere but is dependent a system of education and a history of ideas to which we both refer. Both of those came about through cooperation, through funding, to some extent coercion and to a certain cultural proximity. Even to discuss the subject of radical individualism coherently requires access to collectivities.

Of course I offer a very radical form of radical individualism, someone who rejects all forms of social commitment. Benkei's 5 characteristics describe a thicker version in some respects and in some respects thinner. What would you consider radical individualism to be?

That said, I have to confess: I don't like Popper as a political philosopher. While his falsification theory of science was groundbreaking, his reading of Plato is a caricature. — Benkei

I think that is more than a little unfair. In the preface he makes clear his critique is aimed at nuances, but I can see how you and others may read this as a 'caricature'. I find this harsh judgement though. His attack is on social engineering, so perhaps it is more or less to do with a particular stance you have on social engineering that lies at the heart of your position?

I do not wish to create a strawman argument here, but I think it may help if you explain from exactly what social position problems arise, what is meant by justice in your eyes, and how the law and enforcement plays its part too. The 'strawman' I am trying to avoid here is the idea of a blank slate/equal society. I do not think you are asking for that but I am just trying to read between the lines. I assume you understand that some people are better than others at different things and that this is part and parcel of human life.

To add, what I found most relevant about Berlin was his pluralism. The piecemeal engineering Popper backed was shown as wanting by Berlin due to how this or that agenda can clash with others.

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power. — RussellA

Using this same line of logic, an individual could pretend to be a radical collectivist but is actually an authoritarian radical individualist that consolidates power to become dictator. In essence they are an individual that views the citizens as their property. Stalin comes to mind.

How can we use the essay's explanation to distinguish between the two? Was Stalin a collectivist or a radical individualist that relied on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power?

@Benkei I doubt you'll find this surprising, but my reaction was an answer to the question:

Why do you preach to the choir?

So that they choir will sing.

There's a character that fills shop floors that I call "The Cowboy" -- the cowboy sees themselves out in this world alone with nothing but themselves to rely upon, and furthermore, the cowboy knows they're good enough to get by without anyone's help. They'll accept the consequences of whatever comes. In a way this is an ultimate form of self-responsibility -- accepting any consequences whatsoever and adapting to said consequences. But on the other hand it's false: You're not a cowboy, you're Teddy whose worked in the maintenance shop of Parks and Recreation for 15 years and hasn't paid his dues while reaping the benefits of a union contract.

So, yes, I agree with your position and by that fact it makes it difficult for me to be critical.

I should've led with this @Tobias

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/gpdurWD8Hew

Foucault: Power Without Sovereignty
Foucault challenges the idea that power is only held by institutions and applied through law. Power is diffuse, relational and productive. It acts through norms, language and identity. One does not escape power by avoiding the state. Power shapes how we see and behave.

Foucault writes: “[Power] is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.” — Moliere

Nietzsche's idea, not Foucault's.

The triumphant concept "energy" with which our physicists created God and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an inner will which I characterise as the "Will to Power"—that is to say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists cannot get rid of the "actio in distans" in their principles; any more than they can a repelling force (or an attracting one). There is no help for it, all movements, all "appearances," all "laws" must be understood as symptoms of an inner phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be used for this purpose. It is possible to trace all the instincts of an animal to the will to power; as also all the functions of organic life to this one source....

Even in the inorganic world all that concerns an atom of energy is its immediate neighbourhood: distant forces balance each other. Here is the root of perspectivity, and it explains why a living organism is "egoistic" to the core...

The bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the repelling power exercised by every atom of energy. "Life" might be defined as a lasting form of force-establishing processes, in which the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is by no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in the act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute power of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated. "Obedience," and "command," are forms of the game of war...

There are no laws: every power draws its last consequence at every moment... — Nietzsche

And so so so many more...

But as to the democratic institution of power... well...

"Life" might be defined as a lasting form of force-establishing processes, in which the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally.