If the world we see is an illusion, there still has to be someone experiencing the illusion. — frank
Because of a belief that the truth is beyond words? — frank
This is, then, a single negation summing all the rest and added to them. The One, not being one among all things, is the cause of all. So the general negation represents at the same time the whole progression of all from the One.
….
But from another point of view one must say that he first denies everything of the One, thinking that negations are more suited to it than assertions, and keeping the hypothesis which says “is” of the One. But since, as he advances, he has taken away from it not only everything else but also participation in substance and Being, and has shown that it is neither expressible nor knowable, now at the end he rightly removes from it even the negations themselves. For if the One is not expressible and if it has no definition, then how will the negations be true for it?
….
He is therefore right in ending with the removal even of the negatives, saying that it is impossible that they should express anything about the One, which is inexpressible and unknowable. And one should not wonder that Plato, who always respects the principles of contradiction, says here that both the assertions and the denials are false of the One at the same time.
….
Next then, let us take up the fourth way of solving the problem. The soul ascending to the level of Intellect, ascends with her multitude of faculties, but sheds everything that dissipates her activities. Now going further and having arrived there she comes to rest in the One Being, and she approaches the One itself and becomes single, not becoming inquisitive or asking what it is not and what it is, but everywhere closing her eyes, and contracting all her activity and being content with unity alone. Parmenides, then, is imitating this and ends by doing away both with the negations and with the whole argument, because he wants to conclude the discourse about the One with the inexpressible (Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, 7.68K-74K).
I've told you a number of times now, "the good" as Plato uses this, is not a Form. This idea seems to really skew the way that you read Plato, resulting in your misunderstanding of Symposium 206. The passage is very explicit. It is said that Love wants the good. Then it is said: "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'." Clearly what is described is a separation between Beauty and the good. — Metaphysician Undercover
But this is wrong, and a problem which philosophers have grappled with for millennia. It is well described by Aquinas. The human intellect is deficient because of its dependency on the material body. The supposed Creative Intelligence has no dependence on material existence, being prior to it. Therefore individual intelligences cannot be made of the same stuff as the Creator Intelligence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Diotima is actually establishing a separation between the good, and Beauty, and proposing that the good is what is desired and wanted by people, — Metaphysician Undercover
we have no reason to believe the Creator is an "Intelligence", just like we have no reason to believe that the unity of five fingers is a "Finger": A hand is something completely different from a finger, therefore we ought to also believe that the Creator is something completely different from an intelligence. — Metaphysician Undercover
As far as I can tell, there are two issues:
1. Change itself. For example motion. [Changes]
2. The cause of change: The laws of motion. [Does not change] — TheMadFool
Another pre-Socratic approach was to say that the Parmenidean One exists but there happen to be lots of them. Each 'den' ("thing" - made-up word, opposite of 'ouden' = no-thing) is indivisible, without parts, absolute being without specific properties such as colour or taste. They buzz around in the vacuum and make up the familiar world of sensible objects and properties. The result is Atomism. — Cuthbert
Most philosophers and that includes Socrates, Plato, et al were, my hunch is, uncomfortable with the Heraclitean position because it has sophist written all over it. — TheMadFool
Five fingers does not make one finger, it makes something different, one hand. So by your analogy a multitude of intelligences would not make One Supreme Intelligence, it would make something different. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, if "seeing oneself in the other" is metaphorical for something which involves only one, that would be very very strange. — Metaphysician Undercover
And if this, "seeing oneself in the other", is, as you said, the source of all knowledge, then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it requires more than one. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do but consider, that there only will it befall him, as he sees the Beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with Truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal (Symp. 212a)
But let it be the case that multiplicity has its ordering centred on the monad and diversity centred on the simple and multiformity centred on what has a single form and diversity centred on what is common [to all], so that a chain that is truly golden rules over all things and all things are ordered as they ought to be (On the Timaeus 2.262.20).
All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions (Meta. 1.980a)
But the principles (archai) which are still higher than these are known only to God and the man who is dear to God (Tim. 53d)
How do you account for the fact that there are many different people with consciousness and awareness, when you say that consciousness and awareness is more compatible with One? — Metaphysician Undercover
You never did demonstrate why the "First Cause" ought to be consider to be some sort of awareness or consciousness. All we have to go on, is that the so-called First Cause, is a movement toward a good, a final cause. But we see that all sorts of living creatures, with or without consciousness and awareness, engage in this type of movement toward a good. — Metaphysician Undercover
Look at the inconsistency you have presented here. You start off saying, "Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects", and you call this "One". Then you proceed to talk about "us". But "us" does not refer to one, it refers to many. Further, you talk about a soul seeing itself in another soul. Obviously this is not a feature of one soul, but of a number of souls. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, this "seeing oneself in the other" requires more than one. So if this is "the source and cause of all knowledge", then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it must be derived from Many. — Metaphysician Undercover
Using your own common sense and intuition, don't you find that awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One? Isn't the world full of distinct instances of awareness and consciousness? Why would we say that the many consciousnesses which make up the reality of human existence is One, when it is very clear that it is Many? — Metaphysician Undercover
There is in the universe a by no means feeble Cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called Wisdom (sophia) and Intelligence (Nous) (Phileb. 30c)
All the wise agree that Intelligence (Nous) is king of heaven and earth (Phileb. 28c)
God, however, constructed Soul to be older than Body and prior in birth and excellence, since she [the Soul] was to be the mistress and ruler and it the ruled … (Tim. 34c).
Shall we not say that our body has a soul? Where did it get it, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours [fire, water, air, and earth] only in every way superior? (Phileb. 30a)
Then in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted through the power of the Cause, and in other deities other noble qualities from which they derive their favorite epithets (Phileb. 30c-d).
Consider what it might be if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free of the rocks and barnacles which cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion (Rep. 611e-612a).
Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself (Alc. 1 133c)
Now when the soul is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward and governs the whole world … (Phaedr. 246c)
I think Plato reject this nonsensical sophistry concerning "the One" and moved on to a much more intuitive principle, "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover
A gift of Gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and lived nearer the Gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the infinite (Phileb. 16c).
And you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright. And looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good. And so you will act aright and well. If you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy (Alcibiades 1 134d).
But these are different things. These distinct causes are described, and named, as distinct and different things, To say that different things are one, requires a principle of unity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore the thing which unites the Forms as one, must be something other than a Form. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you see that Beauty and Good, as the motivation for action, exist prior to this first becoming aware of itself? And this is why Beauty and Good are prior to One. — Metaphysician Undercover
We shall not now expound the principle of all things—or their principles, or whatever term we use concerning them; and that solely for this reason, that it is difficult for us to explain our views while keeping to our present method of exposition (Tim. 48c).
There is in the universe a plentiful Infinite and a sufficient Limit, and in addition a by no means feeble Cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called Wisdom (sophia) and Mind (nous) (Phileb. 30c)
Some potential is seen to be good, so it is brought into existence, caused to be. — Metaphysician Undercover
We obviously have very different understandings of Plato. — Metaphysician Undercover
Things have been caused to exits because their existence is good. — Metaphysician Undercover
In that state of life above all others, a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential Beauty [lit. “Beauty itself”]. This, when once beheld, will outshine your gold, your vesture, and your beautiful boys … (Sym. 211d)
I am not entirely sure what it means to say God is eternal. — Bartricks
Socrates said something like that and he wanted us to be aware of each other. In the US textbooks prepare the young for life, not to be products for industry as it started doing in 1958. I think it is obvious that was not a good change in education. We have improved by eliminating the old prejudices but without shared values and principles we are in big trouble.
The breakdown of family comes with education for a technological society with unknown values and that worries me. I can see the benefits of weak families but I think the problems are much worse.
Thank you for acknowledging forcing women into the workforce takes away their right to be mothers, and caring daughters and granddaughters. :lol: If everyone were aware of what it is like to give birth to a child and get up several times during the night to feed the child, there might be greater acceptance of giving her time to be a mother. And I hear there is a reluctance to give family time off the care for older members or sick members of the family. Seriously? What are our values? Humans succeeded because of their willingness to care for each other and shouldn't a civilized society encourage that? It is not just an inconvenience to find someone to care for a family member, but it is anti-family to be put in the position of finding someone else to do caregiving.
We had family fidelity when women stayed home to care for their families and that is being destroyed as now they must have fidelity with their employer, and sorry family, you all must fend for yourselves. It is not gays destroying family values. I think, what you have suggested is socialism can strengthen the family instead of weakening it. Have I interpreted you correctly? I was not thinking of socialism in that way but I really like that idea. — Athena
Are you suggesting democracy is about being full human beings? Not just voting? I wish we all understood democracy as a way of life and an experience of being empowered to fully actualize ourselves. Government is one aspect of democracy. Individualism and family are other aspects of the democratic way of life, and if we replaced the autocratic model of industry with the democratic model, we could better manifest the democratic way of life. — Athena
I interpret that to mean you are opposed to socialism. I can see socialism going either way, supporting families or destroying them. What is the goal of socialism? Is it possible it can be harmful or beneficial depending on the determined goal? — Athena
I think it could be different to a degree, but not totally different. The reason being that it is by means of our experiences of time - our temporal sensations - that we are aware of time. Yet for those sensations to give us an awareness of time, they would surely have to resemble it? The image on a canvas created by a portrait painter needs to resemble, at least to some degree, the image that staring at the sitter itself would create in us if it is to qualify as a portrait 'of' the person in question. — Bartricks
"The good" is the final cause in Aristotle, and is prior to all the other causes. That you relate "the One" to formal cause is further evidence that the One is distinct from the Good. The good is the final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since intelligence is dependent on intelligible objects, and the intelligibility of intelligible objects, we ought to conclude that in Plato's metaphysics, intelligence and knowledge are secondary to the good. — Metaphysician Undercover
Dialectics is the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle (arche) itself in order to find confirmation there (Rep. 533c).
This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the Form of the Good (Rep. 508e).
The objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it (Rep. 509b).
This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the Form of the Good, and you must consider it as being the cause of knowledge and truth, and an object of knowledge (Rep. 508e1-4).
If we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone” (Phaedo 66d–e).
When the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom (phronesis) (Phaedo 79d).
But if God created time, then time was not needed for that initial act of creation. We can conclude, then, that there can be creation without time, for otherwise time itself could not have been created. — Bartricks
And if there is an equality in principles of a hierarchy then it might not be possible to give priority to one "first principle". — Metaphysician Undercover
And of those who hold that unchangeable substances [or immovable essences/realities] exist, some say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13)
You are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power (Rep. 6.509b)
“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d)
It is impossible to conceive of many without one.”
“True, it is impossible.”
“Then if One does not exist, the Others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”
“No so it seems.”
“The Others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the One does not exist.”
“True.”
“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the One is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”
“Most assuredly.” (Parm. 166b)
Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly, the material principle is the "Great and Small," and the essence <or formal principle> is the One, since the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One … This, then, is Plato's verdict upon the question which we are investigating. From this account it is clear that he only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms. He also tells us what the material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the One in that of the Forms—this is the Dyad, the "Great and Small" (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14)
“And yet surely the Others are not altogether deprived of the One, but they partake of it in a certain way.”
“In what way?”
“Because the Others are other than the One by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.”(Parm. 157c)
We must avoid perfect agreement at all costs. What would we talk about if we agreed? And if we didn't argue with each other, our minds would not expand. That would be a terrible thing! — Athena
That is not the democracy we defended in two world wars. How about returning to education for democracy and well-rounded individuals? — Athena
The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover
To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I do think that, metaphysically, the universe is an living entity in itself, so I believe that there are certain things that it can do beyond our human understanding. — Lindsay
Unfortunately, Plato's logic could be renamed early logical or pre-logical argument. — magritte
When I split an idea then I have nothing. — magritte
An education in the Political Sciences teaches one to not confuse what countries say about themselves with what they really are. — James Riley
One has to be able to parse or conflate (depending on their rhetorical goal) the economic from the political use of these terms, each of which can have cross-over. — James Riley
https://www.dictionary.com/e/socialism-vs-communism/Communism, on the other hand, is a branch of socialism
https://www.britannica.com/topic/communismCommunism is thus a form of socialism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CommunismCommunism is a specific, yet distinct, form of socialism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_KoreaAccording to Article 1 of the state constitution, North Korea is an "independent socialist state". It holds elections, though they have been described by independent observers as sham elections, as North Korea is a totalitarian dictatorship,
In the old days, we used to call the Soviet Union "Communist" not "Socialist." — James Riley
Well, your post was a pleasant surprise. That is the most supportive statement I have had in several years. Normally people attack what I am saying. It helps that you are working with information and just your opinion. — Athena
Gerson also insisted that Plato was an Aristotelian ! — magritte
You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. — Metaphysician Undercover
Nor is a certain thinker [Speusippus, according to the translator and other scholars] right in his assumption when he likens the principles of the universe to that of animals and plants, on the ground that the more perfect forms are always produced from those which are indeterminate and imperfect, and is led by this to assert that this is true also of the ultimate principles; so that not even unity [lit. “to hen auto” i.e. the One] itself is a real thing [i.e. it is above being] (Meta. 14.1092a)
So Speusippus evidently takes the One to be the first principle of all and also takes it to be in some sense “beyond being” or “beyond essence,” the position that Aristotle claims Plato holds as well
And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some say that the One itself is the Good itself but they consider that its essence is primarily the One (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13-15)
Your previous proposal, "the Platonists", allows for the reality of "some", but the "Platonists" at that time, taught by Pseusippus, were closer to the Pythagoreans than Plato. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the Platonists treat one of the contraries as matter, some opposing "the unequal" to Unity [or the One](Aristot. Meta. 1087b)
There is no reason for you to insert "the Platonists" here. I see footnotes mentioning Pseusippus in this section, but it's well known that he was not consistent with Plato. — Metaphysician Undercover
And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some 5
....
5 Plato; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10.
Do you see the problem which you are developing here? Plato clearly used "One" in the sense of a principle of number, ("abstract mathematical idea"). And, "ultimate principle" clearly refers to "the good", for Plato. Nowhere do we find Plato using "One" in the sense of "ultimate principle". — Metaphysician Undercover
“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d)
And that which has come into existence must necessarily, as we say, have come into existence by reason of some Cause. Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible (Timaeus 28c).
ποιητής
A maker, μηχανημάτων Id.Cyr.1.6.38; κλίνης Pl.R.597d; τὸν π. καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός Id.Ti.28c
Making use, then, of the causes mentioned our Maker (poion) fashioned the head shaggy with hair … (Tim. 76c)
The rate of abortions and divorces went up, and increasingly women and children fell below the level of poverty. It didn't take long to realize state-paid child care was essential to this economy. John Dewey an American education expert was dismissed as the USSR education advisor, in favor of education for communism and loyalty to the state. — Athena
Timaeus introduces the divine craftsman he calls “poet and father'' of all that comes to be. (28e)
He does not attempt to demonstrate or prove or defend the existence of the craftsman. We are led to ask how Timaeus knows of him. The suspicion is that Timaeus is the craftsman, the poet and father, of the divine craftsman. — Fooloso4
That's how Aristotle greatly simplified this type of description, in On the Soul, by naming these activities as potencies of the soul. So he lists some of them, self-nutritive, self-movement, sensation, intellection. — Metaphysician Undercover
It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover
And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some [i.e., the Platonists] say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13)
.And, further,” I said, “it occurs to me, now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge and not for huckstering.” “In what respect?” he said. “Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers [lit. “autoi oi arithmoi”, i.e. “numbers in themselves” that, like Forms, are within the Divine Creative Nous]( Rep. 525c-d)
Placing the One as the first principle is inconsistent with the passage from Aristotle. Aristotle describes Plato as positing the One as the first principle of Number, but Number is in a place intermediate between the Forms and sensible things. So the Forms are prior to the One, and Number. — Metaphysician Undercover
From this account it is clear that he [Plato] only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14)
So this doesn't really make sense to me. The human soul has an intellect as an attribute. And the human soul has a connection to something Divine, the independent Forms. We might even say that the soul uses the intellect as a means toward understanding the Forms. But the connection is between the soul and the Forms, not the intellect and the Forms, and this is why the Forms are so hard for the intellect to understand. Furthermore, the intellect creates its own forms, which are categorically different from the independent Forms, and since they both have the same name "forms", this confuses the matter. So as much as the human soul has a direct connection to, or relation with, something Divine, which we call "Forms", I don't think it's correct to call this Divine reality an "intellect". — Metaphysician Undercover
Personal faith is fine, as I've said all along. But some people want to claim that some kinds of faith constitute knowledge. — Janus
Socrates
And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.
Meno
Just as good (Meno 97b)
A particular is not necessarily an instance of a universal. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly, the material principle is the "Great and Small," and the essence <or formal principle> is the One, since the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One … This, then, is Plato's verdict upon the question which we are investigating. From this account it is clear that he only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms. He also tells us what the material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the One in that of the Forms—this is the Dyad, the "Great and Small" (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14)
- L. Gerson*, From Plato to Platonism, p. 117Plato was in principle committed to the reductivist tendency found in all Pre-Socratic philosophy, and, indeed, in all theoretical natural science. This is the tendency to reduce the number of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum.
“It is impossible not to include the Good among the first principles” (Aristot. Meta. 1092a14)
For it is said that the best of all things is the Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that which has the attributes of being the first of goods and of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good; and both of these attributes, it is said, belong to the Form of good (Eudemian Ethics 1217b4-5; cf. 1218b7-12)
Why do you first say here, that they are participating in Beauty itself, then you say Beauty itself is the unparticipated? — Metaphysician Undercover
And I can't find your reference in Phaedo. — Metaphysician Undercover
This being so, we must agree that One Kind is the self-identical Form, ungenerated and indestructible, neither receiving into itself any other from any quarter nor itself passing anywhither into another, invisible and in all ways imperceptible by sense, it being the object which it is the province of Reason to contemplate; and a second Kind is that which is named after the former and similar thereto, an object perceptible by sense, generated, ever carried about, becoming in a place and out of it again perishing, apprehensible by Opinion with the aid of Sensation (Tim. 52a).