explain to me what the truth maker of a necessarily true proposition is. — Bartricks

1 + 1 = 2 is a necessary truth as long as your God wants it to be so.

‘a triangle is a space enclosed by three lines’. The truth maker is the principle of identity.

‘no body is without extension’. The truth maker is the principle of contradiction.

‘no one can accept something as true without knowing why’. The truth maker is the principle of sufficient reason of knowing.

These examples I have from Schopenhauer are necessary truths.

And as long as your God sets the truth makers they remain necessary truths.

As to Aristotle being so boring, I believe classical sources point to "delightful" dialogues by him with his mature thought included. They have just all been destroyed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So it will always remain speculation. I consider it a legend that there was ever anything delightfully readable by Aristotle. For one cannot construct a great literary man out of Aristotle from the extant writings, whether one or the other of them is by students.
But who knows. Maybe something will be discovered someday.

Truth is related to propositions in the usual sense, that is true. But truth could also be equated with actuality, reality. That would be a different philosophy.

Necessity for me is a relative, conditional term. The statements "God dictates what is logical and what is not." or "God can do anything." or "God exists" are necessary truths in your system, relative to your system.

I was absolutely delighted like many students reading these authors. It would have been great to have been able to fully commit to Plato there, to reject Aristotle's critiques. Because, of course, Aristotle is not as fun to read. Instead of a series of polished dialogues we mostly have cluttered, meandering lecture notes stapled together. It would be preferable to get to ignore him, if he wasn't right. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would like to add a quote from Schopenhauer to this:

"Aristotle’s main characteristic could be described as the greatest sagacity, combined with circumspection, talent for observation, versatility, and lack of profundity. His view of the world is shallow even if ingeniously elaborated. Depth of thought finds its material within ourselves; sagacity has to receive it from outside in order to have data. However, in those times the empirical data were in part scanty and in part even false. Therefore, the study of Aristotle is nowadays not very rewarding, while that of Plato remains so to the highest degree. The lack of profundity reprimanded in Aristotle of course becomes most visible in metaphysics, where mere sagacity does not suffice, as it does elsewhere; so that in this he satisfies least. His Metaphysics is for the most part talking back and forth about the philosophemes of his predecessors, whom he criticizes and refutes from his point of view, mostly in reference to isolated utterances by them, without really penetrating their meaning, rather like someone who breaks the windows from the outside.a He advances only a few, or none, of his own dogmas, at least not in systematic fashion. That we owe a large part of our knowledge of the older philosophemes to his polemics is an accidental achievement. He is hostile towards Plato mostly where the latter is completely right. Plato’s ‘Ideas’ continue coming back up into his mouth, like something that he cannot digest; he is determined not to admit their validity." (Parerga and Paralipomena Short Philosophical Essays. Volume 1. Translated and Edited by Sabine Roehr, Christopher Janaway)

So there is another way to look at it. Schopenhauer was by his nature rather a Platonist, therefore he had given a preference to Plato.

What I mean by taste is perhaps always the whole of a philosopher, not individual arguments with which one would agree.

I like Aristotle here and there, some analysis and the basic idea of individual substances as ontological primacy. But otherwise he is not part of my philosophical reading, he is more useful for reference. Or books about him are more interesting than he himself. His style is often atrocious. His arguments are also often vague and imprecise. This is only my personal impression.

People often change their philosophy over time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

People don't choose philosophies, they have philosophies carved into them over time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with you only in part. I want to bring up again a quote that is also about the decision to be a Thomist:

"FOLLOWERS. The difference between great philosophers who disagree is perhaps less considerable than that which separates them from their followers. Members of philosophic schools or coteries live on what others have seen, and the disciple usually applies his master's insights with a confidence which, most of the time, the master lacked.
The adherent of a philosopher is often a man who at first did not understand him at all and then staked several years on a tireless attempt to prove to himself that he did not lack the ability to gain an understanding. By the end of that time he sees clearly that his master's critics simply fail to understand him.
Whether one becomes a follower of Wittgenstein or Jaspers, Heidegger or Carnap, Thomas, Kierkegaard, or Hegel is almost accidental in some cases: what all such followers have in common is that after their initial great expenditure no capital remains for a second, third, or fourth investment of comparable magnitude, let alone a novel enterprise.
[...]
Followers are people with no wish to be convinced, and great philosophers rarely understand the criticisms urged against them.

[...]

THOMIST VERSUS NON-THOMIST. Even the difference between Thomist and non-Thomist is apt to be a matter of temperament and loyalty as much as a matter of belief. This, of course, takes our argument a step further, and what has been said so far does not stand or fall with this extension. For Thomism involves acceptance of an unusually articulate and comprehensive theology.
Consider a book which is in many respects at opposite poles from St. Thomas" Summa Theologica: Genesis. A resourceful philosopher should be able to present all of his thought in the form of a commentary on Genesis. This would be a tour de force, but not impossible. It is a reflection of our current climate of thought that those who write philosophy at all prefer to sail under their own colors—or under those of a previous philosopher, like Thomas.
A great deal of the present book could have been presented in the form of a commentary on the Book of Job. A quotation from Job 13, in my own translation, may show what I mean:

Behold, my eye has seen all this,
my ear has heard and understood.
What you know, that l also know . . .
But you, you beautify with lies,
idol-physicians, that you are. . . .
Would you speak wickedly for God
and deceive for his sake?
You think, you favor him?
You think, you take his side? . . .
Be still and leave me that l speak,
and let come on me what will.
Wherefore? I will take my flesh between my teeth,
and my life I will put in my hand.
He will slay me? For that I hope.
But my ways I will maintain to his face.
And let this be my salvation
that no hypocrite comes to face him. (Cf. § 65.)

My critique of theology, and my polemics against finished philosophic edifices and the finding of dubious reasons for what we believe anyway, could have been forced into the mold of a commentary on Job.
In that case, the verse "I only am escaped alone to tell thee" might have evoked the reflection that beasts earn survival by being fit while men must justify their survival after the event. And this might have led to a revision of the quotation from Gide's Counterfeiters, used early in the Preface: What right has a survivor to do over again what other people have done already or might do as well? A commentary on Job need not be dry or impersonal.
The man who chooses Genesis or Job has much more freedom than the Thomist; even those who take off from Plato will encounter less constraint.Thomism furnishes an extreme case, but even the decision to be a Thomist cannot be understood in terms of agreement alone.
The decision is made before one has studied all of Thomas' writings and is not meant to be provisional. A Thomist does not adopt Thomism as a working hypothesis. He is not prepared to renounce it the first time he comes across a sentence which seems false. Rather he decides that he will interpret apparently false sentences in such a way that they will not be false. And he finds his reward in hundreds of surprises: Thomas already knew this, and Thomas anticipated that.
The same attitude is feasible in relation to Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel, and some have adopted it; but no other philosopher can offer a sense of community with as many others as St. Thomas. And this sense of being part of a living tradition, of not standing alone, of belonging, is part of the meaning and inspiration not only of a man's acceptance of Thomism but of adherence to any religion." (Walter A. Kaufmann - Critique of Religion and Philosophy)

In conclusion, Heraclitus is in a bind. He can't talk about change unless he believes/accepts that something doesn't change (the basis for the continuity); also since he refers to both that which was and that which what was becomes as the same thing, it must be that whatever the change that has occurred, it did nothing to alter the essence of that which underwent the change. Basically, Heraclitus, despite being right about change occurring, must agree to an heirarchy of properties, the highest level ones being those that become the basis of the continuity necessary for the concept of change but in doing that he's admitting that change in essences can't occur and that maybe exactly what Parmenides has in mind when he said, "change is impossible." — TheMadFool

For Heraclitus, the whole of the world (the highest or top in the hierarchy) always seems to remain the same:

"This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made. But it always was, is, and will be: an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out." Fragment 30
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#cite_note-20

I also do not believe that pure or absolute flux is logically conceivable. In my opinion, it needs a non-flowing counterpart that makes it understandable what flux means through the contrast.

There is no point in trying to understand what sort of a thing a square circle could be. — Bartricks

Why call this thing a "square circle"? And not rather "babig"?

How do I know that God is not caught in self-deception, should He make something like supposedly square circles?

God may say, "I am not because I am all-knowing and all-good," and "I can because I am all-powerful.
To this you could reply, "People talk a lot of hogwash to pass the time".

My position is that Reason is not bound by the laws of Reason. — Bartricks

That's where our positions diverge. Should reason once not be bound by the laws of reason, it would no longer be reason. You seem to assume something that somehow ontologically precedes reason, and yet somehow remains proto-reasonable.

I think the law of non-contradiction is a law of intentionality. When you do something, you intend something according to the law of non-contradiction. This is my premise which is axiomatically opposed to yours.

Like I say, I can see no way to refute my view without simply assuming it is false for the purposes of refuting it - which is to beg the question. — Bartricks

This is because your theory is the total epitome of self-immunization. You either accept it or you don't. But not accepting it does not imply a contradiction.

God can do anything. And that means there are no necessary truths. — Bartricks

Except God Himself as a necessary truth, right?

No, I'm saying that God can make a square circle. For we suppose such things are impossible because the idea involves a contradiction. But the law of non-contradiction is a law of Reason and thus it is in her gift to change it, to allow exceptions to it, and so on. — Bartricks

In its generality, your thesis seems halfway plausible at first glance. Nevertheless, it should be allowed to ask what this looks like in concrete terms.

When you say that God can make a square circle, the question is what this divine product will end up representing figuratively.

After all, it wouldn't look like that:



square circle

Because then people could also create this geometric shape and give it the name "square circle" or "round square".

I think the law of non-contradiction is a law of intentionality aimed at the other than God. If God cancels this law, he cannot intend anything anymore, not even a circle, let alone a square one.

for all you're going to be able to do is point out the contradictory nature of the idea in question. — Bartricks

The idea of a square circle in God's mind, will have no resemblance for us to our idea of a circle and our idea of a square.

Why should we still give the name "square circle" to the God idea of the square circle. This seems to be absolutely arbitrary. I could also just call it "babig". There is no reason not to do that, on the contrary. It is even more appropriate for us, because for us a square circle has nothing to do with either a square or a circle.

If God makes a square circle, how should it be verified that it is a square circle. It would be only an empty assertion which is based on the very general thesis that God can do everything because he can cancel the logical laws.

To this I believe that geometry has only secondarily something to do with logic. It deals with spatialities. Also a God can produce a two-dimensional line only if he starts from a point and extends this point or draws the line from it.

I am not talking about the abstract idea of a line, but about an ideal extended object.

If you say that God can generate a line without extending a point, I think that is absurd. But you will hopefully agree with me that God cannot create a square circle, which we, as long as we stay on earth, would recognize as such a special circle. God may make everything possible for himself and give all possible names to the results, but in philosophy it is also about the mediation and communicability and demonstrability on behalf of others or towards other minds.

How am I to know that your God is not a deceiver or a conjurer or trickster?

Your write like a native speaker. I could not tell that you were a non-native English speaker. — Philosopher19

It only seems that way because I use a very good translation program that respects grammar and spelling and syntax.

I am trying to make it mainstream that the rejection of God's existence is absurd/contradictory/unreasonable. Hopefully I will succeed one day. If I do, it will be because it was perfection for me to succeed. — Philosopher19

I wish you much success with it. It is probably very difficult to establish new ideas against the spirit of the times, especially regarding proofs of God. Here is an appropriate quote from a German philosopher, which I have also translated:

"Up to now it has simply not been possible to give a reason for the only being of an object as which there cannot possibly be a more perfect one. Nevertheless, I am afraid, the ontological proof of God, even if such a justification should be found once, will not even convince those who understand it of the existence of God (rationally); they will rather not accept the premises of the justification. The reason for this is: They are not ready, even if they are believers in other respects, to be convinced by a proof, but feel it as an epistemological imposition that one wants to force them "as in the Middle Ages" by rational reasons to acknowledge the existence of God, "as if Kant had never existed". According to their epistemological feeling they assume apriori that the existence of God cannot be proved. What proof - ontological or any other - is supposed to convince them? It could only be one that starts from presuppositions that are absolutely indubitable, and I doubt very much that one can find such presuppositions; for even if the existence of God is an analytic truth, it is certainly not a logical or mathematical one (in the strict sense). For a proof to be convincing, one must give it a chance to be so, and in the foreseeable future one is, in my opinion, not inclined to give proofs for the existence of God a chance. For this to happen, the intellectual-historical situation, as it exists essentially since Kant, would have to change fundamentally.
The epistemological prejudice against proofs of God drives apparently grotesque blossoms: One experiences that the same people, who resist tooth and nail against every presented proof of God, acknowledge without proof with the greatest nonchalance the existence, even the necessary existence of the empty set and other abstract entities. Admittedly, they would not be at a loss for a justification of this behavior: "Abstract entities have a theoretical function; we need them in our theories about the world; God, on the other hand, has none; we do not need him in our theories about the world." Accordingly, the essential step in building receptivity to proofs of God would be to give God back his theoretical functions. To do this, it would have to be shown that the natural sciences, which view the world to the exclusion (not denial!) of the God hypothesis, leave open a number of theoretical questions for which the very God hypothesis would provide a satisfactory answer. The project of metaphysics must, in other words, be approached anew - now equipped with the means of modern logic, the best organon philosophy has ever possessed.
In spite of the intellectual-historical situation, one is gladly and recently increasingly occupied with the proofs of God, above all with the most fascinating among them - the ontological proof of God. For this interest might be decisive that one is led by the proofs of God to a wealth of profound logical, ontological and epistemological problems, while in them at the same time a proposition of highest importance is aimed at; in them "something is at stake"; this results in a certain additional thrill. But a proof of God is probably not seriously considered possible by anyone. Some may have a certain gold-digger or alchemist mentality, which lets them hope to find one day the gold mine, the philosopher's stone, the irrefutable proof for the existence of God; but such hopes are rather kept to themselves - for fear of the laughter of the philosophical guild." (UWE MEIXNER - Der ontologische Gottesbeweis in der Perspektive der Analytischen Philosophie; [The Ontological Proof of God in the Perspective of Analytic Philosophy])

I am also no exception, with me reservations, resistances and prejudices are instinctively given against proofs of God.

I agree with you, but on the other hand, there is something futile about good actions without rewards. You can't help feeling this way. One could even say not only futile, but also sad in a very general sense.

No two different attributes can be the same attribute. No one thing can be two different things at the same time. No x can be not x at the same time. Nothing can sit and stand at the same time etc. These are all clear impossibilities. — Philosopher19

I agree with you, the questions are just how is logic derived and what is its ontological status. I can say that logic can be derived from the things of the world. This would make abstract logic something secondary and the things of the world that can be experienced would be primary. Or the abstract logic is the foundation of reality, thus precedes it ontologically. These are questions, which every form of ontological proof must clarify in advance.

Existence exists everywhere. Thus, existence (or that which is omnipresent), exists necessarily, as opposed to just a hypothetical possibility. This is because existence (that which is omnipresent) encompasses and sustains all realities and worlds. Unicorns and humans don't have the same ontological necessity as the omnipresent or existence. It is that which perfectly exists that is necessarily absolutely real, whereas unicorns do not perfectly exist, so they are not necessarily absolutely real. They are not perfect beings and there is only one perfect being. That being God. — Philosopher19

Maybe you're right about what you've said here. But to me it all sounds very much like pantheism, or at least it could apply to pantheism. I don't think, however, that you want to argue pantheistically, do you?
This is not meant to be an objection, but your model of God is very vague so far, and the name God could possibly be exchanged with the name nature in a Spinozistic way.

So here, existing or existence is still a property (one that only applies to God). — Philosopher19

What do you say to the following example:

A shepherd divides his sheep according to the property of the coat color - black and white. He could separate them according to all kinds of characteristics.

But to divide his sheep according to existing and non-existing ones seems abstruse. Therefore, existence is possibly not a property.

None of this applies to the OP. Both Descartes and Anselm took existing to be a good thing without justifying this move. I do no such thing. I ask what perfectly exists, and I provide the answer, and that answer is God (or a truly perfect existence). — Philosopher19

I will read your blog post in time to understand you better. In addition, I am not a native English speaker, so the discussion is not very easy for me.

Perhaps your version of the ontological proof of God is a successful one. Then you should write a paper and have it published so that it is discussed by the scholars.

So, a square circle is not currently a thing, because Reason forbids it from being so. But precisely because that is why it is not a thing, Reason and Reason alone has the power to make it a thing and make one. — Bartricks

Obviously, a circle is a geometric figure that has a two-dimensional base. This is also true for a square, which is a geometric figure with the essential property of being square. Now it should be clear that even no god can produce on a two-dimensional surface a geometric figure that is at the same time perfectly circular and flawlessly square.

For geometry has to do primarily with illustrativeness and only secondarily with translatability into mathematical formulas with numbers and equations.

I think what you are saying is that Reason or God, like human beings, is able to entertain a false idea in the mind. An idea that is obviously contradictory. And when you say that God can make a square circle a thing, it means that He can create the idea of a square circle, but not that He can create real one on a two-dimensional surface.

A matter of need more often than taste. Our shifting philosophies serve a vital need to make sense of our lives, they are not decorative. — Olivier5

You're right, I was probably thinking more along the lines of "decorative" philosophy.

You are just describing an epistemic vice in yourself and projecting it onto others, it seems to me. — Bartricks

What you say may be true. I think it's important to be honest with oneself first. I have certain philosophers that I believe are closer to the truth. But these philosophers have also appealed to me "tastefully". When I introduced them to others, I often heard them say: I don't like that, and the interest of the others was quickly gone.

Rightly you say the following about them:

But those people are not really doing philosophy. For they are not trying to follow reason but trying to get reason to follow them. — Bartricks

Perhaps there is a certain dialectic at play: I hold this philosophy to be true because I like it, and I like it because I hold it to be true.

My philosophical views do not reflect my tastes. I had no desire to believe in God, and no vested interest in doing so, yet now I do due to philosophical reflection. — Bartricks

The question is, how exactly did your intellectual development proceed? Perhaps one would be able to psychologically uncover taste dispositions during this time.

The question is then also why one maintains moral principles whose possible or even probable violation seems threatening and troubling.

I'm no moral realist, but I suppose regardless of you meta-ethical stance, one thing that might happen if you violate moral principles, is social exclusion... which for a social being is bad enough. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, you probably don't escape any form of punitive threat, whether you believe in morality or not. If in the future there was something like the Ring of Gyges, which can make you invisible, then maybe things would be different.

I think that one of the results we might experience if we violate our deepest moral principles is that if anything goes wrong we may begin to see it as a form of 'punishment'. This is connected to any underlying gnawing sense of guilt, and an angry nagging conscience. — Jack Cummins

That's a good important point that I hadn't considered in my original post. The punishing own conscience, whereby the conscience turns out differently with each person and varies depending upon situation regarding importance. Certain lies that could do, I or my conscience would never forgive and it would torment me for the rest of my life. Whereas with other lies, more banal, everyday lies, I would probably completely forget after a few weeks that I had told them. Even these little lies, once uttered, are unpleasant.

Regarding the different consciences, I found this quote, which I have had translated into English:

"A Jew is pricked by conscience when he smokes on "Shabbos", a Christian is not; a Catholic is pricked by conscience when he does not confess, a Protestant is not; an orthodox Englishman is pricked by conscience when he works on Sunday, a liberal German Protestant is not; a Hindu is pricked by conscience when he kills an animal, a German hunter is not, and so on."

Perhaps to add to your point, even if one is not a moral realist, that is, one does not believe in moral principles or values in some sort of Platonic realm, one can still be tormented by one's conscience.

It is unclear whether these particular dreams of mine were precognitive or more clairvoyant. I believe the latter is the case. It's always hard to tell. Of course, I'm also keeping open the possibility that this was all pure coincidence. Only when you experience it yourself, it doesn't seem so coincidental.

In fact, I once had a dream that did not have the usual dream quality, it was different, not so visual, rather everything somehow shadowy outlined, as when you close your eyes in wakefulness and still have a vague idea of your surroundings, which you just saw clearly. The dream was more characterized by a sober feeling of passive witnessing, of being a spectator of a situation, instead of the feeling of being in a fantasy realm where I have to act constantly. What was almost indistinguishable from reality was the acoustics.

Now to the content of the dream or perhaps clairvoyance. A half-sister of mine, who was very pregnant, talked with her partner about the name of her soon-to-be-born son and both had decided on a name.
The next day I could only remember very clearly that an A-sound stood out in the name. Sometime later, perhaps after a few weeks, this had been confirmed. The name was Mat___o.
As I said, it could have been a big coincidence. But the dream was really clearly different in quality from all my previous ones.

The trouble is with those who view their fact-based arguments as backed up by truth rather than just including true things. It's not the same as talking about an actual fact. — Judaka

Yes, it is especially problematic when some want to passive-aggressively impose their philosophy on others.

The true philosophy is one that somehow reconciles all of those different “tastes” together into a single cohesive whole. Optimistic and pessimistic in the ways that each of those is practical. Bridging the abstract to the concrete, the analytic to the synthetic. Both mathematical and artful, well-structured but also well-presented. Breaking old things down and building new things up out of those parts. Etc. — Pfhorrest

That's a nice picture. But do you think it's ever feasible? For one cannot agree even on the deepest philosophical foundations. Whoever says that non-being is always and in every form and without form preferable to being, does not come to a common denominator with someone who says that being is better in and for itself and in every manifestation than non-being.

According to my theory, however, your vision could be achievable if people become more and more alike and similar. That is not excluded, provided that one believes in biological and also cultural evolution. The corners and edges in the different personalities, which corners and edges just seem to dispose philosophically haphazardly, are carried off so slowly until everything is smooth and equal. All would then devote themselves in the future merely to the one philosophy.

That there is more than one path up the mountain is pluralism and not "relativism". — 180 Proof

Or perspectivism. I think, the term relativism does also work, if it is understood as a view, according to which every insight is only relatively (conditioned by the viewpoint of the interpreter) valid, but might never be universally true.

If true, it raises follow up questions - can this be overcome or dealt with in some way? How is it identified? — Tom Storm

Perhaps one can say that many philosophies are not so far away from each other, if one looks more closely. I have found, for example, that Neoplatonic thought is present in many seemingly incompatible philosophies. More ancient Hindu philosophy, even medieval Scholasticism, German Idealism including Schopenhauer up to New Age thinkers and Woo Woo esotericists like Deepak Chopra are somehow hanging on the same big philosophical branch and should, if they make an effort, understand each other.

Can we make an effort to read and understand thinkers we are not drawn to? — Tom Storm

Out of respect and humanity alone, one should give the other person at least a brief hearing. That is my opinion.

Everything (logic, religion, metaphysics, ect) is just a way of life. We are like people running on fire and everyone changes their minds many times in their lives — Gregory

This also has an absurdist touch to it. Some people would be happy about it, others afraid.

Thank you for your response despite its somber content. I am very interested in parapsychological phenomena, that is why I asked you about your precognitive dreams. I know that most parapsychologists assume that precognitive dreams do not present an objective, or objectively given future, but that the mind constructs an event that is very likely to occur.

My particular dreams are a bit more mundane. I had several times dreamed the correct outcome of a sporting event that took place while I was asleep, communicated by some dream person. All electronic devices in my bedroom were switched off. And it had not always been a generally expected result. It was once a boxing match. which was even an upset. However, such dreams were always rare.

I like Nietzsche's short concise explanations:

"Misunderstanding of the dream. - The man of the ages of barbarous primordial culture believed that in the dream he was getting to know a second real world: here is the origin of all metaphysics. Without the dream one would have had no occasion to divide the world into two. The dissection into soul and body is also connected with the oldest idea of the dream, likewise the postulation of a life of the soul, thus the origin of all belief in spirits, and probably also of the belief in gods. 'The dead live on, for they appear to the living in dreams': that was the conclusion one formerly drew, throughout many millennia." (Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Human, All Too Human A Book for Free Spirits §5)

"On the origin of religion. – The metaphysical need is not the origin of religion, as Schopenhauer has it, but only a late offshoot of it. Under the rule of religious ideas, one has got used to the idea of ‘another world (behind, below, above)’ and feels an unpleasant emptiness and deprivation at the annihilation of religious delusions – and from this feeling grows now ‘another world’, but this time only a metaphysical and not a religious one. But what led to the belief in ‘another world’ in primordial times was not a drive or need, but an error in the interpretation of certain natural events, an embarrassing lapse of the intellect." (The Gay Science §151)

"On the origin of religions. – The true invention of the religion-founders is first to establish a certain way of life and everyday customs that work as a disciplina voluntatis while at the same time removing boredom; and then to give just this life an interpretation that makes it appear illuminated by the highest worth, so that henceforth it becomes a good for which one fights and under certain circumstances even gives one’s life. Actually, the second invention is the more important: the first, the way of life, was usually already in place, though alongside other ways of life and without any consciousness of its special worth. The significance, the originality of the religion-founder usually lies in his seeing and selecting this way of life, in his guessing for the first time what it can be used for and how it can be interpreted. Jesus (or Paul), for example, discovered the life of the small people in the Roman province, a humble, virtuous, depressed life: he explained it, he put the highest meaning and value into it – and thereby also the courage to despise every other way of life, the silent Moravian brotherhood fanaticism, the clandestine subterranean self-confidence that grows and grows and is finally ready to ‘overcome the world’ (i.e. Rome and the upper classes throughout the empire). Buddha likewise discovered, scattered indeed among all classes and social strata of his people, that type of person who is good and gracious (above all, inoffensive) out of laziness and who, also from laziness, lives abstinently and with nearly no needs at all: he understood how such a type of person would inevitably, with all of his vis inertiae, have to roll into a faith that promises to prevent the return of earthly toil (i.e. of work and action in general), – this ‘understanding’ was his genius. The religion-founder must be psychologically infallible in his knowledge of a certain average breed of souls who have not yet recognized one another as allies. He is the one who brings them together; and to that extent, the establishment of a religion always turns into a long festival of recognition. –" (The Gay Science §354)

Okay, thanks.

I have also had a few precognitive ones. — Jack Cummins

Can you maybe delve into that in more detail and describe it? I would be very interested in that.

Is it not the case that any given theory, belief, or statement that is semantically inconsistent (contradictory) is false by definition? — Philosopher19

In general, I agree with you, although in the history of philosophy there has always been a dispute about what is semantically inconsistent and what is not. But keep in mind, some say that there can be no fixed rules for the correct, i.e. absolutely correct use of language. They might say that logic is based on the law of contradiction, but contradiction exists only in words.

Can you give me an example of something that is contradictory, yet not impossible or false at the same time? — Philosopher19

There is a theological doctrine or model of God that says that He is a divine simplicity, which means that He has no distinct properties. Omnipotence would be the same property as goodness. Or to put it in other words: being omnipotent and being good would be different senses for the same property:

"Our minds can only have a clear grasp of intellect, power, goodness, etc., as distinct attributes, since they exist distinct from one another in the things of our experience. But in God they exist as one: God’s power is His intellect, which is His goodness, and so forth[.]" (Feser, Edward - The last superstition: a refutation of the new atheism)

For our mind such a teaching is contradictory, but nevertheless not necessarily false and impossible.

Hegel apparently raised contradiction to an ontological principle:

"For Hegel, all finite concepts are inherently ‘contradictory’ because they are always partial and one-sided and usually derive their meaning from opposed ideas." (The Hegel Dictionary - Glenn Alexander Magee)

"Hegel also often speaks not just of thought as involving contradiction, but reality as well." (The Hegel Dictionary - Glenn Alexander Magee)

So there are at least different views on this topic.

Is non-existence not devoid of the property of being/existing? — Philosopher19

Here the mistake is committed to regard non-existence or nothingness as a real, actually available thing. But the non-existence simply does not exist. So non-existence or nothingness is neither devoid of the property of being/existing nor not devoid of the property of being/existing. I think you are making the mistake of reification. You seem to equate the nothing with the something. You probably believe that there is no thing without its corresponding word and no word without its corresponding thing and therefore the thing designated by nothing must also be something. But I hope you agree with me that it is really quite childish to conclude from the existence of a concept or word the reality of the thing that has been thought in the word. Accordingly, non-existence cannot be understood as an imperfect existence or as the most imperfect existence. To understand it nevertheless in such a way is clearly semantically and logically inconsistent.

Right, and if you tried to perceive of a round-square, what happens? You fail because round-squares do not exist in any way, shape, or form. Which means that they do not have the property of existing in any way, shape or form. — Philosopher19

Indeed, there are those who clutter ontology with entities such as The False. Thus, they believe that false propositions also hang around in an extra-temporal realm, that is, somehow exist. This is just to be said by the way. You are right, I cannot successfully perceive a round square, yet the false idea of one exists in my mind. Or to accommodate you, I say that the false idea has the property of existing in my mind, even if this sounds semantically weird. But a visually round square can never exist. That is true.

You do not say a triangle is not a shape (or does not have the property of being a shape) just because the semantic of 'shape' encompasses the semantic of 'triangle' (as well as all other shapes). — Philosopher19

I agree.

The semantic of existing/existence encompasses all meaningful things (including the object X which you perceived). — Philosopher19

What do you mean by meaningful things? Do you want to say that existing beings exist, which would be a pure tautology? Do you understand by existence the epitome, the totality of all being (all existing things)?

I do not think rejecting existence as being a property to be a semantically consistent move. — Philosopher19

Can you make a case for this, perhaps using Kant's thalers as an example?

"A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers" (A599/B627, AW 822a).

"We do not add anything to a concept by claiming that it exists. Thus, Kant mentions the 100 thalers. Kant says that the real and possible thalers must have the same number of thalers in order that the concept be the concept of that object. If there are more thalers in the real thalers, then the concept and the object would not match. So, we do not add thalers when we mention that the thalers exist."
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Modern_S10/Notes/28-Kant5n.pdf

Still, I think you should put your argument into some kind of syllogistic framework so that people can see more clearly what you're getting at.

I don't think that from your own definition of everything you can clearly and unquestionably prove that God exists. I certainly think that definitions contain only concepts of our head, but that our head grasps many things that do not exist. Therefore, I do not see how to come from your concept of everything to the existence of God.

The conclusion from the existence of a concept to its real existence ist just false. From this language superstition then quite logically the ontological proof for the existence of God has emerged. One abstracted further and further, one generalized further and further, until one arrived at the empty or absolute concept of essence or being; and this very emptiest concept should still be brought under the concept of cause, the existence should be cause or effect of being. It is really inconceivable.

I also agree with Michael Martin's following critique of the ontological proof of God:

"Mackie has suggested that even if one grants that existence is a property and is part of the intrinsic greatness of God, the argument does not work. Anselm appears to suppose that the fool's concept is that of a nonexisting being than which no greater being can be conceived, where the entire italicized phrase represents the content of his concept. Given this concept and the assumption that existence is part of the intrinsic greatness of God, the fool does indeed contradict himself. However, the fool need not and should not conceptualize the situation in this way. The fool may simply have the concept of a being such that no greater being can be conceived. He does not include nonexistence within the concept, although he believes that the concept has no application in the real world. Viewed in this way, the fool does not contradict himself. But can the fool afford to admit that existence is part of the concept of a being such that no greater one can be conceived of? There is no reason why he cannot admit this, for he can still insist that such a concept has no application to reality. To put this in a different way, the argument can be undermined by noting the following: Suppose the fool admits that existence is a property of an entity, that existence would add to the greatness of any being, and that God is a being such that no greater being can be conceived of. The fool could say definitionally that God exists in reality. Or to put it in still a different way, "God is nonexistent" would be a contradiction. But the fool would not be forced into admitting that God in fact exists in reality and not just in his understanding. He could insist that the following is not a contradiction: "It is not the case that God exists" or "There is no God."
To say something exists definitionally and not in fact means that by virtue of the way a certain concept is defined, existence is part of the concept. For example, one can define a Loch Ness monster as a large sea animal that inhabits Loch Ness and define a real Loch Ness monster as a Loch Ness monster that exists in reality. Such a creature would then exist definitionally, since existence would be part of the definition of a real Loch Ness monster. But whether a real Loch Ness monster in fact exists is another question. Further, it would be a contradiction to say that a real Loch Ness monster did not exist. But one would not be uttering a contradiction by saying: "It is not the case that a real Loch Ness monster exists" or "There is no real Loch Ness monster." Similarly, if the fool said that God exists definitionally but not in fact, he would in a way be acknowledging Anselm's point that God exists by definition while insisting that the concept that includes existence need not apply to the real world." (Michael Martin - Atheism)

You are not existence nor do you sustain it (contrary to solipsism). You are sustained by existence. You are sustained by God. You are contingent on God. Existence = the existence of God and only God. — Philosopher19

You did not write this to me, but I still have a question. Doesn't that imply that everything that is not God does not exist, thus is nothingness?

"Logic of the Dream.—During sleep the nervous system, through various inner provocatives, is in constant agitation. Almost all the organs act independently and vigorously. The blood circulates rapidly. The posture of the sleeper compresses some portions of the body. The coverlets influence the sensations in different ways. The stomach carries on the digestive process and acts upon other organs thereby. The intestines are in motion. The position of the head induces unaccustomed action. The feet, shoeless, no longer pressing the ground, are the occasion of other sensations of novelty, as is, indeed, the changed garb of the entire body. All these things, following the bustle and change of the day, result, through their novelty, in a movement throughout the entire system that extends even to the brain functions. Thus there are a hundred circumstances to induce perplexity in the mind, a questioning as to the cause of this excitation. Now, the dream is a seeking and presenting of reasons for these excitations of feeling, of the supposed reasons, that is to say. Thus, for example, whoever has his feet bound with two threads will probably dream that a pair of serpents are coiled about his feet. This is at first a hypothesis, then a belief with an accompanying imaginative picture and the argument: "these snakes must be the causa of those sensations which I, the sleeper, now have." So reasons the mind of the sleeper. The conditions precedent, as thus conjectured, become, owing to the excitation of the fancy, present realities. Everyone knows from experience how a dreamer will transform one piercing sound, for example, that of a bell, into another of quite a different nature, say, the report of cannon. In his dream he becomes aware first of the effects, which he explains by a subsequent hypothesis and becomes persuaded of the purely conjectural nature of the sound. But how comes it that the mind of the dreamer goes so far astray when the same mind, awake, is habitually cautious, careful, and so conservative in its dealings with hypotheses? why does the first plausible hypothesis of the cause of a sensation gain credit in the dreaming state? (For in a dream we look upon that dream as reality, that is, we accept our hypotheses as fully established). I have no doubt that as men argue in their dreams to-day, mankind argued, even in their waking moments, for thousands of years: the first causa, that occurred to the mind with reference to anything that stood in need of explanation, was accepted as the true explanation and served as such. (Savages show the same tendency in operation, as the reports of travelers agree). In the dream this atavistic relic of humanity manifests its existence within us, for it is the foundation upon which the higher rational faculty developed itself and still develops itself in every individual. Dreams carry us back to the earlier stages of human culture and afford us a means of understanding it more clearly. Dream thought comes so easily to us now because we are so thoroughly trained to it through the interminable stages of evolution during which this fanciful and facile form of theorising has prevailed. To a certain extent the dream is a restorative for the brain, which, during the day, is called upon to meet the many demands for trained thought made upon it by the conditions of a higher civilization.—We may, if we please, become sensible, even in our waking moments, of a condition that is as a door and vestibule to dreaming. If we close our eyes the brain immediately conjures up a medley of impressions of light and color, apparently a sort of imitation and echo of the impressions forced in upon the brain during its waking moments. And now the mind, in co-operation with the imagination, transforms this formless play of light and color into definite figures, moving groups, landscapes. What really takes place is a sort of reasoning from effect back to cause. As the brain inquires: whence these impressions of light and color? it posits as the inducing causes of such lights and colors, those shapes and figures. They serve the brain as the occasions of those lights and colors because the brain, when the eyes are open and the senses awake, is accustomed to perceiving the cause of every impression of light and color made upon it. Here again the imagination is continually interposing its images inasmuch as it participates in the production of the impressions made through the senses day by day: and the dream-fancy does exactly the same thing—that is, the presumed cause is determined from the effect and after the effect: all this, too, with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this matter, as in a matter of jugglery or sleight-of-hand, a confusion of the mind is produced and an after effect is made to appear a simultaneous action, an inverted succession of events, even.—From these considerations we can see how late strict, logical thought, the true notion of cause and effect must have been in developing, since our intellectual and rational faculties to this very day revert to these primitive processes of deduction, while practically half our lifetime is spent in the super-inducing conditions.—Even the poet, the artist, ascribes to his sentimental and emotional states causes which are not the true ones. To that extent he is a reminder of early mankind and can aid us in its comprehension."

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Human, All Too Human A Book for Free Spirits .

There might be a way to find evidence of at least partial life after death if one lives on in one's donated organs:

"A few authors have reported perceived behavioral changes, mostly after heart transplantation. Pearsall et al6 report heart transplant recipients who have experienced changes in their music tastes to match the donor’s tastes or who have developed aquaphobia after having received the heart of a patient who drowned, without any knowledge of the donors’ tastes or death circumstances. Joshi reports the case of an 8-year-old child who received the heart of a murdered 10-year-old girl. The recipient began having recurring vivid nightmares about the murder, and later described the crime scene to the police with sufficient details to allow them to find and convict the suspect. However, to our knowledge, there has been no systematic research on this population." https://www.dovepress.com/perceived-changes-in-behavior-and-values-after-a-red-blood-cell-transf-peer-reviewed-fulltext-article-IJCTM#ref8

And:

"Nevertheless, there are indications that organ transplants are metaphysically contraindicated, both for the donor and recipient. At issue is whether the consciousness actually leaves the body at the moment brain wave activity and vital functions cease or whether it lingers for hours or even days. Also, there are indications that premature removal of organs can result in the possession of the recipient by the donor, causing the donor to remain "earthbound" and the recipient to be negatively influenced." (Tymn, Michael. “Are organ transplants metaphysically contraindicated?)

Here are a few relevant links:

Memory Transference In Organ Transplant Recipients - Am I You?

Can a heart transplant change your personality?

My personality changed after my kidney transplant.

Realism and plato take nothing away from this rational obligation of ours. — Philosopher19

They don't, but they give you an ontological basis. Otherwise, according to an extreme skepticism of language, your argumentation might proceed only in your head without any correspondence to experienced reality.

You will not be able to deny that you believe in a real given pure semantics of a logical language, which dwells in a kind of separate world, a realm of meanings.

Your appeal to semantic consistency must somehow be supported by something platonically real. Because, as already indicated, without Platonism your arguments could be pure subjective fantasies with abstract words, pure tautologies and pure hypnotically conditioned word superstitions.

Is it not contradictory to say x is existing, but it does not have the property of existing? — Philosopher19

I don't think it's contradictory. I can say that object X has many color properties and also say that object X exists precisely because I am perceiving it. Properties are predicated, existence is indicated. Two different things.

I don't see how you can reject existence as being a property. — Philosopher19

Aristotle (Analytica posteriora, 92bl3f) thinks that existence cannot be a characteristic of being because it applies to everything that is there.

Aristotle says:
‘since being is not a genus, it is not the essence of anything.’
‘existence can never belong to essence; being can never belong to the essence of a thing’

So the definition of a thing and the proof of its existence are two different and eternally separated things.

That which perfectly exists sustains all hypothetical possibilities, realities, worlds/universes and so on. — Philosopher19

So you believe in Meinongian nonactualities. From these non-actualities you get to God. And they are justified in this way:

We are not the sustainers of the items of thought we imagine, or the dreams/nightmares we have. A finite being or existence cannot sustain an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. — Philosopher19

I would dispute the latter: namely, that there are an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. There is only a limited number currently in the minds of all humans or perhaps extraterrestrial intelligent life forms.

Do I understand your concept of existence correctly? That which actually exists, or synonymously, perfectly exists, or exists at all, is that which exists completely independently and self-sufficiently? Humans would not exist perfectly because they would be dependent on something. The most imperfect existing would be the completely dependent one. Is that your definition? If not, please give us a clear definition of (perfectly) existing.

Since you attach great importance to semantic consistency, perhaps you can bring your proof of God into a formal structure like 1. or A) to 2. or B) with the conclusion: Therefore there is the perfectly existing, which we call God.

Because your explanations seem to be a little chaotic and not quite comprehensible for a non-initiated person.

You wrote:

Resembling a perfect triangle (being an imperfect triangle) — Philosopher19

I have replied:

Resembling a perfect triangle is not necessarily identical to being an imperfect triangle. — spirit-salamander

You seem to be saying that to resemble a perfect triangle is to be an imperfect triangle.
I say that this may be true only subjectively, but not objectively, because the resembling may not represent a triangle at all. You haven't said anything about that yet.

First of all, regarding your argument, one must keep in mind that it

"can be linked with a realist view of God only via platonic metaphysics, which takes a realist view of abstract entities. Take it out of that context, and it does not imply a realist view of God at all. On the contrary, it suggests that God is just ideal." (Cupitt, Don. Taking Leave of God)

In addition, one must be careful in the discussion that value judgments do not unintentionally and secretly sneak into the whole thing without being justified.

The shape my four year old drew without a ruler, is imperfect as a triangle. Some would argue it's not even a triangle at all. Resembling a perfect triangle (being an imperfect triangle) and being a true triangle (a perfect triangle) are two different truths. — Philosopher19

The question is also whether your four-year-old had the intention of drawing a triangle. One can only argue about whether the drawing is a triangle if it was intended to be a triangle. Perhaps the drawing perfectly represents some other geometric figure. Maybe a whole new geometric figure that your four-year-old has earlier formed a definition for in her mind.

Resembling a perfect triangle is not necessarily identical to being an imperfect triangle.

If it was never meant to be a triangle, what entitles you to claim that it is objectively an imperfect triangle. A true triangle is given if it was intended to be a triangle and if it conforms to the general definition of a triangle without being too meticulous or splitting hairs.

A) Whatever's perfectly x, is indubitably x (an imperfect triangle's triangularity can either be rejected or doubted. A perfect triangle's cannot).

B) Whatever's perfectly existing, is indubitably existing (just as whatever's perfectly triangular, is indubitably triangular). — Philosopher19

The jump from A) to B) is problematic. Because triangularity is a property, existence may not be one. At least it is controversial. So your proof of God is based on a controversial premise. It is also based on a specific Platonism, which can be rejected outright. In addition, existence is probably neutral to perfection. Indeed, you should define your basic concepts like existence beforehand.

to be an imaginary human, dream, or "real" human, is to exist as an imaginary human, dream, or "real" human. — Philosopher19

This phrasing could create misunderstandings. To be an imaginary human is to exist in the mind or imagination as a property of the mind or imagination. To exist as an imaginary human sounds as if there is a human who perhaps exists as an imaginary human. But this is nonsense. Because the question what exists as an imaginary human is obviously odd. One would have to rephrase the question to make it appear reasonable.

The expression: to be an imaginary human is no better and equally misleading. It makes it seem as well that a subject can be an imaginary human. But this is also semantically nonsensical. An imaginary human is an image, a representation of a subject. But itself is not a subject.

When goodness is the standard, nothing is better than the real God or a really perfect existence. — Philosopher19

‘Good’ is an adjective. The notion of pure goodness is linguistically tempting to take it as a real thing. It was introduced into philosophy by Plato, who places the Idea of Good at the summit of the metaphysics of his Republic. The notion was severely criticized by Aristotle.

Your argument should first of all prove the existence of a Platonic "heaven", then it must clearly define its concepts and then one can see further.

@Bartricks

If it's of interest to you, here's a debate between an idealist (Kastrup) and a panpsychist (Goff):

Consciousness Live! S3 Ep 17 -Discussion with Philip Goff and Bernardo Kastrup
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOykDWGlOxM

I can't wait for the translation. — Manuel

If you know Spanish, there seems to be a full translation at least in the 2014 publication.

(2011) Filosofía de la redención (Antología). Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

(2020) Filosofía de la redención (y otros textos) Antología. Madrid: Alianza.

(2014) Filosofía de la redención. Madrid: Xorki

@Bartricks

Since you are an idealist, how would you answer the following tweeted questions from panpsychist Philip Goff?

"where do distinct subjects come from? what ensures they share a common world of experience? i find these qs easier to answer on panpsychism than idealism."

Here's another reason why panpsychists are panpsychist, again using Philip Goff as an example:

"I argue that the traditional approaches of materialism (consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes in the brain) and dualism (consciousness is separate from the body and brain) face insuperable difficulties. On the basis of this I defend a form of panpsychism, the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. It sounds a bit crazy, but I try to show that it avoids the difficulties faced by its rivals." https://www.dur.ac.uk/research/directory/staff/?mode=staff&id=17324

Panpsychists are panpsychists because the alternatives are questionable to them.

From Goff (Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness) comes still practical reasons. In a panpsychism we are in a healthier relationship with nature and can protect her better:

"Dualism can create an unhealthy relationship with nature in at least two respects. Firstly, it creates a sense of separation. Dualism implies that, as an immaterial mind, I am a radically different kind of thing from the mechanistic world I inhabit. Ontologically speaking, I have nothing in common with a tree. There is no real kinship with nature if dualism is true. Secondly, dualism can imply that nature has no value in and of itself. If nature is wholly mechanistic, then it has value only in terms of what it can do for us, either by maintaining our survival or by creating pleasurable experiences for us when we take it in with our senses. There is a worry that dualist thought can encourage the idea that nature is to be used rather than respected as something of value in its own right."

"Panpsychism has the potential to transform our relationship with the natural world. If panpsychism is true, the rain forest is teeming with consciousness. As conscious entities, trees have value in their own right: chopping one down becomes an action of immediate moral significance. Moreover, on the panpsychist worldview, humans have a deep affinity with the natural world: we are conscious creatures embedded in a world of consciousness."

"Few people are aware of these transformations in our understanding of plant mental life, and many would still probably dismiss the ideas that trees talk as hippie nonsense. But imagine how our children’s relationship with nature could be transformed if they were taught to walk through a forest in the knowledge that they are standing amidst a vibrant community: a buzzing, busy network of mutual support and care."

Matter/information is the real dualism, and demonstrates how ontologically distinct entities nonetheless interact. — hypericin

I do not believe that two ontologically completely different things can causally interact with each other.
When two things causally interact, one must assume that they have something in common, however marginal that commonality may be.

If we do not make this assumption, we have also abandoned a rational conceptual explanation and are at a point where anything goes and nothing is impossible in explaining what happens.

Even Descartes had assumed to his dualism life spirits, which are apparently an intermediate of mind and body, thus containing both corporality and mentality, in order to explain the interaction between mind and body.

With the Occasionalists, God then played the mediating role.

That's why I also assumed that physical fields or waves are a form of matter.

You seem to have said above that what applies to consciousness does not also apply to life. Can you explain why you think that, if indeed you do? — Janus

Maybe I can explain it now.

I think I am assuming that for both the organic (life) and the inorganic (death) the principle applies that the parts are for the whole. By parts, I don't necessarily mean reductive parts, but rather sectors in a continuum or continuous whole

I see this principle as a neutral and logical entailment of things.

An example would be a drop of water that I perceive as a whole. Each small water spot or section of the drop is for the whole. With organic beings it is in principle no different, only much more intricate and complex.

The principle I mentioned would stand beyond or above the concepts alive or dead.

I'm not sure this makes sense. The word "life" cleaves reality so that some things fall on one side, some things on another. And there are things where the cleaving is ambiguous such as viruses. But you can't say, "well in reality things are neither dead or alive".

Rather they carve the world into sets. — hypericin

I was inspired by the Shakespeare quote:

"There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

And Spinoza and Nietzsche say something similar.

I only applied it to the distinction living and dead. Perhaps this is not justified.

I agree with you that for the sake of convention and practicality, the distinction between living and non-living can be made without problems or with minor problems (perhaps also major problems regarding organ donation, because one does not know when a person is really dead). Only, nevertheless, the words can mislead us and make us look at the things of the world askew, so to speak.

This misunderstands words, they do not and cannot point to the true nature of things. — hypericin

Wouldn't we say that words of consciousness point directly to a core of our nature? With life words, I didn't see it as being that obvious.

Bulk matter can be alternatively in a solid, liquid, gaseous or plasma state; it cannot be alternatively, and in the same sense, in a "field" state. Fields are used as mathematical models of continuously distributed physical quantities, but that probably isn't what Lange has in mind (although it can still be asked whether any or all such fields are real things). — SophistiCat

Lange mentioned the passage I quoted as the overall conclusion of his book at the beginning. That is, his whole book revolves, so to speak, around the idea that fields are a form of matter. Since I have only skimmed the book and read only single short passages, I cannot go into your objections in more detail.

I was really only concerned with the basic idea. And my thesis was how one could save materialism. Since materialism represents a monism, i.e. assumes that there is only one kind of stuff, namely matter, which makes up the whole world, I must necessarily, in order to prevent dualism, regard physical fields, provided they are ontologically real, as a form of matter.

The following paper at least argues for the materiality of waves. Thus indirectly perhaps also for the materiality of fields. For either fields are nothing but the sum of waves. Or they merely denote the local sphere of action of waves.

"While waves travelling in material media are perplexing, they are much more straightforward than electromagnetic waves such as light waves, where there does not appear to be any material medium involved. In these cases, we will argue that they are themselves material entities, which participate in their own wave processes."

"We have argued that waves are best classified as processes, and that light and other electromagnetic waves are material entities that participate (or are the agents of) their own travelling wave processes."

"Considering our treatment of electromagnetic waves, and that fields are closely related to the waves that propagate them, one way to resolve the issue would be to claim that the field is a property of the material wave, similar to the approach we have discussed for photons."

Colin Batchelor and Janna Hastings - Waves and fields in bio-ontologies
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-897/sessionJ-paper24.pdf

If fields or waves are closely related, to avoid dualism, one must consider both made of the same stuff.

(Indeed, at an even deeper level, ordinary matter - solids, liquids, etc. - is all quantum fields.) — SophistiCat

Okay, so matter would be quantum fields in your view. I would have no problem with that. The main thing is that monism is ensured. So everything would be a form of quantum fields. Thus also electromagnetic fields, provided they are ontologically real, what I have taken for granted.

f I were making an argument that fields are real things, I would put it the other way around: fields are real things because they have real effects. — SophistiCat

I see, he is talking about relativistic length contraction. That's not an example of fields moving matter; for that you could just refer to e.g. an electric field interacting with charged particles. — SophistiCat

I agree.

I don't think there's much point in debating this question, since there has never been a unified concept of "materialism." — SophistiCat

I think you're right here. When I finished my post and got a lot of feedback, I was wondering which well-known philosopher or even scientist could be considered a pure materialist. And no name came to mind.

This sounds very confused. A field is not a state of matter like solid or liquid. Fields in physics are mathematical models used to describe... physical stuff (let's not get hung up on what "matter" is), in whatever state it may be. Saying that a field is a state of matter is like saying that engineering is a type of car. — SophistiCat

Marc Lange's book is very readable and he tries to make it clear that physical fields must be real things or entities rather than merely a calculational device. At least there are discussions whether fields are something real:

https://www.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de/~bohmmech/Teaching/ontologyofphysics1415/classical_fields.pdf

I like the idea of a field as a form of matter. This avoids dualism in any case, provided fields are something ontologically real. A dualism would indeed endanger a materialism.

Here are some discussions on the ontology of fields:

Ontological categories for fields and waves
https://dl.gi.de/bitstream/handle/20.500.12116/20618/1866.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Waves and fields in bio-ontologies
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-897/sessionJ-paper24.pdf

Looks like you pulled this quote out of context and misunderstood its meaning, which is precisely the opposite of the point you were trying to make. — SophistiCat

Well, fields can move particles, again provided that fields are real things, which I assume.

This is the context. I think you can leave the passage I quoted in isolation without the context.

"From the dynamics-first perspective, the fact that clock slowdown requires an inertial frame to define it doesn’t make it unreal: inertial frames are the basis of how we do physics, and it is only natural for dynamical explanations to be carried out in one frame or another. And in any such frame, when we say ‘a moving clock runs slow’—or, for that matter, ‘a moving rod shrinks’—we mean that the physical processes inside the rod—the interatomic bonds that hold the rod together and define its length, the periodic processes that count time inside the clock—are different for matter in motion than for the same matter when stationary. The electric field of a moving charge, for instance, shrinks in the direction of motion—according to the laws of electromagnetism—compared to the field of a stationary charge. Ordinary matter is held together by electric fields, so if those fields are altered by motion, then it is only to be expected that the shape of the matter will be altered. Despite this concrete electromagnetic example, we don’t actually have to study the detailed microphysics of our clocks and rods in order to predict time dilation and length contraction."

(Wallace, David. Philosophy of Physics: A Very Short Introduction)

I have not yet been able to justify it properly. Here I have tried. It is still half-baked.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540768

I think that the question of consciousness is philosophically more pressing than the question of life.