Hello Corvus,

Can you trust all your empirical perception and observation? Are the data you gathered via your senses 100% error free?

No I cannot. The model which I have of experience is that I represent the world, and those representations are imperfect.

I doubt so called valid scientific knowledge in that nature would be much use.

I think all scientific knowledge, absent metaphysical claims, are perfectly compatible with my view. For example, I should expect that my body is made of cells (as this has been empirically verified plenty enough), but takeaway my possible forms of experience, and the possible forms of other people’s experience (which is similar to my own), and it is not clear at all that we have any reason to believe there are cells at all, let alone bodies, let alone space and time, etc.

The knowledge derived from the visual experience via telescope from millions of miles away from the astral objects without any kind of direct contact is nothing more than imaginary conjectures and inferences

I don’t think they just use pure imagination to determine stars, they use empirical evidence and hypothesized predictions.

Metaphysics can deal with any objects and methodology if they are related to their topics, and also as part of their investigations.

Could you please define what you mean by “metaphysics”?

The whole Marxist movement and running of the countries has been based on the Dialectic Logic. And All those logic listed above are used in many different sciences and technologies for applications to real life situations and device designs.

I didn’t follow the relevance of this part: could you please elaborate? My point was that logic pertains to the form of an argument (of reasoning): not the content. There is no such thing as a valid theory of logic that provides its own content as well as the form of that content.

Many of the concepts such as Time, Space, Substance are also studied by Physics, Chemistry and QM too. You are not just discarding metaphysics, but totally discarding also the general Science as well.

Scientifically studying time and space (and what not) is fine: but it is only valid for possible experience. Without that possible experience, we are over-extending the bounds of the empirical evidence we used to justify our belief in it in the first place.

How do you know something is beyond possibility of experience, if you had not experienced it at all?

Just because I have not experienced it it does not follow that it is beyond the possibility of all experience (for the most part). However, if it is a claim which transcends my forms of experience then I know for sure that it is beyond the possibility of any being which has the same forms of experience as me, and if a being doesn’t have those forms, well...I can’t comprehend their existence anyways.

If something is truly beyond possibility of experience, then you wouldn't even be able to mention it, because you have never experienced it, and your stance is that whatever beyond possibility of your experience is unknowable?

Correct. Whatever exists beyond the possibility of experience is a giant question mark, with no possibility of knowing it ever.

Therefore it couldn't possibly be your criteria for declaring it is metaphysics

Well, so we can imagine things which have never been experienced and never will be experienced. I can use my faculty of reason, for example, to totally make up conceptions of things; such as, for example, the existence of a square circle in the world in-itself; or a aspatiotemporal being beyond the possibility of experience. I can certainly say it, but that doesn’t mean that I’ve ever experienced it nor that anyone ever will. Reason and our imagination can overstep the bounds of empirical reality.

So metaphysics is the long history of people thinking about such things which go beyond empirical reality; and so I can easily define it that way without knowing anything (in truth) about that which is beyond experience.

I am not sure what you mean by experience too.  Does it mean visible and audible and touchable objects only?  Things that we talk about, fantasize, and even imagine, should they not also be mental experience in nature?

I would say ‘experience’ is that first-person immediate knowledge that one has, which includes their mental life, such as things which only are immediately apprehended in time (as opposed to space).

From the perspective of moral realism, the very discussion of morality (and philosophy in its entirety) is useless. By its nature, moral realism is opposed to a reflexive, meta-view of morality.

I didn't follow why this would be true: can you please elaborate?

Hello Manuel,

Yes, models of reality - not models of models

I would say it is a model of experience--not necessarily reality. It is empirically ungrounded, I would say, to claim that our experience gives us any sort of accuracy into reality (unless by ‘reality’ you just mean the human conception of it).

if on the right track, tell us something about the way the world works absent us. Yes, experience tells us this, yes models are not reality, but they refer to it, not to a model.

On what grounds can your models of reality (or, more accurately, of experience) be said to tell us about something beyond that experience (i.e., ‘absent of you’)? I cannot know that the world has the chair of which I am sitting on right now nor that it persists in that world when no one is experiencing it—but I can say that one should expect, all else being equal, to experience it in the same manner next time.

Correct. But I ask you, is there any other way to get any knowledge at all about anything, that's not through a particular experience, related to the relevant creature? Knowledge is relational.

I would say that our knowledge is ‘relational’ (in the sense you described), but I have no clue what kind of creatures may exists in the world in-itself, nor all the actually possible ways by which knowledge can be acquired. I agree that, from our human perspective, it is hard to imagine that any creature would ever not be stuck in the paradigm I have provided—but that is no justification to say that is true of the world in-itself, as neither of us know if the world in-itself has to abide by what we find conceivable.

But you are limiting the historical scope of metaphysics only to things-in-themselves, not even Kant did this. He spoke about morals and religion as aspects of metaphysics.

I mean that’s pretty fair. I would say that morals and religion are also conditioned by our forms of experience and thusly say nothing of the world as it is in-itself.

And even Kant had things to say about things-in-themselves, that they are non-relational, and that they ground the objects of experience.

That is (sort of) true, and I have a hard time semantically distinguishing the subtle differences in my views vs. his. I would say that the ‘world in-itself’ as whatever is strictly beyond our experience is the ‘absolute’ and the ‘world in-itself’ within the model that we represent the world is one which would have to have certain properties (presupposed by the model itself)(such as causality, they “impact” us in some way, etc.).

But remove the forms of one’s experience, and it isn’t even clear that one is representing anything.

Finally, we should recognize, that appearances are part of empirical reality.

True; and, I would say, it is all we have access to in terms of empirical reality.

I do not know why you insist on using this as the benchmark for metaphysics.

I am not intending to say that metaphysics is solely the study of things-in-themselves: I am merely noting that it is impossible to know them (other than what is presupposed by the model that we represent them) and that we know nothing of the absolute.

The way you are defining external world precludes evidence which shows that there are things absent us. Like planets or the stars...Unless you say that because all we have is a model, this model doesn't get to things in themselves, ergo planets and stars are not external to us.

I would say that we can say there are stars and planets sans us as a valid statement for the possibility of experience: that is, we should treat them like they exist independently of us, because every time we experience them they behave as such. However, we have no clue if there are stars and planets, let alone our own bodies, let alone space and time, beyond what is conditioned by our experience. You know what I mean?

I agree we possibly can't have knowledge of things in themselves, but I don't restrict metaphysics or reality to these terms - I don't see a good reason for doing so.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like modeling our experience is a part of metaphysics for you; which just means we are semantically disagreeing (which is fine).

I mean, are we going to ask a model for it to predict something which is beyond all possible experience? That's incoherent.

Exactly. So why think that when it does predict something within experience that it would ever verify something that is beyond it? Which I think you anticipated my response here with:

But then, why is there any reason to believe that a more predictive model will tell us about things beyond all possible experience? We are still stuck in the same cage you set up.

With all due respect, I am not going to come up with a definition for you. Either you have one or you don't: it should not be that hard to explicate if you do...

For example, I define it as "the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience".

Hello Corvus,

In those cases, science uses hypotheses which are imagination in nature.

I have no problem with the imagination being used to try to sort of something empirical—it is when we going beyond the empirical that gets sketchy to me.

If you are only relying on the observable and verifiable objects only, you would have very little to work with.

Every valid aspect of science is a prediction about something which could be possibly experienced. Metaphysics is about that which, in principle, can never be.

For instance most of the astronomical objects are unreachable from earth. They are only viewable by telescope from a far distance.

Viewing it from a telescope is a form of experiencing it. How do you ‘view’ whether the world is actually made of a physical or mental substance? Or that there actually are Universals, or just particulars?

In this case, their studies and investigations are metaphysical rather than scientific

Positing hypotheses to try to predict objects within possible experience is not metaphysics.

Where empirically verified content is devoid, Logic uses inference for coming to their conclusions which is one of the main empirical scientific methods.

Logic is the form of an argument (i.e., the form of reasoning), and does not pertain to the content of arguments. As I read your other post (to another person), I feel I need to clarify this as well (just to anticipate your response):

Could you please clarify which logic you mean here? There are vast many different types of Logic.

Deductive Logic
Inductive Logic
Predicate Logic
Philosophical Logic
Modal Logic
Non-Classical Logic
Dialectic Logic

All of these (except maybe ‘dialectic logic’, depending on what you mean there) share that pertain to the form of argumentation and not the content.

Of course, it attempts to answer questions we humans want to answer, but there is a reason we can’t legitimately: there is no way to ground it in reality, since all we have of reality is our experience of it and the questions metaphysics tries to answer (as a matter of ontology) is beyond that experience. — Bob Ross

I don't understand this point here. Could you please elaborate in detail with some examples please? Thanks.

Of course! Metaphysics, in the sense that I defined it in the OP, is about ontological things; that is, about that which is beyond the possibility of experience (e.g., Universals vs. particulars, nature of time, nature of space, substances, etc.). Now, all we can ever know empirically is from our experience, so the best we can ever do in terms of explaining the ‘nature’ of things is what is conditioned, right off the bat, by our possible forms of experience (and, not to mention, our means of cognizing the world) (namely space and time) and thusly are only valid constrained to them. Take away your forms of experience, and everyone else’s, and what is intelligible left (with any metaphysical claim you can think of)? Absolutely nothing.

None of your links are of you giving a definition.

But the point is that it doesn't tell the whole story. Rather, it raises a whole host of questions about the relationships between "properties" and events, and why some configurations are "preferred" by the universe versus others

Nothing we empirically study is nature herself, it is our model of nature derived from experience. Nature does not have to be anything remotely like what we experience, nor that we could comprehend.

Science is one colour on the palette. Metaphysics is about the palette, and the picture, and the painter, and the model.

I like this analogy, but, for me, the pallette, picture, and painter become the model of our experience, and science is the relationships of the colors, shapes, etc. on the painting.

Awe! I see now that we are in complete agreement! I think you are the first, and perhaps the only one who will, agree with me (:

Hello Pantagruel,

If you start trying to wrap your head around the emergence of physical properties as the manifestation of pointer states in the process of the decoherence of quantum superposition from the web of entanglement it is hard not to think that you're thinking in metaphysical terms.

For me, it is really easy to see how it wouldn’t be: I would just say quantum physics is a model that we use to navigate reality; and is not legitimate beyond the possibility of experience.

Hello Corvus,

I am not sure if the OP's definition on Metaphysics is formally accepted by the public and academics. Metaphysics doesn't use imagination and conjectures all the time as its investigative methods.

My definition of metaphysics is that is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience, and not that it is a process of using the imagination. For most metaphysicians, they use principles like parsimony, explanatory power, internal/external coherence, (logical) consistency, intuitions, etc. to determine metaphysical theories.

For instance, Kant's Metaphysics arrives at its conclusions via rigorous logical arguments.

Logic devoid of empirically verified content is indistinguishable from the imagination. I can make a logically consistent argument for the world being comprised of one giant cookie monster.

and it asks and investigates the topics these subjects cannot deal with or ask, such as the "why" questions.

Of course, it attempts to answer questions we humans want to answer, but there is a reason we can’t legitimately: there is no way to ground it in reality, since all we have of reality is our experience of it and the questions metaphysics tries to answer (as a matter of ontology) is beyond that experience.

Hello T Clark,

He says similar things about time. Is it your position that space and time are illegitimate concepts?

Kant, as can be seen in your quote of CPR, was making most of his arguments from the model that we represent the world; which, from that perspective, I find his arguments convincing.

However, my argument is more fundamental than that: it doesn’t grant, initially, that we are representing anything. Instead, it just notes that we ‘experience’ with two possible forms: space and time. Whether, in our model of reality, we attribute those forms to our representative faculties is irrelevant. Just by determining our forms of experience we thereby determine the ultimate limitations of our knowledge.

But, to answer your question, if I were to engage in metaphysics, in the sense of trying to get at ontology as opposed to mere modelling [of reality], then I would go for a more Kantian view that space and time do not pertain to the world as it is in-itself: there’s no noumenal space and time. Although, I should note that Kant didn’t quite go that far, he only wanted to prove that the space and time we directly apprehend is not something in the world in-itself, which is fine.

Hello 180 Proof,

Inferences with "beyond" premises (e.g. magic, myths, ideals), whether or not they are valid, cannot be sound. Metaphysics is rational, at best, and itself is never theoretical (i.e. explanatory of nature)

Can you please define what you mean by ‘metaphysics’? Because, to me, metaphysics is ‘“beyond” premises’.

In the sense of Aristotle’s original definition, saying it is the study of what ‘comes after’ the physics is really, to me, the same thing as saying ‘to study that which we cannot possibly experience, but would like to explain’.

Hello Manuel,

Astronomical and physics based evidence suggests otherwise, if you take these sciences seriously, you have to seriously consider that the external world exists.

I never said the external world doesn’t exist; and astronomy and physics produce models of reality based off of predicting our experience (i.e., empirical evidence) and thusly are only valid insofar as they reference experience, which is conditioned by our forms thereof.

Not to mention archeological evidence

All of archeological discoveries are conditioned, epistemically, by our possible forms of knowledge (namely space and time): if not, then please provide me with any empirical evidence you have of any archeology whatsoever which is not derived nor contingent at all on human (or animal) experience.

Yes, all these sciences are constrained by our modes of cognition, but when our cognition coincides with aspects of the external world, we get a science.

I disagree. When our cognition can be predicted, we have science. Whether or not one wants to imagine that that predictability suggests a correspondence to reality (beyond our cognition) is another matter.

If that's not enough, or if you think this is not firm enough foundation, then, the only sense which I think cannot be "thought away", is solidity or impenetrability. Everything else is could be modified.

Solidity and impenetrability are grounded, like all other qualities, in our experience. Try to think of anything solid which has empirical evidence for its existence that is sans our experience. This is why, for example, idealists can come up with perfectly coherent metaphysical theories that posit tangibility as a synthetic a priori property (of human cognition).

So either we assert, full stop, that we cannot know anything about the external world, or we say that some aspects we can tease out, most of them we cannot.

In the sense of the external world that transcends us, I would say we can’t know full stop.

But we have to be somewhat realistic, we cannot attain the kind of certainty you are looking for, that is, one that defeats skepticism about these topics.

I am not a hard skeptic. My proposal to you is simple (I think at least). To distinguish something from [human] imagination, it must have empirical content (i.e., empirical evidence for it). Our forms of experience are just that: ours and not the external world’s itself (irregardless of whether one wants to posit another noumenal space and time). All of our knowledge which has any empirical content is derived from experience, and thusly are conditioned by our forms of experience. Any claim about that which lies beyond our experience cannot be grounded in anything empirically accessible to us, since we can only know things from our experience, and thusly it is indistinguishable from the imagination because it has no empirical content [for us]. If you think I am wrong, then I would challenge you to either (1) provide a means of providing empirical evidence for a claim which pertains to that which is beyond our experience or (2) provide justification for how we can know that our experience is accurate to the external world (of which is not appealing to models of reality which are determined by predicting our experience: which, naturally, are conditioned by our experience).

I have no problem with gaining knowledge that is useful for experience from experience, even if it doesn’t provide absolute certainty. For predicting what one could experience is very useful and is an empirically verified way of gaining more knowledge about the world that we experience; but not the world as it is.

But then by definition, we cannot say what metaphysics is, because it is beyond all possible experience.

We can say what it is, but not engage it as a practice. There is nothing stopping me from defining it, for example, as I can know that it is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience without trying to derive anything true of that which is <…>.

My point was simple, we have a model, which we use to navigate the world as is given to us. If there was no world, we wouldn't need a model.

But a model doesn’t really make claims about things beyond possible experience: it just says, hey, look, we can predict stuff in experience if we treat stuff like they are this, so, until we come up with a more predictive model, let’s use that to navigate experience. It doesn’t say: this is actually how the world in-itself is.

I'm not a Kant scholar, but I've read "Critique of Pure Reason." I don't remember it saying anything like "metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imagination." I doubt that it did and I doubt that Kant thought it. I can't speak to Leibnitz, but I would be surprised if he felt that way.

You are confusing my definition with what I claimed about the practice itself: I never said that 'metaphysics' is defined as "the study of that which is indistinguishable from human imagination". I said it is "the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience". In terms of Kant, this can be found in his work (as a presupposition) and explicitly (as well). For example:

First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already lies in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principlesb of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositionsc or basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology

– (Prolegomena, p. 60, Section 1).

Hello Philosophim,

I've noted before I generally do not use philosophical terms such as 'metaphysics' in discussions, because as you can see from the many replies, no one can agree what they actually mean.

Apparently so! I didn’t expect the semantics behind ‘metaphysics’ to be such a pinnacle aspect of the conversation.

I mainly agree with your response, but let me highlight some of the subtle disagreements:

We can only know of the world in-itself through logical limitations and consequences. Namely, some "thing" must be there

This is my fault, as I have been using the “world in-itself” terminology to refer to whatever exists beyond one’s experience, but I actually distinguish the “world in-itself” from “the absolute”: the former is actually a product of the model wherein organisms are thought to represent the world, and the latter is whatever exists completely sans anything we gain from our experience. The subtle difference, and contention I would have with your above quote, is that we cannot know, independently of evidence gathered from our experience (which is constrained by our possible forms of experience), that we represent objects in a space and time that transcends us: takeaway the forms of our experience (namely space and time that doesn’t transcend us) and it equally unintelligible that there is some “thing” out there. In other words, some “thing” being out there is a part of a model itself as well.

If you recall the idea of "discrete experience", we part and parcel reality as we wish within our own minds. I can view a field of grass, a blade of grass, or a piece of grass. I do not even need to call it "grass". It is the applications of these identities in practice which determine their usefulness in representing how a thing in-itself impacts the world in a way that is not-contradicted by its existence.

To build off of this, I would say that our “discrete experience” of the objects, such as blades of grass, says nothing about what may exist in the world which transcends our possible forms: not even that there is a blade of grass—irregardless of what we label it.

Just wanted to chime in at how I thought this was a really great post!

As always, I appreciate your responses!

Hello T Clark,

For me, metaphysics it's the most important part of philosophy. My objection to your OP is that you attempt to discredit metaphysics using a definition that I, and most philosophers, don't believe is correct.

If you have a different definition, then let’s hear it: I am more than happy to entertain other definitions. On my end, I am using the definition used in the Kantian tradition, as well as Leibniz and many before him.

Hello Corvus,

I have nothing to define, but would you not agree that the OP's claim sounds like Metaphysical itself?

I don’t agree, because I am not making claims about that which is beyond the possibility of experience. However, since the term is somewhat muddied these days, I will grant that many people consider the negation of metaphysics to be metaphysics, which doesn’t make sense to me. For example:

"X is unknowable." is also a Metaphysical comment.

The claim of agnosticism about that which is beyond the possibility of experience is not itself a claim about that which is beyond the possibility of experience, just as the claim of agnosticism about God’s existence is not the denial of God’s existence.

Because if it were Science, they will make up some hypothesis on the object they want to find out.

I wouldn’t say that something is either scientific or metaphysical: I think that’s a false dilemma.

Hello Manuel,

Constrained in relation to what?

Constrained by our possible forms of experience: space and time. Just because I experience the outer world in space and time, it does not follow that they exist in the outer world itself; nor that anything I derive from my experience, which is conditioned by them, pertains to anything beyond it. Instead, it only holds valid insofar as it references a possible experience from a being which has a similar ‘type’ of experience as myself.

Also, experience of what?

The world in the sense of whatever transcends experience, if anything, of which I call ‘the absolute’. It is the ‘whole’, the totality of existence, etc.

Absolutely sense-data or sensations or however you want to call it, is fundamental to any metaphysics.

That you sense, is something one empirically discovers; which is thusly conditioned by the forms of space and time of which one (or another person that one trusts) used to experience that empirical evidence.

In other words, I only know I have sensations which get interpreted into perception, according to the standard model of human biology, by collective empirical studies of organisms; all of which are conditioned by the possible forms of human experience. Take away those forms, and there is nothing intelligible left to speak of.

I think the minimum requirement of agreement should be, that metaphysics is about the world.

I agree, if by ‘about the world’ you take it to mean that one is deriving what the world fundamentally is in-itself: knowledge of the absolute, the whole, the totality of existence, that which transcends you, ontology, etc.

Someone who calls themselves a materialist or an idealist use evidence all the time, they'll say that, for example, the collapse of wave function counts as evidence for idealism, or they'll say that the progress of neuroscientific evidence proves materialism is correct.

That is fair, and I agree that they do try to ground their metaphysical commitments in empirical data; however, upon closer inspection, are they successful? No: these empirical claims are still conditioned by our pure forms of experience (namely space and time): without them, the claim becomes unintelligible. Thusly, the claim that “idealism/physicalism is true” is not universally valid, if granted as true on the empirical grounds, but rather constrained to the possibility of experience. So, in other words, the ontological claims get stripped out, and what is left is the claim that we have reasons to consider the world that we experience as idealistic or physicalist (or what not) and not that the world in-itself actually is any of those.

So, you'd have to specify a bit, what you mean by not having an ounce of empirical data. As I see it, experience must count as empirical content, otherwise we are using the word "empirical" to mean, "publicly observable", these are not the same thing.

Hopefully my above comments help clarify a bit. If not, then please let me know. Likewise, I agree that experience is empirical content.

Sounds as if some kind of model-centric version would count as part of metaphysics for you. Because saying "model of possible experience" without specifying what this relates to, doesn't amount to much, so far as I can see.

I guess I am not entirely following: the model relates to possible experience. Metaphysics, as the study of what which is beyond the possibility of experience, is ontological in nature. For me, a model is not an ontology: the former is a map for navigation, which may or may not be accurate to the territory, and the latter is a theory of what the territory is.

Hello 180 Proof,

No, definitely not. By analogy, for instance, the rules – generalizations abstracted from design (logical) space – for valid moves in chess (e.g. metaphysics) are not "over-arching means of determining" winning strategies for playing chess (e.g. physical theories).

Would you say, then, that metaphysics is informed by physics, and never vice-versa?

Irregardless, if metaphysics is the “abstracted design” of experience, then it should never make any ontological claims but, rather, merely provide models of that experience; for how could an abstraction from experience necessarily pertain to that which is beyond it?

Hello simplyG,

Another question one could ask is whether metaphysics is necessary at all and if so why ? I would answer in the positive for the reasons that it’s the father of the scientific method not only in its rationality and application of reason to the real world but hypothetical scenarios which if it’s able to contemplate with rigour, robustness and clarity than it’s results could not be wrong from a hypothetical standpoint. The upshot of this is just like math can correspond to reality so can metaphysics without having to invoke experience.

I agree with most of this, if I were to not be specifically meaning ‘the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience’. I have no problem with creating theories and models ‘of reality’ in the sense of what to expect within the possibility of experience.

The only thing I didn’t agree with was the last sentence: math does not a priori necessarily pertain to the things-in-themselves, our representations of them, nor the absolute. Math, as a practice of predicting relations within experience is absolutely empirically grounded.

If the results of experience or observation match the results of metaphysical speculation can we not say that metaphysics has succeeded in this regard?

In this case, it has succeeded in predicting objects within experience; but take away the possible forms of your experience, and what is left of that observation that matches your metaphysical speculation? Absolutely nothing.

In modern science especially quantum physics the lines between metaphysics and physics have become blurrier and blurrier so it’s fair to ask who will get us out of this muddle, physics proper with its application of empiricism which finds it is limited when explaining physical phenomena at the quantum level or metaphysics? Or perhaps a combination of both?

I am perfectly fine with retaining most of metaphysics as not metaphysics; that is, as the pragmatic study of models for that which is within the possibility of experience—but to extend the claim beyond that is unwarranted to me (which is traditional metaphysics in a nutshell).

Hello Corvus,

Isn't this a metaphysical question? The Metaphysicians have been asking and investigating on the nature of Metaphysics and its legitimacy of the claims. One of the point of CPR by Kant was to find out, "How Metaphysics is possible as a Science."

Depending on how you define it, yes. In the sense I defined it in the OP, no.

Hello Wayfarer,

This sounds very Kantian.

It is very motivated by Kant.

Over all, I agree with your depiction of the origins of ‘metaphysics’.

'Philosophy', Etienne Gilson remarked 'generally buries its undertakers'. Also applies to metaphysics.

I don’t quite agree: I think we can refurbish our philosophical talk into pragmatic modellings of experience, and not actual claims about what may exists beyond that. I don’t see the self-undermining aspect of this argument (like in the case of arguing that philosophy is illegitimate).

I am negating the idea of actually thinking anyone is getting at anything justifiably true with:

In it the nature of 'the knowledge of what is' that is the major subject. The nature of what truly is, which is not subject to change and decay, the imperishable.

This is impossible to obtain.

Hello elephant,

There is no other task that makes us think in a way that does not involve memorization of equation, procedure, or statistics than metaphysics. Philosophical discussions is natural to humans.

I am not saying that philosophy is an illegitimate practice.

Hello Manuel,

Either we hold onto some kind of metaphysics or we do not. If we deny that metaphysics is legitimate, then we are left with the view that all there is, is sense data, for us.

Not at all: it just means all of our knowledge is contrained by the possible forms of experience. Saying we have sense-data is a part of the contemporary model that is useful for navigating experience.

All the traditional topics of metaphysics, materialism, the self, dualism, free will, things-in-themselves, the nature of objects and so on, would be impossible to formulate absent imagination.

Science is also impossible without the imagination, and I was not intending to argue that it is illegitimate for that. Instead, I am arguing it is illegitimate because it is purely imaginative: there is not an ounce of empirical content tied to it.

We shouldn't have a metaphysics that says modern physics is wrong

I wouldn’t say that modern physics is wrong, I would say that the metaphysical claims, which is separate but usually conjoined with the science, should be interpreted as models for the possibility of experience and not actual claims about the world in-itself.

Hello T Clark,

I'll just provide a conventional definition:
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental nature of reality. This includes the first principles of: being or existence, identity, change, space and time, cause and effect, necessity, actuality, and possibility. — Wikipedia - Metphysics

That is not at all the same as:
metaphysics is, in fact, indistinguishable from human imagination

True, but this is not a conventional definition in philosophy: it is an adequate colloquial rundown. That is why, if you re-read it, they are more examples as opposed to an actual definition. Again, I am working with the Kantian (and previous to him) philosophers usages of the term. Either way, I grant you it is different than the basic definitions from a google search.

Hello LuckyR,

I completely agree with you.

:up:

Hello Mww,

If the watershed for the traditional sense of metaphysics is Kant and Enlightenment philosophy in general, and metaphysics in such traditional sense has only to do with conceptions, it follows that to combine metaphysics with, juxtaposition it to, or ground it in, imagination, is very far from the traditional sense.

Kant claims metaphysics is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of experience; but I am not claiming he thought it was a product of the imagination. I think, for him, pure reason is quite different from imagination. For me, not so much.

See:

First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already lies in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principlesb of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositionsc or basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology

– (Prolegomena, p. 60, Section 1).

Hello Joshs,

We wouldn’t be able to distinguish truth from error in the first place if we didn’t have a pre-existing system of criteria ( theory) on the basis of which to make such determinations. Theory is a manifestation of a metaphysical viewpoint

I think we are just using the term ‘metaphysics’ differently: I have no problem with coming up with models (i.e., theories), such as theories of truth, to help us determine other theories (such as scientific ones).

By ‘metaphysics’, I am targeting actual ontologies of the world in-itself. E.g., physicalism, idealism, substance dualism, etc.--basically anything that claims knowledge of the absolute: the world in-itself beyond the possibility of all experience.

The profoundly creative work of science consists not in exposing errors in reasoning but in changing the subject, turning the frame on its head, redefining the criteria of truth and error, not just checking our answers to old questions but asking different questions

Science isn’t metaphysics (in any sense of the term): it doesn’t determine what truth is. Theories of truth are philosophical, and I would imagine (going with your use of the term) metaphysical.

Hello SimplyG,

Yes I agree with you, metaphysics in its nature is not always concerned with producing knowledge but it’s more of a method of thinking and reasoning . You can leave that to science which employs metaphysical methods and theories to yield knowledge such as testable theories that behave as expected in the real world so it’s a fore runner to the scientific method.

I get what you mean, and do agree that we often do this; but, taking the side of the pragmatists, I don’t see why we need metaphysics to do this. We can come up with models pertinent to the possibility of experience, and thusly use science, without making unwarranted assumptions about what may lie beyond that experience.

Take this tautology: All bachelors are unmarried men. Now you don’t need to go around and check if this is true as this is self evident and knowledge of its truth is produced in the sentence itself.

‘All bachelors are unmarries men’, just like ‘a = a’, is only valid within the possibility of experience; and it could be true that the world in-itself behaves in an irrational manner—such that sometimes a != a. Who knows?

Metaphysics is a purely speculative and knowledge is a by product of its enquiry rather than its ultimate aim as it makes no claims of knowledge therefore it remains purely theoretical and abstract.

Metaphysics absolutely claims knowledge about the world in-itself: ask any idealist, physicalist, or substance dualist.

I think it was Einstein who said “imagination is more important than knowledge” and it seems to me quantum theory is ripe for metaphysical speculations of how things at the subatomic scale don’t behave as expected according to ordinary experience.

I don’t see how Einstein’s quote ties back to your point, as I agree that the imagination is important to determining models pertaining to that which is within the bounds of the possibility of experience.

I made a thread specifically related to this question with posters positing that math precedes the physical empirical universe but that there are correlation between the two either by accident or design:

For this discussion, it just depends on if you are claiming this as a useful model of experience or whether it is actually true of the world in-itself.

Hello Mww,

Metaphysics is a discipline; imagination is a faculty.

Even if one chooses to deny to imagination the denomination of faculty, metaphysics is still a discipline, and in which case, the distinction remains that imagination is not.

Couple things that I would like to note:

1. The imagination can be constrained by procedures which make it a discipline, in the sense that you are talking about.

2. Imagination, and pure reason devoid of empirical content, is indistinguishable from mere human conceivability—irregardless of whether it is done is a highly structured way (i.e., as a discipline).

Hello 180 Proof

This is neither a charitable nor close reading of what I actually wrote, Bob

I apologize: I must have misunderstood what you wrote.

Translation: Physics (Aristotle et al), not metaphysics, "is a useful model of experience" (i.e. physical reality, or publicly intelligible aspect of the real, aka "nature"). Metaphysics consists in categorical criteria for making hypothetical, or "useful models..."

Maybe that's clearer?

This makes a bit more sense to me. Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are saying ‘metaphysics’ is the over-arching means of determining ‘physics’ (since the former is ‘categorical criteria for useful models’ and the latter is ‘a useful model’): is that correct?

Presently, science is trying to explain consciousness with the ontological assumption that materialism/physicalism is the case. If, in ten thousand years, that scientific project still has not given a definitive answer to the hard problem/mind-body problem, wouldn't that be strong evidence that materialism/physicalism is not true?

If you consider pure speculation that is indistinguishable from human imagination valid forms of inquiring about that which is beyond the possible forms of one's experience, then, yes, I would say that counts in disfavor of physicalism and possibly in favor of idealism.

Metaphysics also exposes the error in our thinking. So, while that does not count as "knowledge", it makes us examine, or even discover, how we think ordinarily about reality, or the carelessness of how we think, or what we take for granted as true.

In the sense that I defined it in the OP, I don't think we need metaphysics to expose errors in our reasoning: we can do so without making ontological claims.

metaphysics explains only concepts abstracted from, and therefore useful for categorizing, (experience of(?)) 'how things are', and does not explain any facts of the matter. Metaphysics is not theoretical.

I have no problem with this, since it isn't metaphysics in the more traditional sense (I would say at least). You are basically saying, and correct me if I am wrong, that metaphysics doesn't actually get at ontology (like Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, etc. thought): instead, it just is a useful model for experience. To me, that just isn't metaphysics anymore, it's just pragmatic models; which I have no problem with: the actual claim about transcendent reality is missing therefrom.

People have lots of ideas about what "metaphysics" is. Our discussions of the subject are always tangled up in disagreements about the meaning of the word. Your definition is certainly not what I mean when I talk about metaphysics. More importantly, I don't think it's consistent with what most other people think it is either.

What do you mean by it then?

I am using the traditional term going back to leibniz, Kant, etc.

Hello SimpleG,

There’s more to metaphysics than just imagination it also includes reasoning not based upon experience but using deduction thereof such as found in math

1. Reasoning based upon experience to make claims about something beyond experience, as opposed to merely creating a predictive model for experience, is indistinguishable from human imagination; because that claim is not grounded in experience. It is all fine and well to claim that I should expect things within experience to behave like X, but to posit that about things beyond experience is completely devoid of empirical content.

2. Math and logic are grounded in empirical arguments. We can introspectively analyze how we reason to construct them both, and, in the case of math, test to see how well they relate to the world outside of us.

You might like this quote by Kant as to what metaphysics is from his Critique of Pure reason preface.

Kant is a major motivator of my thinking on metaphysics: especially his prolegomena.

Hello jorndoe,

A nonsequitur is [...] — Bob Ross
... negation of "follow". (¬(p ⇒ q))

I am failing to understand what you are contending with here: it seems you just re-stated what I told you. My point was that those arguments were not deductions, and a non-sequitur is not a deductive argument.

Whether supposed to or not, it can't, hence mentioned gap (+ admission). (Aquinas, notes)

If a conclusion is outside of the scope of the intended consequences of an argument, then it is not a gap.

You find "supernatural magic" a fine explanation...? :confused:

No I don’t.

Hello Mww,

I apologize: I thought I responded to you, but I must have forgotten.

I’m saying we have to grant that the things in the world are caused. Even if we don’t know what causes things, if there’s some thing right in front of my face, I’m further along accepting something else caused it to be there, than I would be if I denied it

I don’t have any issue with that as a model of experience, but I don’t think it works for the metaphysical claims Kant was making. However, I think we’ve discussed my complaints pertaining thereto sufficiently (and don’t want to beat a dead horse here).

The brain is just another thing, right? I’m just saying there’s some degree of correspondence between scientific and metaphysical knowledge claims. Or, lack of them.

Yes, this only works if you grant that we can know the things-in-themselves, to some degree, by investigating the appearances (i.e., science)--only then to turn around and conclude we can’t. It’s a nice Kantian paradox he puts himself into.

I wouldn’t word it that way. I’d say everything in the world appears related to something else.

That’s fair.

I’m ok with that. And because you and I will agree on many more things than not, it is more than probable our cognitive systems are congruent in their respective matter, but merely similar in their respective operational parameters.

True.

Hello Mww,

Properly spoken, it should have been, there is awareness of it, rather than I am aware of it.

Yes, I am saying it ‘affects’ you insofar as your senses are aware of it.

and it is true there is a blind spot between the senses and the brain,

So this is where I haven’t fully quite captured your metaphysical theory: are you saying that the world-in-itself (1) has causality and (2) that our representations of it are (for the most part) accurate? Otherwise, I don’t know why you would appeal to scientific investigations of the brain, since they are also representations and not things-in-themselves (unless there is a somewhat accurate bridge between representation and thing-in-itself).

Let it be resolved that to be affected is to grant the necessity of real external objects effecting the senses.

Yes, I agree. But doesn’t this now negate the idea that we cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves if we are allowed to use our representations to determine that there are such real external objects effecting us?

For me to know the causality of Nature, I’d have to be affected by causality, intuit causality and represent it as a phenomenon, understand causality and represent it as a conception, synthesize each representation into a cognition of causality

The more I speak to you, the more I think you have developed (or adhere to) a model of reality, which is extracted from the trusting of one’s experiences, whereof we represent the world to ourselves and our representations are somewhat accurate of the things-in-themselves.

Right off the bat it is impossible to represent causality as a phenomenon because causality is not conditioned by space and time. Causality does not have extension in space; things do. So given the interrupted chain of mental events, I cannot KNOW causality, but I can still think it as a conception.

Interesting, so would you say you believe that the world-in-itself has relations, which are not meaningfully called physical causality?

So it is in thinking alone, that logically Nature must be causal, because it is absurd, and eventually contradictory, to suppose it is me….or you or Bob or Julie or Sir Charles……that is necessary cause of the things both by which all of us are affected, and at the same time, the things only some of us and possibly none of us, are.

This makes sense if we assume that are representations are accurate enough to tell us there are other conscious beings; but, yeah, that makes sense.

:heart: