Why must we dichotomize things in such a way that we look for the degree of trust or mistrust in every relation we have with the world? — Metaphysician Undercover
Because the premise here is that trust is basic to the human condition.
would place both trust and mistrust as reasoned approaches, like you do here, but the majority of interactions which we have are habitual of nature, and therefore fall outside the classification of a reasoned approach, and cannot be described as either trusting or mistrusting. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your leveraging of a distinction here related to habit only highlights the usefulness of a deeper analysis of the concept of trust. You even seem to acknowledge this in the rest of your post. Is it that I was speaking normatively not descriptively the stumbling block? Yes, we do things out of habit. Sometimes that is justified and sometimes not. We should apply reason to know the difference. i.e. that habit is not always borne of conscious reasoning is not a justification for not applying conscious reasoning to it, and when we do, we see habit is largely a matter of trust and largely within our control.
but shouldn't we distinguish two fundamentally different forms of "trust" then? — Metaphysician Undercover
There's no fundamental dichotomy there. Trust occurs both across a spectrum of relationship levels and relates to a spectrum of expectations. What we
require for our trust is what determines its character. And looking at these requirements, we can hypothesize and debate the exact nature of many "trusts" and come to no definitive answer. But the point is more to recognize distinctions that help clarify both why we grant trust at different levels or in different contexts and what the justifications for this are.
For example (at a minimum):
Trust of family presumes love.
Trust of friends presumes loyalty.
Trust of acquaintances presumes integrity.
Trust of workmates presumes competence.
Trust of companies presumes production of value.
Trust of the media presumes accuracy.
Trust of the justice system presumes impartiality.
Trust of the military presumes strength.
Trust of a political system presumes equality of opportunity.
Trust of the physical world presumes a fixed nature.
In the final case above, the instantiation of habit (fixed behaviour) occurs as a reflection of and in response to the physical world's fixed nature and that's not something that normally needs to be questioned. But habit can and does appear at every level in different ways. Also, further to the above, we can get our wires crossed and either grant trust on an irrational presumption or withhold it on an irrational expectation. And so we move from the descriptive to the normative. Why should we trust X? And the (easier): Why should we not trust X?
I've posited above, for example, that we require at least loyalty from our friends to avoid mistrust. To me, that seems fairly uncontroversial. So, someone who put their trust in a friend who was disloyal would be setting themselves up for a fall. But we're talking necessary not sufficient conditions here, so for justified trust, we may need more depending on the context, e.g. reliability if we're to lend them money etc.
It would be easy to get bogged down in this, but I want to bring up the issue of political leaders, which are not on the list but are where I think we make some of the biggest mistakes in terms of trust. The question would be: What is a minimum requirement for trust in a political leader to be rational?
For a lot of people, the answer seems to be "strength" and I think that's the wrong answer, not only because strength is often confused with stubbornness, arrogance, fecklessness, aggressiveness etc. but because we need our political leaders to work for us and "strength" is the domain of warriors not servants. We need something more inclusive. Any ideas?