So what we're asking is, Is that "difference" also something that can be subsumed under the same scientific explanation from which we derive the theory of morality as social control? — J

I wouldn’t call it a theory. I think it’s more a value judgment. I do believe there is a biological basis for all the things we think and believe. That’s not to say it’s the only contributing factor. I don’t see moral judgments or beliefs as any different from any other human judgments or beliefs.

How can it leave an escape clause for things that are actually right, as opposed to learned or evolved rule-following behavior — J

I guess I haven’t been clear enough. I’ll say it this way. It makes a difference to me whether I’m doing something because I think it’s right rather than only because it’s what’s expected of me.

Exactly my view. And I think this is true for non-human animals as well. A walking horse will not step on this bird that is sitting on the ground along the path; the horse prefers to not kill that bird. One could call this behaviour "behavouristic". But that's no answer. Actions are accompanied by feelings. I think it doesn't matter whether the "mechnical reflex" is caused by the feeling or vice versa -- or if it's just a correlation. The feeling of "liking something" is just there and it's very powerful. — Quk

This is from what is an instinct by William James. A bit florid…

“It takes, in short, what Berkeley calls a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem strange so far as to ask for the why of any instinctive human act. To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so upside down? The common man can only say, “of course we smile, of course our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved!”

And so probably does each animal feel about the particular things it tends to do in presence of particular objects. They, too, are a priori syntheses. To the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the she-bear. To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object which it is to her.”

Count, so many cogent points!

First, I reiterate that the hypothesis is that cultural moral norms and our moral sense can virtually all be explained as parts of cooperation strategies - moral ‘means’. The hypothesis is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’.

This hypothesis is consistent with the three common observations of moral behavior you and others mention as follows:

1) Biology triggered motivation to help others “out of love“ as evolved by kin altruism and sexual selection for bonding.

The initial step of the powerful cooperation strategy indirect reciprocity (which underlies much of human morality) is helping others without expectation of reciprocity from that person (which includes a child or a disabled person). The hypothesis is silent on the reason the motivation exists. That evolutionary source could be kin altruism, pair bonding, or reproductive fitness increased by cooperation within groups of unrelated people (the common focus in game theory).

Also, for indirect reciprocity, delays in reciprocity and any eventual reciprocity being to people other than the initial helper are normal. Kin altruism for immature kin can be understood as cooperation between generations.

2) Forming a goal to do “good’ or live a ‘good life’ based on rational thought and, in morally interesting cases, "acting for higher principles"

Again, the initial step of indirect reciprocity is helping others, independent of the source of that motivation. Helping others based on rational thought ("acting for higher principles") does not contradict the hypothesis.

Also, the hypothesis is essentially silent about ‘ends’, it describes ‘means’. So neither the hermit whose goal is isolation, nor Socrates whose goal to live consistently with his moral judgements leading to drinking the poison, are counterexamples to the hypothesis. The hermit and Socrates simply have, or had, different goals than their societies.

But some goals (such as those preferred by psychopaths or implied by some versions of egoism) can include, as a matter of indifference, exploitation of others to the extent exploitation benefits oneself. In these cases, it is the means that morality as cooperation identifies as innately immoral, not the goals.


3) What about cultural moral norms that have nothing to do with reproductive fitness?

The biology underlying our moral sense was selected for by the reproductive fitness benefits of the cooperation strategies it motivated.

But what motivates groups to choose, advocate for, and enforce cultural norms? Groups choose moral norms based on whatever benefits of cooperation appeal to them – reproductive fitness is generally not explicitly considered. Hence, cultural moral norms can be directly counter to reproductive fitness while still being parts of cooperation strategies.

A Hobbesian position. You're arguing that there is 1) morality and 2) it's implementation, which are made up of two separate domains - cooperation and coercion. Sure, you can argue that coercion is needed to ensure compliance by certain society members. But this is an entirely separate project from what constitutes morality. Whether punishment is necessary for morality to function effectively is a separate philosophical claim, isn't it? Morality can stand alone and whether people follow it or not is separate matter to identifying what morality is. — Tom Storm

Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors. As I described, the first category of moral norms increases cooperation within an ingroup but can exploit (sometimes coerce) outgroups. The second category solves cooperation problems within ingroups and does not exploit outgroups - as Golden Rule and so forth.

When I describe a behavior as innately immoral, I mean that it creates cooperation problems. Moral norms that exploit outgroups are, in that aspect of evolutionary morality, acting in an innately immoral way even though their behaviors are descriptively moral. Morality as cooperation offers an explanation of why moral relativism should be an unappealing idea. I also remind you that the morality as cooperation hypothesis has no innate bindingness as scientific truth. Any moral bindingness comes from our choosing it as a preferred moral reference.

Getting back to the punishment of moral norm violators, immoral people might see that punishmnent as coercion. However, game theory shows that punishment (of at least social disapproval) is necessary to maintain cooperative societies. Otherwise, they are taken over by free-loaders and morality motuvated cooperation is destroyed.

You might check my answer to Count, who made some of the same points.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/997480

Here's something you might be interested in. I think it's relevant. First, a link to a "The Moral Baby," an essay by Karen Wynn.

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/f/1145/files/2017/10/Wynn-Bloom-Moral-Handbook-Chapter-2013-14pwpor.pdf — T Clark

I did not find any contradictions between the study's results and morality as cooperation. The behaviors the babies exhibited that were identified as moral were parts of cooperation strategies.
However, morality as cooperation expands on our innate moral motivations (the paper's focus) to include and explain cultural moral norms - norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment.
And, even in infants, they found disapproval of perceived harm to others - be root of punishment of violations of moral norms.

1. Facts are always about what is the case.
2. What ought to be the case is manifestly not inevitably what is the case.

The prosecution rests. — unenlightened

The prosecution is making a category error.
The scientific hypothesis Morality as Cooperation, which is about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, makes no claims about what ought to be.
Claims about what ought to be binding come from people based on their goals and how they choose to accomplish them.

It makes a difference to me whether I’m doing something because I think it’s right rather than only because it’s what’s expected of me. — T Clark

OK, I see that. I hope our moral understanding can support that difference.



A good, interesting discussion, which helps lay bare just how far down the difference in perspective goes. Let me quote two things:

there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors. As I described, the first category of moral norms increases cooperation within an ingroup but can exploit (sometimes coerce) outgroups. The second category solves cooperation problems within ingroups and does not exploit outgroups - as Golden Rule and so forth. — Mark S

When I describe a behavior as innately immoral, I mean that it creates cooperation problems. — Mark S

Now you have every right to describe morality and immorality in this way, and you are scrupulous in calling the behaviors "descriptively moral" rather than just "moral." If there is nothing further to the idea of the moral than a certain group of behaviors that assist humans in cooperating, such a description sounds plausible to me.

But what I'm claiming, along with a few others here, I think, is that this misses entirely what "moral" means, except as a sociological or biological description. When I ask, "Is X the right thing to do?" I'm not posing a question about whether X is consistent with the evolutionary strategy you describe. Of course, nine times out of ten -- perhaps 99 out of 100 -- it may well be. Cooperation, the Golden Rule, etc. are usually very consonant with what I will decide is the right thing to do.

But there are two problems. First, trivially, this is not always the case, unless we mandate the equation by stipulative definition. More importantly, when I choose what I think is right, I do so for ethical/philosophical reasons that do not refer back to cooperation or ingroups and outgroups. Or if they do, I have to ethically justify that connection, rather than merely describe or assert it. In other words, if you ask me, "Why do you think X was the right thing to do?" and I reply, "Because it increases cooperation within an ingroup," you have every reason to persist and ask me, "But why is that a good thing? Is it always? Why in this case?" etc.

I'm trying to avoid putting this in terms of "is can't generate ought," but that's what it comes down to. Mother Nature is what she is, but ethical questions are about what I ought to do. It takes an independent argument to establish that the two are the same.

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The scientific hypothesis Morality as Cooperation, which is about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, makes no claims about what ought to be. — Mark S

Then it is inadequate. Nazis cooperate. Mafias cooperate. That is not what anyone wants to mean by morality — well that's too strong, it's not what anyone ought to mean by morality.

Claims about what ought to be binding come from people based on their goals and how they choose to accomplish them. — Mark S

But of course, claims about anything come from people, and this claim comes from you, but I don't think much of it. I think we ought to have a shared goal in discussion to get as close as we can to the truth, and this shared aim is what grounds the morality of our interaction. Now if someone does not share this aim, there is nothing to be done, but to ignore what they say, and move on, unless we can somehow persuade them that the truth must be their goal in communication in general or communication loses its meaning, value, and function.

Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors. — Mark S

It is. In Chapter 28 of Leviathan, Of Punishments, and Reward, he writes that without fear of punishment people would simply follow their own interests and ignore the common good. It's a view held by many. But so what? So you share a view with Hobbes (and you like game theory).

I see that. I hope our moral understanding can support that differenc — J

Neither option matches my personal understanding of morality. I’ve talked about this on the forum before. Here’s the quote I always use. It’s from Ziporyn’s translation of the.Chuang Tzu.

“What I call good is not humankindness and responsible conduct, but just being good at what is done by your own intrinsic virtuosities. Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more.”

Many people find that unsatisfactory.

What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more.”

Many people find that unsatisfactory. — T Clark

I think people find it unsatisfactory when they listen to themselves reciting and performing according to the image they have of themselves. They do not listen to the emptiness, but fill it with theory and listen to that.

Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. — T Clark

This may be way out of left field, but it reminds me of Kant. Chuang Tzu is saying, What you do is morally irrelevant, or at least secondary. What matters is why you do it. For him, the "why" is a rather mystical expression of authenticity and oneness. For Kant, it's the good will, also rather mystical in the end.

I think people find it unsatisfactory when they listen to themselves reciting and performing according to the image they have of themselves. They do not listen to the emptiness, but fill it with theory and listen to that. — unenlightened

Good. The inner chatter is surely not what Chuang Tzu has in mind.

I think people find it unsatisfactory when they listen to themselves reciting and performing according to the image they have of themselves. They do not listen to the emptiness, but fill it with theory and listen to that. — unenlightened

The note I usually add when I use that Chuang Tzu quote is “Easier said than done.”

This may be way out of left field, but it reminds me of Kant. Chuang Tzu is saying, What you do is morally irrelevant, or at least secondary. What matters is why you do it. For him, the "why" is a rather mystical expression of authenticity and oneness. For Kant, it's the good will, also rather mystical in the end. — J

I don’t think this is nitpicking - rather than “why” I would say “how.” How do I know what to do next without reference to conventional morality or expectations?

As for Kant - I don’t know enough to say, although, when it comes to morality, I haven’t yet forgiven him for the categorical imperative.

I don’t think this is nitpicking - rather than “why” I would say “how.” — T Clark

No, that's good, and it can extend to Kant as well. His "good will" is very much a "how" thing, at least on my reading. Kant did think we needed to know all the conventional moral strictures, but he argued that if we followed them because of some aim -- even our own happiness, or the happiness of others -- we were off-track. We have to will all our actions because, and only because, they follow the moral law. I call that a "how" thing because, if you actually ask yourself what that would mean, what it would look like in practice, it seems to require enormous centeredness and self-transcendence.

The bad news is, he thought this was another way of stating the categorical imperative!

I think the "good will" is useful as an excuse to avoid draconian penalties when something went wrong. As cooperation is an essential stabilization factor in a society, "good will" is an indication of that cooperation. Humans make mistakes; one cannot keep a society alive and at the same time decimate that society by draconian penalties. So these mistakes need to be accepted to a certain degree. This also allows a continuous "learning from mistakes". These are all stabilization factors and evolutionary motors. The "good will" is a requirement for this system. This doesn't work in fascistic systems where every living creature needs to function like a machine and where nobody trusts anyone. Such systems are not stable in the long run.

I agree with all of this, as it relates to what we generally mean today by "good will." Kind of like "they mean well" or "good intentions." We give people a break on those grounds, or try to.

Kant had something different in mind, though arguably it would also be grounds for not blaming people when things go wrong. He talked about "will" as in "power to choose freely" (roughly). He thought we had to exercise this freedom and choose the good for the correct reasons. And for Kant, the only such reason was, "Does my action conform to the moral law?" which in turn meant, "Am I acting in such a way that I could advise anyone in my shoes to do the same? Is what I'm doing generalizable?"

The latter is one way of expressing the categorical imperative: no special pleading, no appeal to personal preferences. The law's the law. This characterization leaves out about 17 important points, but that's enough for this thread!

Yes, I know Kant's categorical imperative. I find that concept useless. It might be of some use when implemented in A.I. though, as machines have no feelings.

The still small voice of conscience is what we used to claim as the source of moral judgement, back in the olden days when we were allowed to be Christian. You were supposed to act according to your conscience, and if Pontius Pilate or some other jobsworth condemned you, you'd go to your death with dignity, and that was the good life.
Those were the days, when we believed we all had knowledge of good and evil because of something we ate. But now we have to defer to some Chinese ancient saying the same things, because it turned out not to be fruit tree, but an evolutionary tree.

Those were the days, when we believed we all had knowledge of good and evil because of something we ate. But now we have to defer to some Chinese ancient saying the same things, because it turned out not to be fruit tree, but an evolutionary tree. — unenlightened

Exquisite comparison. And the difference between the two trees is the concept of sin in the one plant and the absence of intimidation in the other.

Exquisite comparison. And the difference between the two trees is the concept of sin in the one plant and the absence of intimidation in the other. — Quk

Also, the religious story appeals to the individual, whereas the evolutionary story does not. The categorical imperative of evolution is "survive". But individuals do not survive. "Why should I reproduce?" has no answer for the individual from evolution, and so cannot justify any morality, and the species or perhaps 'society' is the moral agent, of which the individual is a mere temporary and dispensable cell. All hail the market, or the party!

"Why should I reproduce?" — unenlightened

Because love and sex feel good.

"Why should I reproduce?" has no answer for the individual from evolution, and so cannot justify any morality, and the species or perhaps 'society' is the moral agent, of which the individual is a mere temporary and dispensable cell. — unenlightened

That's a good way of highlighting the shortcomings of evolutionary explanations of morality. We're being asked to see morality as a kind of trick on us, designed to get us to care about the survival of the real "agent", our species.

Love and sex do feel good, usually, so the trick is very effective, on this view. But what if they don't feel good to me? Or what if I don't care about feeling good? The moment we redirect the question to the individual, the theory is left with nothing to say.

And besides, just cos it feels good, doesn't mean it is good.

Because love and sex feel good. — Quk

So I hear.

But that's why we do reproduce, not why we should. The obligation is "for the survival of the species" whereas the individual reason is "to feel good" Total disconnect. The biology makes sense, but the morality is completely absent.

Yes, same point I made above. Morality asks what is the right thing for me to do, not how the species should survive, or how to feel good.

And besides, just cos it feels good, doesn't mean it is good — J

Not so fast. Seems it would first be necessary to determine the origin and structure of affect and its relation to values, knowledge, ethics and will. Some will argue that answering this question reveals affective valuation as primary and grounding.

I think morality is qualitatively overrated. The normative "should" lies in the feelings and not in those man-made books. The Do is the Should, and the Should is the Do. It hurts me when I hurt you, I'm glad when you are glad. My feelings guide me. I need no book.

Some will argue that answering this question reveals affective valuation as primary and grounding. — Joshs

Sure. I only said that we can't conclude, without further argument of the sort you describe, whether feeling good is what moral good means.