[TPF Essay] Technoethics: Freedom, Precarity, and Enzymatic Knowledge Machines Here’s some clarification on the main thrust as mentioned. I was in danger of writing a new essay, so I had to eventually just stop. Hope it helps.
The first concept worth explaining in detail here is “autopoiesis”. This, firstly, refers to systems and secondly, and more specifically, to a system’s ability to autonomously reproduce its own components. So. e.g., biological systems internally reproduce their parts without this reproduction being directly controlled by anything outside them. This means they are “operationally closed”. The set of operations that functionally defines them and reproduces them is internal and internally controlled. But autopoietic systems are at the same time environmentally open. They import and export to their environment and can both be affected by their environment and structurally coupled (explained further below) to other systems in that environment.
Biological systems, e.g. import food, and export waste, and, through sense organs, are affected by other biological systems and their material environment. So, they are not environmentally closed like, e.g. the universe, which has no external environment (that we know of) but they are also not operationally open, i.e. they don’t, unlike, e.g. a factory, produce anything other than themselves and their operations cannot directly be externally controlled (factories etc are therefore considered “allopoietic” not “autopoietic”)..
Taking this further, we can say autopoietic systems create a reality based on their own code of distinctions that is not shared with their environment and it is this code of distinctions as it is manifested operationally that creates or constructs both their internal and external realities. For example, society as a system reproduces itself on the basis of communications. Its reality is not biological or psychic or material and not reducible to the psychic or biological realms. When we speak of social functions and social institutions, we are speaking not of material or biological or psychic phenomenon, we are speaking of conglomerations of abstract signs and signals constructed and reconstructed through communications. In one way, this is straightforward social constructivism. However, the concept of structural coupling mentioned above adds some depth to it.
Social systems are structurally coupled or joined to biological and psychic systems in a way such that the three co-evolve and help to determine through irritations and perturbations of each other their respective realities. This idea requires some careful elaboration and clarification. First of all, human beings are conceived of as being made up of separate biological and psychic systems that are structurally coupled to each other. And again, we should note the irreducibility here: the psychic is not reducible to the biological and operates and reproduces itself on the basis of a different code (related to consciousness, not biological processes), but psychic and biological systems are joined and constantly irritate or perturb each other. For example, a thought or disturbance in the psyche might correspond to neurochemical or immune system activity in the body, but each system has its separate chain of causes and effects that operate in terms of their respective codes.
Further, this structurally coupled system of the body and the psyche in its further structural coupling with social systems allows subjectivity to emerge, and this is mediated largely linguistically (language is an interface across which social and psychic reality interact). So, we might say that subjectivity and language are spread across social and psychic systems, and the embodied human being is spread across psychic and biological systems. But social, psychic and biological systems are linked and while reproducing their own codes independently are constantly irritating and perturbing each other’s operations. They are both structurally coupled and form mutual environments for each other.
One consequence of looking at things this way is that it undermines the idea of an embodied human being and subject being a separate “thing” to the society in which it lives. It also undermines the idea of society as being made up of individuals. Strictly speaking, the situation looks more like a spectrum from concrete physical to abstract social reality with delineations based on code distinctions—which in turn define modes of reproduction—rather than embodiment or individuality in a simple sense. And subjectivity covers a portion of this spectrum enabled through the interface of language.
This is where the idea of freedom as precarious, especially in the face of technologically advanced media systems, becomes highly relevant. We are, in our subjectivity and in our capacity for freedom, part of any system we engage with, so it's not just that a media system can inhibit our freedoms, but an autopoietic (self-reproducing) media system if we use it in the wrong way (or are used by it in the wrong way) becomes what we are and we what it is to the extent it determines and monopolizes our behaviours through the autonomous reproduction of its own codes of communication. This occurs in a blind process of expansion and self-complexification driven (now) technologically in ways that surpass our ability to fully understand.
To provide a set of contrasting biological analogies of structural coupling to try to make this clear. Consider, the human biological system’s structural coupling with gut bacteria which is a separate biological organism. In this case, the relationship is generally symbiotic. Both systems benefit. Humans digest food more effectively and the bacteria use us as their food producing environment. Now consider the zombie-ant fungus, the structural coupling of which results in the ant being commandeered by the fungus for the fungus’ own ends in an extreme parasitic relationship. If we take the idea of systems theory as covering biological, psychic and social realms seriously, we ought realize that there is no law (and nothing we can do to institute one) that prevents social systems from being parasitic (to whatever degree) on the psychic/biological systems to which they are coupled. And the growing evidence that the media system (through its action on our psyches and associated pathologising of our dopamine cycles) reducing our capacity for pleasure, bleeding our motivation, effacing opportunities for creativity, and disrupting our relationships as it increasingly monopolizes our mental life is one indicator our freedom is not a given.
This brings us to the idea of nominal vs ontological freedom, and I’d like to dovetail with the Dante essay here. To define a triadic model of ontological freedom along the lines presented in that work, we can conceive of it as the ability to intuit correct action or outcomes, to work out a rational means to achieve them, and to maintain sufficient motivation or will to carry out our plans. This involves a positive transduction, or working across layers, of our social, psychic, and biological self-reproducing systems. It is our way of positively reproducing our subjectivity itself in the face of other independently reproducing autopoietic systems we are entwined with. And in terms of the media system, in particular, we should note, as suggested above, its effect on our intuition, our rational or critical thought, and our will is to a very large extent antithetical to our ability to actualize ontological freedom.
The contrast with nominal freedom should be quite clear. Society tends to provide more and more nominal freedoms through an expansion of choice, but it does so to provide new modes of communications which are part of its own code of self-reproduction. Any benefit for us is purely incidental and celebrating, prioritizing, and therefore over-valuing that form of freedom relative to ontological freedom is perverse and self-destructive from the point of view of subjectivity. If we continue to do this, subjectivity itself and ontological freedom will likely continue to degrade in favour of nominal freedom. This is the processing of nominal to ontological freedom mentioned in the essay and the main warning therein.