Thx.

Its a beautyful quote. I see myself in it.

Sorry if I am stepping on some sore toes here, but is S4 adressing to a problem regarding infinite regress -- which, certainly, must be very hard to claim to be possible given that individuals may exist in different (actual) possible worlds -- and as such it does its job flawless as it lays the ground for the coming S5.

I believe that what you are looking for is found in the theorems reflexiveness, which according to https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal-origins/#LewiSyst is given as the first axiom in S1.

Its been a long while since I did formal modal logic, and I now just glanced at it, so maybe this is an answer in full unsuited for answering your question. If so, I beg your pardon.

Also, I think your question really is about the metaphysics of modal realism. Maybe it may be worth your while to take a stroll down that street.

Do you have a note to the quote: "
Men on a lower level of understanding, when brought into contact with phenomena of a higher order, instead of making efforts to understand them, to raise themselves up to the point of view from which they must look at the subject, judge it from their lower standpoint, and the less they understand what they are talking about, the more confidently and unhesitatingly they pass judgment on it. — Leo Tolstoy

I'll be happy if you can share it. Thx.

Hi, and thanks for sharing your thought. I am not familiar with Tolstoys critique of Shakespear, I actually am new to reading him, and I think I will continue so frugally.

However, If that is what he said about Shakespear, I may have to agree. I happen to find Shakespear rather boring, to tell you the truth. Not something I will likely pursue during this lifetime.

You are not clear about my incentives, if I read you correctly unique mr MadFool. Another hidden question I sense within your on point argument, I must answer to, that I consider myself agnostic, as I believe most sensible subjects would and should come to the position of; based on the "I may be wrong"-argument, which with certainty may be traced back to Socrates, at least.

I do not here see an argument for either of the two sides. Not from what you are presenting, at least.

As goes for any "incentives", mine are of course there. My research subject for the moment is Anarchism, and theologian such is therefore difficult to leave unexplored.

I have researched much original theologian text such as the Bhagavad Gita, Pothapada, Quran, New Testament, well, you get the picture. Of course the Bhagavad Gita here in my mind stands on another plateu, so to speak, if one will consider the easiest ways to reach happiness. I have not experienced such easiness for my mind to more or less automatically hold itself in a state of bliss. But these discussions are with much more depth than Tolstoys religious statement, which essentially is what he does in the text.

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Well, shooting from the hip, I would say that 'phenomenologically', what aboutness is, is all those phenomenologically derived 'stuff' a subject can convey to another subject regarding some object. That seems however to be in a framed case. May for instance abstractions have aboutness attached to them? It would seem that at least nominologically, they can.

The aboutness of an object I would probably be more inclined to claim is a product of our inability to convey actual aboutness, distinct from aboutness that may be subject to figments of imagination or the like. Aboutness I would rather say should be seen in the context of reference. An objects aboutness comes with ordinates for carving out some objects from the rest of the world with the purpose of analyzing it.

That 'intentionality' and 'aboutness' is on a par is a definition I must go against, I think. At least my intuition cries out at this fact, so lets look at it a bit closer. I think what I'm getting at is that intentionality is a precursor, and aboutness maybe can be seen as meta. I am now seeing that this may not be so clear.

Aboutness must be applied post-teriori. A subject must have epistemic grounds for claims of aboutness. As when it comes to intentionality, this must surely be possible to apply a priori?

Sorry if I'm way of point.

Hi,

So, I would consider an anarchist meta-discussion to be of the kind of for instance looking at how a certain branch of anarchism would affect for instance political system x associated by political context y.

Maybe that answer more is related to applied anarchism. Let me try again.

Questions for instance regarding what grounds anarchism must surely be an meta-metaphysical discussion; given that the consitution of anarchism is a given. Now, as I see it, there is no actual unified view on anarchism, as there are many different branches.

Come to think about it, I recently stumbled upon the definition that libertarianism and anarchism are put on a par. This must surely be a mistake. I have difficulties envisioning a solution that makes for instance an anarcho-communist and a libertarian share the same view on liberty, freedom, and so forth.

However, the core of anarchism should also be a meta-discussion to have when all 'cards are on the table', that is when a unified view on anarchism has been achieved, if possible. The core should however be possible to extract some other way. Remember the etymology of 'anarchism'. According to this the definition must be considered very broad.

For instance, taking into account an anarchistic conception of time should be one of the more difficult positions to defend, however, maybe such meta-discussions should be possible under the umbrella you are proposing.