Maybe it's just a good theory if you're seemingly so keen on disproving it but unable to?

What would disprove it of course is a long-lasting move towards peace between the US, Israel and Iran - a pipedream to be sure. The reason we don't see that, and we'll probably never see that, is because geopolitical realities put these countries at odds with each other pretty much by default. — Tzeentch

If you want a theory to be taken seriously, it needs to be falsifiable. So your position is that the JCPOA was done for shits and giggles to make sure it continues to fit your narrative. And this is of course nonsense.

The JCPOA was the product of 20 months of multilateral negotiations involving hundres of pages of technical annexes, inspections and UN SC Resolution 2231. It was also strongly opposed in the US itself. It wasn't a PR stunt or fake but a real policy.

The impact on Iran was significant. It shipped 97% of its enriched uranium out of the country, cut its centrifuges to a third and accepted the most intrusive inspection regime ever imposed. Nuclear-related sanctions were lifted by the US. To claim it was all “phoney” because US firms didn’t rush in fast enough simply ignores the chilling effect of the continued non-nuclear sanctions, secondary risk and the volatility of US domestic politics.

Retrofitting failure as proof of insincerity is of course silly. By that logic any diplomatic failure proves the diplomacy was fake.

As for Israeli rejection, the US pursued the deal in spite of it underlining the autonomy of the decision in the first place and proving the break with prior policy.

In other words, you don't have a theory but a narrative, which ignores actual facts but you're hellbent on constructing something that you believe is unassaillable. It will be fun to watch this narrative to become more ludicrous as time passes.

So your position is that the JCPOA was done for shits and giggles to make sure it continues to fit your narrative. — Benkei

What a curious strawman.

Is the thought that phoney amends are made to buy time such a strange thought to you? The Minsk accords were done in the exact same way, and Hollande and Merkel even admitted as much!

It's not a strawman, it's rephrasing what you said. Anyhoo, enough on this. People can read and realise you don't know what you're talking about from the entire exchange. It's just unfortunate that you can't seem to learn anything when it's handed to you on a silver platter.

In other words, you don't have a theory but a narrative, which ignores actual facts but you're hellbent on constructing something that you believe is unassaillable. — Benkei

Oh, and this is nonsense too. I'm repeatedly trying to start a conversation about actual geopolitical realities - ergo the 'root causes' - but you've been pretty much categorically ignoring them.

The Pre-WW1 jingoism and imperialism died especially after the Second World War. — ssu

It's interesting to me how different countries treat it. WWII is shifting from memory to history. In Russia, it's become a source of great patriotic pride; in Germany, it's a source of shame. In the US, in the past few decades, it was often treated as a fairly milquetoast yet media-worthy and exciting good versus evil conflict. Many great series have been made about it, and it's a safe conflict to portray.

But political landscapes shift, memories fade, and modern issues, like mass immigration, challenge old taboos and force us to rethink our past.

I will keep my responses brief because you've clarified that you probably aren't responding. If you want to continue, I can go into more detail, but I'm not writing pages if you aren't continuing.

Of course there isn’t. Because your position is a closed loop. You demand agreement with your metaphysical assumptions before we can even begin to discuss facts or outcomes. You’re not interested in a debate. You’re interested in moral submission. — Benkei

It's hard to reason with those who don't share common values. I can reason with Christians and Muslims because I'm familiar with the contours of their belief systems. You, OTOH, seemingly take a "view from nowhere." Like you're a disembodied mind. Perhaps we can find some common ground, but it's harder because you don't situate yourself.

If we're talking diplomacy or negotiating within a society, that reasoning—that negotiation—takes place among situated individuals, not disembodied minds. Common values & frameworks must be found for constructive dialogue to occur. In the absence of that, there is force.

Any reasoning must proceed from a shared basis. You value the universal, I get it. There is a place for universalism within my tradition, but I certainly don't envision a mass homogenization where my tradition dissolves into others because we are all "enlightened by reason." My tradition values the universal and the particular, whereas you seemingly value only the universal. This is among our main differences and likely the root of our discord.

You call me tribal because I cling to my particular tradition. I suppose you consider yourself beyond such things. Well, good for you.

.. Would you agree you have a little bit of a chip on your shoulder? You say more and more outrageous things until someone calls you on it.

No, I don't. I think you're misreading me. If you read anger into my posts, that's the reader's error.

No, I don't. I think you're misreading me. If you read anger into my posts, that's the reader's error. — BitconnectCarlos

Ok. I guess I just don't get where you're coming from. When I told what Israel did to the Palestinians so that they ended up in refugee camps, you laughed about it, but then you're horrified by the Iranian government. It really seems to me that there's something wrong with your moral compass. Take that for whatever it's worth.

Frank, I don't remember this conversation where you claimed I laughed. Could you give me a link?

Frank, I don't remember this conversation where you claimed I laughed. Could you give me a link? — BitconnectCarlos

That would require work on my part. :smile: I told you that when the Israelis forcibly displaced Palestinians from their homes in 1967, many of them went to the West Bank and began lemon farming. The Israelis didn't like the fact that they were surviving, so they diverted the water from their farms. The failed farmers then turned to retail sales in markets, but the Israelis raised taxes on them until they all went out of business. That's how the huge refugee camps started. It's just the truth. Israel created the horrible conditions in the West Bank that led to unrest.

You laughed about the lemons. Please don't redemonstrate your apathy. It's super depressing to hear someone do that.

The lemon farming anecdote amused me, but I don't think this is historical, as the Palestinians were displaced from the West Bank, not to the West Bank, in 1967. They largely went to Jordan.

The lemon farming anecdote amused me — BitconnectCarlos

That's because there's something wrong with your ability to discern wrong-doing.

but I don't think this is historical, as the Palestinians were displaced from the West Bank, not to the West Bank, in 1967. They largely went to Jordan. — BitconnectCarlos

They came to the West Bank in waves, some of the refugees were living in the West Bank at the time. I'm getting really disgusted by this conversation, so I'm out.

The more I read this the more I enjoy parts of it. You note real points of difference, but from the other side.

Sub 3. It reveals an inability to hold multiple truths at once.
Yes, the Iranian regime is brutal.

But your mind can’t accommodate that tension. You flatten everything into one big moral binary where once you label something “evil,” no further thinking is required. It’s cognitive offloading and it’s dumb because it rejects complexity in a domain that requires it most. — Benkei

As opposed to you, where it's all just a billion shades of grey? Trump brutal. Hitler brutal. Roosevelt brutal. Khomeini brutal. Side with whoever, because the world doesn't have absolutes; we're all just different, slightly darker or lighter shades of grey. Who cares about Khomeini torturing women and beating them to death when the US has bombed Iraq. :roll:

I gotta say, you bring up interesting points that point to our differences.

Step 4: “I don’t care about facts. We need a paradigm shift.”
And there it is: the moment when the mask fully drops. You admit facts don’t matter to you. You just want to feel right. — Benkei

Please tell me more about these theory-independent prescriptive facts. We all have our lens; I acknowledge mine. You, OTOH, apparently have direct access to prescriptive objective reality independent of theory/conceptual framework.

Were the bombings of, say, Berlin or Hamburg murder or killing? What do we say about those deaths? I know civilians died, but I'd like to learn how to make sense of it, prescriptively/in the realm of judgment, without the theory. Is this just one of those cases where "the facts speak for themselves," or maybe, just maybe, we require a lens through which to process these events.

Oh, and this is nonsense too. I'm repeatedly trying to start a conversation about actual geopolitical realities - ergo the 'root causes' - but you've been pretty much categorically ignoring them. — Tzeentch

I have little time these days, but I am "fully in" the geopolitical theorizing.

However, has extremely good points.

A better framework that brings the two arguments together, as I argued for quite some time on the Ukraine thread, is "grand strategy mediated discourse".

Decisions are made by individuals in a network, which are usually best modelled by factions we usually call "special interest" today.

In these decision making processes everyone uses strategic language. For example, if you represent the arms industry and all you want is to sell more arms and have more wars and tensions to sell more arms for short term shareholder value, you're not going to just say that; rather, you're going to translate your interest to sell more arms into grand strategy language.

It's called rationalizing.

Of course, some parties in the decision making process will actually care about a US empire "as such"; for example, a lot of analysts are hired to analyze the world and the interests of "the US" and simply do that job. However, even then, what they come to define as "US interest" is going to be shaped by more powerful players that may have self serving definitions. So, simply because you're an analysis and your identity is serving US interest, doesn't mean you therefore come up with some plausible definition of what US interests are. If it becomes the institutional status quo that defeating Iran is US interest, then you'll start just repeating that as that's what's expected of you.

Point being, "US strategy" is not an accurate model of what drives decisions. All sorts of interests go into policy and government decision making, of which genuine concern for strategy is only one component, and even within this component of some plausibly impartial attempt at "US strategy" there will be a diversity of opinion.

So there are genuine attempts to argue for "US interests" within the establishment, but everyone else is going to present themselves as doing the same thing.

In this case of the 12 day war, the main faction pushing for a US war with Iran in the US establishment is obviously the American Zionists (often duel citizens). Now they want a US war with Iran for Israeli-Zionist interests but they nevertheless present that as US interest.

They've pushed hard for a war with Iran before, and didn't get it, so that in itself informs us there's other factions that disagree that a war with Iran is in US interests and / or their own interest (such as own political or economic interest). For example, the arms industry wants to sell weapons, but they don't benefit from a war's that are too big and chaotic. What they want are arms races, specifically technology driven arms races where they make the most profit, not actual resolutions to conflicts or wars so big that it disrupts the global economy (people need money to be able to buy your stuff). Arms industry doesn't want to get nuked same as everyone else.

Then there's the pentagon, US intelligence agencies, and other US institutions. Pentagon may simply have no viable plan to defeat Iran, so they may hear the rhetoric but then those analysts who identify as objective try to formulate as plausibly objective view of Iran and plausibly objective evaluation of a giant war with Iran. If the results aren't good there's going to be pushback from any general that either also identifies as representing some sort of objective US interest or then doesn't want the embarrassment of losing a war.

There's also diplomatic factions within all these institutions that don't see war as the primary tool to advance US interests, but rather diplomacy is (war being a last resort).

We put all this together, and the original plan to invade Iran was clearly as a next step to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is in the middle. For that to happen the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would have had to go well, they don't.

Obama's elected, there's a giant push to carry out the attack Iran plan, but Obama disagrees that's a good idea, goes with diplomacy instead.

As @Benkei points out, there's no evidence this change in policy to negotiate a resolution is somehow a cynical ploy to keep Iran from developing. Definitely it's a plan to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but the only way to do that is a process of phasing out the sanctions.

One of the fundamental reasons to favour diplomacy (in which Iran also gets some of what it wants, that's how diplomacy works) is that war with Iran would be simply too costly for the US and may not even succeed in at least regime change in the short term. The US may simply lose a conventional war with Iran simply because it would be too costly to win (require a draft for example). Iranians fought an 8 year war with Iraq, so there's no good reason to assume invading Iran would be easy and it could turn out to be so difficult that the US gives up. In addition to the prospects of very clearly failing to topple the Iranian government, there's all the regional chaos Iran could cause; straights of Hormuz and all that.

I could go on, but the point is there's lots of inputs into decision making. Obama decides diplomacy is in the US interest. Then Trump gets elected, undoes Obamas deal not to then immediately start a war with Iran, but because he hates Obama so much. Of course, Zionists don't want a diplomatic resolution with Iran, they want war even if it greatly harms the US (they see Israel as winning in that scenario), so they get to work on increasing the tensions with Iran. However, overall they are losing, as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan aren't going well, and Trump starts the withdrawal from Afghanistan process; that's really not good if you want to attack Iran.

The war we just saw, notably, was not started by the US, but directly by Israel. This isn't the Zionist preference, but a plan B of starting the war themselves and assuming the US will join in.

That also didn't work, so shows the limitations of Zionist influence in the US government.

However, even then, what they come to define as "US interest" is going to be shaped by more powerful players that may have self serving definitions. — boethius

I'm very skeptical about this approach. If you want to understand how things are, then why do we not start by taking powerful players (with their self-interest) as condition of the game and not in light of what the powerless people wish them to be (which again can be considered self-interested, namely based on the self-interest of the powerless players, no less hypocritical)? if we are talking about "interest" as in "national interest" of course a conceptual framework MUST take into account the interest of the involved subjects including powerful players. We are tempted to say: yes, but of all people part of "nation". Agreed, yet the nation includes also power relations between individuals. As national interest at interstate level must take into account power relations among states, so the notion of national interest MUST take into account power relations also within a nation. "Interest" is a very indeterminate notion per se if we do not assess costs and benefits, risks and opportunities that are de facto shaped by power relations. That's why strategic thought can impose itself and lead people and states to convergence independently from self-interest (see how people and states can converge on what is the perceived "common enemy").
Setting objectives that go beyond one's means is a problem for both powerless and powerful people. Powerful doesn't mean all mighty as much as powerless doesn't mean impactless (most certainly not, at a mass level). We disagree less on what is desirable (everybody happy rich healthy free fully-developed for all human beings and possibly animals and nature in the past present and future, on a universal and infallible just society) than on what is achievable.

In these decision making processes everyone uses strategic language. For example, if you represent the arms industry and all you want is to sell more arms and have more wars and tensions to sell more arms for short term shareholder value, you're not going to just say that; rather, you're going to translate your interest to sell more arms into grand strategy language.

It's called rationalizing. — boethius

Also psychologizing is a form of rationalization. Arguably the most hypocritical form of rationalization.

Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran (Brookings Institution, 2009)

I was just about to cite this very paper as an example of people trying to be objective.

The paper essentially makes the point that diplomacy is the only option likely to succeed.

I don't have time to make detailed citations right now, but of the situation we are in (American people simply don't back an invasion so the only attack option is bombing), the authors are very lucid of the likely consequences:

Disadvantages (of just bombing stuff scenario)

- Iran’s determination to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would probably not be reduced by such an attack and, especially in the short term, could well be increased.

-The hard-line Iranian leadership that presently struggles to maintain political support at home might be strengthened by a nationalistic reaction among the Iranian people against what they would doubtless perceive as an unprovoked American attack.

- Even massive airstrikes might only set back the Iranian nuclear program by as little as a year or two, and this seems more likely than the more optimistic possibility that this policy option would delay Iran’s program by three years or more. Given the track record of U.S. and international intelligence in accurately assessing the nuclear programs of foreign states, any attack, even a sustained American operation, might fail to destroy a substantial fraction of Iran’s nuclear program. The United States cannot strike what it does not know about, and there is good reason to think that Iran has or will soon have major nuclear facilities—including alternative uranium hexafluoride storage/production and uranium enrich- ment plants—that have not been identified. — WHICH PATH TO PERSIA? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran - Brookings Institute

Which is exactly what the media is arguing with Trump about presently.

Furthermore, even if the program was delayed by 3 years, which is viewed as essentially the best case scenario, what does that delay accomplish outside a followup invasion? Obviously bombing them is going to motivate them even harder to get the bomb and make diplomacy far more difficult, if not impossible (as we see), to get them to agree to give up their nuclear program (which they've stated pretty clearly they will never ever do). So if the plan is diplomacy, simply doing some bombing in the manner that has been done is not part of any rational diplomatic strategy. If there's no appetite to invade Iran, then bombing (even successful) doesn't delay the nuclear program for the purposes of organizing a successful invasion.

Without a followup invasion, what exactly is the point in simply delaying Iran getting the bomb? With the high possibility bombing: A. causes that to happen as Iran may simply not develop a nuclear bomb if not attacked (as has been Iranian policy for 40 years) B. the bombing is not even effective so don't really delay anything and C. creates domestic and international sympathy for Iran pursuing a nuclear weapon.

All the bombing accomplished is removing the nuclear material (that we for sure know about) from international inspection.

I'm not completely sure if you're disagreeing with me.

By interest I mean people's perceived interest they are working on behalf of, which is (usually) a mix of personal and collective interests of one form or another (family, company, institution, country etc.). For example, someone working in a company may have the interest of the company in mind in making decisions, what the company to succeed, but also want to advance their career; sometimes these interests are aligned (doing a good job advances your career) and sometimes in conflict (advancing one's career requires spreading rumours about someone who's actually more competent; of course in this person's perception; someone else may have "honesty is the best policy" perception as to their personal interest to advance their career).

In terms of how government decisions are made lot's of individuals representing explicitly and implicitly lots of mixes of interests go into these decisions.

However, all of them are going to say what they propose is in the national interest.

To take the war in Iran, American-Zionists who want the US to attack Iran for Israel's benefit, claim this is also the US national interest as well.

So, everyone is always talking grand strategy and sometimes that's in earnest (as earnest as they can, such as the authors of the Brookings paper discussed above) and sometimes it is obviously a lie.

A "healthy" Empire, the plausibly objective interest of the Empire as such manages to assert itself over special interests that wish to plunder the Empire or otherwise consume its capital base (including diplomatic capital) for their own ends. An unhealthy Empire everyone comes to divide up the spoils and get away with their pickings.

Here is where I do disagree with you:

In terms of how government decisions are made lot's of individuals representing explicitly and implicitly lots of mixes of interests go into these decisions.

However, all of them are going to say what they propose is in the national interest. — boethius

Why “however”? What do you want it to contrast to? What is there unexpected about the situation you are describing? Your expectations are based on reality or on your moral standards? National interest is and can’t be anything else than what results from people’s self-serving interests on a national level AND given certain power relations between them. Here what looks very ambiguous to me is the expression “self-serving”. In your views, I suspect, “self-serving” looks very much like a proxy for “selfish”, which in turn looks very much like a proxy for “I’m not as much selfish and I can honestly judge who are more selfish ad who aren’t, and I defend the interest of the powerless against the abuses of the selfish powerful”.
In my views, self-serving interests can simply be seen as a proxy for “competing” interests for both powerful and powerless players. There is no need to frame things with an allegedly “impartial” psychological analysis which is a surreptitious proxy for a self-promoting moral judgement and blame shifting. That’s why I’m reluctant to describe things in your self-serving psychological terms.

So, everyone is always talking grand strategy and sometimes that's in earnest (as earnest as they can, such as the authors of the Brookings paper discussed above) and sometimes it is obviously a lie — boethius

.

As I said you are framing a situation not in terms of competing interests, but in moral terms. This reflects your allegedly “impartial” (or “virtuous”?) interest. Yet your views are exposed to the same “bias” you are accusing others to be victim of or purposefully embracing: namely, viewing national interest in light of your self-interest. Your “populist” views are putatively aligned with those of the mass of powerless nobodies which are victims of the putative abuses of evil elites.

A "healthy" Empire, the plausibly objective interest of the Empire as such manages to assert itself over special interests that wish to plunder the Empire or otherwise consume its capital base (including diplomatic capital) for their own ends. An unhealthy Empire everyone comes to divide up the spoils and get away with their pickings. — boethius

What does “healthy” mean? Who is going to assess what is “healthy”? The slaves of an empire or the lords of the empire? What if they do not converge on what's "healthy"?
What you call “healthy” may simply be the fact that people within a community cooperate more effectively wrt people of another community, where “more effectively” means that the community’s perpetuation and prosperity benefits from such cooperation. But that doesn’t exclude stubborn and toxic competing interests within a community and amongst communities that can erode cooperation to the point of triggering a vicious cycle of suspicion and accusations.

"National interest" points at something that is the result of collective dynamics however inspired by individual expectations and wishes

To continue with the rest of your so-called argument... — Benkei

My post wasn't an argument. I was setting forth a condition for discussion, namely, the understanding that the Iranian regime was wicked.

To which you finally get around to addressing:

Let’s be clear: the world is full of evil. — Benkei

I get it: We are all sinners. The world is full of sin. Whether we throw in with the 7th century savages who behead homosexuals and rape women before their executions or those fighting them is no significant matter. We're all sinners anyway. We can all agree that those fighting the 7th-century savages are no angels. And the problems of the West will, of course, be condemned to their fullest extent, while we can rationalize away the faults of the 7th-century savages if not blame them on the West itself. It's all so tiring.

I suspect it ties back to the Marxist oppressor-oppressed dynamic, where the oppressor deserves zero leniency.

But the presence of evil doesn’t mean we drop bombs until it feels better.

If their wickedness starts seeping over borders, that's when military action may be required. And military action has been the solution to many, many forms of evil throughout history. Sometimes you can't compromise with evil. Nor can you rationalize with it. History tells us that sometimes, evil must be destroyed with force.

.

Why “however”? What do you want it to contrast to? — neomac

The use of the word "however" is to to contrast with the fact that parties seeking their own gain at the expense of some collective gain (family, organization, business, institutional, government, country, empire, or what have you) usually don't advertise that, but will present their plan as in the interest of the group.

So, party A pursues B and party C pursues D; however, party C will usually also claim to be pursuing B.

Perfectly fine use of the word however.

Your expectations are based on reality or on your moral standards? — neomac

The current state of the conversation is descriptive. People can be described to act in the interest of "something". That something could be anything.

For example, some people act in the interest of their pet, dedicating their whole life to their pets welfare. For this particular conversation, people making (contributing to) US foreign policy are unlikely to be dedicated to the welfare of their pet to the exclusion of all other interests.

National interest is and can’t be anything else than what results from people’s self-serving interests on a national level AND given certain power relations between them. — neomac

It obviously can.

You can easily have a situation where the "certain powerful people" self-serving interest would be to plunder the national treasury and make off with the winnings. This is obviously not in the interest of any sensible concept of "the nation".

The fact of the matter is that people don't necessarily do that even if they can, as other people and even "the nation" as they conceive it has value and meaning apart from the maximization of their own store of value.

In order to analyze how policy is made we must take this obvious fact into account.

Of course, simply recognizing that some parties involved are acting in their own self interest to maximize material gains in the process (for example increase the value of a defence stock they are invested in) or then acting in the interest of another nation (perhaps simply because they are a spy or then duel nationality and are unable to serve two masters equally well) or a religious group or whatever, are going to be inputs into government decision making that likely conflict with any sensible definition of national interest.

For example, if one's reason to have a war is that it will increase defence contractor stocks, it's very unlikely that war just so happens to be also great for the national interest.

If someone else's reason to have a war is to fulfill prophecy; again, unlikely to happen to line up with any sensible definition of national interest.

Of course, what exactly is the national interest, even for people trying to be genuinely focused on that, is up for debate, but what is not really debatable is that people who have completely different objectives than the welfare of the nation, defined as the welfare of the people in the nation or then imperial strength or then any plausibly objective definition (i.e. definition apart from their own personal goals), are unlikely to just-so-happen to happen upon goals that are in the national interest (again, under any sensible definition).

However, in pursuing their ulterior motives they will present their motives as in the national interest, as they must convince and bargain with people in conversation where national interest and national strategy is the mediating discourse.

For our purposes here, if a certain powerful American Zionists puts the interests of Israel above the interest of the United States, they are unlikely to simply state that. They are far more likely to state that their Zionist objectives just so happen to be the plausibly objective interests of the United States. So, let us imagine a Zionist wants regime change in Iran at the expense of the United States, knowing full well the US won't derive any net benefit from that (would be just a really costly war), but it would result, in their estimation, in improving Israel's strategic position in the region, they are unlikely to put the argument to non-Zionist American decision makers and analysts, as well as the media and regular people, that American should embark upon an extremely costly war that will harm America but benefit Israel. Rather, they are likely to come up with arguments to try to convince people that what they want happens to be in the interest of "America".

As I said you are framing a situation not in terms of competing interests, but in moral terms. This reflects your allegedly “impartial” (or “virtuous”?) interest. Yet your views are exposed to the same “bias” you are accusing others to be victim of or purposefully embracing: namely, viewing national interest in light of your self-interest. Your “populist” views are putatively aligned with those of the mass of powerless nobodies which are victims of the putative abuses of evil elites. — neomac

At this point in the discussion you are interjecting into, the debate with @Tzeentch and @Benkei is descriptive of whose interest is even being served by recent policy.

@Tzeentch presents a description of the decision making process as coherent grand strategy since many decades, whereas @Benkei and I disagree the policy changes and decisions in the middle-east represent some sort of coherent US grand strategy over many decades.

@Tzeentch and I have debated this for quite some time, when the genocide first started. While both agreeing a genocide is definitely happening, @Tzeentch is of the view that Israel is acting on behalf of US Imperial interest in that "eliminating" Gaza and shoring up Israel's strategic position, while also creating chaos in the Middle East, is a logical next step in a rational US grand strategy in line or then formulated (or then "formulatable") by impartial imperial grand strategists.

I disagree with @Tzeentch, I view the genocide in Gaza as absolutely terrible for US Imperial interests (defined as preserving and expanding imperial power relative to other powers) and the policy to support and cover for Israel's genocide is due to Zionist influence in American government. That Zionism is a powerful faction, they want the genocide in Gaza and they are expending their political capital in order to achieve it vis-a-vis other factions and coalitions in the United States that disagree with them.

By factions I mean in a broad sense including entire institutions, such as the Pentagon even if the Pentagon itself is of course made up of myriad subsections (there is also resulting collective positions from all that sub-factional dynamics).

My analysis of the current situation is that Zionists "went for it" and tried to push the United States into a high-intensity war with Iran and the faction that stopped that from happening (for now) is the pentagon (because they know it conflicts with US imperial interest, represent far more costs than gains, have other regions they worry about, such as East-Asia) and (I would guess) managed to convince Trump in the situation room where it's mostly pentagon people in the room that war with Iran is incredibly high risk and don't recommend it (if they did, I have a hard time imagining the war wouldn't be on full blast right now). For, war with Iran as concept is easy to talk about, but when you get into the nitty gritty of how to actually make war with Iran, that they fought Iraq for 8 years and are not push overs, have bunkers everywhere, mountains and a surface area of 1 Rocky Mountains + 1 France, and the ballistic missiles capacity and so on, it's obviously not an easy task and many dead Americans would result tin the attempt.

At the same time, I believe Israel was threatening to escalate to them using nuclear weapons to destroy the Iranian enrichment plant. Trump bombing the plant with conventional weapons (but not killing anyone) and then Iran's symbolic counter attack, enabled Trump to simply declare a ceasefire.

The reason I was so concerned about Israel escalating to nuclear weapons is because they have no diplomatic off-ramps by design, literally opening the war with assassinating negotiators; precisely so that the US would be inevitably sucked into an expanding conflict.

Trump simply announcing a ceasefire basically short circuited that escalation process, and the bombing removed the reason for Israel to use nuclear weapons.

To summarize, in my model of what's happening, the constant escalation by Israel represents Zionist influence in America essentially cashing in their chips at a combined optimum of the combined factors of their influence in American foreign police and American power relative Iran. A sort of 'now or never' moment for Zionist whose objective is to push Iran into a failed state, as well as carry out genocide while the US can still cover for that.

To this discussion, @Benkei adds the additional information that the previous nuclear agreement with Iran negotiated by Obama was clearly part of a strategy of detente with Iran, that drops sanctions and allows them to develop and normalize, and not some sort of 5-D chess move knowing Trump would come in and tear up the agreement, then Israel embark on a genocide under Biden to be finally in a position to attack Iran in a second Trump administration.

Obviously Obama would be aware that if detente doesn't work American could go to war, but the calculation at the time was clearly that a peaceful arrangement with Iran was more in America's interest, even Imperial interest (allow that pivot to Asia), than another Middle-East war that kills plenty of Americans.

For, even if American Imperial violence hasn't stopped qua violence, there are a lot fewer American soldier deaths since many years now, and I would very much suspect that policy and decision makers with any sense of US interest are very apprehensive about any proposal that involves US soldiers returning in boxes at a high or steady volume.

My analysis of the current situation is that Zionists "went for it" and tried to push the United States into a high-intensity war with Iran and the faction that stopped that from happening (for now) is the pentagon (because they know it conflicts with US imperial interest, represent far more costs than gains, have other regions they worry about, such as East-Asia) and (I would guess) managed to convince Trump in the situation room where it's mostly pentagon people in the room that war with Iran is incredibly high risk and don't recommend it (if they did, I have a hard time imagining the war wouldn't be on full blast right now). For, war with Iran as concept is easy to talk about, but when you get into the nitty gritty of how to actually make war with Iran, that they fought Iraq for 8 years and are not push overs, have bunkers everywhere, mountains and a surface area of 1 Rocky Mountains + 1 France, and the ballistic missiles capacity and so on, it's obviously not an easy task and many dead Americans would result tin the attempt. — boethius

Israel got lured the US to join the strikes on Iran, which sooner or later (and now sooner) were stopped.

The reality just why the noecons under Bush never attacked Iran are now quite evident: there is simply now way to "topple" the Iranian regime with a quick and inexpensive war, only a huge quagmire.

But for Israel this is totally OK: it is quite happy with the "war-on-war-off" mentality and a perpetual crisis that erupts into limited wars every couple of years or a decade. So the strike packages are sent to Iran and it's declared that it's ability to build nuclear weapons is pushed forward.

The reason I was so concerned about Israel escalating to nuclear weapons is because they have no diplomatic off-ramps by design, literally opening the war with assassinating negotiators; precisely so that the US would be inevitably sucked into an expanding conflict. — boethius

I assume that with using nukes Israel is as level headed as other nuclear powers. Why should they escalate?

To this discussion, Benkei adds the additional information that the previous nuclear agreement with Iran negotiated by Obama was clearly part of a strategy of detente with Iran, that drops sanctions and allows them to develop and normalize, and not some sort of 5-D chess move knowing Trump would come in and tear up the agreement, then Israel embark on a genocide under Biden to be finally in a position to attack Iran in a second Trump administration. — boethius

Obama at least had a plan. Trump doesn't have any plan just to wobble into the next crisis that is going to erupt and try to take center stage.

Israel and the US showed just showed their limits on how far they are willing to go. Hence if Iran can build it's military industry that is survivable enough to survive an 12-day bombing campaign, that's it. And now the logical step from a military point of view would be for Iran to learn from this campaign, rearm and get that nuclear weapon and the ability to survive forthcoming attacks from Israel and the US.

Tzeentch is of the view that Israel is acting on behalf of US Imperial interest in that "eliminating" Gaza and shoring up Israel's strategic position, while also creating chaos in the Middle East, is a logical next step in a rational US grand strategy in line or then formulated (or then "formulatable") by impartial imperial grand strategists. — boethius

You're making it sound a little more esoteric than it actually is.

I'm talking about the US foreign policy establishment, aka "the Blob", the neocons, etc.

It's not a homogeneous group, but since it is interested in maintaing/re-establishing US primacy, it's options are bounded by the realities of geopolitics, which leaves a very narrow margin of deviation.

Obama at least had a plan. Trump doesn't have any plan just to wobble into the next crisis that is going to erupt and try to take center stage. — ssu

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/trump-administration-exploring-30-billion-civilian-nuclear-deal-iran-rcna215679

I think the Trump admin would be thrilled if Iran could be bribed into giving up their nuclear ambitions.

hink the Trump admin would be thrilled if Iran could be bribed into giving up their nuclear ambitions. — RogueAI

Think about it, just for a while.

Assume your country would be striken with missiles for 12 days. Over two hundred civilians would have been killed. Then the attackers would want to bribe you with third party investment.

How eager would you to start negotiations with your attackers? How much would you trust them?

I'm talking about the US foreign policy establishment, aka "the Blob", the neocons, etc.

It's not a homogeneous group, but since it is interested in maintaing/re-establishing US primacy, it's options are bounded by the realities of geopolitics, which leaves a very narrow margin of deviation. — Tzeentch

I did not mean to imply there's no variation in your model.

However, my argument is there is plenty of margin for deviation.

Obama's diplomatic policy is a deviation from the strategy of trying to contain Iran (by stick and / or carrot) to the extent of preventing development. Iran did not negotiate itself into some permanent economic hobbling in the JCPA.

Then these recent actions by Israel, there's little evidence they are carried out on behalf of "the Blob" as defined apart from the Zionist faction in the blob acting on behalf of Israel.

For example, if Israel knew about the planned Hamas attack, which seems exceedingly likely, and allowed it to happen in a catastrophic way and moreover kill their own citizens as part of the Hannibal directive, the agency there is Israel and not the US policy blob. Then if Israel used the Hamas attack and subsequent Hannabling as a pretext for genocide, my argument is that that is Israeli and Zionist agency. Likewise the attack by Israel on Iran is Israel-Zionist agency.

Plant of other parts of the blob do not see any advantage of escalating conflict in the Middle-East, for example Obama's policies represents a large coalition of the blob; if this coalition thought war with Iran was a good thing they would have attacked Iran under Obama's presidency.

In terms of maintaining/re-establishing US primacy, the genocide in Gaza is absolutely terrible policy.

Likewise war with Iran.

Now, the great power and influence, but not unlimited power and influence, explains the situation.

Zionist have enough power and influence within America to prevent America from preventing Israel committing more genocide, but not enough power and influence to get the US to fight Iran on behalf of Israel at immense cost to the US.

And, indeed, why this is happening now is that Zionism is at a pretty high maximum for power and influence as well as there being a window closing of US military power. The dollar could collapse in the short to medium term, China and Russia could simply accelerate their relative gains in economic and military power (especially if we imagine Ukraine completely collapsing and Russia outright winning) as well as Iran's continued development (made easier by being in the same sanction boat as Russia), or then conflict break out in East-Asia or elsewhere, putting into disarray any plans to have the US attack Iran. So, it's very much a likely closing window of opportunity from the Zionist point of view and therefore a now-or-never decision (in addition to Netanyahu getting older and clearly the final solution to the Palestinian problem and outright assassinating the Iranian leadership he wants as his legacy).

The model that Zionism is cashing in its political capital to try to achieve regional goals with US resources, military or diplomatic, fits the data of the genocide and attacking neighbours and then Iran.

However, that the US balks at getting into high intensity warfare with Iran where there would be US casualties and no end in sight, fits the data that this faction is in conflict with other powerful factions.

As a result the policy is not some coherent strategy with little deviation, but is extremely chaotic.

The Biden administration was well aware the genocide harmed democrat reelection chances and there's no reason to believe the friction and half measures to try to mitigate the genocide was not genuine friction, but the Biden administration simply chose genocidal Zionism (whether for ideology, blackmail, money, whatever) over their own reelection, for the simple reason that it was mostly filled with Zionists!

However, if there was coherence to the strategy then the US would have continued to escalate with Iran and be in a high intensity conflict right now.

A "bit of bombing" and a "bit of assassination" doesn't achieve any strategic objectives.

The only purpose for limited bombing that has no chance of eliminating Iran's nuclear development capability would be to delay the development of a nuclear weapon in order to prepare an invasion. The way the bombing was carried out (with dozens of trucks removing material from the enrichment plant ahead of time) makes that delay even less likely.

There's simply no appetite among the American people for high intensity war with Iran, it's high-risk and low reward in terms of "US hegemonic interests" that go far beyond Iran, and Zionism ran into this limit in using US resources to achieve Zionist objectives.

Now Israel is in a terrible strategic position, with a terrible economy and risking demographic flight, which could end the entire Zionist project. So if the point of the whole strategy, if coming from US empire, was that genocide in Gaza and attacking everyone would shore up the strategic position of the US proxy in the region, that is not what is being achieved.

And the genocide not only doesn't serve US Imperial strategic interest, it doesn't serve Israel's either.

The motivation is to get the land and also enjoy a psychopathic killing, torture and rape spree, not some strategic improvement to Israel's military position.

Think about it, just for a while.

Assume your country would be striken with missiles for 12 days. Over two hundred civilians would have been killed. Then the attackers would want to bribe you with third party investment.

How eager would you to start negotiations with your attackers? How much would you trust them? — ssu

I was responding to your point that Trump doesn't have a plan. He does. It might be unrealistic, but the plan is to offer Iran goodies to drop their nuclear ambitions.

Would Iran trust us? Doubtful, but there is precedent for the U.S. bribing Iran to drop it's enrichment. Obama did it. What is Iran's alternative, though? They just got punished severely. They got no support from the (civilized) world and even their neighbors turned on them. Top Iranian officials now know Israel can and will take them out. Why not take the bribe the Trump Admin is offering? Isn't enrichment just not worth it at this point?