Hello @Philosophim,

An inapplicable plausibility is different enough from a plausibility to warrant a separate identity in the heirarchy.

It is completely up to you, but I think that inapplicable plausibilities should be a plausibility; It is just that, in order to avoid contradictions, "plausibility" shouldn't be defined as what can be applicably known, just what one believes is "true" (or something like that). What can be applicably known would, therefore, be a subcategory of plausibility, namely "applicable plausibilities", and what cannot be applicably known would be another subcategory, namely an "inapplicable plausibility". On a separate note, the potentiality of a belief would be differentiated between irrational inductions and all other forms (as in it is irrational if it has no potential). And it is not necessarily always the case that a belief that cannot be applied to reality has no potential to occur and, thusly, there is a meaningful distinction between irrational inductions and inapplicable plausiblities (as in the latter is guaranteed to have potential, but cannot be applied). I just think that a contradiction arises if you define "plausibility" as always applicable (can be applied). You could, on the flip side, decide that the belief in what cannot be applied to reality is irrational and, consequently, that would make it an irrational induction.

This is correct. An irrational induction is a belief that something exists, despite applicable knowledge showing it does not exist.

Fair enough.

What does indirect application to reality mean? I only see that as an inductive belief about reality. This isn't an applicable knowledge claim, so there is no application to reality. If there are no sentient beings, then there is no possibility of application knowledge.

What I meant by "indirect" and "direct" seems to be, in hindsight, simply an inductive belief about reality (you are right). But my point I was trying to convey is that we produce meaningful probabilistic models based off of the idea that something is in multiple states at once, which doesn't really abide by the law of noncontradiction in a traditional sense at least.

Superpositioning, to my understanding, is essentially probability. There are X number of possible states, but we won't know what state it will be until we measure it. The measurement affects the position itself, which is why measuring one way prevents us from measuring the other way. You won't applicably know the state until you apply that measurement, so the belief in any particular outcome prior to the measurement would be an induction.

I agree. I was merely conveying that, to build off of what you said here, we don't assume the law of noncontradiction in terms of some quantum "properties" (so to speak), but the contrary. For example, a 6-sided die is considered to have 6 states. Even when the subject isn't observing the die, they will assume the law of noncontradiction: it is in one of the 6 states. Whereas, on the contrary, electrons can have two spin states: up or down. However, unlike the previous 6-sided die example, the subject, if they are quantum inclined (:, will assume the electron is equally likely in both positions (thus, not assuming the law of noncontradiction in the same sense as before).

Great! We might be nearing a limitation for where I've thought on this.

I think that, to supplement what you stated, possibility really isn't defined as clear as it should be. Instead of what "has been experienced before", it should be what "is similar enough to what one has experienced before". This is what I mean by rigidity (although I understand you agree with me on it being elastic): "possibility", as defined as what has been experienced before, implies (to me) that you have to experience it once before in a literal, rigid, sense. On a deeper level, I think it implies that experiences tend to be more like universals and less like particulars. For me, defining it in the previously mentioned refurbished way implies that subjective threshold.

Further, I think that the terminology is still potentially somewhat problematic. Firstly, your essays claim that probabilities are the most cogent, yet they actively depend on possibilities. There is no validity in probabilities, or honestly math in its entirety, if we weren't extrapolating it from possibilities (numbers in actuality, in reality). To say that the probability of 1/52 is more cogent than a possibility seems wrong to me, as I am extrapolating that from the possibility of there being 52 cards. Maybe it is just a difference between cogency and sureness, but I am more sure that 52 cards are possible than any probability I can induce therefrom. Secondly, it seems a bit wrong to me to grant probabilities their own category when there can be plausible probability claims and possible probability claims. For example, it becomes even more clear (to me) that I am more sure of the possibility of 52 cards when I consider it against specifically 1/N probability where N is a quantity that I haven't experienced in actuality (in reality). 1/N would be a probability that is really just a "plausible probability", contrary to a "possible probability" which would be a quantity, such as 52, that I can claim is possible. One is, to me, clearly a stronger claim than the other. Furthermore, probabilities are really just a specific flavor of mathematical inductions, which it seems odd that they have their own category yet mathematical inductions aren't even a term. For example, if I have a function F(N) = N + 1, this is a mathematical induction but not a probability. So, is it a plausibility? Is it a possibility? Depends on whether N is something experienced before or not (or how loosely we are defining similar enough). Probabilities are considered the most cogent, but is 1/N probability, where N is an unexperienced number in actuality, really more cogent than F(N), where N is a number experienced in actuality? I think not. On the flip side, is F(N), where N is an unexperienced number in actuality, more cogent than a 1/N probability where N is a number experienced in actuality? I think not. What if F(N) and 1/N are a number, N, that has not been experienced in actuality before? Are they equally as cogent? F(N) would be a plausibility, and I would say probability too, but probability would be considered more cogent simply because it has its own term (at least that is how I am understanding it). In reality, I think mathematical inductions (which includes probability) are subject to the same, more fundamental, categories: possibility, plausibility (and its subtypes), and irrational induction. Also, F(N) and 1/N where N is unexperienced and so large it can't be applied to reality would both be inapplicable plausibilities. Therefore, I think we are obligated to hold the position that an inapplicable plausibility mathematical induction (such as F(N) where N is inapplicable) are less cogent than an applicable plausibility (such as I can apply the existence of this keyboard without contradiction to reality) because fundamentally, mathematics, abides by the same rules. But, however, an applicable plausibility mathematical induction (such as F(N) where N is applicable) would be more cogent than probably every other non mathematical plausibility I can come up with because the immediateness of numbers, and its repetition, surpasses pretty much all others.

Thirdly, it also depends on how you define "apply to reality" whether that holds true. Consider the belief that you have thoughts: is your confirmation of that ever applied to "reality"? It seemed as though, to me, that your essays were implying sensations outside of the body, strictly, which would exclude thoughts. However, the claim that you even have thoughts is a belief and, therefore, must be subject to the same review process. It seems as though your thoughts are the initial beliefs being applied to "reality", which seems to separate the two concepts; Do you applicably know that you think? I don't apply my thoughts to reality in the sense that I would about whether a ball will roll down a hill: my thoughts validate my thoughts. If my thoughts validate my thoughts, then we may have an example of one of the most knowable beliefs for the subject that is technically inapplicable. However, if we define the thinking process as an experience, then we can say it is possible because we have experienced it before. However, most importantly, that directly, and necessarily, implies that you are not thought but, rather, you experience thought. On the contrary, if you don't experience thought, and subsequently the separation between the two isn't established, then you cannot claim that your own thoughts are possible, since you are incapable of experiencing them.

he question to you is, is it useful for you? Is it logically consistent? Can it solve problems that other theories of knowledge cannot? And is it contradicted by reality, or is it internally consistent?

I think that it is an absolutely brilliant assessment! Well done! However, I think, although we have similar views, that there's still a bit to hash out.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Then what they are describing is an inapplicable plausibility. It is when you believe that something that exists, but have constructed it in such a way that it cannot be applicably tested. I can see though that my language is not clear, so I understand where you're coming from. Applicable knowledge is when you apply a belief to reality that is not contradicted. All inductions are a belief in something that exists in reality. The type of induction is measured by its ability to be applicably applied or known.

I agree with you here, but my point was that it is an inapplicable plausibility (which means we are on the same page now I think). A couple posts back, you were defining "plausibility" as "the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known", which I am saying that is an "applicable plausibility", not "plausibility". I am now a bit confused, because your response to that was "In both cases, the person believes that the plausibility can be applicably known", which that is why I stated people can have plausibilities that they don't think can be applicably known. You are now saying, as far as I am understanding it, that if they think it can't be applicably known, then it is an "inapplicable plausibility" (I agree with that, but notice that doesn't align with your previous definition of "plausibility", as it was defined as "can be applicably known"--unless you think that "inapplicable plausibilities" are not a subcategory of "plausibility", I don't see how this isn't a contradiction).

Upon further reflection, I think that if we define every "plausibility" that has no potential as an "irrational induction" (and, consequently, all plausibilities have potential), rather than an "applicable/inapplicable plausibility", then I have no objections here. So, using my brick example, the claim that one can fit 2,000 5 ft bricks in 1000 sq ft is an "irrational induction" (not a "plausibility") because 1000 / 5 = 200, which necessarily eliminates any potentiality. However, I still think that there are meaningful hierarchies between claims (between plausibilities, for example) that relate to sureness apart from cogency which can be evaluative tools.

Even though you did not actively think about hierarchial induction, you practicied it implictly.

Fair enough. But I would say that the fundamental comparison with respect to the law of non-contradiction is a valid comparison across all hierarchical chains.

No one has ever applicably known a situation in which the something was both itself, and its negation.

This is true, but also notice that no one has ever applicably known a situation in which, in the absence of direct observation, something necessarily was not both itself and its own negation.

If you define something as one way, then define it as its negation, you have created a situation that can never be applied to reality.

Let's say we have these two claims:
1. Absent of direct observation, things abide by the law of noncontradiction.
2. Absent of direct observation, things do not abide by the law of noncontradiction.

Firstly, I could apply both of these indirectly to reality without any contradiction because, using the law of noncontradiction, I can create situations where the law of noncontradiction doesn't necessarily have to occur (mainly absent of sentient beings). Don't get me wrong, I agree with you in the sense that both are inapplicable plausibilities, but that is with respect to direct application. I may decide, upon assessing the state of a currently unobserved thing, to decide that the outcome should calculated as if they are superpositioned (this is how a lot of the quantum realm is generally understood). This can be indirectly applied to reality without any contradiction. Or, on the contrary, I could decide the outcome should be calculated as if they are either/or (this is generally how Newtonian physics is understood).

If we cannot observe it, we cannot apply this to reality.

We cannot directly apply it to reality, but we can produce meaningful calculations based off of superposed states which necessarily imply A being, only in the theoretical, in two contradictory states. Even if we could not produce meaningful calculations, it is equally as much of an "inapplicable plausibility" as claiming it does abide by the law of noncontradiction.

Again, you are doing the practice of hierarchial induction here, whether you are aware of it or not. I don't think its a consideration prior, but a consideration of it.

I think that if these underlying principles, which engulf other contexts, are a consideration of it, contrary to prior to it, then you are agreeing with me that hierarchical chains, to some degree or another, can be compared. I was merely trying to distinguish between the underlying, engulfing, principles and the point at which the induction chains can no longer be fairly compared.

It is more cogent to believe in the first plausibility, then the second. We can do a little math to prove it.

I agree with you here, but now we are getting into another fundamental problem (I would say) with your terminology: if a "possibility" is what one has experienced once before, then virtually nothing is a possibility. And, to be more clear, I think it is a much bigger disparity then I think your epistemology tries to imply. It all depends, though, on what one defines as "experiencing before". I don't think we experience the exact same thing very often (potentially at all) and, consequently, when one states they have "experienced that before" what they really mean is they've "experienced something similar enough to their current experience for them to subjectively constitute it as a match". For example, under your terms, the claim that "that car, which I haven't experienced run, will run, when started, because I've experienced my car run before" is not a "possibility" but, rather, a "plausibility". I think that we would both agree that that is the case. However, this directly implies that I also can't claim that "this apple is edible, although I haven't taken a bite yet, because I've experienced eating an apple before" is a "possibility": not even in the case that I have good reason to claim that this apple resembles another apple I've eaten before. Similarly, I also can't claim that it is "possible" that my car will start because I've experienced it start before because, directly analogous to the apple example, my car is not the exact same, within the exact same context, as when I experienced it start (at least, the odds are that it most definitely is not). In more philosophical terms, the problem is that almost all experiences are of particulars, not universals. A previous experience of thing A cannot be constituted as a previous experience of B, ever, because A is a separate particular from B and, therefore, "possibilities" would be constrained to only that experience after it occurs and never before its occurrence. However, I would say that a previous experience of thing A can be constituted as a previous experience of B if it qualifies, potentially with reference to objective evidence but necessarily contingent on subjective determination, as similar enough, within the context, to a previous context. Notice how "possibility" is no longer a zero sum game, a binary question, and, subsequently, becomes a matter of passing a subjectively determined threshold (which could be, in turn, based off of objective claims) by necessity: this is what I would call the spectrum of sureness. It isn't a question of whether something (1) has been experienced before or (2) it hasn't but, rather, a question of how sure are you of the similarity between what you just experienced and a past experience: does it constitute as similar enough. I think there is rigidity within your epistemology that mine lacks, as I see it more as an elastic continuum of sureness. I don't know if that makes any sense or not.

Correct, depending on the context. You do not know if people have internal monologues in their head like yourself.

Not depending on the context, but every context that contains such a claim. Asking someone if they have internal monologue, no matter how you end up achieving it, doesn't prove it is "possible" in the sense that you "have experienced it at least once before". "Hard consciousness", as you put it, is exactly what I am trying to convey here in conjunction with your "possibility" term: by definition, I can never claim it is "possible" for someone else to have internal monologue. Even if you knew that the person could not physically lie about it, you would never be able to claim it is "possible" because you have never experienced it yourself (even if you have experienced internal monologue, you haven't experienced it particularly within them).

We can determine a bat can think, but we can never have the experience of thinking like a bat.

We cannot, under your terms, claim that a "bat can think", only that it is a plausibility. Even if we scanned their brains and it turns out the necessary, similar to ours, faculty exists for thought, we would never be able to label it as a "possibility" because we have not experience a bat thinking. This is, to a certain degree, what I was trying to convey previously: how incredibly narrow and limited "possibility" would be. It would essentially only pertain to universals (that which has an objective, or absolute--depending on how you define it--basis) or subjective universals (that which is true for all experience for a particular subject). An example of this would be numbers in terms of quantity: one abstract "thing" is the exact same experience as one abstract other "thing" because quantity is derived from the same subjective universal called differentiation. Differentiation, at its most fundamental level, is the same for all particulars for that subject--as they wouldn't even be particulars, but rather a particular, if this wasn't the case.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
I am glad that you are feeling well!

In both cases, the person believes that the plausibility can be applicably known.

I don't think this is necessarily true. It depends on what you mean by "applicably known": lots of people believe in things that they claim cannot be "applicably known". For example, there are ample amounts of people that believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, etc (I call it the "omni" for short) God and actively claim that these traits they believe in are necessarily outside of the scope of what we can "applicably" know. Another, non-religious, example is a priori knowledge: most people that claim their are a priori knowledge also actively accept that you necessarily cannot applicable (directly) know the components of it. At its most generic form, they would claim that we there is something that is required for experience to happen in the first place, for differentiation to occur, but you definitely will never be able to directly "applicably" know that. I guess you could say that they are indirectly "applying" it to reality without contradiction, which I would be fine with.

For example, I hold the law of non-contradiction as true. From this I believe it is plausible that the moon is made out of green cheese. Separately from this, I believe it is plausible that the sun is really run by a giant lightbulb at its core. The basis of the law of contradiction between them has no bearing on the evaluation of comparing the plausibilities.

I think that, because the law of noncontradiction is one of the (if not the) fundamental axiom there is, it is easy to consider it irrelevant to the comparison of two different plausibilities; however, nevertheless, I think that it plays a huge, more fundamental, factor in the consideration of them. For example, if my knowledge of physics (or any other relevant subject matter) that makes it "impossible" (aka has no potential to occur) for green cheese to be able to make up a moon, then, before I have even started thinking about hierarchical inductions, I have exhausted the idea to its full capacity (which, in this case, isn't much). Furthermore, if I have knowledge that both examples (the giant lightbulb and the green cheese moon) are "impossible" (have no potential to occur), then they are equally as useless as each other, but, more importantly, notice that I still compared them to a certain degree. Now, I could hold that the law of noncontradiction isn't as black and white as I presume we both think: maybe I have a warped understanding of superpositioning, for example. Maybe I believe, prior to even having the ideas of the green cheese or light bulb sun, that A can be and not be at the same time as long as there is no observant entity forcing an outcome. Now, this is not at all how superpositioning works (I would say), but someone could, nevertheless, hold this position. Moreover, with the stipulation that there are no observers, even if I have solid evidence that green cheese can't make up a planet, the planet could be made of green cheese and green cheese can't "possibly" makeup a planet at the same time. This refurbished understanding of the law of noncontradiction poses whole new problems, but notice that they wouldn't be objectively wrong: only wrong in the sense that we don't share the same fundamental context (i.e. the same understanding of the law of noncontradiction).

That being said, you can compare the belief in the law of non-contradiction, versus the belief of its denial. If you hold the law of non-contradiction as applied knowledge, or an induction that you believe in, you can evaluate an inductions chain, and reject any inductions that relay on the law of non-contradiction being false within its chain.

This is, essentially, what I am trying to convey. That would be a consideration prior to hierarchical inductions and would provide an underlying basis to compare two different plausibilities. I think we do this with a lot more than just the law of noncontradiction.

I "think" this is what you are going for. If so, yes, you can determine which inductions are more cogent by looking in its links, and rejecting links that you do not know, or believe in. But this is much clearer if you are trying to decide whether the moon is plausibly made out of green cheese, or something else, then trying to compare the moon and the sun. Does that make sense?

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that you are trying to convey that, once all the underlying beliefs are evaluated and coincide with the given belief in question, you can't compare two different contexts' hierarchical induction chains. I don't think this is necessarily the case either, but I want to focus on the more fundamental disputes first before segueing into that.

My main point is that potentiality is completely removed when "possibility" is refurbished in your epistemology. The problem is that there are no distinctions between applicable plausibilities. For example, imagine I have 2,000 5 ft bricks. Now, imagine two claims: (1) "you can fit 200 of these bricks in a 10 x 10 x 10 room" and (2) "you can fit 2,000 of these bricks into a 10 x 10 x 10 room". Let's say that I've never experienced filling a room with 5 ft bricks. I think, according to your definitions, both claims would not be possibilities but, rather, applicable plausibilities because I haven't ever experienced either (and "possibility" is something that has been experienced before). However, I don't need to attempt to apply both directly to reality to figure out which one has the potential to occur. Even though they are plausibilities, #1 has the potential to occur (meaning that, although I could be wrong since it is an induction, all my knowledge aligns with this having the potential to occur) while #2 does not (because, assuming my math is sound, 1000 Sq Ft / 5 Ft only allows for 200 5 ft bricks). So, even if I haven't directly attempted to fill a room with 200 nor 2,000 5 ft bricks, I can soundly believe that one claim is more cogent than the other because one aligns with my current knowledge while the other does not. If we were to put them both as plausibilities, then I would say one is "highly plausible" while the other is "highly implausible" to make a meaningful distinction between the two.

Another fundamental problem is what constitutes experiencing something before? How exact of a match does it have to be? If it is an exact match, then we hold very little possibilities and a vast majority of our knowledge is ambiguously labeled as "plausibilities". For example, I have internal monologue. I think that it is "possible" (in accordance with my use of the terms) that other people have internal monoloqes too; however, I have never experienced someone else having an internal monologue, therefore it isn't a "possibility" in accordance with your terms. I think the obvious counter argument would be that I have experienced my own internal monologue, therefore it is "possible". But my experience of my own internal monologue is not an experience that is an exact match to the claim in question ("other people have internal monologue"). Someone could walk up to me and rightly claim that my own experience of my own internal monologue is in no way associated with the experience of someone else having an internal monologue, therefore I don't know if it is possible (according to your terms): and they would be correct. However, I would still hold that other people have the potential to have internal monologue because they have the necessary faculty (very similar to mine) for it to occur. As of now, I am not saying that they definitely have internal monologue, or that they can, just that they have the potential to. To take this a step further, the belief that other people can have internal monologue is an "inapplicable plausibility" (I can't demonstrate any other than my own). However, although I can't claim that another person can have internal monologue, I would not tell someone else who claims to have internal monologue that that is "impossible" (according to your terms), even though I haven't experienced someone else having internal monologue, because I have a more fundamental parent context that I abide by: empathy. If I were in their shoes, and I actually did have internal monologue (regardless of whether, in my current state, I can actually claim it is "possible"), I would want the other person to give me the benefit of the doubt out of respect. So my empathetic parental context would overrule, so to speak, my factual consideration and, therefrom, I would walk around claiming that it is "possible" for someone else to have internal monologue although technically I can't claim that within your definitions. So basically: I can claim that they have the potential to have internal monologue and, although I can't claim they can have internal monologue, I will claim they can regardless.

This brings up a more fundamental issue (I think): the colloquial term "possibility" is utterly ambiguous. When someone says "it is possible", they may be claiming that "it can occur" or that "it can potentially occur", which aren't necessarily synonymous. To say something "can occur", as you rightly point out, is only truly known if the individual has experienced it before, however to say something "can potentially occur" simply points out that the claim doesn't violate any underlying principles and beliefs. I think this is a meaningful distinction. If I claim that it is "possible" (in my terms) for a rock to fall if someone drops from a mountain top, it depends on if I have directly experienced it or not whether I am implicitly claiming that it "can occur" (because I've experienced it) or that it "can potentially occur" (because, even though I haven't experienced it before, my experiences, which are not direct nor exact matches of the given claim, align with the idea that it could occur). I think this can get a bit confusing as "can" and "can potentially" could mean the same thing definitions wise, but I can't think of a better term yet: it's the underlying meaningful distinction here that I want to retain.

Also, as a side note, I like your response to the object rolling off hills example, however this is getting entirely too long, so I will refrain from elaborating further.

Look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I caught "The Covid," and have been fairly sick. Fortunately I'm vaccinated, so recovery is going steady so far.

Oh no! I am glad that you are recovering and I hope you have a speedy recovery!

An applicable plausibility is something which can be applied to reality if we so choose. For example, "If I go outside within five minutes, it will rain on me as soon as I step outside of the door." I do not know if it is raining, nor can I figure it out from within the house. There is nothing preventing me from going outside within the next five minutes. Its an applicable plausibility that I will be rained on, because I can test it.

An inapplicable plausibility is a plausibility that either cannot be tested, or is designed not to be able to be tested. If for example I state, "There is a unicorn that exists that cannot be sensed by any means," this is inapplicable. There is nothing to apply to reality with this idea, as it is undetectable within reality. Perhaps there is a unicorn that exists that cannot be sensed in reality. But we will never be able to apply it, therefore it is something that cannot be applicably known.

This is all and well, but I think you defined "plausibility" (in your previous post) as exactly what you just defined as an "applicable plausibility"--and that was all I have trying to point out. You defined "plausibility" as "the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known". A "plausibility", under your terms (I would say), is not restricted to what "can be applicably known" (that is a subcategory called "applicable plausibilities"), whereas "plausibility" is a much more generic term than that (as far as I understand your terms).

Just because two built contexts are dissimilar, it doesn't mean they cannot have commonalities. But commonalities do not mean they can necessarily be evaluated against the different inductions within their independent contexts.

I agree in that two contexts can be dissimilar and still have commonalities, but those commonalities are more fundamental aspects to those contexts and, therefore, although they are dissimilar, they are not separate. Even the most distinct contexts share some sort of dependency (or dependencies). An induction (within a context) that contradicts a parent context is less cogent than an induction (within a different context) that doesn't.

The human eye and iron floating on water with butter are just too disparate to compare.

You can compare them relative to their shared dependencies (such as the law of noncontradiction). You could say that, since iron floating on water (even if you haven't experienced it before) cannot occur based off of what you have learned (experienced) about densities in chemistry and your acceptance of the law of noncontradiction, then this is not as cogent as the eye example since it violates thereof. This is a comparison of potentiality, where both are compared to an accepted principle that engulfs both of them (which are part of the context, but is shared). From what I understand from your hierarchical inductions, the idea that (1) A can be A and not A and that (2) A will have the same identity as another A are both not possible unless we experience it, with no distinction between the two (preliminarily). However, I am saying that #1 has no potential to exist while #2 does because I have accepted the law of noncontradiction and law of identity as underlying principles which rules out #1 and allows for #2. However, if I did not accept the law of noncontradiction and I did not accept the law of identity, then #1 has the potential to be "true" while #2 does not. It is also relative to the parent contexts: the shared dependencies (more fundamental concepts that the given contexts at hand depend on).

The law of non-contradiction simply means you have an irrational inductive belief, which is completely divorced from rationality

I would say that it means that the subject has accepted the axiom as "true" and, therefore, it will be a dependency for many future ideas (or beliefs) they will have (as they will build off of it). It isn't necessarily "true" in all contexts, we just share that more fundamental principle.

To add, the comparison is about finding the best induction to take within that context.

I think that that is one goal, but the comparing of all contexts is also desired. All knowledge stems from the same tree, therefore one can derive any given contexts back to a common node. I am just saying that the idea that you strictly cannot compare contexts eliminates potentiality. When I say something can potentially exists, or happen, it means that it does not violate any of my parental contexts (any underlying principles that would be required for the concept to align with my knowledge as it is now). Hitherto, your epistemology eliminates this altogether: you either have a possibility or plausibility (probability encompasses the idea of a possibility) and you can't preliminarily determine whether one plausibility has the potential to occur or not.

no comparing the probability of improving the eye, the the options of plausibility vs irrationality with iron floating on water with butter

You would be comparing it one step deeper than that: iron floating on water has no potential to occur whereas improving the eye does (I would call this "possibility").

Can you clarify this? I interpreted this as follows.

I applicably know A and B.
I applicably know C, D, and E.
I applicably know that the numbers two and three are not synonymous.
Therefore A and B, and C,D, and E are synonymous.

I don't believe that's what you're trying to state, but I could not see what you were intending.

You are absolutely right: I was trying to keep it as fundamental as possible, but I see how that was confusing. I was merely pointing out essentially that the law of noncontradiction is an underlying principle (which is apart of the context) that can determine one context more cogent than another because they exist within a plane. I was just making up a contradictory example off the top of my head and I apologize--as it wasn't very good at all.

I still wasn't quite sure what you meant by parent contexts in these examples. I think what you mean is the broader context of "things" versus "round objects". Please correct me here. For my part, it depends on how we cut hairs so to speak. If the first person does not applicably know that things can roll down a hill as well, then neither statement is more cogent than the other. If the first person knows that "things" can also roll down hill, then there's no cogent reason why they would conclude the "thing" would fly off the hill over roll down the hill.

At its most fundamental level, I was trying to convey that the law of similarity could be another example of a parent context, where one may determine two completely even contexts (i.e. possibility -> plausibility and one that is a possibility -> plausibility) based off of an underlying principle that governs both contexts. If I have witnessed a "thing" fly and roll off of a hill, but the "things" that I have seen fly look less similar to the "thing" on the hill now and the "thing" looks more similar to the "things" that I have seen roll down a hill, then I might determine one context more cogent than the other based off of the fact that I accept the law of similarity as an underlying principle that engulfs both the contexts in question. It is a more fundamental examination then the hierarchical inductions.

What might help is to first come up with a comparison of cogency for a person within a particular context first. Including two people complicates comparing inductions greatly, but generally follows the same rules as a person comparing several inductive options they are considering within their own context.

I agree. I think that, within an individual context, the subject will compare their knowledge based off of a tree like structure (or plane like structure where principles engulf other principles) and decide their credence levels based off of that (which includes your hierarchical induction chains). I think that multiple subjects do essentially the same thing, but they will accept their own experiences are more cogent than others (because it is more immediate to them as the subject) and, therefore, that is the most vital factor.

Look forward to your response.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
The dots have finally clicked for me! I think I understand what you are stating now and, so, most of what I said has been negated (I apologize for the confusion). However, I do still have a couple quarrels, so I will elaborate on those in a concise manner (that way, if I am still not understanding it correctly, you can correct me without having to address too many objections).

Possibility - the belief that because distinctive knowledge has been applicably known at least once, it can be known again.

Plausibility- the belief that distinctive knowledge that has never been applicably known, can be applicably known.

I have no problem with the underlying meaning of "possibility", however I think it still leaves out potentiality, but more on that later. With respect to "plausibility", I think you just defined, in accordance with your essays, an "applicable plausibility", contrary to an "inapplicable plausibility", which is not just a "plausibility". You defined it in the quote that it "can be applicably known", which is what I thought an "applicable plausibility" was. Maybe I am just misremembering.

First, we cannot compare cogency between different branches of claims. This is because cogency takes context into account as well, and the difference between evaluating the human eye, and an floating iron block, are two fairly separate contexts

I think you are sort of right. I think that you are thinking of the hierarchical inductions within a particular context as a linear dependency (i.e. a possibility -> plausibility is more cogent than a possibility -> plausibility -> plausibility); However, I think it is more of a plane, contexts engulfing contexts, style of hierarchies: no context is strictly isolated from any other context as they all are dependent on a more fundamental context which engulfs them together. Think of it as the evaluating the human eye context and the floating iron block context as separate contexts, indeed, but residing within a shared context(s) which is where they can be cross-examined from. A great example is the context in which the law of noncontradiction is a valid axiom: this contextual plane would engulf, because it is more fundamental, the two aforementioned contexts. Therefore, in the abstract, if context A and B reside within the law of noncontradiction context, and A does not abide by the law of noncontraction while B does, then A is less cogent than B on a more fundamental contextual plane--regardless of the fact that their hierarchical inductions are considered separately. Their are always parent contexts that engulf a given context unless you are contemplating the axioms from which all others are derived (then it gets tricky).

Before I continue to your post, let me briefly try to explain the difference between "possibility" (in your terms) and potentiality. Let's use two examples:

I applicably know what two "things" are.
I applicably know what three "things" are.
I applicably know that the underlying meaning of "two" and "three" are not synonymous.
Therefore, "two" "things" and "three" "things" are synonymous.

I applicably know the eye can see X colors.
I applicably know we can improve the eye's ability to see with greater focus.
Therefore I believe we can improve the eye to see greater than X colors.

Although they are to be considered separate from one another, in the sense of the induction chains, because they are two totally different contexts, we can still compare them because they both reside within a parent (or more than one parent) context; The law of noncontradiction, assuming the subject holds that as a fundamental axiom, would be a great example of a parent context that engulfs these two examples and, therefore, the former example is less cogent than the latter, despite their clearly different contexts, due to the parent context's negation of the former example's potentiality. Normally this would be called "possibility", but since you use it differently I think we are safe using potentiality instead. But, most importantly, notice that these two examples are not mutually exclusive, in a holistic sense, as they stem from more fundamental parent contexts.

I applicably know the eye can see X colors.
I applicably know we can improve the eye's ability to see with greater focus.
Therefore I believe we can improve the eye to see greater than X colors.

I understand your hierarchical induction chains, and they are brilliant (and great example)! However, consider this:

1. I see a round object at the top of a hill.
2. I have never experienced this round object before.
3. I applicably know that it is windy out.
4. I have experienced a round log fall down a hill during a windy day.
5. I have never experienced a round log fly up off of a hill during a windy day.
6. I have experienced "things" flying off of a hill.
7. The round object is similar in size to the log, but isn't a log.

Consider the following conclusions:
1. The round object is going to fly off of the hill
2. The round object is going to roll down the hill

Now, I think that you are perfectly right in stating that the cogency of these two conclusions, since they are within the same context, can be evaluated based off of the induction chains. However, in this example, let's try it out:

For conclusion 1:
I applicably know that some "things" can fly off of hills.
I applicably know that this round-object is a "thing".
Therefore, the round-object will fly off the hill.
I can apply this belief to reality to see if it holds.
Therefore, I am holding an "applicable plausibility" based off of two possibilities.

For conclusion 2:
I applicably know that some round-like objects, such as a log, can roll down a hill.
I applicably know that some round-like objects, such as a log, will roll down a hill in windy climates.
Therefore, the round-like object will roll down the hill.
I can apply this belief to reality to see if it holds.
Therefore, I am holding an "applicable plausibility" based off of two possibilities.

Notice that these are (1) both within the same context and (2) they both are at the same point in the induction chain. However, the latter is more cogent than the former because we have to evaluate the parent context(s) that they share: in this case, a good example is the law of similarity. If the subject holds that a generic "thing" is less cogent to base correlations off of than more particular groups of concepts, aka (I believe) the law of similarity, then they hold a more fundamental, parent context, that engulfs the two aforementioned conclusions and, thereby, one is more cogent than the other. Likewise, if the person held a parent context that directly contradicts the engulfed context, then that engulfed context would have to go (or the parent one would have to be refurbished to allow it to live on) and, more importantly, that context would be based off of the law of noncontradiction, which resides within another context: it is a hierarchy of planes that are engulfed by one another where the most fundamental is the most engulfing.

Similarly, with respect to your example prior to eye surgery, that requires a more fundamental acceptance, a parent context, that the context of the situation nullifies the ability for me to say they were truly wrong or right, or that I am truly right compared to them (because it depends on the context). If I didn't hold that context, then I wouldn't agree with you in this sense and neither would be truly wrong: I would just be disagreeing with you at a more fundamental context that engulfs the other.

I believe the above should cover what you meant by "qualitative likelihood".

I am going to refrain from elaborating on "qualitative likelihoods" to restrict the amount of objections I give in this post (that way it is easier for you, hopefully). But we can most definitely talk about this after.

According to this, there is no apriori.

Originally I was going to object, but I think that a priori is perfectly compatible with your view (or at least how I understand it) and can elaborate on this further if you would like.

With the chain of reasoning comparisons I noted above, we can definitely determine which is most cogent to pursue.

Only within the particular context and not considering the parent contexts.

In general, I like your epistemology! I think it is an empiricist leaning view that is more "sure" of the chick and less "sure" of the egg. I just think we can improve it (:

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
I agree: I think that we are using terms drastically differently. Furthermore, I don't, as of now, agree with your use of the terminology for multiple different reasons (of which I will hereafter attempt to explain).

Firstly, the use of "possibility" and "plausibility" in the sense that you have defined it seems, to me, to not account for certain meaningful distinctions. For example,let's consider two scenarios: person one claims that a new color could be sensed by humans if their eyes are augmented, while person two claims that iron can float on water if you rub butter all over the iron block. I would ask you, within your use of the terms, which is more cogent? Under your terms, I think that these would both (assuming they both haven't been applied to reality yet) be a "plausibility" and not a "possibility", and, more importantly, there is no hierarchy between the two: they only gain credibility if they aren't inapplicable implausibilities and, thereafter, are applied to reality without contradiction. This produces a problem, for me at least, in that I think one is more cogent than the other. Moreover, in my use of the terms, it would be because one is possible while the other can be proven to be impossible while they are both still "applicable plausibilities" (in accordance to your terms). However, I think that your terms do not account for this at all and, thereby, consider them equal. You see, "possibility", according to my terms, allows us to determine what beliefs we should pursue and which ones we should throw away before even attempting them (I think that your use of the terms doesn't allow this, we must apply it directly to reality and see if it fails, but what if it would require 3 years to properly set up? What if we are conducting an experiment that is clearly impossible, but yet considered an "applicable plausibility? What term would you use for that if not "possibility"?). Moreover, there is knowledge that we have that we cannot physically directly experience, which I am sure you are acquainted with as a priori, that must precede the subject altogether. I haven't, and won't ever, experience directly the processes that allow me to experience in the first place, but I can hold it as not only a "possibility" (in my sense of the term) but also a "highly plausible" "truth" of my existence. Regardless of what we call it, the subject must have a preliminary consideration of what is worth pursuing and what isn't. I think it is the term "possibility", I think that you are more saying that we must apply it to reality without contradiction--which confuses me a bit because that is exactly what I am saying but I would then ask you what you would call something that has the potential to occur in reality without contradiction? If you are thinking about the idea of iron floating on water, instead of saying "that is not possible", are you saying "I would not be able to apply that to reality without contradiction"? If so, then I think I am just using what I would deem a more concise word for the same thing: possibility. Furthermore, it is a preliminary judgement, not in term so claiming that something can be applied to reality to see if it holds: I could apply the butter rubbing iron on water idea and the color one, but before that I could determine one to be an utter waste of time.

Secondly, your use of the terms doesn't account for any sort of qualitative likelihoods: only quantitative likelihoods (aka, probability). You see, if I say that something isn't "possible" until I have experienced it at least once, then a fighter jet flying at the speed of sound is not possible, only plausible, for me because I haven't experienced it directly nor have I measured it with a second hand tool. However, I think that it is "plausible", in a qualitative likelihood sense, because I've heard from many people I trust that they can travel that fast (among other things that pass my threshold of what can be considered "plausible"). I can also preliminarily consider whether this concept would contradict any of my discrete or applicable knowledge and, given that it doesn't, I would be able to categorize this as completely distinct from a claim such as "iron can float on water". I would say that a jet traveling at the speed of sound is "possible", therefore I should pursue further contemplation, and then I consider it "highly plausible" because it meets my standard of what is "highly plausible" based off of qualitative analysis. In your terms, I would have two "plausibilities" that are not "possible" unless I experience it (this seems like empiricism the more I think about it--although I could be wrong) and there is no meaningful distinction between the two.

Thirdly, think that your use of the terms lacks a stronger, qualitative (rationalized), form of knowledge (i.e. what "plausibility" is for me). If a "plausibility" is weaker than a "possibility", and a "possibility" is merely that which one has experienced once, then we are left without any useful terms for when something has been witnessed once but isn't as qualitatively likely as another thing that has been witnessed multiple times. For example, the subject could have experienced a dog attack a human; therefore, it is "possible" and not "plausible" (according to your terms), but when a passerby asks them if their dog will attack them if they pet it, the subject now has to consider, not just that it is "possible" since they have witnessed it before, the qualitative likelihood that their dog is aggressive enough to be a risk. They have to necessarily create a threshold, of which is only useful in this context if the passerby agrees more or less with it, that must be assessed to determine if the dog will attack or not. They must both agree, implicitly, because if the subject has too drastically different of a threshold then the passerby then the passerby's question will be answer in a way that won't portray anything meaningful. For example, if the subject thinks that its dog will be docile as long as the passerby doesn't pet its ears and decides to answer "no, it won't attack you", then that will not be very useful to the other subject, the passerby, unless they also implicitly understand that they shouldn't pet the ears. Most importantly, the subject is not making any quantitative analysis (as we have discussed earlier) but, rather, I would say qualitative analysis that I would constitute in terms of "plausibility". However, if you have another term for this I would be open to considering it as I think that your underlying meaning is generally correct.

Fourthly, I think that your redefinitions would be incredibly hard to get the public to accept in any colloquial sense (or honestly any practical sense) because it 180s their perception of it all and, as I previously mentioned, doesn't provide enough semantical options for them to accurately portray meaning. I am not trying to pressure you into having to abide by common folk: I just think that, if the goal is to refurbish epistemology, then you will have to either (1) keep using the terms as they are now or (2) accompany their redefinitions with other terms that give people the ability to still accurately portray their opinions.

We cannot state that it is possible that there are other shades of color that humanity could see if we improved the human eye, because no one has yet improved the human eye to see currently unseeable colors

I would say that this reveals what I think lacks in your terminology: we can't determine what is more cogent to pursue. In my terminology, I would be able to pursue trying to augment the eye to see more shades of colors because it is "possible". I am not saying that I "know" that they exist, only that I "know" that they don't contradict any distinctive or applicable knowledge I have (what I would call immediate forms of knowledge: perception, thought, emotion, rudimentary reason, and memories). I'm not sure what term you would use here in the absence of "possibility", but I am curious as to know what!

But what does "likely" mean in terms of the knowledge theory we have? Its not a probability, or a possibility, because the distinctive knowledge of "I think there are other colors the human eye could see if we could make it better." has never been applicably known.

Again, I think this is another great example of the problem with your terms; If it isn't possible or probable then it is just a plausibility like all the other plausibilities. But I can consider the qualitative likelihood that it is true and whether it contradicts all my current knowledge, which will also determine whether I pursue it or not. I haven't seen a meteor, nor a meteor colliding into the moon, but I have assessed that it is (1) possible (in my use of the term) and (2) plausible (in my use of the term) because I have assessed whether it passes my threshold. For example, I would have to assess whether the people that taught me about meteors would trick me or not (and whether they are credible and have authority over the matter--both of which require subjective thresholds). Are they liars? Does what they are saying align with what I already know? Are they trying to convince me of iron floating on water? These are considerations that I think get lost in the infinite sea of "plausibilities" (in your terms). The only thing I can think of is that maybe you are defining what I would call "possible" as an "applicable plausibility" and that which is "impossible" as a "inapplicable plausibility". But then I would ask what determines what is "applicable"? Is it that I need to test it directly? Or is it the examination that it could potentially occur? I think that to say it "could potentially occur" doesn't mean that I "know" that it exists, just that, within my knowledge, it has the potential too. I think your terms removes potentiality altogether.

I feel that "Plausibility" one of the greatest missing links in epistemology. Once I understood it, it explained many of the problems in philosophy, religion, and fallacious thinking in general. I understand your initial difficulty in separating plausibilities and possibilities. Plausibilities are compelling! They make sense in our own head. They are the things that propel us forward to think on new experiences in life. Because we have not had this distinction in language before, we have tied plausibilities and possibilities into the same word of "possibility" in the old context of language. That has created a massive headache in epistemology.

I understand what you mean to a certain degree, but I think that it isn't fallacious to say that something could potentially occur: I think it becomes fallacious if the subject thereafter concludes that because it could occur it does occur. If I "know" something could occur, that doesn't mean that I "know" that it does occur and, moreover, I find this to be the root of what I think your are referring to in this quote.

But when we separate the two, so many things make sense. If you start looking for it, you'll see many arguments of "possibility" in the old context of "knowledge", are actually talking about plausibilities. When you see that, the fault in the argument becomes obvious.

I agree in the sense that one should recognize that just because something is "possible" (in my use of the term) that doesn't mean that it actually exists, it just means that it could occur (which can be a useful and meaningful distinction between things that cannot). I also understand that, within your use of the terms, that you are 100% correct here: but I think that the redefining of the terms leads to other problems (which I have and will continue to be addressing in this post).

Plausbilities cannot have immediateness, because they are only the imaginations of what could be within our mind, and have not been applied to reality without contradiction yet.

I think that they are applied to reality without contradiction in an indirect sense: it's not that they directly do not contradict reality, it's that they don't contradict any knowledge that I currently have (distinct and applicable). This doesn't mean that it does happen, or is real, but, rather, that it can happen: it is just a meaningful distinction that I think your terms lack (or I am just not understanding it correctly). And, to clarify, I think that "applicable plausibilities" aren't semantically enough for "things that could occur" because then I am no longer distinguishing "applicable" and "unapplicable" plausibilities based off of whether I can apply it to reality or not. In my head, it is a different to claim that I could apply something to reality to see if it works and saying that, even if I can't apply it, it has the potential to work. If I state that the teapot example is an "inapplicable plausibility", then I think that the butter on iron example, even if it took me three years to properly setup the experiment, would be an "applicable plausibility" along with the shades of colors example. But I think that there is a clear distinction between the shades of colors example and the button on iron example--even if I can apply them, given enough time, to reality to see if they are true: I have applied enough concepts that must be presupposed for the idea of iron to float on water to work and, therefore, it doesn't hold even if I can't physically go test it.

As one last attempt to clarify, when you state it doesn't contradict any immediate forms of knowledge, do you mean distinctive knowledge, or applicable knowledge? I agree that it does not contradict our distinctive knowledge. I can imagine a horse flying in the air with a horn on its head. It has not been applied to reality however. If I believe it may exist somewhere in reality, reality has "contradicted" this distinctive knowledge, by the fact that it has not revealed it exists. If I believe something exists in reality, but I have not found it yet, my current application to reality shows it does not exist.

I mean both (I believe): my experiences and memories which is the sum of my existence. However, I am not saying that it exists, only that it could exist. This is a meaningful distinction between things that could not exist. I would agree with you in the sense that I don't think unicorns exist, but not because they can't exist, but because I don't have any applicable knowledge (I believe is what you would call it) of it. So I would agree with you that I can't claim to "know" a unicorn exists just because it could exist: but I can claim that an idea of a unicorn that is "possible" is more cogent than one that is "impossible", regardless of whether I can directly test anything or not.

But they are not confirmations of what is real, only the hopes and dreams of what we want to be real.

I sort of agree. There is a distinction to be made between what is merely a hope or dream, and that which could actually happen. I may wish that a supernatural, magical unicorn exists, but that is distinctly different from the claim that a natural unicorn could exist. One is more cogent than the other, and, thereby, one is hierarchically higher than the other.

I look forward to hearing your response,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Absolutely splendid post! I thoroughly enjoyed reading it!

Upon further reflection, I think that we are using the terms "possibility" and "plausibility" differently. I am understanding you to be defining a "possibility" as something that has been experienced at least once before and a "plausibility" as something that has not been applicable tested yet. However, I as thinking of "possibility" more in terms of its typical definition: "Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances". Furthermore, I was thinking of "plausibility" more in the sense that it is something that is not only possible, but has convincing evidence that it is the case (but hasn't been applicably tested yet). I think that you are implicitly redefining terms, and that is totally fine if that was the intention. However, I think that to say something is "possible" is the admit that it doesn't directly contradict reality in any way (i.e. our immediate forms of knowledge) and has nothing directly to do with whether I have ever experienced it before. For example, given our knowledge of colors and the human eye, I can state that it is possible that there are other shades of colors that we can't see (but with better eyes we could) without ever experiencing any new shades of colors. It is possible because it doesn't contradict reality, whereas iron floating on water isn't impossible because I haven't witnessed it but, rather, because my understanding of densities (which are derived from experiences of course) disallows such a thing to occur. Moreover, to state that something is "plausible", in my mind, implies necessarily that it is also "possible"--for if it isn't possible then that would mean it contradicts reality and, therefore, it cannot have reasonable evidence for it being "plausible". Now, don't get me wrong, I think that your responses were more than adequate to convey your point, I am merely portraying our differences in definitions (semantics). I think that your hierarchy, which determines things that are derived more closely to "possibilities" to be more cogent, is correct in the sense that I redefine a "possibility" as something experienced before (or, more accurately, applicably known). However, I think that you are really depicting that which is more immediate to be more cogent and not that which is possible (because I would define "possibility" differently than you). Likewise, when you define a "plausibility" to be completely separate from "possibility", I wouldn't do that, but I think that the underlying meaning you are conveying is correct.

an old possibility is still more cogent than a newer plausibility.

I would say: that which is derived from a more immediate source (closer to the processes of perception, thought, and emotion--aka experience) is more cogent than something that is derived from a less immediate source.

Plausibility does not use immediateness for evaluation, because immediateness is based on the time from which the applicable knowledge was first gained.

Although, with your definitions in mind, I would agree, I think that plausibility utilizes immediateness just as everything else: you cannot escape it--it is merely a matter of degree (closeness or remoteness).

So taking your example of a person who has lived with different memories (A fantastic example) we can detail it to understand why immediateness is important. It is not that the memories are old. It is that that which was once possible, is now no longer possible when you apply your distinctive knowledge to your current situation.

I agree! But because possibility is derived from whether it contradicts reality--not whether I have experienced it directly before. Although I may be misunderstanding you, if we define possibility as that which has been applicably known before, then, in this case, it is still possible although one cannot apply it without contradiction anymore (because one would have past experiences of it happening: thus it is possible). However, if we define possibility in the sense that something doesn't contradict reality, then it can be possible with respect the memories (in that "reality") and not possible with respect to the current experiences (this "reality") because we are simply, within the context, determining whether the belief directly contradicts what we applicably and distinctly know.

We don't even have to imagine the fantastical to evaluate this. We can look at science. At one time, what was determined as physics is different than what scientists have discovered about physics today. We can look back into the past, and see that many experiments revealed what was possible, while many theories, or plausibilities were floating around intellectual circles, like string theory.

Although I understand what you are saying and it makes sense within your definitions, I would claim that scientific theories are possible and plausible. If it wasn't possible, then it is isn't plausible because it must first be possible to be eligible to even be considered plausible. However, I fully agree with you in the sense that we are constantly refining (or completely discarding) older theories for better ones: but this is because our immediate forms of knowledge now reveal to us that those theories contradict reality in some manner and, therefore, are no longer possible (and, thereby, no longer plausible either). Or, we negate the theory by claiming it no longer meets our predefined threshold for what is considered plausible, which in no way negates its possibility directly (although maybe indirectly).

However, as pluasibilities are applied to reality, the rejects are thrown away, and the accepted become possibilities. Sometimes these possibilities require us to work back up the chain of our previous possibilities, and evaluate them with our new context. Sometimes, this revokes what was previously possible, or it could be said forces us to switch context. That which was once known within a previous context of time and space, can no longer be known within this context.

I think you are sort of alluding to what I was trying to depict here, but within the idea that an applied plausibility can morph into a possibility. However, I don't think that only things I have directly experienced are possible, or that what I haven't directly experienced is impossible, it is about how well it aligns with what I have directly experienced (immediate forms of knowledge). Now, I may be just conflating terms here, but I think that to state that something is plausible necessitates that it is possible.

Is it possible that the tree is not there anymore, or is it plausible?

Both. If I just walked by the tree 10 minutes ago, and I claim that it is highly plausible that it is still there, then I am thereby also admitting that it is possible that it is there. If it is not possible that it is there, then I would be claiming that the tree being there contradicts reality but yet somehow is still plausible. For example, if I claimed that it is plausible that the tree poofed into existing out of thin air right now (and I never saw, I'm just hypothesizing it from my room which has no access to the area of land it allegedly poofed onto), then you would be 100% correct in rejecting that claim because it is not possible, but it is not possible because contradicts every aspect of my immediate knowledge I have. However, if I claimed that it is highly plausible that a seed, in the middle of spring, in an area constantly populated with birds and squirrels, has been planted (carried by an animal, not purposely planted by humans) in the ground and will sprout someday a little tree, I am claiming that it is possible that this can occur and, not only that, but it is highly "likely" (not in a probabilistic sense, but based off of immediate knowledge) that it will happen. I don't have to actually have previously experienced this process in its entirety: if I have the experiential knowledge that birds can carry seeds in their stomachs (which get pooped out, leaving the seed in fine condition) and that a seed dropped on soil, given certain conditions, can cause a seed to implant and sprout, then I can say it is possible without ever actually experiencing a bird poop a seed out onto a field and it, within the right conditions, sprout. A more radical example is the classic teapot flouting around (I can't quite remember which planet) Jupiter. If the teapot doesn't violate any of my immediate forms of knowledge, then it is possible; however, it may not be plausible as I haven't experienced anything like it and just because the laws allow it doesn't mean it is a reasonable (or plausible) occurrence to take place. Assuming the teapot doesn't directly contradict reality, then I wouldn't negate a belief in it based off of it not being possible but, rather, based on it not being plausible (and, more importantly, not relevant to the subject at all).

The reality, is this is a plausibility based off of a possibility. Intuitively, this is more reasonable then a plausibility based off of a plausibility. For example, its plausible that trees have gained immortality, therefore the tree is still there. This intuitively seems less cogent, and I believe the reason why, is because of the chain of comparative logic that its built off of.

In this specific case, I would claim that trees being immortal is not plausible because it contradicts all my immediate knowledge pertaining to organisms: they necessarily have an expiration to their lives. However, let's say that an immortal tree didn't contradict reality, then I would still say it is implausible, albeit possible, because I don't have any experiences of it directly or indirectly in any meaningful sense. If the immortality of a tree could somehow be correlated to a meaningful, relevant occurrence that I have experienced (such as, even if I haven't seen a cell, my indirect contact with the concept of "cells" consequences), then I would hold that it is "true". If it passes the threshold of a certain pre-defined quantity of backed evidence, then I would claim it is, thereafter, considered "plausible".

But the end claim, that one particular tree is standing, vs not still standing, is a plausibility.

Upon further examination, I don't think this is always the case. It is true that it can be a plausibility, but it is, first and foremost, a possibility. Firstly, I must determine whether the tree being there or not is a contradiction to reality. If it is, then I don't even begin contemplating whether it is plausible or not. If it isn't, then I start reasoning whether I would consider it plausible. If I deem it not plausible, after contemplation, it is still necessarily possible, just not plausible.

You can rationally hold that it is plausible that it is still standing, but how do we determine if one plausibility is more rational than another?

By agreeing upon a bar of evidence and rationale it must pass to be considered such. For example, take a 100 yard dash sprint race. We both can only determine a contestant's run time "really fast", "fast", "slow", or "really slow" if we agree upon thresholds: I would say the same is true regarding plausibility and implausibility. I might constitute the fact that I saw the tree there five minutes ago as a characterization that it is "highly plausible" that it is there, whereas you may require further evidence to state the same.

I believe it is by looking at the logic chain that the plausibility is linked from.

Although I have portrayed some differences, hereforth, between our concepts of possibility and plausibility, I would agree with you here. However, I think that it is derived from the proximity of the concept to our immediate forms of knowledge, whereas I think yours, in this particular case, is based off of whether it is closer to a possibility or not (thereby necessarily, I would say, making something that is possible and something that is plausible mutually exclusive).

I think the comparative chains of logic describes how (1) it aligns with our immediate knowledge and inductive hierarchies. I believe (2) relevancy to the subject can be seen as making our distinctive knowledge more accurate.

Again, I agree, but I would say that the "chains of logic" here is fundamentally the proximity to the immediate forms of knowledge (or immediateness as I generally put it) and not necessarily (although I still think it is a solid idea) comparing mutually exclusive types, so to speak, such as possibility and plausibility, like I think you are arguing for.

Going to your unicorn example, you may say its possible for an animal to have a horn, possible for an animal to have wings, therefore it is plausible that a unicorn exists. But someone might come along with a little more detail and state, while its possible that animals can have horns on their head, so far, no one has discovered that its possible for a horse to. Therefore, its only plausible that a horse would have wings or a horn, therefore it is only plausible that a unicorn exists

I would say that someone doesn't have to witness a horned, winged horse to know that it is possible because it doesn't contradict any immediate forms of knowledge (reality): it abides by the laws of physics (as far as I know). This doesn't mean that it is plausible just because it is possible: I would say it isn't plausible because it doesn't meet my predefined standards for what I can constitute as plausible. However, for someone else, that may be enough to claim it is "plausible", but I would disagree and, more importantly, we would then have to discuss our thresholds before continuing the conversation in any productive manner pertaining to unicorns. Again, maybe I am just conflating the terms, but this is as I currently understand them to mean.

Logically, what is pluasible is not yet possible

I don't agree with this, but I am open to hearing why you think this is the case. I consider a possibility to be, generally speaking, "Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances" and a plausibility, generally speaking, to be "Seemingly or apparently valid, likely, or acceptable; credible". I could potentially see that maybe you are saying that what is "seemingly...valid, likely, or acceptable" is implying it hasn't been applicably known yet, but this doesn't mean that it isn't possible (unless we specifically define possibility in that way, which I will simply disagree with). I would say that it is "seemingly...valid, likely, or acceptable" because it is possible (fundamentally) and because it passes a certain predefined threshold (that other subjects can certainly reject).

I think this fits with your intuition then. What is plausible is something that has no applicable knowledge. It is more rational to believe something which has had applicable knowledge, the possible, over what has not, the plausible

Again, the underlying meaning here I have no problem with: I would just say it is about the proximity and not whether it is possible or not (although it must first be possible, I would say, for something to be plausible--for if I can prove that something contradicts reality, then it surely can't be plausible). I think that we are just using terms differently.

So then, there is one last thing to cover: morality. You hit the nail on the head. We need reasons why choosing to harm other people for self gain is wrong. I wrote a paper on morality long ago, and got the basic premises down. The problem was, I was getting burned out of philosophy. I couldn't get people to discuss my knowledge theory with me, and I felt like I needed that to be established first. How can we know what morality is if we cannot know knowledge?

Finally, it honestly scared me. I felt that if someone could take the fundamental tenants of morality I had made, they could twist it into a half truth to manipulate people. If you're interested in hearing my take on morality, I can write it up again. Perhaps my years of experience since then will make me see it differently. Of course lets finish here first.

I would love to hear your thoughts on morality and ethics! However, I think we need to resolve the aforementioned disagreements first before we can explore such concepts (and I totally agree that epistemology precedes morality).

Applicable knowledge cannot claim it is true. Applicable knowledge can only claim that it is reasonable.

I absolutely love this! However, I would say that it is "true" for the subject within that context (relative truth), but with respect to absolute truths I think you hit the nail on the head!

I look forward to your response,
Bob

Hello @T Clark,

Although I may have just missed it, I think that most of this discussion has been centered around free will vs determinism and the implications of the world being deterministic with respect to accountability. However, hopefully, hereforth, I can provide a different perspective. Although I understand that you are not interested, within the scope of this discussion, about whether the world actually is determined or not, I would like to state that my position is that the world is determined, but we still have free will.

The way I see it, determinism does not, in itself, necessitate that all the forms of free will are incompatible, it's thereafter that another discussion can arise between what are typically called hard determinists (also called incompatibilists) and soft determinists (also called compatibilists), where the former argues for the eradication of all forms of free will and the latter argues against some forms of free will while still holding at least one form to be true. I am a compatibilist. I think that, although everything is determined, there are meaningful distinctions that hard determinists cannot account for. The most notable of these distinctions is the difference in where the individual's action was derived within the causal chain: the distinction between an "inner will" heavily coerced by external factors (basically anything not directly of the "inner will") and an "inner will" acting of its own accord (which has no dependency on it be a libertarian choice, where one could have decided to do otherwise). For example, the scenario in which I "decide" to eat vanilla ice cream and the scenario in which I eat vanilla ice cream because someone is holding a gun up to my head are both determined but, nevertheless, are meaningfully distinguishable in the sense that the latter is obviously the external factors heavily coercing the inner will whereas the former is it acting of its own accord. Now, we can get into what "inner will" and "external factors" really mean, and the fact that no one is ever completely acting in a way that is at least somewhat influenced by external factors, but I will save that for a later post if you are interested: for now, I am simply giving you the jist. Personally, this is where my frustration came from with respect to hard determinism (and, subsequently, the eradication of all forms of free will): it necessarily leaves obviously meaningful distinctions unaccounted for. On the contrary, more libertarian (not in terms of politics, but in terms of libertarian free will) minded individuals will incessantly advocate that we can do otherwise, which is, in my opinion, thoroughly refuted. This is, in my opinion, where a vast majority of the "free will vs determinism" arguments and dilemmas lie: in the false assumption that you have to pick a side, it's an either/or fallacy. Libertarian free will can be successfully negated by determinism and determinism can still, at the same time, allow for other definitions, or forms, of free will--such as one that is based off of the relation of external vs internal wills (or factors) instead of choices (in a "you could have done otherwise" sense of the term), which can, consequently, be utterly determined.

With that in mind, when you ask if we should hold each other accountable, I would ask for further clarification on what you mean. You see, I wouldn't say, technically speaking, that "punishment" is the right term but, rather, "prevention". However, I would also so that "justice", or "retaliation", is perfectly justifiable under a deterministic worldview. First of all, I think that "prevention" instead of "punishment" rightly shifts the individual's thinking process away from the incessant presumption that the individual could have done otherwise, which, in my opinion, is nonsense and, more importantly, produces an unnecessary level of apathy. However, with that being said, I can most definitely still blame someone for their actions, but, in doing so, I am not implicitly declaring that they should have done otherwise: I'm declaring that I do not approve of what they did, albeit my disapproval is just as much determined as their action, and I am rightly deriving the source of the action towards them because they did it primarily in alliance with their "inner will". On the contrary, if I know that the person was, in one way or another, not in their normal state of mind (and their normal state of mind I completely agree with--in the sense that they don't normally do things I would characterize as "bad") when they committed the act, then I would only blame them in a very strict sense that the action can be traced back to their body, but with the meaningful distinction that they normally do not act in this way (albeit that both are necessarily determined)(and it is much more complicated than this, as their tendency to be under the influence is also a factor here). Furthermore, if I know that the person did something "bad" but it was heavily coerced by another external factor (or factors), then I would not necessarily blame them at all. Most importantly, even with the fact that everything is determined, all of the aforementioned is still distinguishable in a meaningful sense that cannot be stripped down to merely "we can't judge anyone because its all a causal chain".

To keep this brief, I will conclude with one final note: I find retaliation and justice perfectly justifiable within the idea of determinism. If I witness a lion gruesomely devour my mother, I am surely going to be angry at that lion, however, more importantly, my anger won't be as directed at it as say a human if I consider humans to have the ability to do otherwise. This is what I mean by stating that libertarian free will can cause unnecessary amounts of apathy (or decreased amounts of empathy, however you want to think about it) because the individual, in my opinion, is holding a completely unjustified belief that holds humans to a much higher status than all other animals (and objects in general). Don't get me wrong, the spectrum of consciousness definitely elevates humans to have higher capacities which, thereby, can rightly determine humans to be held to a higher standard than other animals. But, most importantly, this higher standard, I would say, is only insofar as we make a meaningful distinction between the capacities of organisms in our world. This is why my lion analogy isn't completely analogous afterall: the lion doesn't have the same capacity, neural and thereby "causal potential" (so to speak), as a human; therefore, we can't, in a complete sense, erode a human to the level of a lion because human's have a higher capacity, but that capacity is still determined!

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

First and foremost, Merry Christmas! I hope you have (had) a wonderful holiday! I apologize as I haven't had the time to answer you swiftly: I wanted to make sure I responded in a substantive manner.

There is a lot of what you said that I wholeheartedly agree with, so I will merely comment on some things to spark further conversation.

I believe immediateness is a property of "possibility". Another is "repetition". A possibility that has been repeated many times, as well as its immediateness in memory, would intuitively seem more cogent than something that has occurred less often and farther in the past. Can we make that intuitiveness reasonable?

I think you are right in saying immediateness is a property of possibility, and therefrom, also repetition. Moreover, I would say that immediateness, in a general sense, is "reasonableness". What we use to reason, at a fundamental level, is our experiences and memories, and we weigh them. I think of it, in part, like Hume's problem of induction: we have an ingrained habit of weighing our current experiences and our memories to determine what we hold as "reality", just like we have an ingrained sense of the future resembling the past. I don't think we can escape it at a fundamental level. For example, imagine all of the your memories are of a life that you currently find yourself not in: your job, your family, your intimate lover, your hobbies, etc within your memories directly contradicts your current experiences of life (like, for instance, all of your pictures that you are currently looking at explicitly depict a family that contradicts the family you remember: they don't even look similar at all, they have different names, they aren't even the same quantity of loved ones you remember). In the heat of the moment, the more persistently your experiences continue to contradict your memories, the more likely you are to assert the former over the latter. But, on the contrary, if you only experience for, let's say, 3 minutes this alternate life and then are "sucked back into" the other one, which aligns with your memories, then you are very likely to assert that your memories were true and you must have been hallucinating. However, 3 years into experiencing that which contradicts your memories will most certainly revoke any notion that your original memories are useful, lest you live in a perpetual insanity. That would be my main point: it is not really about what is "true", but what is "useful" (or relevant). Even if your original memories, in this case, are "true", they definitely aren't relevant within your current context. This is what I mean by "weighing them", and we don't just innately weigh one over the other but, rather, we also compare memories to other memories. Although I am not entirely sure, I think that we innately compare memories to other memories in terms of two things: (1) quantity of conflicting or aligning memories and (2) current experience. However, upon further reflection, it actually seems that we are merely comparing #1, as #2 is actually just #1: our "current" experience is in the past. By the time the subject has determined that they have had an experience (i.e. they have reasoned their way into a conclusory thought amongst a string of preceding thoughts that they are, thereby, convinced of) they are contemplating something that is in the past (no matter how short a duration of time from when it occurred). Another way of putting it is: once I've realized that the color of these characters, which I am typing currently, is black, it is in the past. By the time I can answer the question of "Is my current experience I am having in the present?", I am contemplating a very near memory. My "current" mode of existence is simply that which is the most recent of past experiences: interpretations are not live in a literal sense, but only in a contextual sense (if "present" experience is going to mean anything, it is going to relate to the most recent past experience, number 1 in the queue). The reason I bring this up is because when we compare our "current" experience to past experiences, we are necessarily comparing a past experience to a past experience, but, most notably, one is more immediate than the other: I surely can say that what is most recent in the queue of past experiences, which necessarily encompasses "life" in general (knowledge)(discrete experiences, applicable knowledge, and discrete knowledge), is more "sure" than any of the past experiences that reside before it in the queue of memories. However, just because I am more "sure" of it doesn't make it more trustworthy in an objective sense: it becomes more trustworthy the more it aligns with the ever prepending additions of new experiences. For example, if I have, hypothetically speaking, 200 memories and the oldest 199 contradict the newest 1, then the determining factor is necessarily, as an ingrained function of humanity, how consistently each of those two contradicting subcategories compares to the continual prepending of new experiences (assuming 1 is considered the "current" experience and 2 is the most recent experience after 1 and so forth). But, initially, since the quantity of past experiences is overwhelmingly aligned and only contradicted by the most recent one, I would assert the position that my past 199 experiences are much more "true" (cogent). However, as I continue to experience, at a total of 500 experiences, if the past 300 most recent experiences align with that one experience that contradicted the 199, then the tide has probably turned. However, if I, on the next experience after that one contradicting experience, start experiencing many things that align with those 199, then I would presume that that one was wrong (furthermore, when I previously stated I would initially claim the 199 to be more “true” than the 1, this doesn’t actually happen until I experience something else, where that one contradictory experience is no longer the most recent, and the now newest experience is what I innately compare to the 1 past contradictory one and the other 199). Now, you can probably see that this is completely contextual as well: there's a lot of factors that go into determining which is more cogent. However, the "current" experiences are always a more "sure" fact and, therefore, the more recent the more "sure". For example, if I have 200 past experiences and the very next 10 are hallucinations (thereby causing a dilemma between two "realities", so to speak), I will only be able to say the original, older 200 past experiences were the valid ones if I resume experiencing in a way that aligns with those experiences and contradicts those 10 hallucinated experiences. If I started hallucinated right now (although we, in hindsight know it, let's say I don't), then I will never be able to realize it is really false representations until I start having "normal" experiences again. Even if I have memories of my "normal experiences" that contradict my "current" hallucinated ones, I won't truly deem it so (solidify my certainty that it really was hallucinated) until the hallucinated chain of experiences is broken with ones that align with my past experiences of "normal experiences". Now, I may have my doubts, especially if I have a ton of vivid memories of "normal experiences" while I am still hallucinating, but the more it goes on the more it seems as though my "normal experiences" were the hallucinated ones while the hallucinated ones are the "normal experiences". I'm not saying that necessarily, in this situation, I would be correct in inverting the terms there, but it seems as though only what is relevant to the subject is meaningful: even if it is the case that my memories of "normal experiences" are in actuality normal experiences, if I never experience such "normal experiences" again, then, within context, I would be obliged to refurbish my diction to something that is more relevant to my newly acquired hallucinated situation. Just food for thought.

I'll clarify plausibility. A plausibility has no consideration of likelihood, or probability. Plausibility is simply distinctive knowledge that has not been applicably tested yet. We can create plausibilities that can be applicably tested, and plausibilities that are currently impossible to applicably test. For example, I can state, "I think its plausible that a magical horse with a horn on its head exists somewhere in the world." I can then explore the world, and discover that no, magical horses with horns on their head do not exist.

I could add things like, "Maybe we can't find them because they use their magic to become completely undetectable." Now this has become an inapplicable plausibility. We cannot apply it to reality, because we have set it up to be so. Fortunately, a person can ignore such plausibilities as cogent by saying, "Since we cannot applicably know such a creature, I believe it is not possible that they exist." That person has a higher tier of induction, and the plausibility can be dismissed as being less cogent.

Although I was incorrect in in saying plausibility is likelihood, I still have a bit of a quarrel with this part: I don't think that all unapplicable plausibilities are as invalid as you say. Take that tree example from a couple of posts ago: we may never be able to applicably test to see if the tree is there, but I can rationally hold that it is highly plausible that it is. The validity of a plausibility claim is not about if it is directly applicable to reality or not, it is about (1) how well it aligns with our immediate knowledge (our discrete experiences, memories, discrete knowledge, and applicable knowledge) and (2) its relevancy to the subject. For this reason, I don't think the claim that unicorns exist can be effectively negated by claiming that it is not possible that they exist. A winged horse-like creature with a horn in the middle of its skull is possible, in that it doesn’t defy any underlying physics or fundamental principles, and, therefore, it is entirely possible that there is a unicorn out there somewhere in the universe (unless, in your second example, it has a magical power that causes it to be undetectable—however the person could claim that it is a natural cloaking instead of supernatural, in a magical sense, just like how we can’t see the tiny bacteria in the air, maybe the unicorn is super small). For me, it isn’t, in the case of a unicorn, that it is not possible that makes me not believe that they exist, it is (1) its utter irrelevancy to the subject and (2) the complete lack of positive evidence for it. I am a firm believer in defaulting to not believing something until it is proven to be true, and so, naturally, I don’t believe unicorns exist until we have evidence for them (I don’t think possibility is strong evidence for virtually anything—it is more of just a starting point). This goes hand-in-hand with my point pertaining to plausibility: the lack of positive evidence for a unicorn’s existence goes hand-in-hand, directly, with our immediate forms of knowledge. If nobody has any immediate forms of knowledge pertaining to unicorns (discrete experiences, applicable knowledge, and discrete knowledge), then, for me, it doesn’t exist—not because it actually doesn’t exist (in the case that it is not a possibility), but because it has no relevancy to me or anyone else (anything that we could base off of unicorns would be completely abstract—a combination of experiences and absences/negations of what has been experienced in ways that produce something that the subject hasn’t actually ever experienced before). Now, I think this gets a bit tricky because someone could claim that their belief in a unicorn existing makes them happier and, thereby, it is relevant to them. I think this becomes a contextual difference, because, although I would tell them “you do you”, I would most certainly claim that they don’t “know” unicorns exist (and, in this case, they may agree with me on that). You see, this gets at what it means to be able to “applicably know” something: everything a subject utilizes is applicable in one way or another. If the person tells me that “I don’t know if unicorns exist, but I believe that they do because it makes me happy”, they are applying their belief to the world without contradiction with respect to their happiness: who am I to tell them to stop being happy? However, I would say that they don’t “know” it (and they agreed with me on that in this case), so applying a belief to reality is not necessarily a form of knowledge (to me, at least). But in a weird way, it actually is, because it depends on what they are claiming to know. In my previous example, they aren’t claiming to “know” unicorns exist, but they are implicitly claiming to “know” that believing in it makes them happier and I think that is a perfectly valid application of belief that doesn’t contradict reality (it just isn’t pertaining to whether the unicorn actually exists or not). Now, if I were to notice some toxic habits brewing from their belief in unicorns, then I could say that are holding a contradiction because the whole point was to be happier and toxic habits don’t make you happier (so basically I would have to prove that they are not able to apply their “belief in unicorns=happier” without contradiction). Just food for thought (:

In the case that someone pulled an ace every time someone shuffled the cards, there is the implicit addition of these limits. For example, "The person shuffling doesn't know the order of the cards." The person shuffling will doesn't try to rig the cards a particular way." "There is no applicable knowledge that would imply an ace would be more likely to be picked than any other card."

In the instance in which we have a situation where probability has these underlying reasons, but extremely unlikely occurrences happen, like an ace is drawn every time someone picks from a shuffled deck, we have applicable knowledge challenging our probable induction. Applicable knowledge always trump's inductions, so at that point we need to re-examine our underlying reasons for our probability, and determine whether they still hold.

I completely agree with you here: excellent assessment! My main point was just that it is based off of one’s experiences and memories: that is it. If we radically change the perspective on an idea that we hold as malleable (such as an “opinion”), such that it is as concrete as ever in our experiences and memories, then we are completely justified in equating it with what we currently deem to be concrete (such as gravity).

I believe I've mentioned that we cannot force a person to use a different context. Essentially contexts are used for what we want out of our reality. Of course, this can apply to inductions as well. Despite a person's choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational. I would argue the same applies to contexts.

I would, personally, rephrase “Despite a person’s choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational” to “Despite a person’s choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational within a fundamentally shared subjective experience”. I would be hesitant to state that one induction is actually absolutely better than another due to the fact that they only seem that way because we share enough common ground with respect to our most fundamental subjective experiences. One day, there could be a being that experiences with no commonalities with me or you, a being that navigates in a whole different relativity (different scopes/contexts) than us and I wouldn’t have the authority to say they were wrong—only that they are wrong within my context as their context (given it shares nothing with me) is irrelevant to my subjective experience.

This would be difficult to measure, but I believe one can determine if a context is "better" than another based on an evaluation of a few factors.

I love your three evaluative principles for determining which context is “better”! However, with that being said, I think that your determinations are relative to subjects that share fundamental contexts. For example, your #3 (degree of harm) principle doesn’t really address two ideas: (1) the subject may not share your belief that one ought to strive to minimize the degree of harm and (2) the subject may not care about the degree of harm pertaining to other subjects due to their actions (i.e. psychopaths). To put it bluntly, I think that humans become cognitively convinced of something (via rudimentary reason) and it gets implemented if enough people (with the power in society—or have the ability to seize enough power) are also convinced of it (and I am using “power” in an incredibly generic sense—like a foucault kind of complexity, not just brute force or guns or something). That’s why society is a wave, historically speaking, and 100 generations later we condemn our predecessors for not being like us (i.e. for the horrific things they did), but why would they be like us? We do not share as much in common contextually with them as we do with a vast majority of people living within the present with us (or people that lived closer to our generation). I think that a lot of the things that they did 200 years ago (or really pick any time frame) was horrendous: but was it objectively wrong? I thing nietzsche put it best: “there are no moral phenomenon, just moral interpretations of phenomenon”. I am cognitively convinced that slavery is abhorrent, does that make it objectively wrong? The moral wrongness being derived from cognition (and not any objective attribute of the universe) doesn’t make slavery any more “right”, does it? I think not. The reason we don’t have slavery anymore (or at least at such a large scale as previous times) is because enough people who held sufficient power (or could seize it) were also convinced that it is abhorrent and implemented that power to make a change (albeit ever so slow as it was). My point is that, even though I agree with you on your three points, you won’t necessarily be able to convince a true psychopath to care about his/her neighbors, and their actions are only “wrong” relative to the subject uttering it. We have enough people that want to prevent psychopaths from doing “horrible” things (a vast majority of people can feel empathy, which is a vital factor) and, therefore, pyschopaths get locked up. I am just trying to convey that everything is within a context (and I think you agree with me on this, but we haven’t gone this deep yet, so I am curious as to what you think). It is kind of like the blue glasses though experiment, if we all were born with blue glasses ingrained into our eyeballs, then the “color spectrum” would consist of different colors of blue and that would be “right” relative to our subjective experience. However, if, one day, someone was born with eyes that we currently have, absent of blue glasses, then their color spectrum would be “right” for them, while our blue shaded color spectrum would be “right” for us. Sadly, this is where “survival of the fittest” (sort of) comes into play: if there is a conflict where one subjective experience of the color spectrum needs to be deemed the “right” one, then the one held by the most that hold the “power” ultimately will determine their conclusion to be the “truth”: that is why we call people who see green and red flip-flopped “color blind”, when, in reality, we have no clue who is actually absolutely “right” (and I would say we can’t know, and that is why each are technically “blind” with respect to the other—we just only strictly call them “color blind” because the vast majority ended up determining their “truth” to be the truth). When we say “you can’t see red and green correctly”, this is really just subjectively contingent on how we see color.

I think that my main point here is that absolutely determining which context is better is just as fallacious, in my mind, as telling ourselves that we must determine whether our “hand” exists as we perceive it or whether it is just mere atoms (or protons, or quarks) and that we must choose one: they don’t contradict eachother, nor do fundamental contexts. Yes we could try to rationalize who has a better context (and I think your three points on this are splendid!), but that also requires some common ground that must be agreed upon and that means that, in some unfortunate cases, it really becomes a “does this affect me where I need to take action to prevent their context?” (and “do I have enough power to do anything about it?” or “can I assemble enough power, by the use of other subjects that agree with me, to object to this particular person’s context”).

I look forward to your response!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
I apologize, as things have been a bit busy for me, but, nevertheless, here's my response!

My apologies is this is a little terse for me tonight. I will have more time later to dive into these if we need more detail, I just wanted to give you an answer without any more delay.

Absolutely no problem! I really appreciated your responses, so take your time! I think your most recent response has clarified quite a bit for me!

I understand exactly what you are saying in this paragraph. I've deductively concluded that these inductions exist. Just as it is deductively concluded that there are 4 jacks in 52 playing cards.

There are likely degrees of probability we could break down. Intuitively, pulling a jack out of deck of cards prescribes very real limits. However, if I note, "Jack has left their house for the last four days at 9am. I predict today on Friday, they will probably do the same," I think there's an intuition its less probably, and more just possible.

Perhaps the key is the fact that we don't know what the denominator limit really is. The chance of a jack would be 4/52, while the chance of Jack leaving his house at 9 am is 4 out of...5? Does that even work? I have avoided these probabilities until now, as they are definitely murky for me.

Although I am glad that we agree about the deduction of probability inductions, I think that we are using "probability" in two different ways and, therefore, I think it is best if I define it, along with "plausibility", for clarification purposes (and you can determine if you agree with me or not). "Plausibility" is a spectrum of likelyhoods, in a generic sense, where something is "Plausible" if it meets certain criteria (of which do not need to be derived solely from mathematics) and is "Implausible" if it is meets certain other criteria. In other words, something is "plausible" if it has enough evidence to be considered such and something is "implausible" if it has enough evidence to be considered such. Now, since "plausibility" exists within a spectrum, it is up to the subject (and other subjects: societal contexts) to agree upon where to draw the line (like the exact point at which anything thereafter is considered "plausible" or anything below a certain line is considered "implausible"). Most importantly, I would like to emphasize that "plausibility", although one of its forms of evidence can be mathematics, does not only encompass math. On the contrary, "probability" is a mathematical concrete likelyhood: existing completely separate from any sort of spectrum. The only thing that subjects need to agree upon, in terms of "probability", is mathematics, whereas "plausibility" requires a much more generic subscription to a set (or range) of qualifying criteria of which the spectrum is built on. For example, when I say "X is plausible", this only makes sense within context, where I must define (1) the set (range) of valid forms of evidence and (2) how much quantity of them is required for X to be considered qualified under the term "plausible". However, if I say "X is probable", then I must determine (1) the denominator, (2) numerator (possibilities), and (3) finally calculate the concrete likelyhood. When it is "plausible", it simply met the criteria the subject pre-defined, whereas saying there is a 1% chance of picking a particular card out of 100 cards is a concrete likelyhood (I am not pre-defining any of it). Likewise, if I say that X is "plausible" because it is "probable", then I am stating that (1) mathematical concrete likelyhoods are a valid form of evidence for "plausibilities" and (2) the mathematical concrete likelyhood of X is enough for me to consider it "plausible" (that the "probability" was enough to shift the proposition of X past my pre-defined line of when things become "plausible").

You see, when you say "while the chance of Jack leaving his house at 9 am is 4 out of...5?", I think you are conflating "probability" with "plausibility"--unless you can somehow mathematically determine the concrete likelyhood of Jack leaving (I don't think you can, or at least not in a vast majority of cases). I think that we colloquially use "probable" and "plausible" interchangeably, but I would say they are different concepts in a formative sense. Now it is entirely possible, hypothetically speaking, that two subjects could determine that the only valid form of evidence is mathematically concrete likelyhoods (or mathematically derived truths in a generic sense) and that, thereby, that is the only criteria by which something becomes worthy of the term "plausible" (and, thereby, anything not derived from math is "implausible"), but I would say that those two people won't "know" much about anything in their lives.

Ah, I'm certain I cut this out of part four to whittle it down. A hierarchy of inductions only works when applying a particular set of distinctive knowledge to an applicable outcome. We compare the hierarchy within the deck of cards. We know the probability if pulling a jack, we know its possible we could pull a jack, but the probability is more cogent that we won't pull a jack.

The intactness of the tree would be evaluated separately, as the cards have nothing to do with the trees outcome. So for example, if the tree was of a healthy age, and in a place unlikely to be harmed or cut down, it is cogent to say that it will probably be there the next day. Is it plausible that someone chopped it down last night for a bet or because they hated it? Sure. But I don't know if that's actually possible, so I would be more cogent in predicting the tree will still be there tomorrow with the applicable knowledge that I have.

Ah, I see! That makes a lot more sense! I would agree in a sense, but also not in a sense: this seems to imply that we can't compare two separate claims of "knowledge" and determine which is more "sure"; however, I think that we definitely can in terms of immediateness. I think that you are right in that a "probability" claim, like all other mathematical inductions, is more cogent than simply stating "it is possible", but why is this? I think it is due to the unwavering, inflexibility of numbers. All my life, from my immediate forms of knowledge (my discrete experiences and memories), I have never come in contact with such a thing as a "flaky number" because it is ingrained fundamentally into the processes that makeup my immediate forms of knowledge (i.e. my discrete experiences have an ingrained sense of plurality and, thereby, I do too). Therefore, any induction I make pertaining to math, since it is closer to my immediate forms of knowledge (in the sense that it is literally ingrained into them), assuming it is mathematically sound, is going to trump something less close to my immediate forms of knowledge (such as the possibility of something: "possibility" is just a way of saying "I have discretely experienced it before without strong correlation, therefore it could happen again", whereas a mathematical induction such as "multiplication will always work for two numbers regardless their size" is really just a way of saying "I have discretely experienced this with strong correlation (so strong, in fact, that I haven't witness any contradicting evidence), therefore it will always happen again". When I say "immediateness", am not entirely talking merely about physical locations but, rather, about what is more forthright in your experiences: the experience itself is the thing by which we derive all other things and, naturally, that which corresponds to it will be maintained over things that do not.

For example, the reason, I think, human opinions are wavering is due to me having experiences of peoples' opinions changing, whereas if I had always experienced (and everyone else always experienced) peoples' opinions unchanging (like gravity or 2+2 = 4), then I would logically characterize it with gravity as a concrete, strongly correlated, experience held very close to me. Another example is germ theory: we say we "know" germs make us sick, and that is fine, but it is the correlation between the theory and our immediate forms of knowledge (discrete experiences and memories) that make us "know" germ theory to be true. We could be completely wrong about germs, but it is undeniable that something makes us sick and that everything adds up so far that it is germs (it is strongly correlated) (why? because that is apart of our immediate knowledge--discrete experiences and memories).

With that in mind, let's take another look at the tree and cards example: which is more "sure"? I think that your epistemology is claiming that they must be separately, within their own contexts, evaluated to determine the most cogent form of induction to use within that particular context (separately), but, upon determining which is more cogent within that context, we cannot go any farther. On the contrary, I think that I am more "sure" of the deduction of 2/3 probability because it is tied to my immediate forms of knowledge (discrete experiences and memories). But I am more "sure" of the tree still being their (within that context) than that I am going to actually draw the ace because I have more immediate knowledge (I saw it 2 hours ago, etc) of the tree that adds up to it still being their than me actually getting an ace. Another way to think about it is: if my entire life (and everyone else testified to it in their lives as well), when presented with three cards (two of which are aces), I always randomly drew an ace--as in every time with no exceptions--then I would say the the "sureness" reverses and my math must have been wrong somehow (maybe probability doesn't work after all? (: ). This is directly due to the fact that it would be no different than my immediate knowledge of gravity or mathematical truths ( as in 2+2 = 4, or the extrapolation of such). Now, when I use this example, I am laying out a very radical example and I understand that me picking an ace 10 times in a row does not constitute probability being broken; however, if everyone all attested to always experiencing themselves picking an ace every time, and that is how I grew up, then I see no difference between this and the reality of gravity.

I was going to say much more, and elaborate much more, but this is becoming entirely too long. So I will leave you with my conclusion: the cogency (or "sureness", as I put it) of knowledge is not, at its most fundamental level, about which kind of induction the given claim stems from, but more about the degree of immediateness to the "I". — Bob Ross


With the clarification I've made, do you think this still holds?

Sort of. I think that, although I would still hold the claim that it is based off of immediateness, I do see your point in terms of cogency within a particular scenario, evaluated separately from the others, and I think, in that sense, you are correct. However, I don't think we should have to limit our examinations to their specific contexts: I think it is a hierarchy of hierarchies. You are right about the first hierarchy: you can determine the cogency based off of possibility vs probability vs plausibility vs irrationality. However, we don't need to stop there: we can, thereafter, create a hierarchy of which contextual claims we are more "sure" of and which ones we are less "sure" of (it is like a hierarchy within a spectrum).

In these cases, we don't have the denominator like in the "draw a jack" example. In fact, we just might not have enough applicable knowledge to make a decision based on probability. The more detailed our applicable knowledge in the situation, the more likely we are to craft a probability that seems more cogent. If we don't know the destructive level of the storm, perhaps we can't really make a reasonable induction. Knowing that we can't make a very good induction, is also valuable at times too.

I think that most cases we cannot create an actual probability of the situation: I think most cases of what people constitute as "knowledge" are plausibilities. On another note, I completely agree with you that it is entirely the case that there is a point at which we should suspend judgment: but what is that point? That is of yet to decide! I think we can probably cover that next if you'd like.

I look forward to your response,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I have never been able to discuss this aspect with someone seriously before, as no one has gotten to the point of mostly understanding the first three parts.

I am glad that we are able to agree and discuss further as well! Honestly, as our discussion has progressed, I have realized more and more that we hold incredibly similar epistemologies: I just didn't initially understand your epistemology correctly.

Applicably knowing something depends on our context, and while context can also be chosen, the choice of context is limited by our distinctive knowledge. If, for example I did not have the distinctive knowledge that my friend could lie to me, then I would know the cat was in the room. But, if I had the distinctive knowledge that my friend could lie to me, I could make an induction that it is possible that my friend could be lying to me. Because that is an option I have no tested in application and due to my circumstance, cannot test even if I wanted to, I must make an induction.

I think that this is fair enough: we are essentially deriving the most sure (or reasonable) knowledge we can about the situation and, in a sense, it is like a spectrum of knowledge instead of concrete, absolute knowledge. However, with that being said, I think that a relative, spectrum-like epistemology (which I think both our epistomologies could be characterized as such) does not account for when we should simply suspend judgement. You see, if we are always simply determining which is more cogent, we are, thereby, never determining if the most cogent form is really cogent enough, within the context, to be worth even holding as knowledge in the first place.

Arguably, I think we applicably know few things. The greater your distinctive knowledge and more specific the context, the more difficult it becomes to applicably know something.

I completely agree. Furthermore, I also understand your reference to 1984 and how vocabulary greatly affects what one can or cannot know with their context because, I would say, their vocabulary greatly determines their context in the first place.

I think before I get into your response to the cat example I need to elaborate on a couple things first. Although I think that your hierarchical inductions are a good start, upon further reflection, I don't think they are quite adequate enough. Let me try to explain what I mean.

Firstly, let's take probabilistic inductions. Probability is not, in itself, necessarily an induction. It is just like all of mathematics: math is either deduced or, thereupon, induced. For example, in terms of math, imagine I am in an empty room where I only have the ability to count on my fingers and, let's say, I haven't experienced anything, in terms of numbers, that exceeded 10. Now, therefrom, I could count up to 10 on my fingers (I understand I am overly simplifying this, but bare with me). I could then believe that there is such a thing as "10 things" or "10 numbers" and apply that to reality without contradiction: this is a deduction. Thereafter, I could then induce that I could, theoretically, add 10 fingers worth of "things" 10 times and, therefore, have 100 things. Now, so far in this example, I have no discrete experiences of 100 things but determined that I know 100 "fingers" could exist. So logically, as of now, 100 only exists in terms of a mathematical induction, whereas 10 exists in terms of a deduction. I would say the same thing is true for probability. Imagine I am in a room that is completely empty apart from me and a deck of 52 cards. Firstly, I can deductively know that there is 52 "things". Secondly, I could deductively know an idea of "randomness" and apply that without contradiction as well. Thirdly, I could deductively know that, at "random", me choosing a kind out of the deck is a chance of 4/52 and apply that without contradiction (I could, thereafter, play out this scenario ad infinitum, where I pick a card out of a "randomly" shuffled deck, and my results would slowly even out to 4/52). All of this, thus forth, is deductive: created out of application of beliefs towards reality in the same way as your sheep example. Now, where induction, I would say, actually comes into play, in terms of probability, is an extrapolation of that probabilistic application. For example, let's take that previous 52 deck scenario I outlined above: I could then, without ever discretely experiencing 100 cards, induce that the probability of picking 1 specific card out of 100 is 1/100. Moreover, I could extrapolate that knowledge, which was deduced, of 4/52 and utilize that to show whether something is "highly probable" or "highly improbable" or something in between: this would also be an induction. For example, if I have 3 cards, two of which are aces and one is a king, I could extrapolate that it is "highly probable" that I will randomly pick an ace out of the three because of my deduced knowledge that the probability of picking an Ace is 2/3 in this case. My point is that I view your "probabilistic inductions" as really being a point towards "mathematical inductions", which does not entirely engross probability. Your 52 card deck example in the essays is actually a deduction and not an induction.

Secondly, I think that probabilistic inductions and plausible inductions are not always directly comparable. To be more specific, a probabilistic "fact" (whether deduced or induced) is comparable to plausible inductions and, in that sense, I think you are right to place the former above the latter; however, I do not think that "extended" probabilistic claims are comparable (always) to plausible inductions. For example, let's say that there is a tree near my house, of which I can't see from where I am writing this, that I walk past quite frequently. Let's also say that I have three cards in front of me, two of which are aces. Now, I would say that the "fact" that the probability of me randomly picking an ace is 2/3 is "surer" (more cogent form of knowledge) than any claim I could make in terms of an inapplicable plausibility induction towards the tree still being where it was last time I walked past it (let's assume I can't quickly go look right now). However, if I were to ask myself "are you surer that you will pick an ace out of these three cards or that the tree is still intact", or I think you would put it "is it more cogent to claim I will pick an ace out of these three cards or that the tree is still intact", I am now extending my previous "fact" (2/3) into an "extended", contextual, claim that weighs the "highly probableness" of picking an ace out of three cards with the plausibility of the tree still being intact. These are two, as they were stated in the previous sentence, completely incompatible types of claims and, therefore, one must be "converted" into the other for comparison. To claim something is probable is purely a mathematical game, whereas plausible directly entails other means of evidence other than math (I may have walked by the tree yesterday, there may have been no storms the previous night, and I may have other reasons to believe it "highly implausible" that someone planned a heist to remove the tree). In this example, although I may colloquially ask myself "what are the odds that someone moved the tree", I can't actually convert the intactness of the tree into purely probability: it is plausibility. I think this shows that probability and plausibility, in terms of "extended" knowledge claims stemming from probability, are not completely hierarchical.

Thirdly, building off of the previous paragraph, even though they are not necessarily comparable in the sense of probability, they can be compared in terms of immediateness (or discrete experiential knowledge--applicable and distinct knowledge): the "probabilistic deductions" are "surer" (or more cogent) than "plausible inductions", but "probabilistic inductions" are not necessarily "surer" than "plausible inductions" (they are only necessarily surer if we are talking about the "fact" and not an "extension"). Let's take my previous example of the tree and the 3 cards, but let's say its 1000 cards and one of them is an ace: I think I am "surer" that the tree is still there, although it is argument made solely from an inapplicable plausible induction (as I haven't actually calculated the probability nor have I, in this scenario, the ability to go discretely experience the tree) than me getting an ace from those 1000 cards. However, I am always "surer" that the probability of getting an ace out of 1000 cards is 1/1000 (given there's only one) than the intactness of the tree (again, assuming I can't discretely experience it as of now). Now I may have just misunderstood your fourth essay a bit, but I think that your essay directly implies that the hierarchy, based off of proximity towarfd deductions, is always in that order of cogency. However, I think that sometimes the "extension" of probability is actually less cogent than a plausible induction.

I was going to say much more, and elaborate much more, but this is becoming entirely too long. So I will leave you with my conclusion: the cogency (or "sureness", as I put it) of knowledge is not, at its most fundamental level, about which kind of induction the given claim stems from, but more about the degree of immediateness to the "I". You see, the probabilistic "fact" of picking an ace out of three cards (two of which are aces: 2/3) is "surer", or more cogent, because it is very immediate to the "I" (it is a deduction directly applied to discrete experiences). The probabilistic "extension" claim, built off of a mathematical deduction in this case (but could be an induction if we greatly increased the numbers), that I am "surer" of getting an ace out of three cards (2/3) is actually less cogent (or less "sure") of a claim than the tree is intact because, in this example, the tree intactness is more immediate than the result of picking a card being an ace. Sure, I know it is 2/3 probability, but I could get the one card that isn't an ace, whereas, given that I walked past the tree yesterday (and couple that with, let's say, a relatively strong case for the tree being there--like there wasn't a tornado that rolled through the day before), the "sureness" is much greater; I have a lot of discrete experiences that lead me to conclude that it is "highly plausible" (note that "highly probable" would require a conversion I don't think possible in this case) that the tree is still there. Everything, the way I see it, is based off of immediateness, but it gets complicated really fast. Imagine that I didn't have an incredibly strong case for the tree still being there (like I walked past it three weeks ago and there was a strong storm that occurred two weeks ago), then it is entirely possible, given an incredible amount of analysis, that the "sureness" would reverse. As you have elegantly pointed out in your epistemology, this is expected as it is all within context (and context, I would argue, is incredibly complicated and enormous).

I will leave it at that for now, as this is getting much longer than I expected, so, I apologize, I will address your response to the cat example once we hash this out first (as I think it is important).

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I think that the first issue I am pondering is the fact that neither of our epistemologies, as discussed hitherto, really clarifies when a person "knows", "believes", or "thinks" something is true. Typically, as you are probably well aware, knowledge is considered with more intensity (thereby requiring a burden of proof), whereas belief and to simply "think" something is true, although they can have evidence, do not require any burden of proof at all. According to your epistemology, as I understand it, considers a person to "know" something if they can apply it to "reality" without contradiction (i.e. applicable knowledge)--which I think doesn't entirely work. For example, I could claim that I "know" that my cat is in the kitchen with no further evidence than simply stating that the claim doesn't contradict my or anyone else who is in the room's "reality". Hypothetically, let's say I (and all the other people) are distantly away from the kitchen and so we cannot verify definitively the claim: do I "know" that my cat is in the kitchen? If so, it seems to be an incredibly "weak" type of knowledge to the point that it may be better considered a "belief" or maybe merely a theory (in a colloquial sense of the term, not scientific)(i.e. I "think").

Likewise, we could take this a step further: let's say that I, and everyone else in the room, get on a phone call with someone who is allegedly in that very kitchen that we don't have access to (in which I am claiming the cat to reside) and that person states (through the phone call) that the cat is not in the kitchen. Do I now "know" that the cat is not in the kitchen? Do I "know" that that person actually checked the kitchen and didn't just make it up? Do I "know" that that even was a person I was talking to? I heard a voice, of which I assigned to a familiar old friend of mine whom I trust, but I am extrapolating (inducing) that it really was that person and, thereafter, further inducing off of that induction that that person actually checked and, thereafter, that they checked in an honest manner: it seems as though their is a hierarchy even within claims of knowledge themselves. I think that your hierarchy of inductions is a step in the right direction, but what is a justified claim of knowledge? I don't think it would be an irrational induction to induce that the person calling me is (1) the old, trustworthy friend I am assigning the voice to and (2) that they actually didn't discretely experience the cat being in the kitchen, but am I really justified? If so, is this form of "knowledge" just as "strong", so to speak, as claiming to "know" that the cat isn't in the room in which I am in right now? Is it just as "strong" as claiming to "know" that the cat isn't in the room I was previously in, but have good reason to believe the cat hadn't somehow traveled that far and snuck its way into the room, whereas do I really "know" the cat didn't find its way into the kitchen (which is quite a distance away from me, let's say in a different country or something)?

Another great example I have been pondering is this: do I "know" that a whale is the largest mammal on earth? I certainly haven't discretely experienced one and I most certainly haven't measured all the animals, let alone any one, on this earth. So, how am I justified in claiming to "know" it? Sure, applying my belief that a whale is the largest mammal doesn't contradict my "reality", but does that really constitute as "knowledge"? In reality, I simply searched it and trusted the search results. This seems, at best, to be a much "weaker" form of knowledge (of some sorts, I am not entirely sure).

I think after defining the personal context and even the general societal context of claims, as you did in your essays, and even after discussing hierarchical inductions, I am still left with quite a complexity of problems to resolve in terms of what is knowledge.

Bob

@Philosophim,

I see now! I now understand your epistemology to be the application of deductions, or inductions that vary by degree of cogency, within a context (scope), which I completely agree with. This kind of epistemology, as I understand it, heavily revolves around the subject (but not in terms of simply what one can conceive of course) and not whatever "objective reality", or the things-in-themselves, may be: I agree with this assessment. For the most part, in light of this, I think that your brief responses were more than adequate to negate most of my points. So I will generally respond (and comment) on some parts I think worth mentioning and, after that, I will build upon my newly acquired understanding of your view (although I do not, without a doubt, completely understand it I bet) .

Instead of the word "error" I would like to use "difference/limitiations". But you are right about perfectly inaccurate eyes being as blind as eyes which are able to see in the quantum realm, if they are trying to observe with the context of normal healthy eyes. Another contextual viewpoint is "zoom". Zoom out and you can see the cup. Zoom in on one specific portion and you no longer see the cup, but a portion of the cup where the elements are made from.

I agree: it is only "error" if we deem it to be "wrong" but, within context, it is "right".

Contradictions of applicable knowledge can never be cogent within a particular context.

In light of context, I agree: I was attempting to demonstrate contradictions within all contexts, which we both understand and accept as perfectly fine. On a side note, I also agree with your assessment of Theseus' ship.

Recall that the separation of "this" and "that" is not an induction in itself, just a discrete experience. It is only an induction when it makes claims about reality. I can imagine a magical unicorn in my head. That is not an induction. If I believe a magical unicorn exists in reality, that is a belief, and now an induction.

Upon further reflection, I think that I was wrong in stating that differentiation is an "ingrained induction"; I think the only example of "ingrained inductions" is, at its most fundamental level, Hume's problem of induction. That is what I was really meaning by my gravity example, although I was wrongly stating it as induction itself, that I induce that an object will fall the next time I drop it. This is a pure induction and, I would argue, is ingrained in us (and I think you would agree with me on that). After thinking some more, I have come to the conclusion that I am really not considering differentiation an "ingrained induction" but, rather, an assumption (an axiom to be more specific). I am accepting, and I would argue we all are accepting, the principle of noncontradiction as a metalogical principle, a logical axiom, upon which we determine something to either be or not be. However, as you are probably aware, we cannot "escape", so to speak, the principle of noncontradiction to prove or disprove the principle of noncontradiction, just like how we are in no position to prove or disprove the principle of sufficient reason or the principle of the excluded middle. You see, fundamentally, I think that your epistemology stems from "meaningfulness" with respect to the subject (and, thereafter, multiple subjects) and, therefrom, you utilize the most fundamental axiom of them all: the principle of noncontradiction as a means towards "meaningfulness". It isn't that we are right in applying things within context of a particular, it is that it is "meaningful" for the subject, and potentially subjects, to do so and, therefore, it is "right". This is why I don't think you are, in its most fundamental sense, proving any kind of epistemology grounded on absolute grounds but, rather, you are determining it off of "meaningfulness" on metalogical principles (or logical axioms). You see, this is why I think a justified, true, belief (and subsequently classical epistemology) has been so incomplete for such a long time: it is attempting to reach an absolute form of epistemology, wherein the subject can finally claim their definitive use of the term "know", whereas I think that to be fundamentally misguided: everything is in terms of relevancy to the subject and, therefore, I find that relevancy directly ties to relative scope (or context as you put it) (meaningfulness).

I also apply this (and I think you are too) to memories: I don't think that we "know" any given memory to truly be a stored experience but, rather, I think that all that matters is the relevance to the subject. So if that memory, regardless of whether it got injected into their brain 2 seconds ago or it is just a complete figment of the imagination, is relevant (meaningful) to the subject as of "now", then it is "correct" enough to be considered a "memory" for me! If, on the contrary, it contradicts the subject as of "now", then it should be disbanded because the memory is not as immediate as experience itself. I now see that we agree much more than I originally thought!

I would also apply this in the same manner to the hallucinated "real" world and the real world example I originally invoked (way back when (: ). For me, since it is relative to context, if the context is completely limited to the hallucinated "real" world, then, for me, that is the real world. Consequently, what I can or cannot know, in that example, would be directly tied to what, in hindsight, we know to be factually false; however, the knowledge, assuming it abides by the most fundamental logical axiom (principle of noncontradiction), is "right" within my context. Just like the "cup" and "table" example, we only have a contradiction within multiple "contexts", which I am perfectly fine with. With that being said, I do wonder if it is possible to resolve the axiomatic nature of the principle of noncontradiction, because I don't like assuming things.

Furthermore, in light of our epistemologies aligning much better than I originally thought, I think that your papers seem to only thoroughly address the immediate forms of knowledge (i.e. your depiction of discrete experiences, memories, and personal context is very substantive), but do not fully address thereafter. It seems to get into what I would call mediate forms of knowledge (i.e. group contexts and the induction hierarchies) in a general sense, sort of branching out a bit past the immediate forms, but I think that there's much more to discuss (I also think that there's a fundamental question of when, even in a personal context, hierarchical inductions stretch to far to have any relevancy). This is also exactly what I have been pondering in terms of my epistemology as well, so, if you would like, we could explore that.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I agree, I think that we both understand each others' definition of "I" and that I have not adequately shown the relevance of my use of "I". Furthermore, I greatly appreciate your well thought-out replies, as they have helped me understand your papers better! In light of this, I think we should progress our conversation and, in the event that it does become pertinent, I will not hesitate to demonstrate the significance (and, who knows, maybe, as the discussion progresses, they dissolve themselves). Until then, I think that our mere recognition of each others' difference of terminology (and the underlying meanings) will suffice. To progress our conversation, I have re-read your writings a couple times over (which does not in any way reflect any kind of mastery of the text) and I have attempted to assess it better. Moreover, I would like to briefly cover some main points and, thereafter, allow you to decide what you would like to discuss next. Again, these pointers are going to be incredibly brief, only serving as an introduction, so as to allow you to determine, given your mastery (naturally) of your own writings, what we ought to discuss next. Without further ado, here they are:

Point 1: Differentiation is a product of error.

When I see a cup, it is the error of my perception. If I could see more accurately, I would see atoms, or protons/neutrons/electrons or what have you, and, thereby, the distinction of cup from the air surrounding it becomes less and less clear. Perfectly accurate eyes are just as blind as perfectly inaccurate eyes: differentiation only occurs somewhere in between those two possibilities. Therefore, a lot of beliefs are both applicable knowledge and not applicable knowledge: it is relative to the scope. For example, the "cup" is a meaningful distinction, but is contradicted by reality: the more accurately we see, or sense in general, the more the concept of a "cup" contradicts it. Therefore, since it technically contradicts reality, it is not applicable knowledge. However, within the relative scope of, let's say, a cup on a table, it is meaningful to distinguish the two even though, in "reality", they are really only distinguishable within the context of an erroneous eye ball.

Point 2: Contradictions can be cogent.

Building off of point 1, here's an example of a reasonable contradiction:
1. There are two objects, a cup and a table, which are completely distinct with respect to every property that is initially discretely experienced
2. Person A claims the cup and table to be separate concepts (defining one as a 'cup' and the other as a 'table')
3. Person B claims that the cup and the table are the same thing.
4. Person A claims that Person B has a belief that contradicts reality and demonstrates it by pointing out the glaring distinctions between a cup and a table (and, thereby, the contradictions of them being the same thing).
5. Person B argues that the cup and table are atoms, or electrons/protons/neutrons or what have you, and, therefore, the distinction between the cup and the table is derived from Person A's error of perception.
7. In light of this, and even in acknowledgement of this, Person A still claims there is a 'cup' and a 'table'.
8. Person A is now holds two contradictory ideas (the "cup" and "table" are different, but yet fundamentally they are not different in that manner at all): the lines between a 'cup' and a 'table' arise out of the falseness of Person A's discrete experiences.
9. Person B claims Person A, in light of #8, holds a belief that is contradicted by reality and that Person A holds two contradictory ideas.

Despite Person A's belief contradicting reality, it is still cogent because, within relative scope of their perceptions, there is a meaningful distinction between a 'cup' and a 'table'--but only compared to reality in a relative scope. Also, Person A can reasonably hold both positions, even though they negate one another, because the erroneous nature of their existence produces meaningful distinctions that directly contradict reality. In this instance, there is no problem with a person holding (1) a belief that contradicts reality and (2) two contradictory, competing views of reality.

Point 3: Accidental and essential properties are one in the same
Building off of point 1 and 2, the distinction between an accidental and essential property seem to be only different in the sense of scope. I think this is the right time to invoke Ship of Theseus (which you briefly mention in the original post in this forum). When does a sheep stop being a sheep? Or a female stop being a female? Or an orange stop being an orange?

Point 4: The unmentioned 5th type of induction

There is another type of induction: "ingrained induction". You have a great example of this that you briefly discuss in the fourth essay: Hume's problem of induction. Another example is that the subject has to induce that "this" is separate from "that", but it is an ingrained, fundamental induction. The properties and characteristics that are apart of discrete experience do not in themselves prove in any way that they are truly differentiating factors: the table and the chair could, in reality, be two representations of the same thing, analogous to two very different looking representations of the same table directly produced by different angles of perspective. We have to induce that use of these properties and characteristics (such as light, depth, size, quantity, shape, color, texture, etc) are reasonable enough differentiating factors to determine "this" separate from "that". For example, we could induce that, given the meaningfulness of making such distinctions, we are valid enough in assuming they are, indeed, differentiating factors. Or we could shift the focus and claim that we don't really care if, objectively speaking, they are valid differentiating factors, but, rather, the meaningfulness is enough.

Point 5: Deductions are induced

Building off of point 4, "ingrained induction" is utilized to gather any imaginable kind of deductive principle: without such, you can't have deductions. This directly implies that it is not completely the case that deductions are what one should try to anchor inductions off of (in terms of your hierarchical structure). For example, the fact of gravity (not considering the theory or law), which is an induction anchored solely to the "ingrained induction", is far a "surer" belief, so to speak, than the deductive principle of what defines a mammal. If I had to bet on one, I would bet on the continuation of gravity and not the continuation of the term "mammal" as it has been defined: there are always incredible gray areas when it comes to deductive principles and, on some occasions, it can become so ambiguous that it requires refurbishment.

Point 6: Induction of possibility is not always cogent

You argue in the fourth essay that possibility inductions are cogent: this is not always the case. For example:

A possibility is cogent because it relies on previous applicable knowledge. It is not inventing a belief about reality which has never been applicably known.

1. You poofed into existence 2 seconds ago
2. You have extremely vivid memories (great in number) of discretely experiencing iron floating on water
3. From #2, you have previous applicable knowledge of iron floating on water
4. Since you have previous applicable knowledge of iron floating on water, then iron floating on water is possible.
5. We know iron floating on water is not possible
6. Not all inductive possibilities are cogent

Yes you could test to see if iron can float, but, unfortunately, just because one remembers something occurring doesn't mean it is possible at all: your applicable knowledge term does not take this into account, only the subsequent plausibility inductions make this sub-distinction.

Point 7: the "I" and the other "I"s are not used equivocally

Here's where the ternary distinction comes into play: you cannot prove other "I"s to be a discrete experiencer in a holistic sense, synonymous with the subject as a discrete experiencer, but only a particular subrange of it. You can't prove someone else to be "primitively aware", and consequently "experience", but only that they have the necessary processes that differentiate. In other words, you can prove that they differentiate, not that they are primitively aware of the separation of "this" from "that".

Hopefully those points are a good starting point. I think hit on a lot of different topics, so I will let you decide what to do from here. We can go point-by-point, all points at once, or none of the points if you have something you would like to discuss first.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Thank you for the clarification! I see now that we have pin pointed our disagreement and I will now attempt to describe it as accurately as I can. I see now that your definition of "experience" is something that I disagree with on many different accounts, hopefully I can explain adequately hereafter.

Firstly, I apologize: I should have defined the term "awareness" much earlier than this, but your last post seems to be implying something entirely different than what I was meaning to say by "awareness". I am talking about an "awareness" completely separate from the idea of whether I am aware of (recognize) my own awareness (sorry for the word salad here). For example, when you say:

It is irrelevant if a being that discretely experience realizes they are doing this, or not. They will do so regardless of what anyone says or believes.

You are 100% correct. I do not need to recognize that I am differentiating the letters on my keyboard from the keyboard itself: the mere differentiation is what counts . But this, I would argue, is a recognition of your "awareness" (aka awareness of one's awareness), not awareness itself. So instead, I would say that I don't need to be aware (or recognize) that I am aware of the differentiation of the letters on my keyboard from the keyboard itself: all that must occur is the fundamental recognition (awareness) that there even is differentiation in the first place. To elaborate further, when you say:

A discrete experiencer has the ability to create some type of identity, to formulate a notion that "this" is separate from "that" over there within this undefined flood.

I think you are wrong: "I" am not differentiating (separating "this" from "that"), something is differentiating from an undefined flood and "I" recognize the already differentiated objects (this is "awareness" as I mean it). To make it less confusing, I will distinguish awareness of awareness (i.e. defining terms or generally realizing that I am aware) from merely awareness (the fundamental aspect of existence) by defining the former as "sophisticated awareness" and the latter as "primitive awareness". In light of this, I think that when you say:

If I discretely experience that I feel pain, I feel pain. Its undeniable by anything in existence, because it is existence itself...Again, a discrete experiencer does not have to realize that their act of discretely experiencing, is discrete experiencing. Discrete experience is not really a belief, or really knowledge in the classical sense.

I think you are arguing that one doesn't have to be aware (recognize) that they are aware of the products of these processes ("sophisticated awareness") to be able to discretely experience, which would be directly synonymous with what I think you would claim to be our realization of our discrete experiences. This is 100% true, but this doesn't mean that we don't, first and foremost, require awareness ("primitive awareness") of those processes. The problem is that it is too complicated to come up with a great example of this, for if I ask you to imagine that "you" didn't see the key on your keyboard separate from one another, then you would say that, in the absence of that differentiation, "your" "discrete experiences" would lack that specific separation. But I am trying to go a step deeper than that: the differentiation (whether the key is separated from the keyboard or it is one unified blob) is not "you" because that process of differentiating is just as foreign, at least initially, as inner workings of your hands. "You" initially have nothing but this differentiation (in terms of perception) to "play with", so to speak, as it is a completely foreign process to "you". What isn't a foreign process to "you" is the "thing" that is "primitively aware" of the distinction of "this" from "that" (aka "you") but, more importantly, "you" didn't differentiate "this" from "that": it is just there.

To make it clearer, when you describe experience in this manner:

Experience is your sum total of existence.

At a primitive level it is pain or pleasure. The beating of something in your neck. Hunger, satiation. It is not contradicted by existence, because it is the existence of the being itself.

I think you are wrong in a sense. Your second quote here, in my opinion, is referring directly to the products of the processes, which cannot be "experienced" if one is not "primitively aware" of them. I'm fine with saying that "experience" initially precedes definition (or potentially that it even always precedes definition), but I think the fundamental aspect of existence is "primitive awareness". If the beating of something in your neck, which is initially just as foreign to you as your internal organs, wasn't something that you were "primitively aware" of, then it would slip your grasp (metaphorically speaking). With respect to the first quote here, I don't think that my "primitive awareness", although it is the fundamental aspect of existence, is the sum total of all existence: the representations (the products of the processes), the processes themselves, and the "primitive awareness" of them are naturally tri-dependent. However, and this is why I think "primitive awareness" is the fundamental aspect, it is not an equal tri-dependency: for if the "primitive awareness" is removed, then the processes live on, whereas if "primitive awareness" is removed then, thereby, "I" am removed. Furthermore, the processes themselves are never initially known at all (which I agree with you on this), but only their products and, naturally I would say, they are, in turn, useless if "I" am not "primitively aware" of them. So it is like a ternary distinction, but not an equal ternary distinction in terms of immediateness (or precedence) to the "I". For example, if something (the processes) wasn't differentiating the keys on my keyboard, then I would not, within my most fundamental existence, "experience" the keys on a keyboard. On the contrary, I see no reason to belief that, in the event that I was no longer "primitively aware" of the differentiation between the keys and the keyboard (of which I did not partake in and is just, initially, as foreign to me as the feeling of pain), the processes wouldn't persist. What I am saying is "experience" is "primitive awareness" and it depends on the products of the processes to "experience" anything (and, upon further reflection and subsequently not initially, the processes themselves).

Now, I totally understand that the subject, initially speaking, does not (and will not) be aware of my terminology, but just like how they don't have to be aware of your term "discrete experience" to discretely experience, so too I would argue they don't have be aware of my term "primitive awareness" to "experience".

In other words, when you say:

Experience is your sum total of existence. At first, this is undefined. It precedes definition.

I agree that discrete experiences, in terms of the products of the processes, is initially undefined, but the "primitive awareness" is not. You don't have to know what a 'K' means on your keyboard to know that you are aware that there is something in a 'K' shape being differentiated from another thing (of which we would later call a keyboard). This is way the "primitive awareness" is more fundamental than the products of the processes: you don't have to make any sense of the perceptions themselves to immediately be "primitively aware" of those perceptions.

And, lastly, I would like to point something out that doesn't pertain to the root of our discussion:

In questioning the idea of being able to discretely experience I wondered, are the discrete experiences we make "correct"? And by "correct" it seems, "Is an ability to discretely experience contradicted by reality?" No, because the discrete experience, is the close examination of "experience"

I would not constitute this as a real proof: that discretely experiencing doesn't contradict reality and, therefore, it is "correct". I understand what you are saying, but fundamentally you are comparing the thing to itself. You are really asking: "Is an ability to discretely experience contradicted by discretely experiencing". You are asking, in an effort to derive an orange, "does an orange contradict an orange?". You set criteria (that it can't contradict reality) and then define it in a way where it is reality, so basically you are asking "does reality contradict reality". Don't get me wrong, I would agree that we should define "correct" as what aligns with experience, but it is an axiom and not a proof. It is entirely possible that experience is completely wrong due to the representations being completely wrong and, more importantly, you can't prove the most fundamental by comparing it to itself. I think my critique is what you are sort of trying to get at, but I don't see the use in asking the question when it is circular: it is taken up, at this point, as an axiom, but your line of reasoning here leads me to believe that you may be implying that you proved it to be the case.

In light of all I have said henceforth, do you disagree with my assessment of "experience"?

I look forward to hearing back from you,
Bob

@Philosophim

I am glad that we have reached an agreement! I completely understand that views change over time and we don't always refurbish our writings to reflect that: completely understandable. Now I think we can move on. Although this may not seem like much progression, in light of our definition issues, I would like you to define "experience" for me. This definition greatly determines what your argument is making. For example, if the processes that feed the "I" and the "I" itself are considered integrated and, therefore, synonymous, then I think your "discrete experiencer" argument is directly implying that one can have knowledge without being aware of it (and that the processes and the "I" that witnesses those processes are the same thing). On the contrary, if the processes that feed the "I" and the "I" itself, to any sort of degree, no matter how minute, are distinguished then, therefrom, I think you are acknowledging that, no matter to what degree, awareness is an aspect of knowledge. If neither of those two best describe your definition of "experience", then I fear that you may be using the term in an ambiguous way that integrates the processes (i.e. perception, thought, etc) with the "I" without necessarily claiming them to be synonymous (which would require further clarification as I don't think it makes sense without such). If nothing I have explained henceforth applies to your definition of "experience", then that is exactly why I would like you to define it in your own words.
Bob

@Philosophim

Also, I would then be interested to what you refurbished definition of distinctive knowledge would be: is it simply discrete experiences and memories? If so, then I think this completely shifts the claims your essays are making and, subsequently, my critiques. But I won't get into that until after you respond (if applicable).
Bob

@Philosophim
I think that we are in agreement if you are removing the idea of awareness from discrete knowledge. However, I am still slightly confused, as here is your definition in your essay:

I will label the awareness of discrete experiences as “distinctive knowledge”. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences.

This explicitly defines distinctive knowledge as the awareness of discrete experiences. But now you seem to be in agreement with me that it can't have anything to do (within the context of your essays) with awareness. I would then propose you change the definition because, as of now, it specifically differentiates discrete experiences from distinctive knowledge solely based off of the term "awareness". I think that your essays are addressing what can be known based off of the analysis of the products of the processes and in relation to other discrete experiencers (where their awareness of such is irrelevant to the subject at hand, only that they also discretely experience). Is that fair to say? If so, then am I making any sense (hitherto) about why this is starting at mile 30? Maybe I am not explaining it well enough (it is entirely possible as I am not very good at explaining things). Are you ok with your essays starting their endeavor at mile 30, as opposed to mile 0? Or do you think it is starting at 0?
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I had to laugh at this one, as I've never had senses defined in such a way as sensing thoughts. We have two definitions here, so let me point out the definition the paper was trying to convey. The intention of the senses in this case is any outside input into the body. Some call them the five senses, but I wasn't necessarily stating it had to be five. Anything outside of the body is something we sense. The thing which takes the senses and interprets it into concepts, or discrete experiences, is the discrete experiencer. For the purposes here, I have noted the ability to discretely experience is one thing you can know about your "self".

Although I understand what you are trying to say, this is factually false (even if we remove my claim that thoughts are sensed). Senses are not restricted to external stimuli (like the five senses, for example): there are quite a lot of senses (some up for debate amongst science circles). Some that would be pertinent (that aren't up for debate) to this discussion would be those that are internally based: Equilibrioception (sense of balance, which is not a sense of external stimuli but, rather, internal ear fluid), Nociception (the sensation of internal pain), Proprioception (sense of body parts without external input), and Chemoreception (sense of hunger, thirst, vomiting, etc). I could go on, but I think you probably understand what I mean now: you have plenty of sensations that are deployed and received exclusively within your body. With regards to my claim that "thoughts are not absent of all senses", I do believe this to be true, but I think this isn't relevant to this discussion yet (if at all), so disregard that comment for now.

Could you go into detail as to what you mean? I'm not stating you are wrong. Depending on how you define senses, you could be right. But I can't see how that counters the subdivision I've made either. If I ignore my senses, meaning outputs entering into the body, then what is left is "thoughts".

I think this would digress our conversation even more, so I am going to leave this for a later date. Long story short, I think that just like how you can feel your heart beat pumping (which doesn't require external stimuli) you can also sense thoughts with seemingly conclusory thoughts (which are emotionally based convincements). Again, this isn't as pertinent to our conversation as I initially thought and I understand that it doesn't directly negate your idea that, apart from external stimuli, there is "thoughts". However, to say it is apart from all senses I think it is wrong.

No. I hesitate to go into animals, because its just a side issue I threw in for an example, with the assumption that the core premises were understood. Arguing over animal knowledge is missing the point. If you accept the premises of the argument, then we can ask how we could apply these definitions to animal knowledge. If you don't accept the premises of the argument, then applying it to animals is a step too far. This is not intended to dodge a point you've made. This is intended to point out we can't go out this far without understanding the fundamanets. My apologies for jumping out here too soon! Instead, I'm going to jump to other people, which is in the paper.

I understand your point that discussing animals is a step too far, but my critique also applies to humans.

You would not be able to read without the ability to discretely experience. This was implicit but perhaps should be made explicit. If you can read the letters on the page, you can discretely experience. If you can then communicate me with those letters back in kind, then you understand that they are a form of language. If you can do this, you can read my paper, and you can enter the same context as myself if you so choose. You can realize you are a discrete experiencer, and apply the test to reality.

I completely agree. However, I am not disputing whether you can determine me to be a discrete experiencer: I am disputing whether you can reasonably claim (within what is written in your essays) that you know that I have any sort of knowledge. By your essays' definition, distinctive knowledge is the awareness of discrete experiences: this is a separate claim from whether I have discrete experiences. In other words, you are right in stating that you have sufficient justification to say I am a discrete experiencer, but then you have to take it a step further and prove that I am aware of my discrete experiences. In your essays, both instances of knowledge that you define (distinctive and applicable) are a separate claims pertaining to the subject beyond the claim that they are discrete experiencers.

In your essays, they do not define "discrete experiences" as a form of knowledge (correct if I am wrong here), but they define two forms of knowledge: the awareness of discrete experiences (distinctive knowledge) and, after there is distinctive knowledge, the application of beliefs (applicable knowledge). Since applicable knowledge is contingent on distinctive knowledge and distinctive knowledge is, in turn, contingent on awareness, therefore proving that I, as the reader, have discrete experiences does not in any way prove that I have any forms of knowledge as defined in your essays.

You cannot do that without being a discrete experiencer like me

To that end, it doesn't matter if you're "conscious". It doesn't matter if you're spaced out, in a weird mental state, etc. You're a discrete experiencer like me.

True, but I could be a discrete experiencer without having any knowledge as defined by your essays (namely, without any distinctive or applicable knowledge).

So the rest follows that what you discretely experience, is what you distinctely know.

This is exactly what I have been trying to demonstrate: the first half of the above quote does not imply in any way the second half (for other "Is"). You define distinctive knowledge with the explicit contingency on awareness, not simply that you discretely experience. I am arguing that you can discretely experience without being aware of it. I think this is basically my biggest issue with your essays summed into one sentence (although I don't want to oversimplify your argument): you wrongly assume that you proving something is a "discrete experiencer" therefore proves that they have distinctive and applicable knowledge but, most importantly, you haven't demonstrated that that something is aware of any of it and, consequently, you haven't proven they have either form of knowledge.

Do you deny that you deductively think?

Yes. I inductively think my way into a deductive belief. I have a string of thoughts (inductively witnessed) that form a seemingly conclusory thought (which can most definitely be a deductive belief). My thoughts do not start, or initialize so to speak, with deduction.

So that is good enough for the purposes that I need to continue the paper into resolving how two discrete experiencers can come to discrete and applicable knowledge between them

Again, I think that you are wrongly assuming that proving that an individual discretely experiences directly implies that they have distinctive or applicable knowledge: you defined distinctive knowledge specifically to be contingent on awareness, which I don't think has anything to do with what you defined as "discrete experiences".

They can fundamentally disagree with me by distinctive knowledge. They cannot fundamentally disagree with me by application, unless they've shown my application was not deduced

I agree that, in the event that they begin partaking in their analysis of the products of those processes, they will apply them the same way as you. However, it doesn't begin with a deduction: you have to induce your way to a deduction that you can then apply. If that is what you mean when you say that it begins with deduction (that it is a induced deductive belief) then I agree with you on this.

The sheep examples are all intended to show we can invent whatever distinctive knowledge we want, but the only way it has use in the world, is to attempt to apply it without contradiction.

I agree with you here, but I don't think you are starting your writing endeavor (in terms of the essays) at the basis, you are starting at mile 30 in a 500 mile race. Once we agree up to 30, then I (generally speaking) agree with you up to 500 (or maybe 450 (: ) and I think you do a great job at assessing it from mile 30 all the way to 500. However, I think it is important to first discuss the first 30 miles, otherwise we are building our epistemology on axioms.

What I'm trying to communicate, is that there is no third party arbiter out there deciding what "I" should mean, or what any word should mean. We invent the terms and words that we use. The question is whether we can create a process out of this that is a useful tool to help us understand and make reasonable decisions about the world.

I understand and this is a fair statement. However, my biggest quarrel is that I believe you to be starting at mile 30 when you should be starting at mile 0. If you want to base your epistemology on something that doesn't address all the fundamentals, but more generally (with the help of axioms) addresses the issue in a way most people will understand, then that is fine. I personally don't agree that we should start at mile 30 and then loop back around later to discuss miles 0-29. It must start at 0 for me.

Is it incorrect that an individual can invent any words or internal knowledge that they use to apply to the world? Is it incorrect, that if I apply my distinctive knowledge to the world and the world does not contradict my application, that I can call that another form of knowledge, applicable knowledge?

This is absolutely correct. But I am not disputing this.

If you enter into the context of the words I have used, does the logic follow?

No it does not. Proving a being to be a discrete experiencer doesn't prove awareness of such. Therefore, by your definitions of knowledge, I don't understand how your essays prove others to have any forms of knowledge (distinctive or applicable). If you start at mile 30, and I start at mile 30, then I think that your logic (without commenting on the induction hierarchy yet, so just essays 1-3) is sound. But, again, that's assuming a lot to get to mile 30.

It is not a problem for me at all if someone introduces a ternerary distinction. The same process applies. They will create their distinctive knowledge. Then, they must apply that to reality without contradiction. If they cannot apply it to reality without contradiction, then they have invented terms that are not able to be applicably known.

I agree. But, again, this is starting at mile 30, not mile 0. You skip over the deeper questions here and generally start from the analysis of the products of the processes: this is not the base. If you don't want to start from the base, then that is totally fine (I just disagree). If you think that you are starting from the base, then I would interested to know if you think that the binary distinction is the base.

I don't doubt this is a problem for a reader, so thank you for pointing this out. Your feedback tells me I need to explicitly point out how if you are reading this, you are by the definitions I stated, an "I" as well.

Again, this only proves that you know that I, as the reader, am a discrete experiencer. Now you have to prove that I have distinctive and, thereafter, applicable knowledge. Distinctive knowledge was defined as the awareness of discrete experiences, not merely the discrete experiences themselves. Therefore, I don't think your "I" is being extended equivocally to other "Is" in your essays: your "I" is a discrete experiencer that is aware of it and, thereby, has both accounts of knowledge, whereas the other "Is" merely are proven to be a discrete experiencer (no elaboration or proof on whether they are aware of such). I get that, for me, I know I am aware, but to apply your logic to other people, it does not hold that I know that they are aware due to their discrete experiences. Therefore, when your essays start discussing context, it is wrongly assuming that the previous contents of the subsequent essays covered a proof of some sort that other "Is" are aware of their discrete experiences.

Yes, this is a more accurate assessment of what I am doing. I am inventing knowledge as a tool that can be used.

My critique here (that I am trying to portray) is that this tool is starting out at mile 30, not 0.

I hope I wasn't too reiterative, but I think this is a vital problem with your essays. But, ironically, it isn't a problem if you wish to start at mile 30, and if that is the case then I will simply grant it (for the sake of conversation) and continue the conversation to whatever lies after it. I personally don't think it is a good basis for epistemology because it isn't a true basis: it utilizes axioms.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
Thank you for your clarifications of your terminology: I understand it better now! I see now where our disagreements lie. For now, I am going to grant your use of "discrete experiencer" in a broader sense as you put it. However, this still does not remove my issue with your papers and, quite frankly, it is simply my lack of ability to communicate it clearly that is creating this confusion. So, therefore, I am going to take a different approach: I re-read your essays 1-3 (I left 4 out because it something which will be addressed after we hash this out) and I have gathered a few quotes from each of them with questions that I would like to get your answer to (and some are just elaborative). Hopefully this will elaborate a bit on my issue. Otherwise, feel free to correct me.

Essay 1:

I noted discrete experiences in regards to the senses, but what about discrete experience absent those senses?  Closing off my senses such as shutting my eyes reveals I produce discrete experiences I will call “thoughts.”  If I “think” on a thought that would contradict the discrete experience of “thoughts” I again run into a contradiction.  As such, I can deductively believe I have thoughts absent the senses as well.

I think what you meant (and correct me if I am wrong here) is the five senses, not all senses. If you had no senses, you wouldn't have thoughts because you would not be aware of them. There are many senses to the body and it is always evolving, so I would argue that the awareness of thoughts is a sense (but is most definitely different than the five senses). I think your argument here would be that you are talking specifically senses that pertain to the bodies contact with external stimuli and that is fine. But thoughts are not absent of all senses. I think this arises due to your essays' lack of addressing the issue of the ternary distinction. This will hopefully make more sense as I move on to the next quotes.

Essay 2:

I will label the awareness of discrete experiences as “distinctive knowledge”.  To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences.

I agree. Your advocating here (as I understand it) that in the absence of awareness, you have no distinctive knowledge and, thereby, no applicable knowledge and, therefore, no knowledge at all. You are directly implying that even if you can determine another animal to be a discrete experiencer, you still have no reason to think that they have any distinctive knowledge because that doesn’t directly prove that they are aware of their discrete experiences. Am I correct in this? Therefore, the “I” for you as a discrete experiencer, at this point, has one extra property that cannot be demonstrated (yet) to be in another animals “I”: awareness of those discrete experiences. Therefore, both uses of the term “I” are not being used completely synonymously (equivocally).

Essay 3:

I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an “I”.

As of now, the “I” defined for you has another property that you haven’t proven to exist in the other “I”s: awareness of discrete experiences—distinctive knowledge as you defined it. Just like how I can park my car with a complete lack of awareness of how I got there, I could also be reading your papers without any awareness of it. So, with that in mind, I would ask: are you asserting that this is not the case? That you have sufficiently proven that, not only are other animals an “I” in the sense that they are discrete experiencers, they also have distinctive knowledge? To say "I" and your "I" both exist, in my head, is to directly imply that I am using "I" equivocally: I don't think your essays do that. Your essays, thereby, seem to assume that you have used the term "I" equivocally and immediately starts compared one "I"s knowledge to another "I"s knowledge: but, again, you haven't demonstrated that anyone besides your self has distinctive knowledge, only discrete experiences.

If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an “I” separate from myself.

Only in the sense that “I” is used to denote a discrete experiencer and not distinctive knowledge. Therefore, your essays don't actually determine anyone else to know anything, only that they discretely experience. Am I incorrect here?

If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs.

I agree. But at this point in your essay we have no reason to believe that they are aware of them, which would be required for “I” to be used equivocally. In saying "other "I's" like myself", you are implying (to me) that you think that you have proven other "I's" to have distinctive knowledge (or knowledge in any sense), but I don't think you have.

A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus.

This is why, I would argue, not everyone who reads your paper is going to fundamentally agree with you with respect to your sheep example. They will attempt to gather knowledge starting from the subject, just like you, but they may not view it as a binary distinction. If it is initialized with a ternary distinction, then, as you hinted earlier, solipsism becomes a problem much quicker and, therefore, your ease of derivation (in terms of a binary distinction) will not be obtained by them. For example, for a person that starts their subjective endeavor with a ternary distinction, it is entirely possible that they must address the issue of “where are these processes coming from?” and “am I justified in assuming they are true?” way before they can get to any kind of induction hierarchy that resides within the production of those processes. So I would like to ask: do you think that the barrier between the “I” and the processes feeding it, and thereby the previous questions, is not more fundamental, and therefore must be addressed first, before the subject can continue their derivation with respect to your essays? My problem is that you skip ahead straight to the sheep example, which is an analysis of the products of the processes, when you haven’t addressed the more fundamental problem of whether those very processes are accurate or not (you just seem to imply that it should be taken on an axiom of some sort). Or if we even can know if they are accurate or not. Or if it really matters if they are or not. Don’t get me wrong, I have no problem with your derivation (for the most part) with respect to your analysis of the products of those processes, but your writings imply axioms that are not properly addressed.

To sum it up, your essays, in an effort to conclude induction hierarchies, completely skip over the justification for why one should even start analyzing the products of those processes in a serious manner, to assuming they are true, in the way that you did. If we are to derive a basis for knowledge, then we must assume nothing, starting from the subject, which includes doubting the assumption that we have any reasonably grounds to assume the "I" should utilize the discrete experiences that get thrown at it. Now you could say, and I think this may be what your essays imply, that, look, we have these processes that are throwing stuff at the "I", of which it is aware of, such as perception and thought, and here's what we can do with it. If that's what your essays are trying to get at, then that is fine. But that doesn't start with the most basic derivation of the subject: you are skipping addressing the problem of whether knowledge can even be based off of these products of the processes. In other words, if your essays are simply dealing with what we can "know" in the sense that all we care about is having knowledge pertaining to the product of these processes and, therefore, it doesn't matter if those processes are utterly false, then I think we are in agreement. But I would add that you aren't addressing this at all in the essays and that's why I can't personally use it, as it is now, to base knowledge. Hopefully that makes a bit more sense. If not, please let me know!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Thank you for the wait Bob. I wanted to make sure I answered you fully and fairly.

Absolutely no problem! I would much rather wait for a detailed, thought-provoking response than a quick, malformed (so to speak) one! I thoroughly enjoy reading your replies, so take as much time as you need!

After reading your response, I think your forbiddence of my terminology is fair enough! So I will do my best to utilize your terminology from now on (so, in advance, I apologize if I misuse them--and please correct me when I do). However, I think there is a still, in the absence of my terminology, a fundamental problem with your essays and so I will try to elaborate hereafter in your terminology as best I can.

It is fine if you believe this is too basic, but that is because I must start basic to build fundamentals. At this point in the argument, I am a person who knows of no other yet.

I understand that the intuitive thing to do is the start off with "I" vs "everything else" for most people, and I have no problem with that, but it seems to me, as your essays progress, they retain this position which I, as far as I understand your argument hitherto, believe to be false (and not in terms of later applicable knowledge nor a priori, but in the immediate experiential knowledge that you begin your derivation from). Intuitiveness is not synonymous with immediateness, and I think this is a vital distinction for your proposition. For example, the intuitive thing to do is the separate as you did, the "I" and "everything else", for most people but that is not the most immediately known thing to the subject. For example, if, in your sheep example, you were an individual with depersonalization disorder, the disassociation of the "I", the process of discretely perceiving the sheep, and the discrete manifestations of "everything else" (including the sheep) would be incredibly self-apparent and discrete--although, to a person where their brain associates these concepts very tightly it would be the subjects first and most fundamental mistake to assume it is really the "I" discretely perceiving and the discrete manifestations of "everything else". This is why, although I have to invoke some applicable knowledge (that, although you or I may have never had such a disassociation like depersonalization disorder), for a person with such a disassociation, your essay would entirely miss its mark (in my opinion) because they do not share such a basic fundamental distinction as you. However, I would argue that you both actually share a much much more fundamental basic than the binary distinction your proposition invokes: the "I", the process of discretely perceiving the sheep, and all discrete manifestations--a ternary distinction.

This is where I may need some clarification, because I might have misinterpreted what your proposition was. You see, I thought that "I am a discrete experiencer" was a broadened sense of stating "I am a discrete perceiver, thinker, etc". I read your essays as directly implying (by examples such as the sheep) that a specific instance of "I am a discrete experiencer" was "I am a discrete perceiver and thinker"--and I believe this to be false (if that is not what you are implying, then please correct me). This is not the most fundamental basic separation for the subject. Now I understand that a lot of people may initially be in the same boat as you (in that binary distinction) and then derive the ternary distinction I make, but, most importantly, not all (and it would be a false claim). I totally agree with you that we shouldn't utilize an a priori or applicable knowledge yet, just the discrete experiences as you put it, but "I am a discrete experiencer", based off of such discrete experiences (which can be more self-apparent to people with psychological disorders), is a false basis for knowledge. Again, I do think their is a lot of applicable knowledge that we could both discuss about this ternary distinction I am making, but for your argument I would not need to invoke any as discrete experiences is enough. So, I would argue, either the essays need to begin with a more fundamental basis for knowledge (ternary distinction) or, as the essays progress, they need to morph into a ternary distinction. With that being said, I totally understand (in hindsight) that a lot of my first post was irrelevant to specifically your proposal (I apologize), but I don't agree in deriving the different levels, so to speak, of induction with a basis that isn't the most immediate. Is this me being to technical? Would it overly complicate your proposition? Possibly. This is why I understand if you would like to keep it broad in your proposition, but, in that case, I would temporarily agree with you in this sense; moreover, more importantly, I wouldn't use it as a basis of knowledge because the most fundamental aspect of your epistemology I think to be false. Hopefully that made some sense.

I think this is a fine assessment. We can make whatever definitions and concepts we want. That is our own personal knowledge. I am looking at a blade of grass, while you are creating two other identities within the blade of grass. There is nothing wrong with either of us creating these identities. The question is, can we apply them to reality without contradiction? What can be discretely known is not up for debate. What can be applicably known is.

Again, I completely agree that we can derive a prior (and applicable) knowledge that we could both dispute heavily against one another, but I am not trying to utilize any of such: I am disputing what can be discretely known. I am debating on whether your proposition is right in its assessment of what is discretely known. I am debating whether your proposition is right in persisting such a binary distinction all the way to its last conclusion. As another example, psychedelic drugs (that produce extreme disassociations) can also, along with psychological disorders, demonstrate that an individual within your sheep example, in your very shoes, would not base their derivations on a binary distinction. Again, I understand that, although I said I wouldn't invoke applicable knowledge, I just did (in the case that I do not have depersonalization disorder): but for that subject, in your example, your basis would simply be factually incorrect and if the use of such applicable knowledge is not satisfactory for you, then you could (although I am not advocating you to) produce this disassociation and try the sheep example in real life. Now, I am not trying to be condescending here at all, I am deadly serious and, therefore, I apologize if it seemed a bit condescending--I think this is an important problem, fundamentally, with your derivation in the essays. I could be misunderstanding you completely, and if that is the case then please correct me!

This is a great example of when two people with different contexts share their discrete knowledge. I go over that in part 3 if you want a quick review. We have several options. We could accept, amend, reinterpret, or reject each other's definitions. I point this out for the purposes of understanding the theory, because I will be using the theory, to prove the theory.

I think that this is the issue with your derivation: it only works if the individual reading it shares your intuitive binary distinction. I agree generally with your assessment of how to deal with competing discrete experiences, but to say "I am a discrete experiencer" is only correct if you are meaning "experiencer" in the sense that you are witnessing such processes, not in the sense that "I am a discrete perceiver". I think this is a matter of definitions, but an important matter, that I would need your clarification on. In both bases, ternary and binary, it may happen that both conclude the same thing, but the latter would be deriving it from a false premise that can be determined to be false by what is immediately known (regardless of whether it is intuitive or not).

You want to discuss the concept of the square root of four, while I want to first focus on the number 2.

I think this analogy (although I could be mistaken) is implying that the binary distinction is what we all begin with and then can later derive a ternary distinction: I don't think that is always the case and, even when it is, it is a false one that only requires those discrete experiences to determine it. In other words, one who does begin with a binary distinction can by use of those very discrete experiences determine that there original assertion was wrong and, in fact, it is ternary. Even for a person who doesn't have extreme disassociation, the fact that these processes, that are indeed discrete, get served, so to speak, to the experiencer and not produced by them is enough to show that it is not a binary distinction. Again, I do understand that, for most, it is intuitive to start off with a binary distinction, but applicable and a priori knowledge is not required to realize that it is a false conclusion. I would agree that my assessment is more complicated, which is directly analogous to your analogy here. However, numbers (like the number 2) are first required to understand square roots, which is not analogous to what I am at least trying to say. Again, just as intuitive a binary distinction may be to you, so is a ternary distinction for a depersonalized disorder patient (or even some that have never had a disorder of any kind)--and they simply won't agree with you on this (and it is a dispute about the fundamental discrete experiences and not simply applicable knowledge).

But, because I know you're a great philosopher, for now, please accept the definitions I'm using, and the way I apply it. Please feel free to point out contradictions in my discrete knowledge, or misapplications of it. I promise this is not some lame attempt to avoid the discussion or your points. This is to make sure we are at the core of the theory.

Fair enough! I totally understand that I got ahead of myself with my first post. Hopefully I did a somewhat better job of directly addressing your OP. If not, please correct me!

To recap: An "I" is defined as a discrete experiencer. That is it. You can add more, that's fine.

Again, it depends entirely on what you mean by "experiencer" whether this is always true for the subject reading your papers. If you mean, in terms of a specific example, that the "I" encompasses the idea that it is a discrete perceiver; I think this is wrong and can be immediately known without a prior knowledge, regardless of whether I am personally in a state of mind that directs me towards an initial binary distinction.

And at risk of over repeating myself, the forbiddance of introducing new discrete knowlege at this point is not meant to avoid conversation, it is meant to discover fundamentals

Absolutely fair! However, hopefully I have demonstrated that I am disputing whether the binary distinction even is a fundamental or not.

Would an animal be an "I" under the primitive fundamental I've proposed and applicably know? If an "I" is a discrete experiencer, then I have to show an animal is a discrete experiencer without contradiction in reality. If an animal can discern between two separate things, then it is an "I" as well. Now I understand that doesn't match your definition for your "I". Which is fine. We could add in the defintion of "consciousness" as a later debate. The point is, I've created a defintion, and I've applied it to reality to applicably know it.

Firstly, and I am not trying to be too reiterative here, I am disputing the idea that it is a primitive fundamental: I think it is not. Yes, I see your point if you are trying to determine if the animal is a discrete experiencer in the sense that they perceive external stimuli (for example), but this gets ambiguous for me quite quickly. If that is what you mean, that you can demonstrate that they discretely experience as in they discretely perceive (and whatever else you could demonstrate), then that use of the term "experiencer" would not be the same as the "experiencer" in "I am a discrete experiencer", unless you are stating that "experience" is synonymous with the processes of perception, thought, etc. If you are stating that "experience" is synonymous with the processes that feed it, then you have eliminated "you" from the picture and, therefore, the "I" in "I am a discrete experiencer" is simply "The body is a discrete experiencer", which I don't think that would make any sense to either of us if we were to derive our knowledge from the body and not the "I" (again, I could be misunderstanding you here). In other words, although I understand that I am redefining terms, I do not think you can demonstrate that animals experience, only that they have processes similar to which feeds our experiences. What I am trying to say, and I'm probably not doing a very good job, is that you can't demonstrate an animal to experience equivocally to when you determined that you experience: the "I" (you) cannot determine that the animal, or anyone else for that matter, is an "I" in the sense that both of my uses of "I" are equivocal. Now this brings up a new issue of whether we could determine that other people, for example, have "I"s at all. I would say that we can, but it is later on: applicable knowledge in your terminology. To be clear, you would have discrete experiences that demonstrate that there are other entities that have processes required to experience, but any inferences after that are applicable knowledge claims. This is why it is ambiguous for me: when you say you can prove there are other "I"s like your "I", I think you are utilizing the term "I" in two different senses--the former is simply an entity that has the processes similar to what feeds your experiences (which can be derived from discrete experiences), while the latter is experience itself (which cannot be extended via discrete experiences to any other entities but, rather, can be inferred by applicable knowledge to be the case).

But for the single person without context, if they have defined "I" in this way, this is the only thing they could deduce in their application of that definition to reality.

Hopefully I did an adequate job of presented evidence that this is not true.

I think, for the sake of making this shorter, I will leave your further comments for later discussion, because I think that you are right in saying that we need to discuss the more fundamental aspects to your OP first. I think that the hallucinated dilemma is a discussion for after what I have stated here is hashed out.

Thank you for a such an elaborate response and I look forward to hearing back from you!
Bob

@Philosophim
Absolutely no worries! Take as much time as you need (no rush): I am looking forward to your response (:

Hello @Philosophim,

Firstly, great work! I enjoyed reading your collection of epistemological essays! Since it was a lot to unpack, I am going to simply address your epistemological proposition from an extremely broad sense (thereby only addressing the most vital quarrels I think I have with your proposition). I will leave it up to you to decide what you would like to discuss thereafter:

• Your proposition seems to be founded on the one-sided relationship between “reality” and beliefs; however, it is really two-sided: “reality” can influence a belief and a belief can influence “reality”. For example, placebo effect is a real psychological phenomenon which reveals the two-sidedness of the relationship. With that being said, I do agree with your proposition in the sense that beliefs should coincide with “reality” in some manner—but this does not necessarily mean that anything that isn’t directly factually true (such as a unicorn's existence) directly invalidates the belief in such: belief and knowledge are two distinct concepts. For example, the thorough refutation of libertarian free will does not in any way (I would argue) immediately refute the belief in such--as, even in the case that free will is an illusion (in a hard determinist worldview--which I am not advocating for but merely utilizing as an example), it does not follow that one is obliged to then completely disregard (without further examination) the proposition that the belief in free will is useful. Beliefs, completely separate from knowledge claims, can manifest (psychologically and sociologically speaking) real, empirical facts about "reality".
• Our epistemological worldviews deviate at a much more fundamental level than I expected, but, interestingly enough, we agree the broader we speak. For example, you stated (in, I believe, your first essay): “In recognizing a self,, I am able to create two “experiences”.  That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.” I think that this is the intuitive thing to do, but it is only an incredibly general description and, therefore, doesn’t go deep enough for me. There are three distinctions to be made, not simply “I” and “everything else”: the interpreter, the interpretations (representations), and self-consciousness. In your terms, it would translate (I think) into a discrete experiencer (self-consciousness and the interpreter joined into to one concept) and everything else (the interpretations/representations which are later divided into other “I”s and “everything else besides ‘I’ and other ‘I’s”). I would make it much more precise than that: “I am self-conscious, therefore something is”. I think Descartes biggest mistake was assuming “I” am the one “thinking”. Although you refurbish it into discrete experiences, I think this is still fundamentally assuming things we cannot. That is why I define an “experience” as a witnessing of immediate knowledge (the process of thinking, perception, and emotion) by means of rudimentary reason, and a “remembrance” (or memory as you put it in subsequent essays) as seemingly stored experiences. Notice that I am directly implying that I have no reason to believe that I am an active ingredient, so to speak, in any of those processes. I am not convinced that I am actively participating in the process of perception, emotion, or thought, but rather, I am “participating” insofar as I am a witness of such (I witness the process of rigorous thought and the feeling of convincement): I am self-consciousness. There is another aspect, or “force”, so to speak, that is distinctly separate from the “I” in a “discrete experiencer” (self-consciousness): the interpreter. The interpreter is a form of mediate knowledge (namely a prior knowledge) which is necessitated by the fact that the “I” doesn’t directly affect the processes associated with immediate forms of knowledge. In other words, both the interpreter and the “I” (self-consciousness) are apart of the subject (consciousness), but the “I” is only a particular aspect of it. This distinction, for me, between keeping it a binary distinction ("I" vs "everything else") and regressing it further (the subject into two categories) reveals some heavily impactful positions of mine (pertaining to epistemology). For example, if I wasn’t self-conscious of the process of thinking that is occurring in “my” brain, then, although this response would still get written and sent, "I" would have no knowledge of it. Likewise, if we all were not self-conscious of our process of thinking, perception, and emotion (i.e. immediate forms of knowledge), then there would be no knowledge at all. Interestingly enough, I think that the interpreter's processes would continue—as "we" (self-consciousness) are mere witnesses—but there would be no epistemological grounds for any sort of knowledge because neither of us would have any recollection of it. Think of it like the hypothetical scenario that you had a thought two seconds ago, of which you never experienced (you were not consciously aware of it—aka self-conscious of it) (or you do not and will never remember)--can any knowledge be derived therefrom? I would argue no! This is like your reference of a “discrete experiencer” in the sense that if you didn’t discretely experience then there is no knowledge, however that becomes very confusing to me as I don’t think your consciousness would completely stop. I think you would continue to do exactly what you are doing now (in terms that the interpreter, one aspect of the subject, would persist), except that “you” would have no knowledge of it. Your interpreter, so to speak, would continue to create interpretations (as far as I can tell), which are discrete representations, but those interpretations would not be experienced (in the sense that I defined it--a witnessing of immediate knowledge by means of rudimentary reason) because there would be no witness. It’s kind of like how some animals can’t even recognize themselves in a mirror: I would argue that they do not have any knowledge if (and its a big if in this case) they are not self-conscious. Yes they have knowledge in the sense that their body will react to external stimuli, but that isn’t really knowledge (in my opinion) as removing self-consciousness directly removes “me” (or “I”) from the equation and that is all that is relevant to "me" (as this fundamental epistemological question wouldn't have even been posed in any meaningful way to the subject if the second aspect of the subject--namely self-consciousness--was not present). As an example, let's take your sheep example: what if that entire concept that you derived a deductive principle from (namely tenants that constitute a sheep) were all apart of a hallucination. What if you really snorted a highly potent hallucinogen in the real world and it is so potent that you will never wake up in the real world but, rather, you will die in your hallucinated world once your body dies in the real one. Do you truly have knowledge of the sheep (in the hallucinated world) now, given that the world isn't real? What is "real"? I would argue, since the relevance directly ties to the witness (and not the interpreter) aspect of the subject, whatever corresponds best to what the witness experiences is exactly what is "real" and, therefore, the real world in my example here would be nothing except irrelevant. The knowledge, if knowledge is going to mean anything, of the sheep is just as valid in a real world as a "real" (potentially hallucinated and, thereby, "fake") one! Everything revolves around the subject for me, nay, specifically the witness (self-consciousness, one aspect of the subject). In other words, the validity (absolutely speaking) of the interpreter's interpretations has no direct effect on what one can or cannot constitute as knowledge.
• For now, the last aspect I will discuss here is the idea, which I consider to be your main point, that inductions can be classified by means of how close they are to deductive principles (i.e. your distinction between probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction). There is a lot that can be said about this, but, in an effort to keep this relatively short, I will focus on one aspect: the fundamental problem with this logic. The most fundamental aspect of our lives (I would argue) is rudimentary reason, which is the most basic (rudimentary) method by which we can derive all other things. We reason our way into even knowing (in the first place) that we have any forms of immediate knowledge (perceptions, thoughts, and emotions): we induce by our witnessing (experiencing) the process of perception, emotion, and thought that that we indeed have such (by means of rudimentary reason--a witnessing of a series of thoughts that, in turn, create a seemingly conclusory thought of which we are, at least in that instant, thoroughly convinced of). Imagine that you never witnessed yourself conclude anything: you therefore would be no different, with respect to yourself, than a rock (now to someone who could conclude--aka has rudimentary reason to some extent--would be able to distinguish you from a rock, but you wouldn't be able to). To realize that you have thoughts is to make a conclusion, if that is absent then the interpreter associated with you as a subject would persist in such immediate processes but, most importantly, you would be completely unaware and, honestly, I don't' think "you" would exist anymore (self-consciousness cannot persist in the absence of conclusions): this is what I mean by rudimentary reason, that, although it doesn't have to be rational, you must be able to form conclusions which requires a rudimentary form of something (which I call rudimentary reason). You see, if one were to be committed to stating that the closer an induction is to a deductive principle the more likely it is correct, then the very means by which they induced those deductive principle would have no grounds to stand. My use of rudimentary reason to induce immediate and mediate knowledge, and thereby all deductive principles, would have no deductive principle at its base: it is a pure induction. Experience at its most fundamental level, namely immediate knowledge, is pure induction. Now, I think you are right in the sense that inductions that are based off of strong deductive principles are stronger than inductions that are chained together, but I don't tend to establish what is more knowable based off of this postulation because, as I previously stated, my most immediate forms of knowledge, and consequently my basis of everything one way or another, are induced. That is why I say that the closer (metaphorically and literally) the concept is to immediate knowledge, the more reasonably "real" it is (notice that I am not anchoring it down towards a deductive base).

Well, I think that is enough for now (although there is much to discuss!) as your essays covered a lot of ground. Again, great work! I look forward to hearing back from you on your thoughts.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.

I see your dilemma now, and, therefore, exactly why you are utilizing causality instead of explanation. Although I think that utilizing it in terms of explanations would "open more doors", so to speak, in your OP, I understand that it may introduce a new level of (possibly) unnecessary complexity and, so, I respect you decision to refrain from semantic refurbishment.

While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.

I apologize, I think I misunderstood what you were previously saying. As I understand it now, you seem to be pointing out (quite correctly) that potential infinities may not truly exist (and actual infinities). There is a limit to how many numbers I can fathom within my time constrained lifetime and, therefore, I can't possibly verify that all numbers (within no bounds) actually work for P(n) (and some may not even represent actual quantities in the universe). Even if I continually mentally incremented a number (any number, no matter how big) for my entire life, non-stop, from here onward, I would, nevertheless, never be able to verify them all. With respect to that I agree with you! However, I think there is a fundamental difference between utilizing a P(n) function that is induced to work for an actual or potential infinite, and attempting to utilize it beyond space and time. For example, for me, all that mathematical induction means (in terms of meaningfulness for the subject) is that any number I can fathom in my lifetime is reasonably induced to work in P(n) . But, more importantly, I would never attempt to (somehow) extend it past space and time and infer that some quantity (let's just say X) that exists (somehow) beyond space/time will give reliable results when past through P(n). In other words, any use of P(n) (although technically it could be relating to numbers that don't have any true quantifiable existences in reality) is a use of P(n) specifically tailored for this space/time rabric that I wouldn't say can be reasonably extended past thereof. Anyways, I think you understand what I am trying to say so I will leave it at that.

This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does.

I understand your point here, but think this is exactly why using the term "explanation", contrary to "causation", helps your argument, because I don't think explanation in terms of causation can occur "outside" of space and time. However, I do understand what you mean by "outside", I think that we both don't know what that truly means in terms of the context of "outside of space and time" and I think that is my main point here--that, I would say, neither of us can truly separate our thinking beyond space/time in terms of causation (and that's why I would argue that there is no meaningful usage of "cause" and "effect" "outside" of space and time). But, again, I see where you are coming from and I get that our terminology is quite limited with respect to your OP.

Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)

I think this exposes exactly my issue with your OP, which is that your OP seems to require the use of causality beyond space and time to make its case, but yet then it concedes that any causality past space/time is meaningless to discuss (which I would agree with). You see, I could then argue that space/time is eternal (although I'm not actually trying to argue that), which I would say your OP would be the claim that the fact that it is eternal is the "first cause". But the fact that it is eternal is not a cause (I agree with you that this is epistemological in nature), it is beyond causation (because it is beyond space/time, it is metaphysical in a sense--this fact doesn't "cause" any "effect", it, by definition, explains itself): it is an explanation completely beyond causation (and, therefore, I would argue that, even though it is a complicated topic, explanation and causation are not synonymous). Now, as you pointed out, the explanation could end up being Causation (note the captial C), which would be meaningless for us to discuss because that Causation would be "outside" of our causation (which is restrained to space/time). You see, if you agree with me in that, for all intents and purposes, Causation doesn't exist (in terms that we can't discuss it), then your causal argument gets cut off at space/time, but your explanatory argument proceeds just fine! In other words, although I get where you are coming from on this, there seems (to me) to be a necessary distinction between explanations and causations. The fact that an actual infinite goes on forever is not explained by that very fact being its own cause but, rather, it lies in the fact that, somehow, it, by definition, explains the necessity of it continuing on forever (which could be a result of Causation or something entirely else, but necessarily not causation).

I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning.

I agree with you here: it is semantics and that's why I don't quarrel with people over the usages because, quite frankly, we both are talking about the same thing. However, I think that the fact that we can't truly discuss these matters properly, which (I would say) is directly due to the fact that we can't separate from certain fundamental aspects of our existence, is incredibly telling that we may (but not necessarily are) over-extending our logic into Logic. Personally, the fact that we can't quite accurately pose the question makes me wonder what authority we truly have to ask it in the first place! That's why I do my best to try to conceive of a proper way of semantically putting it, because, in this case, I don't see how I can truly answer the question if I can't even truly verify whether my question is valid or not.

Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole.

That makes sense, I recant my previous statement that you are abandoning it! As you noted thereafter, I do still think it is an arbitrary fix.

Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn?

Although I understand what you are portraying here, I am going to have to disagree with you here in favor of your own OP! You see, your OP is quite strong in the sense of your question here, because to take the position that there can be no first explanation (and, therefore, that the contrary is the unicorn) is to concede the OP! This is because it is paradoxical: the fact that there is not first explanation is, in itself, the first explanation. I think this is exactly why I would argue our logic breaks down (which leads me to describe it as explanatory-collapsibility). You see, there is another option here: although the framework in which we live our lives compells us to make this distinction (that either there is no first explanation or there is one) it doesn't apply if we were to claim that our framework doesn't persist to the level at which we are posing the distinction! I think that whatever kind of framework may exist past space and time is most definitely some sort of framwork completely separate from our own and that is my explanation for why all of these questions we could posit (that seem like binary questions) will inevitably collapse on themselves! In other words, to take the position that there is no first explanation, inevitably collapses into the position that there is one. And to take the position that there is a first explanation, is to presume that there is a possibility that there isn't one, which collapses on itself because, again, if there isn't one then it will, in turn, collapse again into the position that there is a first explanation and, you guessed it, that collapses yet again into the idea that there is an alterative (this infinitely collapses, but, wait, we could then extend your OP to pose that these infinite collapses is the first explanation--which I think you see where I am going with this).

Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.

I 100% agree. However, I respect your efforts to keep it comprehensible (by using terms pertaining to causation).

To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well.

I think you did a marvelous job at arguing your position! I also think that your OP has much merit!

It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!

I agree! However, (although I may be mistaken here), I am starting to think that you may be misunderstanding I position slightly (as in very slightly): if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. Therefore, I think it isn't useful to attempt to uncover some logical reasoning behind it (in terms of causal derivation) but, rather, I would argue that whatever overlying metaphysics necessitates our representations is, in part, completely unobtainable by human reason. If I could reasonably (without producing an explanatory-collapse) extend causal derivation beyond space/time, then I would, at the very least, accept it as just as valid as mathematical induction, but I don't think it is possible to do so. Hopefully that made sense.

Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!

Your responses were more than adequate! I hope I am not reiterating myself on some of my points I am making in this post, but i still think they are relevant to the discussion. You are also a fantastic philosopher!

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
First of all, I would like to thank you for such a splendid, thought-provoking conversation! Moreover, I also think that we are narrowing down to the roots of the OP.

Upon further reflection, I have realized something that I believe to be of great importance that I overlooked this whole time and, quite frankly, I think is the source of a lot of the confusion in the other responses to your OP (or at least the ones I briefly read over). You see, I’ve noticed a general pattern amongst the other responses (although I do not mean to overgeneralize their counter arguments), namely that they were all addressing the issues with the use of causality in the argument (whether that be a counter-argument directed towards causality and effect being the two sides of the same coin, quantum physics producing seemingly truly random effects, or that causality is strictly a priori). To be honest with you, I think that some of these counter-arguments were perfectly valid, yet didn’t pose any threat to the true essence of your OP. The only reason I am able to state that previous sentence without contradiction is because there is a fundamental distinction (that I overlooked this whole time) between causality and explanation. First and foremost, causality (cause and effect) are two sides of the same coin: we semantically (and intuitively) label event, A, a cause if it seemed to be in direct correlation to event, B (with chronological precedence); However, event A is actually an effect, not a true cause, that was “caused” by a previous event, C, that produced A which, in turn, produced B (both A and B are effects). You could do this infinitely. For example, after initiating a chain of dominoes (one falling by the previous domino’s fall), we intuitively consider the “cause” of any particular domino falling as the previous domino—but actually, in fact, the whole chain of dominoes are simply effects sparked by, for instance, me flicking the first domino. So in a sense, the first domino is not only the “first cause”, but actually the “only cause”: this is also wrong. As you already can probably anticipate, if I “zoom out further”, so to speak, I would realize that the first domino was an effect of me flicking it and, therefore, is not a cause either. Doing this ad infitum demonstrates that we have no examples of any actual causes: just effects which we label a “cause” within a relative scope to bring meaning to the world around us (i.e. the first domino, with the scope of dominoes, is the cause of the chain of dominoes falling, but not in an absolute sense). This directly entails that we have no experiences of any sort of true cause, which means we have no reasonable grounds to induce anything (as induction requires experiences). I think a lot of people were quarreling with you on this (although I may be mistaken) and I think that it is perfectly valid, but let me repeat: it poses no threat to the true essence of your OP. As you are already well aware, even if it is an infinite chain of effects with no causes, we are still stuck in the same dilemma that your OP addresses: the actual infinite of effects would be the self-explained “first cause”. Now here’s the issue I would like to propose to you that would resolve this conflict (even in the case of the quantum arguments): your OP is directed NOT at causation, but explanation. In other words, you can’t logically utilize causation to induce a “first cause” (because you have no experiences of a “cause”, just a chain of effects and induction requires experiences as we previously discussed—therefore your “first cause” would be the only example of a cause we would have), but you can logically (in terms of your argument) induce a “first explanation”. You see, explanations are not restricted to causation whatsoever! Sure, we can’t actually, in an absolute sense, determine that this particular domino caused all the others to fall, but we do know that each event (each effect in the continuum of effects) has a sufficient reason (yay we are back at the PSR!). That leads me to my other point: PSR doesn’t require causation nor does it directly utilize it! Rather, it uses explanations. This is why I think, and agree with you, that pointing out that particular aspects of the quantum realm have no causes doesn’t affect your OP because you aren’t arguing (I would say) for a “first cause”, you are arguing for a “first explanation”. Therefore, the “first explanation” would be those quantum aspects that have no previous causes—notice that you would no longer be claiming that those quantum aspects are a cause, but rather, an explanation that is its own explanation. In other words, I think that your reliance on causation (although useful in an everyday sense) manifests most of the counter arguments I have read and the refurbishing of “first cause” to “first explanation” would suffice in resolving this conflict.

Last thing I will state about the previous statements is that, I think that the refurbishing of your OP into an explanatory (rather than causal) argument accurately shifts (thereby strengthening) your argument into what I would consider the true essence of it: PSR, left to its own, causes absurdities which you attempt to resolve by means of claiming that somewhere along the line of explanations (not necessarily causes) there must be a “first explanation”, which is, therefore, outside of the scope, so to speak, of PSR.

Now what I have stated hitherto doesn’t address our conversation too much because I was inadvertently thinking of your argument in terms of explanation and not causation (although I just realized that I was conflating the two terms). So now I will start addressing some of your points directed towards me, but I wanted to propose that refurbishment of your OP: its obviously up to you whether you refurbish it or not (just food for thought).

To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.

That isn’t quite what I meant, although I would agree with your statement. I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. In other words, any n run through the function P(n), is a number within space/time fabric. To use causation to assert, for instance, that any given location some 5000 billion light years away is operating under the concept of causation (that we would expect causation to occur there as well) is induction extended beyond experience (which I agree with you on that), but what I was trying to say is that anticipating (via induction) causality 5000 billion light years away is analogous to mathematical induction. However, mathematical induction is dis-analogous to causation past space/time fabric: it would be, on the contrary, analogous to considering “numbers” in a P(n) function that exist sans space/time. I would consider both extensions of P(n) and causality past space/time fabric to be over-extensions of induction for the aforementioned reasons. However, with that said, I think that a “first explanation” would not be affected by my critique here because explanations (PSR) could possibly exist sans space/time (potentially).

But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration

Yes, this is my whole point! To say it is “outside of space and time” is to make a contradictio in adjectio! The question itself is flawed, because “outside” linguistically refers to a spatial framework! Same goes for asking “what came before space and time”, as “before” linguistically refers to a temporal framework! That is why I would posit a very well known refurbishment to the question: “what is sans space and time?”. Now I still have problems with it (as I don’t think one can completely linguistically detach from space and time), but the use of sans is much better!

If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time.

I am not quite following what you mean by this. The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time.

What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully.

I agree. As I previously stated above: causality is really just a bunch of effects (or randomness in terms of quantum mechanics)(and it simply doesn’t make sense sans space and time). I think you are fundamentally arguing (and correct if I am wrong) for a “first explanation” (in terms of a solution to the problem of the derivation of PSR, not necessarily causation).

The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct?

I would agree (mostly). PSR does have a glaring flaw (two actually: it’s infinite derivation makes no sense and it doesn’t require of itself a sufficient reason—it is an axiomatic metaphysical principle). I would say it can be true in a relative sense, but not true in an absolute sense (because, for me, explanations collapse when extended into an absolute sense). PSR is meaningful (and I think you would agree with me on this) in a relative sense but completely useless in an absolute sense. The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. I think it makes equally as little sense to say that PSR can be fixed, so to speak, by allowing an explanation, somewhere down the line, to explain itself (that isn’t really PSR, although you are more than in your own rights to redefine it that way if you so choose). Although, yes, your definition of PSR is correct, there is no explanatory power (and thereby no true reasons derived therefrom) by saying something explained itself.

But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.

Although I don’t entirely understand why you think there’s “nothing” between things (and I would be genuinely interested as to know why), but I do agree with you in the sense that people aren’t giving your OP enough credit: but I think that is partially (nay, primarily) due to the use of causation in your OP instead of explanation (which I think you could easily swap the terminology out and your argument—as I understood it—wouldn’t change, it would only eliminate a lot of the confusion). Anyways, I am curious as to what you think of my refurbishment proposal (hopefully I explained it adequately enough).

I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR.

To be honest with you, in hind-sight, I think that I understood it better than the rest simply because I have unintentionally thinking in terms of explanations and not distinguishing it from causation. That’s why I think your argument is much stronger in terms of explanation and not causation.


To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation (and I look forward to your response)! I think that our fundamental difference is that I consider the derivation of explanations (aka PSR) to be an explanatory-collapse regardless of which derived concept one derives it back to (but you definitely go me thinking about first explanations for sure!).
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

In short, I find it impossible to function without induction. The only thing we can do is figure out which inductions are more reasonable than others. The paper ends up declaring that. Regardless, if you do find it an unreasonable induction, I would ask a more reasonable alternative be provided. Doubt for its own sake doesn't lead anywhere.

Firstly, I would concur that it is, indeed, impractical to completely disband from induction. However, I don’t really agree with what you stated thereafter. It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. For example, if all of the options are absurd, and we hypothetically could not think of an alternative that isn’t absurd, I would not advocate to utilize the least absurd of them all (which I think ties directly to your argument being a self-proclaimed argumentum ad absurdium). On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). I do no think that someone needs to provide a reasonable alternative in order for an unreasonably derived inductive argument to be disbanded: one simply needs to prove that it is unreasonable (I would say). Now that’s not to say that one shouldn’t attempt to provide a better alternative, but picking the least unreasonable option (as opposed to simply recognizing our ignorance on the topic) isn’t something I would advocate for. Moreover, to your remark about doubt being useless without it being coupled with a better alternative, I take de omnibus dubitandum est (all things must be doubted) to heart. Although gathering reasonable alternatives to unreasonable positions is essential, the removal of unreasonable positions is vital even in the absence of an alternative option (and, I would argue, the best means of doing so it by skepticism, which, in turn, requires doubt). Now, with that being said, I understand that a posteriori knowledge is induction at work and we typically assume they are correct (in the manner you are describing—in that there isn’t a more meaningful alternative to them), but I think there is a distinction to be made from what I call immediate forms of knowledge (for all intents and purposes let’s just say it is synonymous with a posteriori) and mediate forms of knowledge (which would encompass a priori knowledge as an example thereof). To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. Anyways, I can’t expect you to know what I mean by “immediate” and “mediate” (although I would reckon you get a basic idea), it is relevant to the above quote and so, naturally, I felt obligated to at least slightly address it. If you would like to know more, feel free to ask questions about it!

Basically think proving formulas. If A is true, and B is true, C will always be true. But we will never be able to actively prove C is true by experience, because we cannot possibly test all C's in existence. C is logically necessary, but is ultimately an induction based on the idea that the truth of A and B will always hold no matter the situation.

To a certain extent, I agree with you: we do have to utilize induction to, for example, assume that the future will resemble the past. However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. This would be, I think, my biggest quarrel with such a line of thinking, one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. In fact, I would argue that causality (in terms of everything I could possibly conceive) cannot exist sans space/time fabric. The only way I can (in my own head) reconcile this with your OP is that the self-explained first cause must be space/time fabric (or potentially what caused it). But then I think we would be asserting that the PSR stops at space/time fabric: I don’t think we are warranted in saying that space/time (or potentially what caused it) is exempt from requiring a sufficient reason. And even if we were to produce an actual infinite of sufficient explanations, we would be lacking the sufficient explanation for that actual infinite (but, as we’ve previously discussed, we could arbitrarily circumvent this issue if we semantically define an actual infinite to be its own explanation—or requiring no further explanation). I think that this is exactly why I think that no matter how one derives the physical world, one is always going to be left with an absurdity (aka: explanatory-collapsibility).

If you can point out where I do, please do. I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter, and only other people can point out my blind spots.

I think that my main issue, with respect to inductive extensions, in your OP is as follows. I think that your OP is inclined to disband any notion of the use of causal induction beyond space/time fabric (due to causality having no basis sans space/time), and, therefore, you would have to establish the self-explained first cause as either space/time itself or entangled with space/time (somehow). If it is space/time, then I would ask for a sufficient reason (not cause) for why space/time came about, so to speak, as a self-explained first cause. Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! But then I would ask for a sufficient reason as to why we ought to semantically define it as so in the first place: I don’t find it evident why I should (I would argue, arbitrarily) stop issuing the principle of sufficient reason on any kind of seemingly first cause out of nothing (or self-explained in some other manner). On the other hand, if the self-explained first cause is somehow entangled with space/time fabric, then anything part of this first cause that is sans space/time would be irrelevant to your OP (because, again, I would argue that any notion of our causality sans space/time is an over-extension of induction with respect to causality), and, therefore, the only relevant parts would be that which is mixed in with space/time fabric. This would imply, to me, that any part of the first cause that is mixed in with space/time is simply just apart of space/time’s causality and, therefore, there is no actual distinction (that I can think of) between the first cause and space/time itself. In other words, I would ask you: what is the sufficient reason for space/time fabric? If any notion of causality (which only exists within a spatial and temporal framework) is utilized in the sufficient reason, then I would argue that you are over-extending induction (although I could be wrong of course!). Hopefully that made at least a bit of sense.

Is that space also filled with other smaller things?

If space was made up of smaller things, then those things would be space. Unless you are referring to something metaphysically explaining the physical space, which I don't see how we would have any pertinent knowledge on that.

I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.

I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it.

I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.

I apologize: now that I understand your argument better the idea that physical causality may be broken at the quantum level has no effect on your argument. So I would agree with you here.

Correct. Something cannot cause itself, because then we are left right back to the question, "What caused it to cause itself?" So I find ascribing self-cause results in a contradiction, so should not be used.

This is exactly what I meant by a “semantic distinction”. You seem to be defining it in a way where it, by definition, doesn’t require the PSR anymore, which I don’t think is justified.

I hope I addressed it. If not, please point it out!

You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion.

And according to the conclusion of the OP, there must be a point in which the chain of causality ends.

I would ask: does PSR not apply to that conclusion? Besides semantically defining it to not require PSR, shouldn’t we have to provide a sufficient reason for why causality has to end? And how does causality exist beyond space/time?

It would be because if an self-explained entity was divisible, the reason for its existence would be the combination of those divisible parts.

I see where you are coming from on this, but I would (in an effort to provide some exposition on my confusion) ask: what is the sufficient reason for it being indivisible? To say that a self-explained entity cannot be divisible because those smaller parts would be, logically, the self-explained entity instead, would seem to me to be simply (and solely) a semantical distinction. We could then say that this thing A is not a self-explained entity because it is made up of B and C. But B and C also aren’t self-explained because they are made up of D and E. We could do this infinitely. Then we could postulate that the very reason for why everything is seemingly infinitely not a self-explained cause must be the self-explained first cause. But then, I would say, why stop there? Why not postulate that the explanation for the actual infinite regression is actually made up of smaller explanations, and those made up of smaller, and so on ad infitum. So now we are attempting to explain an actual infinite regression that has an actual infinite regression of explanations for it. As you can probably see, we could keep elevating, so to speak, to the next necessary explanation above each infinite regression forever (and thereby never logically deriving a self-explained first cause). Now this isn’t to say that your OP isn’t true, but just that we could (theoretically) create an infinite amount of infinite explanations of infinite explanations of infinite explanations, etc. This demonstrates, to me, the absurdity of the argument (no offense meant).

Hopefully that all made sense. I think that we are more similar than I originally realized: what you would deem a self-explained first cause, I deem an explanatory-collapse. It seems as though this is your origin of things, mine fundamentally (due to the explanatory-collapsibility) cannot be derived therefrom.

As always, I hope this finds you well!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
Before I address your most recent reply, I wanted to apologize for a such a late response! With that out of the way, I will now begin my remarks.

I much appreciate the discussion Bob

I must also confess that I am very much appreciated our conversation as well! I enjoy civil philosophical dialogue, whereas I find (too often than I would hope) most people simply insulting each other (typically in more complex diction and prose) and I am not too fond of it.

I wrote another paper here which examines knowledge using basic principles. I've used that basis of knowledge for years now in my own life and philosophy, but of course you would not know that!

That sounds like a splendid read! I will definitely read them and get back to you on my thoughts (if you would like, of course). For now, I will respond in light of my ignorance on your papers (and, therefore, forgive me if my ignorance shows).

I can't seem to get anyone to have a good discussion with over it, and it bothers me that I haven't had anyone to properly discuss a theory which is a potential solution to the problem of induction.

Although, again, I haven’t read your work, if it is as you describe, then it will, indeed, be an enjoyable read (to say the least).

I am assuming a consistency in laws, and assuming things that may or may not exist. Where I think the deduction comes from is if these inductions were to be true, what would logically have to follow.

I think a proper response will require me to address this after I read your work(s), but I will still briefly address these two sentences. With respect to the first sentence, I would like to ask: what laws are you referring to? Newtonian laws? With respect to the second sentence, I now understand what you were meaning by deduction and, therefore, I was mistaken. You seem to be inducing a basic principle from which to deduce, which makes perfect sense (however I don’t quite agree with doing so, but that will have to wait until after I read your works).

There are a few theories in math that also work this way. They make claims about number patterns that in theory should be logically true, but cannot be confirmed due to the fact there are infinite numbers. I think this is a fundamental of philosophy.

I genuinely would like to know to what theories are you referring? Are you simply referring to the idea that we assume any number will “behave”, so to speak, like any other (i.e. addition will operate the same on 1 as it will with any colossal number I can think of)? Or are you referring to imaginary numbers, which are speculative? Or are you referring to a particular theory you would wish to enlighten me on? Or, and this will be my last conjecture, are you referring to infinite series summations (and such)?

They are the conclusions of what we know today. Causality exists. So causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely. Of course, maybe there's a third option we haven't thought of.

I agree: it is important to work with what we have; however, I think that, in terms of causality and its dependency on time/space fabric, there are ways in which the faculties of reason can be stretched too thin--thereby causing one to be convinced it is intuitive or logical, but in reality it is what I would call lowercase “logic” being extended to what I call uppercase “Logic”. “logic” is that which our faculties of reason utilize all the time and, in many senses, is perfectly valid and useful. However, this “logic” (I think) has its limits and I would say (briefly) that the extension of causality beyond space/time fabric is “logic” being extended to “Logic” (upper case logic). “Logic” is simply defined in terms of what it is not: “logic”; Just like how true nothingness is defined as what it is not: something. Just like how I deem it impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I would also (for the same reasons) deem it impossible to truly know “Logic”. In other words, I find causality arguments (and I am not trying to overly generalize your argument) to be an extension stretched too thin. To sum this section up, I will would say that, although you are totally right in utilizing the knowledge that we do know, I would say your statement “causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely” to be, as you admit in the following sentence, to be only a given certainty in terms of what is closest to our lives (metaphorically and literally speaking). For example, to say that something is a circle or is not a circle is typically considered a pretty exhaustive proposition (and reasonably so). And we could (and arguably would) extend this principle (that a thing is either a circle or not a circle) to all the depths of the universe (assuming we don’t find contrary evidence). However, I would say that our certainty on this principle, in this case the principle of non-contradiction, no matter how ingrained into our reasoning or closely intertwined within our lives, is inversely proportional to how far away a thing is, metaphorically as well as literally, to our lives. In all academic honesty, I am not very certain that I have any true justification for thinking that the law of non-contradiction persists in the farthest away concepts to me (such as the quantum realm, where superpositioning is technically possible). However, I would still advocate to use it (as you said) because it is the best thing that we’ve got for navigating our lives (but I would advocate its use within bounds, and that boundary is something I am still contemplating). Furthermore, and most importantly, the extension of this principle, which is already on fragile grounds when extended into the quantum realm, to that which is beyond our basic understand of all things (namely space/time fabric) greatly increases my skepticism and uncertainty on the issue at hand. So much, in fact, that I am hesitant to grant the idea that it is even useful to derive any concepts from any sort of greatly extended forms of induction (at least, ontologically speaking).

But among the two options of absurdity, we find that even an infinite regression end up having to be self-explained.

I think that I am now starting to grasp (slowly more and more) your argument: there must be an initial cause, or causes, for any given thing and that cause (or those causes) could be a combination of any type of thing that is self-explained (which, thereby, includes actual infinities). If that is the case (and, as always, correct me if I am wrong here), then I find that your argument is tailored more towards semantics: any term that is defined in a way that fundamentally has no cause is fair game. The problem I have with this (or confusion at the least) is that you seem to be advocating to the logical, via the principle of sufficient reason, derivation of causation back to a first cause (or causes) but yet then decide that it (or they—not necessarily in an agency sense of the term, but merely plurality) are outside of the scope of the principle of sufficient reason. In other words, it seems as you are using the principle of sufficient reason to derive a thing of which is excluded from that very principle. To say that it is self-explanatory, in my opinion, also, by your line of causal logic, invokes a particular infinite regression—namely that one would still be required to give a sufficient reason for why it is self-explained. This is why I think that it either becomes a semantic dead end or an infinite regression of “this is self-explained, what is the sufficient reason for its self-explanation, it is self-explained by its own self-explanation, what is the sufficient reason for that, etc”--which this leads our conversation back to your previous statement of how it boils down to indefinite or definite (which, in turn, leads us back to my previous remarks about certainty and the extension of “logic” past its limits). Now, this is exactly why I consider explanations to fundamentally collapse on themselves (which I call explanatory-collapsibility) and, therefore, I take a very different approach to epistemology (but I won’t get into that now, it will have to wait until after I read your works).

Once a self cause is existent, anything that it causes is now a secondary cause from the primary formation.

That is totally fair! However, I would then (and correct me if I am wrong) presume that you are semantically deriving this concept of a first cause—as this idea (in the above quote) is purely (I would argue) semantics (and I am not trying to undermine your position). Fundamentally, as I take it, you are defining this first cause to be, well, the first cause! Which means, as you said, that the term ‘self-cause’ doesn’t really make any sense anymore (but that’s only, I would say, if one already pre-defines it to be so!). If we weren’t to define it in a way where the term ‘self-caused first cause’, semantically speaking, is a contradictio in adjecto (i.e. a square circle), then I think we would be logically inclined, by the lines of your causal argument, to provide a sufficient justification, at the very least, for why the first cause was a first cause. In other words, why was first cause A a first cause and not the first cause B? Why were both B and A not secondary causes of first cause C? We could logically, but only in terms of semantics, conclude that B and A are not secondary causes of C because, by definition, first causes cannot be such. However, as hopefully I am demonstrating, there is still a level of explanation that I don’t think you are entirely addressing. But yet again I could just be misunderstanding you, so correct me if I am wrong!

But thinking about it, I believe first causes by their nature or the base constitute parts of existence. Complex objects are really a combination of smaller objects. A complex object cannot be self-explained, but is explained by its interaction with other objects.

I believe I am following what you are saying, but I am still a tad bit confused: if complex objects are merely constructed of smaller objects, then wouldn’t that be their explanations? Why (and how) would the interaction explain the Complex objects? My hand, mereologically speaking, does not exist, but, rather, is a construction of smaller parts: I take it that this is what you are referring to by “complex objects” (but correct me if I am wrong). The explanation of my hand is (I would say) the smaller parts. But here’s where it gets complicated (really quickly): those smaller parts are actually made of smaller ones, so, in a sense, the smaller parts of my hand are actually complex objects compared to its smaller parts (and so on and so forth!). Hence, I would argue, we end up with explanatory-collapsibility. I would say that we arbitrarily, within a relative scope, defining my hand to exist with respect to its smaller parts (objects), but I can also shift the scope to be of my cells to its smaller parts (objects) and the cells would now become the complex object. As far as I can tell, if one zooms in or out (so to speak), the explanations begin to cave in on themselves (providing little explanatory power the closer or farther away one goes). But yet within a relative scope they can be powerful explanations!

That being the case, a self-explained entity would seem to be indivisible.

Not to reiterate, but, again, what is the sufficient reason for a self-explained entity (first cause) to be indivisible (other than the fact that semantically speaking it is pre-defined as such)? Again, I may simply be misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how that doesn’t require a reason.

This is all of my thoughts for now! I really appreciate your posts and I hope that this was at least somewhat useful. I will definitely take a look at your epistemological works!
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
Thank you for your commentary and further elaborative thoughts on my response post! I really appreciate you taking your time to address my remarks one-by-one. With that being said, I would like to respond to your response and, hopefully thereby, spark further conversation.
Firstly, I would like to confess an apology: I see now that you are making an argument of abducto ad absurdum—which, in your response, you cleared that up quite nicely. Further, I am glad that we can agree about how it can be problematic to use induction as a means of proof (with respect to this discussion topic)! However, I would have a couple issues with the use of abducto ad absurdum as well (in the context of this topic). Before I continue, let me quickly quote you:

The OP is an argument of abducto ad absurdum. Meaning, I am not showing that a first cause is necessary by showing proof of a first cause, but instead showing that if we assume there is no first cause, there exists an absurdity, or contradiction. The argument shows that I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause, even when I propose an infinite regress.

Although (I would say) there is a lot to discuss in the above quote, I will start with your statement “The argument shows that I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause, even when I propose an infinite regress”. Now this may be me just being technical (and forgive me if that is the case), but your use of the term “deduce” leads me to believe that you are attempting, in your argument, to use deduction, on the contrary to induction, to derive (logically) a first cause. This may be a fundamental difference between you and I: I think deduction is actually less reliable than induction (with respect to the topic at hand) because it requires the use of a basic principle (or principles) that then can be “explored”, so to speak, to logically determine its consequences. For example, if I begin with the concept that a triangle has three sides, then I can logically deduce whether a given shape is a triangle or not (which is fine and dandy—solid proof). However, I don’t think the aforementioned example is analogous to the attempted derivation of the origin of the Universe—for what basic principle can one use in their process of deduction? In fact, I would argue, the use of deduction to derive thereof would necessarily require the use of some sort of axiom, which I think would defeat the whole purpose of the derivation in the first place. Now, again, I may be overthinking your use of “deduce”, but if I am correct thus far, then I would say it is a faulty line of logic (no offense). In other words, the derivation of the origin of the Universe is a bottom-to-top (or, more accurately, a subject-to-object) approach (induction or/and abduction) but never a top-to-bottom (object-to-subject) approach (deduction) because the overlying principle (which would have to be used in the process of deduction) would be the origin of the Universe. Anyways, on another note, I would like to push back a bit on your appeal to absurdity to prove a first cause: I do not see how a first cause, which would defy all laws and logic we have thus far (especially causality), is any less “absurd” than an actual infinite. To say something just infinitely regresses, or infinitely loops around, has just as little explanatory power (I would say) as saying it just is, or that it is its own cause in itself. Maybe we just don’t agree, but to put it another way, I think that refurbishing your statement “I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause” to “I simply cannot logically induce (or abduce) a situation that does not have a cause” would suffice in demonstrating our differences on this topic (in an overly simplified sense).

Secondly, I love your enthusiasm and curiosity about the implications of a first cause! Although I am still not convinced that it is the case, given the idea, I also would have a vast array of questions.

Is multiverse theory actually a statistical certainty, and not merely a fun theory? Is the nature of reality essentially infinite time and possibility?

I am a bit confused with respect to both of these statements. I bet you can already guess my question pertaining to your first sentence (in the quote): are you open to the idea that the multiverse, if it is true, also has a sufficient cause? That it has a “first cause”, so to speak? Now, coupled with your second sentence (in the quote), I am now questioning whether you are arguing for a first cause that all things (and “thing” defined in the most ambiguous and generic sense possible) are derived therefrom, or are you merely attempting to prove that the Universe itself had a first cause (of which its first cause would also have a first cause—i.e. the multiverse example)? If the latter is the case, then I would wonder where and why you would draw the line? When is the “first cause” of something necessarily the very first cause of all other “things”? When you say that reality may be “infinite time and possibility”, are you asking if it may be infinite chain of causation? I reckon you aren’t, but then I would be curious as to how “infinite time and possibility” would be derived anywhere but from some sort of actual infinite?
Thirdly, I would like to address your remarks pertaining to the relationship between the first cause and space/time fabric:

Prior to its [first cause’s] existence, yes. But once it exists, is it not part of space and time? ...First causes within our universe would necessarily have to be part of the space and time that results from them. That is because, as you noted, causality happens both ways. For space and time to come from a first cause, it must also be able to encounter space and time.

Before I address the above quote, I would like to, first and foremost, to agree with you that I also think that your argument (as presented hitherto) is open to the idea of multiple first causes, which leads me to believe (given that you agree with me on that) that I may have originally misunderstood your argument: you seem to be arguing for a first cause of the Universe, but not necessarily elaborating on whether those causes were caused or not (which is an entirely different discussion, but, although I won’t elaborate here, I think they are intertwined—as they both bring forth heavy implications for the other). Again, correct me if I am wrong here. Now back to the quote: I am a bit confused because you seem to be asserting that a first cause must necessarily be “part of space and time that results from them”, which seems contradictory to causation. You see, the cause cannot be the effect (nor part of the effect). That would mean that an effect, or at least a part of an effect, could possibly be its own cause—which I don’t think is consistent with humanities knowledge of causation as we currently know it. In other words, the cause of space/time fabric must reside outside of space/time—otherwise, if there is a part of the cause that resides therein, then that part logically would not be part of the cause (paradoxically): it would be part of the effect. If one were to argue that part of the cause is the effect, then one is also arguing that part of the effect caused itself (which is, at a bare minimum, a partial self-manifestation). I also, thus far, haven’t brought up the fact that quantum physics (although I am no expert by any means) reveals to us that our “traditional” intuitions of causation do not work at the quantum level (which I am still exploring the literature on that as we speak). However, I think that may be for another conversation.

For the sake of making this less wordy, I am going to start quickly addressing your comments with less structure (I fear I am not being concise enough):

You are correct however. My only minor quibble would be self-causation, but that's technical and honestly irrelevant. I agree they all fit under the "first cause" definition.

To be honest, I am not sure what the difference would be between self-causation and self-manifestation: is it that the latter may require a will of some kind? If so, then I am perfectly happy using the term self-causation instead! That would make sense to me why you would prefer not to label it that way and, quite frankly, I think it to be a very relevant critique: thank you for bringing that up!

If something creates another thing, even if it is itself, that created thing is caused by the original thing, the first cause.

This may be me being to technical again, but I think this sentence is a contradiction. On one hand, you say “something creates If something creates another thing, even if it is itself, that created thing is caused by the original thing, the first cause. thing”, but then you say “even if it is itself”: the former, I would say, is a perfect representation of causation (as the term another thing can not refer to the original thing), whereas the latter is not. I cannot think of a single example of where an effect caused itself (traditionally speaking, although I would be willing to explore the implications of quantum physics). If that were the case, namely that effects could be there own causes, then there would be no semantic difference between the term “cause” and “effect”: I would argue there would be no meaningful distinction.

If you are implying that we could argue for any type of first cause, that is a conclusion of the argument. A first cause has no explanation for why it exists, therefore it is not constrained by prior rules as to why it should exist.

I think I slightly misunderstood your argument and, therefore, I apologize. But I am still a bit confused because an actual infinite would also not be “constrained by prior rules as to why it should exist” just as much, I would argue, as saying there is a first cause that either just is or is self-caused. That is what I meant by “they would be just as out of bounds of the principle of sufficient reason as anyone could (at least) argue for any type of “first cause””: namely that defining a cause as being self-caused, for instance, breaks the chain of the principle of sufficient reason (that everything has a sufficient reason for its existence) by exhausting that principle inward on itself (i.e. what’s its cause? Oh! It is its own cause! But what’s the cause of its own cause? Oh! It is the cause of that too! Etc...)--just like, on the other hand, an actual infinite would exhaust the principle of sufficient reason outward of itself (i.e. what’s its cause? Oh! That is its cause! What’s the cause of that? Oh! That is the cause of its cause! Etc..). You see, they both break the principle of sufficient reason (and I personally think this is one out of many reasons why our logic and reason is not reliable pertaining to anything beyond space/time, or anything postulated to be the cause of space/time but yet part of it in some way). I am saying this because I was under the impression that you were arguing against the idea of an infinite regression, but I would say that an actual infinite regression is just as valid, so to speak, on contrary to a potential infinite regression, as the idea of a first cause which is self-caused.

The point of addressing actual infinities was to eliminate the only other option to the idea of finite regression. If we cannot have a situation that does not always boil down to a first cause, there must inevitably exist a first cause.

Forgive me, but I am not entirely sure (in light of what I previously stated) how you eliminated actual infinities? I thought, and correct me if I am wrong, that you were arguing that an infinite regression would logically require a reason for why it infinitely regresses: but that’s only true, definitions wise, for potential infinities. By definition, an actual infinite is, in its own definition, necessitated to be truly infinite (there is nothing outside of it), just like how, by definition, a self-caused first cause, in its own definition, necessitates that it is truly its own cause (there is nothing beyond it). I am finding it hard to see how you concluded that one is invalid while inferring the other is perfectly valid.

You are also correct. But they are the only known options we have. I cannot bring logic into that which we have no knowledge of. As such, I am left with what I do know. If there was another option that came into light in the future, then the argument would be invalid. However, within the confines of what we do know, does the argument make sense? I think I've made a decent case.

Fair enough! And you have absolute made a decent case (if not more than that)! However, I don’t think that we can say that there is definitively a first cause given how little we understand the topic: it isn’t analogous, I would argue, to the study of cells, for instance, where we have ample knowledge on the topic. Sure, we could discover something entirely new about cells that rocks our previous understand at its core, but we have plenty of positive evidence for our claims, whereas you seem to be arguing by process of elimination (abducto ad absurdum), which is purely negative evidence. I find this problematic because negative evidence only tells me logically what can’t be, but rarely ever what can be (which requires positive evidence—with the exception of statements that are truly limited in scope, like whether the cat is or is not in the kitchen).
Hopefully my responses find you well and are at least somewhat substantive.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
I really enjoyed your post (regardless of the position I would take on the issue at hand) due its thorough and substantive nature. With that being said, I do have to confess that I do not share your view as described in your initial post and, therefore, I would like to provide you with some of my thoughts pertaining to the matter at hand (which you can naturally do what you like with). Furthermore, I will try to be chronological (as best I can) with my remarks, but I apologize in advance if it seems a bit all over the place.
My first remark pertains to the very concept of “causality”, which I think can be reasonably inferred as your basis of your argument (although please correct me if I am wrong here). To be quite frank, I am very skeptical, to say the least, of any form of causation beyond physical (material) causation which, I would profess, is confined to space-time fabric. To say some effect was caused by some cause implies, I would argue, that (1) the cause came before the effect (no matter how minute or minuscule of a duration of time) and that (2) some form of matter was “converted”, so to speak, into something spatially different (whether directly perceived or abstractly inferred) than it previously was (which is then defined as the effect and investigated to determine the cause—which, in turn, is derived from the principle of sufficient reason). I would like to emphasize the implications of the two aforementioned properties of causality: without a spatial-temporal framework, causality is something that is (assuming there is a kind of causality separable from space-time) completely out of the scope of my perceptions and thoughts—thereby potentially unobtainable in my current biological state. All notions of causation, that I at least can fathom, has some sort of ties (no matter how subtle) to the two aforementioned properties (namely the spatial and temporal implications)--kind of like how I can’t actually, in a literal sense, fathom true nothingness (and I don’t mean that in a scientific sense of the term). Just like how to think of true nothingness one must necessarily tie it (no matter how subtle) to the closest imaginable absence of all things (such as empty space-time fabric), so it is with causation (I would argue). Now, before I continue, I would like to bring forth a common counter argument I hear, which I thought you may be interested to hear along with my ideas as they have been thus far portrayed: there is an argument out there (and I would confess I have found it to be relatively common of one) to consider there to be simultaneous causation—that is, the effect and the cause occur simultaneously. An example of such would be (as Immanual Kant put it) a ball sitting on a cushion: the cause simultaneously, in its very act, conceives the depression in the cushion. Another example is the act of sitting down simultaneously creates a lap. Now, I do have to say that I do not consider any of these to be actually simultaneous, but for the sake of providing counter examples (as the best I can), I ought to include them. Just to very briefly discuss why I don’t consider them simultaneous, I think that the reason causation can be, at times, perceived as simultaneous is simply because without measuring tools that have incredible amounts of precision (unlike our immediate senses) it seems as though the ball simultaneously caused the depression in the cushion; however, no matter how convincing it may seem to the naked eye, I would argue that more precise measuring tools enable us to conclude that the ball, no matter how incredibly quickly applied, requires a certain amount of time to effect the cushion and, thereby, create the depression. In terms of the lap example, I would argue that sitting down and “creating a lap” are two defined concepts that represent the same physical thing and, therefore, do not represent two different effects (in other words, saying “the process of sitting created a lap” is synonymous with saying “the process of sitting caused you to sit in a particular style we call a ‘lap’ in our language”--there is still one physical cause causing one physical effect). Now the reason I bring up all this skepticism pertaining to causation is that I view causal arguments for a first cause to be, simply put (and I am not trying to undermine your argument), the process of induction being utilized to infer something that is well beyond that which any given experience could reasonably supply to induction itself. In other words: to infer a first cause one must utilize induction, induction is an inference (and, thereby, reasoning) derived from experiences, any given experience is necessitated from a spatial-temporal framework, but yet the conclusion pertains to something beyond a spatial-temporal framework. I would say that this kind of logic is exactly how your #1 premise is derived and, quite frankly, I would argue this is the logical basis of your whole argument (as I would say it is an argument of causality).
My second remark pertains to your a-c options (or possible explanations) pertaining to the derivation of our world. You see, I am also not entirely convinced that those are the only three options. I would say there are five (if one is going to use logic and its metalogical principles, which I won’t elaborate here, but I would be skeptical of this too): eternal existence, self-manifestation (causa sui), infinite regression, infinite loop, and arbitrary stopping point. Firstly, I think you may have too hastily lumped all causes that are defined as “not having a prior cause” into your “first cause” (c), when, in fact, I think there are at least (at a minimum) two distinct sectors: eternal existence and self-manifestation (causa sui); I would be personally unwilling to say that these two concepts are synonymous or analogous to one another—although I would concede that they both fit under your “first cause” (c) definition. Without going to deep into it, I would just like to briefly highlight the major difference between the two: one simply is while the other caused itself. To elaborate a bit further, I shall quote you:

If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself.

. In light of the two aforementioned concepts (eternal existence and self-manifestation), I am not entirely certain as to if you are arguing for a “first cause” that created itself (which would constitute it being its own justification) or if it just is (which, I would argue, isn’t its own justification: it has no justification because, one method of argument would be that, it isn’t within the scope of the principle of sufficient reason). Secondly, I would like to point out that both forms of indefiniteness, as far as I could tell, in your 3 options (namely a and b) were references to actual infinities—contrary to potential infinities. A potential infinite is that which is infinite constrained within the boundaries of a finite (think of theoretically continually walking halfway towards a door, or getting smaller and smaller measurements within one meter on a ruler), which have been both mathematically and in practicality proven to be not only possible but true (as far as my knowledge goes). On the contrary, an actual infinite is that which is infinite and is not constrained within a finite, which (as far as I know) has not been proven to exist. The reason I am bringing this up is because of what you said here:

Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality.”

Although I would concede that actual infinities have not been proven to exist, if they do exist, then they would not be subject to your criticism here: they would be just as out of bounds of the principle of sufficient reason as anyone could (at least) argue for any type of “first cause”. Furthermore, I would argue that your critique actually pertains to potential infinities: that a infinite within a finite must have, well, a finite cause—which makes sense. Again, I merely trying to point out that there may be a completely different “infinite” of which I don’t think you addressed (at least, at a minimum, adequately) in your initial post.
I apologize for how long my reply is, but I have an inkling that you would rather have a too long response than one that is way too short. My final remark I will make pertains to your conclusion:

Because there are no other plausibilties to how causality functions, the only only conclusion is that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause.

I honestly don’t see how this follows. At best, I would say that your argument (as portrayed thus far) gets you to disproving a and b, but that doesn’t logically mean that c is automatically true. Now, I have heard counter arguments that it isn’t an appeal to ignorance fallacy if one has definitively proven that the options at hand are the only ones and, thereby, proving that process of elimination is a perfectly valid argument; however, with the consideration of what I have said henceforth, I do not see how one could possibly prove that a-c (or even if you were to accept my previously mentioned five possibilities) are literally the only options: I don’t think this situation is analogous to stating “the cat is either in the kitchen or it isn’t” which upon disproving one or the other would necessarily prove the contrary. Moreover, I think that scenarios like the previous cat statement are the only true scenarios where I would agree with proving one thing by disproving another. Another way I think about it is, to state that all options are truly exhaustive, one must necessarily know all the possibilites about the given subject: I certainly don’t think I could possibly ever reasonably determine that I know all the actual possibilities of how this world, as I know it, came about (in terms of derivation, however I could say it came about in terms of the big bang or evolution, but those aren’t absolute stopping points like a first cause).
Anyhow, in conclusion, I hope that this post found you well and hopefully I brought up some remarks that, although you may not agree with, sparks some sort of intellectual contemplation. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me.
Bob

@Edy
First and foremost, I really enjoyed your analogy Edy. However, I must say that I do not agree with it (on multiple different levels). Don't get me wrong, I found your analogy quite thought provoking, but I would like to elaborate on some of the areas I don't find very convincing. Firstly, I don't think the analogy (on the surface) truly holds because any video game you can reference does not involve some of the vital aspects of why we would consider your examples (such as murder, burning people alive, etc) immoral--such as life, consciousness, the ability to feel pain, etc. When the programmers test their program (by shooting a person in it, for example), they are not shooting a being that is conscious of the fact that they are shot nor can they feel the excruciating pain of the bullet as it rips through their body. I would reckon that if the aforementioned was actually the case, that they could feel the pain, then we would have laws attempting to prevent people from abusing virtual characters within video games. What I am trying to say is that your analogy only holds if shooting a person in a video is exactly analogous to shooting someone in real life--and I think there is a clear difference.


Secondly, I think your concept of morality (as best as I could infer) is that of a cognitivist--that is, it seems to me that you are attributing moral actions as truth claims that are seemingly discoverable in an absolute sense. For example, it seems as though you are implying that God he "coded in", so to speak, our absolute moral standards, but he is amoral in the sense that he doesn't need to abide by his created moral standards for us. As you may be already anticipating: I abide more towards non-cognitivism (in a general sense)--that is, I do not think there are moral truths (in an absolute sense). Morality is not based off of some baseline (some absolute) but, rather, it is relative to sentient beings. Therefore, I would conclude that whether God's actions (assuming he exists) are immoral or moral is utterly up to the sentient being's discretion. I for one, assuming we are discussing the abrahamic God, would consider His actions in the Old Testament immoral (but, more importantly, not in an absolute sense). I would appeal to perceived objective facts that I have obtained throughout my life to make a compelling argument (or at least I would consider it so) that mass genocide (regardless of whomever commits it) is immoral (if the term "immoral" is going to mean anything at all).

Thirdly, I would like to point out that amorality is (I would say) a non-cognitivist position because it is only possible to claim something is amoral if that thing resides in an "environment" that has no moral truths and, subsequently, no moral judgements. I would also like to point out that amorality is not the idea (as I best understand it) that something is out of bounds of morality (which I think this is what your analogy is aimed at, although I could be mistaken), but, rather, it is that there are no moral truths or judgements.

Hopefully this finds you well,
Bob Ross