Comments

  • What is a painting?


    A result of what I just said is that Russians can distinguish shades of blue more accurately than English speakers, showing that perception is to some degree linguistically relative. See this study: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.0701644104

    English and Russian color terms divide the color spectrum differently. Unlike English, Russian makes an obligatory distinction between lighter blues (“goluboy”) and darker blues (“siniy”). We investigated whether this linguistic difference leads to differences in color discrimination. We tested English and Russian speakers in a speeded color discrimination task using blue stimuli that spanned the siniy/goluboy border. We found that Russian speakers were faster to discriminate two colors when they fell into different linguistic categories in Russian (one siniy and the other goluboy) than when they were from the same linguistic category (both siniy or both goluboy). Moreover, this category advantage was eliminated by a verbal, but not a spatial, dual task. These effects were stronger for difficult discriminations (i.e., when the colors were perceptually close) than for easy discriminations (i.e., when the colors were further apart). English speakers tested on the identical stimuli did not show a category advantage in any of the conditions. These results demonstrate that (i) categories in language affect performance on simple perceptual color tasks and (ii) the effect of language is online (and can be disrupted by verbal interference).Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination
  • What is a painting?
    1) Russians don't see light blue and dark blue as shades of the colour blue. I would be surprised if Russians saw colours differently to non-Russians.RussellA

    Yes, Синий and голубой are basic colour terms and are thus seen as basic colours, not as shades of the same colour.

    2) Russian speakers have Russian words for "light blue" and "dark blue", and these Russian words don't make any reference to being part of the same colour "blue". But this applies to English also, in that neither ultramarine nor cerulean refer to the colour blue.RussellA

    The difference is that we think of ultramarine and cerulean as shades of blue, since in English that's what they are.

    Read this, it's short:

    https://thecolorlanguageproject.wordpress.com/2016/07/24/linguistic-facts-about-color/
  • What is a painting?
    It blows my mind how people don’t get it, and even refuse to accept it. Surely once in my life I’ll get the appropriate reaction: “oh really, that’s cool” (perhaps followed by, “I wonder if that backs up linguistic relativism”)
  • What is a painting?
    I've spoken to many Russians about this and they call blue blueI like sushi

    So have I and they don’t. But your comment is meaningless without more information. The colours denoted by “синий” and “blue” are not the same.
  • What is a painting?


    You need to do more research. What is shown there is closer to голубой than to синий. синий in English is “dark blue” or maybe “deep blue”.

    The word “blue” has no equivalent in Russian; translations are approximate and misleading. If you actually take on board what I said, which is that Russians (Russian speakers) do not see light blue and dark blue as shades of the same colour, then you will understand why this is the case.
  • What is a painting?
    Yes. Doesn't everyone.RussellA

    No. Russians don’t.

    Some pairs of hues are closer together than others, but the rest is preconceptions.
  • What is a painting?
    I don't approach seeing colours with any preconceptions.RussellA

    Do you see light blue and dark blue as shades of the same colour?
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Introduction: Argument and Experience (ii)

    The demand for committalness [Verbindlichkeit] without system is that for thought-models. These are not of a merely monadological sort. The model strikes the specific and more than the specific, without dissolving it into its more general master-concept. To think philosophically is so much as to think in models; negative dialectics is an ensemble of model-analyses.

    This is the distinction I've mentioned before between examples and models (or "thought-models" as he puts it here). Models are better than examples for negative dialectics because they don't dissolve the object into its general master-concept. But more than just being the better choice (say for illustrative purposes), thinking in models is the constitutive activity of negative dialectics. It's its bread and butter.

    Here's an updated list of where to find negative dialectics applied in the form of thought-models:

    1. In ND itself, in "Part III: Models". However, these are still at a fairly high level of philosophical abstraction, so they're less useful as—for want of a better phrase—practical applications.

    2. In Minima Moralia, a treasure trove of "micrology". Topics include marriage, genocide, tactfulness, technology, femininity, and the shortcomings of the American landscape.

    3. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which Adorno and Horkheimer make some grand claims that seem very far from micrology.

    4. In Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, which consists of articles and lectures intended for a general audience, produced at the height of his fame when he was appearing frequently on radio shows (this was the 50s and 60s, when he was back in Germany). Topics include television, sexual taboos, the concept of progress, and free time.

    5. In Aesthetic Theory, the only major work of Adorno's written after ND.

    But how exactly do models avoid dissolving the object into its master-concept? Primarily, by avoiding the reduction of the object to a mere instance of a universal. For example, a cynical critic of modern life who hadn't learned the art of negative dialectics might say that watching YouTube videos is a mindless compensation for a life of alienated labour. Thus YouTube is a mere instance of alienated escapism. In a thought-model, on the other hand, the complex tensions and textures of the experience of using YouTube are given their due. We could look at YouTube's strange temporality: the way the endless stream of recommended videos collapses time into a perpetual now, in contrast with watching a movie, which is clearly demarcated between a beginning and an end. Or with the variability of its content—educational, shallow, moving, profound—all delivered through a system designed to maximize attention. The viewer is neither simply brainwashed nor fully autonomous; instead, there's both freedom and compulsion, passive enjoyment and active engagement. A thought-model would draw out these tensions rather than simply condemning YouTube. The viewer is not regarded simply as an alienated and passive consumer of ideology, and their pleasure is not dismissed as false consciousness. Instead, the model recognizes and does not reconcile the dialectical interplay.

    Crucially, this is not a softening of critique. The condemnation may still be there, and may actually be much stronger; but it would not be the whole point of the exercise. Critique can be sharper when it reveals the complexities, since that's where society's depths of brokenness are.

    But I have to disagree with Adorno's insistence (implied in the lectures) that thought-models are not examples. Plainly speaking, thought-models do in fact serve as examples of negative dialectics. It's just that they do not exist merely for illustrative purposes, merely to help you understand the abstract concept—they're negative dialectics in action, in earnest, and they are not arbitrary, as examples sometimes are.

    I see a distinction that I hadn't noticed before. There are two kinds of example (there might be others, but these are the relevant ones). One is what Adorno hates, and the other can accommodate his thought-models (otherwise the complete banishment of examples just seems unreasonable). I can best convey the distinction with ... an example.

    A jazz teacher, introducing a student to improvisation, could give two kinds of examples. The teacher has already begun describing the way that the lead instrument improvises a melody using notes from the scales associated with the changing chords, so his first example of improvisation is to play notes from the most basic pentatonic scale for each chord. This is in a sense a good example, in that it illustrates a very basic potential strategy for improvisation, suitable for a beginner. But in another sense it's a really bad example, and barely even jazz, since it's likely to be boring and unoriginal. As a different kind of example he could play a 1959 recording of Ornette Coleman, in which there is no following of chord changes and in which there isn't even a chord-playing instrument in the band. This second example is more than a passive illustration; it is jazz, actively contradicting the rules the teacher has so far taught.

    I'll call these living and dead examples. Adorno doesn't like calling his thought-models examples at all, but I think we can, so long as we mean living examples.

    Philosophy debases itself into apologetic affirmation the moment it deceives itself and others over the fact that whatever sets its objects into motion must also influence these from outside. What awaits within these, requires a foothold in order to speak, with the perspective that the forces mobilized from outside, and in the end every theory applied to the phenomena, would come to rest in those. To this extent, too, philosophical theory means its own end: through its realization.

    Philosophy becomes mere ideology when it acts like objects can be studied in isolation, ignoring external influence. This is to say that you can't prioritize particulars without also taking into account the connections, and "affinities" between them. What awaits within the objects, which I take to be the truth about them, requires the foothold of philosophy in order to be revealed. Thus, external forces and philosophical theory itself all have the object as their goal (in negative dialectics). The last sentence is Adorno's utopianism cropping up again: to complete this task of philosophy would be to do away with philosophy, since thought would be properly reconciled with its objects.

    But what is the connection between the former passage, about thought-models, with the latter passage, about philosophy more generally. I think it's that the only way of achieving the latter is by the former. The only way of directing the power of system unsystematically to allow objects to speak is using thought-models, which do not reduce objects to instances and specimens.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    This would be a subject requiring much discussion and debate.Metaphysician Undercover

    :scream:

    Well, I’m willing to postpone it till we have our final showdown. I will say that “he is clear with his choice” is ambiguous. He is clear that particulars must be prioritized so as to let them speak for themselves without being devoured by dominating concepts, but that doesn't mean he can’t oscillate, and obviously he can’t abandon general concepts anyway, as he admits.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    As to whether Adorno would (not only) concur to thinking being one of the greatest pleasures of life, I very much doubt that he would:Pussycat

    Excuse me for butting in. That passage does not to me show what you think it shows. At most it shows he condemns thinking when it's a complacent or dominating pleasure. The “resistance of thinking against the merely existent” can be pleasurable, I would think. Why not? Adorno of course likely thought that good thinking was both pleasurable and painful. And since he speaks with such approval of play in philosophy, I reckon we can be confident that Redmond’s assessment is right.

    Anyway, I think it jumps off the page. He’s enjoying himself.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    I think this relates directly to what he says about system thinking. The idea of negative dialectics is not to reject systems thinking, but to determine its true form. And this displays how Adorno thinks of criticism. To criticize is not to reject, but a way of bettering the thing being criticized.

    There's been some back and forth between you and I in this thread, concerning this issue. First there was the question of whether Adorno accepts or rejects Hegelian principles. Also we had the question of whether what Adorno presents is properly called "dialectics" in the context of Hegelian "dialectics". It's becoming apparent to me, that the process is to neither accept nor reject a given principle, but to criticize it. This leaves synthesis as unnecessary, because acceptance of principles, adoption of belief is not the intended end. The process may or may not enable synthesis, and having synthesis as a goal from the outcome would prejudice the procedure.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    This looks right to me. :up:

    I think that this is the real issue with the idea of the concept going beyond, or overshooting the object. Relations between objects "affinity" is something categorically distinct from objects themselves. So conceptualization which focuses on objects, and representing objects (identity thinking), really cannot grasp this very significant aspect of reality which is the affinity between objects.

    The issue appears to be the difference between the relations between concept and object, and the relations between object and object. When the concept overshoots the object it may establish a scientific relation of prediction. Notice though that this relation is a subject/object relation because that overshooting is directed by intention toward producing an extended conception of the object. What Adorno is interested in is the true object/object relation. This must take as its primary assumption, a separation which produces a multitude, rather than the primary assumption of unity which conceptualizes "the object". The difference being that the primary postulate is separation rather than unity.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    A strong statement of the problem, but I think this bit is wrong: 'Relations between objects "affinity" is something categorically distinct from objects themselves.'

    And I think that's probably the key to unlocking the puzzle. Even though Adorno wants to focus on particulars, and in a fragmented way, it doesn't mean he thinks these particulars are themselves fragmented or necessarily lie, isolated, within a fragmented world. In other words, he does not want to treat objects as self-contained or atomistic. Rather, objects are always already mediated, connected to other objects in a web of history and society. And this mediation or connectivity is constitutive of the objects. Objects are nodes in networks. I think Adorno thereby avoids your dualism.

    But I think things will become clearer when we begin to get a grip on the idea of constellations (which he took from Walter Benjamin).
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Introduction: Idealism as Rage

    I'm backtracking here. Reading the following from J. M. Bernstein in the Blackwell Companion to Adorno made me realize that I missed some good stuff in the "Idealism as Rage" section, so I'll have a look at it here.

    But first, and incidentally, I think this passage from the Bernstein essay goes some way to accounting for Adorno's form of expression and also justifying the statement that "the need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.":

    Even if one were to concede that grasping a concept is grasping its inferential commitments – a version of the doctrine that meaning is use – nothing of the value of those inferences would thereby be captured. Although scientific rationality is ideally affect free, if identity thinking is for the sake of controlling nature and a product of the drive for self‐preservation, then even truth‐only cognition is interested and desiring. Adorno offers a hyperbolic genealogy of idealism in this respect, tracing it back to the animal’s rage at its soon‐to‐be victim [...] The rationalist and idealist systems are rigorous sets of inferential relations among foundational premises and remote conclusions about things – matter is nothing but res extensa or atoms or force fields composed of positive and negative forces – that express the concept of a totality in which thought is set in opposition to each content, evaporating the content in the thought of it. What matters in this is Adorno’s contention that inferential relations always express something more and other than their sheer logicality; truth‐only cognition sublimates desire, fear, and rage into chilling indifference, into a coldness that colors rationalized reason’s approach to every living thing. Adorno’s skepticism about the neutrality of truth‐only cognition explains one of the singular ambitions of Negative Dialectics, namely, to find a mode of argument that could achieve bindingness without system, that is, a form of rigor that could be both rationally and cognitively compelling in a manner that while not crossing the limits of logic, derived its authority from a distinct mode of writing and presentation.

    [...]

    If the satisfaction of truth‐only cognition is not the normative guide for critique, what is? What is the expressive impulse of negative dialectics? Adorno’s answer is direct and blunt: “The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth. For suffering is the objec- tivity that weighs on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated” (Adorno 1973, 17–18, 1975, 29). If rationalized reason is indifference, it is above all indifferent to suffering, the most deeply subjective experience a living being can undergo since it is the immediate experience of the negation of particular life; giving voice to suffering is providing the vanquished transient dimensions of human life with the conceptual presentation that modern reason has deprived them of. For here and now, this is what being true to human living comes to, hence the condition for all truth.
    — Bernstein, J. M. Concept and Object: Adorno’s Critique of Kant The Blackwell Companion to Adorno, p. 495

    Anyway, on to what Bernstein refers to as Adorno's "hyperbolic genealogy":

    The system by which the sovereign Spirit thought to transfigure itself has its Ur-history in that which is pre-intellectual, in the animal life of the species. Predators are hungry; the pounce onto the prey is difficult, often dangerous. The animal needs, as it were, additional impulses in order to dare this. These fuse with the displeasure of hunger into rage at the victim, whose expression is designed to terrify and weaken the latter. During the progression to humanity this is rationalized through projection. The animal rationale [French: rational animal] which is hungry for its opponent, already the fortunate owner of a super-ego, must have a reason. The more completely that what it does follows the law of self-preservation, the less it may confess the primacy of this to itself and others; otherwise its laboriously achieved status as a zoon politikon [Greek: political animal] loses, as modern German puts it, credibility.

    The life-form to be devoured must be evil. This anthropological schemata has been sublimated all the way into epistemology. In idealism – most obviously in Fichte – the ideology unconsciously rules that the non-Ego, l’autrui [French: the others], finally everything reminiscent of nature, is inferior, so that the unity of the thought bent on preserving itself may gobble it up, thus consoled. This justifies its principle as much as it increases the desire. The system is the Spirit turned belly, rage the signature of each and every idealism; it distorts even Kant’s humanity, dispelling the nimbus of that which is higher and more noble in which this knew how to clothe itself. The opinion of the 34person in the middle is the sibling of contempt for human beings: to let nothing go undisputed. The sublime inexorability of moral law was of a piece with such rationalized rage at the non-identical, and even the liberal Hegel was no better, when he walled off the superiority of the bad conscience, from those who demurred from the speculative concept, the hypostasis of the Spirit. What was emancipatory in Nietzsche, a true turning-point of Western thinking, which later versions merely usurped, was that he expressed such mysteries. The Spirit, which throws off its rationalization – its bane – ceases by virtue of its own self-reflection to be that which is radically evil, which irritates it in the Other.

    I found an online translation of most of the introduction to ND by Christian Thorne and Matthias Menda, available here:

    https://sites.williams.edu/cthorne/theodor-adorno-negative-dialectics/

    Comparing various sections with the Redmond translation, it mostly seems to convey the same sense but in a more readable form. I don't want to switch, because I am very happy with the clunky-but-accurate Redmond, but sometimes it's good to have a look at an alternative rendering, especially if it's also pretty good. Here's the "Idealism as Rage" section:

    Philosophical system, in which the sovereign mind entertains delusions of its majesty, has its earliest history in the pre-intellectual realm, that is, in the animal life of the species. Beasts of prey are hungry; pouncing on a victim is hard, often dangerous. If the animal is to risk it, it will require not just the standard impulses, but an auxiliary set, as well. These fuse together with the un-pleasure of hunger to become a kind of rage against the victim, the expression of which, in turn—and expediently enough—terrifies that victim and stuns it. Along the pathway to humanity, this gets rationalized by means of a projection. The rational animal who develops an appetite for his opponent has to, as happy owner of a super-ego, come up with a reason for attacking. The more completely his actions accord with the law of self-preservation, the less he is able to concede, to himself or others, its primacy; otherwise, the status of what the Germans now call the zoon politikon, achieved after so much effort, would come to seem implausible. Any creature marked out for eating had better be evil. This anthropological scheme has been sublimated all the way into epistemology. Idealism—and Fichte most emphatically—is governed unknowingly by an ideology which says that the not-I, l’autrui, anything, finally, that reminds one of nature, is worth almost nothing, so that the unity of the self-sustaining thought can devour it in good conscience. This vindicates the principle of thought and, equally, whets its appetite. Philosophical system is the belly turned mind, just as rage is the defining mark of idealism in all its forms; it disfigures even Kant’s humanity, confutes the nimbus of elevation and nobility with which Kant’s thinking has a way of investing itself. The view of the man in the center of the world is akin to contempt for humanity: to leave nothing uncontested or unchallenged. The sublime implacability of moral law was of the same cut as such rationalized rage against the non-identical, and even Hegel, liberally inclined, was no better, scolding, with the superiority of bad conscience, anything that rejects the speculative concept or hypostasis of the mind. What was so liberating about Nietzsche, who truly marked an about-face in the history of Western thought, a turn which later figures merely usurped, was that he spoke such mysteries out loud. The mind that breaks the spell of rationalization by dint of such stocktaking stops being the radical evil that, when rationalized, is the mind’s goad and trigger.Idealism as Rage

    So, idealism is the projection into reason of the predator's rage against its prey. It is the demonization of the Other, of nature, of the non-identical, to justify devouring it. This is even more extreme than the geneaology I was looking at before, and again the question is just how to interpret it. But in a way, it feels like that doesn't really matter: the passage is electrifying and scandalous, so it's a lot of fun to read; and it has an intuitively persuasive power, as if I understand it already. It hits in the way that sociobiological just-so stories hit those who are not already sceptical of them, with the shock of recognition. Or conspiracy theories might be another example.

    Once again, the true interpretation is somewhere between literal and metaphorical. Or rather, it is both at the same time. Things didn't really happen that way—Adorno is not actually doing evolutionary biology—but he is making truth-claims about the structure of idealism, the way it functions to dominate, and speculating about which antecedent animal passions could have conditioned human beings in such a way as to allow this kind of thinking to develop. The result is a true picture with a speculative, coherent origin story. The origin story is needed to emphasize that reason's tendency to domination is not just an accident along the way. And it is literally true that reason was and still is used to justify domination, so it makes sense to trace this back to the earliest form of domination we can think of.

    It operates at the limit between metaphor and material history. Adorno isn't doing evolutionary natural history, but he's doing more than metaphor for rhetorical effect (even though the passage is rhetorically effective). One of the things Adorno wants to convince us of is that there is a space between poetry and hard science.

    So the passage makes two central claims: idealism systematically replicates predatory logic (demonization as justification of consumption); and this emerges from real conditions of human animality, not by way of genetic determinism but as sublimated survival strategy, channeled into reason.

    I think these are plausible at the very least. The origin story exposes reason's domination as non-accidental while avoiding biological determinism. The speculative prehistory unearths, in a similar way to Nietzsche and Freud, reason's repressed animality through its own contradictions. When Fichte belittles the non-Ego, this really does continue, in infinitely developed form, the predator's rage, because the material needs of self-preservation persist in the structure of thought itself.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Introduction: Argument and Experience (i)

    The thought which may positively hypostasize nothing outside of the dialectical consummation overshoots the object with which it no longer has the illusion of being one with; it becomes more independent than in the conception of its absoluteness, in which the sovereign and the provisional shade into one another, each dependent on the other. Perhaps the Kantian exemption of the intelligible sphere from every immanence aimed for this. Immersion into the particular, dialectical immanence raised to an extreme, requires as one of its moments the freedom to also step out of the object, the freedom which the claim of identity cuts off. Hegel would have abjured this; he relied upon the complete mediation in objects. In the praxis of cognition, the resolution of the irresolvable, the moment of such transcendence of thought comes to light in that solely as a micrology does it employ macrological means.

    A hell of a passage, ultra-compressed and dialectical. Adorno is criticizing Hegelian dialectics but at the same time showing how its failure can lead to the non-identical. The "thought which may positively hypostasize nothing outside of the dialectical consummation" is the Hegelian thought that insists on systematic comprehensiveness. But why does he seem to imply that hypostasizing something outside of the dialectical consummation is a good thing? He seems to be criticizing Hegelian thought for failing to hypostasize anything except what is immanent to the dialectic and therefore to reason. Well, that's just it: in hypostasizing merely within the system it neglects to posit anything outside it, denying the reality of objects beyond this system, i.e., treating abstract concepts as concrete entities in the system, but failing to see concerete entities precisely where they are, beyond the system.

    This thought therefore "overshoots the object" and flies away into abstractions, in its commitment to the system. But the object is "the object with which it no longer has the illusion of being one with." This refers to the identity-thinking of Hegelian idealism, the idea that thought and object coincide without remainder—but how did the Hegelian thought suddenly become so self-aware such that it is no longer under this illusion? The answer is that Adorno is pushing two stages together: represented here is the collapse of Hegelian dialectics into Adornian critique and negative dialectics; the overshoot is the failure that exposes the illusion, and in grasping this the thought has already found its way to negative dialectics (all being well). This part of the sentence is thus a dialectical image of the revealing failure of Hegel's system.

    From that point, the thought "becomes more independent than in the conception of its absoluteness, in which the sovereign and the provisional shade into one another, each dependent on the other." (As far as I can tell the interdependence of sovereign and provisional might refer to the simultaneous presence alongside the Absolute—the telos of the dialectic and the final authority to which everything is subject—of a historical contingency that Hegel has, conveniently and retrospectively, made necessary in his system.)

    Perhaps the Kantian exemption of the intelligible sphere from every immanence aimed for this.

    Perhaps Kant, in putting the thing-in-itself beyond reason, wanted to reserve a space for the non-conceptual, denying reason's ability to capture everything.

    Immersion into the particular, dialectical immanence raised to an extreme, requires as one of its moments the freedom to also step out of the object, the freedom which the claim of identity cuts off.

    In negative dialectics we focus on concrete particulars, this being the dialectical method of immanent critique that pushes concepts till they fail. Thought here needs to be able to step out of the object and recognize that it has failed (failed because it used a deficient or ideological concept, for example). The claim of identity embedded in Hegel's system denies this freedom to thought since it insists beforehand on an identity between thought and the object. As Adorno says, "Hegel would have abjured this; he relied upon the complete mediation in objects." Negative dialectics is always ready to admit thought's failure; Hegel's dialectics has no such humility.

    In the praxis of cognition, the resolution of the irresolvable, the moment of such transcendence of thought comes to light in that solely as a micrology does it employ macrological means.

    Micrology is the commitment to concrete particulars, but what about macrology? I think it must be referring to what has gone before, i.e., Hegelian dialectics. But employing "macrological means" does not mean to employ Hegel's system, only its dialectical tools. So the point is that only in a philosophy deeply committed to concrete particulars can a method derived from a totalizing system produce the "transcendence of thought" whereby thought manages to reveal something of the non-conceptual, which was the point of philosophy all along.

    QUESTION: I said that the following is a dialectical image of the collapse of Hegelian dialectics: "The thought which may positively hypostasize nothing outside of the dialectical consummation overshoots the object with which it no longer has the illusion of being one with." But since this collapse produces negative dialectics, which is supposedly the better philosophy, how is this dialectical movement not a positive synthesis?
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Others are welcome to go over the system sections in more detail, but since we discussed the stuff about system quite a lot when reading the lectures, I'm not inclined to do my usual commentary. As far as I can tell he's saying basically the same thing, though in more glittering and arresting prose. So I'll just skate over the sections here.

    In the Relation to System section his view of systems seems entirely negative, and he even calls them insane:

    The excrescences of the systems since the Cartesian pineal gland and the axioms and definitions of Spinoza, already filled to the brim with the entire rationalism which he then deductively extracts, proclaim by their untruth that of the systems themselves, their madness.

    But the dialectical character of his view comes out two sections later in Double Character of the System, which begins with...

    Critique does not simply liquidate the system.

    In other words, "I know I said that systems are crazy, but that doesn't mean they can be entirely rejected." And the task is...

    ... to transpose the energy of thought once unbound from the philosophical systems into the open determination of particular moments.

    This "open determination" is what he referred to in the lectures as "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought." And crucially the focus is on individual phenomena rather than on the whole as it is in systems, which are essentially totalizing.
    Reveal
    (He calls these phenomena "particular moments" because they are to be engaged as if they are nodes or phases in a dialectic (though of course Adorno rejects the Hegelian implications of that, so his use of dialectics is negative)).


    Then, in an intriguing passage, he gets more specific about what he wants to preserve of systems:

    As prejudiced as this postulate is in the presupposition of the identity of everything existent with the cognizing principle, so too does that postulate, once burdened as in the manner of the idealistic speculation, legitimately recall the affinity of objects to each another, which is rendered taboo by the scientific need for order in order to yield to the surrogate of its schemata. What the objects communicate in, instead of each being the atom to which classificatory logic reduces it, is the trace of the determination of objects in themselves, which Kant denied and which Hegel wished to re-establish against Kant through the subject.

    Here he explicitly associates the "affinity of objects to each other"—an affinity that escapes scientific and otherwise systematic classification—with things in themselves. This takes me back to my post in which I wondered how close the non-identical was to the in-itself.

    But rather than continuing to wonder about that, the main thing to see is that there are relations between things that are not adequately captured, or are obscured, by our concepts and categories, especially the scientific ones. It's about qualitative relationships, those which paradigmatically concern artists, rather than the measurable relationships represented and reified in equations.

    In Adorno's hands, Kant's in-itself becomes metaphorical or at least redefined and refunctioned. It is no longer beyond experience, unknowable, unconditioned or mind-independent. But it does represent what is most real in things: their irreducible particularity, the non-identical.

    To comprehend a thing itself, not to merely fit it in, to register it in a system of relationships, is nothing other than to become aware of the particular moment in its immanent context with others. Such anti-subjectivism stirs beneath the crackling shell of absolute idealism, in the impulse to open up the thing in question, by recourse to how they became. The concept of a system recalls, in inverted form, the coherence of the non-identical, which is exactly what is damaged by deductive systematics. Critique of the system and asystematic thinking are superficial, so long as they do not make it possible to unbind the power of coherence, which the idealistic systems signed over to the transcendental subject.

    This goes back to the earlier discussions about systems. What matters here is the idea of a coherent, meaningful reality, an inheritance of system that's worth hanging on to.

    In the System Antinomical section he returns to his genealogical account of systems as products of bourgeois consciousness. This implies that there were no systems prior to the modern era. Indeed he points out that system "could be imputed only retrospectively" to Plato, for instance; and that Kant's criticism of Aristotle's categories (as merely empirical) is a historical product of Kant's epoch, in which the reason of the autonomous individual was to be elevated above everything else, hence the concept of the transcendental.

    The crucial call to arms comes at the end of the section:

    However the speculative power to blast open that which is irresolvable is that of the negation. Solely in it does the systematic movement live on. The categories of the critique of the system are at the same time those which comprehend the particular. What has once legitimately stepped beyond the particularity in the system has its place outside of the system. The gaze which becomes aware, by interpreting the phenomenon, of more than what it merely is, and solely thereby, what it is, secularizes metaphysics. Only a philosophy in fragment form would give the illusionary monads sketched by idealism what is their due. They would be representations [Vorstellungen] of the totality, which is inconceivable as such, in the particular.

    The spirit of system or "systematic movement", and therefore the idea of a coherent, meaningful reality, can now live on only in negativity, i.e. in critique rather than by charting progress, and only by focusing on the particulars.

    QUESTION: How does he propose to focus only on particulars, doing philosophy in fragment form, and at the same time uncover a coherent, meaningful reality and the affinity between objects?
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    @Moliere

    I flatter myself that I'm getting a good feel for it. But maybe the best way to understand how to apply it or use it is to read Minima Moralia and Dialectic of Enlightenment, as well as the “Models” section of ND.Jamal

    I feel like I might want to read his Aesthetic Theory after ND. Since it was written after ND, it might actually be a conscious application, whereas MM and DoE are negative dialectics in action before Adorno had formally theorized it. And since the art and aesthetic angle is so important in ND, Aesthetic Theory seems like it might be ideal.

    Until now I've been a bit put off by what I expect to be his exclusive avant garde and modernist preoccupations—where Adorno goes for Schoenberg and Berg, I go for Stravinsky and Messiaen, not to mention the dreaded jazz—but I've seen enough interesting quotations from AT recently to catch my attention.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno


    That's an interesting point that I will ponder.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno


    Again, ND is in a sense doing just that, since the idea of immanent critique is to confront ideological concepts on their own terms and push them to breaking point.

    someone else's ideologyfrank

    If it's not obvious, my use of "ideology" is the Marxist one: the ideas that justify the status quo.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno


    Yes, because ND itself tries to see the world without the distortions of ideology (he notes the importance of the appearance/reality discinction). Even so, a pure unideological standpoint is not possible; critical thought is itself produced by the society is critiques.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    And so it would seem that the project is severely hampered and severed from the outset.Pussycat

    Since we are not reading the original, I take it you think my recent post about how Adorno performs the content of his philosophy in the form of his writing is completely misguided?

    I want to understand how to do "Negative Dialectics" for topics other than negative dialectics itself.Moliere

    I flatter myself that I'm getting a good feel for it. But maybe the best way to understand how to apply it or use it is to read Minima Moralia and Dialectic of Enlightenment, as well as the “Models” section of ND.

    As for who could be said to have done ND after Adorno, the closest I think would be Fredric Jameson and Zizek, though the latter is far from explicitly Adornian.
  • Fight Test, by Cat Stephens
    Things like this belong in the Lounge, so put it there yourself next time please.
  • What is a painting?
    So if we break down your claim, we could say, "Art's value is not contingent upon [... an] outcome." That's actually sufficient, given that nothing, insofar as it is sought as an end in itself, is valued as contingent upon an outcomeLeontiskos

    :up:
  • What is a painting?
    The very fact that so many are driven to devote their whole lives to art's creation, and the fact that we are seemingly driven to saturate our environment with art, speaks instead to its deep connection to human purpose, instead of an inexplicable obsession with useless things.hypericin

    This does not even begin to address or even acknowledge my points.

    It is our job as philosophers to make the implicit explicit, only then can we actually understand what we are investigating.hypericin

    But some of us think you're thinking about it wrong.
  • What are you listening to right now?
    At age 11, this was probably the second album I ever owned.

  • What is a painting?
    @hypericin

    You've contrasted pragmatic function with usefulness. But when Oscar Wilde said that "all art is quite useless"—and I believe @Moliere is expressing basically the same thought—it is precisely art's lack of pragmatic function that is meant. The idea is that art's value is not contingent upon a measurable, definite, or clearly apparent outcome. So the concept of usefulness here is instrumental utility—basically another way of saying "pragmatic function". I think Oscar Wilde's use of useless might be better than yours, which seems too expansive to be ... useful.

    That said, the statement that art is useless is intentionally provocative, since in modernity we are so used to justifying our practices according to their pragmatic utility; I believe people instinctively want to push back against it because they think it's a devaluation. What I like about Wilde's aphorism is that it challenges this instinctive (I would say ideological) association of value with utility, reversing it to imply that the higher the value, the less intrumentally functional something becomes. (It's no coincidence that the aphorism seems very Adornian)
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno


    I'd probably be interested in Baudrillard's criticism of genealogy but I don't understand it from what you've quoted or from the interview it's taken from. I did, however, nod along to the mention of "the mysterious point where he [Foucault] stops and finds nothing more to say."

    His portrayal of Adorno and Benjamin as both dialectical and non-dialectical fits quite well with my understanding. It's his way of describing their anti-Hegelian kind of dialectics. Adorno himself says he is doing dialectics but without the progressive unfolding of reason in history. This negativity is what Baudrillard is talking about.

    Do you think that in the later passage that you quoted, Adorno is trying to provide an exegesis for exactly that?Pussycat

    "Exegesis" is the wrong word (sorry for the pedantry) but yes, he is giving a genealogical account of what it was that "drove the philosophical Spirit towards the system." Since he does this in terms of class analysis and ideology, the appropriate conception of the philosophical Spirit becomes "the bourgeois consciousness."

    Quite literally, I would say. If we take Adorno's "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, remains alive because the moment to realize it was missed", seriously, together with his demand that philosophy becomes conscious as to what it's been doing (to the non-conceptual), then I think we can safely conclude that all philosophies prior to negative dialectics were unconscious reactions to stimuli of their time.Pussycat

    Nice angle. But how far we should take literally the claim that in the 17th century the philosophical Spirit qua bourgeois consciousness expanded its autonomy into the system and exercised its freedom in thought to produce the Monadology, Cartesianism, and Spinozist pantheism, because it feared it was not able to produce the freedom it had promised in the real world—whether that should be taken literally is another matter.
  • Differences/similarities between marxism and anarchism?


    It should be a new discussion. It doesn't belong in this one.
  • Why are 90% of farmers very right wing?
    Today I was reading Revolutionary Spring: Fighting for a New World 1848–1849 by Christopher Clark. It describes some of the counter-revolutionary acts of the German farmers and their generally suspicious or contemptuous attitude to the urban liberals and working class radicals. Urban movements demanding employment were looked down upon by the farmers and peasants as ragtag mobs of unemployable layabouts.

    It occurred to me that this was because economic and social change was affecting urban workers much more than it was affecting rural inhabitants, but all the farmers could see from their relatively stable social and economic positions were lazy vagabonds. As a result, they began to see their relative stability as under threat from those urban radicals.

    And as has often been the case, those urban radicals failed to reach out to the farmers and peasants who might have supported them.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    In the "Relation to System" section there's a remarkable passage that charts the rise of the philosophical system and accounts for this in starkly Marxist terms, i.e., in terms of class and ideology:

    In the history of philosophy the systems of the seventeenth century had an especially compensatory purpose. The same ratio which, in unison with the interests of the bourgeois class, smashed the feudal order of society and its intellectual reflection, scholastic ontology, into rubble, promptly felt the fear of chaos while facing the ruins, their own handiwork. They trembled before what ominously continued under their realm of domination and which waxed in proportion to their own power. This fear shaped the earliest beginnings of the mode of conduct entirely constitutive of bourgeois thought, of hurriedly neutralizing every step towards emancipation through the strengthening of the social order. In the shadows of the incompletion of its emancipation, the bourgeois consciousness had to fear being cashiered by a more progressive class; it suspected that because it was not the entire freedom, it only produced the travesty of such; that is why it expanded its autonomy theoretically into the system, which at the same time took on the likeness of its compulsory mechanisms.

    Hegel, Nietzsche, and Foucault all do this kind of thing (though not from the same political perspective), and we call it genealogy. I'm very partial to it, myself, but the question that always comes up, at least in my own mind, is how literally are we supposed to take it? Adorno is not really doing history, so what is it? Does he really mean that the philosophical systems of the 17th century were created with the aim of cementing the bourgeois social order so as to prevent more radical social change?

    On the one hand, of course not. That is not what Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza intended, and it was not close to being their motivation. Neither were they brainwashed puppets of the bourgeoisie or consciously taking on the role of middle-class heroes fighting the intellectual fight against the ancien régime on one side and the proletariat on the other.

    On the other hand, yes. These philosophical systems functioned ideologically in literally the way he describes, and they literally seemed like good ideas at the time partly for the reasons he gives. The trick is just to know how to interpret these genealogies: not as accounts of the intentions of the people in question, i.e., not as empirical history, but as speculative reconstructions of cultural tendencies and the way that these ideas functioned socially and historically.

    So I think it's somewhere between literal and metaphorical, not exactly one or the other. That said, it does seem extremely schematic and therefore a bit crude; it's not much different from the standard Marxist narrative of the bourgeois superstructure in the period following feudalism and prior to full-on industrial capitalism.

    EDIT: But I think we have to always keep in mind Adorno's dictum that "only exaggeration is true." The crudeness is intentional: it's the bluntness of a sledgehammer.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno


    Very interesting post, MU, I like it. I think your interpretative scheme of death/religion, profound/profane, sacrosanct/blasphemy, is inventive and enlightening. I think it's a good model, or instance, of what Adorno is referring to—or else a metaphor (or both). I don't think it reveals his central referent, as you seem to be suggesting, but it's a good way of thinking about it anyway. I particularly like the idea of the critique of ideology as profanity.

    Certainly theology, which he mentions, is an instance of ideology in the garb of profound philosophy, justifying the submission to authority by appeals to the soul's salvation and the Absolute, etc. Adorno is using this as a model of the problem situation.

    This brings us squarely to the issue of suffering. And, I must admit that I do not really know how Adorno relates these two. So I will speculate. I suppose that this resistance to ideology, this renunciation of the sacrosanct, is itself an expression of suffering, as if that profound, or sacrosanct ideology is oppressive. This is similar to what Plato says in "The Republic" about the relation between the philosopher and the ruler, a relation known as 'the philosopher king'. The philosopher knows that the job of ruling is the worst possible job, and in no wants to do that job. So the philosopher will not move to take that position until the suffering of having to live under the punishment of the prevailing rulers is worse than the pain of having to rule. It is the suffering caused by poor leadership which brings out the good leader.

    So to relate this to what Adorno says about "the need to give voice to suffering". Ideology gains its power of authority through the appearance of profundity. But the ideology may itself be a medium of oppression, by which objectivity weighs on the subject as suffering. The facade of profundity is what needs to be broken, through the speculative moment. This is the expression of suffering, profanity.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    Well said. Yes: profound, sacrosanct ideology is oppressive. I would add that it is oppressive in that it justifies the material state of affairs that oppresses people in actuality. And yes: to resist ideology, renouncing the sacrosanct, is to give voice to suffering, the suffering of those being oppressed.

    At this point I can no longer postpone my attempt to interpret this:

    The power of the existent constructs the facades into which the consciousness crashes. It must try to break through them. This alone would snatch away the postulate from the profundity of ideology. The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence. What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth. For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.


    The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.

    This is not just a brilliant line and a stirring exhortation; it is also a radical challenge to standard theories of truth which is meant to be taken entirely seriously.

    In the words of Ben Shapiro, facts don't care about your feelings. Indeed, they don't care about anyone's feelings. And that's the problem with facts, or rather with the Enlightenment rationality that takes facts as the be-all and end-all of truth (and therefore knowledge). Adorno wants a more expansive concept of truth, one that doesn't submit to Enlightenment's split between facts and values. (Another option would be to reject truth entirely, but to do so would be to embrace nihilism and to give up on critique).

    Truth for Adorno is the reality and injustice of suffering. Since, where the most important matters are concerned, the real is unjust, truth should not be neutral.

    Examples help. A factual report on the Holocaust that ignores witness testimony is not true in Adorno's expanded sense. We could think of this as a lie of omission (which is not to say it's intentional deception). And this is a signpost to another aspect, found in the work of Foucault: the idea that a truth that depends on the suppression of marginalized voices is suspect—and in Adorno's terms, not really a truth at all. You might say, then, that facts are lies of oppression.

    But it's not just that facts are not enough; it's that knowledge in the form of facts is already ideological, is value-laden without knowing it (or without saying so). To uncover the truth then is not just to add more, or different kinds of, information, e.g., including formerly marginalized voices, but to critique the facts themselves to reaveal the truth negatively. You can see this better with a fact like, workers are free in capitalist society because in taking jobs they voluntarily sign contracts. This fact can be criticized to reveal that the company and the worker are not equal parties except in a narrow legal sense, and that the choice between the burdensome job and destitution is no choice at all.

    Adorno's condition equally applies in art. Compare Goya's Black Paintings and his Disasters of War series with propaganda art that glorifies war or labour. I don't think I'm using a special notion of truth when I say that the former are truthful and the latter are not. And the former are truthful because they give voice to suffering, not only by actually depicting it but by explicitly going against both the style and the content of paintings that celebrate war.


    For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

    Suffering is not just a private feeling but is a material, social reality with real causes. The subject suffers under objective conditions. The inability of a South African miner to stay awake and concentrate for half an hour on the book he wants to read after a 12-hour shift in a gold mine, his fatigue exacerbated by his chronic silicosis, is both the most personal and private of problems and also an example of the economic injustice of capitalist society.
  • Why are 90% of farmers very right wing?
    I always assumed the original resistance of independent farmers to socialism was that land reform rarely distinguished between large landlords and smaller farms (and that forced collectivization was a disaster, plus the whole kulak designation, or similar schemes in China—both later developments, but foreshadowed early on by some policies). Had land reform been handled better, it might not have shaken out that way.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Yep.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    But this section goes deeper than that, since he is talking about his own mode of expression, i.e., it's meta. Expression in language that aims to uncover reality in the way described above should itself enact dialectics in its mode of expression. Thus, we get Adorno's way of writing: style as substance, form as content (I'm glad we've finally got back to this topic, which I think I mentioned on the first page of this thread). Rather than obscurantism, this is the fullest stringency (EDIT: or maybe better put, the best balance between expression and stringency). He does not want to explain and describe, but to performatively expose. The same applies to negative dialectics as applies to screenwriting: show don't tell.Jamal

    So how does this play out in the text? Take the following sentence as an example.

    The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence.

    The thing to notice is how compressed it is. It awkwardly crams in too many thoughts. I would word it more naturally using multiple sentences, one following the other with a linear logic. For instance:

    The speculative moment, which does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts, survives in such resistance. It goes beyond the facts while remaining in the closest contact with objects. Furthermore, it does so while renouncing the sacrosanct transcendence of dogmatic metaphysics.

    My version is easier to read because it's laid out in a series of steps, whereas the original is all squashed together. But it also kind of defuses the tension. The original's very awkwardness is meant to make us actually feel the tensions and paradoxes. Notice also that in my version I removed any mention of "transcendence" in reference to going beyond the facts, so the contradiction of immanent trascendence did not appear. For Adorno, this is to hide what's important, which is to hold the contradictions open.

    You might say that my re-write is a middlebrow petit-bourgeois deradicalized version. Maybe that describes all of my posts in this group?

    EDIT: It just occurred to me: Adorno's style is mimesis in action, showing in the form of his writing the real contradictions of the world.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    EDIT2: Also I'm finding myself scratching my head in the first paragraph of Portrayal (Darstellung) -- Darstellung contrasts with Vorstellung, which is what I'm gathering to be the difference between the importance of Portrayal in philosophy, at the beginning, and how it is not just science at the end.

    Vorstellung is usually translated as "Representation", and in Kant is important to scientific knowledge. So I understand that much. Darstellung is the "portrayal" -- expression, language -- of the representation. But I'm struggling to see how Darstellung, in Adorno, differentiates philosophy from science at the end somehow and that's what I'm puzzling over:

    "If the moment of expression tries to be anything more, it degenerates into a point of view; were it to relinquish the moment of expression and the obligation of portrayal, it would converge with science."
    Moliere

    Maybe something like this. Darstellung or the moment of expression is the deliberate interpretation of the given facts, whereas Vorstellung, the representation, is the given fact itself. The latter may also be a product of interpretation, but this interpretation is unknowing and ideological, such that things that are the product of ideology are taken as given. Darstellung on the other hand is an interpretation of an interpretation; that is, a re-appraisal, by means of expression in concepts and language, of the given facts. Or better put, it is the construction of a space, by means of dialectical confrontations and movements, in which reality can reveal itself.

    The freedom of philosophy is nothing other than the capacity of giving voice to this unfreedom. If the moment of expression tries to be anything more, it degenerates into a point of view; were it to relinquish the moment of expression and the obligation of portrayal, it would converge with science.

    On one side of the tightrope we fall into mere personal opinion (or a scream of pain), and on the other side it's scientism. Darstellung controls expression by applying a method (dialectics, immanent critique), thus avoiding the first danger; and in its speculative nature, its dynamic dialectical nature, and the negativity of its critique, it avoids reification—which means it avoids scientism, since scientism rests on the treatment of dynamic relations as thing-like facts.

    But this section goes deeper than that, since he is talking about his own mode of expression, i.e., it's meta. Expression in language that aims to uncover reality in the way described above should itself enact dialectics in its mode of expression. Thus, we get Adorno's way of writing: style as substance, form as content (I'm glad we've finally got back to this topic, which I think I mentioned on the first page of this thread). Rather than obscurantism, this is the fullest stringency (EDIT: or maybe better put, the best balance between expression and stringency). He does not want to explain and describe, but to performatively expose. The same applies to negative dialectics as applies to screenwriting: show don't tell.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Though Adorno notes that the responses have been obscure, he wants to speak up in favor of this speculative thinking, or a moment within thinking, whereby the facts, on their face or as read, do not determine thought, but rather produce a facade through his thought must push towards and outward from in order to get closer to the things themselves.

    Only, without a category that determines the thing -- it's non-conceptual. In a way I think I can see the fantasm as the appearance, whereas negative dialectics wishes to get beyond the appearance of facts (themselves conceptual) to the thing.
    Moliere

    Exactly. And the sentence I've bolded hits the nail on the head. Adorno's version of speculative thought is only negative; it doesn't offer a positive dogma consisting of a system of categories.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Introduction: Speculative Moment

    This section is about speculation and depth, covered mainly in lecture 9. There's something I missed in my post about that lecture, because I didn't pick up on the reference: the meaning of the speculative moment in Hegel's Logic. I'll look at that now.

    The springboard of Hegel's philosophy is the antinomy of pure reason described by Kant in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant showed that reason and in particular speculative metaphysics, in reaching beyond experience, inevitably produces irresolvable contradictions between apparently justified propositions. For instance, here is the first antinomy:

    Thesis: The world has a beginning in time and is also enclosed within bounds as regards space.

    Antithesis: The world has no beginning and no bounds in space, but is infinite as re­gards both time and space.

    And both turn out to be well-supported.

    For Kant, rather than siding with one or the other, philosophy must recognize these contradictions as the result of reason's attempt to transcend the limits of possible experience (in this case seeking the unconditioned totality of the world), an attempt which, though natural, is bound to fail. So one of the major tasks of transcendental philosophy is critical restraint: to confine reason within the bounds of experience.

    But Hegel sees the antinomies not as failures of reason or "dialectical illusions," as Kant put it, but as revealing the legitimate, and necessary, dialectical movement of thought. So contradiction is the engine of truth, which unfolds through that dialectical movement in phases, or moments:

    Abstract (thesis)
            ↓
    Negative (antithesis)
            ↓
    Speculative/Concrete (synthesis)
    

    Another version looks like this:

    Understanding (thesis)
            ↓
    Dialectic (antithesis)
            ↓
    Speculation (synthesis)
    

    Thus, in Kantian terms you could say that for Hegel the synthesis, also known as the speculative moment, is where reason advances successfully beyond experience, and therefore that the speculative is not as futile as Kant said it was. But it's misleading to put it in those Kantian terms: for Hegel, the speculative moment is not beyond experience at all, since he abandons Kant's dualism and everything becomes immanent to reason. Speculative thought is not a failure but is rather the culmination of reason: rather than reaching beyond experience it grasps experience as the process of reason realizing itself in and through the world.

    Now we come to Adorno. As I see it, he wants to preserve the speculative moment while abandoning its claim to success, reconciliation, and synthesis. For Hegel, the speculative moment and synthesis are almost the same thing, but Adorno prises them apart. The moment then becomes the crisis point that can help to reveal the truth, only negatively: he agrees with Hegel that the speculative moment reveals or points to the truth—and this is why he pays his respects by using the concept at all—but disagrees that this is a conclusive, positive truth in which the antithetical propositions are reconciled.

    @Metaphysician Undercover @Moliere: I agree that the last paragraph is crucial. Every so often we see the central motivation of negative dialectics.

    The power of the existent constructs the facades into which the consciousness crashes. It must try to break through them. This alone would snatch away the postulate from the profundity of ideology. The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence. What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth. For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

    The existent is the social reality whose power produces ideology, i.e., produces conceptual structures that mask the material reality of social relationships. When consciousness breaks through this facade, it takes the ideological claim (a postulate like "the market is rational") out of its fake depth and exposes it as a mask for a historically contingent reality. Mathematical economics naturalizes precarity and suffering—the market doesn't work for everyone, to say the least—thereby justifying the system, as all good ideology must do.

    But I wondered in what way the ideology from which the postulate has been snatched away by our bold consciousnesses was supposed to appear as profound. Well, the idea that the market is rational uses mathematics to dress up transient conditions as universal and necessary—just as law-governed, eternal and fundamental as gravity. The science of economics here has a fake depth, an ideology in the form, not just of a hazy bunch of ideas, but of a mathematical system of equations and graphs.

    Or think of another ideological postulate that still gets a lot of support (e.g., Jordan Peterson): social hierarchies are natural. Once again, the very attempt to naturalize is a semblance of depth, and kind of like the economic example, this is also backed up by a purportedly rigorous science, namely sociobiology or evolutionary psychology. Or we can even just look at Hobbes, who put these ideas in the form of a profound philosophy.

    The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence.

    An interesting sentence. In the speculative moment we go beyond the given facts, the appearances which are so often misleading (and ideological). But this transcendence is not the "sacrosanct transcendence" of traditional metaphysics, which ventures into a pure, higher, eternal reality. No, the reality we hope to reach is immanent to experience.

    The trouble is, immanent transcendence is an oxymoron. As Adorno might say, "that's just too bad".

    What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the subject.

    Thought aims to break through the facade but is also bound to the object as that to which it is directed, since this is immanent critique that takes the facts on their own terms. The expressive urge of the subject is the urge to express in words, or concepts, the non-conceptual that lies repressed in the facts. Which leads to this:

    The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth. For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

    Since this is the ethical core of negative dialectics, I feel I need to do it justice either by saying a lot or by saying nothing. For now I'll go with the latter, because I'm out of juice.
  • Currently Reading
    Modernity and the Holocaust by Zygmunt Bauman.

    I've been meaning to read Bauman for years, and I happened upon this one, which happens to work very well in support of the Adorno reading, since it provides a concrete sociological grounding for Adorno’s abstractions.

    The nutshell is that the Holocaust was not a break with, or a regression from, modernity, but represented its hitherto unsuspected potential. But Bauman seems significantly more optimistic than Adorno.

    EDIT: The suspicion arises that sociology, a paradigmatic product of modernity, was itself in some sense implicated in the Holocaust. Bauman so far hasn’t made that claim explicitly but it seems to be an underlying worry.
  • Why are 90% of farmers very right wing?
    I would have thought that the Left, historically being the side for the working class, it would be natural they would be on that side.unimportant

    I’ll just respond in a rather arcane and non-topical fashion to this particular point, without addressing the main question. Some of the most influential socialists have of course been Marxists, and Marxists are traditionally hostile to farmers and peasants, seeing them not as proletarians but as petit bourgeois, and as standing in the way of capitalist development, i.e., the only route to communism. For Marxists, only the proletariat is revolutionary—everyone else being presumed at least non- and often counter-revolutionary.

    And even though Leninism rejected the idea that capitalist development must be seen through to completion before communism is possible, the Bolsheviks only spoke with approval of the peasants because they needed their support; they later abused and exploited them.

    So, farmers worldwide have never forgiven socialists for the Bolshevik ban of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1922, the only powerful political party in Russia rooted in the peasantry.

    (That last sentence is a joke, though it has a kernel of truth, namely that there is no necessary affinity between farmers and the Left and that farmers are not necessarily wrong to distrust the Left)
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    I'm wondering if anyone has thoughts on what "thingly bad state of affairs" means. I was wondering if it's supposed to say "thinly" just as a first guess?Moliere

    Interesting!

    Expression and stringency are not dichotomous possibilities for it. They need each other, neither is without the other. The expression is relieved of its contingency by thought, on which it works just as thought works on it. Thinking becomes, as something which is expressed, conclusive only through linguistic portrayal; what is laxly said, is badly thought. Through expression, stringency is compelled from what is expressed. It is not an end in itself at the latter’s expense, but carries it off out of the thingly bad state of affairs, for its part an object of philosophical critique.

    It's definitely thingly, since he uses it again later on in the book, where it's helpfully accompanied by the German:

    As mediated as being is by the concept and therein by the subject, so mediated is, in the reverse case, the subject by the world in which it lives, so powerless and merely internalized too is its decision. Such powerlessness permits the victory of the thingly bad state of affairs [dinghafte Unwesen] over the subject. — section: Function of the Concept of the Existent

    A.I. gives me the following for dinghafte Unwesen in this context:

    - Reified monstrosity
    - Thing-like perversion
    - Thingly mischief
    - Reified disorder
    - The tyranny of thinghood
    - Thingly corruption
    - Reified malignity

    I think it's connected with alienation and commodity fetishism. The state of affairs he is talking about is one in which things dominate the individual, e.g., commodities or institutions. This is the state of affairs characterized by reification, in which relationships are frozen conceptually into fixed and autonomous things. This is made more obvious in the later passage. The first passage says that careful expression in language is required to break out of the thingly way of thinking that is habitual in this thingly society, i.e., to break out of reification and of static thinking.

    Incidentally, Ashton has "materialized mischief". If my interpretation is right, Ashton's translation, though it reads more smoothly, is seriously inaccurate.

    By the way, I haven't got to the Portrayal section yet, so I'll say more about all that later.
  • Reading group: Negative Dialectics by Theodor Adorno
    Before I say something about the "Speculative Moment" section, I'll just pick up on something in the previous section.

    The philosophical concept does not dispense with the longing which animates art as something non-conceptual and whose fulfilment flees from its immediacy as appearance [Schein]. The concept, the organon of thought and nevertheless the wall [Mauer: external wall] between this and what is to be thought through, negates that longing. Philosophy can neither circumvent such negation nor submit itself to it. What is incumbent on it, is the effort to go beyond the concept, by means of the concept.

    The last sentence expresses an idea that's quite familiar to us now, but I'm interested in the idea of concepts as simultaneously barriers between subject and object and also the only means of access that the subject has to get to those objects by way of thought (accepting that there is no uninterpreted object of cognitive access). This makes me think of perception. There's a popular way of thinking about perception, namely as a distorting medium that ensures that all we can know through the senses are internal representations, meaning that we are necessarily cut off from the world around us, isolated minds housed within sensory pods. I have often voiced the view that, on the contrary, this pod scepticism mistakes our means of access to the world for a barrier — our senses are what enable us to know the world and act effectively in it. And I think this captures what Adorno means when he speaks of mediation.

    One could tackle the present issue in the same way, to defend thinking against a thoroughgoing scepticism of the intellect, e.g., an intuitionism like Bergson's that says we can't hope to grasp the truth of reality through concepts. But simply coming down on the side of successful access would, of course, not be dialectical enough—Adorno wants us to think of a concept as both a barrier and a means of access, to see the essential contradiction or paradox in the activity of philosophy. Similarly, we could try to circumvent the interminable debate over the "problem of perception" with a dialectical approach. In fact, Adorno probably has something like that view, since he is dead against naive realism and also takes the falsity of appearances as a fundamentally important theme in philosophy. Furthermore, Adorno's whole point is that concepts do not ensure a successful access to or grasp of reality.

    This dialectical approach exemplifies immanent critique. I can best explain this by first outlining my previous way of thinking.

    When I was thinking about hyperbolic scepticism and the problem of perception I would often say, in the same breath as my emphasis on access and my criticism of the idea of a barrier, that we cannot oppose these ideas by meeting them on their own terms. For example, one doesn't oppose external world scepticism by arguing point-by-point against those who see it as a serious problem for epistemology, but rather by undermining the hidden premises, refusing even to countenance the supposedly secure starting point (in the head with a primary self-knowledge).

    Immanent critique does things differently. It precisely does engage with ideas on their own terms—not to refute them directly, but to push their internal logic until it leads to contradictions. Where the sceptic's barrier is dismissed outright by the direct realist, Adorno's dialectics enter the barrier (the concept), exposing how its contradictions reveal the very non-identity it tries to suppress.

    Thus, following the practice of immanent critique Adorno will repeatedly emphasize the seeming paradox of using inadequate concepts to go beyond concepts, by means of an exposure of their inadequacy. He wants to use concepts to transcend concepts precisely because their inadequacy is not only an obstacle but is also the negative pathway to truth. In doing so he is engaging with the idea of the concept as barrier, without abandoning the concept simply because it's a barrier.