Seems to me that we can posit clarity as an aesthetic value. As something that we might preference not becasue of what it leads to, but for it's own sake.
Seems Moliere agrees, but perhaps you do not. — Banno
Cheers. See A challenge to Frege on assertion for a bit more, if you are interested. Frege set the force of an utterance aside so that we could look to other aspects of it's structure. As I said there, the "a" inI've heard of the judgement stroke, but no-one has ever explained to me what it does before. Thank you for that. — Ludwig V
Yes, good point. The issue seems to be what Searle called the "sincerity condition", which requires that the speaker genuinely possesses the mental state expressed by the speech act. In this case making an assertion involves the speaker in committing themselves to the mental state of holding what is asserted to be true.All this talk of assertions is making me think about speech acts. — Ludwig V
I'll go along with that. We could fill in the details of how an aesthetic value relates to an obligation, and I'd also agree that we have an obligation to each other to be clear enough to be understood. Taht was part of what is behind @Moliere's thread on aesthetics, I believe.Could we not say that clarity has more than one value? — Ludwig V
Neither do I.I don't know whether Williamson is closer to my view or yours. — Srap Tasmaner
I'm not sure what "without you and I stipulating what an assertion is going to mean" is doing here.So if I merely assert the sentence, without you and I stipulating what an assertion is going to mean, are you able to come to a conclusion about whether I think it's true, or only quite likely to be true? — J
Call it a performative entailment, rather than a logical entailment, if you like. If you assert something that you think is false, or judge to be false, your assertion misfires - it is insincere.Right, that was more or less my point. It's not a logical entailment or something that's true by definition. We have to agree on it. — J
So if I merely assert the sentence, without you and I stipulating what an assertion is going to mean, are you able to come to a conclusion about whether I think it's true, or only quite likely to be true? — J
A mathematical proof is never completely clear - there is always more to be said, more for the mathematician to clarify. — Banno
There is still work being done on ZFC. But there is enough clarity for mathematicians to get on with other questions in the mean time. — Banno
Odd. Seems to me the very point of contention.None of this business about absolute or relative clarity was at issue. — Srap Tasmaner
A goal, at least.Is making things clear, to whatever degree, the goal of mathematics? — Srap Tasmaner
Yep.Great. They have enough clarity to get on with what exactly? Making other parts of mathematics clear? And in the meantime of what? Of making set theory even clearer? — Srap Tasmaner
The trouble is, "What are all things made of?" is not as clear as "What is bread made of?". I'd suggest that progress came from iterating clear questions: "What is φ made of?" - "what is bread made of?"; "What is water made of?"; "what is Hydrogen made of?"; What are protons made of?" And that this has proved more agreeable than just-so-stories about water and fire.My response: Those who jump too quickly to an answer to "what are things made of?" fall; not water, not fire. The doubters have it right: we can intelligibly ask what bread is made of, but not, at least amongst the presocratics, what everything is made of. It is a step too far to ask what things in general are made of. It was exactly by answering questions like "what is bread made of" that we were able to progress towards the broader question. The answerable questions have a large part in this progress. Understanding the nature of grain and water and heat, and how they interact, lead by degrees and indirectly to the questions of chemistry and physics that constitute our present start of play. — Banno
None of this business about absolute or relative clarity was at issue. — Srap Tasmaner
Odd. Seems to me the very point of contention. — Banno
Given two proofs, the clearer is preferred. On that we agree? — Banno
The trouble is, "What are all things made of?" is not as clear as "What is bread made of?". I'd suggest that progress came from iterating clear questions: "What is φ made of?" - "what is bread made of?"; "What is water made of?"; "what is Hydrogen made of?"; What are protons made of?" And that this has proved more agreeable than just-so-stories about water and fire. — Banno
If you assert something that you think is false, or judge to be false, your assertion misfires - it is insincere. — Banno
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term
It seems to me that you are advocating absolute norms while @Moliere (and I) advocate relative or comparative norms. I may be mistaken.Moliere and I were talking about the norms of analytic philosophy, and I don't think either one of us ever mentioned it. — Srap Tasmaner
Yep. There need be no absolute measure. But if you and I agree that this proof is clearer than that, then we might proceed. A comparative measure.I don't think there's a standard measure of how clear a proof is. — Srap Tasmaner
For you, sure. But why shouldn't clarity also be a goal, if not for you, then perhaps for others? And so an aesthetic.My point right here will be that, once again, clarity is a means, not the goal. — Srap Tasmaner
And hence analytic philosophy... dissection over discourse.This used to be called "analysis".) — Srap Tasmaner
Why are the only alternatives "true" or "false" — J
But this is not what is being pointed out. Someone might go ahead and assert that the cat is on the mat despite it being blatantly obvious that the cat is not on the mat. What we are entitled to conclude from their assertion is not that the cat is on the mat, but that they hold it to be the case that the cat is on the mat, provided we take them as sincere.Why must we insist that the only sincere use of "to assert" is in a case when we believe there is no possibility whatsoever that the sentence is false? — J
Teleology.The aim of philosophy...
My point right here will be that, once again, clarity is a means, not the goal. — Srap Tasmaner
For you, sure. But why shouldn't clarity also be a goal, if not for you, then perhaps for others? And so an aesthetic. — Banno
This is where my view is at odds with that of Williamson. I am on the side of the doubters at the philosophy conference in Presocratic Greece, rejecting the discourse of Thales and Anaximander in favour of dissecting the bread. — Banno
Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e., these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. One then simply says something like: "That's how it must be."
The advantage of the question What is bread made of?" is that there is a pathway to answering the question, that we might well answer the question. You have the answer when you can make bread.
Seems pretty direct. — Banno
Yes. There are two points that one can make to articulate the difference. The first is that the relationship is what is called "defeasible". That means that sometimes, in particular cases, there is that evidence that the speaker is lying, or joking, or intends the statement ironically or sarcastically. In those cases, the link is broken. The second is that it helps to think of an assertion as what is called a speech act, and the link with "X judged that..." or "X believes that..." is part of what is done when one asserts - one gives the audience a basis for recognizing that I have judged, or that I believe. That would be, I believe, an example of illocutionary force.Right, that was more or less my point. It's not a logical entailment or something that's true by definition. We have to agree on it. — J
So the moral of the story is: don't ask questions you don't already know how to answer, or don't just already have the answer to. — Srap Tasmaner
Well, there is the possibility of working out how to answer a question, if you don't know. But it will help to answer the questions you do know how to answer, and approach the big question through them.More like: Look for questions that look answerable, or at least for which you have some way of recognising the answer. — Banno
It may help here to steal an idea from the study of the arts. There, you don't get an answer to the question what makes some novels or pictures, etc. better than others. What you do get is a collection of examples which have been widely accepted as good examples. The expectation is that you will not be limited to imitating them (although that might be a useful exercise). The expectation is that students will be enabled to create new work by developing a critical judgement from those examples. The examples are collectively known as the canon."Professor Banno, can you please explain what makes some conceptualizations and systemizations of our language better than others?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm inclined to think that some concept rather like that of the proposition, as usually understood in philosophy, may be useful or even necessary. But I'm also inclinded to think that a definition along the lines of "a proposition is a sentence with its use" has potential. So maybe it will help if I try to disentangle what I think it wrong with the usual understanding.They're not. The point is that the scope of the "⊢" takes in all the propositions, so as to maintain extensionality - and this is so whether we understand "⊢" as "It is true..." or as "I judge..." or as "perhaps..." or even "quite likely...". — Banno
The grammar here slips. One can't say a non-linguistic thing. It is true that there is a collection of sentences that say that the cat is on the mat in diffferent ways. I deliberately do not say the same thing, because actual synonymy is very rare in natural languages, so "the same thing" is not appropriate. Compare the argument that because there are many shades of red, there must be something in common - the universal. But the universal is a metaphysical object and so nominalism is born. I repeat - all we need is a collection of sentences that say that the cat is on the mat in different ways.Proponents of propositions hold that, speaking strictly, when speakers say the same thing by means of different declarative sentences, there is some (non-linguistic) thing, a proposition, that each has said.
I really don't see why one should not say that a declarative sentence is true or false. Natural language has a commonplace variation of this - "It is true that the cat whose name is Jack is on the mat". I think we can manage with that and the variant of nominalism I outlined above.A declarative sentence is true or false derivatively, in virtue of expressing (in the context in which it is uttered....) a true or false proposition.
I'm afraid I think there is a lot to be said for Aristotle's hierarchy of purposes and actions done for their own sake. But not for his idea that there is only one such hierarchy, topped off by The Good. Ryle makes use of the former idea quite unself-consciously. Peters famously builds the latter idea into his philosophy of education.So today, to speak of ends in the Aristotelian sense is to reinvigorate a discredited metaphysical picture. Best left alone, unless one explicitly defends that framework. As, indeed, some do. — Banno
Um - forgive me. But that's what I call a sentence; I would say that when it is used - to tell someone where the cat is, for example, - it becomes a statement in that context. However, I've learnt the philosophical dialect and so I know what you mean, in one sense. However, the SEP article seems to want to say that a proposition is what is in common between a number of sentences or statements. That's what I don't get.:up: If you note the part I bolded, that's what we call a proposition — frank
↪Count Timothy von Icarus
My classes did not begin with broad statements of what metaphysics is, but proceeded by doing metaphysics, self consciously, examining what we did as we proceeded.
Becasue we do not start with a definition—we start in the middle. We do not start with a definition becasue we are not only teaching a body of beliefs, but also providing a set of tools.
Nice rhetorical move on your part. — Banno
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