All brute facts about things in the world are subjective, relative and contingent.
— Joshs
Is this to be read as a stipulation? It doesn't correspond to, say, Searle's use of 'brute fact" as mind-independent, non-institutional and (at least usually) physical — Banno
And yes, we can't address every problem, but must pick the most tractable and interesting. — J
Why does the question remain unanswered? Why is it ignored? — Banno
No. — Banno
You are basically painting with a roller rather than a brush.could explain why it will not be answered... — Fire Ologist
You are basically painting with a roller rather than a brush. — Banno
↪Joshs I
I'll have to leave you to it.
Thank you for the example. — Banno
Part of the problem is that it is often left unclear just how extensively a constraint is being challenged. A philosopher treats the law of excluded middle as if it carried no authority whatsoever but implicitly relies on other logical principles (perhaps in the metalanguage): exactly which principles of logic are supposed to carry authority? A philosopher treats some common sense judgement as if it carried no authority whatsoever but implicitly relies on other judgements that are found pre-philosophically obvious: exactly which such judgements are supposed to carry authority?
When law and order break down, the result is not freedom or anarchy but the capricious tyranny of petty feuding warlords. Similarly, the unclarity of constraints in philosophy leads to authoritarianism. Whether an argument is widely accepted depends not on publicly accessible criteria that we can all apply for ourselves but on the say-so of charismatic authority figures. Pupils cannot become autonomous from their teachers because they cannot securely learn the standards by which their teachers judge. A modicum of wilful unpredictability in the application of standards is a good policy for a professor who does not want his students to gain too much independence. Although intellectual deference is not always a bad thing, the debate on realism and anti-realism has seen far too much of it. We can reduce it by articulating and clarifying the constraints...
Philosophers who reject the constraints mentioned above can say what constraints they would regard as appropriate. Of course, those who deny that philosophy is a theoretical discipline at all may reject the very idea of such constraints. But surely the best way to test the theoretical ambitions of philosophy is to go ahead and try to realize them in as disciplined a way as possible. If the anti-theorists can argue convincingly that the long-run results do not constitute progress, that is a far stronger case than is an a priori argument that no such activity could constitute progress. On the other hand, if they cannot argue convincingly that the long-run results do not constitute progress, how is their opposition to philosophical theory any better than obscurantism?
— Timothy Williams
I could lament that we haven't answered or achieved agreement on a host of questions, but still acknowledge we've made progress in understanding them. For that matter, rather than lamenting, I could postulate that a lack of closure is a hallmark of what constitutes philosophy.
The Wittgensteinian Ur-picture, which I don't share, is that "philosophy leaves everything as it was." It is a diagnostic tool to help us understand where our language led us astray. Once we've done that, we'll be left with very little to worry about. Genuine problems will be assigned, or promoted, to the disciplines that study them, such as physics and politics. You can see why this is often viewed as a therapeutic understanding of philosophy -- or, less elevatedly, as plumbing out the pipes.
I think this is what Banno is describing. Again, he will tell us, I'm sure. Personally, I think a dose of Doctor Witt's therapy is a very good thing for all of us from time to time, especially when we get a strong hunch that our terminology is backing us into implausible corners. As I said to Banno above, I don't think all the important philosophical questions can be treated and dissolved in this way, but it's a fantastically useful technique to have at the ready. — J
Understanding Witt’s ‘therapeutic’ project in the context of consonant efforts in phenomenology and poststructuralism allows us to see that he doesn’t so much dissolve all philosophical questions as shows us that scientific , logical and mathematical domains are not self-grounding but instead are contingent and relative products dependent for their grounding on an underlying process of temporalization. Unlike writers like Husserl, Heidegger and Deleuze, Wittgenstein was reluctant to call the questioning that uncovers this process philosophical. He thought of philosophy as the imposing of metaphysical presuppositions (picture theories) on experience but not the self-reflexively transformative process of experiencing itself. — Joshs
this is certainly the sort of stuff that has historically be called "philosophy," even if some of it might fall into literary analysis. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You (or Tim) may argue that we need something external or absolute or a platonic form or some such to fix the judgement. But that there is such a thing is itself a normative judgement. — Banno
So too for reason. It is oriented outside of itself. We have come to see logos as a finite tool, the creation of man and his culture, but it is rather, I would argue, that man participates in Logos. The nature of logos is to transcend; it is always already past its limits and with the whole.
The relevance to the larger topic here is that modern philosophy is defined by its move to "bracket out" all sorts of considerations as irresolvable by reason, or beyond the limits of reason. The boundaries vary, it can be the phenomenal, the mind, language, culture, etc., but in each instance the bracketing involves a methodological move that assumes much about the world and reason. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You and J both seem to be saying I’m not even in the neighborhood. — Fire Ologist
is there something about the structure of language that may be influencing what (one of us) takes to be obvious, or capable of only one interpretation, or producing some necessary metaphysical inference? — J
the thing to focus on here is probably that "language about language" is an essential tool. — J
But language about language remains the clearest domain of the most scientific statements we can make. — Fire Ologist
the measure of progress in science has emerged from sciences like physics, and not from analysis of language. We learned from physics how to be rigorous and how to measure progress, and then applied this as a tool to philosophy, — Fire Ologist
since physics is science par excellence — J
But it's always appropriate to call a time-out, so to speak, and say, "Now hold on. Notice how we're using the words here. Do we agree on terms, for starters? — J
To me, that's just being a "disciplined" (to use Williamson's term) philosopher. I don't require such analysis to set the philosophical world aright, and as that hasn't happened yet, I doubt it will. — J
Quite so, and not just with analytic philosophy. The temptation to jump ahead, to overgeneralise, to use the big brush, is great.Much even of analytic philosophy moves too fast in its haste to reach the sexy bits. — p. 14
Precise errors over vague truths. It would be a mistake to characterise this as marking some considerations as irresolvable, rather we should be open and explicit about our inability to formulate some issues clearly enough for due consideration, to put the effort into those areas that show the most promise.The fear of boring oneself or one’s readers is a great enemy of truth. — p. 15
If I remember right, the original philosophical reason for the "translation" into logic was to clarify natural language, so that at least some philosophical problems could be resolved or dissolved. The other (possibly philosophical) project was the attempt to provide a foundation for mathematics. But I had the impression that both projects were abandoned, though to be honest I have forgotten exactly what the reasons were. My question is simply what is the aim of the translation project now? Is it the same, or something different?The present state of play, so far as I can make out, has the philosophers working in these areas developing a variety of formal systems that are able to translate an ever-increasing range of the aspects of natural language. — Banno
Williamson apparently sees convergence as an indicator of progress. An interesting thought — Banno
Would divergence indicate a problem then? — Count Timothy von Icarus
My question is simply what is the aim of the translation project now? Is it the same, or something different? — Ludwig V
But I also think if I rephrased what you seem to me to be saying, and questioned “metaphysical” above about the inference, and if I expounded on “the structure of language” being referenced here regarding what is obvious to only one of us, or addressed “capable of only one interpretation” - if I spoke about what you are saying you would probably say I was still getting it all wrong — Fire Ologist
the thing to focus on here is probably that "language about language" is an essential tool.
— J
But language about language remains the clearest domain of the most scientific statements we can make.
— Fire Ologist
“essential tool” similar to “clear…scientific”.
Not the same, but neighbors, or showing family resemblance, if you will. — Fire Ologist
I’m hoping I’m close, explaining why and how I think that, and asking you to work with me to either dissect and clarify what I said, or agree and/or build on it. — Fire Ologist
My biggest philosophical interest and justification for all of the painful rigor, is something eternal. — Fire Ologist
"When you say 'language about language' — J
Those who applaud a methodological platitude usually assume that they comply with it. I intend no such comfortable reading. To one degree or another, we all fall short not just of the ideal but of the desirable and quite easily possible. Certainly this afterword exhibits hardly any of the virtues that it recommends, although with luck it may still help a bit to propagate those virtues (do as I say, not as I do). Philosophy has never been done for an extended period according to standards as high as those that are now already available, if only the profession will take them seriously to heart.
You don't seem to even see what I am saying. I see us saying a lot of the same things. — Fire Ologist
So your answer to whether I am understanding anything from the article or from what you said must be "no" — Fire Ologist
I think I'm following the article just fine. — Fire Ologist
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