The ineffable I think the main difference is that I can show you an apple, but I can't show you my experience. I can show you my expression of pain, but not the pain itself. — Luke
First, I think you
can show me the experience. If you prick your finger with a pin, you can show me the experience by pricking
me with a pin. Are the experiences the same? Well, there’s no numerical identity, but there’s some level of qualitative identity. There can’t be
total qualitative identity because that would be equivalent to numerical identity, and that would require that I experience the pinprick as you, which is just to
be you. I don’t think it’s right to describe this as ineffability.
I see this kind of how I see perception. Some around here will say that perception is deficient or distorted because we perceive in a particular way which is determined or conditioned by our anatomy and physiology and our behaviour in our environment. This view presumes that perfect, undistorted perception would be a view from nowhere or, in Kant’s terms, an intellectual intuition. This is a bad account of perception.
I don’t really disagree with the bulk of your post; we just draw different conclusions. In fact, I’m not yet even sure that I’m absolutely against your use of “ineffable”. I do think that the position I’ve set out goes some way to clarify things.
Second, all analogies will break down at some point. The apple, unlike the experience, is not subjective, so I agree that there’s a significant difference.