What does it mean to say that a statement is true?

Is it, as some assert, that a statement has the property of truth or is it that a statement is merely labelled as true?

The trouble with asserting that truth is a property of a statement is in finding a logical process by which the property of truth can be identified.(Tarski's artificial meta-system fails to answer this question.)

On the other side, if statements can only be labelled as 'true' by someone who considers that the statement conforms with the facts of the world as they see them or that it conforms with the axioms of a formal abstract system then the above-mentioned problem evaporates.

Then statements like' this statement is true' make no more sense than 'this statement is blue'. and statements like ' this statement is false' would no longer be problematic.

I would say a statement has the property of truth if it refers to/conforms to the world (specifically, the way things are at some time).

Related: Crispin Sartwell wrote a recent article, arguing one commonality between analytic and continental philosophers was their emphasis on language- the linguistic turn. He goes on to conclude that emphasis seems off, and even destructive, in a world where truth matters (of course, it has always mattered). His example is climate change. In general, I have noticed a shift. It used to be sexy to say things like, "Your truth is whatever you want it to be." I don't see much celebration of the malleability of truth anymore. I think the political landscape, at least in the US, has shown us how reckless those attitudes can be. At any rate, Sartwell:

"Any philosophy that seemed to undermine the reality of the natural world, or make it a malleable human artefact, has come to feel potentially destructive."

The post-linguistic turn

The critical aspect of philosophy in regard to religion, and in general, has been helpful but to what end? I think ancient philosophies had a more general purpose- to live well. I'm reminded of Hadot's What Is Ancient Philosophy? The idea that the primary function of philosophy is its function to critique is an anemic one. But I do think much contemporary philosophy works under that assumption. At least, critique is part and parcel of the refining of arguments that is so much of the literature (in the analytic branch, at any rate). If the primary function of philosophy is not to help us live well, then it should be. Critics are a dime a dozen. How many of them know how to live?

*This post tends toward self-referential incoherence.

If a Christian says that their faith tells them that God hates fags and thinks women should stay at home and black people are inferior - do you accept that claim because it is faith based and they experience the truth of these claims? How do you determine what religious claim you will accept? The same Christian religion will also have people who say faith tells them that god loves and endorses gay people and wants women to work and is a feminist. You might say that the same religion 'cancels itself out

I don't think we can say someone's experience is not what they experienced. Who is in a position to do that? Your conclusion that adherents in the same tradition that differ somehow cancels out the tradition is hasty. Whether adherents within a particular tradition are incompatible, say in Christianity, could simply be the difference between one who has had a legitimate experience and one who has not. I think Jesus said my followers will love as I do, or some such thing. The one who says they follow Jesus and yet hates others might be one who is not an actual follower. The tradition has not been canceled by that incompatibility; it's just that one adheres and one does not.

I don't think experience is a 'get out of jail free' card. Is there anything that can't be justified through claiming experience

Experience doesn't necessitate validity; however, the legitimacy of another's experience can't be denied out of hand. Someone who hallucinates and sees a three legged elf is surely hallucinating, but it would be inaccurate to claim they are not seeing a three legged elf. My point is not that every experience is valid; my point is that no one is in a position to discount a whole set of experiences, in this case religious experiences, simply because they are incompatible.

I think the general point is not that all religions are 'rubbish' but that no religion has demonstrated why it or others deals in Truth about reality. Until this happens, why take any of them seriously? I am not saying none of them are true, I am saying none of them are in a position to demonstrate their truths. And all religions justify their diverse 'authenticities' using similar arguments - personal experience, causation, meaning, truth, morality, etc.

I don't really disagree since I have been saying that their reliance on experience makes them virtually impervious to critique from the outside. Whether one takes them seriously or not is a matter of personal choice, I suppose. What I reject is someone claiming they're all invalid since, as a whole, they're mutually incompatible. As I have shown, that's fallacious.

At the very least, it seems impossible to say which one should be taken seriously

From the outside, it is. I can't really say someone else's experience isn't valid. If the Buddhist tells me they have experienced Nirvana, I can't reject the veracity of that claim simply because it's presumably incompatible with the dogmatic claims of Roman Catholicism. That makes no sense. No religion can be reduced to a set of truth claims. They all assume that one must practice it, immerse one's self in it, to understand it. I would have to experience the same thing as the Buddhist before I could present a legitimate critique against their experience. Thats the problem.

The problem with the various religions is not their seeming incompatibility to the outside observer. It's the fact that in order to give a legitimate critique of the various religions, one would have to have a lived experience of each one of them, which is not practical since most religions worth their salt assume it takes a whole-life orientation to become suitably immersed to call a religion one's own. Religion escapes legitimate critique precisely because, at its best, it deals in experience. You and I might not get it, but we can't say much about it until we have the experience.

Some vague notion that religions all focus on the idea of oneness or transcendence is so slippery and inexact it would seem to be foundational quicksand

I agree. But, again, if it's true, it's not going to be subject to evaluation by an outside observer. Mystics from various religions will talk about a common element (perennial philosophy, if you will) but you and I can't hand wave it away until we experience the same. I would be interested in hearing from someone who had a mystical experience, say some experience of Nirvana, and said, "Yep, that's complete nonsense. I just had indigestion." Lol

Your comparison with governments seems a false equivalence, as governments are nominally cooperative and administrative entities and by definition flexible and subject to constant modifications and never deal in transcendence or Truth. And don't forget that anarchists would seek to abolish governments precisely because there are no best forms of government

Perhaps it is a false equivalence. I'm thinking a monarch that has absolute power, for instance, is going to be incompatible with a democracy, e.g, the kind Plato deplored. I like your suggestion regarding anarchists, but I think the general idea that a set whose members are incompatible somehow nullifies the veracity of any of the individual members is fallacious, as a principle. All it takes would be one true member, and regardless of the mutual incompatibility of the members in the set, the principle fails.

Religious exclusivism is the view that the various religions are ultimately incompatible. I would say it is some form of informal fallacy (fallacy of composition? I don'tthink that's it) to assert religion as a whole should be rejected because they are ultimately incompatible with each other (assuming they are, in fact, incompatible, which is an arguable point). It could very well be the case that two or more are valid in some general respect, or that one is true to the exclusion of the rest The idea of rejecting all because, as a whole, they're incompatible with each other would be like rejecting all positions regarding the best form of government because they are all, ultimately, incompatible with each other.

I understand Descartes' circular reasoning to be, not the Cogito itself, but the argument that God can be proven by clear and distinct ideas since God would not be a deceiver, which presupposes the reliability of clear and distinct ideas.

The Cogito, in itself, is not circular. At least, one's ability to think does not assume self-existence so much as it entails self-existence.

"I am that I am" seems to be a tautology that does not seem, on the face of it, to show self-existence. It's a proclamation, or maybe just an iteration. Then again, if you mean, "I say that I am; therefore, I am," then that does seem to have a similar sense of entailment as the Cogito.

I wouldn't say struggle and difficulty are good for people; therefore, we should construct opportunities for struggle in order to benefit people.

I would say struggle and difficulty are inherent to human existence. What is needed are the skills to navigate human life in such a way that one can have a relatively good life given the struggles and difficulties that invariably obtain for the vast majority (the privileged few who don't have to work at living are acknowledged, but even they will experience some kind of difficulty inherent to human existence).

As I said above, I have sympathy with the idea that one avoids all of this by not bearing children. I think anyone thoughtful enough to plan on whether to have a child should consider the basic fact they will bring another person into this vale of tears. Unfortunately, folks often (probably) have children for all kinds of reasons wholly unrelated to the interests of the one who is born. That's an unfortunate reality. Nonetheless, once that new, human life starts sucking air, a whole set of responsibilities obtain that can't be discarded on account of the fact it might have been a bad idea to breed.

I’m going to come back to your reply but I’d like to show ↪public hermit this reply to start thinking about the differences between mitigation and wholly wanting to create burdens for someone else in the first place — Schopenhauer1

So the idea is to not bring children into the world so they won't have to learn how to navigate an existence that entails struggle and suffering? I can sympathize with that position (assuming I understand the point). Yes, not having children would eliminate the need to teach them how to endure this existence that entails difficulty.

That being said, I reject the idea that someone's autonomy as a human is being violated when it comes to teaching children how to be responsible humans, if that's the argument. Yes, there is a point where one can place undue burden on a child, but proper rearing need not entail undue burdens. To the contrary, I would argue it's a violation of their humanity to not teach children how to be an autonomous human. We cannot be a law unto ourselves without the discipline and experience that allows us navigate life in some meaningful way. Put a child on the street, completely on their own and say-Go be a law unto yourself and flourish! If they survive they'll hate you for neglecting your duty to them as a human.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the point of this thread, but the idea that a child with no education in how to navigate life is going to flourish as an autonomous human is a pipe dream. If one ends up flourishing as an autonomous human because they figured it out on their own through trial and error, then the undue burden was placed on the front end by the adult who neglected to train them.

- is there something of a boundary that is crossed when we presume for others that we need other people to struggle when a struggle did not exist in the first place? What is it about this that doesn't sit right — Schopenhauer 1

Yes, I suppose there can be a boundary crossed when we presume struggle is needed and so we create struggle. Let's say I decide to cut holes in the bottom of the trash bags to make the task of carrying out the trash even more difficult. That seems unnecessary and mean.

But carrying out the trash, in and of itself, is just something that needs to be done. Whether it is experienced as a struggle or not depends, in part, on the one doing the job. Taking out the trash was one of my jobs as a kid. At first, it was kind of great because I had a responsibility, then it became a struggle because I had to do it whether I wanted to or not, and then it just became something I did because it needed doing and it was my responsibility to do it. I take it that is how things like that are supposed to build character. Gratefully, no one thought they needed to make it harder on me by cutting holes in the bag; although, I'm glad no one suggested that to my older sister. :)

So the overriding question becomes, "Is it ever morally right to cause someone a burden just so that they can overcome the burden, in the name of some positive like "growth"? In other words — Schopenhauer 1

I think it's fine to cause a burden that can be endured without undue harm for the sake of nurturing the kind of character that can endure greater burdens. Telling a child they have the family duty of taking out the trash daily isn't going to kill them, but it might teach them the experience of enduring hardship for a certain goal, i.e., not living amongst piling trash.

The second scenario you offered seems quite "Spartan," which would not be appropriate in a society where trash collection is sufficient. We don't really need survivalist as much as we need people who can pick up after themselves. I don't really want to defend that last point; I just mean we need people with the kind of character suited for our society. If we were Spartans it might call for different skills, I guess.

There are those who leave one fundamentalism only to find another, who putting down one bible, choose another — Banno

I think this is often the case. Epistemic humility is hard to maintain when you flee one thing looking for truth and find another that, at the least, seems more promising than what you left. Falliblism is in short supply, apparently.

So are human beings good or bad (or evil) or is the leaning to either side just a misunderstanding of human nature or are there genuinely good reasons why evil takes place ?

Or is evil just a manifestation of a human beings nature and his worst side — invicta

I think we're more human the better we are at working together and less human when we work against each other. We're political beings in the best sense when we are living together in a functioning "city." It is self-centeredness, whether in terms of the individual or "my group," that sustains so many avoidable woes. So, I think we are inherently good in terms of potential but actually bad at being human. Evil is a lack and we lack the skill to be human, too often.

I don't think a perfect system is possible. I'm going to say it's probably some combination of the candidates highlighted in (1). I think human justice is achieved when humans flourish. By flourishing, I would say the emphasis is on quality and not just quantity, obviously. Having lots of folks doesn't necessitate human flourishing. Injustice, then, includes those human acts that prevent or diminish general flourishing.

Which system works best for the end of human flourishing? I would say it would include laws determined by those subject to said laws (social contract/original position kind of thing?). I don't think punishment should be thought of in terms of retribution. It should be remedial given the end of general flourishing, which includes those whose acts have prevented or diminished flourishing. I know that can seem a bit pollyanna, but it fits the idea that justice is achieved when humanity, in general, flourshes. I also think such flourishing would need a particular kind of culture that did not reduce flourishing to the acquisition of possesions. A flourishing humanity would value beauty, learning, leisure- philosophically understood. :smile: Yeah, we're doomed, per the usual.

There's seems to be two experiences that keep me cognizant of the passage of time: 1) the constant change of entities (taken broadly as everything empirically relevant to my experience), and 2) the fact everything seems to come into existence and then exit. It's the latter that can make things seem urgent. But if I bracket (2) and just look in terms of (1), I can get a sense of eternity. I want to think of change as necessary to our experience of the passage of time, and maybe it is, but if change is a constant and there's no fear of not-being-there, then it's a different experience, I think. The moment becomes much more relevant, maybe, and that's all there really is.

I don't think science will replace religion, but I think science has had a positive effect on religion for reasons already mentioned in this thread. I find that most if not all major religions have a mystical element even if its emphasis is dogmatic. And, of course, some are inherently mystical. Sometimes Meister Eckhart has more in line with Taoism than with his own dogmatic tradition, and yet he was thoroughly informed in the Aristotelian/Thomistic thinking of his day. Orthodox hesychasm is not wholly unlike Pure Land Buddhism in terms of method. I don't think science has a way to replace that mystical experience that permeates virtually all religions, whatever that experience might be. Significantly, I don't think any of the currently popular, Christian contemplatives, e.g., Cynthia Bourgealt, Thomas Keating, or Richard Rohr are fundamentalist; they all embrace current scientific understandings. I think any religion/spirituality worth its salt will look something like that.

Evidentialists believe that our beliefs should only come from justifiable evidence. Logic and reason alone are enough to form beliefs and seek truth. — Epicero

Don't forget empirical experience. The problem with religious faith is that it can be experiential, and in that case, it is hard to argue against it. I might hallucinate that I see sheep skipping across the meadow, but no one can tell me my hallucination is false since that is,in fact, what I see. The problem is a lack of inter-subjective agreement regarding those skipping sheep. If a hundred of us saw it, that would be a bit harder to mark up to hallucination (not impossible but harder)..

"The unconditioned necessity of judgments, however, is not an absolute necessity of things" Immanuel Kant Critique (A593/B621).

I took that from a recent article by Andrew Stephenson "Existence and Modality in Kant: Lessons from Barcan" in The Philosophical Journal. Is it the case that if something is possible then there must be something that possibly instantiates it? I don't know, but I'm gathering the de re/de dicto distinction might help show why the modified version won't work, @Epicero

The only scenarios that might lead to profound skepticism here is the brain in the vat theory or solipsism. In which case all of these interactions could be created like an elaborate fiction for our consumption but there seems to be currently no grounds for believing this.

I agree with this if we're thinking in terms of epistemic contextualism,, e.g. Keith DeRose. In our everyday context it doesn't make sense, or have much practical importance, to question my own existence. But in the context of a philosophy class/discussion where knowledge and how we know is up for discussion, skepticism might be justified or warranted. I might assume skepticism for the sake of argument, and such an assumption would be warranted given the context. Perhaps, that warrant would last just long enough to show it is only warranted in that context and for that purpose.