Obama's diplomatic policy is a deviation from the strategy of trying to contain Iran (by stick and / or carrot) to the extent of preventing development. — boethius

As I noted to Benkei, this is not a change of strategy, but a change of method.

It was never a feasible alternative to the stick, because why would Iran do business with the US (with all the baggage that brings) when it can do business with the Russians and the Chinese on a more or less equal basis, with no strings attached?

In terms of maintaining/re-establishing US primacy, the genocide in Gaza is absolutely terrible policy. — boethius

Obviously this isn't explicitly US strategy, but unwavering support for its proxy Israel is.

Israel is critically vulnerable in more ways than one, so letting Israel ethnically cleanse/commit genocide in Gaza is par for the course at this point.

Does it hurt US credibility? Sure, but what credibility did it have left to begin with?

Apparently no amount of support for genocide is going to make the Europeans or any other key strategic allies second guess their relationship with the US, so in the grand scheme of things it matters little.

If you're of the opinion that US support for the Gaza genocide damaged US interests in a significant way, I expect you to be able to point out those damages.

And the genocide not only doesn't serve US Imperial strategic interest, it doesn't serve Israel's either. — boethius

I disagree somewhat. Israeli genocide provides the US with an exit strategy that practically writes itself. And as you point out, Israel is going to be cut off sooner or later, because the US will no longer want to pay the increasing cost of keeping Israel afloat in its unsustainable situation.

The US is simply milking Israel to the fullest extent before that moment arrives. Which means causing maximum chaos, even if their capacity to sow chaos has significantly decreased.


I think you and Benkei are operating under the erroneous assumption that there's any strategy available that doesn't lose the Middle-East for the US.

We are way, way too far down the line for any salvaging operations.

Every nation in the Middle-East hates their guts. Diplomacy is a fucking pipedream, especially now that Russia and China are offering an alternative.

I was responding to your point that Trump doesn't have a plan. He does. It might be unrealistic, but the plan is to offer Iran goodies to drop their nuclear ambitions. — RogueAI

I do agree that Trump has plans. Many plans, actually. Like "Liberation Day" tariffs, remember? Great plans!

Yet in this occasion it's totally clear that Israel was the initiator and the real actor here, Trump simply responded when initial Israeli strikes went so well.

Would Iran trust us? Doubtful, but there is precedent for the U.S. bribing Iran to drop it's enrichment. Obama did it. What is Iran's alternative, though? They just got punished severely. They got no support from the (civilized) world and even their neighbors turned on them. Top Iranian officials now know Israel can and will take them out. Why not take the bribe the Trump Admin is offering? Isn't enrichment just not worth it at this point? — RogueAI

One thing would be for them to drop the program. Another thing to get Israel to believe the program is dropped.

We should remember all the talk of the "Mushroom cloud" and the "Yellow cake from Niger" when the Bush administration was making the case for war against Iraq after 9/11. Well, Saddam didn't have any nuclear program then. Saddam did have one before he went and invaded Kuwait, yet afterwards he didn't have a program. Yet in the end: that didn't matter. And similar thinking should be applied here too.

First of all, is an Iran that has great relations to it's Arab neighbors the optimum situation for Israel, or is an Iran that still is a "rogue state" that can be bombed every once and a while better? I fear that for Bibi, the war prime minister, the latter is a better option.

Iran can be later bombed again and again.

First of all, is an Iran that has great relations to it's Arab neighbors the optimum situation for Israel, or is an Iran that still is a "rogue state" that can be bombed every once and a while better? I fear that for Bibi, the war prime minister, the latter is a better option. — ssu

Then once Iran has the bomb they can be like "See! See! We were right all along! If only we bombed them harder!"

Then, as you note with North Korea, Iran doesn't strike anyone with nuclear weapons and the issue is forgotten about, but sanctions permanent due to having nuclear weapons.

Then once Iran has the bomb they can be like "See! See! We were right all along! If only we bombed them harder!" — boethius

Exactly. To welcome back Iran to the international community, or at least to accept not attacking it is against the hawkish policy. Even if Iran would want to change it's policies, it's very difficult to change the course of Israeli lead US now.

Then, as you note with North Korea, Iran doesn't strike anyone with nuclear weapons and the issue is forgotten about, but sanctions permanent due to having nuclear weapons. — boethius

Sanctions will be a natural part, but note that's it's only Western sanctions. Iran isn't similar to the Hermit Kingdom (North Korea).

If the MAGA people cheer on how inept and totally useless the UN or other international organizations are, do note that then simply "the South" goes it's own ways. As I've said earlier, we are on track to go to an international order that was present in the 18th Century (as even the 19th Century had functioning international cooperation and organizations).

Agreed.

Sanctions will be a natural part, but note that's it's only Western sanctions. Iran isn't similar to the Hermit Kingdom (North Korea). — ssu

Is North Korea even so isolated now?

My understanding is that by ejecting Russia from the Western trade system they have quickly integrated with all the existing sanctioned countries.

One of the most mind boggling aspects to the Western policy with Russia, that sanctions only work against a small network of countries. Russia isn't small and to even have a chance that sanctions are meaningful would require the rest of the world to go along, not to mention China and India.

If the MAGA people cheer on how inept and totally useless the UN or other international organizations are, do note that then simply "the South" goes it's own ways. As I've said earlier, we are on track to go to an international order that was present in the 18th Century (as even the 19th Century had functioning international cooperation and organizations). — ssu

It's so wild that the US is now attacking institutions it created for its own benefit.

However, I doubt the global south would exit the UN, as it's clearly useful as a forum of diplomacy (especially if Israel stops murdering diplomats). Global South is more focused on creating parallel economic institutions, such as to substitute the IMF.

But do you reference the 18th and 19th century in it's relatively peaceful international relations, such as between European powers not having yet discovered the true power of industrial warfare, or in its ruthless colonial competition aspects? (just with non-European colonial powers competing for resources in this century)

Is North Korea even so isolated now? — boethius

Good point, actually North Korea is the country which is now in a firm defense pact with Russia. The North Korean troops now fighting in Europe show this.

It's so wild that the US is now attacking institutions it created for its own benefit. — boethius

And it's actually the real reason why the Superpower status of the US is waning.

Especially the MAGA-morons don't understand that whole system was designed for the US itself and to especially benefit Americans! But no, the brainfarts of Trump, the great populist orator, have been taken as Holy Scripture and they truly think that all the international organizations are there to fuck Americans. And that international trade is bad. And they don't need that Superpower status, that somehow it isn't useful at all for them.

But do you reference the 18th and 19th century in it's relatively peaceful international relations, such as between European powers not having yet discovered the true power of industrial warfare, or in its ruthless colonial competition aspects? — boethius

18th Century was a mess in Europe. A lot of wars and very unstable alliances. Yes, there wasn't yet industrial warfare, but there were the fighting and the armies roamed, that was total warfare. And so it had been even earlier.

Colonial competition started really in the 19th Century globally as then the technological advantage the West enjoyed was totally overwhelming. It was only Napoleon who first showed European technological superiority to the Ottomans, but do noticed that he was kicked out of Egypt. Only in the 19th Century was the Ottoman Empire "the Sick Man of Europe".

Why “however”? What do you want it to contrast to? — neomac


The use of the word "however" is to to contrast with the fact that parties seeking their own gain at the expense of some collective gain (family, organization, business, institutional, government, country, empire, or what have you) usually don't advertise that, but will present their plan as in the interest of the group. — boethius

In order to talk about “parties seeking their own gain at the expense of some collective gain” one has to establish how collective gain must be assessed. Adopting a normative standard for it. The problem I’m pointing out is that involved parties do not necessarily share the same understanding of collective gain. So before talking about dishonesty one has to discuss about views of national interest.
The fact that accusing government representatives of being dishonest about their claims or policies over national interest, not only suggests (without proving it) one’s own honest and/or non-exploitative attitude toward national interest (how convenient is that for powerless anonymous people whom nobody would hold accountable?), but that there is a shared view on what the national interest is. Unfortunately there are competing views of ”national interest” within a nation (see pro-Ukraine vs pro-Russian views within Ukraine, or pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel views in Israel). And due to these competing views, whatever supporter of any of them can be accused of being self-serving and exploitative. Any propaganda has its counter-propaganda. Besides humans are generally more prone to detect the abuses they suffer from than the ones they inflict on others, and if offense is in the eye of the beholder, nobody can consider themselves immune from such accusations.
What I find peculiar to “national interest” wrt other concepts is that it is inherently subject to a perpetual ideological struggle with moments of greater convergence or divergence. This is what can be said, independently from what ideology one personally espouses or one side one picks.

So, party A pursues B and party C pursues D; however, party C will usually also claim to be pursuing B. — boethius

You mean, C can’t do both, pursuing B and D?
Your formula applies as well to negotiations. A sells bread, C seeks bread. If C tells A: “hey I’m here to buy some bread from you”, is C being deceitful or exploitative toward A because in reality C wants bread, not give money to A?
What is missing in your formula is what you wished to highlight: the deceitful/exploitative part.
Yet also the notion of “exploitation” can be more slippery than it looks at first. See, there are cooperative games where each player can maximise their payoffs by choosing to cooperate instead of refusing to cooperate. Yet the payoffs are unequally distributed among players. Is this enough to claim that the players who get the least are exploited by the ones who get the most? What if we also add that payoffs are not only unequally distributed but also uncertain or unstable over time? What if we also add that understanding of the payoffs and uncertainties, is not shared?

National interest is and can’t be anything else than what results from people’s self-serving interests on a national level AND given certain power relations between them. — neomac

It obviously can. You can easily have a situation where the "certain powerful people" self-serving interest would be to plunder the national treasury and make off with the winnings. This is obviously not in the interest of any sensible concept of "the nation". — boethius

Here some additional clarifications. If “nation” refers to a series of perceived common traits among certain individuals (e.g. shared language, geographic roots, ancestors, historical events, traditions, phenotypical traits, etc.) that supports a sense of collective identity and common fate wrt other nations, then each individual can form a certain understanding of what could be beneficial to the nation as a function of how representative of the nation one perceives himself (with his self-interest) to be and the kind of cooperation he expects to be likely among national fellows (given certain power relations).
Now multiply this by all the members forming a given nation. What you get is the number of views one nation can offer about their “national interest” , and we can’t simply assume they converge to the point of perfectly overlapping. So more or less competing views of national interest will struggle to become popular and politically represented. Hence my point: “‘National interest’ points at something that is the result of collective dynamics however inspired by individual expectations and wishes”. It’s a collective historical process that determines what counts as the national interest de facto, not what any isolated individual has in mind and calls national interest.
That’s where I find your focus on the honesty of powerful people about "national interest" conceptually misleading. Indeed the dishonest or exploitative intent of powerful people doesn’t necessarily compromise the fact that a policy can still be legitimately perceived in line with national interest. There might be reasons independent from the trustability of certain politicians for others to support these politicians' policies. Besides, lacking “moral” scruples in pursuing taking certain decisions and policies can’t be a-priori considered inherently unapt to achieve national interest. It’s very much human the predicament where people understand what needs to be done but lack the courage or the determination to do it, also for alleged “moral” scruples. Any society as the human beings that form it, have its own inertia due to cross-generational habits, entrenched self-serving interests and prejudices which make non-cosmetic change hardly possible for any national government. While dramatic change will likely trigger controversy and any side will invoke "morality" to rationalize their self-serving views (and "populist" views like yours are not immune from such risk either). Besides, a politician can exploitatively promote a policy which he honestly believes detrimental to national interest and yet be mistaken as much as a honest politician can be mistaken about what is beneficial to national interest.
My considerations should be hardly surprising since politicians do not take decisions in a void of collective expectations, lobby pressure, and collaborators’ advice that are integral part of a nation. Even more so where decisional power is institutionally constrained and distributed over a wider network of influential people. And things get even messier when one reasons strategically under uncertainty where the payoffs of political moves by one player are determined how all other players are moving. Also at inter-national level.
Whatever plausible moral hazard one pins on Netanyahu, Hamas leaders, Iranian leaders, Trump, Putin or Zelensky, all powerful and wealthy people, and all trapped in a conflict of interest between personal gains and their political functions, even more so in times of crisis (what unexpected is there really? How else could it be? is there any instance of power in human history immune from such suspects and fears of abuses?), is not this what I find it decisive to assess the alignment of certain decisions and policies with national interest. On the contrary, it can be misleading in making us believe e.g. that if it’s enough to remove Netanyahu, Trump, Putin, Zelensky, current Hamas leaders or Iranian leaders things will change or align better with national interest. Also discrediting them today as national catastrophes won’t preclude them from being revalued in the future as national heroes. See how Putin elevated Stalin as national hero (e.g. wrt Lenin), compared to previous presidents like Khrushchev, Yeltsin or even Medvedev. And how popular this has become amongst Russians now. Perceived national interest evolves.
It’s an entire nation that is historically engaged in determining what national interest is from within and outside pressure. And that’s why I agree with your following statement: “what exactly is the national interest, even for people trying to be genuinely focused on that, is up for debate”. However, it’s not just misinformation or evil intentions which make us debate and speculate over what’s best for national interest. It’s its inherently historical and ideological nature.

As I said you are framing a situation not in terms of competing interests, but in moral terms. This reflects your allegedly “impartial” (or “virtuous”?) interest. Yet your views are exposed to the same “bias” you are accusing others to be victim of or purposefully embracing: namely, viewing national interest in light of your self-interest. Your “populist” views are putatively aligned with those of the mass of powerless nobodies which are victims of the putative abuses of evil elites. — neomac


At this point in the discussion you are interjecting into, the debate with Tzeentch and @Benkei is descriptive of whose interest is even being served by recent policy.

@Tzeentch presents a description of the decision making process as coherent grand strategy since many decades, whereas @Benkei and I disagree the policy changes and decisions in the middle-east represent some sort of coherent US grand strategy over many decades. — boethius

Nice summary. I’m willing to accord Israel (and Ukraine and Europe) more decisional autonomy from US demands/instructions than Tzeench seems willing to concede. And I would even go further than you did: namely, even if the Israeli attacks against Iran ultimately benefits the US grand strategy, or aligns with a certain understanding of it, that wouldn’t prove that the Israeli attacks were due to the US initiative or consent.
My comment is however about something else, on purpose, no matter how tangential it looks to you. Your “descriptive” yet ideologically loaded analysis is based on certain assumptions of what national interest of the US is and how certain political decisions fulfill such national interest (“I disagree with @Tzeentch, I view the genocide in Gaza as absolutely terrible for US Imperial interests”), to then identify intent and later assess responsibility (“My analysis of the current situation is that Zionists "went for it” and tried to push the United States into a high-intensity war with Iran and the faction that stopped that from happening (for now) is the pentagon (because they know it conflicts with US imperial interest, represent far more costs than gains, have other regions they worry about, such as East-Asia)”). As far as I’m concerned, I find nothing philosophically interesting in adopting certain normative standards (e.g. genocide is bad), assess (not describe) if certain actions comply or not with held normative standards (e.g. supporting a genocidal state is bad), and then attribute intentions (e.g. the US can’t possibly have supported a genocidal state, if it wasn’t somehow forced into doing it), and later blame accordingly (e.g. sure the Great Satan is the evilest, but we can’t blame it for the initiative of Israeli’s attacks against Iran) be it in the moral or political domain. You as the others are engaging in a political debate and wish to be representative of certain political views, possibly contribute to amplify them and make them more influential (I don’t care how honestly). Good luck with that.
That’s the gist of politics and propaganda not philosophy, though. My engagement in political debates in this philosophy forum is finalised to do philosophy no to fix the world. The philosophical task, as I understand and enjoy it, is engaging in conceptual investigations. Hence my focus on the notion of “national interest” to challenge views like yours.

So, basically the 12-Day War has turned out as a complete disaster for the United States and especially for Israel.

Neither of two possible goals (regime change and destruction of Iran's nuclear program) were achieved. In fact the war has made it more likely that in the long-term Iran's regime will survive and that it will get its hands on nuclear weapons.

The fact that the Iranian regime was able to survive the attempted decapitation strike has signaled to Russia and China that Iran is a safe investment - something which was entirely up for debate prior to the 12-Day War due to the questionable nature of Iran's internal security. Simultaneously, this war has pushed Iran further into the arms of Russia and China - a process which historically they have been weary of, but are now likely to fully embrace.

In terms of nuclear weapons, the war has prompted Iran to end all cooperation with the IAEA (a institution that has now been shown to blatantly spy for the US and Israel, and produce pretenses for their wars whenever it suits them) thus putting any of Iran's future nuclear development programs out of international supervision.
Of course, Iran's incentive to produce nuclear weapons has dramatically increased. That it will actively pursue nuclear armament is virtually a guarantee now, and the limited damage that was done to its nuclear facilities, and its strengthening ties with Russia and China, suggest that it will be able to do so within a relatively short timeframe.

The damage that has been done to the IAEA's credibility is something that will have global consequences for nuclear profliteration.

Meanwhile, Israel was shown to be critically vulnerable even under limited aerial bombardment. Since the country has zero strategic depth and basically only two lifelines (Haifa and Ben Gurion Airport), it was always a matter of time before western technological supremacy would wane and Israel's vulnerability would be exposed.
A couple hundred rockets and drones is all it takes to threaten Israel with economic crisis - all of Israel's enemies will have taken note of this.


When all these factors are taken together, we're looking at a critical defeat for Israel, and that makes for a very dangerous situation going forward.

Speculations abound concerning follow-up attacks that may include nuclear weapons use.

What options do the US and Israel have left? Conventional strikes were clearly shown to fall short of achieving their objectives. A ground invasion is practically unthinkable.

Uncle Sam and his rabid pet monkey Netanyahu are rapidly running out of options.

"The American strike on the three nuclear facilities – at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan – was undoubtedly effective. “Most serious analysts think that the damage of the US strikes was very, very serious, and it’s hard to imagine that Iran still has a credible nuclear weapons programme in place that has somehow eluded intelligence,” said Patrick Wintour.

...

Tehran has seen the regime parade the coffins of the “martyred” military chiefs and nuclear scientists who died in the strikes to state funerals."
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/01/tuesday-briefing-how-weakened-is-iran-after-operation-midnight-hammer-and-where-might-it-go-from-here

Who wouldn't want to work on Iran's nuclear program? You get to be a martyr and a free state funeral.

So, basically the 12-Day War has turned out as a complete disaster for the United States and especially for Israel.

Neither of two possible goals (regime change and destruction of Iran's nuclear program) were achieved. In fact the war has made it more likely that in the long-term Iran's regime will survive and that it will get its hands on nuclear weapons. — Tzeentch

In the long run maybe, yet it wasn't a disaster. Iran isn't parading captured Israeli or US pilots. Nor are there pictures of IDF or USAF/USN aircraft being shot down.

It's like the Patriot missiles during the Gulf War. Back then the technology was still to poor and basically the Patriots didn't hit incoming Scuds at all, but the media portrayed a stellar kill score for the old missiles. And that was enough. The public didn't care about it later when it came to light that the Patriots back then had failed. With these strikes, history will tell us in the future, but then it will be an issue the public doesn't care about.

The real failure is that there is no peace is in sight for Israel and Bibi and the Likud party have basically accepted that. Israel is in a permanent war footing, and it will need similar large scale military operations in the future. And now the US is trusty sidekick for Israel.

And the MAGA-morons are still happy with Trump. The no-new wars in the Middle East will be forgotten and what will be promoted is that Donald Trump is the only President since Reagan that has fought with the Iranians (and selectively even Reagan's successful war, Operation Praying Mantis, will be forgotten).

I'm not looking to get into a semantic discussion about the word 'disaster', but it made a bad situation worse in every conceivable dimension.

The only thing that hasn't happened is for the entire narrative to collapse. People keep on believing the delusions, etc., but that's not actually something that will help the US going forward. Keeping people high on delusions and propaganda has a long-term cost, and all it is achieving is allowing the US to continue a defunct foreign policy.

But honestly I think the worst thing to come out of this, is the image of a weak Israel. It has operated for decades with the knowledge that it needed to maintain an image of invincibility to stave off the myriad enemies it has in the region. It cannot afford to look weak, but now it does, and there's seems to be nothing that can reverse that.

Meanwhile, the US is cutting aid to Ukraine as it worries about its own stockpiles - another signal that the US might not be a position to keep Israel afloat in the future.

The average American genuinely couldn't give a flip. I think that's true of Trump as well. He's just having fun.

The average American can afford to not give a fuck, until they cannot. Geopolitically, the United States is destined to be a sideshow, and that's where it's headed due to its delusional foreign policy that basically turns everyone into enemies.

When the United States reverts to its natural sideshow status, its gigantic national debt will present an obstacle the average American cannot afford to not give a fuck about.

They don't care about that either.

U.S. is the richest country in the world, with a GDP of $27 trillion. Who do you think is going to pass them up and when?

They'll care as soon as they understand what it actually means.

They'll care as soon as they understand what it actually means — Tzeentch

I doubt it.

Neither of two possible goals (regime change and destruction of Iran's nuclear program) were achieved. In fact the war has made it more likely that in the long-term Iran's regime will survive and that it will get its hands on nuclear weapons. — Tzeentch

:100:

The only thing that hasn't happened is for the entire narrative to collapse. People keep on believing the delusions, etc., but that's not actually something that will help the US going forward. Keeping people high on delusions and propaganda has a long-term cost, and all it is achieving is allowing the US to continue a defunct foreign policy. — Tzeentch

You are right. If US Middle East policy is looked on the long run, it really has been a train wreck. But people just don't think about it. Yet when you went from having CENTO, having nearly all the major regional players as your allies to then having "Twin Pillars" (of Saudi-Arabia and Iran) and then to the present, it's obvious that things have gotten just worse.

South East Asia shows how actually things can improve. The US has now ties with Vietnam. The Korean Peninsula is rather stable. It isn't involved in a shooting war in the area. Now it doesn't have such an alliance system as it has in Europe (SEATO simply failed), but the region is rather peaceful (apart of Myanmar).

The fact is that domestic politics overrides conventional foreign policy for the US especially when it comes to Israel. And Bibi understands this well, I'd consider him the only case of politician that can operate in the political realm of two countries.

If US Middle East policy is looked on the long run, it really has been a train wreck. — ssu

I wouldn't quite agree.

To make such a statement, one must first understand what the principal US goals have been in the Middle-East. In my view, it is first and foremost about securing access to cheap oil and denying stable land-based access to others (like Russia, China and India). Second, it has been to avoid any regional competitor to Israel from rising. (Note the role Iran plays in both of these)

This policy has been remarkably successful for decades. The US completely dominated the Middle-East, and successfully laid waste to the region at will.

What has changed today is the geopolitical balance of power. It's not US Middle-East policy that has ran its course; it's the US empire that has ran its course.

The US is now clearly struggling to continue achieving these two goals, and that situation looks like it will only be getting worse. That's why this long-time policy is now defunct.

The problem I have with the way you seem to frame it is probably best summarized by the following play on a well-known axiom: "Do not attribute to ignorance that which is clearly the product of malice."

You are right. If US Middle East policy is looked on the long run, it really has been a train wreck — ssu

The Middle East has been fucked up since the British ruled it. The US has not returned it to a state of organic ease and well being, but all they wanted was oil, right?

Due to fracking, the US could probably meet it's own energy needs now

To make such a statement, one must first understand what the principal US goals have been in the Middle-East. In my view, it is first and foremost about securing access to cheap oil and denying stable land-based access to others (like Russia, China and India). Second, it has been to avoid any regional competitor to Israel from rising. (Note the role Iran plays in both of these) — Tzeentch

If your previous allies turn into your enemies, how do you think that would be a success of any kind?

This policy has been remarkably successful for decades. The US completely dominated the Middle-East, and successfully laid waste to the region at will. — Tzeentch

Bullshit. Laying waste to a region isn't anything successful. Having something like the occupation of Iraq isn't a success. US has now fought several wars in the region. It's simply a huge waste of money as the region is as volatile as before.

Having Western Europe in NATO and peaceful is what success looks like.

Just compare the UK and Saudi-Arabia as allies to the US. Which country is the US afraid of if there would be a revolution and the current regime would be ousted and a hostile to the US regime could get into power? Or how about Egypt? What if the Muslim Brotherhood takes power or an even more radical cabal takes over? How friendly are now the ties with the US and Iraq?

(Anti-US demonstration in Iraq in 2020)

The Middle East has been fucked up since the British ruled it. The US has not returned it to a state of organic ease and well being, but all they wanted was oil, right? — frank

Don't forget the French. Thanks to technological advances like fracking, the US isn't dependent on the Middle East anymore. So what's really the point?

So what's really the point? — ssu

Trump is having fun. His advisors tell him stuff, he expounds his great wisdom to them. They say, ok. He's the commander in chief. I get that some people expect there to be more to it than that, like grand purposes, grievous failure of some continuous long-term policy. Nothing will convince them otherwise because they have a worldview that says things somehow make sense. There's a plan. There is meaning. It's not wasted breath to vent your hatred of the USA.

By the way, did you see the video I posted in the news thread about Elvira Bary's take on Russia? I guess I knew some of the things she was saying, but I was still a little shocked at the way she put it together. She says there's an underlying current of thought in Russia that says it needs to be an empire in order to survive. It's not just about being big shots, it's that the west will eat them up if they aren't strong enough. It's strange how differently people see things when we're all attached to the same rock flying through space.

The Middle East has always been "fucked up." To pin it on the Europeans might be politically correct, but it's not accurate. Those living in the area possess agency and are perfectly capable of "fucking it up" themselves.

Europeans do get into trouble when they project their notions onto the Middle East and insist that the region submit to their impositions.

If your previous allies turn into your enemies, how do you think that would be a success of any kind? — ssu

It's irrelvant. US power in the Middle-East would be waning anyway as a result of the shifting balance of power, but the key here is that none of those enemies are capable of inflicting a real cost upon the US.

The US will retreat to its island, and it will leave other nations to deal with the fallout - in this case Israel. Some day it will be Europe.

This is a well-established pattern in US foreign policy, and they wouldn't be repeating it ad nauseam if it weren't so wildly effective.

It's not wasted breath to vent your hatred of the USA. — frank

I don't have a hatred towards the US. The US has had a great foreign policy in the long run in Europe. When other countries voluntarily join your alliance, do want keep in it, and look for the US for leadership, that is true success.

But in the Middle East, two former ally countries of the US became it's enemies (Iran, Iraq), which the other one the US invaded (Iraq), and with a third country (Pakistan) the relations are now non-existent and nearly hostile, which can be seen from the crucial role Pakistan had in the Taleban defeating the US backed regime, which meant that the US lost the longest war it had fought.

Why do you say that above is this astounding remarkable success or "a well-established pattern"? It's not my hatred of the US that I "vent" this. It's simply the truth. Losing wars like in Afghanistan isn't what the US would want to happen.

Perhaps for Trump the Middle East with the Gulf States brazenly and openly giving bribes to him is what he is indeed the place that he is exited about. That Western democracies don't do this and cannot do this perhaps makes him irritated. Why this would be a good thing I don't know.

It's irrelvant. — Tzeentch

It's not irrelevant.

How did the Warsaw Pact countries then show their gratitude towards Russia after being former "allies" of the Soviet Union? Of course, these countries were no "allies" like NATO members are as the basic objective for the Warsaw Pact to exist was to reinforce the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. And in this role the Warsaw Pact acted very well in 1956 and in 1968. So them joining NATO when they had the opportunity just shows this. Putin's disastrous policies afterwards have just shown they were 100% correct and invading neighboring countries has just reinforced other European countries to see what kind of a danger Russia is.

US power in the Middle-East would be waning anyway as a result of the shifting balance of power, but the key here is that none of those enemies are capable of inflicting a real cost upon the US. — Tzeentch

The Taleban couldn't inflict a real cost upon the US, but it won the war and the US lost, just like in Vietnam. That's a fact. My basic reasoning here: when you have to bomb a country, you have already lost a lot, namely peace. Being in a dominant position and having peace is the true measure of success.

If you have to bomb, occupy countries and there is true resentment of your occupation (like in Iraq), that's not success. It isn't the worst defeat, but it surely isn't success. All I'm saying is that this train wreck cannot be described as an success in any way.

All I'm saying is that this train wreck cannot be described as an success in any way. — ssu

US Middle-East policy has been incredibly successful for many decades.

Let me list the successes:

- For decades the US successfully prevented regional powers from rising through classic 'divide & rule' strategies, and by destroying any Middle-Eastern country that started showing signs of prosperity and a sense of independence.

- It has successfully controlled Middle-Eastern oil to such an extent that it allowed the US to take the world economy hostage via the petro-dollar.

- It has successfully locked other great powers like Russia, China and India out of stable land-access to the Middle-East (and Africa and Europe, by extension).


You, and many others, are operating under an assumption that the 'forever wars' had some envisioned endpoint of permanent victory. They did not. Talk of 'spreading democracy', etc. was just the figleaf.

Causing chaos and destruction was the whole point - except in those countries that willfully kowtowed before Washington and basically assigned themselves voluntarily to vassal status.


The fact that the strategy no longer works now doesn't mean that it wasn't successful.

If the 12-Day War had succeeded in plunging Iran back into chaos, it would have extended US-Israeli dominance in the region for a long time and we wouldn't even be having this conversation. It would have been another success in a long string of successes.

However, it is specifically the 12-Day War that now heavily suggests that the US is too weak to continue this policy. It's definitely not certain. The US and Israel could be planning follow-up operations for all we know, that might yet succeed.


Calling back to my earlier point of figleafs - the US needs to pretend this wasn't the point all along. All the chaos it has sown in the Middle-East has caused millions of casualties, and to publicly come out and say it was all intentional is unthinkable.

That's why they have to come up with fairytales about spreading democracy and supposedly failling.

I think we're talking past one another. I don't think Trump has any particular policy regarding the middle east.

That Western democracies don't do this and cannot do this perhaps makes him irritated. — ssu

I doubt it. He just does whatever he can get away with, as always.