aha, the scenarios where we have pegasi on the one hand and unicorns on the other. If neither pertain to reality nothing about the argument is relevant. — Benkei

My example was like that to show how absurd conclusion the idea "If we are in a position where we cannot ascribe propositions such as "people are suffering" or "people are not suffering" then the absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone." will lead.

↪Antinatalist then what are we killing? — evtifron

A fetus, not a sentient human being.

That´s why I put the word "state" on quotation marks.
— Antinatalist

As if that resolves the fact that it's meaningless. — Benkei

Couple of pages before in this same thread I answered to Isaac. After all, he didn´t agree with me.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/525339

If you think the way Isaac does, I just have to wonder the logic of both of you.

Non-existence is of course "state", where is no he or she.
— Antinatalist

This is metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Nothing doesn't have properties or states. The ability for a thing to have a property presupposes that it exists. — Benkei

That´s why I put the word "state" on quotation marks.

once the situation is "inescapable game, that 'hey you might like some aspects'" I believe there to be a problem, even if it has 'hey you might like some aspects' qualities". At that point, what other choice except suicide or slow death is there of course.. It's not like there's a button that we can just say.. "Next!".
— schopenhauer1

At no point was there any choice. There are no yet-to-be-born souls wishing someone would ask them. If people really truly don't want to be in the game any more, they can always opt out. For someone who really does not like the game, it would be nothing but a brief inconvenience. It would be ridiculous to argue that causing people minor inconvenience is immoral. The problem is that most people contemplating suicide do like the game, they just wish they could experience it without the pain they're feeling. — Isaac

On suicide.

The possibility of suicide of course exists.  Once born, however, a human being is highly unlikely to have the sufficient skills to commit suicide before the age of five – often, in fact, not before turning ten or even fifteen. When this wish arises and the individual aims to fulfil it, surrounding people strive to prevent the suicide almost without exceptions if they only can. 

Furthermore, a vast number of highly retarded people exist who, due to their condition, will never really be able to commit suicide. One must in any case consider the possibility of having to live a perhaps highly agonizing period of life before suicide, due to a choice – that of creating life – for which the individual him/herself is not responsible. And most importantly, not even suicide guarantees that the individual will achieve the state or non-state where s/he “was” before the decision of having a child was made. (Be it complete non-existence, for example.)

Non-existence is of course "state", where is no he or she.

↪Antinatalist my position is that I am for abortion according to my moral principles, but if we take the logical proposition that a zygote cannot be killed because she does not feel anything or because she is not a reasonable person, then we logically assume that people with the syndrome can be killed down because he is not a reasonable person or we can kill sleeping people because they do not feel anything, yes we can say that a person will wake up, but then he will cease to be a sleeping person with the same condition a person can be born, it is important to note that only with the fusion of a sperm and an egg can to be born a person and of course separately they do not represent human life, which is understandable. — evtifron

Ability to feel emotions is one criteria, not the only one. A living person usually have also, for example, future plans, some interest for current and future life etc. These things exist, however, is the person sleeping or not. And I don´t believe that sleeping person doesn´t feel anything.

And for my point of view is not essential is somebody reasonable person, essential point is - but not the only one - can she/he feel emotions (pleasure, pain and so on).

I am deeply convinced that the problem of abortion is a language problem, because the concept of a person is a humanistic concept and we cannot trace the moment of its origin, but if we take the proposition that you cannot kill a person at one stage, then you cannot kill him at another. but this only concerns the logical sequence in the real world, there are various situations when an abortion is necessary and I support this, and of course for me, according to my moral convictions, the death of a person who was born is much worse than the death of a zygote — evtifron

I agree, that the part of the problem is the way we use words. My point is when you kill fetus at early stage of pregnancy, you are not killing a person.

Antinatalist abortion is often delayed by the fact that they do not kill a full-fledged person if we take this proposition, then it follows that we can not kill full-fledged people with various defects because I gave this example, if we take another proposition that we do not kill a person then we ask the question and who do we kill? one way or another, we kill one of the stages of human development, and if you follow this proposition, there is no difference if you kill an old man, a zygote, or a person with down syndrome, you will still kill a person. what is worse and what is better depends on the question posed, moral facts, etc. in any case, nothing is more important than human life — evtifron

Our point of views strongly disagree.

Five days old human zygote is not sentient human being. One very essential point when we value
something is have that being or object ability to suffer, to feel.
Human zygote may have human DNA, but it doesn´t have emotions, feelings etc.

It´s absurd to be against abortion and then support animal industry for culinaristic reasons. Animals are sentient beings - unlike 5 days old human zygotes - and could suffer and will suffer also at this very moment. I think that´s obscene. Some religious movements even think contraception is wrong, because they consider ovum and spermatozoon as human life also, and terminating them is also killing human being, or at least potential human being. (They eat industrial meat and eggs with smile in their face, what a paradox!)


Our opinions are quite opposite, we both give great value for human life, but we define human life different.

↪Antinatalist I completely agree with you in everything, on the example of sleeping people or people with down syndrome, I wanted to show some identity with the murder of the zygote in the sense that this murder is even more terrible in my opinion, as far as moral facts are concerned, I believe that they do not exist as something materially provable, but this does not exclude their significance and for me, moral factors are the criterion of truth and the highest virtue. — evtifron

I´m not sure that I can follow your logic.
Do you mean that killing, let´s say five days old tsygote, is a bad thing?
And if so, is it as bad thing that killing someone already born person with Down syndrome?

Saying that, I think killing people is wrong and extreme violation against person´s sovereignty and autonomy. That is a moral value I truly stand for. But I don´t believe that my that point of view, or any, can proof the way mathematical theorems can. But for me, my moral values are more meaningful than some mathematical theorems. (And while I earlier said about your unjustified leap about from zygote to killing sleeping person or someone with Down syndrome, I know that my point of view is just my point of view, like your is yours. Either one is not a scientific fact). But that´s another topic, anyway. — Antinatalist

I have to add, that logic is logic. And tautology is a tautology. And some arguments are better - and some worse - in pure logical way.

And I correct my recent statement: The absence of absolute proof of moral facts doesn't necessarily mean that there isn´t them (moral facts).

↪Antinatalist The problem is that in this concept there is no worthy argumentation, but it is all based on moral judgments that cannot be verified in any way. another point is that a person does not become a person at some particular moment, such as after birth, the concept of "person" is a humanistic concept that can be considered from different points of view, but one thing you can know for sure is the zygote is the stage of human development and if we assume that a person you cannot kill, for example, in old age or at a young age, which means we admit that it is impossible to kill a person, and if we admit that it is possible to kill a zygote, then we admit that it is possible to kill sleeping people, people with down syndrome, etc. but it is important to note that this proposition works there we believe that people really cannot be killed, that is, we admit, again, a moral fact. — evtifron

Like I said - or at least mean - usually demarcation line is hard to set at some particular point, and only at that point.
But i think you make harsh, unjustified leap from zygote being something, which have intrinsically value (my words, my definition) like sleeping person or people with Down syndrome should have.

About moral facts, I´m not sure if there are any (in the word´s purest meaning). No, I´m not moral relativist. If there are moral facts, I don´t see there are any logical/empirical etc. way to absolutely proof them. And then again, moral facts or moral values are far more important than some trivial facts you can easily proof.

Saying that, I think killing people is wrong and extreme violation against person´s sovereignty and autonomy. That is a moral value I truly stand for. But I don´t believe that my that point of view, or any, can proof the way mathematical theorems can. But for me, my moral values are more meaningful than some mathematical theorems. (And while I earlier said about your unjustified leap about from zygote to killing sleeping person or someone with Down syndrome, I know that my point of view is just my point of view, like your is yours. Either one is not a scientific fact). But that´s another topic, anyway.

But its a vegetable. It cannot feel; it is not sentient or conscious. If you think its wrong to kill fetuses that are non-persons then you must have a problem with killing vegetables, or all life. You must also abstain from eating meat. I don't see any tragedy in eating a head of broccoli. — ToothyMaw

I certainly agree.

I also think, that David Benatar is right about on abortion, at least at the most part. I´m against killing sentient human being. Demarcation is usually hard, Benatar´s point of view is that aborting the fetus since to about 28 weeks from conception is morally obligatory act. After that time line, according to Benatar, it´s no longer abortion, but killing sentient human being.

I´m not sure is the (about) 28 weeks the right demarcation line. Anyway, my point of view is that at least at first couple months after the conception the abortion isn't just a righteous act, but a moral obligation.

Some people of course disagree. One of them is already deceased utilitarian philosopher R.M. Hare.


My thoughts on abortion and R.M. Hare´s Golden Rule


Now, let us take a moment and touch upon one of the most interesting value ethical debates of the past few decades: the discussion on abortion. In the last few decades, the justification of abortion has been one of the most central questions in value ethical discussions. Among the most noted abortion debate openers has been philosopher R.M. Hare. Hare’s basic premise is the principle of life preservation which cannot be breached with abortion. The concept of 'a potential person' lies at the core of Hare’s argumentation. He states that a foetus, or even a newly conceived egg cell, is a potential person, and therefore an abortion would be a crime against this potential human being. At the same time, arguments have been made against euthanasia (and for it) by stating that life preservation is also a value overriding the will of an existing person – even in the event that this person personally wants euthanasia.What is common to all these instances of debate is the underlying assumption of life as something desirable as such, and most of all, as a self-evident value. According to Hare, our duty – assuming that we are happy that our lives have not been terminated at the foetus stage – is not to terminate the life of a "potential person" living to see its foetal stage.(Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule. Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, 1975, 201-222) Not taking a stand on whether or not Hare abuses the concept of "duty", one must take into account three important aspects.


1. The assumption that we are happy to be alive at the moment does certainly not cover all living individuals, even if most living individuals consider their life to be a positive thing.

2. Even if happiness about life were to be a universal viewpoint, it cannot be used as an argument in concluding whether or not abortion would have been a better choice with regard to happiness. Hence, one cannot know whether it is betterto be than not to be.

3. A noteworthy aspect is also the fact that bringing about life – which in this case, if successful, means creating a self-conscious human being, a person  – does not mean merely bringing about life. It is somewhat rational to assume that a forthcoming conscious person will come to die one day. Furthermore, whether or not this is a shift back to the state or non-state which prevailed before the person, there is no clear knowledge of the nature of this shift beyond the fact that the human being ceases to exist as a biological organism. Bringing about life is also a necessary condition for its ending – or termination. 

Hare’s argument therefore is that life is likely to be a better state of affairs than the lack thereof. What a bold and peculiar argument! And one that should be used to justify obligation towards a potentially forthcoming individual. Having said that, it is somewhat evident that our naturalistic attitude drives us to investigate the questions of existence in a highly biocentric manner, with an emphasis on the(presumed) value of life and by perhaps regarding it as a “given value.” And yet: why has this reasoning not been taken to its natural conclusion by comparing the relation of life and non-life and the arguments and circumstances in which it is justified to value one over the other, if either?

In the viewpoint represented by Hare, sperm is not yet a potential person – even though it can be seen as one if potentiality is defined in a broad sense. Therefore, it does not possess the rights of a potential person. Following Hare’s model, one does not have the duty of “giving” life to the sperm. But what about the right to do so? If a human being does not have the duty of giving life to sperm in the form of human life, does one have the right to do so? Hare does not approach this question.

As stated, a sperm is not a potential person in the sense discussed by Hare, and therefore our related actions are not directed at a person or a potential person. In other words, our actions towards the sperm are relatively insignificant to it. Having a child is an action in which decisions are made concerning an individual’s life. The act of having a child has an object, a potentially forthcoming human being. This individual should not be perceived as a person, however. My purpose is not to imply that the object as a person exists at the moment of conception, but having a child affects an individual’s life: the object of this action is a child to be born, and that child usually fulfils the criteria of a person. Therefore, it can be concluded that the act of having a child has an object, but this object is not a person at the moment of conception. Hare’s hypothesis is that life itself is a value, the creation of which holds no ethical problems, whereas the prevention and especially termination thereof holds several. Biocentrism is of course our naturalistic and natural attitude which has developed during evolution, but it does not imply anything about values as such.

The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).

I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist

Well, I'll bear that in mind next time I ask a cobbler to fix my shoe - 'must not use him as means to an end'. Don't know how I'm going to get this sole re-stitched, but still, we can't go around ignoring the half-remembered edicts of dead eighteenth century Germans now can we? — Isaac

I think Kant´s point is still valid.
The cobbler has at least at some kind of choice, what she/he will do in the world in general. The forthcoming child has no choice, whatsoever.

we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.
— Antinatalist

So you're positing that there is a non-existent individual? You see the contradiction there? — Isaac

As a matter a fact I´m saying:

Scenario A: There is no individual as an object in the moment of the conception.
Scenario B: What we call "non-life" really isn´t non-life. In some kind of reality, there´s living an individual. She/he doesn´t exist in our world, but when the conception will happen, it starts the process that she/he will born to our world.

The Scenario B is very unlikely, I don´t believe it in myself. I think it is some kind of esoteric BS. But arguing years and years on the topic, I have thought and heard many unlikely scenarios. This one is one of them.
So, personally, I don´t believe there is a non-existent individual at the moment of conception.

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.
— Antinatalist

So I agree with this 100% but what they are going to do is say, "What is the foundation of this specific act"? They will say it is special pleading because in other cases, X, Y, Z causing harm or force on another is necessary... For example, would it be wrong to wake up a lifeguard to save a drowning child? It is "forcing" the lifeguard. — schopenhauer1

Let´s compare the act, having a child, with another question on existence, the termination of life.

Let´s assume that an adult human being seems to outsiders in their right minds to be willing to die and to clearly and unambiguously state “Kill me!” Is this sufficient justification for killing this human being? Juridically surely not, but what about ethically? In my opinion, NO. I believe that a vast majority of people hopefully agree with my view (even though this is no basis for justifying the value of the action).

Nonetheless, in the above example case, the actor has more information on the tendencies of the object of  the action than in the example on bringing about life – i.e. in the active deed that aims at creating a new human being, a child. Hence, there is some information available on the desires and intentions of the object of "mercy killing". As for the object of conception, there is no information available on the desires of the(forthcoming) individual. This is also true in the likely case of the (intended) object of the action not existing yet. The fact that it is impossible to have this necessary information when creating

So my response for the foundations includes two rules:
Not violating dignity and Not creating unnecessary suffering. Both would violated in the case of procreation. — schopenhauer1

I agree.

As I say, if someone dies they are deprived of life's pleasure. Is it only different for the unborn because they are not someone? Because that is what Benkei is saying. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Deprivation is not the right word.

Something, which doesn´t exist doesn´t suffer from deprivation.
Then again, if someone who already exists will be killed, it´s extreme violation against her/his sovereignty and autonomy.
And if you think not having a child is morally as same level as murdering someone, think again.


But, let´s assume that having a child is a good thing. Absolutely good thing, in any circumstances.

If this is true, it might not result in the duty of producing as much life for the Earth as possible, but it would undoubtedly be a supererogatory – a Mother Theresa-like – act. Therefore, it is a considerably immoral deed for social workers or anyone else to persuade potential heroin addict mothers to use contraception or even to terminate their pregnancies!

But, the epistemic state of people being as it is, we cannot plead to the value of creating life with such speculative arguments.

we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world.
— Antinatalist
— Isaac

Well no, they're not.

We know that if that child is not born we could also bring about much pain and suffering (in fact are much more likely to), so the pain/suffering argument doesn't work. — Isaac

The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).

I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means.

We do make the decision without consulting the child but we make decisions for people without consulting them all the time in life and consider it perfectly acceptable in many circumstances, so that argument doesn't work either. — Isaac

But having a child or not having a child is not a trivial everyday task, which doesn´t have any severe influences.

It´s a question about human life.

My conclusion about having a child or not having a child is not necessarily same as Benatar´s (the foundation of the argument). Here´s my conclusion:

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.

For your first sentence, maybe so. But I´m not sure, I have forgot so much of the philosophy, that I have read in my life.
— Antinatalist
In moral philosophy, deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek: δέον, 'obligation, duty' + λόγος, 'study') is the normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules, rather than based on the consequences of the action.[1] It is sometimes described as duty-, obligation-, or rule-based ethics.[2][3] Deontological ethics is commonly contrasted to consequentialism,[4] virtue ethics, and pragmatic ethics. In this terminology, action is more important than the consequences.
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontological_ethics — schopenhauer1

Thank you. That was at least quite familiar. But perhaps I should revise things that I´ve read years ago and now forgotten. And in moral philosophy in general are of course things and ideas that I don´t know, but maybe I should.

Based on all this, your position seems to be deontological of the negative ethics variety, which is about where mine is too :up: . That is to say, the concern lies in what not to do (preventing force of autonomy if possible, preventing unnecessary harm if possible, etc.). — schopenhauer1

I have to strongly agree, at least for the second part.
For your first sentence, maybe so. But I´m not sure, I have forgot so much of the philosophy, that I have read in my life.

Antinatalist too
It's not about act, it's simply the state of affairs of not being harmed/in pain/suffering/negative, etc. is in some way "good". — schopenhauer1

I understand your point. But when I´m saying that not having a child is morally neutral, I mean not having a child is a moral obligation.

Benatar has also stated his asymmetry can be used in any normative ethical system, so it could be deontological or utilitarian, for example. — schopenhauer1

My point of view slighly differs from Benatar´s.
I think his asymmetry argument has valid point of person´s moral rights and moral obligations.

If you have the gun, the rule would be to not cause the the unnecessary suffering (preventing bad). It's not a strong "do this!" simply a common "don't do this!". — schopenhauer1

I agree.

Therefore there could be values without the valuer.
— Antinatalist

Lots of things could be. The important question is whether they need be, how useful it is to assume they are, what problems arise if we do etc.

So with values (without a valuer) - what advantage does seeing things that way give us? If it does give advantages, what are the disadvantages and are they sufficiently outweighed? Where would the values reside and what form would they take? If a value can exist without a valuer, then what happens when the values we know exist with a valuer contradict them?

I can see more problems than are worth it with a dualistic realm of 'values', but if you've got a good defence of the concept I'd like to hear it. — Isaac

That is very complex case.

"It is logically absurd that a part – private life – is important and meaningful, but the whole – life in its entirety – is insignificant and dispensable." (Pentti Linkola) 


The fact that private life is important and meaningful, which is also my point of view, is a state of affairs (or, to be more precise, the state of affairs affecting as the viewpoint of a certain creature), which is in relation to a state of affairs within another sphere of life. Regarding these values as ”good” is in some cases of course rational, but not unambiguously logical as such.
I want to point out here that I see value in life myself. It is also the case that life contains indirectly valuable things whose value is based on their instrumental value for life - if there were no life, there would be no need for these indirectly valuable things. One could even argue that life in general has value over non-life. Rational reasoning does not give any support to this argument. Anyone, who sees a contradiction in my position, correct me.
I want to emphasize, that I am antinatalist, not pro-mortalist. I´m not advocating terminate the life, which already exists.

A Linkola-spirited argument to this could be: "Only what is can have value. Non-life cannot have value." A possible response could be: "Maybe so, but similarly only what is can have non-value." And I mean this so, that suffering, which would be too well-known for too many, will appear at least in some cases as anti-value, very negative and sometimes as extremely bad things. Something to really avoid.

However, I accept a point of view that for some human being life could be better option than non-being. At least theoretically. But we could never reach any kind of certainty at any case, any circumstances, any place that life is better for any unborn, potential person. 

Finally, nobody will absolutely (in word´s purest meaning) know is it better for human being born to this world or not. However, we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world.

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell?
— Antinatalist

Yes, that's right.

It's just nonsensical to say the alternative would be 'better'. 'Better' is judgement, a state, of a human mind, without the human mind to contain the judgement it simply can't exist. It has no mind-independent existence such that it would still be 'better' even if there were no person to hold that thought. 'Better' in whose opinion?
— Isaac — Antinatalist

Let´s call the Hell scenario as Scenario A, and let´s call the alternative option, where nobody exist, as Scenario B.

You say it is nonsensical to say the alternative would be "better".

Let´s assume that in Scenario B comes a time, when Hell simple disappears, and also all people in it (so the Hell wasn´t eternal after all). But one bystander remains alive. His life is mixture of joy, despair, pleasure, some pain - but nothing like Hell. Some midlife crisis etc. now and then. Some rainbows to look for.

According to your logic, this one bystander makes the Scenario B better than the Scenario A.

And when this bystander dies, according to your logic, we cannot make separation for these Scenarios.
We could not say the Scenario B is better than A, vica versa.

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell?
— Antinatalist

Yes, that's right.

It's just nonsensical to say the alternative would be 'better'. 'Better' is judgement, a state, of a human mind, without the human mind to contain the judgement it simply can't exist. It has no mind-independent existence such that it would still be 'better' even if there were no person to hold that thought. 'Better' in whose opinion? — Isaac

That kind of thinking reminds me from some comments on language theory.
Some people say there are no non-linguistic thinking (Temple Grandin would disagree).

But at least in some cases the language acts as a nomination.

Therefore there could be values without the valuer.
Or at least there could be anti-values.

↪Antinatalist Nice explanation rebutting Benkei's causation objection. — schopenhauer1

Thank you.

he absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone."
↪Benkei


If you are right, then the concept of euthanasia is absurd.
— Antinatalist

Not at all because in euthanasia there is still a population of humans living in a world with less suffering in it as a result. The completion of the hard antinatalist program results in a world where the absence of suffering is of no consequence at all because there are no humans to enjoy living in a world without it. — Isaac

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell?
(Because there were no people to enjoy the absence of suffering.)

The idea that "not having children" is a good act is absurd. It is at best neutral. If you want it to come out as "good" you run into a lot of problems. For example: "Not shooting people" is now also a good act by the same reasoning. Therefore someone who owns a gun and chooses not to shoot someone can justifiably walk up to you and say "Why observe what a paragon of virtue I am! Can you see how many people I haven't shot!". And the more guns they own and choose not to use, the better they are.

This seems absurd. Choosing to not harm someone is not in itself a good act. It should go:

Have a child:
Risk of suffering- bad, risk of pleasure- good

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering- neutral, prevention of pleasure- neutral — khaled

I have to agree with you.

But if you mean having a child and not having a child are both neutral acts, then I have to disagree.

Thank you for the recommendation. :)

I was a teenager in early nineties. I thought about existence, being and non-being. Coming to life and
exit from life (to non-existence). I thought lots life and non-life and in 1995 I wrote short text of the subject.
I discover the term "antinatalism" in 2015.

Thank you!

It's only good to prevent suffering if there's someone existing to benefit from that prevention. — Benkei

I have to disagree.


An example

When planning a statue portraying American rock star Bruce Springsteen, the statue does not exist at the moment of planning. Were the statue project to become successful, however, the statue is the object of the action (or one of them). The statue existed as an object, even if not as an actual and existing one, as early as the brainstorming and planning stage. The participants and executors of the statue project can be justly seen as actors responsible for the execution and act of acquiring the statue. The situation is fully analogous to that of knowingly having a child. It is true that the individual does not exist at the moment of conception. The individual also does not exist without the act of conception. Therefore, even though the act of conception is the reason or one of the crucial reasons as to why an individual, fulfilling the requirements of a person, will later be born, this person does not exist at the time of the act – in fact, not even as a potential person (R.M. Hare).

Can we therefore talk about "true causation"? (Note: if we cannot talk about "true causation", the oft-mentioned concern about future generations and, above all, the moral claim to do something for a better life for the yet unborn future generations – actions to be taken to preserve the Earth in a more viable state, perhaps – is completely absurd.) My argument is that R.M. Hare’s viewpoint is unfounded.The object of the action is a potentially forthcoming person, in similar manner to sperm and an egg cell. Even though it is a fact that, unlike the egg cell and the sperm that exist at the moment of executing the act – the attempt to have a child – this person does not exist nor will s/he perhaps ever exist (the conception may not be successful, a miscarriage may take place, or other complications may prevent childbirth), the act is to be assessed in connection with the object of the act (the forthcoming human being) and the potential person.  However, as the person materializes, the individuals behind the act of conception hold central roles in the creation chain of the person. These individuals are therefore, in both good and bad, responsible for the emergence of a certain person.

↪Antinatalist Maybe quote the whole thing for starters. And no, quite obviously alleviating specific suffering where no other solution is available then euthanasia is entirely different from a blanket claim we should stop procreating because of suffering. But your leaping ahead. Let's first start with the fact living obviously doesn't cause suffering. — Benkei

I have to disagree.

In some theoretical and hypothetical Utopia we can think, that life doesn´t cause suffering. But that´s Utopia, not the real world.

Thank you for the information. :)

"If we are in a position where we cannot ascribe propositions such as "people are suffering" or "people are not suffering" then the absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone."


If you are right, then the concept of euthanasia is absurd.

Hello,

I´m interested philosophy in general, but especially about ethics.