No, you are tacking on that last bit yourself with seemingly no reason, is how it looks to me — flannel jesus
do you think of me as a rat or something like that? — Metaphysician Undercover
There is an issue I have found with German philosophers in general, and that is that they tend to have very idiosyncratic word usage. It appears to me like they actually choose unusual words, to intentionally hide the origins of their conceptions. So they'll read and learn prior philosophers and prior concepts, then present them in a new way with different words, hiding their sources, and creating the illusion of originality. — Metaphysician Undercover
But he recognizes that the structures of language games developed over time. — Paine
I dont know why you want to say that , but I can tell you that in Husserl’s phenomenology objects don’t just appear to a subject as what they are in themselves in all their assumed completeness, but are constituted by the subject through intentional acts. This means they present themselves to the subject within some mode of givenness. For instance, an object can be given in the mode of recollection, imagination or perception. Within spatial perception, we never see the whole object in front of us; the object gives, or presents, itself to us in only one perspectival aspect at a time. So what we understand as the object as a unitary whole is never given to us in its entirety. This abstract unity is transcendent to what we actually experience. — Joshs
It's a good question. I'm not convinced that speaking of things presenting themselves to us necessarily invokes agency on their part. Well at least not agency in the sense of intention to present themselves. In the context of chemistry agency is spoken about—we say there are chemical agents, defined as those compounds or admixtures which have toxic effects on humans.
While things don't have the intention to present themselves, they could be said to have the propensity to do so. Language is multivalent. We can speak of things presenting themselves or being presented or being or becoming present to us.
I don't know if I've answered the question adequately but that's all I've got right now. — Janus
I'd be curious as to what connotations "present" has in this context and how those connotations might contrast with a scientific view on the matter. — wonderer1
Whatever the case, I think we might agree that I made a Freudian slip — Metaphysician Undercover
snow, the solid form of H2O, evapourates directly to gas, without passing through the intermediary, liquid form, in the process of evapourating — Metaphysician Undercover
Whether you can coherently think of the object as autonomous in its capacities to affect us while placing the means by which its nature is revealed as an interaction involving an agent is an issue which clouds all that. Which is a question of whether objects transcendentally condition interaction with them based on their properties. — fdrake
The back of the house presents itself to you — Jamal
...has intimations of intent on the part of the back of the house. — Banno
262. I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long… etc.—We should be trying to give him our picture of the world.
This would happen through a kind of persuasion.
612. At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) — Wittgenstein, On Certainty
The aliens in the ocean seem to be speaking, though. — Moliere
but there are bigger fish to fry — Banno
I don't see any advantage in such obtuse phrasings — Banno
In other words, the limits of my form of life mean the limits of my world — Jamal
The form of life of a cloistered monk is not my form of life, but it is possible for me to become a monk and for the monk to leave the monastic life. — Fooloso4
On Kant's side, the "limit of experience" is not so much trying get beyond a particular domain, like a dog straining against a tether — Paine
but a problem of perceiving the self, particularly a self in the world: — Paine
From all this one sees that rational psychology . . . — CPR, Kant, B421
On the Wittgenstein side, I do not read the "form of life" as a replacement for what could not be explained by Kant. — Paine
But can a “form of life” include a more generous scope for philosophical language that abstracts from experience (or "my world") to question itself? — J