immediate effectiveness must remain foreign to all essential thinking,

It's an . . . unusual claim. Does anyone know whether another philosopher besides Heidegger ever said something similar? Reminds me of Beethoven saying that his final music was "for a later age." — J

Nietzsche was known to say his philosophy was for the thinkers of the future.

From "On the Genealogy of Morals"
"The man of the future who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness—he must come one day."

In Beyond Good and Evil , Nietzsche frequently refers to "philosophers of the future”, positioning his philosophy as preparation for those who will come after. He writes about philosophical "free spirits" who are precursors to future philosophers who will create new values.

In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche explicitly states that he writes for posterity, not his contemporaries, famously declaring himself "a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow."

Nietzsche consistently positioned his philosophy as being ahead of his time, written for future generations who would be capable of understanding and implementing his ideas about value creation, self-overcoming, and the rejection of traditional moral systems. He saw himself as preparing the ground for future philosophers and cultural creators who would build new foundations for human flourishing.
[/quote]

When law and order break down, the result is not freedom or anarchy but the capricious tyranny of petty feuding warlords — p. 17

Without agreed-upon constraints, philosophical debates become dominated by style, authority, and local jargon—each little sub-school operating as a fiefdom, each debate carried out on terms untranslatable to others. Sound familiar? has a point. It was rather neatly described elsewhere as

...people building drone view pyramids of arguments... — Ansiktsburk

It captures a recurring phenomenon in both contemporary philosophy and in this forum: the appearance of rigour—complicated argument-mapping, textual scaffolding, with little real pressure placed on foundational assumptions or cross-framework intelligibility.

Williamson's suggestion:

We can reduce it by articulating and clarifying the constraints. — p.17

Indeed, and this requiers agreement, convergence. This is Williamson’s minimalist prescription: no methodological revolution, just a re-commitment to being explicit. What logic are you using? What counts as evidence? What assumptions are you allowed to make? These are, in a sense, procedural constraints, shared norms that allow for adversarial argument without descending into chaos.
Williamson isn’t pushing a single method (e.g., scientific naturalism or conceptual analysis), but calling for transparency: if you’re doing verificationist semantics or paraconsistent logic or metaphysical grounding, say so. And make it intelligible.

Yes, Nietzsche is a good response, should have thought of him myself. Except . . . do you really believe he didn't want to be understood by his contemporaries? that, indeed, if he had been, he would have felt he hadn't done worthwhile philosophy? That doesn't sound like him, except when he's in a very bad mood.

For that matter, Heidegger did not exactly shy away from praise, or conversation with peers.

I agree with Leontiskos that one particularly appealing way to figure out what philosophy is, is to look at Socrates and Plato. Whatever they're trying to do, it's what we call "philosophy". — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I am not opposed to that thesis, which is a much softer form of Gerson's. Still, I was trying to be more conservative and say <If someone's definition of philosophy excludes Socrates and Plato, then it is a bad definition>.

So I'll give a simple definition of what they were trying to do, which I hope is not controversial: philosophy is thinking well about what it is important to think about. — Srap Tasmaner

Good enough for me. :up:

The work of philosophers lands somewhere in a space measured by these two axes. Those most concerned with the "thinking well" part tend to focus on logic and language, moving a bit along the other axis into metaphysics and epistemology. All of this together is the territory most strongly associated with academic analytic philosophy. If it's technology, it's the technology of philosophy.

Does it leave untouched important areas? Morality, politics, spirituality, art, culture? Of course. But thinking poorly about those important areas of human experience doesn't deserve the name "philosophy". — Srap Tasmaner

This is all very good and very helpful, but I am going to disagree with the bolded. I don't think "thinking well" has any need to leave untouched areas of importance. Crucially, I would say that if (say) Wittgenstein's approach to thinking well does not allow us to think well about those important areas, then it is not a sufficient or complete approach to thinking well. I would even say that if a kind of "thinking well" is incapable of thinking about any important things, then it fails even as a "thinking well." It would be like if I created a measurement tool that simply cannot measure anything worth measuring. "It's capacity for accurate measurements is unprecedented, but unfortunately it simply cannot measure any of the things that most need to be measured."

Indeed, and this requiers agreement, convergence. This is Williamson’s minimalist prescription: no methodological revolution, just a re-commitment to being explicit. What logic are you using? What counts as evidence? What assumptions are you allowed to make? These are, in a sense, procedural constraints, shared norms that allow for adversarial argument without descending into chaos.
Williamson isn’t pushing a single method (e.g., scientific naturalism or conceptual analysis), but calling for transparency: if you’re doing verificationist semantics or paraconsistent logic or metaphysical grounding, say so. And make it intelligible. — Banno

All this assumes procedural constraints and shared
norms can be willed into existence on the basis of some imagined neutral playing ground. I can play your game according to your rules only if I can relate to that game and those rules. William doesn’t think he is pushing for a single method but he is doing exactly that.

The systematic philosophers people continue to read generations after their passing are the ones that stand up to such scrutiny, if not quite entirely then more than enough to credit their discipline. — Srap Tasmaner

Also beautiful.

The fact that what you just said is the case, and I think it is, means to me that the qualitative difference between what the analytic tool-makers do (essential to scrutiny), and what the system builders do, is important in itself. It is something to consider and develop. We can’t expend all of our efforts on only one or other. Either one, when taken alone, loses at least some, if not all of its value.

Nietzsche consistently positioned his philosophy as being ahead of his time, written for future generations who would be capable of understanding and implementing his ideas about value creation, self-overcoming, and the rejection of traditional moral systems. He saw himself as preparing the ground for future philosophers and cultural creators who would build new foundations for human flourishing. — Joshs

But is that admirable? It could also be seen as a mere dog-whistle to those who would think of themselves as part of an intellectual elite, pretending to understand words that were hollow.

Is he a radical voice ahead of his time, misunderstood because of the profundity of his insight? Or is he a clever ironist, whose appeal to future generations flatters the vanity of self-anointed "deep thinkers," regardless of the actual content?

All this assumes procedural constraints and shared norms can be willed into existence on the basis of some imagined neutral playing ground. — Joshs

Willed into existence, yes, but not on some "imagined neutral playing ground", so much as by the hard graft of making oneself clear and explicit.

And a certain amount of good will.

This is @J's particular genius.

Except . . . do you really believe he didn't want to be understood by his contemporaries? that, indeed, if he had been, he would have felt he hadn't done worthwhile philosophy? That doesn't sound like him, except when he's in a very bad mood.

For that matter, Heidegger did not exactly shy away from praise, or conversation with peers. — J

Neither Heidegger nor Nietzsche said they did not want to be understood by their contemporaries. They wanted desperately to be understood, tried every way they could to be understood, but also knew that fundamentally new ways of thinking are not commodities whose communication is guaranteed by use of the right words. This is a mentality shared by analytic philosophers, technologists and the corporate world. If one spends one’s whole intellectual life surrounded by conventionalized and communized ideas, then one assumes that anything worth saying can be summarized in a good sound bite or logical formula.

But is that admirable? It could also be seen as a mere dog-whistle to those who would think of themselves as part of an intellectual elite, pretending to understand words that were hollow.

Is he a radical voice ahead of his time, misunderstood because of the profundity of his insight? Or is he a clever ironist, whose appeal to future generations flatters the vanity of self-anointed "deep thinkers," regardless of the actual content? — Banno

The point isn’t whether Nietzsche is right about the status of his work, it’s the very idea that concepts aren’t bits of data and we arent data-processing computers. Interpretation of the sense of particulars is dependent on their role in a wider framework of understanding, which as Wittgenstein shows, is discursively produced. But different discursive communities can’t rely on good will to overcome incoherence in interpretation between groups, even of procedural issues as seemingly benign as the one Williamson discusses.

Williamson finishes by explicitly acknowledging that his own essay does not meet the criteria it advocates.

He couldn't, becasue the essay is not an argument as such, so much as an aesthetic critique. He is showing us again what is beautiful in philosophy, and what isn't.

Despite all the talk of rigour, logic, clarity, and convergence, Williamson’s piece is fundamentally rhetorical: it persuades not by example, but by tone, stance, and value judgment.

Is transparency and clarity enough? We might add a need for responsiveness, a desire to be both understood and to understand. That, too, is a constraint.

But that is an attitude, and so depends on what one wants, on what one is doing here.

What is philosophy for?

That's the question that will decide what you think philosophy is, and how you will do philosophy.

They wanted desperately to be understood, tried every way they could to be understood, but also knew that fundamentally new ways of thinking are not commodities whose communication is guaranteed by use of the right words. — Joshs

Good. That makes Heidegger's hyperbole here a bit suspect, doesn't it?:

precisely this misinterpretation of all my work (e.g., as a “philosophy of existence”) is the best and most lasting protection against the premature using up of what is essential. And it must be so, since immediate effectiveness must remain foreign to all essential thinking, and because such thinking, in its truth, must be prevented from becoming “familiar” and “understandable” to contemporaries.

The bolded statements are kind of criticism-proof, aren't they? Reading them as a literary editor (which I am, partially, IRL) they also seem defensive and self-consoling in the face of lack of acceptance. Why couldn't he just say, "My stuff is hard. It'll take a while," instead of making it a hallmark of "essential thinking" or "genuine philosophy" or whatever?

But human, all too human . . . as are we all.

But different discursive communities can’t rely on good will to overcome incoherence in interpretation between groups — Joshs

Sure. But absent good will, and there is no hope at all.

who would think of themselves — Banno

elite, pretending — Banno

vanity of self-anointed "deep thinkers," — Banno

Isn’t all of that off topic? That’s psychology that can apply to any type of philosopher or non-philosopher.

——-

He is showing us again what is beautiful in philosophy, and what isn't. — Banno

I think he shows what he sees as most beautiful in philosophy, but does not show what isn’t. He just characterizes it as ugly. Maybe that is a function of him not using names for the ugly philosophers.

What is philosophy for?

That's the question that will decide what you think philosophy is, and how you will do philosophy. — Banno

:up:

Still, I was trying to be more conservative and say <If someone's definition of philosophy excludes Socrates and Plato, then it is a bad definition>. — Leontiskos

True. But surely Williamson is proposing no such definition, is he?

I don't think "thinking well" has any need to leave untouched areas of importance. — Leontiskos

Not "has to", no, but might. Not everyone writes about everything, or even thinks about everything.

(Peter Strawson quipped that he would get around to writing about ethics once he was in his dotage, so near the end of his career he wrote a single lovely and extremely influential paper.)

But I should add that your insistence on pulling the object of the verb into your interpretation of the adverb sails right past the distinction I was trying to offer.

It's a somewhat tenuous distinction, but I think if used cautiously it could be useful. There's something about the facts on the ground that almost seems to demand it, and it seems to be a distinction Williamson believes in, so there's that.

I think Heidegger is referring to his distinction between between vorhanden "present at hand" knowledge and zuhanden "ready to hand" wisdom. I see that distinction as being basically similar to the distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how".

So if the vorhanden is that which merely exists in a contextless way (as for example a hammer is merely a configuration of material or materials), the zuhanden is the hammer as a useful tool that exists in a context of nails, timber, building design and construction and so on. The realm of "knowing that" can be seen as a realm of mere factoids, whereas "knowing how" can be seen as the realm of practical wisdom and creativity in general.

Can you take a stab at what you think it means?

That's not crazy and reminds me that when talking about Plato I wanted to point out that changes in technology, and especially in expertise and "know how", are well known as social factors driving the dialogues.

These experts and artisans have a new sort of authority based on their specialized knowledge. Well, what sort of knowledge is that? What kinds of specialized knowledge are there? Can you have special knowledge of wisdom? Of goodness? Etc etc

Can you take a stab at what you think it means? — Janus

Sure will, but probably not tonight, life calls. Appreciate the insight.

True. But surely Williamson's is proposing no such definition, is he? — Srap Tasmaner

No, I don't think so, though I do think he tends to overemphasize the "thinking well" side of the equation. Or perhaps he is focused on a particular kind of "thinking well."

Not "has to", no, but might. Not everyone writes about everything, or even thinks about everything. — Srap Tasmaner

I actually want to say that if someone thinks well about some subject, then their "thinking" can be transposed into other areas. Contrariwise, if their "thinking" cannot be transposed into other areas, then I would doubt that they were truly thinking well about their particular subject. This is vague, but one way it cashes out would be in my claim that someone will improve their own thinking in their own particular field just by reading an excellent philosopher who is speaking to a different field, though they may not know exactly how the improvement came about.

But I should add that your insistence on pulling the object of the verb into your interpretation of the adverb sails right past the distinction I was trying to offer.

It's a somewhat tenuous distinction, but I think if used cautiously it could be useful. — Srap Tasmaner

I definitely doubt how separable they are. I would say that the quality of thinking will naturally correlate to the importance of the object, in much the same way that a beautiful and intelligent man will want to marry a beautiful and intelligent woman. If this is right then a culture which focuses on the highest objects of thought will develop the best ways of thinking. At the same time, a culture's mode of thinking will always be related to the objects it chooses and desires to think, whether these are low or high.

But I will end by highlighting the importance of this, lest we go too far astray:

So I'll give a simple definition of what they were trying to do, which I hope is not controversial: philosophy is thinking well about what it is important to think about. — Srap Tasmaner

That's not crazy and reminds me that when talking about Plato I wanted to point out that changes in technology, and especially in expertise and "know how", are well known as social factors driving the dialogues.

These experts and artisans have a new sort of authority based on their specialized knowledge. Well, what sort of knowledge is that? What kinds of specialized knowledge are there? Can you have special knowledge of wisdom? Of goodness? Etc etc — Srap Tasmaner

I seem to remember that in Aristotle's' understanding phronesis or 'practical wisdom' acquired by artisans in their practices could assist them in understanding the arguments regarding goodness, beauty, justice and so on.

Is there an absolute, context-free wisdom? Most of us here are probably familiar with Socrates' notion of wisdom regarding virtue, goodness, justice etc. consisting in knowing that we do not know. Within some context we may know, in the sense of wisely judge, what is good, virtuous or just, but beyond that...?

in much the same way that a beautiful and intelligent man will want to marry a beautiful and intelligent woman — Leontiskos

Not to be "Mr Woke" but do you want to try another simile here?

I would say that the quality of thinking will naturally correlate to the importance of the object — Leontiskos

Is this to say that the most important objects of thought are only accessible to the best thinking?

I'm having trouble following you throughout. Maybe I get where you're headed, but maybe you have another way you could explain it.

I actually want to say that if someone thinks well about some subject, then their "thinking" can be transposed into other areas. — Leontiskos

Two thoughts. (1) this is almost literally the goal with spending time on logic, but people who work on "logic" are actually mostly people who work on metalogic, which to me is, well, a different thing. And different again from philosophy of logic and from philosophical logic. (2) The other way round is important too, maintaining exposure to other fields or at least subfields, other disciplines and pursuits entirely. (I know I've mentioned this before with chess, the importance of having a broad "chess culture," not being too specialized.)

Thanks J...whenever you are ready. I think life is more important than philosophy. If philosophy cannot help us to live better, then what use can it be beyond being an interesting diversion?

and it seems to be a distinction Williamson believes in, so there's that. — Srap Tasmaner

For my money, Williamson strikes his best chord in the second paragraph on page 10, beginning, "Discipline from..." That is all spot-on, and it is very closely related to ' idea that wisdom must have some determinate content.

Not to be "Mr Woke" but do you want to try another simile here? — Srap Tasmaner

Nope, I don't. Why would I? I am thinking of the male/female synergy, and I see nothing wrong with male/female similes.

Is this to say that the most important objects of thought are only accessible to the best thinking? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, that would follow in its own way.

Maybe I get where you're headed, but maybe you have another way you could explain it. — Srap Tasmaner

So one theorem which flows out of what I said is this: if an analytic philosopher claims that any subject which his analytic philosophy cannot handle is eo ipso unimportant, then his understanding of "thinking well" will be limited and incomplete at best, particularly when such a subject is widely recognized to be important. This is pretty common among analytic philosophers.

(1) this is almost literally the goal with spending time on logic — Srap Tasmaner

That's right, but I actually define logic as the art of thinking or else reasoning well, so I don't think it has a specific object. In fact good logic courses incorporate a lot of translation between formal languages and natural language, and they naturally use examples that are of interest to students. Showing a student that she can reason well about important things is the best way to teach her how to reason. Indeed, if the student does not understand the applicability of logic, then she arguably isn't even learning logic (as opposed to symbol-manipulation).

but people who work on "logic" are actually mostly people who work on metalogic, which to me is, well, a different thing. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree.

(2) The other way round is important too, maintaining exposure to other fields or at least subfields, other disciplines and pursuits entirely. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, and I think that's sort of the same thing. It's something like, "Anyone who thinks well about one thing also thinks well about other things." Or else:

This is vague, but one way it cashes out would be in my claim that someone will improve their own thinking in their own particular field just by reading an excellent philosopher who is speaking to a different field, though they may not know exactly how the improvement came about. — Leontiskos

None of these points would hold if "thinking well" in one field were entirely different and disconnected from "thinking well" in another field.

The bolded statements are kind of criticism-proof, aren't they? Reading them as a literary editor (which I am, partially, IRL) they also seem defensive and self-consoling in the face of lack of acceptance. Why couldn't he just say, "My stuff is hard. It'll take a while," instead of making it a hallmark of "essential thinking" or "genuine philosophy" or whatever — J

You have to appreciate these remarks in the context of Heidegger’s critique of technology. When he says that the “immediate effectiveness must remain foreign to all essential thinking, because such thinking, in its truth, must be prevented from becoming “familiar” and “understandable” to contemporaries”” , he equates the the familiar and immediately effective with the technologizing instrumentalism of empirical science as well as the Cartesian metaphysics that grounds it.Philosophy cannot be the mere putting into practice of a pre-conceived plan.

I think life is more important than philosophy. If philosophy cannot help us to live better, then what use can it be beyond being an interesting diversion? — Janus

We often talk about philosophy as if it’s a single activity. Traditionalists would probably argue that many versions of philosophy aren’t truly philosophical, or are simply dead ends and mistaken paths. One issue with philosophy is that it has no clear starting or end point. It’s an umbrella term for a range of activities and ideas, so disparate and complex, it’s a wonder we have any agreement on this site at all.

To determine whether philosophy helps us live better might amount to a kind of conceptual trap. An infinite regress, even. How can we do this without relying on philosophy to decide what “living better” even means? And even the verb “help” is somewhat ambiguous.

I think of philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom, and the pursuit of wisdom as the attempt to find ways to live better. So, the analytic pursuit of conceptual clarity might help some, and modeling one's life on, or simply gleaning insights from, the Stoics or the Epicureans or the existentialists or the postmodernist or following some religion or other might help others.

I don't think the right way can be determined, if by "right way" is meant " one way for all". Humans are diverse, which means we are left to find our own ways. I don't have much patience for authoritarian or traditionalist thinking, because those modes of thought and their ideologue adherents do inevitably posit one way for all.

So, it is not "philosophy" which we can rely on to determine what living better means but our own individual experience and practice of philosophy―philosophy as such cannot decide anything―it is individuals who must decide for themselves what living better means for them (and not for others) or else blindly follow others if they don't want to or can't make such decisions. The term 'help' may be ambiguous, but surely it is possible for individuals to come to know, even if only via trail and error, what helps, and what hinders, them? Can anyone else decide for you?

Nicely put. I have no real sense what philosophy is for and as far as the average person is concerned, I think we inherit presuppositions, and even our reflections on these are based on sets of presuppositions.

The term 'help' may be ambiguous, but surely it is possible for indivduals to know what helps, and what hinders, them? — Janus

Not sure if that helps. To a Marxist help is going to look very different than to a Randian. I'm not convinced we all inhabit the same world, see the same things, recognise the same barriers or enablers of good practice (for want of a better term).

I am thinking of the male/female synergy — Leontiskos

So thinking being the male and its object being the female?

Metaphorically. Or maybe archetypally.

Anyone who thinks well about one thing also thinks well about other things. — Leontiskos

Another way to say this might be that good thinking is portable, which I think most of us want to believe, but I suspect the evidence there is a little mixed. Right from Socrates we get, "If you want to know about horses, do you ask a physician or a horse breeder?"

Yet another way to put this might be that the good reasoning that went into a good piece of thinking, or the good thinking that went into a good decision, ought to be 'extractable', that you in your field (or life) could learn from someone else doing something else.

And that again relies on a distinction between the movements of a mind and its object. To draw them back together, as you are inclined to do, would be instead to distinguish reason from instrumental rationality, giving to reason not only the expertise in reaching the desired result but something like the 'proper' selection of a goal, or of an object of thought. Instrumental rationality would then be only part of reason, not the whole thing.

Is that close to your view?

Suppose AP never does anything with the questions it raised about the nature of meaning. Will it fall back toward mysterianism? What is the future of philosophy?

Nicely put. I have no real sense what philosophy is for and as far as the average person is concerned, I think we inherit presuppositions, and even our reflections on these are based on sets of presuppositions. — Tom Storm

Thanks, I agree. Studying philosophy is obviously not for everyone. But there is a sense in which everyone practices philosophy, even if they unconsciously adopt presuppositions about how they ought to live. I favour the broadest sense of the term 'philosophy'.

Not sure if that helps. To a Marxist help is going to look very different than to a Randian. I'm not convinced we all inhabit the same world, see the same things, recognise the same barriers or enablers of good practice (for want of a better term). — Tom Storm

Again I agree―but for me both Marxists and Randians are ideologues like the dogmatic religionists just because they posit some old "one way for all". It seems to me we all inhabit the same world in the empirical sense of "world"―but on the other hand beyond that we each inhabit our own worlds, which are microcosms, along with our family, friends, acquaintances, colleagues and so on. We inhabit the world of the Philosophy Forum, for example.

I'm happy to listen to different people's philosophies, but I lose interest when people assert that such and such is so, and then try to back it up with walls of text cut and pasted from some other philosopher or source, as though they believe that constitutes an argument for why everyone should agree on whatever point they are labouring or bias they wish to confirm. On the other hand if they present well-considered arguments, then I'm happy to listen and consider, and then either agree or offer critique. Ideologues always seem to take umbrage at critique.

~~