Oh, that's very good.

So we have a transcendental argument in Kant, something like: The only way we could make judgements is if we have a unified objective experience; we make judgements; therefor our objective experience must be unified; hence the "I" in "I judge...". (An outline of the argument only; we might spare ourselves detailed exegesis if we mutually accept that there will be variations and things to finesse, rathe than go in to detail?)

And that might well bypass my reservations concerning private language. I'll give it some more thought.

The other thread hanging loose here is Davidson. he might be more problematic. Kant's argument assumes a separation between world and thought that Davidson might well have rejected. For Davidson the world is not the manifold of intuition against which we have experiences - that would both be too individual, and involve a separation of world and word, a notion of an uninterpreted world of which we can make no sense. Rather than "I Think..." as the only option in the transcendental argument, Davidson would reject a transcendental subject, having instead a triangulation between belief, world and meaning.

My apologies if that is not so clear. Kant is not my area. I'm suggesting in effect that Davidson might deny the first leg of the transcendental argument, that the only way we could make judgements is if we have a unified objective experience, and say instead that our judgements arise from the interplay of our experiences and beliefs, together with our place in a community of language practice.

Anyway, that'll do for now.

I think Williamson wishes to describe something like an experimental approach to philosophy, and that's what his whole competition between theories business is meant to be. Is it really similar to how science does this? If it's not, does it still make sense? — Srap Tasmaner

If you look at his chosen example, the answer must be yes. But his list of things that might/do discipline philosophy is varied, so I don't think he wants empirical data as a universal constraint. Empirical philosophy has been around for a while now, I think. I've seen some interesting work. Not sure.

Same boat here with academic presses, but do you have interlibrary loan? My public library got me the Rodl book and let me keep it for months. — J

The short answer is No. Inter-library loand is available in the universities and similar institutions. I don't have access to them any longer. It was available in public libraries some years ago. But, alas, no longer.

We might do something similar with progress and clarity. If we agree that there has been progress, then what more do we need? If we agree that there is clarity, what more do we need? And if we disagree, then at the least we can agree that we disagree - we might agree that you think some idea clear while i disagree, That I think progress is being made while you do not. — Banno

There is much to be said for this.
On clarity, I agree that clarity that no-one perceives as clarity seems something of a self-contradiction. However, Dodgson's article on Achilles and the tortoise seems to show that there are limits to the explanations that can be given to clarify an argument - and some of Wittgenstein's remarks point to the same conclusion. Something needs to be said about that. I'm also impressed by the fact that people can think that something is perfectly clear and yet be persuaded by argument that that is not the case. Perhaps Euclid's parallel postulate is an example.
Well, yes, it does seem that progress that doesn't look like progress to people is again, self-contradicting. But see next comment.

That framing imports a teleological structure into the practice, as if its value or identity depended on a fixed aim or destination. But metaphysics, as I understand and teach it, is not defined by its conclusion—it’s revealed in the doing. We start in the middle: with questions, distinctions, and confusions—not with a final cause or overarching purpose. — Banno

I agree with you on two counts. First, it seems to me obvious that most academic disciplines do not have a fixed aim or destination. Each new development immediately becomes the ground from which the next new development will come and the criteria of success are changed so that progress can be claimed. The history of physics shows this in operation. There is no necessary end or conclusion that would enable people to say that the job is now done.
But if the next step is revealed in the doing, what are the criteria that enable us to classify the next step as progress? In the case of physics, there are some criteria that enable us to make that judgement. In the case of the arts, not so much - though of course each new step is accompanied with exactly that claim. For example, each new fashion seems better than the last, but can we really identify progress here? (The abolition of high heels would be progress, but more in public health than fashion as such.)
However, there is one criterion that might work. What counts as good and appropriate in one set of circumstances may become a burden and a hindrance when things change. Adaptation to new circumstances may be the kind of criterion one looks for. But that is not improvement that accumulates, so only provides a local criterion for progress, not a global one.

Why not? — Banno

Because you keep saying best. We all do.

If one is better than the other, then one is best.

You don’t see ‘better’ until you see ‘best’.

You know a light switch with a dimmer on it. When the dimmer is all the way down the light is off and when the dimmer is all of the way up the light is brightest; and in between the light is dim. You seem to be saying that the light is always dim to one degree or another. I agree with that in one sense, because when the light is off we don’t have absolute darkness and when the light is brightest the whole world is not full of light. But in another sense, when the light is dim, it is still on. So if you compare a dimmer to a simple on/off switch, a dim light is on. You don’t have ‘dim’ absent ‘on versus off’.

You don’t have ‘better’ absent ‘best’. It doesn’t mean we have the ontological ‘best’ in our hands. Like when the dimmer switch is brightest we don’t have a world full of light. But we would never know there was more and that we were somewhere in the middle if we did not have the concept of the superlative metaphysically. Which highlights that ‘better than’ is also a metaphysical theory not an ontological thing in hand.

We could throw away all use for ‘better than’ if you want (doubt we could get through a day of speaking with others without it), but if we want to use ‘better’ we are using ‘best’.

You don’t see ‘better’ until you see ‘best’. — Fire Ologist

I don't think this can be right, at least not across the board.

I assert that the Beatles were a better band than Gerry and the Pacemakers.

I can make my case, we can discuss, and no one will be in any serious doubt what we're talking about -- whether one was better than the other, musically.

Does this mean we know what "the best band" means? Hardly. It doesn't mean anything, as far as I can tell.

There's an equivocation here between "best" as a conceptual or metaphysical endpoint -- this is what I'm claiming we don't know, or even understand, in the musical example -- and "best" as "out of X number of choices, the top choice." Sure, we can call that "best" if we want to, but it's tangential to what we're interested in, here in this thread, I think. Here, we're surely asking into "best" as a kind of telos, optimum, or endpoint.

Human rational judgement, including, paradigmatically, empirical judgement, may have truth as its formal aim. This formal aim is being acknowledged in the explicit claim "I think P" whereby one locates one's act in the space of reasons (i.e. within the public game of giving and asking for reasons). — Pierre-Normand

Good, and likewise your subsequent formulation in terms of shared mental representations, rather than a strictly individual/psychological construal.

acts of receptivity (intuitions) and acts of spontaneity (concepts) always must be involved together in contentful acts of judgement. ("Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.") — Pierre-Normand

Yes. Though we can always raise the question, concerning Kant, of whether a thought without content is even possible. (An intuition without a concept is possible -- though, as the motto says, we can see nothing with it.) This doubt might have interesting implications for Rödl's version as well.

Rödl usefully stresses the fact that one expressing what it is that one believes regarding any proposition P isn't a separate act from the one involved in making up one's mind regarding the truth of P. — Pierre-Normand

Would you agree that Rödl also wants to call to our attention that "making up one's mind" is necessarily 1st personal? That there is no objective form of this?

the need for acts of representation to be internal to the sphere of the conceptual, while public discourse also is internal to that sphere and must hence also be answerable to what it is that "we" think. — Pierre-Normand

We could say: The act of representation brings 1st personal experience into the Space of Reasons. We could even continue the Kantian parallel and say that our subjective life is "heteronomous," while the Space of Reasons allows us to enter as "autonomous" individuals, under the law of reasons rather than causes, just as Kant claimed in the moral sphere. The place to keep pressing, here, is how to fill out "subjective life" -- to what extent must this refer to intersubjectivity? And how far would Rödl buy in? His "absolute idealism" could be taken as strictly, individually determined, could it not? He might not desire this reading, but what prevents it?

What makes the expression of those commitments warrant the use of the first-personal pronoun in "I think" just is the fact that we each are individually responsible for our own moves. — Pierre-Normand

Well, yeah, but Rödl is "continental" enough to be saying something in addition. I think he wants a phenomenological reading as well. He's reminding us that "I think" is something that happens. It's not merely a formal term. The Space of Reasons, the "moves in a game" -- none of this can occur without me, without us. And we don't just posit this stuff, we actually experience it. In order for me to say, "I think 'The cat is on the mat'", I am first saying something about an event that occurred at time T1. There was a previous time during which I did not have this thought -- or, if you prefer verbs, that I did not think that the cat was on the mat -- then came a time when I did. Now, as result, I can offer "I think 'The cat is on the mat'" in an entirely different way. It's no longer merely a report of a psychological event at time T1; I can now, if I like, assert it. Rödl is rightly bothered by the idea that there could be assertion without this background story.

Rather than "I Think..." as the only option in the transcendental argument, Davidson would reject a transcendental subject, having instead a triangulation between belief, world and meaning. — Banno

Yes, good. And I can imagine Rödl being frustrated with this, because of how thoroughly it leaves out the 1st person, whether construed as singular or plural.

Now we should pursue @Pierre-Normand's attempt to link this back to the "what is the aim of philosophy" question.

There's an equivocation here between "best" as a conceptual or metaphysical endpoint -- this is what I'm claiming we don't know, or even understand, in the musical example -- and "best" as "out of X number of choices, the top choice." — J

I think I agree there is an equivocation, but it is between ontological (like physical/actual) objects, and their grouping (language-ifying/metaphysical-izing) as choices and comparing them against the best-worst measuring stick. Calling Beatles the best in a Battle of the Bands with Gerry and the Pacemakers, or calling them better than…both equally understand “best” as “better than” and so both equally use “best” when speaking about the two bands as a grouping.

I am starting to see Banno is right to avoid references to the ontological “best” out there somewhere, but I am right to avoid agreeing we can compare or speak about objects without an understanding of ideals and superlatives.

Banno said “one thing is better”. One ultimate thing among some group? That is an absolute best - same thing. ‘Better than’ means ‘best of’ - same thing - so ‘the best’ is metaphysically there when we speak about comparisons of what is ontologically there.

I am right to avoid agreeing we can compare or speak about objects without an understanding of ideals and superlatives. — Fire Ologist

Ah, and this can be given a good, sensible construal. Let me paraphrase and see if you agree:

We can't compare items in terms of qualities they may share unequally without 1) understanding that there indeed may be an ideal amount/kind/degree of said qualities, even if we don't know what it is; and 2) understanding how to use superlatives.

We can't compare items in terms of qualities they may share unequally without 1) understanding that there indeed may be an ideal amount/kind/degree of said qualities, even if we don't know what it is; and 2) understanding how to use superlatives. — J

I think I am saying for 1 that we show an understanding that there indeed IS an ideal.

So this sounds ontological - like some platonic form of the ideal is out there for us to grab and make a measuring stick. I think I am tabling the ontological question. How an ideal exists, I don’t know. But as soon as I say “this thing is better than that thing”, I am admitting into the world the presence of an ideal I am talking about. So maybe the ontological reality of the “best” thing is me saying “best” - my mind IS Plato’s universe of the forms.

But regardless of all that speculation, I don’t get past the “better than” starting line without simultaneously getting past the “best” starting line. “Better than” doesn’t work, has no use, means nothing, without the baggage (or bonus) of “best”.

I think I am saying for 1 that we show an understanding that there indeed IS an ideal. — Fire Ologist

Well, but tie that back to the Battle of the Bands. Aren't you saying that we can't compare the two bands meaningfully without a commitment to there being an ideal "best band"? I'm not worried about the ontological or Platonic aspects here; I just don't know how to make sense of it. Can you sketch a use of "best" here that captures your meaning? Doesn't it just collapse back to that other sense of "best" which simply references "top choice out of X choices"?

“Better than” doesn’t work, has no use, means nothing, without the baggage (or bonus) of “best”. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that's the question under discussion. Don't draw a line under it yet! We're just getting started. :smile:

Yes, that's the question under discussion. Don't draw a line under it yet! We're just getting started. :smile: — J

I agree. What I am saying isn’t crystal clear to me.

I need to think on the Battle of the Bands analogy to directly address it and will get back. I think I’m saying the sense of ‘best’ that is collapsed into the ‘better of choices’ is the same and only ‘best’ there ever is. We don’t have to reify anything discreet between ‘better than’ and ‘best’ once we set a limit (meaning we limit the world to two bands, and the one that is better becomes the one that is best); if there were 4 bands, one would be worst, another better, another better still, and one would be best, but none of that analysis happens without some standard (ideal) measuring stick that must have worst and best on it at the very least.

Or go back to my light switch analogy. On/off represent the superlative ideals. Dim represents where we live in the middle. If we call everything in the middle some level of dim, the light has to be on at all before it is dim. The on-ness of the light, is the best-ness of the better-than.

Rather than "I Think..." as the only option in the transcendental argument, Davidson would reject a transcendental subject, having instead a triangulation between belief, world and meaning. — Banno

Excellent comparisons, all around.

A question popped to my mind on this just now: How would Davidson distinguish "belief" from "I think..." ?

Something that comes to mind for me is that we could reconcile their epistemologies, at least, by noting how language and world are always-already interpreted, much like the categories shape our experiences. Furthermore for Kant these are supposed to be universally applicable "rules" such that all thinkers will share the categories. That'd be meaning. "The world" would just be what we refer to in speaking to one another, or the intuition for Kant.

But I gather there really is supposed to be one world, at the end of the day. "The noumenal" could just as well be read as the "nonsensical", perhaps.


Also @Srap Tasmaner -- Kant might be more of an ally to Williamson than I had first thought. His whole thing is trying to discover the scientific basis of metaphysics, but only to conclude agnostically on the subject. It seems Williamson is open to the possibility of a science of philosophy, at least, if not metaphysics so the idea which Kant presents -- that a philosopher can state the boundaries of reason in a clear enough manner so as to be able to distinguish when reason has gone too far, and it's only a matter of doing philosophy to state these limits -- that seems to get along with the idea of trying to do better.

The difference would be in style -- rather than the Magnum Opus from a genius it seems like Williamson would adopt the more modern scientific approach of distributed cognition through shared practices.

None of this is news, but what interested me is that science doesn't really begin by saying subject over here, object over there; it begins by deliberately submitting to being acted upon, in a controlled way, and separating its work into being-acted-upon and not-being-acted-upon. — Srap Tasmaner

Good posts. :up:

Part of the difficulty here is that "science" is poorly defined, as was shown in <this thread>. I think what you mean by "science" here is something like, "studying how something works."

Here's where I thought to start, with the self-image of a toy version of science: in order to study and theorize the laws of nature, science breaks itself into one part that is by design subject to those laws, and another that is not. (There's a problem with this we'll get to, but it's not where you start.)

What I mean by that is simply that the data a scientist wants is generated by the operation of the laws of nature in action. You can observe events where those laws are operative; you can also conduct experiments to try to isolate specific effects, which you then observe. But the whole point of an experiment is to submit some apparatus or material to the forces of nature so that you can see what happens. This part of the work of science deliberately submits itself to nature at work. — Srap Tasmaner

Does science want to see what happens? Or does it want to understand laws (or principles)? I would say that the scientist is only doing the experiment in order to understand the laws or principles at work. That's the endgame (and that is one way of cashing out the knowledge vs. wisdom distinction).

So let's come back to this:

it begins by deliberately submitting to being acted upon, in a controlled way, and separating its work into being-acted-upon and not-being-acted-upon. — Srap Tasmaner

Part of what you are saying is, "Science separates its work into being-acted-upon and not-being-acted-upon." I would say that such a claim requires clarification, given that you are sneaking in two entirely different subjects. What is being-acted-upon (i.e. what is the patient)? It is the thing being studied, such as the falling weight or else the law of gravity (i.e. the falling weight is being acted upon by gravity, and gravity is being acted upon by the mind of the scientist). What is not-being-acted-upon? It is the scientist. So here there is an equivocation of subject, which is precisely why your claim is not yet plausible, "science doesn't really begin by saying subject over here, object over there." Everything you say seems to presuppose, "subject over here, object over there."

The real kicker is that the nature of the rational subject is always a difficult subject (and we should think here about Frege's judgment stroke, Medieval debates over universals and whether intellect is universal or individual, the "view from nowhere," etc.). "Science" wishes to treat the rational subject in a precritical way, but that turns out to be impossible.

science breaks itself into one part that is by design subject to those laws, and another that is not. — Srap Tasmaner

I would agree in saying that science divides itself into two parts. This all has to do with act and potency. In one way the scientist views the falling weight as (patient) being acted upon by a law which he will eventually give the name "gravity." In another way the philosopher-scientist views the whole sequence as (patient) being acted upon by his own mind, which through the operation of abstraction recognizes the law of gravity. So the law of gravity "moves" the falling weight, and these "two" things "move" the scientist's mind to the formulation of the theory. But what is crucial for Aristotle is that the scientist's mind is not unmoved or unsubjected, as you claim. His mind is affected by the the experiment, but that is incidental given that he constructed the experiment and willingly subjected his mind to it. What is more interesting is that his mind, rather than being unmoved or unsubjected, is self-moving. The scientist is able to direct and move himself, and particularly his mind.

Of course you are correct that if we merely consider gravity as the agent, then within the imaginary of the experiment the scientist takes the weight to be moved by gravity, but not his own mind. This is closely related to Bob Ross' recent thread on the immateriality of the intellect, and specifically the idea that there is a sense in which the intellect moves all corporeal things without being moved itself in the same manner. More simply, the scientist's presumption is that gravity affects the weight but it does not affect his own mind, and therefore his mind can act upon and understand the law of gravity without being self-recursively entangled in the explanation.

Finally onto logic:

Now what about philosophy?

Can it achieve this sort of self-division? Must it do so to achieve the same rigor as science? (Or can it be just as rigorous without doing so?)

--- I spent a few pages trying to answer these questions, but it was a mess, so here's just a couple obvious points:

1. If you think philosophy (or logic) studies the laws of thought or of reason, you're unlikely to think any of your work needs to separate itself from those laws

2. If you think philosophy studies norms of thought and behavior, neither making your work subject to the specific norms you're studying nor making it subject to different norms seems obviously satisfactory. Both present problems. — Srap Tasmaner

Aristotle would argue that nothing can be both agent and patient simultaneously and in the same way (i.e. both mover and moved - acting-upon and being-acted-upon). For example, this would mean that (1) is incoherent insofar as it takes itself to be studying what at the same time it takes for granted. To study the laws of logic with the laws of logic looks to be a form of petitio principii.

Rather than belabor this post, I will just nod to @Count Timothy von Icarus who has written recently on intellection and ratiocination. I would take all of this in the direction of Plato's divided line. In a univocal sense, logic cannot study logic. What is needed is nested hierarchy. Logic cannot study logic, but intellectus can study ratiocination. Other thinkers will posit higher levels within the hierarchy, and say, for example, that nous can study intellection (although the word "study" is at this point becoming strained, given that it connotes ratiocination). This is why Platonism unifies in a sort of static fullness, which many of us have experienced in deep states of recollection, and from which flows a remarkable amount of intellectual fecundity. This is also why Aristotle places contemplation at the highest place.

(More simply, what Banno can only take as an axiom, others believe can be grasped as true. This is also why Frege eludes Banno with his syncategorematic judgment stroke. The univocal logician cannot even recognize Frege's motive for such a thing, much less the thing itself.)

I'll just observe that we know more or less exactly why this happens at quantum scale — Srap Tasmaner

That seems unlikely to me. The recent discussions on quantum foam are on point.

I was using the turnstile as a shorthand for Frege's judgement stroke, so read "⊢⊢the cat is on the mat" as "I think that I think..." or "I think that I judge..." or whatever. Not as "...is derivable from..." — Banno

A double judgment-stroke would make no sense for Frege. It is precisely a syncategorematic expression, and therefore cannot be nested in that way.

There's a difference between a standard and an end. — Banno

There is a difference between a standard and an end, and between a goal and an end, but all standards and all goals are ends. Therefore your eschewal of ends is entirely incoherent. This is yet another example of someone who tries to rebut something without understanding it, and another example of someone doing that with Aristotle.

- :up:

Oh, Leon. That's so far from what was actually said. — Banno

Do you see how you evade? Over and over you say, "That's not what I said," but you simultaneously refuse to say what you did say. (Of course it is precisely what you implied <here>, hence my "if" which you simply ignored. spoke of "aims" and you objected, even though he said nothing about Aristotle.)

From my bio, "And don't just say why [he is wrong]; say what you think is right." This is precisely why your "dissection" is so often in bad faith. You want to criticize without giving any positive account yourself. You do this even when after objecting to aims, you deny that you opt for aimlessness, and all the while you refuse to explain how that is remotely possible. This is directly parallel to the way you gaslit @Count Timothy von Icarus with his simple (p v ~p), objecting to it while refusing to give a coherent reason for over 20 pages.

We need not assume [...] that we must have an aim. — Banno

I don't think one can discuss "better or worse" while denying ends completely. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly.

Banno, you seem to be rejecting the ‘best’ and the ‘worst’, while seeking to retain the ‘better than’ and the ‘worse than’.

But to do this, you are saying “one thing is better” which means, between the two things, one is best and the other isn’t. — Fire Ologist

Count is right, but there is no need to talk about "best." There is an interesting argument to be had about whether better presupposes best, but that argument is not needed to show that @Banno and @J's position is wrong.

"Better" implies a standard, and a standard is an end. Banno says:

we don't need an absolute standard in order to be able to say that one thing is better or worse than some other. — Banno

This is another example of what I pointed out in the previous thread:

This is the modus operandi of J and @Banno. Someone claims that there must be some criteria and in response there is an immediate equivocation between some criteria and specialized or qualified criteria. For example... — Leontiskos

"Absolute" (whatever that means) has nothing to do with it. The question is whether there is a standard. Then we come to this:

There's a difference between a standard and an end. — Banno

Yes, much like there is a difference between a cat and a mammal, but every cat is a mammal, and every standard is an end. So if you eschew ends you eschew standards, just as if you eschew mammals you eschew cats.

Banno uses the word "better" and this requires standards. Given that all standards are ends, this also requires ends. So @Count Timothy von Icarus is right when he says, "I don't think one can discuss 'better or worse' while denying ends completely."

(This is closely related to .)

---

Further, I'm not sure if "how a practice normally works," allows us to speak of "better or worse." It merely tells us about what current practice is, and if we are deviating from it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps at bottom is the simple question of whether philosophy has ends. I would say that @Srap Tasmaner's talk about the aim of philosophy is innocuous and self-evident. All human activities have ends, and philosophy is a human activity. Denying that philosophy has any ends looks to be a desperate escape route for the thoroughgoing pluralist. Again, whether or not we ever come to agree on the precise ends of philosophy, we all believe that philosophy has ends.

Williamson begins by claiming (uncontroversially) a shared lineage for science and philosophy, and he mentions the relation of science to philosophy at several points. — Srap Tasmaner

We could also think about this whole question historically, and through the lens of the agent-patient dichotomy.

In ancient times knowledge was seen as especially experiential, and often epitomized in sexual intercourse (i.e. "Now Adam knew Eve his wife, and she conceived and bore..." - Genesis 4:1). Sexual intercourse is a characteristically synergistic or inter-causal act, where the two are mutually moving and being moved in a way that breaks down the agent-patient dichotomy.

Even in Greek thought (and the Platonic-Aristotelian thought that extends throughout the ages) we see that the known moves the knower, such that the modern agent-patient schema is in some ways reversed. This retains a similarity to the synergistic account, insofar as known and knower are mutually moving each other. Analogies between love and knowledge are common, along with the magnetism of the beloved.

It is only in the modern period that we get a strict knower-as-agent vs. known-as-patient dichotomy, where the interaction or intercourse between the two is minimized, with both being viewed as highly inert and unmoved.* My sense is that this has everything to do with the Baconian quest for mastery over nature.

Presumably when modern science runs up against quantum mechanics, it is running up against the limitations of the modern understanding of knowledge. Perhaps it is only by moving into deeper and more synergistic modes of knowing that one can overcome the inherent limitations of the modern dichotomies.


* See especially Simpson's comparison of Schopenhauer to Wittgenstein on this point.

Dodgson's article on Achilles and the tortoise seems to show that there are limits to the explanations that can be given to clarify an argument - and some of Wittgenstein's remarks point to the same conclusion. — Ludwig V

Glad to meet someone else who appreciates What the tortoise said to Achilles.

The argument there proceeds as follows.

We have
(A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.
(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.

You, I and Achilles will suppose that if A and B are true, one must accept Z.

But the Tortoise has a different idea. He doesn't yet accept Z. He doesn't accept:

(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.

And challenges Achilles and us to force his agreement. He points out that (C) is a hypothetical, and hence that before he accepts (C) we must first show him that if A, B and C are true, he must accept Z:

(D) If A,B and C are true, Z must be true

...and so it begins.

Now I think the Tortoise makes an interesting point, but that there is something very important that is missing from his thinking. — Banno

This relates to Wittgenstein's answer to the problem he raises of what it is to follow a rule.

Separately, the Tortoise here is a precursor to Kripke's scepticism.

The answer to Dodgson is that while we might not fully state the rule, there is a way of understanding the rule that is not found in such an interpretation, but but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases (PI§201)

And again, "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (PI§217).

people can think that something is perfectly clear and yet be persuaded by argument that that is not the case. — Ludwig V

That's a very interesting point. Clarity is not final - but if things are sufficiently clear for us to move on, that'll do? Seems to be so.

The example of fashion reveals a sort of 'churning" that is worth paying attention to. Fashion no longer serves it's own purpose, but instead the need for an industry to sell more product. Each "new" fashion contradicts the last - novelty, not consistency, driving the process, no “rule” being followed except the imperative to create difference for profit. The point of the practice - expressing belonging and individuality? - has been lost, the purpose and rules being followed now sit elsewhere.

Same for pop music and Spotify.

Because you keep saying best. We all do. — Fire Ologist

Do you see that this restates your position, but does not answer the question? I hope so.

If one is better than the other, then one is best. — Fire Ologist

This outlines an argument. Better.

This would be so provided that we are dealing with a closed and complete set. If you consider the cardinals up to ten, then there is a biggest cardinal - ten. But if you consider all the cardinals, there is no biggest.

It's not just infinite sets that have this characteristic. Any set that is not closed - to which we can always add another item - may behave in the same away. That this painting is better than that one does not make this painting the best, nor does it imply that there is, somewhere out there, a best painting.

Your reasoning trades on a slide from relative to absolute. But comparative judgments don’t always entail global rankings. Just because some things are better than others doesn't mean there's a best. “Better” only implies “best” under artificially limited conditions. Otherwise, the concept of “best” isn’t required.


Yep.

Again, misses what is being claimed, and argues against something other. :grimace:

Would you agree that Rödl also wants to call to our attention that "making up one's mind" is necessarily 1st personal? That there is no objective form of this? — J

Should we go along with him here?

First, seperate out what is being done here. There's the trite logical point that "my making up my mind" is about me, so trivially in the first person. But there is also "our making up our mind", first person plural; "you making up your mind", second person singular; "they made up their mind" second person plural and Fred Blogs making up his mind - third person. We might share a collective deliberation.

But also there is the proof of the pudding - how is it shown that one's mind is made up? That's seen in what one does, and so is public.

Following Wittgenstein, we

Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you. — PI IIxi

Supose you made up your mind then changed it but didn't notice. The evidence of you having made up your mind is in what you do.

Rödl doesn't get to where he thinks he does.

Yes, good. And I can imagine Rödl being frustrated with this, because of how thoroughly it leaves out the 1st person, whether construed as singular or plural. — J

Yep. So much the worse for his account. :wink:

(sc. the tortoise) challenges Achilles and us to force his agreement. — Banno

So he does. So I think that Dodgson's focus is on the force (!) of the logical "must", which we all take for granted. One might perhaps think that this scenario suggests that it is not what settles disputes but a paper tiger.

This relates to Wittgenstein's answer to the problem he raises of what it is to follow a rule. — Banno

Yes, indeed. Though I think that Dodgson is suggesting that the tortoise knows perfectly well what it would be to follow the rule and is deliberately misbehaving - which is quite different from misunderstanding the rule. Again - it's about what it is to be forced to do something in this context. The best that we can do is to say that if you don't follow the rule, you aren't playing the game.

And again, "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (PI§217). — Banno

One is inclined to say that the tortoise needs training in a drill, rather than explanations. Once the tortoise has mastered the drill, it will be possible to explain things to him.

Clarity is not final - but if things are sufficiently clear for us to move on, that'll do? Seems to be so. — Banno

Perhaps it is. But I think this creates room for doubt about the meaning of, for example, "perspicuous representation", which is somehow meant to be final. Contrast the ways in which a teacher might try to clarify or explain something to a student; it's entirely a pragmatic practice, with no pretence that what works for one will work for all.

The point of the practice - expressing belonging and individuality? - has been lost, the purpose and rules being followed now sit elsewhere. — Banno

I've read stuff that claims that the modern practice of introducing new designs to stimulate the market rather than anything else was actually invented and first practiced by Wedgwood in the market for china. That was the real basis for his success. But fashion worked in much the same way before modern industrial practices came along. Naturally. the practice flourished more or less exclusively among the rich and in social contexts like the royal court.

Furthermore for Kant these are supposed to be universally applicable "rules" such that all thinkers will share the categories. — Moliere

Don't you find that quite distasteful?

Davidson undermines this again, by denying one leg of the transcendental argument that leads to it. In this case, he'd say that it's not categories that are held constant, but truths. We interpret the utterances of others so as to maximise their truth. We don't need shared categories.

So it's not that we must think alike, but that we can try to understand others as if they were saying the same things we would. That’s a much more humane model of reason.

Though I think that Dodgson is suggesting that the tortoise knows perfectly well what it would be to follow the rule and is deliberately misbehaving — Ludwig V

I suspect Kripke was again doing much the same as the tortoise.

"perspicuous representation", which is somehow meant to be final. — Ludwig V

Not final, so much as enough...?




Fashion's main anthropological purpose might be to distinguish us from them.

A double judgment-stroke would make no sense for Frege. It is precisely a syncategorematic expression, and therefore cannot be nested in that way. — Leontiskos

Syncategorematic means it has no meaning in isolation, only in context (like logical connectives), but that doesn't automatically rule out meta-level use — i.e., a second-order application about a judgment. Your argument again does not arrive at your conclusion.

"~" is also syncategorematic; yet we can write ~(~(A)). Necessity is syncategorematic; yet we can write ☐(☐(A)).

In Grundgesetze, Frege does not propose nesting judgment-strokes, but he does engage in meta-logical reflection — talking about what is asserted, and about the act of asserting.

A nested judgment-stroke would not violate Frege’s logical vision; it simply belongs to a different level — a meta-logical one — where judgments themselves become the objects of analysis.

Do you see how you evade? Over and over you say, "That's not what I said," but you simultaneously refuse to say what you did say. — Leontiskos

:rofl:

I already said what I did say...

And yes, I am evading you. There are better things to do, even here in this thread.

Just because some things are better than others doesn't mean there's a best. “Better” only implies “best” under artificially limited conditions. Otherwise, the concept of “best” isn’t required. — Banno

I’m saying “better” always relies on a “best”.

Better exists on a scale of worst to best. You don’t see the better “thing” without knowing the “best” as ideal. “Best and worst” are the standard. The ideal, to which you hold up things and find them always somewhere in the middle.

Is “best” conceptually required for comparison?

• You can have purely relational comparisons without a fixed ideal. Saying “X is better than Y” only requires a comparison between X and Y, not a fixed “best” somewhere else. Even if no “best” exists, you can still say one thing is better than another.
• Is “best” always explicit or cognized when we judge better? Often, we don’t have a clear idea of what the “best” is—no ideal painting or solution clearly in mind. We just compare what we have. The notion of “better” can operate locally without a global “best.”
• The ideal may be an asymptotic or regulative concept, not a concrete one: Perhaps “best” is a kind of horizon we approach but never fully reach. We use it as a guide, not necessarily as a fixed known point.
• Practical usage often doesn’t require the best: When choosing between two apples, you don’t need to know the best apple in the world; just which one tastes better.
• The “scale” might be constructed post hoc: Sometimes we impose a scale after seeing the comparisons, rather than having it given beforehand.

how is it shown that one's mind is made up? That's seen in what one does, and so is public. — Banno

Yes, but as I've often averted to in past discussions, there's one exception to this -- namely, when the audience who is "shown" is myself. It simply isn't credible that I don't know whether I've made up my mind on some subject unless I do something in public about it. Do I need to construct some obvious examples, or would you allow this?

Don't you find that quite distasteful?

Davidson undermines this again, by denying one leg of the transcendental argument that leads to it. In this case, he'd say that it's not categories that are held constant, but truths. We interpret the utterances of others so as to maximise their truth. We don't need shared categories.

So it's not that we must think alike, but that we can try to understand others as if they were saying the same things we would. That’s a much more humane model of reason. — Banno

I hadn't thought about it like that until now. I was mostly looking for points of comparison.

The "must" in think alike is descriptive, I believe, rather than proscriptive though. The categories organized experience -- truths organize the world maybe? And given Kant's whole shtick about freedom and creativity I'd be hesitant to say his isn't humane: from a secular point of view Kant's is something of a humanistic rationalism.

But, then, I'm inclined to agree with you about how there's no need for shared categories, and even if Kant thought there was this one structure that structures all minds I'd be more inclined to ground these things in social practices that are shared with others -- a sort of intersubjectivity of practice.

What do you think about calling or treating or striving towards philosophy as a science, if we take Davidson's stance? At least, in the manner that Williamson seems to be indicating to go towards or achieve.

It simply isn't credible that I don't know whether I've made up my mind on some subject unless I do something in public about it. — J

Prima facie, yep.

But consider: what is it to have made up your mind? Your choice remains open to reconsideration until you act.

You might change your mind. Right up until you make it so.

So sans action, have you actually made up your mind? Or is there still the possibility of your deciding otherwise?