No worries! Just let me know if you decide to tap back in!

I just realized I forgot to note that the acceptance of the material world being identical to the subjective world (of conscious experience) does not entail ontological idealism. Realism is still on the table.

Correct. A 'thing in itself' is a logical limit. If we observe some 'thing', there has to be something to observe. But if we are observing it, we realize we are observing it by interpreting things like light, sound, touch, and nerve firings. Logically, we cannot see the thing as it is 'in itself' because we are always observing it through another medium, and then creating one or many identities or discrete experiences out off it.
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I do not believe in apriori knowledge apart from instinct.

Without admitting that there are a priori means by which your brain cognizes objects, then you have no basis to claim that our observations are limited—that they are not 100% mirrors of reality as it is in-itself. Direct realism would still be on the table.

To be fair, what you described is, in fact, a simplified statement of exactly what a priori knowledge is...so I am not convinced you actually disbelieve in it (;

This “logical limit” that you described is the same as saying, in philosophical jargon, “the thing-in-itself cannot be known, because we can only ever experience a ‘thing’ which was the result of a prior processes and of which pertain solely to the way our representative faculties are pre-structured to represent”.

So, likewise, I don’t really see how you are getting around the paradox either.

Even though I'm seeing a red ball in front of me, I'm really seeing the light and interpreting it. The light is bouncing off the ball, so something is there. But I can't understand what its like to see a ball without light bouncing off of it.

The ball which you see, and any experimental investigations of the light and how it reflects off the ball, is conditioned by the a priori means by which your receptivity senses and your brain represents; and so you cannot understand what the ball is like itself at all—not just what it would be like without color.

Viz., your understanding of the ball is fundamentally construed by the two pure forms of sensibility (i.e., space and time), riddled with a priori concepts (e.g., quality, quantity, relation, etc.), a priori mathematical relations (e.g., 3 ft diameter, etc.), a priori logical relations (e.g., principle of non-contradiction, excluded middle, identity, etc.), etc.; and so there is absolutely no way for you to know how that ball exists independently of those means of knowing it (re: just try to strip away the a priori means of understanding the ball, and you will certainly have nothing conceptually left but an object with no definite properties).

Thus the placeholder for this logical determination is a 'thing in itself'. And there is nothing more to know about them then that.

The paradox arises, and of which you have not really resolved, when you realize that you had to trust your experience to tell you that you exist in a transcendent world, you have representative faculties, and that those faculties are representing external objects—all of which are claims about reality as it is in-itself. You right to note that the ‘thing-in-itself’ is off limits if those claims are true, but that’s exactly why it is paradoxical: you had to accept that very claim is false to accept the original claims to begin with, and then by accepting those claims come to deny the other one. See what I mean?

The two elements of our cognitions I mentioned were phenomena and conceptions. I have yet to mention a priori knowledge for the simple reason at the juncture of phenomena and conceptions, in and of themselves alone, there isn’t any to mention, in that the faculty of reason which is the source of it, isn’t yet in the explanatory picture.

An a prior conception is a prior knowledge: that is knowledge which one has independently of any possible experience.

The end result of the unity of those two elements, phenomena and conception, is thought

So when you see a ball, you would call that the “thought” of a ball and not the “phenomena” of a ball? This doesn’t seem to cohere well with Kant’s semantics, but admittedly I don’t have the time to go back through the CPR and grab quotes—so take this comment with a grain of salt.

The object we experience is called, is expressively represented by, whatever name understanding thinks for it

This is cheating. I am asking what you call, generically, the thing which is the result of the intuition and cognition—of which we experience—and you just replied with “it’s whatever our brain thinks it is—e.g., a ball”. I would call it, most generically, a phenomena: I am still unsure what you call it.

To be fair, you may have a legitimate paradox in mind, but the expression of it herein, the conditions by which you promote its validity, cannot follow from the text in which you say it is to be found.

Do you not believe that transcendental idealism presupposes that one has cogent knowledge that the individual exists in reality as it is in-itself and is of such a nature as to have representative faculties which represents objects which exist in reality in-itself according to how it is pre-structured to sense and represent? These are all claims about the world as it is in-itself, and not merely as it appears to us.

I think you’re sensing it as a paradox because you have an innate conviction that the world is innately real - and yet Kant seems to call this into question. So it’s more a kind of cognitive dissonance. Isn’t that the source of the paradox you’re claiming to describe, in simple terms?

I am not following how you are avoiding the paradox described in the OP here. If one takes a realist or an idealist approach, they get the same problem.

The paradox is that the ‘thing-in-itself’, which Kant most definitely claims must exist as a transcendental truth, cannot be known if our conscious experience is representational; but to know that one’s conscious experience is representational requires us to trust that very conscious experience to know some aspects of the things-in-themselves (such as that we exist with a nature such that we represent objects which impact our sensibility).

What you are noting that Kant calls into question, is the material world’s existence; and depending on which version of the CPR you will find that part taken out. All it suggests, as Schopenhauer noted, is that Kant was entertaining (ontological) idealism at one point; but eventually swapped it for indirect realism.

This OP’s problem for indirect realism applies just as much to any (ontological) idealism which posits that our conscious experience is representational.

Why don't you see any paradox, now that you understand the OP?

For many indirect realists, arguments from illusion, dreams etc. are "grounds" for accepting representational experience.

You just quoted the OP out of context, and made an argument that does not even remotely attempt to resolve the paradox described in it.

Nice to see you again, Philosophim!

So in sum, we are limited to knowing there are things in themselves by contradictions to our representations by experience. That's it.

I see. Am I understanding you correctly to be denying the claim in the OP that we cannot know anything about things-in-themselves if we only have representational experience?

If so, then here’s the two “arguments” I gave @wonderer1 and @180 Proof:

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations and not things-in-themselves; and those sensations are limited by our sensibility. Our sensibility is incapable of migrating the properties of the things-in-themselves over to the understanding because they are limited to how they are pre-structured to sense (such as the two forms of sensibility: space and time). For you claim to hold, you would have to explain how it can be that our sensibility can migrate the properties of things-in-themselves to our understanding.

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it.

With all due respect, you didn't even attempt to address the OP at all.

None of these things can be established empirically.

As you noted, this isn’t a critique of the OP. All philosophical positions are like this: so I am failing to see how you are resolving the paradox or denying its existence. All you noted is that we cannot provide a strict empirical proof for any philosophical position.

Again, there is no paradox because the claims are neither true nor false.

You don’t believe that philosophical statements are propositional? E.g., you don’t believe that “two objects cannot be in the same place and time” is propositional?

Thanks for the nod, Bob. Hopefully whatever I contribute helps in some way.

:wink:

If he correctly concludes, how can a paradox arise? Isn’t a paradox only possible if he wasn’t correct with his conclusion, given the initial conditions?

The paradox was outlined in the OP, and arises out of Kant correctly concluding (from the stipulations) that we have no knowledge of the things-in-themselves.

Is it that a paradox is being manufactured from a misunderstanding?

You tell me!

The “phenomenal world” is only intuition itself, and, the “certain relations” are between the “undetermined object” and space and time. “Arranged and viewed” is merely a euphemism for cognized, which is clearly post hoc relative to the synthesis of the matter of sensation to the pure form in the mind a priori.

“Elements of our cognitions” are that which constitutes them, but are not them. Phenomena then, are one of two elements of our cognition, the other being conception, there being possibly a manifold of each for any given cognition.

All these were fair points. I was thinking of “phenomena” as the result of our cognition to keep things simple. Techincally, yes, phenomena are the intuitions which are, thereafter, cognized.

THAT there is an appearance of something is determinable from its sensation, but that an object appears, from which we know only the mode of its reception, re: which sensual device is affected, does nothing to facilitate the object’s relation is to our understanding, or, which is the same thing, how it is to be, first, cognized, and consequently, known, by us.

Shouldn’t it be “intuited”, since the, according to you, “phenomena” are the result of a priori intuition and not cognition?

Any given phenomena presupposes the a priori means of intuition, otherwise none would be given.

By “phenomena”, I was referring to the end result of intuition and cognition: we were just talking about two different things. What term would you use for such an end result which includes the two elements you described (namely phenomena and a priori knowledge)? Viz., what’s the object which we experience called then?

Sadly, I don’t think you addressed the paradox from the OP: what were your thoughts on it?

E.g., If you can trust the appearances of your experience to tell you that you exist with a brain which cognizes objects that are outside of it (and that this is true in reality as it is in-itself: not appearance); then this contradicts the notion that you cannot know the things-in-themselves and that you can only know appearances. Either you know you exist only facially or you know it as a matter of fact about reality in-itself.

If you can only know them as they appear to us then you cannot know them as they are in-themselves, but you have to claim certain things about things-in-themselves to begin with: namely, the five claims I noted in the OP. See the paradox?

I appreciate your response and quotations, but I don't think it addressed the OP whatsoever. I am not noting in the OP the implications of only knowing the "images of reality" but, rather, a paradox that arises for anyone who accepts that they have a brain and it represents objects which exist outside of it according to a priori modes and means. They must trust their experience to believe that indirect realism is true (in the sense of the commonly accepted version of it) which necessarily trusts their a priori modes of cognizing reality to give information about things-in-themselves, and then the theory necessitates (from this indirect realism) that we cannot now the things-in-themselves at all.

Both claims seem perfectly cogent to me and seem necessitated by accepting indirect realism in the sense of having a brain that represents reality; and so I am wondering if anyone has a solution or any useful comments on how indirect realism (or some sort of idealism) could salvage itself.

I'd suggest seeking scientific understanding of what the sensations are a result of

I don’t think you are fully understanding the OP’s proposed paradox yet, but I think we can get there.

Scientific understanding is a posteriori (i.e., it is purely empirical [besides the underlying philosophical presuppositions of it]); and so if we accept that scientific knowledge can tell us that we have representational experience (viz., that indirect realism is true) and about how we represent objects which impact the senses, then we are immediately and necessarily conceding that we can trust our representational experience to know about some things about the world as it is in-itself (namely, what was noted before). The paradox arises because when we accept it, because then we must also perform a transcendental investigation of it (which is philosophical, as opposed to scientific) and that investigation produces the conclusion that we cannot know things-in-themselves. Even on a scientific note, the science supports we cannot know the things-in-themselves with respect to the first reason I gave: if you accept that we have scientific knowledge that we have sensibility and that our brains cognize objects based off of the sensations therefrom, then you should also accept that the sensations cannot possibly a priori migrate properly the properties of the things-in-themselves (since they are preconditioned by the prestructured way by which the sensibility senses); and so the objects of our experience (i.e., phenomena) are really representations of sensations and not things-in-themselves.

The paradox arises because we had to trust that scientific (or more generally empirical) knowledge that we have sensibility and representative faculties to begin with (which is also mediated fundamentally by our a priori knowledge)—so we are trusting that our experience can give us knowledge of the things-in-themselves to some extent even though we thereafter must conclude we have no knowledge of the things-in-themselves.

Do you see what I mean?

Translating into wondererese yields, "If the functioning of a person's brain is disabled, the person won't have intelligible thoughts." My response to my interpretation is, "Right. And???"

If I were to take a jab at translating into “wondererese” I would say: “We accept we have a brain and that it represents objects which are outside of it and this brain is incapable of knowing the things-in-themselves because it represents sensations according to how it is [and its neurological receptors are] pre-structured, but this acceptance of all the previously mentioned required us to trust our experience, which is produced by that very brain, to know that we had a brain in reality as it is in-itself in the first place—thereby contradicting where we began”.

I am not merely pointing out that if our brains didn’t function properly, that they would function properly; which is all I understood your translation to say.

By claiming we have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, you are denying that representational experience cannot afford us knowledge of the things-in-themselves (which I noted Kant had rightly pointed out in the CPR). So we would, then, have to discuss what reasons we have for thinking that the a priori modes by which we cognize objects can afford knowledge of a thing as it is in-itself. I will start the discussion with two "arguments".

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations and not things-in-themselves; and those sensations are limited by our sensibility. Our sensibility is incapable of migrating the properties of the things-in-themselves over to the understanding because they are limited to how they are pre-structured to sense (such as the two forms of sensibility: space and time). For you claim to hold, you would have to explain how it can be that our sensibility can migrate the properties of things-in-themselves to our understanding.

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it.

Has anyone yet mentioned that self-defense is nearly by definition a preventing of harm to one’s own self?

Self-defense is usually defined in a way to include the defense of other innocents as well.

On what grounds is allowing the murderer (whose intentions are most always deemed unethical to begin with) his desire of harming your own being to be deemed anything but bad?

Did you read the OP? The OP is exploring what justification exists for self-defense's permissibility given certain stipulations.

The OP is not arguing that self-defense is impermissible: it is just exploring how a non-consequentalist who accepts the OP's stipulations would be able to justify it. I completely agree that self-defense is permissible; and I will update the OP with the solution.

My OP presupposes moral realism; so whether not an action is good, bad, or neutral is stance-independently true. It does not matter semantic differences in what you or I may call 'good' or 'bad'.

:up:

:up: :kiss:

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous?

I definitely do not pursue philosophy to feel righteous or a part of some sort of ‘elite’: I do it to uncover the truth, and to give myself (as well as hopefully others) a coherent and consistent account of reality.

The reason I find ethics so important, is because it is the basis of all action (and inaction)—it is the crux for why we should be doing anything at all, and why we shouldn’t being doing certain things. Without ethics, agency is like a boat that has set sail with no destination—what wind is favorable, then? None, and nihilism or radical individualism ensues.

I think it is a shame that ethics has been shoved under the rug in modern times; and I see a real threat of society (and the individual) collapsing if we do not correct this. I think the postmodern sense of “ethics” has the potential to do real damage to the individual; and I see it starting to happen already (e.g., active shooters, suicides, mental illness epidemics, the loss of respect for life, etc.). I, consequently, devote my free time to endeavoring to find a coherent, holistic ethical account of living; and I hope, one day, I can find the answers which will give us the key to reinstating ethics and living a actually (not hypothetically) good life as central to human culture, and I hope to (at least) give myself a full account of the living the good life.

I understand that life is a sticky place, and it can excite past emotions to try and think about topics, especially ethics, through the lens of the dull, rigid eye of reason; but it has to be done, if one is to have good reasons for what they permit themselves to do (and what not). Otherwise, we just have irrationality governing our actions—and this cannot be what ethics surmounts to.

I completely understand wonderer1: this OP is meant to explore, intellectually, the underlying justification for self-defense. Of course, the intellectual pursuit of a coherent ethical theory is going to be much different from the reasoning one may find through experience.

I am essentially endeavoring on determining a fully coherent and plausible account of what is right and wrong; and so, although it may seem in practicality obvious that self-defense is permissible, I must be able to back that up intellectually in a way that coheres with my ethical theory.

I think the solution to this is to note that harming [something] is not a proper act, because it is an action includes the intentionality behind it; so act of self-defense is a specific action which can produce harm, but is permissible (and even sometimes obligatory) because it is good in-itself (being that the intention is to stop the attacker and NOT to kill or harm them).

To answer you question: yes, you could argue that self-defense which does not use harm is fine; but, then you have the problem that harming is being implicitly utilized as a proper action, and so you end up with the problems you noted (e.g., is hitting a gun out of their hand technically harm?).

Absolutely no worries, Philosophim! If you don't want to continue the conversation, then I respect that; and, as always, I look forward to our next one!

I don't believe that you are operating in bad faith, but you still have not defined what an action nor a choice simpliciter are; and it is impossible for us to progress the conversation if you cannot. Like I noted before, most of the issues that you want to discuss hinge on false and incoherent understandings of the concepts [of choice and action]; and this is why you are failing to understand how a choice can be about an inaction; and how that choice can be made without any action being committed because of that choice [about inaction].

At this point, without diving into your schema (which would require you to provide definitions), I cannot provide anything else useful to the conversation without it being a mere reiteration.

I am unsure how to progress the conversation: I keep trying to get you to define what a choice and an action simpliciter are; and you seemed to just accept that you don’t have any—or don’t need to provide them.

The difference between the problems with volunariness (which you brought up about my schema) and your definitions is that yours are internally incoherent whereas mine, even if I grant you your critiques, are. I’ve cited many times how yours are incoherent, and you keep ignoring them.

To avoid repeating myself, I am only going to address the parts of your response that I think haven’t been touched on adequately yet.

But a person's disposition is not will

I didn’t define ‘a will’ as a person’s disposition—I defined it as ‘the dispositions of an agent taken as a whole’. My point is that a person’s will is typically considered whatever they desire, are passionate about, believe, etc. taken as a whole. ‘A will’ is not an instance of willing—to will is not the same thing as a will. A will is about a person’s character and personality as a whole, and to will is willing.

The reason I am avoiding saying willing is ‘the act of volition’ is because that is suspiciously close to circular reasoning—but technically isn’t. Acting and willing are identical to me, so saying ‘the act of willing’ is like saying ‘the willing of willing’.

What does the "exercised power of determining" mean?

Willing is a power that one can exercise and it is the power of imposing one’s will on reality.

Our job is to take the language that is commonly used, process it to be more accurate, clear up issues, etc. and put it back into the language of everyone else.

That’s exactly what I have done. It is impossible to refine colloquial usages of words in such a way as to completely preserve them—that was my point.

The problem you are having is you keep using notions in your arguments and I am trying to get you to elevate them to concepts. Using colloquial understandings of terms, with no modifications, which are pluralistic most of the time, is not going to cut it in a formative analysis of a subject-matter. It never has, and it never will.

Specifically, what is the problem with will as commonly defined?

It is notional, vague, vacuous, pluralistic, … need I go on? Look up the definition of any word, and you will find three or four irreconcilably different definitions for it—all from reliable sources. Webster isn’t about providing robust and refined definitions: they are trying to just give a super-basic exposition of the words that people use. None of the well-known dictionaries nor search engines provide good formative nor formal definitions of words.

If the person is unconscious and sleeping, how is that at their full capacities? What example can you give of a person not at their full capacities, and why?

Because their brain has shutdown most of their higher-level cognitive functions—wouldn’t you agree? A person who is sound asleep cannot converse with you, they cannot think, they are not aware of their surroundings, etc.

In sleep, a person only gets a phantom of these processes through dreaming.

Why do people use it interchangeably?

Because they don’t have a clear understanding of what they mean. People use terms to vaguely delineate meaning all the time—that’s basically the essence of colloquial speech.

In what sense is it logical to do so, and in what sense is it logically not to?

There’s nothing illogical about it, and that’s not saying much.

I defined 'choice' in this case as "a choice of action".

So you are taking a pluralist account of concepts, then? I want one definition of what you think a choice simpliciter is—I don’t care how other people use the term, nor if they use it in mutually exclusive and incoherent ways.

Your set has problems with ignoring involuntary actions

The critiques you made have nothing to do with an inconsistency nor internal incoherence with my schema—you are noting what is, for you, an external incoherence. For your schema, it is blatantly internally incoherent.

At best, if I grant your critique, my definitions allow for some actions which would intuitively be found to be involuntary as voluntary; whereas under your view, at best, a choice is and is not solely about actions.

If your body does something against your will then, isn't that an involuntary action?

Yes. Like I stated before, there are gray areas where I am not entirely sure how the biology underlying it works to comment—but I clearly outlined that there is such a thing as involuntary acts, and that they are “actions which one commits which do not correspond with one’s will”. What you just asked stipulates exactly what I need in order to claim it is involuntary.

But according to your earlier definition of will as being synonymous with disposition, wouldn't this be a disposition and an act of will? What do you call your body doing an action without your will?

I call it an involuntary act; and it wouldn’t make it to the brain to be processed through the lens of one’s dispositions taken as a whole nor as a part—e.g., a reflex to avoid pain. Certain aspects of the brain, in conjunction, are responsible for the fact that we are agents and subsequently have wills; and there are certainly lower-level actions which are performed which can’t be meaningfully tied to those aspects [of the brain]. Where is the line drawn? I would say wherever the threshold is for the brain judging things. A reflex as primitive as removing one’s hand upon touching a hot surface is probably not an act of judgment by the brain; and if it is, then it is not processed very thoroughly (such as going and eating ice cream because it taste good).

To be honest, this aspect does call for more investigation and is interesting; but it utterly irrelevant to the analysis of morality. So I see no need continue on this point.

Continuing to pull the lever is a part of the action which you are still performing; and one can make decisions while still acting; so, yes, me choosing to continue to perform action X does not create a new action Y. — Bob Ross

You just noted exactly what I pointed out. "Choosing to continue to perform action x", or "Continuing to act" is a choice. Actions are performed over time.

Nope. Not at all. I’ve tried explaining to you that you keep conflating choices and choosing with acts and acting; but you refuse to engage.

Finally, what is 'acting simpliciter'?

I mean simply acting—not acting in a morally relevant manner or what not…just what it means to act in general.

Bob

The main issue is that we will not be able to find common ground until we both provide clear schemas of the concepts; and, dare I say, your definitions are still patently (internally) incoherent with your view (as a whole).

For example:

A choice - Noun. An intent of action that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen
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I have noted that there is the possibility of making a choice without regards to actions

Your usage of the concept of a choice and the act of choosing are incoherent with the definition you have provided; as you defined a choice as necessarily about an intent to act, while also claiming that it is not necessarily about an intent to act. Again, you must either (1) throw out your definition of a choice, or (2) deny that choices exist about non-actions (such as choices about favorite colors). You need to address this before we get into most of what you want to discuss, because the confusion lies in the fact that you aren’t using the concepts coherently.

Being in a coma is an autonomous action, not an act of will
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”Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing. “ – Philosophim

You’ve agreed with me that an action is a volition of will; but then incoherently claim that not all actions are volitions of will. This is why I think you need to deny my definition of an action to make your position work; otherwise, it is internally incoherent. You can’t say that an autonomous action is a type of action which is not a volition of will and then say that actions are volitions of will.

It seems like, from your response, that we are not referring to the same thing by ‘willing’: for you, it seems to be linked to conscious activity (in the modern sense of that term) and this you seem to interchangeably use with ‘intentionality’. For me, willing is ‘the exercised power of determining according to one’s will’; ‘a will’ is ‘the dispositions of an agent taken as a whole’; ‘an intention’ is ‘an end an agent has for something’; ‘intending’ is ‘acting’: ‘a volition of will [with an intention—which is implied given my definitions]’; and by ‘volition’ I mean ‘willing’ (viz., ‘a volition of will’ is the same as saying ‘an instance of willing’).

I completely agree that, in colloquial speech and legal speech, we would not say “I willed to sleep walk”; but this is because the terms are not robust, nor do they need to be, for their application. The average person has absolutely no robust account of what they mean by “I” nor what it means ‘to will’.

An agent is the whole of their physical constitution responsible for the processes of judging and production of dispositions which that being has; and this ‘whole’ is taken to have a will, which is just the conglomerate of dispositions which that judging being has. In this sense, it is very clear that “I willed to sleep walk”—in the event that one did sleep walk—is (1) true (because the agent as a whole, comprised of the judging faculties of the brain, did will it), (2) an action (because it is an instance of willing), and (3) is not an instance of willing with the full capacities of that agent (taken as whole). #3 is what you noted and why legal speech doesn’t think of ‘willing’ this way: all the courts are interested in is what I call ‘rationally deliberate action’ (i.e., what one chose to do).

Again, this distinction between voluntariness and choosing does not exist in colloquial speech: people say “I chose to do X” and “I did X voluntarily” interchangeably (because they have no robust analysis of these concepts).

For me, morality is concerned with right and wrong behavior that is chosen; and not merely actions which were voluntary.

The problem is that we cannot make headway on this if you cannot provide a clear and robust alternative schema to what I have put forth here; and so far I have demonstrated (above) that your definitions are still internally incoherent.

In the context of what I've written you would need to be conscious to have volition right?

NO. That’s what I am trying to get you to see: if you are using a ‘consciousness’ vs. ‘unconsciousness’ schema (and omitting ‘subconsciousness’), then sleep walking is a conscious act. Normally sleep walking is a subconscious act—if it were an unconscious act, then there would be no walking whatsoever (as someone would is unconscious, in the modern sense you are implying, has completely lost their ability to act whatsoever [e.g., a person knocked out cold from a punch]).

I think, at a minimum, you have to abandon your ‘consciousness’ vs. ‘unconsciousness’ distinction for one that includes ‘subconsciousness’. However, then you have the issue of explaining how subconscious acts aren’t actions...like sleep walking.

You might, then, sublate your view with something like: “well, ok, I need the concept of ‘subconsciousness’ to work; and sleep walking is a subconscious act; and so it is an act; but it is not an act that is willed because it wasn’t done consciously”. If that is so, then you are (1) denying my definition of an action (i.e., that an action is a volition of will) and (2) you need to provide a definition which coheres within your schema that enables you to make such a claim. You probably can do it, but then we will just to talking over each other: since all I need you to understand is that, given my definition of an action, subconscious activities are actions—under your definition, they are called something else.

But, here again, you are being incoherent:

The division between conscious and unconscious actions is a fairly common understanding in science

Again, you agreed with me that an action is a volition of will; said that unconscious actions exist (which are called autonomous actions); and said these sort of actions are not willed: this isn’t coherent. You have to throw out one of these claims.

Do you believe that an action is only made if you alter the state you are in from a previous moment of time?

No. I would say that actions are about changing reality. It may be the case that I am forcing my body to stay how it is, contrary to what it would be doing otherwise, through willing. However, willing something to be the same is the act of stopping something from doing what it was going to do otherwise; and so this is a form of change insofar as it is a form of preventing change.

What I was noting with the lying down example, is that (1) lying down is an action, but (2) continuing to lie down (all else being equal) is not. It is a lack of willing that keeps me in that position on the floor. Now, you added into the mix that I have a disability where my body naturally jerks around without me choosing it, then I am acting by forcing those jerks to stop through hyper-focus. See what I mean?

So I could be pulling the lever and it isn't budging. Two seconds later I get a choice that I can release the lever. But if we are to extend logically your implications on an action, because I've been pulling the lever, continuing to pull the lever isn't an action, while releasing it would be.

Continuing to pull the lever is a part of the action which you are still performing; and one can make decisions while still acting; so, yes, me choosing to continue to perform action X does not create a new action Y.

Again, the reason you are failing to understand this is because you have no robust nor internally coherent account of what an action vs. a choice is; nor how acting simpliciter relates to acting qua choosing.

I genuinely think that once you come up with a robust schema, a lot of these issues will expose themselves to you; and you will be able to work out the crinkles without any problems.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I thought we made progress, but now that I have gotten you to try to define the concepts it is clear to me that you are still not agreeing on even the parts that you have agreed to before; so I am going to focus on addressing your definitions for now (so that we don’t talk in circles here).

That is because you still haven’t defined the concepts! What is ‘voluntariness’ under your view? What is an ‘action’? — Bob Ross

An act of volition. An involuntary action like a reflex is not an act of volition.

This is a circular definition: you defined an action as an act of volition.

Action - Noun. A bodily state at any tick of time.

Like I stated before, this would include what is clearly not an action—e.g., lying perfectly still in a coma. As bodily states are not always volitions of will.

Act of volition - Noun. An act based on will/consciousness/intention/agency.

You are lumping a lot of distinct concepts together there: when people use the term “conscious”, they are usually referring to the ‘ego’ or, in other words, self-consciousness. That’s why most people still associate the ‘id’ with ‘subconsciousness’.

Willing is not tied to conscious acts in the sense of actions which the ‘ego’ takes responsibility for. Willing is a faculty of imposition of a disposition determined by an agent; and there are degrees to willing—e.g., to take your example, the heart beating is still, as far as I remember, an act willed by the brain and, so, it is voluntary but that does not mean that it was willed equivocally to when your brain decides to eat ice cream.

Autonomous act - Noun. An unconscious act

I see what you are going for; but, again, unconscious acts are obviously willed. E.g., sleep walking. You are going to have a hard time explaining why sleep walking isn’t an action willed by the brain but yet is an unconscious act.

To act - Verb. The act of undertaking an action at any tick of time.

This is circular: ‘to act’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘the act of <…>’. This definition needs to be thrown out.

A choice - Noun. A decision that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen. Choices have a reason. They can be emotional, rational, but are made with agency. Reasons can be as simple as, "I didn't like the other choices", to complex as a highly refined argument. "Choice" can be defined in terms of the past, present, and future.

Past choice: A moment in time prior to now in which a decision was made to take an action at x time. X time may, or may not have passed. If X time has passed, and the action was completed at X, then the choice was fulfilled. If X time has passed, and the action was not completed at X, then that past choice was unfulfilled. A past choice is a promise of intent, but it is a promise that does not have to be kept.

Present choice: The option one has decided to act at the moment. An autonomous action is not a choice.

Future choice: A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds. A promise does not need to be fulfilled, and a choice can change up until the point of X seconds.

Why are you separating their definitions based off of time? A choice is a choice. Once you define what a choice is, then you can easily determine its past, present, and future tense. You don’t start out without a definition and start defining the tenses separately.
Let me try, nevertheless, to dissect them anyways:

A choice - Noun. A decision that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen
…
Past choice: A moment in time prior to now in which a decision was made to take an action at x time
…
Present choice: The option one has decided to act at the moment.

All of these are circular! A decision is a choice! I am throwing out these definitions: please provide a new one that isn’t circular. You did not get any closer to exposing what you mean by making a choice here nor what a choice is: you just substituted the word for a synonym.

The only one that isn’t circular is this one:

Future choice: A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds

Ok, so a declaration of intention to act (in the future) is a future choice. So this would mean that a choice is an intention to act—no? Are you defining a choice as an intention to act?

Again, we have agreed now that it would be patently false to define a choice as about actions; so this definition of future choices and the extrapolated definition of a choice are both patently false. You’ve already agreed with me that choices can be about things which aren’t actions nor inactions (e.g., picking a favorite color).

Do you see how all over the place your definitions are? How they inchohere with all the progress we’ve made at getting you to see that choices aren’t just about actions?

Voluntary - The choice and/or action are made with agency.

What’s agency? We need to try to stick to the same terms so we can find common ground. This definition seems oddly close to mine (of an action in correspondence with one’s will) but there’s slight differences that I don’t know how to parse—e.g., splitting up a choice and an action in this definition implies that some choices are not actions (which you denied above in your definition of a choice) and that some of those can be made without agency (which makes no sense: how does one make a choice without thinking about it?--or do you just mean thinking about it but with external coercion involved?).

The circumstances can inform us of how to act, but they never dictate whether an action is right, wrong, or neutral. If stealing is wrong, then one should not steal: period.

If we want to get very technical, 'stealing' isn't a very clear act; as the government takes people's earned wealth all the time without their consent and it is not considered stealing (e.g., taxation). A worthy question to ask is: "what is stealing, exactly?". Stealing, to me, is actually, technically, a neutral act; because taking someone's private property isn't wrong in-itself--as is clear with taxation. I think a lot of laws are built around pragmatically and generally instilling justice; and so a lot of those laws are themselves circumstantial.

In the case that an act is neutral, then whether or not someone should be doing it is determined by the effect which they intend to bring about, and any side effects which will also reasonably be brought about.

It is also worth exploring whether it is permissible for a person who has the means and wealth to feed a starving person to choose not to; but this would be besides the point I made.

However, I mentioned none of this to Philosophim because I am trying to get them to analyze actions in-themselves, and assuming stealing is wrong per se is an easy example for demonstrative purposes.

It would be helpful if you pointed out how its incoherent as I'm not seeing it. But its ok to move on.

Like I said before, you haven’t defined them clearly; and your attempts I outlined before:

”Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing. “ – Philosophim


You cannot accept that an action is a volition of will and then say not all actions involve willing—that’s patently incoherent; — Bob Ross

”"Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'. “ – Philosopim


This is the closest you got to a definition, but instead of giving one noted two mutually exclusive definitions of the word; and I am not sure which one you mean to use for this discussion. Are you taking a pluralistic account of the concept? — Bob Ross

"When I entered the cave, I sneezed," describes to me what people would call an action. Its one they couldn't help, a reflex that was outside of their autonomy, or choice. What are you calling an involuntary sneeze then?

Under my definitions, sneezing upon entering a cave might constitute a voluntary act (although it would perhaps be a stretch); because it is a volition of will insofar as my body will’s to sneeze as a reaction. In my view, the knee-jerk reaction to the doctor hitting your knee (to test its reflexes) is a voluntary act; but not an act of choice.

Remember, voluntariness is about what is in accordance with one’s will; and choosing is about what is in accordance with the conclusions of rational deliberation.

Whether or not sneezing upon entering a cave is voluntary or not is going to hinge, for me, on if one can connect it to the will of the organism which sneezed. Irregardless, an involuntary act would be like sneezing because one’s brain has a huge tumor in it that is causing the sneeze.

I honestly have no issue in separating the two concepts if you have a term that properly covers 'autonomous' actions.

What you are calling an ‘autonomous action’ is for me an action which is not a choice. There’s not second concept at play here for me: that’s the issue with your concepts. You agreed with my definition and then turned around and implicitly denied it.

If an action is a volition of will, then how can it not be a choice? What you will to happen is what you choose to happen no?

Willing is not always a product of thought; and thusly is not always a product of rational deliberation. So not all acts are choices, but all acts are willed. E.g., punching someone out of pure rage can happen very well without any thinking involved, and this is an action but not a choice—and likewise the action is (most likely) voluntary because it was willed in accordance with one’s will. It is important to note that not everything which is willed is in correspondence with one’s will—e.g., eating ice cream because someone is threatening to kill you otherwise.

I don't see how its possible to make an action and say, "I didn't choose to do it", if you voluntarily did it.

That is because you still haven’t defined the concepts! What is ‘voluntariness’ under your view? What is an ‘action’?

For me, I have been very clear; and it follows from my definitions that an action can be voluntary without being a choice (since an action can be in correspondence with one’s will without being a product of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]).

How do you reconcile this with the way the words are most commonly used in language?

Common language is full of vague, notional, incoherent, and irreconcilable uses of terms: I am not particularly interested in trying to fit my schema to match 1:1 the common usages; however, I am interested in giving a refined schema which can provide clarity with respect to their common usages. E.g., people say “I think <…>” interchangeable with “I feel <…>” when these are clearly different concepts, and I am not interested in reconciling them.

Except what do the terms of permissibility mean? "They mean what you should, and should not act on".

Permissibility is the mode of moral thought whereof one can do an act but doesn’t have to. What you just described is impermissibility or obligatoriness.

I feel I've analyzed it pretty in depth at this point.

Send me the links to where you defined the following clearly: ‘an action’, ‘to act’, ‘a choice’, ‘to choose’, and ‘voluntariness’. You haven’t.

That would literally mean its permissible to cease to exist, and nothing more. Again, you're taking a figure of speech, "I did nothing", and thinking that means you actually did nothing. No, you did something. Give me an example in which you did absolutely no actions.
…
This is why I think you are wanting an example of a morally relevant choice that results in inaction and are failing to find one, because in all my examples you are conflating the analysis of the given choice qua itself with qua all choices related to it. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what this means, can you elaborate more?

The problem is that you are not understanding that a choice can be made about something without it also itself being made about something else. I have pointed out that one can choose to do nothing, and you keep pointing out that after making that choice they then separately choose to do something else. Plainly and simply put: one can reach a conclusion with rational thought which has absolutely no reference to performing an action and complete reference to not performing an action.

Here’s exactly that issue:

1. It is solely about inaction on that one particular option. It does not entail that you did not act on another option.
…
Of course they are separate decisions.

If you agree that they are separate decisions, then you agree that they are separate choices being made! If you agree that they are separate choices being made, then the choice to not do it is itself a choice and solely about inaction: that’s the only point I have been making. Your view only works if you deny that they are separate choices; because you have defined a decision in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of a choice being made which refers solely to an inaction.

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. — Bob Ross

That's all I'm saying. If you understand this, you understand my position.

Which doesn’t demonstrate your original point, which was that choosing cannot be about inactions. If you agree with me on this now, then you can now understand why inactions can be evaluated independently of any subsequent actions one takes—viz., it is possible for me to say that an inaction is evaluated differently than an action.

Remember, my original point was that, all else being equal, one should let themselves continue to starve because the only action they can take is to steal. You cannot appreciate this if you keep denying that one can let something bad happen (which implies it was a result of inaction that is to blame for the bad thing happening).

Since you continue to fail to give an internally coherent definition of the vital concepts at play (e.g., ‘to act’, ‘to choose’, ‘a choice’, etc.), and with all due respect, I am forced to assume you don’t have any; and so I am going to proceed with my definitions for my response here. Please let me know, at any time, what your definitions are if you can think of them; and if it is the case that you don’t have any because, perhaps, you haven’t had to dive this deep into those concepts then no worries! I’ve been there too!

The good news is that you now seem to recognize that not all choices are about actions; but the bad news is you think all morally relevant choices are about actions. Before we get into that, I need to point out a couple slightly irrelevant issues with your response:

Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing.

You cannot accept that an action is a volition of will and then say not all actions involve willing—that’s patently incoherent; so, no, you technically are not accepting my definition. This is why I wanted to you to define an ‘action’, because you are importing a definition which as of now remains utterly concealed and notional. For now, I am assuming that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’ and, thusly, that an ‘autonomous action’, by virtue of being an action, does involve willing.

This is my thinking as well. What you are describing is the present and future. "Choosing" is the present, and "choice" is either future or past. Future if you have yet to act on it, and past if you have.

If a ‘choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and you agree with me (by saying ‘this is my thinking as well’), then you would have to agree that:

1. Not all actions involve choices.
2. Not all voluntary actions involve choices.

I think we can agree on this now that you agree with my definitions.

Ok, on to the substance of the conversation: why would one think that not all morally relevant choices are about actions?

First, we have to understand what a morally relevant choice is. Now, to avoid begging the question, I would like to point out that what makes the choice morally relevant is that it is about what is permissible, impermissible, omissible, or obligatory as those concepts relate to goodness and badness—irregardless if you would leave out inaction from consideration with respect to choices.

Now, if we give an example of any of those moral modes of thought, then we can evidently see that it can pertain to inaction. E.g., it is permissible, sometimes, to not do something. This entails that morally relevant choices can be about inaction—e.g., to say ‘it is permissible to not do X’ is to the say that ‘one can choose to not do X [if they so choose]’.

This immediately invalidates your position.

If you're not doing X, and you're doing something else instead, aren't you doing an action?

You are failing to analyze the given choice per se: we are currently asking if a given choice can be about, and only about, not doing something. What you are noting is, at best, after making that choice another choice may be committed to do something instead of what was chosen not to be done. E.g., if I choose to not eat ice cream and go for a walk instead, I have chosen (1) to not eat ice cream and chosen (2) to go for a walk. The reasons for each decision may be interrelated, but they are separate decisions.

This is why I think you are wanting an example of a morally relevant choice that results in inaction and are failing to find one, because in all my examples you are conflating the analysis of the given choice qua itself with qua all choices related to it.

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. However, (1) my choice to not get up is a choice solely about inaction, (2) my choice to keep doing what I am doing is a separate choice (albeit related), and (3) the choice to continue doing something is about continuing to act and does not introduce a new action into the mix.

If you can try to segregate the choices being made instead of evaluating them on the final, chronological action being taken; then I think you will be able to see what I am saying.

I appreciate the elaboration, and we are getting closer!

I think the problem is that 'choice' can have two meanings

Ok, so here’s the first problem: nowhere in your exposition of ‘choice’ and ‘to choose’ did you define it (in your response)! Again, what is a ‘choice’ and what is ‘the act of choosing’ in your view?

"Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'.

This is the closest you got to a definition, but instead of giving one noted two mutually exclusive definitions of the word; and I am not sure which one you mean to use for this discussion. Are you taking a pluralistic account of the concept?

This confusion is partly my fault: since we are having to get this technical about it, it is important to note that ‘a choice’ and ‘the act of choosing’ are separate things; and thusly deserve separate definitions. For me, ‘a choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and ‘the act of choosing’ is ‘the act of rationally deliberating [i.e., thinking]’. What do those mean under your view?

So let me break out the difference in choice by separating the two into 'unactualized choice' and 'actualized choice'.

I am assuming you don’t mean to say that ‘the act of choosing’ nor ‘a choice’ each have two equally cogent and incompatible definitions; so this actualized vs. unactualized distinction is just noting that when we choose to do something sometimes it doesn’t actually happen. I don’t have any problems with this; however, I must note that this in no way entails that all choices made are about actions.

This also requires us to dive into the definition of 'action' a bit.
…
[actions] can be described as you noted, "a volition of will', or 'embodiment of being by intention'.

Are you agreeing that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’? It seems like you are accepting my definition now, because this is the closest you got to defining an ‘action’ in your response.

The point is, that choices are all about intent of action, or actual action.

Why? That just begs the question. For now, I want to know how you define ‘a choice’, ‘the act of choosing’, and ‘to act’. You elaborated on them, without defining them clearly.

Given your terms (and notwithstanding the circularity), when you say "I chose not to do X" that is equivalent to "I decided to perform the action of not doing X". — Bob Ross

No, it is equivalent to, "I decided to perform an action that was not X". It in no way means, "I took no action at all".

This is so patently false though! E.g., I can legitimately decide not to pick up my phone, and that is not itself the decision to respond to your response instead. Viz., one can decide to not perform an action, and this does not imply a decision to do something else—even if one has to perform actions for the rest of their life continuously.

Likewise, I can act without choosing, which you seem to agree with me on that, and this implies that I can choose to not act and then proceed to act without choosing—which refutes your position here.

Unfortunately, we aren’t making any progress in our discussion so far. The main issue is that your use of the concepts of ‘to choose’ and ‘to act’ are littered with incoherencies; and that is primarily what I would like you to see.

For example:

I've tried to explain that a choice is what you are going to do, and by consequence, what you actively chose not to do.

I understand that you use “choice” in a looser sense, but what exactly is it under your view? — Bob Ross


A decision to make an action. — Philosophim

Do you see how these two statements are incoherent? If to choose is to decide to make an action (notwithstanding the circularity in the definition), then you cannot claim that one “actively chose not to do” something. There is not such thing as “choosing not to do X” in your view by definition.

EDIT:: Given your terms (and notwithstanding the circularity), when you say "I chose not to do X" that is equivalent to "I decided to perform the action of not doing X".

You need to overcome this problem before we can continue to all your examples.

I think the best way forward is to pause here, and ask you to try and define 'to choose’ again; because anything I point out in your response is going to hinge on your vague and incoherent use of the terms.

Again, to be clear on my side, an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’; and to choose is to ‘arrive at a conclusion from rational deliberation’.

I think I understand what you are going for, which is that ‘one must perform an action to avoid another action’. (1) This isn’t true; and (2) even if it was it would not negate my point.

With respect to #1, the problem is that you keep using examples where one coincidentally chooses a different act instead of doing the act in question (e.g., walking away instead of pulling the lever); but this is not always the case. For example, imagine you decide to just stand there and keep watching instead of pulling the lever: continuing to watch is not itself an action—instead, you would be deciding to not do anything and since you are already watching you continue to watch. What you are doing is failing to analyze the inaction in-itself—e.g., choosing to not get up is itself (A) a conclusion reached through thinking and (B) not a choice to do something.

With respect to #2, even if I grant your point it does not follow that one cannot choose to do nothing: even in the case that it is true that “one must perform action X to avoid action Y”, it also true that the choice to not do Y precedes the choice to do X—all you are noting is that not doing Y requires a subsequent action which is not Y for Y to not be done. If this is true, then even under your view it must be conceded that choices can be about inactions—which violates your definition of ‘choice’.

In your view, we end up with a peculiar conclusion that it is false that ‘one can choose to not do Y’; and you get this problem because you are falsely inferring that “one cannot choose to do nothing” because “one cannot lack action”. You are forgetting that deliberation is an act, but that it can be about inaction; and this means that one is technically acting when they are concluding to not do something (in virtue of performing the act of thinking), but that they are performing the act of choosing to not do anything.

I can choose to not respond to the post, but I choose to make some other type of action in my life.

That is not a part of the original choice made—or at least it isn’t per se. You could choose to not respond to the post without, in that act of deliberation, choosing to not do so for the sake of some other action. Whether or not you must choose, after that, to act is a separate and irrelevant question.

You still have failed to give a coherent definition of a ‘choice’, and I think this is what is hindering you from seeing the issues I have exposed (even above).

I would say agency more than thinking, as one can act emotionally, then rationally think about it later.

An emotion is not a result of a choice: you don’t choose what you feel. Choices are cognitive, not conative. Again, you defined ‘choice’ as a ‘making a decision to act’: decisions are cognitive—it makes no sense to include emotions in that other than what emotions are filtered through reason.

"The action they took did not involve pulling the lever, because they thought it more moral to do that action then pull the lever."

This is wrong, because you have conflated a reason one may possibly have for not doing X with it being necessary that they have such a reason for not doing X: do you find it impossible for a person to choose to not pull the lever “because they simply wanted to watch them die”? If not, then your point cannot stand: they are not choosing to not pull the lever for the sake of another action they want to perform.

An action 'simpliciter' is simply what your being is at any moment in time.

I find this inadequate, although I appreciate the elaboration. According to your definition here, a person who is brain dead in a coma is ‘acting’ by not moving their arms; because it is a part of ‘what their being is [at this moment]’. Actions are tied to agency, not being.

A decision to make an action

I see the problem now: as a matter of definition, you must reject the idea of choosing to do nothing.

This is absurd to me, because, again, it is so painfully obvious that you can choose to not do something without choosing to do something else. You can decide, right now, to never respond to this message without choosing to go do something else instead: if that is true, then you made a choice to not make an action—which violates your definition of ‘choice’.

You know me: I hate semantics as much as the next person; but if you define ‘choice’ in this way, then I would note that you must still agree that one can ‘reach a conclusion through the process of thinking’ which results in that ‘conclusion’ being that one should not act; and this then would not, by definition, be a ‘choice’ in your schema—but that’s what I am getting at.

Assuming agency, if you choose to do A, but at the last second, pick B, you changed your choice to B.

What you are noting here, is that ‘if one acts, then they chose those actions’; and if I were to grant your point here, it would not suffice to negate the possibility of being able to choose to not act. All this notes, is that ones actions are necessarily chosen; but not that ones choices are all about actions.

Like I stated before, I do reject that all acts are chosen; because it is impossible to reach a decision other than through rational deliberation; which leads me to my next point:

A decision to make an action

Choosing is the act of deciding: you circularly defined a ‘choice’ here with ‘decision’. I would submit to you that ‘making a decision’, ‘making a choice’, etc. are all the results of the process of thinking; and ‘thinking’ is an act of rational deliberation (even if it is irrational in the sense that one doesn’t have sound argumentation or hasn’t thought it through very robustly). If this is true, then you must accept that one can act without choosing; because one can act without thinking—and surely you agree, semantics aside, with that.

I've already pointed this out once, but I am talking about mutually exclusive scenarios.

Got it: that wasn’t clear to me. You said it was a matter of a logical formula, which was confusing me.

They chose to not pull the lever, and acted on it, because they thought it more moral to do something else

How did they act on it? What you are missing, is that the choosing to not pull the lever is a choice to refrain from acting; and if that is the case then they didn’t act on it.

Omissibility in itself neither necessarily exempts or makes the person responsible

I apologize, I used the terms wrong: moral omissibility is a category of moral thought that revolves around when someone fails to do something good. The point I was making is that an omission is sometimes permissible.

if we had a 50/50 situation, in which you only had two choices and both were equally bad, no one could judge you for your choice.

These examples we are using are not situations where all choices are equally bad. Again, allowing something bad to happen is not as bad as doing something bad. Likewise, to use your negligence example, the worker would be held morally responsible if they should have reasonably known to push that certain button; but if they couldn’t have reasonably known, then they shouldn’t be. The main point would be, though, that this concedes that not even all inactions are equal. E.g., it would not be right to say that the worker in both instances is doing something equally bad.

No, I'm not saying that at all.

We have deeper issues now. If you define a ‘choice’ as ‘a decision to make an action’, then one cannot choose to let something happen—as a matter of definition.

And in the situation of moral choice, 'not acting' is the action you take.

That’s manifestly incoherent: you either have to accept that all moral choices are not instances of ‘not acting’, or you have to concede that your definition doesn’t work.

Good discussion!

@Lionino, I think our conversation went astray because I (or perhaps we) was (or perhaps were) focusing on the pain involved in the vaccination and not the harm. In a complete sense, the harming of the person is necessarily prior to the release of the dead cells (or what not) that will help them build immunity; and so I completely understand and agree with you (now) that this is analogous to the self-defense example I gave: part of the means is harming the person, as opposed to being a side effect of the means.

Your solution to the OP, however, is wrong; because it liberates the discussion into weighing the consequences of actions instead of their natures; and this leads (necessarily) to the bizarre permitting of immoralities for the sake of the greater good.

The solution, I think, is to reject 3: I realized that my theory is eudaimonic and not hedonic, and so I am not committed to the idea that harming someone, in-itself, is bad for them. Likewise, I find nothing wrong, now that I have liberated myself from 3, with deploying a principle of forfeiture whereby one can harm someone for the sake of preventing them from doing something wrong; and this is not a case of an action which is bad in-itself because the action of harming is not in-itself bad and the intention bound-up with the action (of harming), in this case, is good.

I don't know what the phrase "flow of intention" is supposed to mean

I mean what is intended in-itself (at least within the context) and what is intended directly for that per se intention. An archer aims to hit their target, and pulling back the string on the bow (with an arrow in place) is intended for the sake of the intention of hitting the target. The whole motion of placing the arrow in place, pulling the string back, etc. is a part of the intentional flow towards the end; but, e.g., what is not a part of that directional flow is effect of alarming a deer standing nearby.

@Leontiskos

It's not so clear to me that self-defense involves an intent to harm.

It doesn't per se, but a lot of cases do. For example, if I am about to get shot by an aggressor and the only way to stop it is to pull out my gun and shoot them, then, in that case, I must directly intentionally harm them to save myself; for the causal means of saving myself is shooting my gun and the effect necessary to prevent my death or injury is the bullet penetrating the aggressor and harm them sufficiently to stop them from pulling their own trigger. I don't see how, in that case, you could argue that (1) there is not intent to harm nor (2) that the intent is direct.

When we consider self-defense in the context of double effect, and scrutinize the criterion that the bad effect may not be a means to the good effect, it becomes crucial to determine what we mean by a means. Is it a causal or temporal means?

I was meaning a causal means, like pulling a lever. Technically the gun, or my fist (in case of punching), is the means and the effect is the bullet harming the aggressor.

When I look through Aquinas it would seem that he does not view harm as a proper act

This is a really good point that I overlooked; and helped me realize that I am not committed in the slightest to accepting that harm in-itself is bad. An action is a volition of will; and as such cannot be analyzes independently of the per se intention behind it.

Unfortunately, I am still not following exactly what you are arguing. I responded with an analysis of “action” and you responded to that response shifting the goal post towards “action of agency”. I don’t know what “action of agency” is vs. “action” simpliciter.

I understand that you use “choice” in a looser sense, but what exactly is it under your view?

Again, what do you mean by “action”? It doesn’t seem clear what you mean at all, and of which is very clear with this:

An inaction is not an action: this is obvious, so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. If you would, I would like you to explain why the following is wrong.

an inaction is a lack of action — Bob Ross

Yes, on a set of choices.

If an inaction is a lack of action, then an inaction is the negation of an action; and the negation of something cannot be identical to that something.

An inaction is a choice to not act on one or more possible actions. And in this, I am using using the logic that if one acts on A, one is not acting on B. Total inaction, is for all possible letters, you did not act on them. That means the removal of actionable agency. This is if we are using the terms consistently and logically.

I don’t understand what you mean by “if one acts on A, then one is not acting on B”. Again, A could entail B: there’s nothing logically impossible about that. Likewise, do you mean to say “if one performs action A, then one does not perform action B”? Again, action A may be identical or imply or contain B; and nothing about that conditional statement relates to the other statement that “if one does not perform action A, then they have not acted”. Likewise:

"The inaction of A, the action of B".

That isn’t a coherent sentence. What do you mean?

I think what you are trying to note is that, somehow, agents always are doing something; but the point is that not doing something is not itself an action. Not picking up a phone is not itself an action; just as much as:

Of course you did something. You chose not to pull the lever, and did something else.

With respect to the situation of the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem, you didn’t do anything else—that’s the point! You did something insofar as you rationally deliberated (viz., made a decision) to not pull the lever; but not pulling the lever is not itself an action—and this is what I want to see if we agree on or not.

Again, I think 'morally permissible' conveys your intention clearly

Moral omissibility is not the same as moral permissibility; and the former is not standardly the same as “doing something impermissible”: it is separate moral category of thought. This is important for my analysis, because of this:

I have a feeling the real goal here is that you want a person to have a 'get out of jail free card' on moral situations by claiming 'not acting' means they weren't involved

Something that is morally permissible is something which is not bad; whereas something that is morally omissible is bad but is exempt from moral responsibility—that is an important distinction. All else being equal, one should be held responsible for failing to act in a reasonable manner to prevent something bad from happening, because failing to reasonably prevent a bad effect or act is in-itself bad, but in some cases it is exempt from moral scrutiny; and one such example is when one cannot act in any morally permissible way to prevent the bad act or effect from happening. E.g., if I could reasonably and easily grab someone who is starting to drown out of a river into my boat, then me failing to do so would constitute negligence and be punishable; whereas, if I can only reasonably grab that person and put them in my boat if I push you overboard, then that is morally omissible (exactly because I cannot save this person without doing something bad, and doing something bad is worse then letting something bad happen).

The absurdity in your view, so far, is that there is no such thing as allowing or letting something bad happen; as opposed to doing something bad; because you completely lack the vocabulary to notate a choice to not act, since you think inaction is action.

Does it then follow that it is okay to "harm" an attacker who cannot feel pain? And that because the end is still achieved in such a case, therefore the infliction of "harm" is a side effect?

No, because “harm” is more than just physical pain. My point with @Lionino was that the relevant difference between punching someone in self-defense and injecting someone with a needle to provide immunity is that the latter case has a means which has a double effect whereas the former has one effect that produces the other effect. Viz., me punching that perp in the face directly produces only the effect of causing harm and only indirectly (as a subsequence) the effect of preserving myself—which is not a double effect proper. It is the 7 diagram as opposed to the V.

That’s what makes self-defense so tricky in the OP, and I am unsure how to account for it without disbanding from stipulation 2 and replacing it with “it is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad towards an innocent living being—even for the sake of something good”.

The key here is that when it comes to self-defense harm is not a precondition for success.

This is true and I agree: self-defense itself is merely the direct intention to defend oneself from an assault and this does not necessitate causing harm to someone; but I am thinking of cases of self-defense which would require it, as is the case for the vast majority (e.g., punching someone in the face, knocking them out, engaging in a shootout, etc.). In those cases, self-defense requires using physical harm as a means towards a good effect (of saving oneself); and so it seems as though one must either reject that (1) one should not do bad things as means towards good ends or (2) physical harm is not bad in-itself.

For example, one relevant difference between your case and the nurse who vaccinates or the surgeon who makes an incision, is that this is presumably done with consent or at least implied consent on the part of the patient.

That is true as well; but, like I said, the needle is the means and it produces two simultaneous effects: physical harm and immunity. This is NOT the case when one punches someone legitimately in self-defense: the physical harm is effectively the means (by being the effect of the punch) which, in turn, produces the good effect: the good effect is not produces simultaneously with the bad effect. Punching someone legitimately in self-defense is analogous, to an extent, to shoving someone into the train to save the five: the good effect is an effect of the effect of the action.

the categorical (3) should qualified by the innocence of the victim: "Do not harm the innocent."

Yes, this is true: I could say it is not bad in-itself to harm another but, rather, it is bad in-itself to harm an innocent person; and this is honestly probably the solution. The problem is that if we are analyzing harm in-itself, then it does seem bad irregardless—which comes to light when we consider using excessive force in self-defense.

It seems like the best bet is to refactor stipulation 2 and say that doing something bad a means towards a good end is not necessarily impermissible; because the bad action is permissible if it is a proportionate response towards a guilty agent.

They are same thing: what you are referring to is when I refer to a thing as in-itself vs. per accidens bad--e.g., an action that is in-itself bad.

Why is it bound to fail? That is what I want you to elaborate on, and provide justification for. Are you agreeing that self-defense cannot be justified with the OP's stipulations? If so, then which stipulation would you reject and why?