Thanks. That's helpful. I hope everyone reads your post, clarifies to themselves what the literal definition is (the wiki page would be a good start), and then thinks about how that might be problematized or examined. That could be fruitful. Insisting, as a starting point, that folk or metaphorical notions of language just are what language is isn't though.

Just look. It is not hard. There is some disagreement, but many linguists are fine with it. — I like sushi

No, they're not. Anyone, linguist or not, may use the term "language" in a metaphorical sense, but linguists of all people know the basic literal definition and it doesn't extend to bee communication. Non-linguistic forms of communication have been categorized extensively. Your mistake is similar to claiming Zoologists think dinosaurs are mammals.

If you spend a lot of time thinking about poetry, in particular, it's hard not to think of language as this quasi-magical means of reaching out to the world, to things themselves, as the man says. The social-use-first view feels a bit deflationary by comparison. — Srap Tasmaner

True. And we can reach out into the world in different ways. I like what Baggs does and I find it interesting from an artistic perspective. But I wanted to clarify it's not language. However, you can't make people follow standard word usages so... Anyway, I'll come back to this tomorrow.

Can you summarize her main point and how it relates to this?

It's the same type of mistake that would claim body language is language by the way. It's not. It's just communication. (That can be subcategorised into nominal, expressive etc. See also: https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao0el/webct/de361s41_folder/tsld001.html )

Bees communicate but it's not through language: https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao0el/webct/de361s41_folder/tsld007.html

Provide your academic sources that claim they do.

The whole thread is just littered with equivocation between the literal and metaphorical meanings of "language". Disentangle those and the debate ends. And it doesn't take a whole lot to do that: e.g. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language .

@KrisGl

@fdrake more or less covered it. What Baggs is doing is not language. Strictly speaking, "language" refers to human language, which has quite specific attributes that distinguish it from other forms of communication.* Of course, metaphorically, language can be anything, "the language of love" etc. The metaphorical use reduces language to very generalised forms of communication and human interaction, which adds some colour to the word at the expense of obscuring its actual meaning.

It might help to locate language as a subset of human communication, which is a subset of human expression. Baggs is certainly expressing their self---in way that could be considered artistic or interesting, but what she's communicating if anything remains obscure. And even if she is communicating something and even if you can describe that something in language, it doesn't make their form of expression linguistic.

Suppose, I am in an interview and I fold my arms to communicate my nervousness. That is an expression that communicates something, "discomfort", which is publicly interpretable and which is often described as "body language". But it is not language. Folding one's arms could conceivably be linguistic as part of a system of sign language, but in that case it could mean anything. The severing of the link between the expressive and the semantic is part of what makes language what it is. The very fact that Baggs seems to be freely expressing their self negates her own thesis.

Also, the first couple of lines of her speech show they don't know what language is, don't care, or perhaps are deliberately misleading their audience (I'm not making any presumptions, just describing possibilities). What they are doing might or might not be significant artistically or psychologically or socially (in terms of understanding how better to relate to the autistic community) or it might just be someone trying to get attention by making an outlandish claim and leveraging their obvious vulnerability in doing so, but in no sense does it suggest a rethinking of language because what they are doing has nothing to do with language except in the metaphorical sense.

*Here's a basic list of the major properties of language:

https://www.ff.umb.sk/app/cmsFile.php?disposition=a&ID=6765#:~:text=These%20six%20properties%20of%20displacement,core%20features%20of%20human%20language.

Edited: for preferred pronouns

@Count Timothy von Icarus @T Clark @wonderer1 @Apustimelogist @Janus @J @schopenhauer1 @Leontiskos @Wayfarer @Relativist

(I hope I got everyone).

Answering this post might be a useful segue into dealing with, or at least acknowledging, the other contributions here since I last posted, some of which have been excellent (I have been reading comments, but struggling to find useful additional things to say).

Like saddling physicalism with a commitment to determinism, for example. (OK, that's not quite fair, because this is not central to your criticism, and besides, this is so blatantly false as to be hardly worth focusing on.) — SophistiCat

What I said about determinism as written and qualified isn’t blatantly false or false at all. However, it may ironically be an empty suitcase for the OP because if determinism cannot be applied to modern versions of physicalism in general as many other metaphysical commitments cannot (e.g. the reductionism of physicalism has been criticised in the thread, but there are “non-reductive” forms of physicalism too—the snake pit survives even if individual snakes don’t) then why mention it at all? So, there’s value to that criticism.

I am not attached to such vague labels. I prefer discussing more specific positions. If I ever identify as a physicalist, it is for sociological reasons: — SophistiCat

This ties well into one of my explanations for the empty suitcase: The badge of honour. It generally sounds good for those working in scientific fields to call themselves physicalists. There’s potential social capital there. And it's often not really taken for a metaphysical commitment, but something more akin to common scientific sense.

What are we to say of it then? The suitcase serves a function but often in an indirect way. Maybe many know it's empty or don’t know what’s in the suitcase, but just so long as you have a suitcase! But then, to avoid hypocrisy, the door should be open to alternative metaphysical commitments that don’t have any direct bearing on the conducting of the scientific method, no? Except those who take that route seem to get a much harder time of it---socially.

I suppose I am advocating for a kind of radical agnosticism as to the ultimate nature of things because I think language won’t take us anywhere near there and we end up creating word games that unnecessarily divide and polarise. But then that too might be criticized as a metaphysical commitment. Maybe just opening our mouths about these issues creates empty suitcases, wallets, handbags and other accessories, the only difference between them being a matter of taste. But I'll stick to my position until and unless it's shown to be as shaky as I see the others.

True.

Despite the fact that most of what he's saying is utter bullshit, I can see him coming across as sincere and likeable. If I just remove the words and their meanings, I could like the guy too. Better than Kamala whose personality problem is that she has none. Trump just seems human, unpolitical, and like Joe, many Americans are laughably helpless at unravelling his B.S. and that then is enough. It's looking worse for Kamala every day, but surely the establishment has a few tricks left up its sleeve?

The funny thing about this is that anyone ever believed the Washington Post's lies about itself. It was a business, is a business, and will continue to be a business, nothing more. Bezos is just saying out loud (through his actions) what anyone with any sense should have known all along. The hysteria is comical and delusional.

Welcome to the forum!

We all need a strategy to protect ourselves from being consumed by consumption. Yours sounds good. I mostly use self-binding. There are only certain hours in the day I get to use the internet for leisure. Usually two, separated by a break. Often what happens is I end up being productive / creative while I'm waiting--suffer boredom for a while and it often resolves that way--writing, playing the guitar etc. I also get to think if I'm lucky. Almost no one is thinking when they use the internet (TPF is generally an exception). Combine that with the fact that most people now spend most of their free time on the thing and welcome to our modern mental dystopia.

So, yes, whatever works.

Musk’s public affection for Trump begins, almost certainly, with his savvy understanding of economic interests—namely, his own.

Yes. He comes across as a fuckwitt with some of the things he says, but if you just look at how it's all functioning, it makes sense.

Most of us seem to agree Trump is winning as things stand, me, @Mikie, the betting markets, Nate SIlver etc. The fact we may disagree slightly on the odds doesn't matter a whole lot. In fact, none of it matters a whole lot because, even at 60/40, Kamala wins 4 times out of ten. Not bad. Plus, the polls and betting markets could swing back her way before election day. I suspect there will be some drama anyhow.

:up:

Harris is a dud — Mikie

Something, I guess, we can all agree on.

Yeah but it isn’t for that reason. It’s actually due to about four people — Mikie

No, it's not. His odds have been going up rapidly across betting markets generally since the start of October. Averages about 59% overall now. Maybe polymarket very slightly overestimates relative to the average but it's hardly detectable. The "four people controlling this" story is kind of a silly distraction. The betting odds are increasingly favouring Trump because Kamala is sinking in the polls and the polls are the most reliable means of figuring out odds.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/politics/2024/10/18/betting-markets-presidential-election-odds-trump-harris/

Of course, if the polls are wrong, the betting odds will be even more wrong, like they were in 2016. But then it was state level polls that were mostly out. The last aggregate national poll on 538 was right within the margin of error.

Political idiots like Elon Musk play into this misunderstanding by claiming polymarket is more accurate then the polls. No, it just tracks the polls. It's derivative and will continue to be so.

We don't need polymarket as a primary source anyway. It just reflects the polls. When Kamala was about 3% ahead nationally, polymarket read 50/50. She is now about 2% ahead, so it reads 60/40 Trump. She probably needs to be more than 3% ahead nationally to win, considering the Republican advantage in the electoral college set up (e.g. HRC won by over 2% and lost). People betting large amounts most likely know that, so more of them are likely to be betting Trump. 60/40 is still a toss up. But leans Trump. That`s also your most recent evaluation. It's not rocket science.

Maybe the polymarket crowd slightly over fancies Trump, but it's in broad agreement with what the polls suggest and has been all along. And maybe people are confused because a small movement in the polls causes a larger movement in the betting markets. Those literate in basic mathematics should understand why that is and don't need polymarket to tell them what aggregate polls are already saying.

There's a buck or two to be made selling Dem Kool Aid, apparently.

The race is a toss up as it stands. A "blue tsunami" would require a major shift. Which is possible, but it would have to be very big news.

(By the way, I'll try to keep up and respond to all the points raised with me. If I fall behind on this, I hope to catch up at some point. I do appreciate all the input).

What about the Original Post? Perhaps "methodological naturalism" is doublespeak for soft metaphysical naturalism, and physicalism really does deviate insofar as it is a form of hard metaphysical naturalism. On that view the problem is not that physicalism is metaphysical, but rather that it is too confident, too far out over its skies. The underlying issue is the difficulty or impossibility of adopting a thoroughgoing epistemological methodology without also adopting some form of metaphysical commitment. — Leontiskos

I think this is a good line of argument. I had thought of physicalism, also metaphorically, as kind of a snake pit where whenever one snake pops its head up and you cut it off, another one simply reappears in its place, reflecting the adaptive ability of physicalism to proliferate new versions of itself in response to new objections. This overall amorphism seems highly suspect in the context of scientifc endeavour. But then the question arises, as you and others have pointed out, is it really realistic to presume you can entirely rid yourself of that type of problem and "just do" science under the guidance of methodological naturalism or some other supposedly more neutral framework? Aren't there snakes everywhere? Aren't there metaphysical commitments inherent in making your job philosophically coherent as an enterprise?

I think to an extent there are. And an associated problem is even finding generally accepted definitions of the concepts in question, so that hard lines can be drawn. Perhaps the scientific method, methodological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism (including physicalism) can be placed on a kind of spectrum of increased commitment and perhaps even that modest enterprise has its complications. But I still think its useful to try to get out Occam's razor and try to do what we can, especially when one finds oneself defending science against ideological and metaphysical encroachment in general. Let's take the beam out of our own eyes first.

The alternative is a view of science which opens the door to the soft sciences, including theology. If the repeatability requirement is softened then interpersonal realities can be the subject of scientific study, because repeated interpersonal interactions do yield true and reliable knowledge, even though the repeatability is not as strict as that of the lab scientist who deals with a passive and subordinate substance. — Leontiskos

Here's another interesting line of approach. I had been thinking of the hard sciences, but most of my own background is in the soft sciences. And there's again a specturm to be considered. But qualitative studies do play a part in science and the soft sciences are absolutely drenched in philosophical commitments, particularly structuralist ones. Though, again, there is some kind of division envisioned between methodologies and metaphysics, it's very hard to see where that line really is. That's probably a conversation that's too broad for the scope of this thread, though I won't deny its relevancy.

It's Scooby Doo saying "November".

To succinctly reiterate the main thesis: physicalism is unnecessary and undesirable metaphysical baggage in relation to the scientific method; it tends towards vacuity in its broader forms and is highly problematic in its narrower forms. That's the locus around which my argument revolves.

It appears to me that you miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. — Relativist

I've emphasized that and wondered why others don't seem to realize the import of that even in the text you quoted.

No. they are supposed to smile at the sarcasm. Like this : :grin: — unenlightened

[sarcasm] Hey man, are you, like, being sacastic? Are you, like, really saying we're not supposed to smile? Can you just, like, indicate whenever you're being sarcastic with, like, some square-brackety notes or something, so I just, like, know. It's just, like, sooooo confusing. [/sarcasm]

More than 20% of Black Americans own or have owned cryptocurrency assets. Vice President Harris appreciates the ways in which new technologies can broaden access to banking and financial services. She will make sure owners of and investors in digital assets benefit from a regulatory framework so that Black men and others who participate in this market are protected.

Basically saying nothing again. "Cryptocurrency is good. But it might also be bad. We'll make it better in the most non-specific way possible. Now be on your way, pleb."



Yeah, agree.

@Michael

"Protect cryptocurrency investments so that Black men who make them know their money is safe."

What does that actually mean? And how is that "creating opportunity" for Black men? If anything it sounds racist against Black men. Why is protecting cryptocurrency investments protecting Black men more unless you're saying they're more likely to fall for scams or whatnot?

That's to say, you don't get on the plane naked, but an empty suitcase isn't any further help as long as you've got clothes on.

But then the same can be said of methodological naturalism. What does it mean to be natural or supernatural? — Michael

In this context, amenable to the scientific method or not. In order to employ the scientific method, you employ it on that which it can be employed but you don't make a prior assumption that everything is this or that, you act only as if it were and the results justify your efforts (or not). The supernatural is just that which can't be reliably measured, replicated etc. in principle.

Thanks for the references. :up: I will take a look at that article.

In particular, it’s a crucial point whether physicalism has to declare by fiat that anything that exists or happens has a lawlike physical basis, thus in effect relabeling what most of us would call “non-physical” in ordinary circumstances. Leontiskos mentioned Nagel’s The Last Word, and as usual Nagel puts it well: “I [want to] interpret the concept of ‛physics’ restrictively enough so that the laws of physics by themselves will not explain the presence of . . . thinking beings in the space of natural possibilities. Of course, if ‛physics’ just means the most fundamental scientific theory about everything, then it will include any such laws if they exist.” If that’s all physicalism amounts to, then you’re right, it adds nothing conceptually. — J

I think this highlights an important tension within physicalism. Broad physicalist interpretations certainly add nothing conceptually, but the more physicalism is restricted, the more objections arise. There's an ironic tradeoff there where in order to make physicalism meaningful, you pretty much have to make it wrong or at least so problematic as to be questionably worth defending.

This feeds into Hempel's dilemma as mentioned by @Michael "if physicalism is defined via reference to contemporary physics, then it is false — after all, who thinks that contemporary physics is complete? — but if physicalism is defined via reference to a future or ideal physics, then it is trivial — after all, who can predict what a future physics contains?"

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#HempDile

Hempel's dilemma wasn't exactly what I had in mind writing the OP. The later criticism I discovered by Chomsky though is almost identical to my main point as he essentially makes the same argument--that movement beyond the boundary of methodological naturalism adds unnecessary and undesriable metaphysical commitments, i.e. creates the empty suitcase.

Here are the clearest formulations I've been able to find online so far:

https://plato.stanford.edu/archIves/sum2020/entries/physicalism/

"[Chomsky argues that] the physicalist project in philosophy of mind is on the face of it rather different from the naturalistic project. In the first place, the physicalist project is, as we have noted, usually thought of a piece of metaphysics. But there is nothing metaphysical about the [methodological] naturalistic project, it simply raises questions about what we can hope to explain.

...

It is precisely at the place where the physicalist project departs from the naturalistic project that Chomsky's criticism begins to take shape. For insofar as it is different from the naturalistic project, there are a number of ways in which the physicalist project is questionable. First, it is hard to see what the project might be — it is true that throughout the history of philosophy and science one encounters suggestions that one might find out about the world in ways that are distinct from the ones used in the sciences, but these suggestions have always been rather obscure. Second, it is hard see how this sort of project could recommend itself to physicalists themselves — such a project seems to be a departure from methodological naturalism .but most physicalists endorse methodological naturalism as a matter of fact"

And:

https://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz/index.php/tv/article/download/271/293

'Chomsky’s objection is that the doctrine has no clear content. He thinks that those who advocate physicalism and those who would endeavour to prove it false are both wrong in thinking that there is a substantive doctrine at issue. Chomsky holds this general view about physicalism because he also holds the more particular view that the concept of the “physical” (or the “material”), which must inevitably enter into any characterisation of physicalism, is devoid of clear meaning. At best, talk of “the physical” acts as a placeholder for whatever we discover, or could discover, to be true about nature. He writes:

"There is no longer any definite conception of body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory." '

This seems like a misunderstanding. Quantum phenomena have discernible, even measurable effects. That is what qualifies them as 'physical'. The seeming spookiness arises when we seek to apply macro physical concepts to micro phenomena. — Janus

Solid criticism. I should have reined myself in and been more precise and nuanced there.

(I may reformulate the point in my new thread rather than here or I may leave it for now. Not sure yet.)

The term “physical” starts losing clarity if it encompasses everything. — schopenhauer1

Yes.

Still, I believe we can distinguish between physical and non-material realities. Physical reality consists of things we can observe, measure, and interact with directly. Physicalism is most useful when it suggests that reality is, in principle, measurable. — schopenhauer1

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context.

I do see methodological naturalism being presented as justified based on results, but it is an open question whether the success of modern science is independent of metaphysical presuppositions.

The other question is whether a robust methodology can perdure independent of metaphysical presuppositions. — Leontiskos

Can it be done without physicalism? — T Clark

This is where I wonder if a certain logic to the situation is obscured. Is there something practical to the suitcase I can't see? What is the minimum we should need to get on with science optimally? Methodological natualism seems to be the answer to me. But I am open to reasons why more might be needed.

(A) sounds like materialism. Physicalism doesn't really say that. I mean, what is this substance? — noAxioms

Yes, that was poorly phrased. I've edited it.

(B) is untrue. There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM. — noAxioms

I had this under the rubric of "most". Changed to "some" to avoid being misleading.

Many thanks for identifying those issues.

OK, it's a methodology, not a premise. Scientific investigation proceeds as if there is nothing supernatural. If this is wrong, then science will presumable hit a wall at some point.
But then you treat it like it is a theory with this:
But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...
It proceeds as if.. Saying 'posit' makes it sound like naturalism itself. — noAxioms

The first "it" I've bolded in your quote is methodological naturalism. The second one is metaphysical naturalism. You seem to be talking as if you think I was referring to the same thing. But the difference is crucial as it's roughly where I think the dividing line against unnecessary metaphysical assumption (the suitcase) comes into play.

I'll get back to you on this. I've discovered after writing the OP that Chomsky made a somewhat similar critique. An available paper discussing his view for those interested: https://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz/index.php/tv/article/download/271/293

I've only read a bit of it. It's rather late where I'm at.

I generally agree with this. My previous comments here have, of course, been somewhat lacking in seriousness.

It might help to think of time 'running backwards' and then looking at how you view this or that as 'causal'? — I like sushi

What happens then is you strip away / distort the contextual network; enabling conditions like gravity, thermodynamics etc become meaningless and you are left with a bare sequence of events, sound and fury, signifying nothing.

he expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky. — Wayfarer

I won't develop the point here as we're drifting off-topic, but what's considered spooky for the physicalists are just the metaphysical assumptions that are not theirs, and there are at least a couple of big ones that are no less "spooky" than those of their major opponents.

That OP looks messy and unfocused to me. And this conversation seems now to be about everything and anything.

the storyteller has entered the story and transformed it. — unenlightened

Apparently so.