I see! You are right that they would have to absolutely apply to epistemology, so if you have examples where they fail then I would love to hear them!

Although I am not sure I am fully understanding your connection of dualism to your original OP, an argument against dualism does not count in favor of physicalism (if that is what you are suggesting here).

Also, I likewise find dualism to be quite implausible, but I am not a physicalist.

Hello Judaka,

Our discussion was regrettable, despite everything I've said, I know your intentions were genuine, and I wish you the best.

I agree that our conversation, regrettably, has not been fruitful; but, likewise, I recognize that you are also being genuine and I respect you for that! Sometimes when two people converse the words which they use to express their positions are being used in such foreign manners to the other person that it becomes hard to convey anything; and that seems to be the case here.

I appreciate you taking the time to discuss the topic with me, and I wish you nothing but the best as well!

I am unfamiliar with a 'meta-problem' of consciousness; but I don't find it plausible that 'learning architecture' will ever be conscious.

It seems to take more than merely quantitatively generating a 'experiential concept' (whatever that may be) to have qualitative experience. There is something it is like in and of itself to have qualia, which is not something mere algorithms can produce (at least there's no foreseeable conceptual explanation of how it would work at all). A very easy way of seeing the incredibly difficulty in giving a conceptual account of the reduction of mental properties to physical properties is mary's room.

What AI will end up being is a philosophical zombie--a really convincing mimick of proper minds.

If I make a commitment to be someplace but then get sick, it is reasonable for me to cancel the commitment based on the judgment that my health is more important than being where I am expected to be. The situation you describe is analogous.

Not in the case that you are culpable for the condition of another life. For example, if you are not feeling well, you are driving, and you accidentally hit someone with your car (of no fault of their own); then you cannot continue driving in order to go to your appointment at the doctor’s office: you are obligated to stop and attend to that person that you caused injury to.

In the case that you are not at risk of any significant, unwanted bodily modifications and it wasn’t your fault when you hit that person with your car, I would say you still need to stop and help them. But, since you are not culpable for their condition, you could speed off if your health it at severe risk if you were to wait (to get to that doctor’s appointment). — Bob Ross

If I am responsible for a pregnancy and you decide I have to go through with it even if it risks my health, you are deciding that the fetus' life is more important than my health.

in the case of (1) consensual sex which (2) makes the woman (and man) culpable for the condition of that new life: yes. Not in other circumstances. — Bob Ross

Hello Apustimelogist,

Just a some things I would like to clarify about the hard problem of consciousness:

1. It is technically, at best, only a problem for reductive physicalism. One could be a irreductive or elimativistic physicalist (although I personally find other problems with them).

2. There is no such thing as refutation in metaphysics (and thusly not in philosophy of mind): no one can claim that physicalism is refuted by anything but, rather, they can describe reasons that they think count against the theory.

3. Due to the nature of metaphysics, one can reconcile even reductive physicalism with the hard problem, even when granted it as true, because one can metaphysically justify virtually anything. Thusly, a person could say that it is expected that consciousness would not be reducible to the brain states since they are, after all, the representations. However, the idea in using the hard problem as an epistemic token against reductive physicalism is that it makes it significantly less coherent or at least less plausible: all we directly know is mental (and not physical) and if one is conceding that they cannot explain reductively mentality, then it appears as though nothing one directly knows can be sufficiently explained. The trade off, allegedly, is that the theory fits with the rest of our knowledge; but why would we posit this extraneous physicality when we can reductively explain it in the reverse direction? Anyways, the idea here (that I am trying to convey) is that metaphysics is all about tradeoffs: what counts in favor and against the theory?

4. If mentality is not explanatorily reduced to physicality, then what reasons does one have to believe it is reducible to it (in theory)? That’s like me saying this property A is reducible to B but that I can never prove it: so why think that is actually the case?

Hello T Clark,

In my first post I made it clear that your "absolute moral principle" is not relevant as far as I'm concerned. What is relevant is your willingness to apply that principle as the basis of laws to restrict women's ability to have abortions.

I already noted that I am saying that it should be translated into law. So simply substitute “absolute legal principle” for “absolute moral principle”.

In the OP, you wrote:

In what you quoted of me, I never said nor does it imply that the life and well-being of the fetus is more important than the pregnant woman. What I said in that quote is that culpability, as a principle, by my lights, implies that in the situation of consensual sex the woman’s health now is less priority than the fetus (because she is cuplable for that person’s condition): this is not the same thing as claiming that the fetus’ life is more important than the woman—for one is an absolute judgment about one trumping the other, and the other is constrained to a particular context.

Where does this "culpability" idea come from.

Morally and legally it is found everywhere in society. If I am culpable for the condition of another life, then I am obligated to remediate the situation (and cannot simply unconsent) (e.g., car crash, battery, etc.).

The right word is "responsibility."

I don’t think that quite captures it, because one could have responsibilities that they are not technically culpable for. For example, someone could argue that a rape victim is responsible for taking care of the fetus, but is not culpable for its condition.

If I am responsible for fulfilling some obligation but can't because of risk to my health, I am making the decision that my health is more important than the obligation

Not in the case that you are culpable for the condition of another life. For example, if you are not feeling well, you are driving, and you accidentally hit someone with your car (of no fault of their own); then you cannot continue driving in order to go to your appointment at the doctor’s office: you are obligated to stop and attend to that person that you caused injury to.

In the case that you are not at risk of any significant, unwanted bodily modifications and it wasn’t your fault when you hit that person with your car, I would say you still need to stop and help them. But, since you are not culpable for their condition, you could speed off if your health it at severe risk if you were to wait (to get to that doctor’s appointment).

Your position that women whose lives are at risk from their pregnancy should not be able to have abortion is a claim that the health of the women is less important than the life of the fetus.

in the case of (1) consensual sex which (2) makes the woman (and man) culpable for the condition of that new life: yes. Not in other circumstances.

This is why you are straw manning my argument when you say:

Your whole argument rests on the claim that the life of the fetus is more important than the women's life, health, and personal autonomy.

You are making claims that I never made by expanding the context to every pregnancy situation; which I never made.

Hello Apustimelogist,

In what sense would you say your norms are objective?

I would say that there are objective (i.e., mind-independent) epistemic norms insofar as there are objectively better ways to “know the world” which, in turn, is the precondition for epistemology in the first place. In other words, epistemology, as a practice, is predicated on the acceptance of the hypothetical norm that “one ought to acquire how to come to know the world” and this, as a precondition of this practice, has objective consequences (e.g., that since I am committed to knowing the world, I should use whatever principles/norms are the best at acquiring knowledge).

Hello Mww,

So, yes, interest is devoid of will insofar as having an interest is not to will anything, nor is it the structure of will, which is reducible to pure practical reason. Accordingly, before anything is to be willed there must be an interest in the manner in which it is to be done, hence, interest in a principle which grounds the will’s determined volition.

I see now! I was not understanding that ‘interest’ was distinct from ‘willing’, which I agree they are different—as I can have an interest in something without deploying my will to engage in it. However, I am skeptical that ‘interest’ is completely devoid of willing, as when I am interested in something, I am thereby willing attention towards it (even if it be very brief and only cognitive).

Perhaps ‘interest’ is the initial, weakest form of willing?

However, desire takes no account of good in the attainment of its objects other than the satisfaction of the agent, but mere ‘feel good’ satisfaction can never be deemed truly moral behavior, which is ‘good’ in and of itself regardless of the feeling derived from it.

This is where I think your ‘feeling’ vs ‘willing’ distinction unfairly favors one abitrary camp of tastes over another, as there absolutely no way for a person to willfully obey a moral principle in and of itself without having a taste to do it. There is no such thing as performing an action devoid of ‘feelings’ but, rather, only devoid of (or more like in opposition to) one’s initial (or superficial or less-prioritized) emotional responses to something.

Yes, that’s true, and further instance of space/time conceptual irreconcilability of the two geniuses

If einsteinien space/time is irreconcible with Kantian space and time, then, as a transcendental idealist, do you deny Einstein’s general/special relativity?

Hello T Clark,

Sure, but I think those can be boiled down to two major issues 1) People should be allowed to have control over their own bodies 2) Based on @Bob Ross's judgment, which I don't share, the life and well-being of the fetus are more important than the pregnant woman's.

#1 is false as an absolute moral principle, and true if relative to various factors in the circumstance.

#2 is an incorrect formulation of my position: I never said that the well-being of the fetus is more important than the pregnant woman’s. In fact, I sided with pro-choice in the matter of rape (for reasons already expounded in the OP).

Hello 180 Proof,

Yes, it seems you believe that minds are dis-embodied (i.e. dis-encephalized), Bob, whereas we know that minds are embodied (i.e. encephalized).

They are “dis-embodied”, for me, insofar as the body is an extrinsic representation, a product of the thing-in-itself conforming to my representative faculties which produce it synthetically as tangible, of a mixture of reality + myself (i.e., my mind).

Also, “we know that minds are embodied” just begs the question, as that is the whole debate in philosophy of mind and you are thereby presupposing physicalism as true.

Also, as a dual-aspect monist (i.e. Spinozist) who therefore discounts panpsychism, I do not 'equate life with mind' (e.g. bacteria, etc are mindless).

By ‘panpsychism’, are you referring to idealism? If so, then I think Spinoza can very easily be interpreted as an idealist.

Secondly, I would like to hear more about your irreductivist approach to explanation; for, to me, it seems like you are wanting the cake and wanting to eat it too. I genuinly don’t understand how an entity can be derived or composed of a set of entities and its relations but there are somehow properities it has which are irreducible to those set of entities and relations between those entities. Of course, I may be just completely misunderstanding: could you elaborate on your theory of explanation here?

Hello 180 Proof,

I don't understand your objection.

In your post you shared with me (where you outlined your justification for their being ‘moral facts’) I understood the crux of your argument to be that promises are some sort of ‘is’ that is an ‘ought’ and thusly are moral facts (as that is what you said in that post). My point was that they are not an ought that is an ‘is’: I am claiming that I ought to do X because I promised X, but that isn’t a valid argument (but, rather, a colloquial shorthand). The real argument is:

P1: I ought to fulfill my promises.
P2: I promised X.
C: Therefore, I ought to do X.

Notice that the promise is not an ‘is’ that is also an ‘ought’ but, rather, a mere description: a fact, but not a ‘moral’ fact. Thusly, as far as I understood your post, you didn’t prove nor suggest any sort of moral facts.

Hello Apustimelogist,

I think maybe there is still a kind of something like an is-ought problem in epistemology

There are, indeed, those who argue for the non-existence of categorical epistemic norms based off of Hume’s is-ought gap; but, to me, since epistemology is predicated off of the hypothetical imperative of “one ought to know the world” and that impertive is outside of epistemology itself (as a precondition for it), then there are objective norms which are derived from the hypothetical imperative which, within the context of epistemology, are categorical.

Hello Judaka,

Nope, goals must be rational as well, if your ethical position is invalid, inconsistent or illogical, then you aren't being rational by merely being consistent.

Saying one’s ethical position is irrationalif they are inconsistent or illogical, is to agree with me. Saying it is “invalid” is ambiguous: what you do mean by “invalid”?

Besides your criteria of validity, you just agreed with the sentence you quoted of me while attempting to disagree with it:

But, as I said before, rationality does not consider anything ethical except for being consistent in one’s ethics; and I thought you agreed with me on that? – Bob Ross

Perhaps the confusion lied in me not explicitly saying ethics must adhere to one’s logical theory?

give me an example like "the serial killer has this goal and this opinion and these values", that's remarkably distinct from reality.

It isn’t. There have been, historically speaking, very rational serial killers. In fact, there were some who did it in such a rational and ingenious way that it took the authorities a really long time to catch them.

I have no basis by which I can question the traits or opinions of a hypothetical serial killer, and so your word is law here.

That’s why it is called a “hypothetical”: you evaluate it based off of the stipulations. This is not a problem whatsoever.

You can give your serial killer all the traits, values and beliefs (and you have done that) to make him rational, and thus, I can't reasonably call him irrational. That's true for the hypothetical serial killer, but not in any real-life case.

Firstly, you admitting in the hypothetical that the serial killer is rational refutes your position that ethics is a criteria for rationality—that’s why I used that example. Hypotheticals are really good ways of teasing out incoherencies and inconsistencies in peoples views.

Secondly, there are many real life cases of serial killers that were quite rational: they just didn’t value other human beings’ well-being.

In real life, I'll be using my interpretations, my beliefs, my characterisations, my knowledge and my understanding of the serial killer, not yours.

This is completely irrelevant and misses the point of hypothetical thought experiments: they test whether you are being coherent and consistent in your beliefs, by giving you stipulations and seeing if the necessary conclusion is made that aligns consistently and coherently with your claims.

I already tried to, but you just found ways of dismissing everything I said, as though that meant something. Whatever traits or beliefs your serial killer needed to be rational, you gave him, however, it was required to interpret his actions to be rational, you argued for. As someone who considers rationality highly subjective, none of this is compelling. Mostly you're just proving that he who acts the judge can conclude how they deem fit.

You have not given a counter-example nor an example of how my definition leads to nonsensical and true propositions: you have continued to beat around the bush, and if you aren’t willing to give them then just say so!

If you really think you are provided counter-examples, then please quote them from a past discussion response you made, and I will happily concede if I am wrong here.

Just rationality's importance in ethics.

I am starting to think we may need to just agree to disagree here, because we seem to be getting no where: I already stated that this is a non-issue for us and is not the claim I am contending with but, rather, your claim that ethics pertains to rationality.

Can you explain how two unthinking concepts can be "in agreement"? Explain how that works.

I don’t quite understand what you are asking. Two concepts could be in agreement in the sense that they cohere well with each other, are equivalent to each other, are analogous to each other, etc. But the concept is in agreement with reality iff that concept corresponds to something in reality.

So a concept which is of another concept (like the concept of concepts) would be true (and in agreement with reality) if, in reality, that really is the concept of that other concept (e.g., my concept of concepts corresponds to what the concept of concepts is in reality). Is that what you are asking about?

Perhaps a better definition is “an act that attempts to agree with reality” — Bob Ross

That would be a significant improvement for sure.

On second thought, I actually don’t think intentions matter for rationality, because one could be intending to be rational while actually being incredibly irrational; so I think the definition stands as “to act in a manner that agrees with reality”.

surely, you can think of examples without my help.

I honestly am starting to believe you don’t any examples of what you are claiming, as you never provide them and constantly beat around the bush about them. So long as you provide none, I am going to assume you have none.

Your understanding is a mess as expected.

If you want to discuss theories of truth, then please post it in that discussion board (I linked): this one is for this OP.

Hello Mww,

The interest isn’t of the will, which is the autonomous faculty of volitions. The interest residing in the agent, is in a principle, with which the will determines a volition.

Oh, so are you saying that there is an ‘interest’ devoid of ‘will’ which is a part of the structure of being a will? Is that the idea?

subjective moral fact equates to moral commitment; objective moral facts equates to rational commitment

If there is really an ‘interest’ (i.e., a desire) which pertains to the structure of being a will and not to a will itself, then I think that would be, by definition, a moral fact (in its own right).

I do not know of any such moral facts though, and I would only find them useful insofar as I do have a desire to commit myself to them. Perhaps, then, the moral fact and my taste would run full circle, and the latter would be an illusion of the former.

They can’t be reconciled, because Einstein invoked a geometry Kant didn’t use in his construction of the conceptions of space and time

But under Einsteinien space/time fabric, they are not synthetic judgments—they are not isolated ‘pure’ forms of one’s experience (like Kant thought): they do pertain as properties to the things-in-themselves. I am curious how a Kantian would reconcile that: would you say space and time are analytic judgments but do not exist fundamentally as extension and temporality?

Kant derived true propositions in order to prove their possibility, and because the proof of their possibility stands, they can be employed as ground for something else relative to them. Einstein disputed the propositions as being true in any condition, but they were never intended for any condition, but only for one.

What true propositions are you referring to here? A priori judgments? A priori categories, conceptions?

Einstein didn’t like Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori propositions….the ground of all mathematical proofs…

Isn’t the idea that mathematics is proven true in virtue of the structure of our representative faculties? And math is always synthetic, as the numbers and mathematical operations on those numbers do not contain in themselves the result of them?

Another question I have: if one’s conscious experience is a representation (of the world) and extension & temporality are only the forms of one’s experience, then is Kant referring to atemporal representation? For isn’t “representation” itself imply temporality—but these operations which produce within a pure form of time these representations would have to be outside of that pure form, which is either in a noumenal time or no time at all. That’s my logic, at least.

Hello T Clark,

Do you think your moral judgments should be used as the basis for laws restricting access to abortion?

Yes, I do.

Anyone who wants to restrict abortion and birth control should be sent to live in Alabama.

(: I agree.

Hello 180 Proof,

A seed is not a tree. A sapling is a potential tree. A pre-26th week old unviable fetus is not a person. A viable fetus aka "baby" is a potential person.

A person is a qualitatively experiencing being (or if one would like, a being with a mind), which, as an idealist, I would say is always true of anyone alive. Life does not begin at 24 weeks, the brains formulation does (for the most part). This is our disagreement, as I would assume you believe that one is not qualitatively experiencing whatsoever until they have the proper brain parts. Correct?

Hello 180 Proof,

I appreciate you referring me to your exposition of moral facts (in another thread), but, unfortunately, I am not seeing how they are really such. A promise is not an ‘is that entails an ought’, for it is the obligation to fulfill one’s promises that furnishes one with a valid deductive argument for any obligation contained in the promise itself. Just my two cents.

Hello RogueAI,

1), I'm not sure you should be forced to save a drowning kid. It would be nice if you did, but do we want government compelling charitable acts?

I think that duty to rescue should exist insofar as one should be legally obligated to save someone, when they are in the vicinity of an incident, if it would not produce any significant unwanted bodily harm to them to do so.

If there was a baby that got dropped off at your porch and there was no service you could call to get this child help (and thusly it will die if you do nothing), then I don’t think you have the right to not consent and let that child starve to death. You have a de facto obligation to save them. What do you think?

2) Forcing a woman to give birth is not even close to risking an ear infection. It entails months of pregnancy and birth has all sorts of complications and a non-trivial mortality rate.

I was never intending to make that comparison. In fact, I am pro-choice in the case of rape exactly for this reason (and because there is no culpability).

A woman's bodily autonomy right trumps the fetus's rights at every stage, even if it's a person at the moment of conception. Bodily autonomy rights are that important.

I agree that bodily autonomy rights are important, but they are not absolute. If they were (as you are suggesting), then I can unconsent from saving the kid who is drowning in the pool (given there is no one else around to do it) because there is risk to my body getting an ear infection. Forcing me to do it would, indeed, violate my right to bodily autonomy. I find this to be blatantly wrong, as I am de facto obligated to save the kid in this situation: no one should care if I consent or not. No one has an absolute right to life, nor to bodily autonomy.

Here's the problems I have with personhood arguments:

1. I disagree with the stereotypical physicalist notion that the brain must be present, fully or adequately, for one to consciously experience. An embryo is consciously experiencing, just more rudimentary then ourselves (as fully developed adults). I thusly would extend personhood to the developing human being (in the womb) so long as it has any sort of autonomous movements (e.g., a heartbeat), which is significantly sooner than your 24 week mark.

2. Personhood does not absolutely matter. Just because the developing human being is a person, it does not have the right to use a rape victim's body to develop without consent because it posing a reasonable risk of potentially significant unwanted bodily modifications (and she is not culpable for its condition).

3. If we were to grant persons absolute rights to their lives, then that would lead to unwanted consequences. For example, a person who is walking passed a burning building and hears someone scream would be obligated to protect and save that life, even if they do not consent to that level of risk of bodily danger. The only way to refute this is to concede that personhood is relative principle and consent does matter in some cases. Even arguing that the person has a right to their own life (and thusly doesn't need to put it in danger to save the other person) is contingent on consent/bodily-autonomy arguments.

Nahhhh….oil and water. She’s a retired Fed in the intelligence services with U-Dub Masters in history and library science, for her, it’s facts and nothing but the facts.

Lol. I was just curious, as two transcendental idealists, as a couple, is quite a rare feat!

Still, in proper philosophy, I submit it is not so much the directed towards, but rather, the arising from
…
Simply put, it follows that interest in a principle it that by which a moral act is given and its negation impossible regardless of circumstance, but mere desire for a good feeling is just as likely to invoke an immoral act as a moral one

I sort of understand: all interest is of a will, but the desire to do something irregardless of whatever surface-level pleasure/pain is better, correct?

I’ve been thinking about “moral realism”.

I agree and am also suspicious of the existence of moral facts; however, I also, nowadays, find the moral facts, if they do exist, to be irrelevant as long as the person has committed themselves to being rational.

This is a bit off-topic, but I am curious: how do you reconcile Einstein’s general/special relativity with Kantian notions of space and time?

Hello Judaka,

I don't think rationality "relies" on ethics, but ethics play an important role in rationality, in so far as one's goals, values and beliefs naturally take ethical considerations into account

But, as I said before, rationality does not consider anything ethical except for being consistent in one’s ethics; and I thought you agreed with me on that? Now it sounds like you are claiming that what is rational is contingent on what one thinks is ethical or unethical beyond merely being consistent.

Your thinking is binary. As far as you're concerned, seemingly, if you can prove a single exception, then you've proven rationality is disentangled from ethics.

Sort of. If I can provide an example of a person that you would consider rational, under the definition thereof, which does not exhibit a property of which you are claiming is essential to rationality, then I thereby have demonstrated a contradiction in your view. Thusly, either, in that case, you have to refurbish your definition of rationality or reject that the person is being rational. You can’t have the cake and eat it too (;

In the case of the psychopath, you can’t claim that (1) there is such a thing as a rational and egregiously immoral psychopath and (2) that rationality, by definition, entails moral goodness.

I'm focusing on the 99.99% of cases where ethics matter, you're focusing on the 0.01% of cases where it mightn't.

I am just using a radical example to tease out the contradiction in your view. I don’t think morality is relevant 100% of the time to whether or not a person is being rational. Perhaps, if you would like, then you could offer a counter-example, similar to mine, that demonstrates the need of moral consideration to determine a person as being rational? I would be more than happy to entertain any such examples.

Why are you so concerned with this technical, trivial truth that rationality doesn't necessarily include ethics?

I am not. Again, the OP is about there being objective epistemic norms: it isn’t even focused on rationality. You brought up rationality, and somewhere along the lines we started conversing about whether ethics plays a role in its the definition.

If rationality doesn't technically mandate including ethics, should we ignore the relationship between the two?

What relationship?!? You are just begging the question here, as I am saying there is no relationship between rationality and ethics (in that direction), but there is vice-versa. If you think that there is, then please elaborate; or, at this point, just provide a counter-example (like my psychopath one).

Welcome to the real world, where people don't always speak honestly.

There is absolutely no relevance to the OP whether people are dishonest or not.

Where we advocate for rationality, full well knowing and intending the implications the concept would have on morality and ethics.

Like I said before, ethics is tied to rationality, but rationality is not tied to ethics. I don’t disagree that what is rational will impact ethics, but you are saying that ethics impacts rationality.

The importance of rationality in morality and ethics is the moral consideration

In that case, then you aren’t saying that ethics impacts rationality but, rather, vice-versa; which I have no problem with.

nothing that mentions anything that falls outside the area of thought

Thinking is an action, and actions which are in agreement with reality are rational. Sure, one could say that one is not intentionally being rational if they act in agreement with reality (to the best of our knowledge) but more lucked their way into it—but they would still be acting in a rational manner.

Despite that, its definition, as well as yours, primarily focuses on acts as being rational or irrational.

That is all the definition should ever portray: what is rational, and, in light of that, what is not. There is absolutely nothing else the any definition should do other than define the word.

If I was studying but got distracted by a conversation with a friend, since what I'm studying for is action to accomplish my higher priority goal, then by definition, that's irrational.

Firstly, this just depends on what your goals are: if you are just casually studying, then it would not be irrational to step into a side conversation.

Secondly, if the goal is the maximize comprehension (of what one is studying) then it is actually better to take breaks.

If I know it would be beneficial to put my keys in the same spot each time, but I forget to do it, by definition, that's irrational.

I don’t think this is irrational because you were still being consistent, to your best ability, with your goals: you just forgot. I don’t see how the act of genuinely forgetting is irrational.

Yet, by definition, actions are rational or irrational even in cases where there's nothing wrong with the quality of my thinking.

I think this is a good point: I think that defining it as merely an act precludes intentions, which I think matters. Perhaps a better definition is “an act that attempts to agree with reality”. If you had the intention of doing something quite rational, but for some reason your body fails to actualize that intention in a rational manner, then I wouldn’t say you are being irrational; because the irrational behavior was outside of our control (in any meaningful sense of the term).

Describing actions that don't align with long-term goals or higher-priority beliefs as a flaw of one's thinking is a riot, but that's exactly what the term does.

I don’t see how this is a flaw: if one has a goal and has prioritized it above all the others, then it makes no sense do something prioritized lower—either de-prioritize the goal or do it.

The implication that such actions are necessarily thinking or knowledge problems is absurd and antiscientific

How is it absurd and antiscientific?

One's actions may not be of "a manner that agrees with reality" for many reasons outside of knowledge. You can insist that the term is purely epistemic, but you're wrong

Give me some examples of when someone would be justified in acting in a manner that disagrees with reality.

You're asking me to give an example of sensible behaviour being nonsensical, why don't you see that as a problem? The definition is vague, that's the issue, and what I consider sensible may seem nonsensical to you and vice versa.

I am starting to suspect you don’t have any examples of my definition implying something nonsensical; as I already stated that you don’t have to use the term “nonsensical” in whatever way you are assuming I use it. You are the one who said it implies “nonsensical” claims, so what are they?

I am interpreting, on my end, the term in its colloquial usage (unless you specify otherwise): having no meaning; making no sense or ridiculously impractical or ill-advised.

You keep assuming I define “nonsensical” in terms of “rationality”, but even if I do it has no bearing on whatever you claiming, as you used the term in whatever sense you mean it.

Explain how "There is a truth to the matter" is not the same as saying there's an objective truth.

You can see my thread on truth here .

It's part of the discussion in 99.99% of cases, and arguably in 100% of cases, but there's some subjectivity there

Then give me an example!

As I said, if I want to interpret the serial killer's actions as irrational, and his thinking and goals as foolish, nothing stops me.

You would be violating my definition and most (if not all) colloquial definitions.

It's a symbolic practice heuristically (or algorithmically) effective for controlling behavior and / or the environment despite insufficient time and/or information – IIRC, Peirce-Dewey's conception of 'rationality': practice.

Thank you for the definition! So, is “rationality”, then, for you, a pragmatic tool for achieving our desires? If so, then wouldn’t that tool be separate from the desires and wouldn’t it have a set of principles which stem from it that are “rational”? If so, then wouldn’t those “rational” principles, which you say are used for pragmatic purposes of control, devoid of moral content themselves (irregardless of whether someone is deploying them with morally motivated reasons)?

I ground ethics in rationality (i.e. inferential rules/heuristic-making) because I conceive of ethics as the study of 'the how of well-being', that is, how to reduce negations of well-being. (NB: Thus, I analogize well-being (how to reduce its negation) in ethics with e.g. sustainability (how to reduce its negation) in ecology and optimal health-fitness (how to reduce its negation) in medicine.)

Upon further contemplation, I actually don’t see anything wrong with this (without importing my own normative ethical theory in the mix); but I am saying that vice-versa is false: rationality is not defined with any moral considerations. Someone can be utterly rational and immoral.

To me, you using rational principles to infer your ethical obligations is fine, as rationality, then, would be a prerequisite to your ethical discussions; but rationality itself would not be presupposing any ethical considerations.

Are you saying that the moral facts obliges us to posit hypothetical imperatives?
Yes; just as medical facts and ecological facts also oblige us to ask 'how to reduce' their adverse impacts as noted above.

I see.

Species (e.g. h. sapiens) specific functional defects – natural vulnerabilities – which cause dysfunction or worse – increase suffering – in living individuals when such defects are neglected and/or exacerbated (via e.g. deprivation). In other words, whatever harms – is bad for – our kind.

I understand that these are facts, but how are they moral facts? They do not inherently have any obligations contained therein, nor do they inherently have moral worth, nor are they categorical imperatives...someone has to decide, as a matter of taste (no matter how deep within their psyche), that they have any moral worth.

And how are they facts (as opposed to hypothetical imperatives themselves)?
At minimum, they (e.g. hunger, bereavement, isolation, injury) are constitutive constraints on – limits to – (our) biological functioning.

A limit to our biological functioning is not, by my lights, a moral fact; it is an amoral or non-moral fact. There is nothing about a limitation on our biological functioning that itself categorically obligates someone to strive to reduce impairments or injury to their physiology.

Yes, I am. In other words, I am saying an aspect of rationality is for one to act in accordance with one's values regardless of whether I think one should act in accordance with their values

I agree and don’t see how this contends with my definition. Also, this entails that the psychopath is being rational as long as, all else being equal, they are acting in accordance with their values.

I'd argue the entire idea of acting in a way that is consistent with one's values is a moral one. It's about holding people accountable.

Right now, we are just discussing what rationality is, not why one would be motivated to tell someone to act in accordance with their values. With regards to motivation, there are a lot of reasons someone would advocate for a person to be rational.

that's an important role rationality plays in morality and ethics.

I agree that ethics heavily relies on rationality (which is epistemic); but not vice-versa. Usually, what is used to decipher what is wrong or right is epistemic principles (e.g., law of noncontradiction, etc.), but rationality itself does not include any moral considerations (viz., rationality only makes reference to people being consistent which, in turn, implies that one ought to be consistent in their values; and they must abide by their values because they literally can’t act without a value judgment occurring; but neither of these consideration are ethical ones: it doesn’t say what is right or wrong).

The idea of rationality starts to fall apart if we don't include any moral considerations

I don’t see any moral considerations in what you have been saying about rationality. Saying that one should be consistent in their moral considerations is more like a prerequisite to ethics, not ethics itself.

It's not possible from your understanding, because you've defined rationality as the opposite of nonsense.

I don’t care if you abide by my semantics, if you think that my definition leads to implied nonsensical propositions (that are posited as true), then I need you to be able to demonstrate at least one. Otherwise, I don’t think you can claim that.

It can never be true that "a manner of acting that agrees with reality" was nonsensical

What action that is a manner of acting in agreement with reality is nonsensical to you? Give me one example.

is that sensible has no baggage,

Like “common sense” and “reasonable”, it has a ton of baggage.

Right, but I didn't say that. I'm saying they'd find the serial killer to be inconsistent and incoherent because the serial killer's ethical stance was nonsensical or unjustifiable.

But if all you are claiming is that a part of rationality is that one should “act in accordance with one's values”, then they would be factually wrong to claim that the serial killer is irrational because their ethical position is so-called “unjustifiable” or “nonsensical”. As long as they are being consistent and coherent (with their own views), then a person would be wrong to call them irrational; hence, rationality does not have any meaningful connection to ethics.

Most serial killers believe that what they're doing is immoral, they just either don't care or can't help themselves

You have to be careful here: usually they mean “immoral” merely in the sense that they are doing something that most people would consider wrong, but they themselves don’t think it is.

You consistently misunderstand language, as though there's an objective truth to whether the serial killer is consistent and coherent, rather than thinking of these as words people use to convey opinion.

Firstly, I don’t think truth is objective nor subjective, but that’s for a separate discussion.

Secondly, I do think there is a truth to the matter of whether the psychopath or serial killer is being internally coherent and logically consistent: that absolutely not a matter of mere semantics.

Obviously, nobody who thought the serial killer was coherent and consistent would simultaneously say he was irrational because he was incoherent and inconsistent, as that would be contradictory.

Then you agree with me that ethics is not a part of the discussion about if a person is being rational; for that serial killer could be violating every common moral law and still be considered rational.

Hello Mww,

Sure, but at the risk of detouring the thread topic? Up to you, of course; it’s you that called the meeting.

Fine by me!

Moral obligation relative to interest, indicates the employment of practical reason in determining a willed volition. That obligation relative to an interest in a principle, then, indicates practical reason determine a willed volition in accordance with the subjective disposition of the moral agent himself. A principle in a moral agent that accords with his subjective disposition, is called a maxim. The point being, to eliminate outside influence with respect to moral considerations in general.

Taste, on the other hand, represented by aesthetic judgement, indicates merely a desire, which is always relative to sensation, re: attainment of that which corresponds to, and thereby satisfies, a desire, which in turn is always influenced from outside. Influenced from outside eliminates employment of practical reason, without which there is no proper moral consideration.

Morally speaking, acts willed according to good principles are more powerful than acts willed by mere good feelings.

I see what mean and agree that “obligations” are more powerful than “desires” within your semantics; however, where I could never get on board with this kind of terminology is the that both a “interest” in a “principle” and a “desire” in a “’good’ feeling” are both mere acts of “taste”, just separated semantically by what it is directed towards.

To me, any act of one’s will is a “taste”, irregardless of whether one has a euphoric or emotional feeling with it, as it is a subjective “desire” that one has. Yes, desiring more rigid, long-term oriented, principles tends to be a better bet in life (and are more powerful, as you put it) but it is still just a taste. Thusly, I fear that your terminology makes an unwarranted implicit favoritism towards one arbitrary class of desires over another. I mean, who’s to say my short-term desire is not geared towards a “principle”? Or that my “good feeling” is not towards a “principle”?

Dunno about semantically. I positively detest, and refuse to engage in, so-called “language games”.

I agree, but what I mean is that we are using two different schemas, so we need to hash out terms first—not to debate them but to see where eachothers heads are at.

Shall indicates a command of reason offering no alternatives; should desire indicates a conditional want which implies a plethora of alternative inclinations.

So is “shall”, for you, a command with literally no alternatives (e.g., a person being forced to do something, etc.)? If so, then that doesn’t seem like the word is too often applicable.

Personally, I think as soon as society enters the conversation, morality becomes group morality writ large, which is ethics. So maybe there is a form of realism in society, but it isn’t moral as much as ethical, realism

I don’t make a distinction between “ethics” and “morality”, but I do agree that we have laws, which are morally motivated, which do become considerations that supersedes the individual’s wants.

Anyway….obviously I survived 6 days in the bush. She with the whistle and spray, me with the .44. No need for either and good times for all.

I’m glad! I am just curious: is she a transcendental idealist too?

Hello Judaka,

I think I may have identified our confusion with each other: are you trying to convey that "rationality" includes the consideration of one's morals and values, as opposed to 'rationality' entailing any sort of particular ethical theory? — Bob Ross

Yep.

I see! Let me try to interpret your response through this lens then.

I am not saying one needs to be consistent with their own values, I'm saying that's part of rationality.

I am confused here: aren’t you saying that it is a part of rationality to be consistent with their own values? If not, then please elaborate on what exactly you are referring to here is a part of rationality (so I can assess).

Or are you making a distinction between acting in accordance with vs. consistent to one’s values? Because you say:

No, rationality by definition references the importance of acting in accordance with one's values, that's what rationality is.

Yet, your definition is so vague, that I have no doubt your definition can be used to justify anything bar utter nonsense, so I'm not convinced by what you're doing whatsoever.

So I can understand your counter here better, please provide me with one example of something which you can derive from my definition which is “utter nonsense” (or even just nonsensical).

If I'm judging the rationality of your choice of ethical theory, I may arrive at a different conclusion than you, and the serial killer is a good example of that

I agree, and this is why rationality is not contingent on one’s ethics. It is not irrational or rational, in-itself, for a psychopath to murder people simply because they are doing something immoral. However, it is irrational for one to be inconsistent in their ethical commitments.

Most wouldn't find the serial killer's goals and values to be rationally justifiable, and so even though his actions align with their own goals,

Why? If that psychopath is being consistent, coherent, etc. then I don’t see why anyone would be justified in saying they are irrational on the grounds of them performing an act which violates that person’s ethical theory (of what is the right thing to do).

Rationality is a bloated concept, so full of aspects that I think one can arrive at whatever conclusion one likes.

Well, now “rationality” is just being treated as a trivial notion! My definition is the core of the concept of what it means to be rational; the term, for me, is not just a whimsical term.

Hello 180 Proof,

On the contrary, I "ground" ethics and epistemology and ... "in rationality" (i.e. adaptive inferential-discourse). Maybe this divergence is why we're talking past each other.

Probably. Can you firstly define what you mean by “rationality” and, secondly, explain how and why you ground ethics in it?

Bob: that is, such facts oblige rational agents to posit hypothetical imperatives – normative practices – which are adaptive with respect to those facts as constraints.

Are you saying that the moral facts obliges us to posit hypothetical imperatives? If so, then what are those facts? And how are they facts (as opposed to hypothetical imperatives themselves)?

In terms of my position, I have already outlined it here.

Hello Judaka,

Before responding to your whole post, I wanted to get some clarification first.

I think I may have identified our confusion with each other: are you trying to convey that "rationality" includes the consideration of one's morals and values, as opposed to 'rationality' entailing any sort of particular ethical theory?

If you are just trying to convey that one needs to be consistent with their own values, whatever they may be, then I agree and do not see how my definition precludes that. If you mean that 'to be rational' includes someone adhering to a particular ethical theory, then I disagree and say "rationality precludes ethics" (in that sense).

I think that it is rational to consider one's values stems from the fact (i.e., that it agrees with reality for me to say that) that one must use their values inevitably to perform any actions; and so it would be irrational to contradict or put no effort into deciphering one's values. However, there is no consideration of any ethical theory in what it means to 'be rational', as it would be very odd indeed to say that someone is irrational for merely disagreeing with one's normative ethical theory (or what not) even in the case that they are being logically consistent, coherent, etc.

And to respond to your clarification request:

Clarify something for me, are you trying to use the word "rationality" as though you invented it? To give it your own definition and understand it in your own way. Or are you treating it as a public term where I need to justify my understanding of rationality?

I am not sure if I fully followed this question, but I would say that I am treating it as a term that is open to refurbishment as problems arise with its current definition.

If by “public term” you are referring to colloquial speech, then I would say that I am not aware of any reputable dictionary that defines “rationality” with any ethical consideration (as it usually just means vaguely "to abide by reason"); and, furthermore, people (at least from my experience) tend to have a notion of rationality that precludes ethical considerations in the sense of what is or is not ethical to do.

For example, if someone disagrees with another person’s normative ethical theory (e.g., someone disagrees with you that what is morally good is what is best for the group) and their theory was highly thought-out, logically consistent, coherent, has some good points, etc., then most people would say that the person (that disagrees with their theory) is being rational but that they simply disagree. In your definition, I think it lacks this key aspect of how people use it in colloquial speech if you are claiming that what is wrong or right is relevant to 'being rational' as opposed to 'one must be coherent and consistent in whatever they think is right or wrong'. Hopefully that makes sense.

In terms of a technical definition, which I am much more interested in than colloquial notions of it, I think that my definition is a sharpened form of the colloquial notion.

For now, I would like to start here so as hopefully we can progress the conversation and hone-in better on what each other mean.

Bob

I recommend that if you intend to keep it no matter what, you shouldn't respond to this comment, it will be a waste of your time.

I never intend to retain my views at all costs, as that is intellectually ingenuine and does not further the conversation. If I am convinced by anything you say, then I am more than happy to concede on whatever point you are making; and I expect the same from anyone else.

Yes, I'm unwilling to work with you while you use that definition, it's dishonest to an extreme, but like I said, keep it as is your right.

These kinds of straw mans do not help us further the conversation: why do you think, in addition to me being wrong, that I am being dishonest?

What do you think makes something part of rationality?

I already gave the definition and elaborated on it in detail to you: see the OP.

Is something only part of rationality when we agree with it?

Not at all, and I never suggested that. Someone is being rational if however they are acting sufficiently seems to be agreeing with reality.

What makes an understanding of the concept "correct" or "incorrect"?

This is just a question about epistemology in general, and I would say that it is based off of many factors; such as the one’s I had in the OP. E.g., parsimony, explanatory power, intuitions, reliability, credence, logical consistency, coherence, empirical adequacy, etc. Of course, we develop more fine-tuned principles depending on the goals of the particular study, but I would say the aforementioned are the basics.

You say you disagree with the ethical dimension of rationality, but is it even valid for you to disagree?

I think so. I don’t think you have demonstrated why “rationality” would include ethical considerations, and I think I have demonstrated that excluding ethics actually fits experience better (such as in the case of a rational psychopath).

Who gets to decide what is or isn't part of rationality, and on what basis?

Epistemological speaking, on evidence, intuitions, explanatory power, coherence, etc…

I am not saying that everyone should use the term in the manner I defined it: there are literally millions of contexts and there may be some where it is better to use a different definition; and, of course, if one wants to discuss with a particular group of people who use it in a specific manner, then it is probably best to use it in there sense of the word (even if one disagrees).

It just depends; but I think that my definition gives the best account of the crux of what it means to be rational.

Rationality just is what it is, I explained my understanding of what it is, and if you provide a very good problem with it, then I won't just say "Ah, that's not part of rationality then", I'll instead say, "You've pointed out a good problem with the concept"

I agree, but this has not happened in our conversation. You have not provided, by my lights, a very good problem with my definition. If you did (and I recognize it), then I would gladly concede on that point.

You've set up rationality as "good", you've literally defined it as "good practice", and thus, rationality can never be a problem, and I think that's asinine.

It can never be an epistemic problem, but it can surely be a pragmatic or moral problem! You keep conflating the different types of “goodness” I have outlined with some sort of generic one, which doesn’t work.

Also, I have not crafted “rationality”, by definition, in a way that fits my goals (i.e., as good); but, rather, it is epistemically good because of the inherent hypothetical that a person commits themselves to when engaging in epistemology. You keep overlooking this point I keep making.

Can't you see how stupid that is? If rationality is best practice, then it's self-evident that it's the best, so why would we need a thread validating it?

This is stupid because you are arguing against your own straw man of my position. I never said rationality is “the best practice”: practice of what? I, likewise, am not even claiming it is inherently, in-itself, the “best practice” of epistemology: I am saying that the inherent hypothetical imperative to epistemology favors rationality as the best means of achieving it.

I said it was possible for a serial killer's actions to be considered rational

Let me clarify. If you accept that a serial killer can be rational and it is morally wrong to be a serial killer, then rationality precludes morality. Now, please tell me which antecedent you disagree with, so we can further this discusion.

It sounds like your response is that it is possible because morality is about what is best for the group: now you are just importing your specific normative ethical theory into this, of which, in this case, I disagree with; but I do not see how it is relevant for us to now argue about our different ethical theories. First, I want to know what benefit there is to including moral considerations in the term “rationality”, and then we can dive into ethical theories if we want to.

It's not unbiased, it's not fair, and the concept is rigged against the serial killer - though mind you, most people are fine with that.

As I have defined it (which has no moral considerations), it isn’t rigged; so the crux between our positions is that you seem to think it needs to include moral considerations, and I don’t. Why do you think it needs moral considerations?

If you wanted to know what instrumental rationality is, how about, GOOGLING it? What the heck... I'm not the first person to bring it up to you.

I don’t want to know (right now): it isn’t relevant. I want you to engage with what I am saying, and not whatever instrumentalist rationalism says.

Ah, is that so? You said yourself that nobody can be 100% perfectly rational, which should invalidate it as a binary, does it not?

Not at all. I said nothing that denies the law of noncontradiction.

Rationality is just an idea, it can have flaws, well, at least if you define it reasonably, which you haven't.

I never said my definition is flawless.

I would also like to mention that the primary focus of the OP is not the definition rationality: you have just hyper-focused on it: the argument is that there are objective epistemic norms.

Hello Judaka,

Based off of your response, I do not think this discussion is going to be productive. I think I put in the effort to address all of your points and, instead of reciprocating that effort, you resorted to primarily re-voicing your distaste for my definition (with no real substantive response).

I am going to briefly respond to your points, but if you are unwilling to engage with my previous response, then I think we may have to just agree to disagree.

Yes, well, as I said, you're describing instrumental rationality.

This is may be true, but I do not know what this “instrumental rationality” is that you are referring to; and, thusly, will not endorse it. I am saying what I am saying, and if it happens to coincide with some position I have never heard of, then that’s fine.

I didn't amend anything, I merely said it was unlikely and then gave some if statements.

You said:

It's unlikely that a psychopath's desire to kill would qualify as rational, though it's possible. If they understood their actions were wrong, considering that morality is of the highest importance, we couldn't say their actions aligned with their beliefs and values, which is a prerequisite to rationality.

Your justification for it not counting as rational, which is imperative for your position to work, is the hypothetical that they understood their actions were wrong; which was not a part of my example: that’s what you amended. If this was just a hypothetical side-note, then please respond with how the psychopath’s rational murdering is irrational. You seem to just be saying, by my lights, that it is immoral, but why would that have any affect on the rationality of it?

Your definition is so vague, that I'd be surprised if you couldn't fit whatever you wanted into it. Hence why I called it a form of "good".

You cannot fit anything into it: it is a very clear definition. If one is acting in agreement with reality, then they are fundamentally behaving in a rational manner. Any principles derived from this obligation or taste to ‘act in agreement with reality’ is likewise a part of ‘being rational’.

You're entitled to your opinion, but you'll get pushback from others.

That is fine, but I am wanting to know your push back.

This is just linguistics. You're behaving as though your definition was earned, given to the term rationality because it really deserves it. Have you forgotten that you just made it up...?

Logical, actual, and metaphysical necessity are not mere ‘linguistics’: they are modes of modality.

All definitions are ‘made up’, but that doesn’t mean they are whimsical or arbitrary.

What do you mean by ‘earned’? My definition is meant to best portray, at its root, what rationality is and I think it captures it quite well. I was never claiming to have provided every principle that can be derived therefrom.

There's zero ambiguity here, it's never good to fail to act in a manner that 'agrees with reality", there's no merit to it. Not epistemologically, morally, logically or in any other way.

Logic does not comment on the merit of arguments other than its form, so what do you mean by it has no merit to it if it abides by logical laws?

I already accepted that it is epistemically good; and any moral merit is just an irrelevant importation of you own ethical theory.

And you've decided these are the two options? Rationality or irrationality? Get a bit more creative.

I am not sure what you are implying here: either something is p or it is not p; so either something is rational or it is not rational.

Ahh... by the way, you won't be able to succeed in this if you keep your current definition of rationality. Perhaps just try to think about rationality through its tenants instead.

The tenants of rationality are not the same as its definition: they are examples of it. I gave the definition.

I appreciate your elaboration of your view! As I believe now that our views are not so apart as we originally thought.

I agree with a lot (although not all) of the tenants you voiced about “rationality”, as I would consider them coherently derived from my definition: let me explain.

Logical thinking - One should think logically, and avoid unhelpful emotional and psychological influences

Why does thinking logically entail being rational? Because, I would argue, it is means (an act) which agrees with reality when one is trying to derive something. In other words, if they want to derive something, then it is most rational to be logical because it agrees with reality; and, for example, why it is irrational to think in accordance with “if it is has the property of blueness, then it is true: if not, then it is false” is because it doesn’t agree with reality: blueness is not a property that determines, in reality, the truthity of a proposition.

Goal-driven thinking - One acts in accordance with their goals

Why is goal-driven thinking rational? Because, in reality, one has to start with their will when performing anything; so it agrees best with reality to understand what one’s goals really are (so that, for example, they don’t waste a bunch of time).

Logical Consistency - One acts in accordance with their values and beliefs

I don’t agree with this one for two reason:

1. Logical consistency is not “one” acting “in accordance with their values and beliefs”: it is to not hold any logical contradictions in one’s beliefs.

2. Acting in accordance with one’s values and beliefs, to me, is subsumed under “goal-driven thinking”.

Hierarchical Thinking - One follows 2) but prioritises goals and values in order of importance

Again: it is rational to do this because it agrees with reality. If prioritizing things was merely a reflection of whimsical imagination, then it would not be rational to do so when trying to perform actions, or actualize goals, in reality.

Reflection and Openmindedness - One aims to improve their thinking and decision-making

This is rational because, as you can anticipate, it provides the person with a better understanding of the world, which, in turn, is predicated on the goal to agree with reality. If one doesn’t care about agreeing with reality, then they may very well decide to be close-minded—to stick to whatever belief they like and stand ten toes down.

Ethical Considerations - Rational decision-making should take into account ethical principles and moral values.

No (: This is a hard no for me. Again, a psychopath can kill people in a highly rational (as in carefully planned, logically consistent, goal-oriented, coherent, effective, etc.). Which leads me to briefly respond to:

It's unlikely that a psychopath's desire to kill would qualify as rational, though it's possible. If they understood their actions were wrong, considering that morality is of the highest importance, we couldn't say their actions aligned with their beliefs and values, which is a prerequisite to rationality.

You have amended the originally example I gave in a manner that fundamentally changes it: you are positing that the psychopath themselves believe that they are doing something wrong. Of course, a person who does something they think is wrong (in its most primitive sense of the term) is being irrational because they are contradicting themselves.

However, my example made no such stipulation: a psychopath could believe it is perfectly right (or at least permissible) to do horrific things to other people; and they can do so in a highly rational manner. This is no different than anyone else who deploys principles of which they think highly agree with reality to achieve their goals.

Their actions have risks such as imprisonment or death, if one understands the risks of an action outweigh the potential rewards, then by definition, pressing ahead anyway would be irrational.

I agree that if the reward does not outweigh the risk, then it does seem (at least prima facie) to be irrational to do so. However, two things to note:

1. It is not self-apparent that the psychopath’s reward of thrill and gory action against countless victims does not outweigh the risk of being put in prison (from their perspective).

2. The reward is subjective in most scenarios; that is, how rewarding an action is is usually based heavily on one’s personality. So, for me, it may be that I don’t find the reward outweighing the risk, but someone else could and would be still rational.

Ok, back to your tenants:

7) Acknowledging Biases - One should aim to think objectively, be mindful of the potential for biased thinking and aim to focus on the facts

This is only rational because it is a principle which attempts to agree with reality: in this case, to try to know the world better by attempting to remove the bias lens of subjective interpretation.

Evidence-based Thinking - One should ensure their thinking has sufficient evidence to be justifiable

This is rational because it is the best way of agreeing with reality (in action). If I want to know something, then the best way to know (something about reality) is to evaluate the evidence. If this were not true, then this would not be rational to do.

In summary, I think that your tenants are derived from my over-arching definition of rationality.

Rationality has an important role in morality, because within philosophy, morality is overriding, it's of the highest priority

I am not denying that morality supervenes on epistemology but, rather, that what one ought to do to know the world is distinctly and completely different, in principle, from what one ought to do for the sake of being ethical. Thusly, to be rational is purely an epistemic consideration; but it may be that certain rational behaviors are banned for moral reasons.

Are you honestly saying that it's not epistemologically good to "act in a manner that agrees with reality"?

It is, but you weren’t claiming that before: you were claiming that it is “good”.

You've set up rationality as inherently good with your definition, have you not?

I wouldn’t say it is inherently good whatsoever; but I would say it is i]epistemically[/i] good and not (necessarily) morally good. This is because what I need to do to know the world may not coincide with what I need to do to behave ethically; and rationality is only epistemically good because it is the best means of achieving knowledge, and the definition itself does not entail an inherent goodness of any sort. It is good as a biproduct of what epistemology is set out to do: to know the world.

It's not conditionally good, it's necessarily good.

Rationality is conditioned to be epistemically good by what epistemology is set out to accomplish, which is to know. It is not logically, actually, nor metaphysically necessary that it is good.

No soul under any circumstances would consider being called irrational praise, especially not with your definition.

This is just an reflection of the colloquial usage of “rationality”: of course, it is an insult in every day-to-day talk to be called irrational; but that doesn’t lend any weight to your argument that rationality as I defined it is inherently good.

How unfortunate, you're contrasting rationality against nonsense.

Irrationality is nonsense.

Or in other words, why do I need to act in a manner that agrees with reality to know the world?

Because in order to know the world one has to deploy principles which agree with it.

It's pretty much the other way around, I need to know the world to act in a manner that agrees with it.

This is a good point, and I think there are two things worthy of pointing out here:

1. You rightly point out that one cannot just inherently know how to agree with reality; but my point is that that is what people who are engaging in epistemology are trying to do! They are, in other words, attempting to agree with reality to know it; for one cannot come to know reality by using principles which do not hold for anything in reality: it is like using an instrument that doesn’t work. I would say that rationality is all about, at its core, agreeing with reality in this way; and that rational people are always taking in the world as input, processes it, and attempting to come up with principles which will help them better process the information.

2. No one, under my definition, is perfectly rational: not even if they did every tenant you can think of 100% of the time. This is because one can never absolutely know that their actions 100% agree with reality. That belief of agreement is pragmatic (i.e., evidence-based) reasoning. We can only ever strive to to be perfectly rational.

Make no mention of acts, logic or goals, limit your definition to knowledge if that's all you want to talk about.

Actions, logic, and goals are all pertinent to epistemology, and are not precluded nor excluded by the practice.

"normative" is "the normal way”

Normativity, as I understand it, is etymologically “the normal way” but means something which is a prescriptive statement (e.g., ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘obligated to’, etc.) and not merely what is “normal” in society. Granted, sociologically people tend to use it in the “normal to society” manner.

As in, there are other ways of interpreting rationality besides the normal way. My only meaning is that l I'm saying your understanding isn't normal.

Fair enough!

Hello Judaka,

It seems as though we are thinking of “rationality” in completely different ways, which is fine! What would be the fun in us simply agreeing? (;

Although I am going to address your points as adequately as possible, I would like to ask you to define and elaborate on, likewise, what you think “rationality” is; that way, I can assess and compare our views more sufficiently.

Your definition can't be taken literally, as it wouldn't make sense

I am failing to see why it doesn’t make sense when taken literally: could you please elaborate on what wouldn’t make sense if taken literally?

You've said this isn't just "good", great, prove me wrong. I struggle to imagine you can come up with one because I can't understand why it would ever be good to not "act in a manner that agrees with reality". Could you give me an example of where it would be?
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I hadn't intended "good" to refer to "moral goodness". Your "good" is unknown to me, it's just clear that your definition is a version of "good".

Firstly, I honestly don’t know to interpret a generic goodness. Although I don’t think this is what you are asking (because of the last section of the above quote), if you are asking how one could consider it morally bad to “act in a manner that agrees with reality”, then I would say that literally any position that one could hold that posits such would be an example. For example, it is perfectly compatible with my OP for one to also posit that it is morally abhorrent to be “rational” (in the sense I defined); or for a psychopath to systematically kill people in a highly rational manner.

In the sense of epistemic goodness, although I may have misspoke in a previous post, I would say that the “goodness” is the result of accepting the hypothetical imperative to “determine how to know”; and from this is where epistmology stems (and the epistemic norms therein and rationality).

In the sense of another category or type of goodness, I genuinely do not know what to make of it without further clarification. What exactly do you mean by this?

I've called your definition another way of saying "good" because I'm confident you think it's always "good" to act in a manner that agrees with reality.

What is “good”, if I were to allow myself to contemplate this generic goodness without fully understanding it yet, in its most trivial sense, is just what one thinks one ought to do; and if you think that you ought to act in a manner that agrees with reality, then, yes, it would be good. However, in this sense, “goodness” is trivial: I can say of any definition of any verb, for example, that it is “good” insofar as I think I ought to be performing that action—but the definition of the verb is not presuming that it is in-itself good as a matter of definition. I would say that being rational is an objective consequence of engaging in epistemology, and that the definition of it has nothing to do, in-itself, with it being good. In other words, being rational is good if one is engaging in epistemology (or committed themselves to some sort of moral imperative).

Meaning, you will not be willing to refer to anything that you thought wasn't good as "acting in a manner that agrees with reality"

Couple things that standout to me in this sentence:

1. Whether I think being rational is good (in any sense of the term) is irrelevant to its definition in the OP.

2. I could, as a hypothetical, claim that it is (morally) bad to be rational, or that one can be rationally evil because the definition is morally neutral itself.

Do you see my logic? Your definition almost certainly divides between good and bad, and that's seemingly the only thing it does.

I don’t see how it, by definition, divides between moral goodness vs. badness, and it being epistemically good is not the definition of it but, rather, a biproduct “rationality” being an essential element of epistemology.

How is the division between some good vs. bad “the only thing it does”?

Objectively better? Could you elaborate? Do you have any evidence to back up your claim?

There are objectively better norms for “knowing the world”; that is, there are better ways, independent of minds (i.e., of “opinions”, of “subjects”, etc.), to come to know reality.

An easy way to think of this is that if there weren’t any better ways to “know something”, then any explanation is valid. Thusly, I can say that I know that “this is green” because “a square circle told me”; that “cucumbers are on mars” because “I like the idea of that”; that you are wrong because “1+1=2” (and somehow that makes you wrong); etc.

Epistemology entails that one is engaging in intellectual investigation that tries to figure out what actually exists, and this implies that there are betters ways of knowing. These ways are not just subjectively better, it is objectively (epistemically) wrong to claim that “cucumbers are on mars” merely because “I like that idea” because it violates this attempt to know the world (as opposed to what we want the world to be).

you are definitely understanding rationality in your own way. I had been assuming much based on my understanding of normative rationality, but it's clear that doesn't apply to you.

We clearly do not think of rationality in the same way, and that is why I would appreciate it if you elaborated more on your view (so that I can better respond to your inquiries). For me, the only kind of rationality is normative, so when you say “normative rationality” it makes me anticipate that you may believe that there is a non-normative mode of being rational: is that true?

Hello Judaka,

Aren't (3) and (4) key components of rationality?

I would say that all four epistemic norms (I expounded) are key to being rational.

Your definition of rationality is terrible, "acting in a manner that agrees with reality". You're really going to refer to "agrees with reality" as being "objectively grounded"?

I am not entirely sure what you mean here: yes, acting in a manner that agrees with reality is the general definition I use. The epistemic principles which are used to do so are objectively better or worse then other epistemic principles one could use to try and do so; and so rationality, being grounded in those norms, is likewise grounded in objective norms.

The manner of acting that can be referred to as "agrees with reality" is just "good".

This is a semantic association that I did not want to use for the OP (because it isn’t necessary). Objective epistemic norms provide an epistemic “goodness” but not a moral goodness.

The act of agreeing with reality (i.e., being “rational”) is epistemically “good” because it is an objectively better means of “knowing the world”, which is a hypothetical imperative that one has committed themselves to the very moment they engage in epistemology.

That which is sensible, efficient, or appropriate, is what can be referred to as "agreeing with reality"

No. That which is “appropriate” or “sensible”, is going to depend on the person or society and I am not arguing that any sort of individual or collective agreement itself proves a principle to be objective (epistemically).

That which is “efficient” could be an aspect of being rational, if by that you mean parsimonious, coherent, logically consistent, etc.

So, it's objectively good to be things that by definition can only refer to things that are good?

Couple things:

1. I am not saying that one should be things that agree with reality: I am saying that one should act in a manner that agrees with reality.

2. It is not objectively morally good but, rather, epistemically good to be rational.

3. I don’t understand what you mean by “by definition can only refer to things that are good”: being “rational” is not itself what is “good” here but, rather, the epistemic norms provide the “good” and rationality is guided (or compelled to) that epistemic “goodness”.

Contrast rationality with a reasonable alternative.

What do you mean? A reasonable alternative definition?

Setting up rationality as "good" and then talking about how it's good to be good, that's pointless.

I never used the term “good” nor did I imply that rationality is just by definition "good": you are countering your own straw man of my argument.

Hello 180 Proof,

I assume, @Bob Ross, you will take issue with this paraphrase and so I look forward to you making explicit its problems or confusions.

I do, in fact, take issue with the “paraphrase” (:

Here’s my contentions:

1. It is a not a paraphrase of the OP but, rather, applies the OP to a specific metaethical & normative ethical position.

2. Specific metaethical or/and normative ethical positions are irrelevant to the OP’s argument, as, according thereto, there are objective epistemic norms simply due to the nature of epistemology.

3. A “hypothetical imperative (of reducing suffering…)” being a “presupposition of ethics” has no relevance to there being a hypothetical imperative of epistemology. There could be moral facts or no moral facts, and there would still be the hypothetical imperative of “one should determine how to know [the world]” which is implicitly accepted when engaging in epistemology.

4. Moral facts are useless. See here for details.

5. Moral facts could certainly impact how one engages in epistemology, but they wouldn’t themselves generate (by my lights) epistemic normative facts—they would only ever produce more moral facts (of which influence, at a deeper level, one’s epistemic commitments to some degree).

6. Although this is going to come down to what you mean by “rationality”, I would say that rationality is not deeply rooted in ethical principles. For example, a psychopath can systematically kill people in an extremely rational fashion.

It seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, you ground rationality purely in ethics and not epistemology (and I do the opposite).

I look forward to hearing your reply 180 Proof!

I appreciate your response! Everything you said I found to be fair enough!

I was not meaning to imply that the evidence against one's intuitions must come from beyond oneself; as I agree that one should be actively trying to "attack" their own intuitions. However, they will only be able to critique their intuitions, or even change their minds, by accepting new (or other) intuitions; and so intuitions, I would say, are still primary even in the case that one is critically thinking about them.

Heading into the bush for a few days; not sure of cell coverage, so…. forewarned.

Absolutely no worries, my friend!

Negative on both. Moral obligations begin with interest in a principle, and one SHALL, not merely SHOULD DESIRE to, abide by a categorical imperative the principle determines….in order to declare himself an moral agent that is worthy of his happiness.

Interesting! Couple questions:

1. How is "begin with interest in a principle" different from "moral obligations begin with tastes"? You contended the latter, but affirmed the former; and I am just having a hard time understanding how those are different claims.

2. What are you semantically distinguishing with "shall" vs. "should desire"?

I would say that "certainty", in the sense of absolute--beyond a doubt--confidence of the truth of a proposition, is only a derivative of uncertain reasoning, as it is defined by an inductive commitment to the principles of logic. Thusly, the truth of a proposition is said to be (absolutely) certain iff it is logically impossible for it to be false.

Therefore, only what is deduced from the inductively ascertained grounds of logic is said to be certain. Such as, for example, 'a = a'.

For me, consequently, absolute certainty only pertains to the form of an argument and never its content; and only certain principles of that form which I inductively commit myself to.

In the sense of some sort of absolute certainty, some absolute ground, from which one can begin their reasoning, I find it to be non-existent. One is only afforded degrees of confidence at the roots of their derivations.

Hello Alkis Piskas,

I think we may be reaching a semantic dead-end here, but let me try to adequately respond.

I am using the term “proposition” in these two senses that you provided:

Logic: A statement in which something is affirmed or denied, so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
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A proposition in philosophy is the statement or conjecture which can be analyzed for its truth value.

This is exactly what I defined it as here:

Philosophically, a proposition is a statement that is truth-apt

Now, something important I wanted to clear up:

Both expressions "to be" and "can be" refer to a future action

To say that it “can be analyzed for its truth value” is just to say that it is truth-apt. This does not imply whatsoever that the proposition expresses a statement concerning the past or present, but, rather, that it expresses something that is either true or false (and not both).

"to be" refers to existence, which does not entail any particular tense, but I can agree that "can be" refers to something in the future in a practical sense.

In fact, these definitions are not much different than the what I discribed earlier.

It is incredibly different, you said:

A proposition is something that is suggested to be considered, accepted or done. It clearly refers to the future

Propositions do not exclusively express a truth-apt sentence about the future.

See, you don't make a proposition for the sake of the proposition itself, and just forget about it.

The point of a proposition, in philosophy (of logic), is to define a form of expression (i.e., a sentence) that expresses something which can be evaluated as true or false (i.e., truth-apt) in the sense that it depicts something that is either true or false (and not that a person has the physical or mental capabilities to evaluate it properly).

I was never suggesting that we create a proposition for the sake of itself, nor that we forget about them.

Can you fit this term in any of the descriptions of the term "proposition"?

Firstly, I am not saying that “fact” is synonymous with “proposition”, so I don’t have to fit it into any of the definitions.

Secondly, it “fits” insofar as I noted before:

a ‘fact’ is a proposition of which its content appropriately agrees/corresponds to reality

In other words, a ‘fact’ is a statement which is truth-apt, of which went evaluated agrees with reality with regards to what it claims about it.

Nothing of these is a proposition. They are just information about things that happened or happen are are going to happen. That is either facts (past and present) or expectations (future). There is nothing in them that proposes anything.

We may just have to agree to disagree, but I can assure you all of those are text-book examples of propositions in philosophy. See https://www.cs.odu.edu/~toida/nerzic/content/logic/prop_logic/proposition/proposition.html#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20%22Grass%20is%20green,and%20the%20second%20%22false%22.

We can't say, e.g. " I propose that Bob went to the store yesterday”, or "I propose that Bob is eating” or "I propose that Bob is going to eat”. They all sound ridiculous, don't they

Those aren’t propositions!

Firstly, saying “I propose...” is a proposal, not a proposition. Saying you propose something just means that you are hypothesizing or asserting something, and what you are asserting is the proposition. “Bob went to the store yesterday” is the proposition being proposed in the sentence “I propose that ...”. Not all sentences are propositions.

Secondly, you have to be careful with indexical statements, as they do not refer, if taken as a proposition, to what you seem to think: “I think that Bob went to the store yesterday” is not the same as “Bob went to the store yesterday”--the former pertains to whether or not the person-at-hand thinks that bob went, and the latter pertains to if bob actually went (and not to mention that the former’s truthity is relative to the subject being considered, so it could be true for me and false for you if I do think bob went and you don’t).

OK, we can go on forever if you keep trying to milk the bull.
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anyone would have the patience to do ... But my patience is over.

Absolutely no worries, my friend! I do not want you to be frustrated with me, and if I am convinced by your argumentation then I will gladly concede (as I am not trying to “milk it”); but, with all due respect, I don’t think you right about propositions at all. In philosophy, the term “proposition” means something very specific, it is not a proposal.

A proposition is something that is suggested to be considered, accepted or done.

Philosophically, a proposition is a statement that is truth-apt and not merely something “suggested to be considered, accepted, or done”.

It clearly refers to the future.

Not at all. A proposition can be about the past (e.g, “bob went to the store yesterday”), present (e.g., “bob is eating”), future (e.g., “bob is going to eat”), tenseless expressions (e.g., “bob went to the store on Friday, December 23rd, 2022 at 5:55 a.m.”), or atemporal expressions (e.g., “God is [eternally and timelessly] good”).

The only qualification for something being a proposition (in philosophy) is that it is truth-apt, which are statements.

A fact on the other hand refers to something that is present or in the past.

In practical life, I agree; but this depends on one’s theory of time. If one considers the future to not exist yet, then, yes, facts must pertain to the present or past. However, if one considers the future to exist equally as much as the present and the past, then there are “currently” facts about the future. Also, if one believes in atemporal entities, then those would be facts which do not pertain to the present or past. Either way, I don’t think it matters for this discussion, as I am saying that if these “moral principles” exist (mind-independently), then that qualifies them as facts.

I'm afraid that you must choose a term/concept other than "fact" for your posit. It will be much better than altering its meaning to fit your posit. Don't you think?

I don’t think I am altering the philosophical senses of the terms at all here.

From what I could understand from your description, maybe the term/concept of "thought" will do ....

I am not arguing that morals are concepts of thought, I am generically discussing the metaethical debate about moral facts (i.e., moral realism) vs. non-facts (i.e., moral anti-realism) and noting that even if the former is right it is so insignificant that it doesn’t matter.