Hello @Philosophim,

You have brought up some very thought-provoking points and, thusly, it has taken me some time to really give it its due. I realized, with aid of your contentions, that the synthetic/analytical distinction is also not actually directly exposing what I want (just as, I would argue, the applicable/distinctive distinction isn't) and, therefore, I can no longer invoke it legitimately to convey my position. Consequently, I was forced to really dive into what I am actually trying to convey and, therein, really clearly define each fundamental building block. So, I now going to share with you what I believe to be a much more clear, distinct representation of what I am trying to convey (but of course it could not be as well (: ).

As a general overview, I still do not think (as I alluding to above) either a/s or a/d properly convey the distinction I am addressing and, quite frankly, I don't think it quite explicates properly what you are trying to convey either. I think both distinctions are missing the mark: in hindsight, the a/s more than a/d. It is like at prima facea a/d makes sense, but at a deeper evaluation it diverges from the rightful distinction. Let's dive in.

First I need to start my derivation not at the distinction I want to convey but at the groundings, fundamentals, of everything. That is, a deeper analysis of reason to determine, recursively, what is occurring across all instantiations (because reason is the focal point of all derivation, I think we would agree on that at least generically). If this endeavor is accomplished, then I submit to you that it will be relevant, at the very least, to your epistemology as it would be the protocol by which all else conforms.

I think that, although I am open for suggestions, there are two groups of fundamentals worth mentioning right now: the most fundamental and some sub-distinctions therein. It is important to note, before I begin deriving and defining them, that I only giving ordering in terms of those groups and not in terms of the items therein: in the case of the most fundamental I am not particularly convinced one can make a meaningful order and in the case of the sub-distinctions therein I don't find it relevant at this point to parse it.

Most Fundamental:
In the case of the most fundamental, they are as follows:

- The principle of non-contradiction (PoN): subject concept which is not in contradiction by its predicate.
- Negatability: the ability to conceive of the direct opposite (contradiction) of a given concept.
- Will: a motive.
- Connectivity: the ability to construct connections via connectives.
- Connective: a concept which relates two other concepts in some manner (relations).
- Spatiotemporality: the spatiotemporal inevitable references of concepts.

These are the fundamentals which are such because they are the utmost (or undermost) conceptions that one can derive. Any other concept is thereafter.

It is important to note that by "spatiotemporal" I am not referring to "space and time" (as in two separate distinctions) but more as "space and time juxtaposed as one". Time and space cannot be separated in a literal sense.

Sub-distinctions Therein
There are two sub-groups worth mentioning at this time. First is the sub-group of connectivity:

- Possibility: a predicate which does not contradict its subject concept.
- Necessity: a predicate which is true of all possibilities of its subject concept.
- Impossibility: a predicate which contradicts its subject concept.
- Conditional (Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in some sort of dependency. This includes, but is not limited to, biconditionals (IFF) and uniconditionals (IF).
- Unconditional (Not Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in a manner that has no dependency (e.g. the connection that A and B are not related is a relation determined by a connective which dictates their unconditioned nature).
- Communal: two concepts share a concept.

The second relevant sub-group is of spatiotemporality:

- Quantity: A concept which is numerable. Such as "particular", "singular", "three", etc.
- Quality: A concept which is innumerable. Such as degrees on a spectrum from 0 to 1.

Immediate Productions of The Fundamentals and Sub-distinctions
Now, from those fundamentals, along with the understanding of the relevant sub-distinctions therein, arises immediate processes of reason which are identifiable, which are:

- Concepts
- Properties
- References
- Contexts
- Conflations
- Conceptual Conflations
- Contextual Conflations
- NOTE: probably many more, but the aforementioned are the relevant ones.

These immediate processes, derived ultimately from the fundamentals, are, in fact, arranged in order (unlike the two groups I mentioned previously) as their definitions rely on the previous to understand each other. They are what I would consider the "fundamentals" which can be constructed given the actual fundamentals (previously explicated).

Concepts:
A "concept" is spatiotemporal connection(s) composed of spatiotemporal connection(s).

E.g. Concept A is comprised of other concepts:

NOTE: apparently philosophy forum strips white space characters and won't let me upload any images, so I am going to have to represent by diagrams a bit odder.

'=' will be assigning operator
'[ ]' will be a set
'&' will be a reference operator
'<=>' biconditional operator
'( )' order of operations

A = [P1, P2]

Properties:
A "property" is a concept, P, which is connected (related) to another concept, C, in a manner of necessity as one of C's comprised parts. In the above example, P1 and P2 are properties of A.

References:
A "reference" is a connective, R, which connects its concept to another separate concept, wherein "separate concept" entails that the given concept is not a property of the other concept.

Concept A, which has two properties, is referencing concept B, which has a property that is not equal to either of A's:

B = [P3]
A = [P1, P2, &B]

Contexts:
A reference which dictates its concept as conditional on another concept in the manner of IFF (biconditional).

There are two concepts defined as A, but each is biconditionally referenced to concept B and C respectively (B and C would thereby be considered contexts):

B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

It is important to note that the properties of both A's must be different, otherwise it is not a biconditional and, therefore, not a context.

Conflations:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties or/and references (see subsequent examples).

Conceptual Conflations:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties.

A = [P1, P2]
B = [P3, P4]

Conflation: B has property P1 because A has property P1.

Contextual Conflation:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their references.

B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

Contextual Conflation: A from C has property P1 because A from B has property P1.

Brief Explanation:
The entire point of the previous derivation is so that I can more accurately and precisely convey my point of view and is not in any way meant to derail the conversation into a discussion about a different epistemology (although it inevitably sort of requires such insofar as it is my position). To keep this brief, let me elaborate on my previous definitions in contrast to your epistemology:

Advantages Over Your Epistemology

Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto.

Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. In relation to concepts, dissolving of the distinction of "distinctive" vs "applicable" resolves a lot of issues, such as the fact that contextual conflations can occur in distinctive knowledge which seems, in your epistemology, to be an exemption wherein no conflations can occur. Take the elephant example, here's your response:

Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.

The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case).

The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible".

Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. Thereafter, we can easily explain and justify the validity of what you are meaning to distinguish with "possibility". We simply need to provide the concepts of "reality" and "self" (for example) and demonstrate that the two concepts have at least one different properties and, therefore, they are two different subject concepts. Therefore, it would be a conceptual conflation to relate a predicate to both by mere virtue of them being considered synonymous (because they aren't). It is important to note here, as I have defined it, that this would not be a contextual conflation but a conceptual conflation. This is because the approach previously mentioned is differentiating the two concepts by means of their properties and not their references to other concepts. If it were the case that "reality" referenced a context and "reality" referenced a different context, then the use of a predicate for both in virtue of being synonymous would be a contextual conflation. But in the case of comparing properties, the conflation is not occurring contextually. To be clear, a "conceptual conflation" occurs by means of properties and "contextual conflations" by means of references.

Further, notice that properties, as I defined them, are only essential (because they are utilizing a connection of the nature of necessity) and never accidental (unessential). I think this nicely portrays what the mind really does: if something is an accidentally property, what is actually happening is the mind is determining the accidental property to be "possible" (as I defined it) and therefore noting that the given concept could reference another concept but it is not necessitous. For example, if concept A has one property of "being circular" (to keep it simple) and concept B has one property of "being green", then it is "possible" for A "to be green" (reference concept B: A = [..., &B]) because "being green" does not contradict A. Now, what you are noting, and rightfully so, is that A referenced in the concept of "reality", so to speak, cannot be conflated with a reference to "imagination", which really looks like:

Reality <=> (A = [Circular])
Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

A contextual conflation arises if one were to claim X of Imagination's A in virtue of Reality's A (and vice-versa) because of the referential difference (even though they are the same conceptually in this case, so there's no conceptual conflation). Likewise:

Reality <=> (A = [Green, Circular])
Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

This would be a referential and conceptual conflation if one were to claim X of one in virtue of the other. In this case the conceptual conflation would determine that the concepts of A are not synonymous when compared with each other (in their contexts). Which I think is important as well.

I think, overall, this really gets at the fundamental situation of reason and how it operates, which is the pinnacle in relation to a given subject.

As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. Which I think is important to note that the epistemology is never complete, only consistent. The most fundamental is that which is apodictic.

The last thing I will say is that I can see how this all, at prima facea, seems like I really used what your epistemology states to even derive these terms (e.g. I "created" definitions and applied them without contradiction). However, I actually think that the previously mentioned process is what occurs as the fundamental building block of reason (at least human reason) and your epistemology happens to align with it pretty nicely, but the subtle but vital differences required me to really derive and explicate my position to figure out what wasn't quite adding up for me: I think mine explicates the situation more clearly and precisely. Hopefully that makes sense.

In terms of your post, I am now going to try to respond to what I think is still relevant to our conversation, but feel free to prompt me to respond to anything you think I left out.

I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties.

I would define synonyms as two concepts which have the same properties, where property is connected as necessary. Apart from the obvious difference in semantics, the important part is that non-essential properties no longer exist: they are references to other concepts determined by "possibility".

But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive.

applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions:

Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty.

I see this as a direct contradiction. Which I think is resolved in my position because we no longer need a/d.

No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.

I think that I was wrong to think the distinction needed to be contextual conflations, it is actually simply conflations in general (both).

No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction.

In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. There's a difference between stating "I believe it will rain" and "I don't know if it will rain". The former is an induction, the latter could be either: both are expressing uncertainty. The latter is not a hypothesis, it is a certainty of uncertainty (assuming it was deduced). if I state "IF it rains, THEN ...", I may not be claiming that I "believe" it will rain, I could be claiming "I do not know either way" which is not an induction. That's my only point.

Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.

I still think hume's problem of induction isn't really answered here. But I completely understand and agree that the most rational thing to do is the hierarchy of inductions. But more on that later as this is very long.

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Well I have clearly missed the mark yet again ): It seems as though we are not semantically disagreeing but, rather, fundamentally disagreeing. I understand now that you are by no means making a synthetic/analytic distinction. It is becoming exceedingly difficult to map d/a to s/a because, quite frankly, they aren't the same distinction. However, I am making that kind of s/a distinction (as opposed to d/a), so I want to clarify that my usage of a/s hereafter isn't meant as a depiction of your distinction but, rather, of mine in contrast to yours.

Are the names I made very good. Probably not. I'm not great with coming up with names! I like distinctive, as it flowed nicely from discrete experience. "Applicable" is probably not very good, but I'm not sure what else to call it. I view words as place holders for concepts, and I view placeholders as contextual. As long as the word works in some sense within this context, that's fine by me. I see it as "Applying distinctive knowledge" to something other than itself.

But I am very open to new naming! Perhaps creative and comparative knowledge? Identity knowledge and confirmable? Dynamic and static? The problem of course with all of these comparisons is if you interpret the word meaning a particular contextual way, they don't quite work either. The contextual implication of the words in their general use gets in the way when trying to apply them in context to the argument. The reality is, the knowledge I'm proposing has never existed before. Its a concept no one (I have read) has proposed. So perhaps I need new words entirely and should research some latin.

People are indeed diverse, and I can definitely see how some people simply either don't engage with refurbished terminology or misunderstand your points due to the previous definitions of the terminology: fair enough. In that case, latin may be a good choice; Simply as a means of forcing them to understand the underlying meaning and so they don't get upset by the refurbishment of terms.

Out of the terms you suggested, I think "creative" and "comparative" was the closest to what I think you are trying to convey. But I think you are only constituting something as "applicable knowledge" if it is a match, with no relation to contrast (so comparative may not be the best word: "matched" might be, I am not sure). For example, if I begin the act of matching and thereby determine that concept A is not a match of concept B, then do I, under your terms, "applicably know" they aren't a match? In other words, is contrasting, as opposed to simply comparing similarities, an aspect of "application" in your terms? I am understanding you to more be making the distinction strictly in the sense that "a successful match" is "applicable knowledge".

...analytic expresses the contrary: "a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept" — Bob Ross


To compare to distinctive knowledge, we need to remove proposition, predicate, and subject.

I understand now that one would have to remove "proposition, predicate, and subject" to roughly map it onto "distinctive knowledge" because, quite frankly, we aren't speaking of the same distinction (which I previously thought was the case). To my understand, the fundamental reason for your distinction was meant to expose indexical conflations in a given claim presented by a subject . However, I think that I can achieve that underlying meaning, assuming I understood it right, by using the most fundamental distinction in terms of how reason works: a proposition (all reasoning beings are capable of such) wherein the predicate (all propositions must have a predicate, and therefore all claims made by a subject that must recognize the distinction of indexical relations must have a predicate) is contained (or not contained for the contrary) in its subject concept (all propositions must have a subject concept). If the sentence doesn't meet these fundamental underlying requirements, then the distinction I think you are trying to make isn't applicable anyways (by applicable I am not referring to your term, just normal use). Now, I want to clarify that I am not referring to diction, semantics, or syntax: those all can be contextually redefined (or defined) in terms of both societal and personal contexts. I am referring to the underlying concepts. The given individual doesn't have to call it a "predicate" nor do they have to syntactically abide by the english language, but they necessarily must have a "predicate" concept which refers, in terms of underlying meaning, to a predicate. If not, then it is incoherent to consider it in terms of indexical conflations (e.g. "oranges" therefore "oranges" makes no valid references, therefore it isn't possible to conflate anything that we would like to expose in terms of indexical conflations).

Here's some examples:

If I propose "B", it is not a proposition.

If I propose "B is", it is not a proposition.

If I propose "is blue", it is not a proposition.

If I propose "B is the same as A", then either B matches the definition of A or it does not. However, to know either way, I have to compare and contrast. This is the first issue I have with your terminology: I have to compare and contrast everything to know even if it is distinctive or applicable, but yet "applicable" is supposed to be the area in which I "match" (and potentially contrast?): which doesn't really fit the distinction that I think should be made. In the case that B is a match of the definition of A, then I recognize that there is not an indexical conflation occurring if I were to make claims about B which were derived from claims about A. You would call this "applicable knowledge". In the case that B does not match the definition of A, I recognize that it would be fallacious to make claims about B which were derived from claims about A. At first glance, it feels like that is what you mean by "applicable" and "distinctive", but I don't think it is holistically. I have to perform this for everything, which is the problem with your distinction. For example, if I distinctively define A and distinctively define B, but they are by happenstance defined the exact same, my conclusion that they are defined the same is a comparison of the two distinctively defined concepts, A and B, to derive that they are indeed a match: this didn't involve anything "outside of my control", so to speak. I think you would regardless consider it holistically in the realm of "distinctive knowledge", which I would disagree with. The concept that "concept A = concept B" is a different concept which is not contained in the subject concept of either A or B (therefore it is not analytical): it is a synthetic unity of both A and B under equivocation from matching their definitions all abstractly. The definition of A did not contain the necessity that the concept of B is equivocal to itself. I have to use both: I analytically unpack the definitions of A and B to then synthetically compare the two. Maybe I am just misunderstanding you (I probably am), but here's your definitions:

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.


Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.

It is tricky to map onto a/s because both distinctive and applicable are synthetic and analytic in their own regards: I am starting to see there's no line that can be drawn in the fashion I think you are trying to in order to provide a distinction that exposes indexical conflations.

Applicable knowledge does involve the creation of a new concept: the synthetic joining of "A = B", which is a separate concept from A and B. There was a concept A and a concept B, now there's a new concept that "A = B". This is not necessitated in the concepts A nor B, but yet true of them (i.e. it is synthetic). But there was an analysis that was required to determine "A = B" which was the analysis of what is contained in the concept A and, likewise, what is in the concept B, which is analytical. So both were used to obtain "applicable knowledge". I think this, as of now, is the true pinpoint of the distinction we are both really trying to portray (but I may be wrong, as always).

Both distinctive and applicable knowledge can be seen as the extension of one's creation on the world. A discrete experience (the rock) has no inherent properties that necessitate it be called anything. Distinctive knowledge is when we create those essential and accidental properties that allow it to be called a "rock". This is our creation upon the world. Upon finding finding a new discrete experience (potential rock) we attempt to match our definition of a "a rock" to "the discrete experience". If we deduce that the essential properties match, we have applicable knowledge that "the discrete experience" is a match to "A rock". This is another extension of our creation upon the world.

I think you are right and that is why I need to be careful with my verbiage: synthesis and analysis are both projections in a sense. However, in terms of a/s, there's a meaningful distinction between the joining of two concepts and what is contained within a given concept. Another reason why we are disagreeing here is because I am viewing the "matching" you described as synthetic and analytic. So matching "a rock" to the what is called "a rock" would be projection (the connection of concepts together) whereas the derivation of the properties of "the rock" would be analytical (which wouldn't be meaningfully depicted as projection, but technically would be in a sense). Projection probably isn't a good word here, so I am going to stop using it.

It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities.

I don't think this directly explicates the recognition of indexical conflations. It is more of a byproduct.

To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge.

I think that we start with analysis (which is empirical observation) and therefrom derive synthesis. I haven't found a way to neatly map this onto your d/a distinction. I don't think we always start with distinctive knowledge as you've defined it.

For example, take the concept of "A is equal to B" ("A = B"). To realize that I actually synthetically connected the concept of A and the concept of B in a relation of equivocation I must first analytically dissect the created concept of "A = B" to determine that there's a synthesis that occurred. Likewise, I could then counter myself with "well, bob, you just performed synthesis in determining that you analytically discover synthesis". And I would be correct, however I didn't realize that necessarily until after I analytically observed the claim (i.e. that I analyze to discover what is synthesized). I am always one step behind the synthesis, so to speak. Hopefully that made a bit of sense.

The act of experiencing a memory is part of the act of discrete experience itself. For example, "I remember seeing a pink elephant." Whether the memory is accurate when applied is irrelevant. It is the memory itself that is distinctive.

The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience: the conclusion that it is a remembrance of the past is not. It would be more like "I am imagining a pink elephant right now" as opposed to "I remember seeing a pink elephant before". The further consideration of whether it is a remembrance is synthetic as I am doing essentially "A = B". The discrete experience of the pink elephant would be analytic, at least prima facie, because it is simply analyzing what is contained in the concept. But any labeling would be synthetic of the contents of the concept.

"Pink elephant" combines our distinctive understanding of "pink" and "elephant".

The definitions of "pink" and "elephant" would be analytical. But the new concept of a "pink elephant" would be synthetic. The problem is that "pink", in isolation, is "distinctive knowledge". So there's no clear distinction here that "pink" -> therefore "pink elephant" is wrong because it doesn't enter the domain of "applicable knowledge". In other words, your epistemology essentially allows full knowledge claims in the realm of distinctive knowledge and emphasizes the incorrectness of indexical conflations, but yet the latter can occur in the former. Imagine I never imagined a "pink elephant" but, rather, I envisioned "pink", in isolation, and "an elephant" in isolation. If I then claimed "pink elephant", it would make just as little sense as envisioning a "pink elephant" and claiming "there's a pink elephant in my backyard". The a/s distinction, I think thus far, does the best job of constructing the most precise line that exposes indexical conflations holistically.

The hypothetical is a possible resolution to an induction. If there was no induction, there would be no hypothetical. The coin can land either heads or tails. We can hypothetically deduce that if it lands heads, X occurs, and if it lands tails, y occurs. But the hypothetical cannot exist without the induction as a source of alternative outcomes. A deduction leads to a necessary conclusion, not a hypothetical conclusion. Only inductions can lead to hypothetical conclusions. That's the whole point of the IF. If there was no uncertainty in the outcome, we would not need the IF. I don't think we're in disagreement here beyond semantics.

Unfortunately, I don't think we are merely semantically disagreeing on this either. I think you are conflating "uncertainty" with "induction". You can have deduced uncertainty. Therefore, a premise that is hypothetical is not necessarily, when stripped of its if conditional, an induction. It could be a deduction or an induction. If I say Premise 1 = IF X, I am not thereby implying necessarily that X is an induction. I could have deductively ascertained that I simply don't know if X is true, therefore I need an IF conditional to ensure that Premise 1 validates the form of the deduction.

To correct this, I am saying inductions are necessary premises to create a hypothetical deduction. The IF implies uncertainty. If you remove the IF, it is no longer a hypothetical, it is not a deduction.

I would refurbish this to "uncertainty is necessary to create a hypothetical deduction".

Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)

Again, I agree with this analogy, yet it doesn't prove that the hypothetical is an induction when the if conditional is removed: I might deductively not know whether or not the penny will land heads.

Can an induction ever resolve then? If I say, "I believe the next penny flip will land on heads" will I ever find out if I was correct in my guess? All I'm noting is how we figure out the outcome of the guess. That must be done applicably.

Yes, so with further contemplation, you can resolve an induction, but is resolved deduction -> induction (or induction <- deduction), not induction -> deduction. Again, this is implying to me the indexical conflation consideration: it seems to me you are implying, rightly so, that "a guess" entails uncertainty which entails that some sort of empirical observation (analysis) is required. I am simply noting that this is true of both "applicable" and "distinctive" knowledge. "a guess about A", G, implies that G is not contained in the concept of A, which was analytically ascertained and thereafter a new concept of "G != A" was synthetically created. Therefore, claims about A that are contained in A cannot be extended graciously to G: further empirical observation is required. This process can and does occur abstractly.

I'm simply noting the accuracy of the induction. I think you're taking two steps here, noting the accuracy of the induction, and then deciding to dispense or retain it. For example, I could deduce the penny lands on tails, but still insist it landed on heads by inventing some other induction like "an evil demon changed it", or simply not caring and insisting it landed on heads regardless of what I deduced. The second step of deciding to stick with or reject the induction is a step too far from what I'm saying. All I'm noting is the deduced outcome after the induction's prediction comes to pass.

Fair enough.

I have already concluded that you cannot make any knowledge claim about the future. You can only make inductions about the future. The smartest way to make inductions is to use the most cogent inductions we already know of. So we would make our decisions based on the hierarchy of the inductions we have at our disposal. Just because we can speculate that the rules of reality may change in the future, doesn't mean its possible they will. Since we know what is possible and probable, it is possible and probable they will continue to happen in the future.

Then I think you may be agreeing with me that we do not know that a possibility is more cogent than a speculation in the relation to the future, we only know that it is true of the past. The grounds of the induction hierarchy in relation to the future (which is the whole purpose of it is for the future) is an induction.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Firstly, I think your deduction is incorrect: you cannot deduce that 9 out of 10 are wrong. — Bob Ross


That's why I wrote "at least".
...
We are not talking about absolute certainty or even only 1 σ certainty. In the example we have at least 90% uncertainty (in reality much higher).

I apologize: I did not see that you wrote "at least", which is indeed an important distinction. However, I still think your deduction is incorrect. At least 9 out of 10 does not equate to 90% uncertainty: this would only be the case iff 10 is holistically the denominator that accurately represented the entire set of possibilities on the given subject; however your analogy is not postulating those 10 experts as proposing the only 10 possibilities in relation to the given subject. In other words, deducing that at least 9 out of 10 experts are incorrect, does not mean that any given expert is 90% certain they are incorrect: there is not a 90% chance they are incorrect.

To really hone in on this, let's take a trivial example of probability. There's three cards: two kings and an ace. As you are well aware, if they are randomly shuffled, then the odds of picking a king is 66%. To choose to guess that the card will be an ace is to deductively know that there's a 66% chance one is wrong. Most importantly, I think you are trying to use this in your example but this is not analogous to what you proposed (in analogy). This is because the sole reason that choosing to guess ace has a 66% chance of being wrong is because we deductively know that the only possibilities are those 3 cards., whereas in your example the 10 hypotheses are not the only possibilities.

That means no evidence, no argument could convince another. Being able to maintain the illusion of knowledge under those circumstances requires a lot of arrogance (or a lot of stupidity).

Again, this is not an accurate representation of knowledge holistically. It would, indeed, be either arrogant or ignorant (I would not say necessarily stupid) for any given expert in your analogy to claim that there is a consensus among them all; however, it would not be necessarily arrogant or ignorant if one were to claim they know X about subject S even though the other nine have proposed hypotheses that contradict it. There is not a 90% chance they are wrong. Furthermore, to be specific, I think that it is only possible to determine a quantitative likelihood (probability) of that which has a deductively ascertained denominator and numerator. In your example, we only have a deduced numerator, not a denominator: therefore the probability is indeterminate because the denominator is inductively ascertained.

I addressed both:

So each single one has to doubt her hypothesis and can't be sure to know and as a group they have to admit they can't contribute to the body of knowledge. — ArmChairPhilosopher


"God" is purposely an incredibly vague, ambiguous term.

I did not interpret it that way, but I apologize. If you are referring to individual vs societal in the aforementioned quote, then I think, although you are making such a distinction, you are misusing them. When you state "each single one has to doubt her hypothesis", I think you are suggesting (and correct me if I am wrong) that the absence of a consensus entails that they should doubt their hypotheses (as opposed to not doubting them if there was a consensus): it shouldn't matter how many people agree, if you didn't deduce it then you don't know it. A million people could collectively agree claim X about subject S and they are all incorrect. Quantity of agreement doesn't suggest that it is correct, it is the evaluation of the actual claim that determines whether it is knowledge or not in relation to an epistemology.

Likewise, when you state "as a group they have to admit they can't contribute to the body of knowledge", I am interpreting that as "knowledge" equates to societal knowledge: am I misunderstanding you? Just because 9 out of 10 must be wrong (at least) does not mean that a given expert cannot or should not claim to "know" their claim: what determines that is whether it was deduced or induced (abduced). If all 10 hypotheses are inductions, then none of them know. If they all, by their nature, necessitate that the others are wrong if one is correct, then if one of them is deduced then the other 9 are induced. If two or more are deduced (validly), then that would mean that they aren't contradictory after all (but in terms of your hypothetical, this has no bearing).

Moreover, it is possible that two are deduced but don't necessarily need to be agreed upon societally. For example, if one of the experts postulates that semantically "1" should refer to what we would consider (in terms of underlying meaning) 2 and another expert postulates that semantically "1" should refer to what we consider 3, then they can both know within their own individual contexts. It isn't that either one knows or the other, it's that they must understand that they haven't thereby gained any communal knowledge (inter-subjective agreement). Thusly, just because two hypotheses contradict each other societally does not entail that neither can know anything, which is what you seem to be claiming.

As long as you have "an incredibly vague, ambiguous term", you don't know - you can't know - whether a concrete example falls under the category.

Firstly, I was referring to generic "theism" and why it isn't a suitable candidate for your claim in terms of in-group consensus. I would agree that there are many denominations and such, but they do agree on basic tenants which constitute them under that specific religion in the first place (so there is a consensus to a necessary degree amongst a given label and the more specific the label the less ambiguous the claim is). Even if, hypothetically, every theist had a completely contradictory view of "god" in relation to each other, this would not mean that no one knows anything. This is because of what I stated previously in this post: I can deduce something which holds individually which is contradicted by someone's else equivalent in their individual context: we both have knowledge, yet it contradicts. This is because it contradicts societally (which is a different context, which I am not claiming to know). At best, I would say, completely unique contradictory views of "god" would prove that we have no societal knowledge of "god", in the sense that we have no consensus. This is not "knowledge": it is one of two general subcategories of knowledge.

Knowledge is contextual. We may not know X inter-subjectively, but do know it subjectively.

Imagine the following scenario: on a conference 10 experts propose 10 different, contradicting hypothesis. Neither of the speakers can convince her colleagues. I can deduce that at least 9 out of those ten have to be wrong (don't know what they are talking about). The same goes for the experts. When they are honest, they have to admit that their hypothesis has a 90% chance of being among the wrong ones. So each single one has to doubt her hypothesis and can't be sure to know and as a group they have to admit they can't contribute to the body of knowledge. Even if one of the hypothesis turns out to be true, neither can be justified in believing that it's hers.

Firstly, I think your deduction is incorrect: you cannot deduce that 9 out of 10 are wrong. You could hypothetically stipulate that for all intents and purposes, but it is not deduced via the fact that all 10 are proposing contradictory hypothesis: they could all be wrong. As your analogy is explicated in the above quote, there is therefore not a 90% chance that any given expert is wrong (nor a 10% chance they are right): as the analogy was given, there's an indeterminate probability (quantitative likelihood) of any given expert being right or wrong.

Secondly, regardless of whether we assume 9 out of 10 are wrong or that it is indeterminate as explicated thus far, they should always be doubting their hypothesis (their inductions) as, by definition, the premises do not necessitate the conclusion. In terms of anything they deduced, they would know it, but they still should doubt those as well. By "doubt" I don't mean incessantly deny ever knowing anything but, rather, that anything deduced is categorized as "knowledge" with the careful consideration that they have not obtained 100% certainty. There's never a point at which someone should think that they have 100% definitively obtained knowledge of anything possibly imaginable.

Thirdly, your analogy is conflating a subject's knowledge with societal knowledge: I think these are two very different contexts. I can know something of which you only believe (and vice-versa), because I may be able to deduce it while you induce it. Society is simply a collection of individuals and, thusly, societal knowledge requires consensus: maybe that is what you were referring to by "knowledge"? I don't think "knowledge" or "truth" or what have you is a real, objective, body in the universe. Societal knowledge is inter-subjectively agreed upon deductions. "objectivity" is, in terms of societal knowledge, an inter-subjectively agreed upon classification of a concept as an "object", and, in terms of individual's knowledge, that which is deduced by the subject (without any regard for what other may think). These are both knowledge.

Fourthly and finally, let's assume, as a hypothetical (which isn't deduced, but simply stipulated as a presumption), that only 1 out of the 10 is right (guaranteed)(9 out of 10 are wrong in other words). Then, at best, they must agree that they have no consensus (which I think that's what you are referring to by "good faith"), which entails that there is no societally agreed upon knowledge of the subject S. However, this is also stipulating that S is actually narrow enough of a context to warrant the agreement that there's no consensus. In terms of religion, all theists do not have to agree for there to be a consensus about "god" in relation to a specific definition of such. "God" is purposely an incredibly vague, ambiguous term. So this analogy, at best, would apply to a specific subbranch of theism (e.g. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc), wherein none of the experts (1) agree and (2) they have contradictory claims. #1 and #2 are not necessarily the case in terms of disagreement. Either that or I think your analogy only is valid if one were to compare it to general "theistic" concepts of god, which do have a consensus.

Even if you are right, it is irrelevant to the topic at hand. We don't deal with the last man on earth, we deal with a myriad of god claims and the possibility of the claimants to communicate

What I am disputing is that a necessary tenant of "knowledge" is "transferability". If I am correct, holistically in what I said (not just merely the last man on earth analogy), then the disputes pertaining to a claim within an in-group only suggests there is not a proper consensus, but never that an individual in that in-group cannot "know" the claim they are specifically making. The last man analogy was meant to explicate the issue of "knowledge" having a necessary "transferability" characteristic, which does pertain directly to "possibility of claimants to communicate".

What I am trying to convey is that the non-consensus amongst an in-group simply entails that they haven't been able to get each other to agree, not that one doesn't know something: they are two very distinct things in my mind. Likewise, "in-group" would need to be further defined, because everything is contextually an "in-group" to some other "out-group", and I don't think a generic "theism" would suffice as a valid "in-group" to your critique (it is incredibly ambiguous to be placed in "theism" just as it is to be a member of "atheism").

And, as I explained in my answer to @Nickolasgaspar, none can, in good faith, be justified in his belief of knowledge.

I do not know what post you are referring to, but if you would like to invoke whatever argument you made with someone else, then please feel free to share that argument with me. Likewise, I have no frame of reference to what you mean by "none can, in good faith, be justified in his belief of knowledge". A subject can derive an epistemology and, in good faith, be justified in it. Also, deriving an epistemology is not necessarily grounded in a belief (mine is certainly not).

You are confusing transferable (potential) with transferred (actual). True knowledge could be potentially transferred from the last human to the next sapient recipient (alien or evolved rat) in writing.

Even if there is not potential for transference, I would still argue an individual could know things. It depends on what you mean by "potential" though, because I would characterize the possibility of transmittance as requiring a receptor (whether actual or potential); If (1) there are no receptors and (2) there is no possibility of any receptor every actualizing, then technically (I would argue) there would be no consensus yet there could be knowledge. Even if it were literally impossible for anyone to comprehend my knowledge, i would still know it. This is because, I would argue, knowledge is that which is deductively ascertained (as opposed to abductively or inductively ascertained) and, therefore, can be acquired individually (although the dialectic is nevertheless important).

"If you can't show it, you don't know it." as AronRa would say.

It depends entirely on what you mean by "show" whether I would agree with you or not. Something can be "shown" relative to the subject without ever having the possibility of being demonstrated to another being (e.g. contemplation whilst stuck in a coma). I could demonstrate, strictly to myself, that I have deductively ascertained something and, consequently, know it without necessarily having the capability to escape my own thoughts to write it down or speak it out loud. It could never have the possibility of even being transmitted and/or it could not have the possibility to be received (yet could be transmitted) and yet I would argue I can still "know" things. I don't base what I know on consensus.

Suppose you wake up and you remember dreaming about raiding the fridge. Then you are not sure if that was real. Then you are convinced it was real. Do you "know" you raided the fridge or do you have an illusion of knowledge? To be sure, you have to show it (if only to yourself).

My only point, as of now, here is that you could "show it" to yourself (as you noted) and never have the ability to demonstrate it to anyone else (which would entail it is not transferable nor transferred). Likewise, you could transmit it (broadcast it, so to speak) legitimately yet no one ever did nor had the possibility to receive it. Likewise, you could transmit it, somebody can receive it (possibly, potentially, or/and actually), yet it was never possible that that somebody could accept the contents of your transmittance as true (which is a completely separate consideration). What is most correct doesn't necessarily have to align with consensus, but, nevertheless, it tends to. Furthermore, on a different note, even after "showing it" to yourself that it either did or did not happen, you may still not know it: did you deduce that you did raided the fridge, or did you induce it? Without further context, I have no way of providing further elaboration.

Another example: you have studied for a maths test. You think you know the formulas and how to use them. Do you "know" or do you have an illusion of knowledge. You will be sure after the test.

You may or may not be sure after the test, if by "sure" you mean "know". Did you deduce that you did, in fact, comprehend the formulas appropriately or are you inducing such? It is entirely possible to induce a conclusion to another induction and mistake it for knowledge.

The principle works reasonably well in science.

Sure, the scientific method works well. However, to clarify, that is not the only means of achieving knowledge: I do not subscribe to scientism.

That is right. I think it is fair to ask the believers to come to a common definition among their "in-group" before they address the "out-group".

Fair enough; however, my contention would be that consensus does not equate to knowledge.

And sorry, also to Nickolasgaspar, for mixing your posts in my recent answer.

No worries my friend! It did trip me up at first a bit, not going to lie, but no worries.

Someone once defined knowledge as "justified, true, belief". Not the best definition but it will do for the argument.

Personally, I don't hold the contemporary epistemic views. As you kind of alluded to, it is an incredibly ambiguous definition and, subsequently is full of paradoxes. For the sake of conversation, I will likewise address your points in terms of that view.

The other important thing is that knowledge is transferable. You can argue about a fact and you can convince an open minded interlocutor as is done in science all the time.
Theology had thousands of years to come to a consensus. The fact that it didn't shows that what you think is knowledge isn't justified.

I think the problem I would have here (even in the sense of using the contemporary epistemic views) is that knowledge doesn't have to be transferable. In terms of the contemporary view of knowledge, I don't think there's anything defined in it (traditionally) that necessitates that "justification" requires a tenant of "being transferable" (correct me if I am wrong though).

But I would presume that when you state "knowledge is transferable", it is implying (1) that you are arguing for that as an amended tenant of "justification" and (2) that it is transferable to quantitatively equivocal recipients in relation to the sender. For, I would presume that it would be a straw man to your argument that obviously knowledge cannot be transferable from, hypothetically, the sole human in existence to a rock: if one human remained on the planet, then that person wouldn't know anything (if we are taking "knowledge needs to be transferable to be justified" literally). At a deeper level, since I am presuming that is not what you mean, I still am not quite seeing yet why knowledge would need to be transferable, even amongst equivocal recipients: even if the last two humans on the planet disagreed on some subject S, one could possibly be right and other wrong even in the situation where they could be proven to have the same IQ (for example). Moreover, it is possible that one human obtains a legitimate proof of S but, due the major disparity between themselves and every other human being on the planet, no one agrees with them. Would they not "know" it then?

Likewise, "transferability" only necessitates that a message can be transmitted from a sender to a recipient, which has no bearing on (1) whether the recipient accepts the received message as true nor (2) that it be transmittable to multiple recipients. What I am gathering you to mean (if I am understanding you correctly) is more that it be transferable to the point of majority consensus within a given in-group, which I don't think is the same thing as "knowledge being transferable".

It is mostly a concession towards the theists. They might complain that atheists have a straw man vision of god. I don't require that theists convince atheists to acknowledge that they might have knowledge about god, just that they come up with a consensus among themselves. I think that is a fair criterion to falsify my position.

I think I was misunderstanding you: I was thinking "atheist views" in terms of epistemic positions traditionally voiced in terms of atheism, but you seem to be referring simply to the fact that you do not require a consensus amongst in-group and out-group, just in-group. Is that right?

Correct, it seems we are on one page now.

I am glad I am understanding you correctly (:

It wouldn't directly disprove Agnosticism but it would deprive me of my best Argument. The obvious existence of a myriad of contradicting descriptions of a god is evidence and proof that the believers don't know what they are talking about.

I am not sure how contradicting descriptions of god proves that, on an individual level, that one doesn't know what god is. At best, I would imagine that ample contradicting views would prove that society hasn't come to a consensus, but I don't see how that has any relation to whether or not someone can accurately describe god. As of now, although I'm sure your argument goes deeper than your brief explanation, I think it is totally possible that someone can describe accurately what "god" is and yet societally no one agrees. Just like how someone could have an elaborate grasp of Einstein's general relativity whilst the vast majority (1) have contradictory views to the real theory and (2) can't agree with one another.

(I discard atheistic views because they are biased.)

I am not sure I am understanding you correctly here. What do you mean by "atheistic views"? Do you discard all of them? Why? I understand that every position possibly conceivable has bad arguments, but they tend to also (generally speaking) have much stronger ones (with at least some merit worth contending with).

Hello @Philosophim,

In light of your post and upon further reflection, I think that your "applicable" vs "distinctive" knowledge distinction is becoming ever so clear to me. In fact, I am now fairly confident we are essentially conveying the exact same thing in terms of underlying meaning, but we are semantically disagreeing. Or I am misunderstanding you yet again and we aren't on the same page: only time will tell (:

While I think we use applicable knowledge to resolve inductions, the act of resolving inductions in a deductive manner is not applicable knowledge itself. Applicable knowledge is when we attempt to match an experience to the distinctive knowledge we have created, and deductively resolve whether there is, or is not a match.

I believe, alas, I understand your distinction, which is simply that which is created vs that which is matched. I have no problem with that distinction (in terms of the underlying meaning). I have a similar view for myself, albeit not in the form of that terminology. However, which this is reverting back to one of my original contentions in our discussion, I find the terminology you use confusing (in light of what it is meant to structurally convey).

"Distinctive knowledge" is misleading (in my opinion) because all of knowledge is "distinctive" in the sense of what the term actually means (but I understand you are implying more than that with it as you define). Likewise, "applicable knowledge" is misleading (I would say) because all of knowledge is "applied". Therefore, I find (as of now) the distinction to be most accurately represented as synthetic (~projected) vs analytic (~discovered) knowledge, whereof synthetic knowledge is a child of analytic knowledge (not to be confused as a sibling). synthetic generally means (philosophically) "a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept but related", which clearly describes (in my opinion) the extension of one's own "creations" (projections) onto the "world", so to speak. For example, the concept of a rock (or just a rock, so to speak) on the floor doesn't have any inherent properties that necessitate it be called a "rock": I synthetically projected that property onto it. Likewise, analytic expresses the contrary: "a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept"; I think that clearly describes something which cannot be a mere projection (or extension of a concept).

No, distinctive knowledge is when I create an identity when I flip the coin. There are no limitations as to what I can create. I can call it one side "feet" and the other side "hands", with their own essential and non-essential properties.

I am presuming you meant "no limitations" loosely, which I would agree with. But, to clarify, there are limitations. In terms of my example, I think you are right if I am understanding your terminology correctly now: since it has no bearing on the induction and it is analytical, it is applicable knowledge.

This is the induction I'm talking about. When you believe that what you've seen matches distinctive knowledge, this is an induction, not a deduction. The act of checking, understands that you don't know the answer until after you've checked.

I would agree, but clarify the implications of this postulation: this directly entails that a lot of topics traditionally viewed as "controlled" by the mind can also be applicable knowledge (analytical knowledge)(e.g. imagination, thoughts, etc). I'm not sure if you would agree with me on that. For example, thoughts are analyzed (~discovered), not synthesized (~projected). However, those thoughts can analytically discover, so to speak, the fact that each inferred "current" thought seems to be "projecting something which is synthetic in relation to a given concept". In other words, and this goes back to my subtle disclaimer that "synthetic knowledge" is a child of "analytic knowledge", we analytically discover that we synthetically project.

Moreover, going back to our discussion of whether "distinctive knowledge" can be induced, this also implies that the deduced validity of a subset of memories (in relation to another subset) is applicable knowledge (discovered: analytic), as opposed to being distinctive knowledge (projected: synthetic): which would be where, if I am currently understanding your view, we went sideways (our argument was presupposing the analysis of memories as "distinctive", which is incorrect). I have a feeling this is not what you are intending, but I nevertheless think it is the necessary implications of what you are distinguishing. For example, my assertion that memory A is valid in relation to the set of memories S would have to be analytical (because I am discovering the "truth" of the matter), whereas labeling it as "memory" + "A" and "memories" + "S" would be synthetic.

But I realize I am stretching what it means to be an induction here. The idea of deductively matching to the identities you distinctively know, vs creating identities you distinctively know, was the original way I described applicable knowledge.

I think that if you are reverting back to that definition (and I understand it correctly), then you are not stretching the definition of inductions, since it has no bearing on the distinction anymore.

I also still claim that one can only resolve an induction applicably

If I am understanding you correctly (as I have elaborated your distinction hitherto), then I actually agree. Because "distinctive" is no longer meaning what I thought it meant. On a separate note, I still do not think we can ever validate the entire set of memories S: we can only validate a subset in comparison to another subset. But I'm not sure how relevant that is anymore.

An induction can be resolved with another induction, or a deduction. If one "resolves" an induction with another induction, its not really resolved. In the case of an induction's resolution being another induction, we have taken a belief, and believed a particular answer resulted. In the case where we applicably resolve an induction, we have removed uncertainty. Of course, this has never meant that knowledge could not change at a later time as new distinctive knowledge is learned, or we obtain new experiences and deductions that invalidate what we knew at one time. But the future invalidation of a deduction does not invalidate that at the time it was made it was a deduction, and what a person could applicably know in that situation with what they had.

If I am understanding your distinction correctly, then I agree here except that applicable knowledge is not relatable to an induction directly. So when you state " In the case where we applicably resolve an induction, we have removed uncertainty", it seems a bit like you may be implicating inductions + uncertainty + applicable knowledge again, which I think is incorrect.

This example was only to demonstrate the importance of looking at the chain of thinking, and how it is important to realize that deductions in isolation do not necessarily tell the full story of what a person knows.

I would now attribute this to a synthetic vs analytic distinction: your example demonstrates the conflation many people have with claims that are contained in the given concept, and those that extend beyond it.

This again is more of an example to demonstrate the importance of resolving a situation that is "unknown". While originally I proposed the resolution of the induction was applicable knowledge, I feel confident at this point to go back to my original meaning, which was that one could solve this uncertainty applicably, or distinctively. The point here is to emphasize once again that resolving inductions with deduced resolutions is an important societal need and should be considered in any theory of knowledge.

I would agree in the sense that "deduced resolutions" are induction ~> deduction, which I think you are agreeing with me on that. It is indeed vital to have a means of "resolving" inductions in any given epistemology, however I would personally describe it as "having a means of dispensing of inductions for knowledge" to really hone in on my position thereon.

As I've noted so far, I believe the decision to create an identity, vs match to an identity one has already created is a meaningful distinction that is important when trying to resolve knowledge questions. We can go into this deeper next discussion if needed.

Assuming I have finally grasped what you were trying to convey, I agree!

I did not mean to imply that science marks as "true" whatever is not disproven. It simply notes such alternatives are not yet disproven. I don't want to get into the philosophy of science here (We have enough to cover!), as long as there is an understanding science takes steps to disprove a hypothesis, that is the point I wanted to get across.

Fair enough.

A hypothetical deduction is when we take an induction, and take the logical deductive conclusion if it resolves a particular way.

I don't think this is true. A hypothetical deduction is a deduction wherein each premise is hypothetically granted as true: it is a valid deduction due to it conforming to the necessary form of a deduction. It is not constructed of inductions where we presume they resolve one way or another (it could be that, if we were to disband it from its hypothetical roots, it has deductive premises as well). I think this is where it is vital to distinguish "resolution" in terms of induction -> deduction vs induction ~> deduction again: the former implies inductions are valid premises of a hypothetical deduction (which is wrong), whereas the latter implies we can dispense of that induction. I think it may be even more clear when "induction ~> deduction" is postulated as "induction <- deduction", as that is really what I think it is. In pseudo formal logic:

D = deduction
I = induction

¬(I →D) ∧ ¬(I →¬D)
D →(I ∨ ¬I)

I was a bit confusing previously, because there is truly no ~> relation between inductions and deductions, it is really a relation of the deduction to the induction.

This deduction is not a resolution to the induction, this is a deductive conclusion if the induction resolves a particular way.

I'm not certain I agree with this. The induction does not resolve a particular way: the deduction resolves the induction insofar as we can reinterpret the induction via our apperception. The induction does not resolve into a deduction (which I think you are agreeing with me), but, rather, a deduction can resolve an induction by either dispensing of it (as now it is known that the induction happened to be accurate or it wasn't) or retaining it as not directly pertinent to what is newly known.

But, does your distinctive context escape the epistemology proposed here? I would argue no. You still need a set of definitions. You can create a distinctive logic using the definitions you've come up with. The question then becomes whether you can applicably know it in your experience. If you can, then you have a viable distinctive and applicable set of knowledge that works for you. I of course can do the same with mine. If I expand the definition of the I to also include "will", then I can prove that I can will my arm to move, and it does. And in such a way, my definition of "I", and having control over particular things is applicably known as well. I personally find the idea that I control things useful to my outlook in life. You personally do not. For our purposes here, I'm not sure this difference between us is all that important to the main theory.

I don't think our free will differences matter anymore either, assuming I understand your distinction correctly. "control" is irrelevant to synthetic vs analytic knowledge.

The hierarchy of induction is distinctively known based on the logic proposed earlier. I have always stated that despite our conclusions of what is more cogent, they are always still inductions. Meaning that choosing a cogent induction does not mean the outcome of that induction will be correct.

First I want emphasize that you did a more than adequate job of proving the induction hierarchy in terms of first order. However, I wasn't referring to the first order derivation of it (I have no problem with your example of empirically verifying that probability based propositions tend to pan out more than possibilities): I was referring to the second order (a deeper consideration). To really explicate this, less assume we have empirically obtained (via your extensive test) that each scenario resolves to accurately prove that each respective induction type was always in the postulated relation of probability > possibility > speculation > irrational. We thereby have a satisfying first order proof that this hierarchical structure works (I would, on a side note, argue that such a test is not required to prove it, but that's irrelevant right now). However, now we must deal with a second order proof pertaining to why we ought to believe that because they related in a particular way in the past that it will hold in the future (aka hume's problem of induction). If, for example, given the probability of drawing a king out of three cards which contains two kings and a non-king is 2/3, I were to obtain via trials that over time the continual simulation of drawing a king out of such approaches 66%, then I have a first order proof. However, I don't have any reason thereby to claim that my knowledge of 66% = 2/3 (trials matched abstract) in the past holds true in the future. This is the area that I don't think we have addressed (and, if I'm remembering correctly, your essays briefly gloss over). In other words: do we know the hierarchy of inductions is true (in terms of the cogency relation) or is that in itself also an induction (again, in terms of second order analysis)?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I'm not sure but you seem to confuse the distinction of "inner state" versus "position" and "hard" and "soft". They are orthogonal. The former tells whether you are making a statement about yourself or the world, the later is talking about how something is (actuality) versus how something could (not) be (potential).

What you described isn't quite what I was thinking by "inner state" versus "position". If the former is "talking about how something is" and the latter is "how something could (not) be (potential)", then I don't see how this relates holistically to an inner state. Claiming "I can prove X could be Y or Z" is not equivocal to "I just think X could be Y or Z". The latter is almost, but not actually, noncognitive insofar as it is assumed that there's nothing to negate nor affirm (it is just what I think), whereas the former is something which still asserts potentiality (could/ could not be) but is actually open to criticism (more cognitive in a sense). I was thinking "inner state" would refer not just to a noncognitive claim, e.g. an emotion, but any claims that only indexically refer to the individual at hand. In other words, I was envisioning both my X examples as inner states, but it seems as though you may mean it in a more in the sense of the second example, is that right?

The stronger position would of course be the "hard" variant (we don't know and we will never know).
I can't defend that position. In fact, I see my position being falsified one day. When the last-but-one theist dies or de-converts there is only one (valid) definition of god left and soft Agnosticism would be wrong.

I agree that the stronger position is that of a "hard" variant, but, as far as I am understanding so far, that would include some that refer to "could be" (as previously shown). On a separate note, I am not entirely sure how unified definition would disprove Agnosticism, but I am interested to hear why you think that is the case.

Exactly. (And for the agnostic there is no way to claim that s/he and only s/he is unable to gain that knowledge without special pleading. So there are no "hard" agnostics.)

I think I am slowly starting to understand what you mean (and the meaningful distinction therein). I am not sure though how it would be special pleading for an "agnostic" to claim they cannot know God exists, while still refraining from postulating that is true of all other humans. Maybe another person's intellectual capacity greatly surpasses there own? Maybe someone has access to information that they will never obtain. These are all worthy considerations (albeit hypotheticals) that, I would say, at least at face value, would not be special pleading.

I realized that Agnosticism is a stronger position (really, a position instead of just an inner state) than mere atheism.

Without a doubt, claiming to know (or even believe) that (1) no one can know, (2) no one currently knows, or (3) "I" cannot know whether God exists is a position that produces a burden of prove (and, in that respect, is stronger for sure), but I am not really sure how this isn't a distinction of "hard agnostic atheist" vs "soft agnostic atheist", or something along those lines. Admittedly, I am starting to see how the two-dimensional labeling system needs a bit of refurbishment to more concisely and accurately represent such views as yourself (or maybe potentially a new labeling system may be required), but "soft" vs "hard" would accomplish such a distinction: wouldn't it? Or am I missing something? I think the only hiccup would potentially be your agnostic "inner state" distinction, but wouldn't that just be a "soft agnostic atheist" (or something like that)?

Also, on a separate note, I am still not sure why your terminology is "colloquial" vs "philosophical" agnosticism: although this is merely semantics, why is that?

(It also makes me lonely. Neither atheists nor theists know how to handle my arguments so they just ignore me.)

Well that is disheartening indeed. I think I still need to really hone in on what you mean in relation to your terminology, but thereafter I would love to hear what those arguments are if you would like to share them.

I agree. And I said so in the OP. I was primarily focused on the distinction of inner state versus position.

That is fair. I was under the impression that Agnosticism and agnosticism were supposed to serve the purpose of being a terminology system (what you outlined I thought as the most prevalent distinction) wherein one is either accurately depicted as Agnostic or agnostic. My contention, I suppose, is that, although you do mention that there are many other definitions (as there always are), the terminology is incomplete. But if you are simply focusing on two distinctions among many, whereby conceding that the terminology does not represent a complete labeling system, then I simply misunderstood (I apologize if that's the case).

Agree again. The former is often referred to as "soft" and the later as "hard" Agnosticism. But both are only ever possible options for the Agnostic, not the agnostic.

Before I comment, let me ask for some clarification: is your Agnostic vs agnostic distinction about whom the claim is indexically referring to? As in, when you say "god is not known" is "soft Agnosticism", do you mean "[no person knows god exists"? Whereas "god is not known" in an "agnostic" position would really mean "[I do not know god exists, but I do not know if any other person does or does not know god exists"?

I also did before changing to / relabelling myself as Agnostic.
(And I also remain an atheist - by definition, not by choice.)

very interesting, what made you decide to change?

I don't think that your terminology quite accurately depicts all the positions available with respect to the topic at hand. Firstly, I think that "Colloquial Agnosticism" can, in terms of its definition you proposed, be applied to many philosophical positions. So I would like to semantically note that holding the position "I do not know" is not merely restricted to colloquial speech.

Secondly, "Philosophical Agnosticism" seems to lump two drastically different claims into one, which I would argue thereby warrants two separate terms (at the very least): "god is not known" is not equivocal to "god can't be known". The former asserts a humbler position that we (or potentially "I") have not obtained knowledge of God existing nor not existing, whereas the latter asserts the impossibility of ever acquiring knowledge of God's existence: these are two very different claims. Consequently, "I don't know what god is- and neither to you" could be merely asserting the former or the actually asserting the latter, which would be vital to distinguish in a conversation (i.e. "I don't know what god is - and neither do you and neither will us both ever know").

Thirdly, I think your two terms are a false dilemma: either I accept that I am merely claiming "I do not know God exists", or I am obliged to accept "We do not know nor can we know God exists or his nature". But I could very well claim many other permutations of these positions, here's just a few:

1. We do not know God exists (implies we don't know his nature).
2. We do know God exists/doesn't exist, but do not know his nature
3. I do know God exists/doesn't exist, but do not know his nature
4. I do not know God exists (implies I don't know his nature).
5. I do not know God exists, but I believe a God exists.
6. I do know God exists, don't know its nature, but believe certain characteristics to be of its nature.
7. etc...

Fourthly, an agnostic only has a burden of proof IFF they are asserting they know that we or they can't know, which the only other option to this assertion is to take a "inner state" approach in your terms, which I don't think is the only other option.

To summarize:

Do you agree with these definitions?

I don't. I think generically agnosticism is the suspension of asserting either way pertaining to a knowledge claim, regardless of whether they believe either way.

Are you an agnostic/Agnostic?

I would personally use a two-dimensional labeling system wherein one axis is knowledge (and lack thereof) and the other is belief (and lack thereof). In such a system, I would most accurately label myself an agnostic atheist. I do concede that it is highly controversial, but nevertheless that's the closest representation of my views I have found to date. As of now, I cannot confidently assert I know god doesn't exist, but I do not believe it does.

Hello Moses! First I would like to welcome you to the forum!

I agree with some of this post but I don't know where you're getting the "ascend into heaven for eternity" bit. The OT says next to nothing about the afterlife; is that NT stuff? In the OT when Korah challenges Moses God opens up the Earth and all of Korah and his family fall in and are destroyed. God often strikes down evil people in the OT and nothing would lead me to believe that they end up in heaven. He also sends plagues and poisonous snakes on the Israelite community because they start complaining ("grumbling") about conditions in the desert and thousands are recorded as dying

Firstly, I would like to clarify that I was not making an argument from my own opinion on the topic at hand, nor an argument that was geared towards asserting that it is true in relation to the Bible: I was providing some further context to the OP about what biblical literalists typically believe (with regards to the excerpt you quoted from me). My entire response wasn't meant to convey that my points therein were true of the bible (in terms of my own interpretation of such): only that they are true representations of many Christians, and specifically (in terms of what you quoted) what biblical literalists believe (typically). In other words, the intents and purposes of my post (in relation to literalism) was not to portray biblical literalists as correct, only that they do indeed exist (as the OP seems to have a disposition that completely lacks most Christian perspectives beyond quite a rudimentary interpretation of the bible).

Secondly, in terms of whether the Old Testament "says next to nothing about the afterlife", it depends on what you mean whether I would agree. It references that there is an afterlife (heaven) countless times. Just as a quick example, 2 Kings 2:11 (King James Version):

And it came to pass, as they still went on, and talked, that, behold, there appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven.

As another example, Daniel 12:2-3 (King James Version):

And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.

And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever.

Now, if what you meant was that the Old Testament doesn't give incredibly vivid descriptions, nor honestly detailed descriptions whatsoever, of what "everlasting life" truly is beyond being in the present of God for eternity, then I would agree with you on that. In the New Testament, it goes in somewhat deeper detail, but I would still say that (unless I am misremembering) the concept of heaven isn't vividly detailed in the bible in a literal sense (mainly metaphorical--but I guess that is up for debate).

Thirdly, it is a completely separate question from my original post whether or not we have reason to believe that anyone that God striked down in the Old Testament went to heaven. Again, I would like to emphasize that I wasn't attempting to address that issue in my post: in terms of biblical literalism, I haven't spoken with a biblical literalist that utilized examples in the Old Testament of people going to heaven after being struck down to support their argument. Likewise, the absence of any example of the Bible explicitly stating that some person went to heaven after God striked them down does not imply its impossibility. They typically, from my encounters with them, argue that it is possible, regardless of whether it has happened before. Likewise, quite a few examples of God killing people doesn't even bother to mention where they got sent to in the afterlife, so an analysis of this is typically done by inspecting God's attributes to infer its possibility/impossibility.

Which leads me to my fourth and final comment: the excerpt you quoted was in relation to moral justification (i.e. it is moral for God to strike someone down even if they would have gone to heave, so to speak), which was not meant as a proof that there exists a specific example of God actually striking someone down and sending them thereafter to heaven.

Bob

@Philosophim,

Wonderful post!

"Applicable knowledge is the conclusion of an induction". Add in "Deductive conclusion" because it is possible to believe the conclusion to an induction is another induction.

With respect to the first sentence, it depends on what you mean by "conclusion" whether I would agree. Again, by "conclusion" are implying there is an actual connection between an induction and a deduction, or is it simply that the latter followed the former, but was necessarily not a result of it? I think that we colloquially assert that in the event that deductive knowledge follows an induction pertaining to the same subject we have thereby concluded our induction was correct or incorrect, but I don't think that holds formatively. In other words, if you mean "induction" -> "deductive conclusion", then I disagree. However, if you mean "induction" ~> "deductive conclusion" -> "analysis of induction", then I agree. "->" is how I am signifying a strict entailment, whereas "~>" is a loose entailment (e.g. I induce A, A motivates me to investigate the subject B pertaining to A, I then ascertain knowledge K on subject B deductively, and then analyze A through my newly acquired K to determine how aligned it was with knowledge, however A does not directly entail K in any way beyond the loose entailment of motivation or incentive).

With regard to the second sentence, I think you are suggesting that Applicable Knowledge can be a conclusion that is an induction, which I would strongly disagree with (if I am understanding that sentence correctly). If "Applicable knowledge" is a "conclusion of an induction", and "conclusion" is purposely not restricted to "deductive conclusion", then I can substitute it in and get "applicable knowledge is (or can be) an inductive conclusion to an induction", which I think cannot be true since an induction is not knowledge. One can most definitely formulate a "conclusion" to an induction which is also an induction, but it would not be "applicable knowledge".

Yes, you could have. But that does not negate the situation in which there is an induction that you are actively trying to discover the end result.

I think I am starting to understand better what you are conveying. Essentially (and correct me if I am wrong) you are utilizing "applicable knowledge" as a distinction to emphasize that which is not in our control and, thusly, must be discovered as opposed to projected. Although I think there is a meaningful distinction between "discovery" and "projection", I think ultimately it is all discovery. I can recursively analyze my thoughts in the exact same manner, and so I don't think the distinction between "induction" ~> "deduction" has any bearing on what you trying to convey. If one claims knowledge pertaining to something that does not indexically (contextually) refer to the proof they provide, then therefrom a contradiction arises which invalidates such.

The induction in this case is the belief that what I am observing matches a previous identity I have created. Does this side of the penny match heads? That is "the question". The result, "Yes it does, "if deduced, is "the answer".

The "question" you posited here is not an induction. You are correct, however, that the induction in your example was "see a symbol that seems familiar", but that is not simply just a question. "Does this side of the penny match heads?" is a completely neutral assertion, because it isn't an assertion at all. I am not inducing that it does match or that it doesn't. So that "question" coupled with the "answer" would be, in this case, distinctive knowledge. But in your previously example (asserting it is familiar) would be applicable. That's why I can easily refurbish your example as distinctive and still obtain the same exact knowledge:

I can also flip a penny, look at the result and wonder if I've seen it before. I then try to match the symbol to what is considered "heads" in my mind, and I do so without contradiction. This is distinctive knowledge.

When you stated "seems familiar", I can see how that could potentially imply an assertion that it actually is familiar, which would imply that it has been seen before (which is an induction). But wondering is not an assertion either way in itself.

If I had believed that the penny would result in heads, then the answer is the resolution to the induction. Identifying an induction that has not yet resolved, versus an induction that has a resolution in our chain of thinking is incredibly important!

I 100% agree it is important to understand whether an induction has been resolved or not; however, I don't see how that is a comparison of an unsolved induction vs a resolution in our chain of thinking (it would simply be, in my head, identifying an unsolved vs solved inductions). "resolution" of an induction is simply utilizing our knowledge to ascertain how aligned it was with true knowledge, which is a spectrum (it isn't a binary decision of "I resolved that it was true or that it was false): my induction could have been correct to any degree, and incorrect to any degree. Likewise, it is a continual process, we simply take the knowledge we have and utilize it to determine how "correct" our induction was, but we can very well keep doing this as our knowledge increases. So, I'm not sure where the line would be drawn for when an induction truly is "resolved" vs when it is still "unresolved". I think colloquially we simply roughly discern the two as "inductions with very little knowledge grounding it" vs "inductions that have lots of knowledge grounding it". I think that it can seem like a binary situation when considering really trivial examples, such as flipping a coin. But when considering something really complicated like evolution, it is much harder to see how one would ever holistically know such: it is more that we have ample knowledge grounding it (such as evolutionary facts and many aspects of the theory), but there's never a point where we truly can deduce it holistically.

I could come up with an entirely fool proof deductive point about Gandolf in the Lord of the Rings. Isolated, no one would care. But if at the very beginning of my deduction I started with, "I believe Gandolf is a real person," that puts the entire "deduction" in a different light!

I'm not sure what you mean by "no one would care". Sure, people may not be interested in Gandolf from the movie, but, if you truly came up with a fool proof deductive argument, then that argument would be true of Gandolf in the movie (regardless of who is interested therein). And, yes, inducing that Gandolf is a real person does put it in a different light, which is simply that it no longer indexically refers to a movie. I'm not sure how this necessitates that this distinction ought to be made as "induction" ~> "deduction" vs "deduction". I know deductively the indexical properties of the given proposition, and thereby can ascertain whether my assertion actually does pertain to the subject at hand or whether I am misguided.

Knowledge is about a chain of thinking.

I would say only insofar as knowledge is strictly deductions. It is within the realm of inductions where I would say we are claiming chains of thinking matter (in terms of cogency), but inductions aren't knowledge (as you are well aware).

When people make a bet on what horse will win the race, there is active incentive to find out what the actual result of the race is

Incentives do not entail knowledge in themselves. If I state that my horse won the race (simply what you would call distinctively), then obviously I do not know this in relation to the "actual" race, because there's a contradiction here: all I know is that, at best, I am convinced my horse won the race (or I am imagining a race within my mind which is not the "actual" race), not that it actually did win because there is an indexical consideration, of which I am therefrom accidentally committing a conflation.

People also don't want to hear, "Oh, Buttercup lost? Well I'm going to redefine my bet that when I bet on Princess, I really bet on Buttercup"

Although I see the meaningful distinction here, I don't think this has any direct correlation to your "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction. Firstly, someone could actually have meant to bet on Buttercup but instead associated the wrong horse with the name on accident. Secondly, they could be simply trying to change because their bet was wrong. It isn't that we want definitive "deduced answers", it is that we want definitive answers (which can be inductions). In most places, even if everyone knows that I have pure intentions and truly meant to bet on the winning horse but mistakenly bet on a different one, they take my induction definitively with pre-agreed upon definitions. No one cares if I deductively ascertained it or inductively ascertained it, they just care what I said and not what I meant.

Contextual, yes. Specifically distinctive and applicably contextual. We could view it as distinctive and applicably indexical if you wish. Although I may need to refine the meaning of those terms within contexts now that I've tweaked the meaning of applicable.

Contextual is fine, no need to redefine it as "indexical", I understand. The problem is that there aren't only two contexts (as you are trying to posit). What exists in my thoughts may not exist in my imagination, and it may not exist in "reality" either. Likewise, what may exist in "reality" here may not exist there, likewise what exists in "imagination" here may not exist there, and ditto for thoughts. Just because I can rightfully claim knowledge of X in "reality" here doesn't mean it is not a contradiction to thereafter claim X there. This critique, a very important critique you are making at that, is subjected to a potential infinite of contexts. I am failing to see how hyperfocusing on one contextual distinction (distinctive and applicable) amongst a potential infinite of contextual differences is meaningful. I am starting to see that it really boils down to control for you (I think): distinctive is what is in our control vs applicable is what is not (i.e. discovery vs projection), but, as we will see in a bit, I find this to be an incredibly difficult line to draw.

It is when I make a belief that X matches Y definition in my head that I am making an induction, and need to go through the steps to deduce that this is true

I hate to reiterate, but I could very well simply omit the belief and see if X matches Y, thereby obtaining distinctive knowledge.

At the point the coin is flipped, the induction happens when I attempt to match the result to my distinctive knowledge.

Not necessarily. An induction only happens in this scenario if you propose a belief towards if it matches. If you simply attempt to match a result to "distinctive knowledge", then that is purely deduced.

The implicit induction is, "I believe the result could match to what I distinctively know."

This is very interesting, because it is not an affirmation nor a denial of the result. It is merely whether one is capable of matching non-abstract symbols to abstract ones (such as memories). I think this is deduced as true and if one happens to deduce the opposite then they don't pursue trying to match them. I don't believe that I can match non-abstract symbols to abstract ones, I know I can. Are you saying you don't know if you can, you simply believe you can?

Science does not seek to prove a hypothesis, it seeks to invalidate a hypothesis. A hypothesis must be falsifiable. There needs to be a hypothetical state in which the hypothesis could be false. Science attempts to prove a hypothesis false, and if it cannot, then we have something.

I partially agree with you here. but it is vital to clarify that science does not solely seek to prove something is false and, in the event that it can't, deem it true (that is the definition of an appeal to ignorance fallacy). Science deals with "positive" and "negative" evidence: the former are tests conducted to see if the results match what should be produced to support the hypothesis (as in it is what is expected if it were true), whereas the latter are tests conducted to see if one can produce results that negate the possibly of the hypothesis being right. Both of which are technically attempts to falsify the hypothesis because positive and negative evidence are two sides of the same coin. The mere falsifiability of a hypothesis is simply the preliminary verification step. Peer reviews do not just seek to verify that the tests conducted produced negative evidence: they also make sure there is positive evidence for the hypothesis. In other words, just because something hasn't been falsified does not mean scientists take it seriously.

I think there is a meaningful distinction here. Categorical deductions involve no potential inductions. Hypothetical distinctions take a potential induction, and conclude a deduction based on a hypothetical outcome of the induction

What do you mean by "potential inductions"? I would hold that there are no inductions in deductive premises. If conditionals are not inductions.

Any time you attempt to match your identity of "red" to something else, you are making an implicit induction

Only if I formulate a belief then this is true. If I state "I think this is red", and then attempt to match it to "redness" abstractly am I making an induction (originally). However, I can see something and ask "what is this?" or "I wonder if this is a color?" and then match it to "redness" abstractly to deduce it is red. An induction is not necessary, but can occur.

I am not saying that an induction becomes knowledge. I am stating the deduced result of the induction becomes knowledge.

I apologize if I was misrepresenting you, I understand. What I am depicting is that this doesn't mean we have a "induction" -> "deduction" relation, nor do I find any meaningfulness in a "induction" ~> "deduction" relation.

I am simply noting that when one decides to induce, applicable knowledge is the deduced resolution to that induction.

This makes sense (as in it is a working definition), but I don't think this has any direct correlation to the critiques you are claiming towards "breaking out of the old epistemologies".

What proof is there that we do not have control over certain things?

First I need to say that I am talking about libertarian free will, but we can get into different definitions if you want.

At face value, something is only in one's control if we can prove that it is. If we can't prove it, then we don't know that we control anything. At this point, it doesn't mean we don't control anything, it simply means we don't know whether we do or not. Likewise, the default belief should be that which is the most intuitive, so to speak, so libertarian free will would be the default (I would say).

At a deeper level, there's many different reasons (I will briefly overview here) why the "subject" does not control anything as defined by libertarian free will:

1. To control one's thoughts, one would have to think of those thoughts before thinking them. Which inevitably leads to an infinite regression (potential infinite that is) of which we do not have: thoughts simply manifest.

2. The natural order either (1) abides by causation, which inevitably proves causal determinism, or (2) is a result of true quantum randomness (which also produces determinism, just not causal determinism in a traditional sense).

3. To know why reason manifests how it does, one would have to literally transcend their own reason, which is impossible. If we think of it in a more materialistic mindset, one would have to truly transcend their own reason to bridge the gap between mind and brain to determine the manifestations of reason. From a more idealistic mindset, one would have to truly transcend their own reason metaphysically to determine what powers (or what not) is determining such manifestations. Either way, it is impossible.

Now, for number four, I am actually going to address your proof:

I can will my arm to move, and it does. I can will against my emotions to do something more important

This doesn't prove (in the sense of libertarian free will, which I have no clue if you subscribe to it or not) you have control over your emotions nor your bodily movements: it proves that your mind's will can align with your body's will--which is not the same proposition (I would say) at all. Yes, there's a plethora of situations in which I genuinely know that my will aligned with my body's actions (which is typically referred to as "intentions" and "actions" alignment), but that doesn't mean that I have any reason to believe that my will was the manifestor of those actions. In other words, something aligning with my will does not in the slightest mean that something was in accordance with my will. There are two separate questions: was my arm lifting in alignment of my will or/and from my will? You just proved the former and not the latter. This would be point 4 and, to keep it brief, I will stop there.

Are you saying that you have control over nothing Bob? I don't think you're intending that, but I think I need clarification here. And if you are intending that we can control nothing, it would be helpful if you could present some evidence as to why this is.

I am most aligned with soft determinism, also called compatibilism, which dictates that the natural world is determined, but that at least one form (or definition) of free will is compatible with it. So I hold that libertarian free will is incorrect and incompatible with determinism, but that doesn't mean we can't still make meaningful distinctions pertaining to acts of "free will" vs "unfree will" (i.e. just because it is determined, doesn't mean we are completely unfree either). I think I will just end here for now on that to serve as merely an introduction.

Again I'm confused here. I'll need this broken down more.

I hold that the "subject", or reason, is that which makes the synthetic and analytic connections of objects, which are manifested in the form of a concept. This is why I do not hold that "consciousness" is equivocal to "reason", because there are numerous aspects of consciousness that are more than adequately accounted for via the brain (materialistic origins). At best, I would say, we could induce that repetitive alignments of the will of the mind and the will of the body reasonably suggests that they are actually one and the same (however I think there are problems with it, too great for me to commit myself to that view).

It was a while back, but I believe I did cover this. It had to do with chains of inductions away from the induction. A probability is one step from a deduction, a possibility is a less focused induction that probability, because it cannot assess the likelihood of it happening. A speculation is an induction introduces not only a possibility, but the induction that something that has never been confirmed to exist before, can exist. And then you remember irrational inductions.
...
The hierarchy cannot determine which induction is more likely to be. It can only determine which induction is more cogent, or least removed from what is known. Cogency has typically been defined as a strong inductive argument with true premises. Here cogency is measured by the length and degree of its inductive chain away from what has been deduced.

I think your hierarchy of inductions boils down to two key principles, one of which that is important here is: the deductive groundings of an induction dictates its cogency level in comparison to other inductions within the induction hierarchy. But what is this principle based on? Knowledge or a belief? This is the presupposition of which I don't think we quite explored yet. I don't see how it is necessarily deduced (therefore knowledge) for them. In other words, do we "know" that the strength (or cogency) of an induction increases due to an increase in deductive groundings, or are we inducing such?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

However, if there's one thing I think we can conclude from the epistemology, its the reasoning and path we take to get there that matters as well. This is why there is a hierarchy for inductions.

I am not particularly sold on this quite yet. The hierarchy of inductions analyzes the "paths" in relation to its epistemic groundings, which is a relation of deduction -> induction (which I think is fine), but this relationship is not symmetrical (i.e. induction -> deduction). We can create meaningful labels pertaining to deduction -> induction, but not vice-versa (i would say). I think you are seeing it as symmetrical, whereas I see it more asymmetrical.

Applicable knowledge is the deductive result of an induction. It is not a deduction that follows an induction.

You explicated the dilemma much more elegantly than I did here! From what you said here, I am arguing the exact converse: to claim a deduction is a result of an induction is to necessarily concede that they are not mutually exclusive (there’s at least one relationship, no matter how weak or strong, being claimed to be validly made). I am claiming that a deduction can follow an induction, but never is a result of one. The results of a deduction can prove how aligned an induction was in relation to knowledge, but an induction never produces a resulting deduction.

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I have a penny in my pocket. (Deduction)

...

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I flip a penny I found in my pocket and it turns up tails. (Deduction)

I think these are truly the same: the latter just feels connected, but isn't anymore connected than the former. I could have just as easily, in the case of the latter, not posited a belief and flipped the penny from my pocket and it turns up tails (which would thereby no longer be applicable, yet I obtained the exact same knowledge distinctively).

So why is this an important/needed distinction? Because it can help us realize our limitations. I noted earlier that one can create a fully deductive abstract in one's head. I could create an entire world with its own rules, laws, math, and it be a purely deduced achievement. A set of knowledge which has no inductions with deduced resolutions in its chain of reasoning is circumspect. The reality is we face uncertainty constantly. Our deductions which are reasonable at the time, may be countered in the face of new information. Part of reality is uncertainty, and our reasoning should reflect that. Arguably, the uncertainty of life is why we have the concept of knowledge at all.

For the most part, I agree with the underlying meaning I think you are trying to convey (i.e. recognizing our limitations), but I think your "distinctive" vs "applicable" isn't a true representation thereof. What I think you are really trying to get at is that "knowledge" is always indexical. I am not certain what the result of flipping a coin (non-abstractly) will be until I do it, because my abstract simulation does not refer to non-abstract consideration (although I can definitely conflate them as synonymous). I can, therefore, have a belief prior to my deductively ascertained knowledge that it flipped tails, but that has no bearing on how I obtained that knowledge. I could equally have not posited a belief and obtained the exact same result, which indexically refers to something relationally beyond my abstract consideration. I am failing to see how the induction provided a meaningful difference, because even if I didn't induce anything prior to flipping the coin, thereby labeling it as "distinctive", does not equate to "categorical": I still had to obtain it non-abstractly in the exact same manner as applicable knowledge.

If there was no uncertainty in whatever we concluded, wouldn't we already know everything?

Firstly, I don't think "uncertainty" directly entails that one has to formulate an induction: I can be neutrally uncertain of the outcome of flipping a non-imaginary coin without ever asserting an induction. So when I previously stated that inductions and abductions only provide the uncertainty, I was slightly wrong: we can deductively know that we do not deductively know something and, therefore, we are uncertain of it (to some degree). No induction is technically needed (but definitely can be posited).

Secondly, yes, we would, without uncertainty, know everything. However, where are you drawing that line? I think you are trying to draw it at "distinctive" vs "applicable", but I don't think those definitions work properly. As previously discussed, the non-abstract flipping of a coin could be either form and still be obtaining knowledge pertaining to something uncertain.

Lets look at science. Science is not a success because it has carefully crafted deductions. It is a success because it has concluded carefully crafted deductions to inductive situations. Science seeks not to deduce, but to induce and then find the result. Science's conclusions are essentially applicable knowledge.

Yes, science does claim to "find the result" after a test, but the "result" has no relation to the induction (hypothesis) itself: that was merely posited as the best educated guess one could make prior to any knowledge deductively obtain after/during the test. Most of the time, science never reaches the point where we have verified the entire hypothesis (deductively) before it gets translated into a "theory": scientists obtain enough deductively ascertained knowledge that supports the hypothesis (or hypotheses) to warrant stating it is more than just a hypothesis (but, most importantly, it is not holistically knowable most of the time).

Although I may be misunderstanding you, if you are trying to claim that "applicable knowledge" is something scientists obtain about the holistic hypothesis, then I think you are (most of the time) incorrect. Unless the test is something really trivial (like "this will fall if I let it go"), then it generally doesn't make it to knowledge, just a stronger version of an induction (more thoroughly tested which entails more knowledge that it is grounded in). Sometimes they do categorically deductively ascertain during experiments, such as if I were to test whether this particular bottle is made of glass, which would inevitably be tested against my definition of "glass" and the means of verifying it meets each criteria of "glass" is also categorically defined. But i don't see how any of this proves in any way that they obtained something other than one form of knowledge (and, further, although I see the underlying meaning useful in terms of indexicals, I don’t see how there’s really a distinction between the two forms you are positing).

I meant it as purely the emotional sense of doubt. You can doubt anything, whether its reasonable or unreasonable to do so. Yes, we are in agreement that despite having doubts, one can reasonably conclude that one's doubt is unfounded or incorrect. So to clarify, I was not talking about a reasonable doubt, which is limited, but the emotional non-reasonable doubt. In this epistemology, reasonableness is not a requirement of any person, it is always a choice. However, their unreasonable choices cannot counter a reasonable argument for those who are reasonable.

That's fair enough.

In regards to hypothetical deductions, I believe we are in agreement! It just seems we had some slight misinterpretations of what each meant.

I think we are in agreement then! My question for you is: do you find it a meaningful distinction (categorical vs hypothetical), and what terminology would you translate that to in your epistemology? I don't think it is the same distinction as what you are trying to convey with "distinctive" and "applicable", but I could be wrong.

So I can state, "Assume that the essential property of a cat is that its green." I'm putting a hypothetical outcome to an induction, not a deduced outcome of an induction. The hypothetical property can be a part of a deduction, but it is a deduction that has avoided the test of induction.

In terms of underlying meaning, I understand and agree, but I don't think this is being described correctly. Everything is tested, abstract and non-abstract alike, but what makes the error you are explicating correct is that the tests are indexical. Testing in my mind in terms of my imagination, for example, does not automatically hold for that same "label" in non-abstract considerations. So I wouldn't say that "avoiding an induction" is a mistake, it is "avoiding the indexical consideration" that is the mistake. If I deduce that a "card" exists in my imagination with the color red on it, it would be a mistake for me to thereafter conclude there is a "card" in the non-imagination. Now, in terms of obtaining whether a "card" that is red exists in non-imagination takes the form of all other tests (including testing that belief in the abstract in terms of my imagination), and so I don't necessarily have to pre-judge whether or not I think there actually is one. If I look down and see a "red" "card", then I just deductively ascertained (without an induction) that non-abstractly there exists a "red card". I am failing to see how this is contingent on inductions. If I cannot deductively ascertain that there is such a thing as a "red card", then I am left with nothing else but to induce my best guess and, if push comes to shove, I bank my money on it.

In the second case where I state, "The next cat I will see will be green", I am putting something testable out there

But that belief has no bearing on uncertainty. You can have easily have simply deductively noted that you have no clue what the next cat will be, and then saw it was green (and you would know that you have no clue deductively). If you do submit such a belief (as you did), then yes we can deductively ascertain how aligned your induction was with real knowledge, but it never becomes knowledge. Even if you guessed right, you didn't know. Not even in hindsight. In terms of the induction hierarchy, we are simply inducing that given that the inductions more grounded in knowledge seem to produce more aligned results (with knowledge) that we are more rational to hold those over other, less grounded, inductions. We do not deductively know this. There's nothing that deductively tells me that a possibility actually is more certain of a claim than a speculation, only that I should rationally bank my money on it because that has tended to work out better. I have no deductive reason to believe that because something has been experienced before that it has a higher chance of happening again over something that has never been experienced: that is an induction (similar, if not exactly like, Hume's problem of induction).

So I could deduce the conclusion that I would be correct if I found the next cat was green, and I could deduce a conclusion if it was the case that the cat is not green. But neither of those deductions are the resolution to the induction itself. They are deductions about what is possible to conclude from an induction, but they are not the deduced result of the induction itself. I find this distinction key to avoid ambiguity when someone claims they "know" something.

Again, i see this not as "a result of an induction" but, rather, the importance of understanding knowledge is indexical. There's nothing wrong with positing a hypothetical deduction, but, as you rightly pointed out, that has no meaning if the IF conditionals are removed. By definition, it would no longer be hypothetical, so it would either have to be categorical or an induction.

"Since I changed my definition of heads to tails, my induction was correct." But, the induction was not correct based on the distinctive knowledge at the time. In this, applicable knowledge acts as a historical marker of one's chain of thoughts.

So, firstly, the induction is never "correct", it is just a "best guess" (or potentially not the best guess but no less "a guess"). It can happen to align with knowledge to any degree, but it isn't knowledge.

Secondly, you are right that the terminology is sometimes deductively (categorically) defined before the induction and that does shed light into their intentions, but this has no bearing on inductions. I could categorically define "cat" as "1 square" and then, without inducing anything, see what one would usually refer to a cat and decide to change my terminology. There's still a historical marker here, and it is memory (oh boy, which gets us back to that dilemma), not inductions. It's not that you induced X that provides a historical marker for me that you had other intentions prior to deductively ascertaining about X, it is that I remember you using terminology in your induction in a manner that suggests you weren't meaning it in that way, which I deduced. Now, we could get into whether I truly can deduce your intentions (it may just be an induction), but hopefully you see what I mean here.

But what we cannot do is claim applicable knowledge of, "Society doesn't actually believe that the color of a cat is non-essential" I can distinctively know my own definitions. I can distinctively reject societies definitions.

I think what you really mean here (and correct me if I am wrong) is that society's definition and my definition do not have to align (because knowledge is indexical). I can induce that society doesn't hold that a cat is essentially defined by "color", or I could categorically define "society" as necessarily not holding color as an essential property of cats. The problem is that when I define "society", it is in relation to what I've deduced, which indexically refers to my abstractions, and the definition someone else may have deductively defined indexically refers to themselves (and it would be a conflation to think they are necessarily bound to one another).

I could distinctively know that society does not define something a certain way.

This is where you sort of lost me. If by "distinctively know" you mean that you can categorically define "society" in a way that necessitates that they don't hold that definition of "cat", then I agree. But this has no relation to any sort of induction, the conflation arises when knowledge isn't viewed as indexical.

But I cannot applicably know that society defines something a certain way, when the result of that claim would show that they deductively do not.

I would agree insofar as the distinction being made is that my deduced abstract consideration of what a "society" or "cat" is has no indexical relation to non-abstract considerations, but I am failing to see how this has anything to do with necessarily positing an induction prior to deducing.

Correct, if you decide to use reason, then you cannot reasonably be convinced that you are not convinced of anything. If you decide not to use reason, then you can. Its like a person who states, "Everything is absolute". Its completely unreasonable, but there are some who forego reasonableness, even when it is pointed out, and insist on their belief. Fortunately, we can use reasonableness, but this does not deny the fact that a person can reject all that in favor of what we might call insanity.

This is true in a sense, but I think you are agreeing with me that this doesn't mean someone can actually do whatever they want just because they claim it.

There are unreasonable people that we still label as people. Holding reasonable positions is non-essential, meaning if a human is biologically or willingly an unreasonable person, there is nothing we can do to make them.

I would say that you are correct that people can feel as though they can be without reason, but they necessarily are. Someone can look a table, and then say they didn't just look at a table, but they did (and I think you are agreeing with me on this). It is an essential property of "human being" that they are a reasoning being, but I think how you are using "reasonableness", they don't have to have it. But they nevertheless abide by certain rules, which is their reason, even in the most insane of circumstances, which is apart of the definition of being human.

I think so. My understanding of abductions is that it is an induction that is the most reasonable one a person can hold given a situation. From the Stanford Encyclopedia, "You may have observed many gray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an abductive inference."

I apologize, I was too hasty to slide that into the discussion, we have much bigger fish to fry. I think we should not proceed to that conversation yet (that's my fault).

Despite cases in which you cannot easily decide to part and parcel, there are other instances in which you can. Look at one of your keys on your keyboard. Now look at the letter. Now look at any space next to the letter. Draw a circle in your mind around that space. You could if you wish mark a circle, and have created a new identity on that key. You can look at my writing. The page. The screen. The computer system. The room. You can focus and unfocus, and create new identities distinctively as you wish.

I don't think any of this proves that I was in control of anything. What discerns actual accordance from coincidental repetition?

We do, colloquially, make distinctions between something like "intention" and what the body actually is capable of, but ultimately I fail to see how we truly control any objects (which includes all concepts, so thoughts, imagination, the body, etc). What proof is there that you are not along for the ride?

No, I am noting that while we have an incredible amount of power within our own agency, there are things outside of our control

This isn't quite what I was trying to get at, I do think that you think that some things are outside of our control (if not a lot of things), but you do think that there is a clear divide between "incredible amount of power with our own agency" and that which isn't: where is that line drawn at? Do you think you control your thoughts? Imagination? Bodily movements? Maybe not absolutely, but sometimes at the very least? I am trying to hone in on what you mean, because I do not hold that the subject, reason, has any control over objects.

But I can imagine that I am able to. I have a world I can create, a logic I can form, and conclusions that will never apply to reality, but be valid in my mind.

Do you think that you sometimes can control your "dream world" within your imagination, or all time? Or never?

The distinction you are making in terms of what a proposition references (indexicals) is still valid if one doesn't control objects whatsoever.

And you agree with me by stating there are things you cannot choose to part and parcel. Can it be granted at this point that we both believe there are things outside of our mental control?

I cannot quite remember what I stated previously, but my contention isn't really "is there anything outside of our control" but, rather, "is there anything inside our control" (which is different). To say "outside our control" is fine, and I would agree that there are, but where I am failing to understand you is where is the line drawn? When you say "outside of our mental control", this leads me to believe that you think that you control your mental, or abstract considerations, but I do not think you do. There is no point at which, in reference to any object, where we "know" that we controlled it. It is an induction at best.

Correct in that both are deductions. I hope I clarified here that the real distinction is the in the chain of reasoning.

I think that what you are trying to convey (if I am understanding it correctly) is right, but it is wrong to postulate it as having anything to do with a chain of reasoning (I would view is asymmetrical to induction chains).

Distinctive knowledge: Discrete experience or
A deduction that leads to a deduction.

Applicable knowledge:
An induction that leads to a deduced resolution

If by "leads" you are saying "results", then I disagree. We deduce knowledge and, in hindsight, see how close our inductions were (if we even posited any) to that deduced knowledge. Deductions can "lead" to inductions, but never vice-versa in a literal sense (like "results"), but if you mean a loose sense like an induction can "lead" someone to investigate further in some circumstances, then I agree. If "lead" is being used loosely, then I wouldn't consider something sparking your interest as something that then results in a deduction (another deduction could have just as easily sparked my interest).

But we can obtain the actual outcome of the induction. When an induction resolves, we have the outcome.

The outcome is not apart of the induction, that is knowledge which is a deduction (which I think you would agree with me on that). There's no entailment from induction -> deduction. You don't need to state a belief either way before flipping a coin. The flipping of the coin and its conclusion is all deductively ascertained (thusly knowledge) either way.

The first part is part of the reason, but I did not understand what a "dispensable entity" was.

Essentially occam's razor.

We distinctively know the hierarchy of inductions, we do not applicably know if the claim is true.

Upon further reflection, I don't think we deduce the hierarchy holistically (either as distinctive or applicable--either way they are both considered deductions). Nothing about the premises necessitates the conclusion that "possibility" is more cogent than "speculations". Nothing about experiencing something once deductively necessitates that it is more likely to happen again over something that hasn't been experienced (and isn't an irrational induction). I think some of them may be deductively ascertained (such as irrational inductions since they defined as contradictions, which would necessarily always be known as the worst option), but I don't think it holds for all of them (but I need to ponder it a bit deeper).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Now take away humans, take away animals. We get a view from nowhere. Here is true metaphysics. What then exists in the view from nowhere? If you’re imagining a world as perceived and inferenced and synthesized by humans you would be mistaken. What is a non-perspective world? In what way can we talk of it intelligibly? Planets planeting? Particles particling? What does that even mean when there’s no perspective?

Although I could be misinterpreting you, I think that your OP is primarily associated with the ontological aspect of this and not metaphysical: you are essentially asking what exists apart from observance (which I would argue is ontological not metaphysical, but I can see how it could bleed over into metaphysics the deeper one contemplates it). With that being said, I think you have formulated a question which is itself a contradiction: you are asking for a "perspective" (as I understand your definition) when their are "no perspectives" available. Therefore, to answer "nothing is there" or "something is there" are both incorrect because the question itself is contradictory. It is like if I asked "what does a square circle look like?": no matter what one posits in terms of the appearance of a square circle, they are inevitably wrong (doomed from the start). To be brief, I think that the question "what is a non-perspective universe" is nothing more than the combination of concepts in a manner that merely (and only) produces a description of a contradiction (albeit sometimes enticing to pursue as if it did postulate something more than that).

How is information akin to perspective? Perspective, a point of view, seems to be attached to an observer, not an information processor. How can information processing simpliciter be the same as a full-blown observer? I think there are too many jumps and "just so" things going on here to link the two so brashly.

I would agree that, indeed, "understanding" is non-computational. The verification of something being true is computational, but the understanding that it should be accepted as true is non-computational. So, in other words, yes: information processing is not synonymous with "perspective" in the sense outlined previously.

So if not information, where is this "perspective" in the view from nowhere?

Again, I think this, specifically speaking, is nothing more than a description of a contradiction. However, if one were to contemplate what their "perspective" (or "understanding") is, then it inevitably becomes a question of metaphysics (however, the contemplation of your OP question I would say is ontological because it is questioning what is left when "perspectives" are removed--regardless of any metaphysical inquiry into what "perspectives" actually are).

If localized interactions, "what" makes the perspective happen from these interactions?

I think that you are thinking of it in the wrong order. "from these interactions" seems like you are trying to derive where "understanding" (or "perspective") arises from what has been produced from the understanding itself. I can never look at a brain, which is an interpretation derived from understanding, and figure out my understanding therefrom. The best I can do is inquire recursively (i.e. reason upon itself) to understand the mechanisms of my understanding via that understanding. That's the best that can be done.

@Philosophim,

I hate to double post, but just to explicate more clearly my dilemma with "applicable" vs "distinctive" knowledge, let me explain a bit more (now that I've been thinking more and more about it).

I don't think that there are two "forms" of knowledge and, to my understanding, I don't think your epistemology truly posits two different forms (even though I think you are arguing for such).

For example, let's use your "Go Fish" example. Abstractly, I can determine that a game, which I will define as "Go Fish", is possible according to the rules I subject it to: thereby I "know" "GoFish" is possible in the abstract. However, as you noted, it is an entirely different claim to state that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly" (as I conjured up "Go Fish" according to my rules) (e.g. it turns out a totalitarian regime burned all the playing cards, what a shame, or my rules do not conform to the laws of nature). I think, therefrom, you are intuitively discerning two forms of knowledge to make that meaningful distinction.

However, I believe it to be an illusory distinction, albeit intuitive: the claim of knowledge towards abstract "Go Fish", and more importantly the "cards" therein, is a completely different conception than "cards" being utilized when claiming "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly". The conflation between the two (what I define abstractly as "a card" along with its existence presupposed in reference to the abstract vs what coincides non-abstractly) is what I think you are trying to warn against. I may define "card" as "floating mid-air" and quickly realize that this is only possible in relation to "abstract cards" and not "non-abstract cards".

Consequently, "distinctive" and "applicable" are the exact same. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible abstractly", I know this deductively. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly", I also know this deductively. I could, however, posit "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly" as knowledge when I do not in fact know it because it is an induction, which would be illegal in the sense of your epistemology. If I induce that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly", then I believe it and it is subjected to the hierarchy of inductions. If I deductively obtain sufficient knowledge pertaining to the possibility of Go Fish in the non-abstract, then I thereby have "knowledge".

In the event that I did induce then deductively affirm that induction (holistically, as in verify the entire induction was true in the sense that I have since then deduced its premises and conclusions) (let's hypothetically say), then I am still only gaining knowledge via a deduction and the induction was merely coincidentally correct.

In other words, it is possible to ground an induction in knowledge (deductions), but not possible to ground a deduction in beliefs (inductions): the relation, therefore, is uni-directional. Furthermore, I now can explicate much more clearly what the hierarchy of inductions is grounded upon (assuming I am understanding correctly): the induction with (1) the most knowledge (deductions) as its grounds and (2) no dispensable entities is the most cogent within that context. This is exactly why, for example, "possibility" is more cogent than "speculations": "possibility" is (1) grounded in more knowledge. However, upon further reflection, I am not entirely sure that you would agree with #2: what if a "speculation -> speculation" is justified as necessitous? What if it isn't multiplying entities without necessity? What if the opposing induction "speculation" is eroding some necessary components of the induction chain?

But an even deeper dilemma arises: the claim, and I would say key principle, underlying the hierarchy itself is an induction (to hold that the inductions that are more acquainted with, grounded in, knowledge is an induction, not a deductively concluded principle). Which inevitably undermines the hierarchy, since there is necessarily one induction (namely inductions grounded in more knowledge are more cogent) which is outside of the induction hierarchy (since it is itself contingent on it in the first place: we construct the hierarchy from this very induced principle). So, we do not "know" that the hierarchy of inductions is true, under your epistemology, I would say, because it is induced and, therefore, we "believe" it is true. If knowledge is only deductions than I think we are forced to conclude this.

Anyways, I thought I would share my thoughts you can see more clearly what I am thinking here.

Bob

My understanding of the term atheist is the point of view that nothing supernatural exists, most particularly a deity, and this is expressed as an absolute. — Elric

The definition of "atheism" varies depending on what one is trying to convey. Some use a labeling system wherein "atheism" is the affirmative denial of gods, "theism" is the affirmation of at least one god, and "agnosticism" is no affirmation whatsoever. Others use a two-dimensional labeling system wherein one is plotted on a graph, so to speak, in relation to an axis representing "agnosticism/gnosticism" and the other axis representing "atheism/theism": this typically separates more clearly the claims of "knowledge" from those of "belief". In the former labeling system, you would be more or less correct: an atheism would be affirming there are no gods and not merely lacking a belief. However, if the latter labeling system is being utilized then you would be incorrect: an "agnostic atheist" does not affirm there are no gods, they simply lack a belief in any gods.

Some will claim that every person is an atheist in their own regards, to some particular subset of gods, to more clearly explicate the difference between "lacking a belief" and "believing".

To be quite frank, this is a hot topic, eternal semantical feud, amongst many out there in the community. For me, I worry more about the underlying meaning the person I am conversing with is trying to convey. For me, I would fit more with the "agnostic atheist" label than "atheist" (in regard to its one-dimensional usage). But if one were to insist that, semantically, "atheism" is the expression of the affirmation of no gods, then I simply am "agnostic".

I would also like to emphasize that, even if one is expressing the affirmation of no gods, they are not necessarily positing it as an absolute. Not all epistemologies allow for "absolutes" and, therefore, they may be claiming to "know" there are no gods while retaining that it is not an absolute judgment.

Moreover, "atheism" does not entail the denial of the "supernatural" nor "metaphysical", it is simply either the affirmative denial of gods or the lack of belief in all gods or the lack of belief in a particular subset of gods (again, depends on whom you are speaking to).

My perspective is that both points of view are asinine, as neither can be proved. The fact that you have not found evidence of the supernatural isn't conclusive proof that it does not exist.

I think that the views you are attacking are "gnostic" absolute claims either way: which are not the only two options. I think that we tend to default to something "does not exist" until we have proof that it does. So, although, yes, simply lacking any evidence whatsoever does not necessitate that supernaturalism is false, it would entail that we shouldn't belief it is true.

If feelings are a valid tool to perceive factual reality, and you FEEL that the supernatural exists, then it would be equally true that it does NOT exist, because someone else FEELS that it does not.

I think I would need further elaboration on what you mean here. What are "feelings"? Sensations? It seems as though you are trying to convey that "feeling" either way is not proof (either way), which I would agree with. I think the problem is that one cannot be in a middle space between holding a "belief" and "not believing". Sure, we could distinguish "disbelief" as the negative affirmation and "not believing" as merely the lack thereof, but nevertheless there is no truly neutral space here: either you belief something, or you don't.

You cannot gain knowledge of consciousness through quantums and relativity, because consciousness is you, the subject, the one who is waiting to be met. You cannot meet yourself through quantums and metaphysics. Rather, what Pascal suggested was "esprit de finesse", spirit of fineness, or we can just say spirit.

I think that it depends entirely on what you are referring to by "consciousness". I do not hold that exploring, empirically, consciousness is a self-defeating (absurd) task (to that like continually running into a brick wall). Certain aspects, at the very least, of what I would consider consciousness is obtainable via empirical observation. For example, we can discover that this aspect of the brain has some role in color interpretation (e.g. damage that and they can't see red anymore). However this may merely be a semantical difference between us because I hold that reason is the "subject" and, therefore, is the bedrock. Moreover, the investigation (empirically) of reason inevitably fails (only in the sense of grounding it absolutely in the brain) because it is that which is presupposed (which is what I presume you were trying to convey), but I don't think that "reason" is generally synonymous with "consciousness": we can causally evaluate consciousness to see how it relates to conscious states. Maybe "reason" is what you are referring to by "spirit"?

We can even consider noble, honourable, this pseudo-science, because science is research that, as such, improves human knowledge and human condition.

I don't find anything "pseudo" about empirically observing my own mind recursively to evaluate what seems metaphysical or transcendent (or what isn't): in fact, I think it is progressive and insightful into understanding itself. However, I do agree that this is always performed with careful consideration that it is being logically derived from reason itself (or from "me" as you put it) and, as you stated, everything is always conceptualized as an object and, therefore, even both of our arguments entail that we are providing an explanation which is an objectification of subjectivity, because, I would say, there is no subjectivity in that sense of the term--for "subjectivity" is simply manifested, conceptualized, as what is manifesting the manifestations. Therefore, even to argue "consciousness" is "me", as I think you did, is to merely conceptualize the manifestations, ever active conceptualizations, as an object manifesting them. Something truly "beyond reason" is something relatable to "indeterminate", "impossible", "undescribable", or "unfathomable". However, even those concepts do not transcend reason, in a literal sense, and so there is not a truly transcendent concept. With that being said, we can still logically derive the objective relation of "subjectivity" to the "objects", for they are both inevitably objectified (e.g. reason is metaphysical in relation to the physical, but neither truly transcends reason as they are both conceptualized as objects).

In short, I do not really see the dilemma, or contradiction, in binding "consciousness" to the brain, albeit that nothing transcends reason (not even the very concept of "transcendence" and "nothingness"). I don't think it is hypocritical, stupid, etc to empirically investigate anything, including the brain and "consciousness" and "reason", for that is all we have (nevertheless, we can thereafter, naturally, have things, i.e. chains of reasoning, which produce a convincement of metaphysical aspects that transcend things). But once we begin empirical, recursive examination of reason on itself, we quickly realize that, in relation to reason, it logically follows that reason itself is not a "thing" but, rather, metaphysical. But this was obtained empirically, because it all is.

Is your frustration more towards people who are more that of materialists? Those who claim the brain and the mind are one and the same? That we will be able to causally examine a brain so in depth that we discover all truths of the mind therefrom?

@Philosophim,

I apologize, the week has been quite busy for me.

Firstly, I think we need to revisit the "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction holistically because I am still not understanding why it is important. Hypothetically, if I were to grant you that abstractions never are inductions, and subsequently that there are two distinct methods of arriving at a deduction, I don't see the meaningfulness behind such a distinction. I went ahead and re-read your past two posts, and, to just quote you briefly, this is generally what you stated (although I could just be missing it as I am re-reading):

I would not mind renaming the words within that distinction, but that distinction is absolutely key to breaking out of the previously failed theories of knowledge. I will see if I can show you why in our conversation.

Even after re-reading the whole post (this is two posts back), I don't see how this achieves nor is necessary to "break out of the previously failed theories of knowledge". I understand (at least I think) what you are referring to by what failed in previous theories, but I see this evidently clear in two key principles of your epistemology: (1) inductions are not knowledge and (2) inductions are not equally cogent as one another. These are the two principles, as I see it, that are vital to breaking out of such failed epistemologies: nothing pertaining to the distinction between methods prior to deducing knowledge. Yes you could technically, if I grant that abstractions are not inductions themselves, make a distinction between a deducing after conjuring an induction vs abstractly deducing, but this has no bearing on what I think is the bedrock of your epistemology. Principle #1 demonstrates exactly what you have been outlining in your examples (such as inventing a game with cards abstractly vs non-abstractly): if I induce it, I do not know. I think it is that simple and, thusly, am failing (even in terms of granting your argument as far as I can imagine) to understand the importance of distinguishing that I can thereafter obtain knowledge of what I deduce in relation to that induction. Again, principle #1 outlines this clearly already.

I guess where I am confused is: why not just say "if you didn't deduce it, you don't know it" instead of "you don't gain applicable knowledge until it is deduced"? It seems like the latter is obviously given (at least to me) in the former: regardless of when we can, as subjects, conjure an induction and when we can't. My question for you is, given that you clearly see it as vital to the epistemology, what am I missing? I'm sure I am just missing something.

Likewise, I don't think "applicable knowledge", in the sense of a deduced conclusion pertaining to an induction, has any actual relations to the induction. The induction and deduction are completely separate: mutually exclusive. To say I induced something, then deduced knowledge that happens to fall under that same category of inquiry is just that: a coincidence or, at best, the induction was merely the motivation but necessarily has no direct relation to the obtaining of knowledge whatsoever.

I think clearing that up will help with what we are currently conversing about. Now on to your most recent post:

I don't want this to come off as dismissive or unappreciative of the great argument you've set up. It is just the goal of this endeavor is to create an epistemology that can be applied and supply an answer to any epistemological question.

Absolutely no problem! Do what you wish with my responses: I never want you to feel obligated to address it in a specific manner (or in its entirety).

According to the foundational epistemology I've proposed, you can doubt anything you want.

So this is tricky. If by "doubt everything" you mean that everything is technically falsifiable, then yes I agree. However, once we endeavor on our journey of doubt, we realize that we have obtained that certain things cannot be doubted. So, in another sense, I disagree: you cannot doubt everything. You cannot, as outlined in my previous post, the "present thought". Sure, you can doubt my assertion of it, disagree with it, etc, but you will nevertheless always be trusting your "present thought" to the degree I mentioned before. If you are claiming that your epistemology allows for "pure doubting" of literally everything, wherein the subject never obtains anything which it realizes it strictly cannot doubt, then I think that is simply false (but I have no problem if you mean it in the sense of everything is falsifiable).

The entirety of this would still be distinctive knowledge. Only after the 2 induced premises had a deduced conclusion, would we call the result applicable knowledge.

Although I want to agree with what you are proposing here, upon further reflection, the hypothetical deduction has no inductions (not even in the premises)(nor do deductions in general). To state that "IF an essential property of cats is that they are green" is not an induction: it is simply a logical conditional. I am not asserting that given repetition I think that an essential property of cats is "greeness", I am simply stating that IF it is, then this is what logically follows. My main point here is that you would be correct if they were inductions, in terms of how you defined applicable knowledge, but the premises are logically verified (i.e. IF) and are thereby certain. In other words, although I was onboard with the idea of deductive premises being inductions, I think that "IF ..." conditionals are deductively verified to be true: "IF .." is not incorrect. Even if I stated "IF a square circle ...", that is valid, but if I stated "a square circle ...", that is invalid. This is because I am not asserting that the contents of the IF are true or actually can be true, only that if granted as true what would follow logically. So, I don't think this hypothetical deduction's premises would ever become applicable knowledge.

Now what I think you were trying to get at (and correct me if I am wrong) is that if we were to remove the IF conditional and try to verify the content, then it is either deductively ascertained or inductive. If it is inductive, then we do not know it until it is deduced (thereby becoming applicable knowledge). My point is that the premises, when postulated with IF conditionals, are not inductions. Now let's go back to your original example (because I think I can more adequately address it now):

1. An accidental property of cats is they are green. (Could or could not)
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat. (Must be)
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

This is not a deduction. Why? Because premise #1 does not logically necessitate the conclusion (which is the definition of a deduction). You haven't posited IF all cats are green, you've posited it logically as not necessary for a cat to be green, which means it does not necessarily follow that Bob is green. Therefore, this is not actually a deduction.

1. An essential property of cats is they are green.
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

However, this would be a deduction, because you have posited it in a way that necessitates the conclusion. But my main point is that this is not "necessitated" in the sense the premises are being argued as actually true, only that, at the very least, are granted as true in an IF conditional.

So, although they would both be valid deductions, this is not quite the same as your previous example (in the above quote):

1. IF an essential property of cats is they are green.
2. IF an essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Then bob is green

This is also a valid deduction, but is not asserting that the premises are actually true, which is why I distinguished this as a "hypothetical deduction". But what I was missing in my previous response is that a deduction cannot, by definition, have an induction as a premise (that would mean the conclusion does not necessarily follow).

The question will be when those first two premises are "inductions", and when they aren't.

They never are inductions, unless it wasn't a deduction to begin with.

In the solo context, the answer to the "inductions" is whatever we decide. We decide if they are essential properties or not. They are not inductions, their conclusion is certain to whatever we decide.

Again, they are never inductions. I think you are conflating an induction with logical if conditionals, I don't think they are the same. Sure, we can decide what is categorical and what is hypothetical insofar as we do not contradict ourselves. I cannot willy nilly conjure up whatever I want.

If however, we pull another person into the equation, a society with written rules, then we have an evolution. I cannot conclude whatever I want. I must make an induction, a belief about what society will decide. The answer to that, is applicable knowledge. Even then, the abstracts of society that it creates, that I must test my beliefs against, are its distinctive context, not applicable context.

The same critique you made of solo contexts applies to societal contexts: I can deny whatever society throws at me, just like I can deny whatever I throw at myself. Ultimately I have to decide what to accept and what not to. If someone else came up with:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green

We are still in the same dilemma. I don't think the process is as different as you may think.

In the solo context, the answer to the "inductions" is whatever we decide.

the answer to anything is what we decide (ultimately). This doesn't mean we are right and it surely doesn't mean (in either solo or societal contexts) that we are actually completely free to do whatever we want.

If you are a purely abstracting being, then you decided it was a coherent sequence of reason. You just as easily could have decided it was not.

I agree. But this doesn't entail what you are trying to entail. Just because I can utter the words "I decide that it was not a coherent sequence of reason", does not make it so. Just because I convinced of it, that does not make it so. And as an example, your next sentence is a great explication of this:

You could decide to never be convinced of anything

This is true in the sense that I can be convinced that I am not convinced of anything, however I am definitively wrong because I am thereby convinced of something. The danger of the mind is that it can fail to grasp things, not that it can do whatever it wants. Reason is not relative, it is absolute in relation to the subject at hand. I can utter and be convinced that "pon is false", but thereby it is true. I can fail grasp that, or it may never pop into my head, but that is still an absolute grounding for me (the subject).

It is a hypothetical deduction as you noted earlier. The question comes into play when we consider what appears to be an induction in premise one. There is one key here. You determine whether you remember correctly that the previous answer is six. If you do, then you do. If you remember that it is 7, then it is 7.

I should have made it more clear:

1. IF I am remembering correctly that I previously answered 6.
2. IF the correct answer must abide by what I remember the square root operation is
3. THEN the answer to the square root of 25 is 6

This is not a valid hypothetical deduction because it is not a deduction (the premises do not necessitate the conclusion). But, I apologize, my original formulation of it was wrong and you are correct there that it was a hypothetical deduction.

In light of my position that premises cannot be inductions in a valid deduction, then I think you are right in just that respect. But I can induce that what I remember being 6 does align with what I remember is the square root of 25 (when the operation I remember is applied) without first applying it. However, I would only know they align via a deduction (remembering the 6 and applying the operation to 25): which would be completely separate from the induction (which I would consider abstract).

Likewise, I want to be clear that I do not think that the induction component and deduction component of "applicable knowledge" are in any way related. Just like how I can induce that 6 and square root of 25 align (and my knowledge they don't was a completely separate deduction/deductions), so it is with "applicable knowledge": whatever was induced that isn't contained in what was deduced remains induced, and whatever is contained in the deduction is now verified via the deduction where those inductive conclusions get thrown out into the garbage can. There's no relation between an induction and a deduction: they two completely separate forms of reason.

I would also like to note very briefly that we have been kind of ignoring our friend "abductions", which is not an "induction" nor a "deduction". I'm not sure where you have that fit into this equation: is it simply merged with inductions?

To be very clear, this is because an abstraction has no rules besides what you make. There is no one besides yourself who can tell you your own created abstraction is "wrong". No one to tell you but yourself that your memory is "wrong". In short, abstractions are our limitless potential to "part and parcel" as we like.

I think where we disagree fundamentally is that you seem to be positing that we control reason (or our thoughts or something) in the abstract, but we do not. I do not decide to part and parcel in a particular way, it just manifests. There are rules to abstract though (again, pon). I can linguistically deny it, but nevertheless my reason is grounded in it. I cannot literally conjure whatever I want, because conjuring follows a set of rules in itself.

There must be something outside of our own power and agency that creates a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises we've created.

It seems like you are arguing you do have power over your thoughts (and potentially imagination): I do not think you do. They are all objects and reason is the connections, synthetic and analytical, of those objects.

Moreover, if I have a deduction, and it is sound, then nothing "outside of my power" (whatever that entails) cannot reject it (in the sense that "reality" rejects what "I want", or what have you). The deduction is true as absolutely as the term "absolute" can possibly mean. Inductions (and abductions) are the only domains of reasoning that can be rejected. We are still dictating "what is outside of our control": I decide that it holds without contradiction that my friend bob jr. has a totally different definition of "pancakes" than I do. I could fail to understand this, or straight up deny it, and claim that we both actually have the same definition, where mine is "round object" and his is "square object", but that doesn't mean I am right. Same thing is true of thoughts: they are objects. I can tell myself "I can do whatever I want abstractly", but that doesn't make it so. It is no different than "reality" or "other powers" scenario. My main point here is that your criticism of "we can make a dream world of 'reality'" is just as valid and can be posited for "we can make a dream world of our thoughts".

I will address your points on the mind-bender dilemma of the reliability of thoughts after the aforementioned is resolved because I do not feel that I can substantively respond without understanding the rest first.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

I want to disclaim that this post is going to be quite complicated, as you brought up an incredibly valid, and thought-provoking, dilemma which deserves an adequate response. The reliability of memories was a keen insight Philosophim!

Before I dive into that dilemma, let me first address deductions.

But I'm not sure the hypothetical is an actual deduction. Let me point it out

A deductive argument is that which has a conclusion that is necessitated from its premises, not that the premises are true. So, a better way to propose my cat example, at first glance here, is:

1. IF all cats are green
2. IF bob is a cat
3. THEN bob is green

You are absolutely correct that #1 and #2 could be false (even an induction), but that doesn't mean it isn't, by definition, a deduction. I understand what you were trying to get at with your refurbishment, which looked like:

1. An essential property of cats is they are green.
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

1. An accidental property of cats is they are green. (Could or could not)
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat. (Must be)
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

My response is tricky here, because you are sort of right when you posit #1 like that. But I still don't think you are right that deductions can't have incorrect (or inductive) premises (deductions are defined by their form, not truth value). The first deduction here I think we both agree is a "categorical deduction", but #1 in the second one isn't really a deduction (I would agree) because it is not positing IF. In my head, it is equivalent to:

1. Not all cats are green
2. Bob is a cat
3. Bob is green

That isn't a deduction because it doesn't have the logical necessitous form (has nothing to do with whether they are true, just that the premises necessitate the conclusion). My main point here is that this would be a hypothetical deduction:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green

This was not categorical, in the sense I was meaning it, because I am not, in positing it, affirming the truth of #1 and #2 (however it is still indeed a deduction that may or may not be true). This is different than actually claiming that I am categorically defining cats as must having an essential property of greeness (as in cats actually are all green). So, in short, I think you are right that, in the manner you depicted it, it would not be a deduction but this is not based off of truth value: it is about the form. However, I still think hypotheticals are different than categoricals. A deductive argument is denoted by IF the premises are agreed, then it necessitates the conclusion. The premises could be inductions.

Alright, now it is time for the main dilemma you posited: the reliability of memories (which I would extend as thoughts as well). Fair warning that this gets complicated fast, but I know you can handle it (: So, firstly I want to give a brief overview of what I think and then dive into what you said.

Here's a brief overview first:

1. I cannot doubt a thought until after it becomes apart of the past (therefrom an absolute grounding of trust is established).
2. Any given past thought is always recollected as a reliable memory (in virtue of #1).
3. The validity of a given past thought is deduced insofar as it relates to other past thoughts.
4. The reliability of the total set of past thoughts is never established (inductively nor deductively) because it is an illusory transcendent concept.
5. Inductions can arise pertaining to deduced memories.

Let's talk about #1: I cannot doubt a thought until after it becomes apart of the past. The "present thought", which I will define as 0, is always necessarily granted as trustworthy, and this is apodictic. However, the proof for this is not an easy feat. The problem is that to claim a "present thought" is taken as trustworthy (albeit potentially questioned thereafter by even the very next thought) requires that its immediate trustworthiness be evaluated by a subsequent thought--thereby rendering it a past thought (which it means, at face value, the very last thought is being utilized as reliable to deduce that when it was the "present thought" it was necessarily trusted). However, the proof for the immediate trustworthiness of the "present thought" cannot rely on the reliability of a past thought (because that would defeat the whole purpose). Therein lies the difficulty. But I realized this can nevertheless be proven (I think at least), because I can deduce (regardless of the validity of any thoughts) that if a past thought hypothetically was at one point actually the "present thought" and it wasn't immediately trusted (prior to another thought succeeding it) then I would never have a coherent sequence of reason. Therefore, I would never be convinced of anything. But since I am convinced of things, and thusly have coherent sequences of reason, I know that I must be trusting the "present thought". In short, I think there are two logically true statements we can make regardless of the reliability of the total set of past thoughts:

1. Regardless of the validity, my past thoughts are always in succession, therefore in a sequence, which necessitates boundaries. Which in turn, necessitates the "present thought".
2. if any given past thought was actually at one point in time the "present thought", then it is necessarily the case that it was trusted immediately. For, otherwise, I would not have obtained the coherent sequence of past thoughts, regardless of the validity therein.

This brings us to the vital understanding of #4: The reliability of the total set of past thoughts is never established (inductively nor deductively) because it is an illusory transcendent concept. I can only merely prove that, given the sequence of past thoughts I have, if any given past thought was the "present thought", then I would logically be obligated to trust it immediately prior to another thought manifesting. But this doesn't speak to whether the sequence of past thoughts I am analyzing are indeed reliable (for all I know, my "present thought" is referencing a completely false previous past thought or the whole set is fallacious). The main problem is that I am always inferring the "present thought" by virtue of the sequence of past thoughts. Therefore, the concept of a past thought existing objectively as itself does not exist, for I am always potentially infinitely referencing memories via other memories.

My brain hurts (:

Now, this means, if I am correct (emphasis on if), then it is deduced that the absolute grounding of trust is the "present thought", which can, admittedly, be doubted fervently thereafter.

Now on to #2: Any given past thought is always recollected as a reliable memory (in virtue of #1). Recollection is the process of retrieving a past thought, which inevitably brings it forward as the present thought. Therefore, as the memory loaded into the present thought, it is granted trustworthiness (although it can be questioned thereafter). Recollection, although it does bring forth past thoughts as a present thought, does not "refresh the time stamp" so to speak: the memory itself is merely referenced in relation to when it is thought to be in the sequence of past thoughts, but the recollection itself, being a present thought, is always appended to the succession of thoughts separately. For example:

1. if I remember memory A, I am recollecting it.
2. Recollection entails A being presented as the “present thought”, 0
3. therefore, 0 is referencing A (i.e. the recollection is not A, it is 0 which references A)
4. therefore, A is still referenced in the sequence of past thoughts where it is remembered to have occurred relative to the others, but 0 will become a new past thought (aka: memory of remembering A)
5. This occurs recursively for a potential infinite


Moreover, #4 here is not completely explained (as noted by the emphasis on “remembered”): in immediate recollection, whatever is referenced from A in 0 is immediately trusted. If A contained holistic or partial references to where it is in the collection of past thoughts, then that is immediately trusted as well. However, if A doesn’t contain where in the collection it should be (i.e. its index), then a subsequent thought will be required to attempt to deduce what is remembered as its index (which is subjected to the same process as previously described).

Now, the doubting occurs when a remembrance of a memory (0 now as a past thought) is examined by 0 (the present thought) in relation to what could potentially be the difference of A and &A (A being the memory, &A being the reference to A in 0). In other words, &A is posited as potentially not holistically referencing A as what it initially was, therefore is potentially A != &A, and therefrom the dilemma occurs. But, to invoke #4 (from my original generalization of my views), the validity of the thoughts is never obtained nor actually performed outside of a relation between past thoughts and, therefore, the answer to the reliability of all thoughts is unobtainable. The apodictic nature of referencing past thoughts in the present thought entails that the concept of a thought as itself vs how it was referenced (A vs &A) is illusory. It would only ever be how A is considered by some subset of past thoughts vs how &A is considered by some subset of past thoughts: thereby never achieving a transcendent concept of “a true thought in-itself”.

As we already established #4, #3 (in my original generalization) simply denotes that what really happens when we question our past thoughts (and sometimes determine some to be unreliable and others reliable and still others undetermined) is that we are only establishing "reliability" as it relates to other past thoughts: it is the analysis of the sequence of past thoughts via the present thought (which is always granted as trusted immediately). The procedure of determining what is reliable or not is not relevant to the dilemma itself, so I will leave it there.

Now, how's does that all relate to what you said? Well, I think you are partially right:

Case 1. I remember that what I remembered yesterday, is what I remember today.
Case 2. I remember that what I remembered yesterday, is not what I remember today.
Case 3. I conclude "I'm unsure if what I remembered today is what I remembered yesterday."

if your cases are referring to one memory’s validity in relation to the set of past thoughts, then you are right that we can deduce such. If you are trying to derive the validity of the entirety of the set of past thoughts, then you are wrong (it is an illusory concept that acts as if it has transcended reason). They seem to be lacking the consideration that it is a recursive dilemma. The first two cases are explicitly self-contradictory ("I remember"), and the last case is essentially the same thing: they all beg the question of the validity of those memories being utilized to resolve the conflicting memories. It is a recursive operation that is inevitable, but can be accurately portrayed in a non-absurd manner if one realizes that it is all relative to the absolute point of trust: the present thought.

Now, let me address your main contention here:

In short, in what we conclude in a prior reference to our memory, an abstraction, is a deduction because it is whatever we experience.

I think you are partially correct. In terms of the process of thinking as outlined previously, the reliability in relation to another past thought is deduced. Likewise, it is deduced that there is a "present thought" and that it necessarily is trusted. However, the reliability of set of past thoughts is not determined. Also, I still think that an induction is possible abstractly, however your definition of "abstraction" doesn't allow it by definition (and I would say it is not a main stream definition of abstraction). None of this entails that something cannot be an induction pertaining to two deduced subsets of memories.

So at the time when you state, "the answer is 6", that's still distinctive knowledge and deduction.That is because what you experience remembering as the answer, is the answer.

This is where #5 (from my original generalization) comes into play: this is simply not true. I deduce that I remember the answer being 6, but that does not mean I deduced that that memory must be correct in relation to what I remember are the rules of the operation of the square root. I induced that it was correct, based off of the fact I remember the answer being 6. Nothing about me remembering that the answer is 6, even if it could be proven it was 100% accurate that I did indeed answer it as 6 before, necessitates that the answer actually is 6 (in accordance to what I remember is the mathematical operation). Deductions are what necessarily follow from the premises. Now, it is deduced that the answer must follow my pre-determined operation of the square root, which is subjected to your critique that I may not remember that operation reliably, but nothing about my memory of answering a particular way necessitates that it is the answer. I think what you are missing is that both the operation and the answer are deduced memories, which are compared, and you are correct in the case of questioning the memory of the operation (whatever I remember is the square root operation, is the square root operation), but the connection of the memory of the answer 6 being accurate to the memory of the operation of the square root is an induction. If I remember the operation of the square root (whatever that may be) and remember answering six, I can logically, abstractly, derive whether my memory of answering six actually aligns with the correct answer (as derived from my memory of the operation).

Look at it this way:

1. IF I am remembering correctly that I previously answered 6.
2. THEN the answer to the square root of 25 is 6

Does the conclusion necessarily follow from the premise? No. Therefore, it is not a deduction. I think your critique is perfectly valid, and very thought-provoking, in terms of the reliability of the operation of the square root. Likewise, let’s say I remember that there was a mathematical operation of the square root but I can’t remember what it was at all, then it may be the case that the most cogent induction is to go with what I remember answering with before: but it is not a deduction.

I think I may need to stop here for now. Wonderful post Philosophim!
Bob

Spectacular :) So the way that people such as myself would say it, is "all concepts exist beyond time".

I'm interpreting this as an agreement, but refurbishment, of what I said. However, I do not hold that "all concepts exist beyond time".

Your answer to the op would be, "existence was always here".

I don't want to be reiterative, and if you would like to close the discussion that perfectly fine (I am enjoying our conversation, but if you would like to end it that is fine too), but I want to clarify that I do not hold that position. If you would like to explain why you think that I am somehow implicitly arguing for that statement then please feel free: but I explicitly stated I am not in agreement with that proposition.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Excellent. Do you think the concept of "being" has always existed (or do you think that this concept had a beginning)?

Depends on what you mean. If you are referring to "being" as "existence" (as I depicted it), then you are again asking "do you think "existence" has always existed": which is an invalid question. If you are referring semantically to the word "being" in english, then yes it had a beginning. Concepts under the existential reference can be posited as "existing" or "not existing" in reference to in space and at a particular duration of time, but "existence" itself cannot be posited as "existing" or "not existing".

Has that concept of a unicorn always existed? Or does that concept of a unicorn only exist for a certain amount of time (such as while you imagine it)? If the concept of the unicorn did not always exist, does that mean the concept of the unicorn had a beginning?

Yes, any concept under the uniform existential reference can "be" or "not be" in relation to time and space. "not be" is a negation in reference to existence (in space and pertaining to a duration of time), and "be" is an affirmation.

Do human beings exist? Do you think the existence of human beings had a beginning? Or do you think human beings always existed?

What do you mean by "human beings"? If you mean "human being" as in the animal (as taken and thusly analyzed as an object), then they had a beginning of existence (with respect to many, I presume--as in the evolutionary definition would produce a beginning roughly of the first homio sapiens, or a different beginning time with regards to the first multi-cellular life, etc).

As in the subject (which I would specifically hold is reason, which is metaphysical), it is not subjected to the same analysis as the consideration of a "human being's" body (taken as object). But that might derail our conversation quite a bit, so I will leave it there and let you decide what you want to talk about.

Bob

I apologize if my responses were confusing, let me try to explain it more proficiently.

You are saying that there cannot be a predicate of existence because any answer would entail existence itself? Thus, it would be a contradiction?

So, as you previously pointed out, I am making two claims: (1) "existence" is not a valid predicate, and (2) "existence" has no valid predicates. In terms of #1, I think you are already understanding what that means (but, as always, I could be utterly wrong on that, so feel free to inquire further if you want). In terms of #2, I don't think there are any valid predicates to "existence": it is essentially a priori (or transcendental), which is necessarily presupposed in every manifestation of reason.

For example, any predicate offered for "existence" necessarily presupposes existence itself: existence is X, became X, was X, was caused by X, etc. is, became, etc references existence as its a priori presupposition.

In the op, I offer another option, instead of saying that there is a predicate of existence, you could say that existence was always here.

I may be misunderstanding you, but my critique here is that I don't think what you are offering truly is an alternative to a predicate of existence. To say "existence was always here" has a predicate (which is in bold). I'm not sure how that is separate solution from "a predicate of existence" (they are both predicates). If I say "existence was caused by X" or "existence has always been here", they both produce the same contradiction (as they are both predicates of existence).

I suppose what I do not understand is, why is it useful to you, to say that the question is illogical?

Are you saying that existence was always here? Or are you only saying that the question is illogical, but ignoring (I do not mean this in an accusatory sense!) the option of an eternal universe?

This is fair, my contention has been with the question itself. But in this case, although I understand how disappointing this is going to sound, the question is invalid (so I don't think there is a solution). If I asked you "how far can I throw a square circle?", you can't provide a valid answer because it is not a valid question (albeit enticing of a question). So if I am right (emphasis on if), then the question cannot be answered in a valid manner, because it is an invalid question. It would entail that it is a wasted effort to try and discover the answer to "what color is a triangular rectangle?" ("existence was caused by X"--was caused by X is a predicate which presupposes existence).

Now, I don't want to completely disappoint you: we can ask mind-boggling, thought-provoking questions pertaining to what pertains under the apodictically true references of our manifestations of reason (such as where did the "universe" come from). But existence in its entirety, is simply the ever referenced (a priori if you will) aspect of our reason. In terms of the universe (if posited as dis-synonymous with "existence" in its entirety), I think that it is a potential infinite: that would be my explanation. Zoom out, zoom in, go forward, go back, etc it will always be a potential infinite.

Does that help?

Bob

Disclaimer:

Bob, this was a very long post. Please make sure to read to the end before starting your response. I think that once you read the post in full, you will see that I cleared up all the confusion. Thanks!

I appreciate the disclaimer, but I would like to assure you that I will always read your posts in their entirety before making any assertions: I would not be giving you nor your ideas the proper respect it deserves if I didn't. You can always expect this of me, and if I fall short then you have permission to slap me through the internet (:

That being said, I am going to respond in chronological order (I find it easier that way), but if that is an issue just let me know and I can try a different approach.

Well, if there is no predicate for existence that is certainly one thing. If it is a contradiction to ask the question that would be another thing. And of course it could be both as well, hehe (3 options you are alluding to).

Yes, I think you are right here: I would be positing the combination of both.

Hmm, not exactly. You see, you are creating a trap for yourself. When you say that something existed without existing, that would merely be an oxymoron. I would not be so silly as to ask a question that was merely an oxymoron. :)

Asking for the predicate of existence is asking what created existence in the first place. I suppose to you, that sounds the same as "what existed without existence". :)

I understand that it is silly, when posited in the manner I did, to ask such a question: but that is my point. When you state "Asking for a predicate of existence is asking what created existence in the first place", I think you are thereby conceding that whatever created existence exists prior to existence. Now, you may be referring to maybe a different underlying meaning for "existence" for the creator vs the creation (so two different meanings for "to exist"), but nevertheless they would both be underneath the universal "being" reference (but you talk about this later on, so more on that later).

Let me ask you a question, what does "existence" mean to you?

I am not sure how in depth to explicate here (so feel free to inquire more in you would like), but I would consider "existence" as "to be" (or "being"), which, for me, has no relation "the external world" specifically. My imaginations exist. My thoughts exist. However, it exists only insofar as it is not contradicted. For example, a unicorn that I imagined in my mind exists as an imagined unicorn, but does not exist as a concreto in "the external world". Still exists, just abstractly. I think we (as in humanity) like to make meaningful distinctions between a unicorn "existing" in the sense of in my head and in the so called "real world", but both are engulfed by the ever present, unescapable "existence". Colloquially, for example, people may argue that "unicorns don't exist"; however, as you are probably already gathering, I would say that they are referring to a concept of "existence" under the holistic concept of existence. Hopefully that makes a bit of sense.

Well, on the surface of it, it would seem that "nothing" creating anything other than "nothing" is an oxymoron, indeed. :) Nevertheless, there are Physicists who believe that this is what happened.

This is just a side note, but I honestly don't think Physicists (for example, Lawrence Krauss) are actually referring to "true nothingness", but an altered version (especially in Krauss' case: he just can't seem to grasp that he isn't solving the philosophical dilemma pertaining to such because he is not defining nothing in the same manner).

As far as something causing existence...I think you're getting too caught up on what is considered to be logical, versus illogical, non-logical, etc. It does appear as well, that you conflate non-logic as being synonymous with illogic. Something could be non-logical and that does not automatically entail that it is illogical.

Very interesting! I don't think, as of now, I agree (I don't think it is a conflation). It may be, however, that we aren't referring to the same "logic" (semantically), but if something is non-logical it is illogical. In turn, something that is illogical is irrational. But to dive into that, let's take your example:

You do realize that first of all, the universe could be illogical, right (or non-logical)? For all intents and purposes we can't even disprove a solipsistic existence (no, I am not advocating for solipsism, I can already see you saying, "that's another debate" :)).

You know me too well already (that's another debate) (:. But all joking aside, I first want to explicate back to you what I think you mean by "illogical" vs "non-logical" (so you can correct me if I am wrong). "illogical" is that which is violated during the process of "logical inquiry", whereas "non-logical", which is where I am not clearly seeing the definition, is when something doesn't directly violate "logic" but, rather, is simply something that lacks "logic" altogether. Did I understand that correctly?

I think that (to keep it brief) something is "logical" if it is not contradicted and something is "illogical" if it is contradicted. "non-logic", in the sense of an absence of "logic", is subject to the same critique as before: it is only our logical derivation of what the negation of logic would be. Maybe if you explain it in further detail I can respond more adequately, but I don't see when something could be non-logical.

In terms of solipsism, I want to separate two claims that are typically made therein: we have no good reasons to believe other people are subjects and we are the only subject. The former I have no problem with (and actually agree), the latter is a leap (a giant leap). The latter is where solipsists get into trouble, and that's where the contradictions arise. I think (and correct me if I am wrong) you are positing solipsism as an example of something we don't hold, but nevertheless can't be dis-proven (logically): it is dis-proven in the sense of the latter, and proven in the sense of the former. I genuinely don't see how anything pertaining to such was "non-logical".

And whatever did create the universe would obviously have to surpass the normal laws of Physics that we abide by.

So when I speak of something never surpassing the universal being, spatial, and temporal references, I don't mean "physics". I am perfectly fine, for all intents and purposes, agreeing with you that such a being (if they exist) would have to transcend physics (I don't hold that "physics" or "laws of nature" are synonymous with "logic").

For a lot of what this question asks, logic will totally fly out the door.

If what you mean by this is "physics will fly out the door", then I agree. I do not hold that "logic" flies out the door, as it is utilized to derive everything (including "everything" itself). There's never a point at which I can conclude that I've derived a situation where the principle of noncontradiction is false, because even if I could do that it would be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place (i.e. this hypothetical situation where pon is false, is contingent on me utilizing that very principle to derive it in the first place).

The art of this is to properly identify what is the most rational line of logic, if any, that we can apply to it. But do not forget that the very question will blur the lines of reality (since we are asking for the origin of reality itself).

I hate to be reiterative, but it blurs lines, I would say, because it is contradictory (albeit not self-evidently contradictory).

This is simply not true. An omniscient entity need not abide by the rules of our physics. The possibilities are as far as the imagination can go.

I think that we are utilizing "logic" differently. I have no problem, for all intents and purposes, conceding that an "omniscient entity" would not need to abide by the rules of our physics, because I don't hold "physics" as synonymous with "logic". Imagination abides by logic (I know, it may sound crazy). That doesn't mean that my imagination abides by physics (it definitely doesn't: I can fly on my imagined earth).

"Nothing" does not reference existence. Nothing is the complete opposite of that. "Nothingness" has no reference in the first place.

"Nothing" is not an existence. Nothing would be the complete opposite of that. Nothing is not a spatial reference. Nothing has no reference in the first place. The more you try to describe nothing, the less it is the true idea of nothing :)

Well, we are "something" so it is very hard to conceptualize "nothing". As you are saying, whatever concept you have, it will be of "something". That's how you know what nothing is (it's the exact opposite). Do you see how that works? :)

This is merely more of the same. The key to understanding "nothing" again, is not to envision the "combination of concepts" as you say, but rather, the deletion of them. When you get good at conceptualizing the "absence", then you will have a decent understanding of nothing.

Sure, it is ultimately impossible to conceptualize nothing, but that is exactly what you need to understand. :)

It's the exact opposite of everything you know. The more you fight it, the less it is "nothing". Embrace the "absence". Btw, do you know what would happen if you could actually conceptualize "nothingness"?

I think you are agreeing with me that we cannot conceptualize or fathom "nothing". However, I think you are stilling positing that it somehow exists apart from existence. Would you agree that "nothing" is simply the potential infinite of "deleting" concepts? My point is that that potential infinite would merely, at best, approach the limit of "nothing", and I feel like you are agreeing with me on that. However, that previous sentence is partially wrong, there is no "actual nothing" that is apart from "nothing" as a potential infinite of removals (we aren't approaching "true nothingness").

Likewise, the process of achieving a potential infinite of removals is simply the removal of something from space. That is what I mean by nothing being spatially referenced. Obviously nothing would negate "space": but would it? No. It would negate a conception of a spatial framework under the uniform space. Every attempt to negate "space" would follow that pattern for a potential infinite of times. Do you agree with me on that?

So, to recap, to say that one gets decent at understanding nothing by practicing the deletion of concepts, that is all "nothing" is. There's no "actual nothing" that we are approaching the limit of when we perform such actions.

Where you make your mistake is in assuming that because we are "something" that we cannot learn about "nothing". But we can; nothing is the complete negation of everything that we know to be something.

I don't have a problem exploring the practice of the absence (in a potential infinite fashion) of concepts. My point is that "nothing" in the sense of a potential infinite is not the same as positing a "complete negation of everything": that is attempting to achieve something which doesn't exist (an actual infinite of removals). That is recognizing the potential infinite of removals and leaping (in my opinion) to the idea that we are moving towards (approaching in a limit style) "true nothingness".

And here you are telling me that we cannot understand nothing. We are the only ones that can! Because we are something!

Hopefully I cleared up some of the confusion: I agree that we, as something, can explore the concept of a potential infinite of removals, but that's not "true nothing" in the sense of an actual infinite of removals. I would refurbish "true nothing" as simply the former and deny the latter.

I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob

Absolutely! You have it right, it's just that ever since Einstein described time as a fourth dimensional property, time was seen as something existing outside of the 3 dimensions we currently live in. :smile:

In terms of what we've been discussing (which it is a great discussion by the way!), I have no problem with either postulations (it being outside of 3D or within it), as my main point is that both postulations have no bearing on my assertion. They would both still be conjectures that are under the uniform spatial reference. It could very well be that I am missing something, so please feel free to point it out if you think I am misunderstanding (:

The article is merely stating that they are trying to prove that time can be used as a measurement within 3-d space. Nevertheless, time would still be separate from space whether in a fourth dimension or as a measurement.

Ah, so if it is indeed postulating that time is nevertheless "separate" from space in a fourth dimension or third, then I think it is subjected to the same exact critique. But to get into that, let me address the rest of your post.

I guess my larger point to your contention (Physics experiments aside :)) regarding notions of "nothing", and things that do not have a cause, self-creation, etc., is that such descriptions are actually possible.

Just because something cannot exist does not mean it cannot be described.

With regards to the second quote here, I actually (generally) agree: I may determine that, in hindsight, something that I thought was possible was actually impossible given the circumstances, and I nevertheless can describe them. However, I wouldn't quite agree with the first quote (which I think is in connection to the second): a predicate that contradicts its subject is describable only insofar as it demonstrates the contradiction itself. For example, a "circle that is square" only describes my ability to conceive of a "circle", a "square", and the joining of non-contradictory shapes (e.g. a square rectangle, two circles overlapping one another, etc). These three concepts are arranged in a particular order that produces a predicate that contradicts its subject (i.e. "circle is a square"): I take both concepts of the shapes and determine they are impossible. Moreover, more importantly, when I truly try to conceive of a "circle that is a square" I attempt to join the two shapes together, and given I can't, I never conceive of it. Now, I think what you are getting at (correct me if I am wrong), is that I nevertheless was able to describe what a circular square would be. To that I would agree only insofar as I am able to explicate the contradiction (and therefrom the three aforementioned concepts), but never what a "circular square" actually is. All I obtain, as described, is a "circle", a "square", and the joining to non-contradictory shapes. So I wouldn't completely disagree with you, but I wouldn't agree either.

Sure, we can accept that the universe was always here, but it will still lead to very difficult questions to be answered.

I would say that it depends on what you mean by "universe". Can we potentially explain the big bang? Or something else in the causal chain? Yes. If by "universe" you mean holistically all of "existence", then no. I think that causally speaking it is all a potential infinite. We are never going to get to a point where we can rest our heads and proclaim "we've find the first starting point!". All within the causal order is potentially infinite. So, I am not accepting that the universe was always here in the sense of an actual infinite but, rather, I would explain it in terms of a potential infinite. However, that potential infinite, if granted as the explanation, doesn't explain all of "existence", only merely that which is in the causal order.

It must be said that "nothing" is far easier than "something". For nothing to exist there is no friction, no energy that need be applied, no mathematics, no logic, no suffering, no agony, no dismay, no death and destruction, no moral arguments, no restitution nor justice. There needn't be any struggle for survival, betrayal, striving for immortality, fighting against the odds...there would merely be nothing. Nothing is far easier. It is the highest paradigm of Occam's razor.

Why need there be something when there can be nothing?

I understand what you are conveying here, and it is worthy question to ask. However, I would like to firstly disclaim that whether "nothing" is easier than "something" (which, as you are well aware, inevitably invokes Occam's razor) is a separate debate (albeit I am more than willing to participate). The only reason I say that is because it also has no bearing on what I was meaning to convey in my original post. Nothing, in terms of how you are using it in your example, is not "true nothingness", which is what I was trying to dispute. Your consideration is exactly in agreement (I think at least) with what I was saying: you are simply conceiving of "nothing" as the negation of all "things", which is the absent of all conceivable concepts. My original point was that that is not "nothing" in a pure sense (as it can't be postulated in a pure sense).

Anyways, back to what you were saying. I think that "nothing", in the sense of conceptualizing complete absence, is dependent on "something". For I would hold it is "something". If I conceptualize the negation (as you did) of all concepts, there's inevitably a spatial reference left over (i.e. no energy, no mathematics, etc are simply the conceptualization of something without that concept--such as something without mathematics). This hasn't "escaped", so to speak, the uniform spatial reference: to posit something as not there, I am referencing "a there". So, if what you mean by "nothing" is describable is that we can describe the negation of all concepts (in a potential infinite fashion), then I agree. However, I don't see how that negates what I am saying either. However, the problem with me saying "nothing" is "something" is that "nothing" would negate that "something" (it is a contradiction to claim that "nothing" is "something"), but my point is that the negation is this without that.

In terms of whether "nothing" is truly "easier" than "something", I am not so sure of that. Again, I don't think there is "nothing" without 'negating something'. Even stating "nothing without negating something" is utilizing the uniform spatial reference.

So when you ask "why is there something rather than nothing?", I think, holistically, you are asking "why is there something rather than the removal of concepts from my inevitable spatial reference?". But, in terms of causal order, we can ask a potential infinite of questions pertaining to why this was cause by that rather than that simply not causing this.

Certainly we are not here to just accept it all. I mean, plenty of people do, and that works out just fine for them. But to have a brain and be surrounded by countless inanimate matter, in an environment where we seem to be the pinnacle of intelligence, we are thus obligated to question how we got here and why.

I don't see how we are "certainly not here just to accept it all". However, I am not entirely sure what you are meaning by "accept it all". In terms of the causal order, we can most definitely try to explain why the universe is the way it is, or what caused the Big Bang, or something like that. However, the entirety of existence cannot be explained in that manner.

Providing the sound principle of "Occam's razor" we must admit that something is far harder than nothing.

As far as I understand his principle, it is "entities should not be multiplied without necessity", not that the simplest answer (or easier answer) is better. Also, I don't think that Occam's razor derives any sort of qualifications for comparing two theories in terms of complexity (in other words, Occam's razor speaks to if something rather than nothing is more complex than nothing without necessity, then we should hold that the latter is true over the former). Later, any arguments one may give for that actually being the case (something being harder than nothing) is an attempt to apply that rule (that there should actually be nothing). Otherwise, the razor itself simply points out that the belief that has minimal necessary specifications should supersede others. So, in other words, accepting Occam's razor does not necessitate that something is far harder than nothing (that's a separate argument, I would say).

And if this is not the case, then what is it that is stopping nothing from existing?

I see this no different than asking what is stopping a square circle from existing: it can't (not only that, but it can be only conceived of and described insofar as a contradiction, which wouldn't be what it would actually be).

If we are the power that defeats nothing then we must be the power that creates inquiry.

I am not sure how the impossibility of nothing necessitates that we create inquiry: how is that so?

Wonderful points (:, I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob

I appreciate your response. Although I may just be misunderstanding the article you referenced, it seems as though they are disputing time being that of 4D (and positing it as apart of 3D), not that time is "separate" in the sense of time being truly separate from "space" altogether:

Time is 'separated' from space in a sense that time is not a fourth dimension of space. Instead, time as a numerical order of change exists in a 3D space. Our model on space and time is founded on measurement and corresponds better to physical reality.

In terms of what I said in my post, I don't find anything wrong with positing time "in a 3D space".

Hypothetically (just in case I misunderstood the article), let's say they were arguing for a time which is "outside of space" (or "beyond space"), then I think it would be subject to the same critique I made in my original post.

It also depends on what you are referring to by "space". I am not considering it in the sense of "outer space", "string theory", "special relativity", etc (although they are really interesting and worthy considerations): I am referring to the universal spatial reference of everything (including "everything" itself"). Which I think physicists tend to be more interested in distinctions of "space" under the uniform, inevitable spatial reference (which, to be honest, I think they should be: they're profession is science not philosophy).

Briefly speaking, I would argue that there is no predicate to "existence" and to ask for one I think is a contradiction: it is asking for what existed without existence. Therefore, "existence was caused by nothing" is just as much of a logical contradiction as "existence was caused by something". Nothing can be posited that isn't engulfed in the universal reference of "being", and, consequently, it is not possible to actually posit the question "what is the predicate of existence": it can be uttered, but nevertheless references something causing something under the universal spatial (and "being") reference. Even "nothing" itself is referencing existence, but merely an existence most absent of all things (i.e. a spatial references with absolute minimal things contained in it). I can nor could I fathom whatever an "actual nothingness" would be because I am simply cogitating a concept of "nothingness" as without something (i.e. zero apples is simply a reference, still to existence, of something that can't be identified with "apples"). And the reason I am able to even assert (and contemplate) "true nothingness" or "actual nothingness" is simply due to my ability to conceptually combine concepts together: "actual" implies that something isn't what I deem "fake", and when I concatenate that to "nothingness" (the absence of as much as fathomable) I get a false hope that I have somehow achieved some other concept than "nothingness" ("nothingness" as itself, apart from all illusions)(that I could "actually" conceive, even partially due to the very utterance, "nothing"). "Nothing itself" (just like "true nothingness") is no more than the concatenation of concepts that produces a fallacious belief in producing a new concept. For example, "what is outside of space?" produces an illusion that I have somehow achieved a question that suggests something beyond space, but really I have conjoined the concept of "space" with my concept of "outside" (which is spatially referencing). What really is being posited in "what is outside of space?" is a spatial framework under the universal spatial reference that may be distinct from yet another spatial framework (i.e. "outside"): thereby getting no closer to even fathoming anything beyond space (and "beyond space" is subject to the same critique).

@Philosophim,

I decided to give it a couple days to mow it over in my head, as I didn't feel like I am completely understanding you, and now I think I understand what you are trying to convey. As always, I could be utterly wrong, so I am going to explicate it here (along with some suggestions that presuppose I am correct in my inference).

Firstly, "distinctive knowledge" is "deductions". "Applicable knowledge" is merely referencing the means of achieving that "distinctive knowledge" (i.e. the transformation of an inductive belief into deductive knowledge--belief into knowledge) and, therefore, is unnecessary for this distinction you are trying to convey. If it was induced and confirmed via a deduction, then that is "distinctive knowledge" (an induction that transformed into a deduction). Therefore, the dividing line I think you are looking for is "deductions" vs "inductions", so "knowledge is what is deduced" and "beliefs are what are induced": I honestly don't think it gets any clearer or more concise than that. Therefore, I suggest removing the terms "distinctive" and "applicable" knowledge outright in exchange for "deduction (knowledge)" and "induction (belief)". That would also resolve my confusion with abstraction vs non-abstraction, as abstraction can be induced and deduced (i.e. I can induce about my capabilities of reason or imagination, etc or I can deduce that the principle of non contradiction is a necessity). The dividing line of abstraction vs non-abstraction doesn't line up with deduction vs induction, which it doesn't have to in your case (unless I am wrong here).

But I want to be very careful here, as I would not agree that all deductions are knowledge. For all intents and purposes here, I am going to elaborate with a distinction of "categorical" vs "hypothetical" deductions (not married to the terms, just for explanation purposes). Although they are both deductions (and, consequently, their conclusions necessarily follow from the overlying principle and subsequent premises), they differ in the validity of the overlying principle itself. If a deduction was "categorical", then it is necessarily (categorically) true. However, if it was "hypothetical", then the conclusions are only true in virtue of granting the overlying principle as hypothetically true. This can be demonstrated (both of them) in one example:

1. All cats are green
2. Bob is cat
3. Bob is green

If I am asserting this as "categorically" true, then I am actually defining "greeness" as an essential property of "cat", therefore this deduction is necessarily true unconditionally. However, if I am asserting this "hypothetically", then I am thereby asserting in virtue of hypothetically holding that it is true that all cats are green. In your terms, it would be that "greeness" is an induced unessential property of "cat", which has thus far been true of all "cats" (let's just hypothetically say). Likewise, deductively obtaining the properties of an object doesn't necessitate that you deductively obtain that it is or isn't something (i.e. you don't necessarily obtain knowledge). if I define "glass" as having the essential property of being "(1) clear and (2) made from melting sand", then, assuming I didn't watch it get made, I can't assert that this pane in front of me is actually "glass": it would be an induction. So, although I deductively discover the properties of the presumably "glass pane" in front of me, I do not deductively obtain that it is thereby "glass" (I inductively assert it is).

So, I would hereby agree that "distinctive knowledge" should actually simply be "categorical deductions" (it can semantically be whatever term you want), which encompasses "knowledge". Inductions (and abductions) are beliefs, and hypothetical deductions are not knowledge, but with respect to what hypothetically follows they are (which doesn't mean one "knows" anything beyond the logical consequence of the overlying principle being taken in virtue as true--aka the logical consequences, or premises, are "categorically" true in the sense that they logically follow, therefore knowledge but the hypothetical is not).

I would also like to briefly clarify that my square root of 25 example was meant as a "solo context", as it can be posited as either one (but I should have made that clear, so that's my bad). The dilemma is still there if we were to presume that I came up with the mathematical operation of the square root. I came up with it a year ago, by myself, and began memorizing the answers of the square roots of like 100 integers (or what have you). Then, a year later, I ask myself "what's the square root of 25?". I immediately assert it is "6" in reference to what I believe was what I memorized a year ago (in accordance with the mathematical rules I produced). That's an induction. I then deductively invalidate it by means of actually performing the mathematical operation in accordance to how I defined it a year ago. Same dilemma. It is trivial in the sense that I could semantically change it, but I would still be incorrect with respect to what I constructed a year ago.

If you agree here with me (presuming I understood what you were trying to convey correctly), then this inevitably segues into "essential" vs "unessential" properties. Even in the sense of what you were explicating in the sense of "premises" and "conclusions" (in an attempt to ground them absolutely), we will need to revisit what essential properties are. I think in theory they sound great, but I'm having difficulties actually implementing them. For example, what is the essential property (or properties) of a "dog"? I get that I could, in a solo context, categorically define it. But soon enough I would realize it is insufficient, as I would be necessarily excluding a predominant population of "dogs" no matter how I try to divide the line (create essential properties). The only feasible means I've found is making one essential property that is a combination (conjugation) of all properties of being a "dog". Thusly, there's no unessential properties, and every "dog" is compared abstractly to what my mind comes up with as a "perfect dog". Otherwise, I could keep performing a reductive approach where I never derive a true essential property of being a "dog". For example, if I cut a "dog" in half, neither side shares anything I would imagine even remotely has to with an essential property of a "dog". Nevertheless, I would reference them as "two halves of a dog". But in referencing it to "dog", I've thereby implicitly conceded it resembles a "dog". But resemblance necessitates a communal property (in this case, a communal essential property). So even if I were to claim that I have different "essential properties" for "bottom half of a dog" and "top half of a dog", I am still implicitly conceding they necessarily share a trait with "a dog" (but with essential properties it is impossible they share anything related to such--and I truly hope you can prove me wrong here). Therefore, I am starting to think the resemblance is my mind's abstract "mapping" or "consideration" of both halves, whereby I am able to assert they are halves "of a dog". That's essentially my dilemma.

I think that the aforementioned consideration of "essential properties" is important to distinguishing "hypothetical" vs "categorical" (or what have you) deductions.

But now, I think with my further realization of the difference, I can finally remove "reality".

I agree, I think that the term was causing (me at least) confusion.

Knowledge ultimately is a deduction. A deduction is a conclusion which necessarily follows from its premises.

Hopefully I demonstrated that this is not necessarily true. Yes, a deduction is what necessarily follows from its premises, but that isn't necessarily knowledge with respect to the initial principle(s).

Any legitimate contradiction to a deduction, means its not a deduction any longer.

In terms of it's logical consequences, yes. Any contradiction to the overlying principle(s) does not revoke it as a deduction.

A zero point is the origin of an X and Y graph. When you are looking at a line pattern, putting it to the zero point can give clarity on comparing its symmetry and slopes. What we're doing with definitive and applicable knowledge is putting knowledge on a zero point, and noting the X and Y dimensions. It is in essence a drawn line or parabola, but charted in a graph in such a way as to break it down into an easier calculation.

I think this contradicts the whole purpose of the epistemology (especially in terms of essential properties), which entailed clear and distinctive terminology. The terms can share inheritance, but not definitional essential properties. For example, a square and a triangle are mutually exclusive, however they share the trait of being a "shape". I don't think this is what you meant by (0, 0): I think you are arguing for the allowance of minimally ambiguous terminology.

And when you combine the two, that result cannot be obtained without both an induction, and a deduction.

I don't think this is true (or maybe I just am not following). An induction that transforms into a deduction is no different than a deduction (ultimately). If I induce that that object over there is a potato and then I go over there an deduce it actually is, this is ultimately the same exact thing as if I had it in my hands to begin with and deduced it was a potato. Both are "distinctive knowledge". Only what is deduced is verified in the induction, anything else would remain an induction. "Applicable knowledge" means nothing more than I happened to create a belief prior to deducing any knowledge about it. The induction is not constituted in any of the "knowledge" aspect.

What you are missing here is another ingredient we have not spoken about very much, but is important.

I understand why you went to societal contexts, but it can be posited (and was supposed to be posited) as a solo context.

I feel in a self-contained context, the descriptors of distinctive and applicable are clear

I don't think they are. I think "inductions" and "deductions" (and "hypothetical" vs "categorical" deductions therein) are clear. But maybe that isn't what you are trying to convey.

An induction, who's conclusion has been reached deductively, is applicable knowledge.

I don't find any meaning in this definition. If it was deduced, then it is distinctive, not applicable. If it happened to be an induction previously, well then it was an induction previously. I don't see how this is a meaningful distinction to make.

In terms of the coin flipping example, that was distinctive knowledge that is being semantically refurbished as applicable simply because you happened to preemptively determine a belief towards what will happen. If you didn't guess it would land on heads, it would have been purely distinctive knowledge (nothing was induced). Why does it matter if I preemptively guess?

Finally, it is essential to note how the induction is concluded. Having an induction that happens to be correct is not the same as knowledge in any epistemological analysis I've ever read. And for good reason. A guess that happens to be right is not knowledge, its just a lucky guess. We can have knowledge that we made a guess, and we can have knowledge of the outcome of that guess, but that is it.

I don't think this is a relevant point to your epistemology, as it doesn't claim inductions are knowledge. The moment you deduce what actually is, that's what you know. Even if it aligns with your induction and you have legitimate reasons to conclude you were on to something with that induction, you didn't know anything--you had an inductive belief. Even in hindsight, you didn't know. At best, you now know that you lucked your way into aligning with real knowledge, regardless of how solid your evidence was for the induction you held.

I still believe distinctive knowledge always comes from applicable knowledge

If distinctive knowledge is a categorical deduction (and maybe potentially also the categorically true logical consequences of the premises of a hypothetical deduction), I agree.

I would clarify that the applicable is not the attempt to verify inductions, it is the deductive result of an induction

If this is the case, then it is distinctive knowledge. A "deductive result of an induction" is simply distinctive knowledge when it happened to be preceded by a belief on the position, which could very well not have asserted (and the deduction would have still occurred). For example, if I am walking around and pick up an object off the ground, without any prejudgments of what it is, and deduce it is a potato, this is no different ultimately than if I spot it at a distance, claim it is a potato, and then deductively discover it is a potato (it just has more extraneous steps involved).

This is the part you might like Bob, as I believe you've been wanting some type of fundamental universal of "reason". This logic of induction and deduction is reached because we are able to think in terms of premises and conclusions. This is founded on an even simpler notion of "predictions" and "outcomes to predictions". Much like our capability to discretely experience, this is an innate capability of living creatures. I believe this coincides with your definition of "reason" earlier as "decisions with expectations".

I still think we are slowly converging in our views, it is just taking a while (: . I wouldn't put it that way (in terms of reason), but I think you are starting to explore recursively reason on itself and, thusly, realizing that "deductions" and "induction" are innate in us. I'm not entirely sure how you are planning to ground it, but I definitely think you can (assuming it remotely aligns with my conception of reason).

Just to be brief, I think you are going to have to ground it in fundamental logic, which is something I don't think you agree with yet (I think you believe it all to be constructed). That fundamental logic, whatever you want to semantically call it, is going to (I would anticipate) resemble the basic transcendental properties of reason (as in that which is deductively obtained as necessitous and apodictic of the mind, which is concluded to be such due to its ever present--potential infinite--nature in all forms of thoughts). But I will let you navigate the conversation as you deem best fit.

Can we define this in a way that is undeniable, like discretely experiencing?

As of now, and this goes back to way back when we first started having this conversation, I don't think you have grounded "discrete experience" except that it is "undeniably there". But I think you will have to ground both in the same manner (if it is going to be an absolute grounding), and I definitely think you can do it. I think your initial usage of pon is a perfect start (but there's some things, I would say, that precede distinctions--aka discrete experience). I think "discrete experience" is a convenient clumping of many aspects of the fundamentals of the mind, but to achieve your grounding of deductions, premises, conclusions, induction, predictions, etc, I think you are going to have to at least conceptually analyze the sub-categories.

I agree that we may need to save "will" for later and I concur that "reason" hasn't been discussed too much yet. I can do so if you want, otherwise I will simply respond to wherever you navigate the discussion. Likewise, although I think it will be inevitably discussed soon in relation to your "actions" and "premises" and such, I will allow you do decide if you want to discuss "fundamental logic" or not.

I look forward to hearing from you!

Bob

@Kuro,

To briefly answer your original question, I think that most people nowadays default to materialism (physicalism). But since this discussion forum has seemingly naturally segued into an actual debate between more idealist minded individuals vs more materialistic minded individuals, let me give you my two cents (for whatever they are worth) on the topic. I think that a vast majority of what we know is empirical, but necessarily never solely such: some things are presupposed in any empirical investigation. To be clear and concise, let me provide one example: connectives (as the components of a conclusion which act as the connections, whether that be synthetic or analytic) is always necessarily presupposed in any empirical evaluation. To keep it brief, I think that reason is always met with a recursive potential infinite of connectives when attempting to empirically explain any given connective. For example, if A is connected (in any fashion or form) to B, we then can very well ask why that connective is valid. But when, let's say, explanations for the connective(s) involved in connecting A to B are derived (such as C and D or what have you), we can always ask the very same of those connectives utilized to derive such, and we can perform this for a potential infinite of times, thereby we never get any closer to explaining connectives (i.e. the actual connective's validity, for any further explanation necessarily utilizes connectives itself which are presupposed as valid in explaining the original connective); Only as we trudge along the path of the recursive potential infinite of explanations of connectives do (I think) we realize that the most cogent solution is that of connectivity being transcendental (as in not completely separate from reason--aka not transcendent--but proposed as necessarily an unconditional absolute grounding of reason itself as derived from reason), whereby we still freely concede that this was also a connection and, consequently, the connective(s) involved in that conclusion reveal connectives, as a whole, as truly something of a potential infinite prerequisite of reason itself. So, in relation to reason, it is reasoned that connectives can only be proficiently explained in reference to its potential infinite nature, which necessitates that it be conceptualized as transcendental of reason. Furthermore, this entire investigation into connectives was obtained empirically by analysis of reason on itself to determine that, actually, this entire process of empirical investigation always (for a potential infinite) presupposes the validity of all connectives. So, that which is transcendental (in this case, connectivity) is necessarily obtained empirically, but reveals that which is necessarily presupposed for empiricism in the first place (that which is not empirical). So, I hold, even if we could hypothetically explain (which involves connections) the mind as reduced to the brain, we would not have gotten any closer to explaining the connectives utilized in that empirical investigation: therefore, at best (hypothetically), the mind holistically being derived of the material brain (holistically in the sense that seemingly every manifestation of reason is properly explained by science--i.e. we could tell when you think of a car vs a cat, decide to do something, make you angry, etc) would only be in relation to reason and the connectives presupposed as valid in the first place and, consequently, only ever pertaining to what is manifested by reason and not what is transcendentally true of all manifestations of reason itself--therefore not truly holistically (as in completely) explanatory (there's always an aspect that will never to be explained).

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I really appreciate your elaboration, as I think I am starting to grasp the "distinctive" vs "applicable" distinction you are making. Your uncovering of inductions vs inductions verified via deductions is marvelous (and not to mention, helped me understand your viewpoint better)! However, sadly, I am still having troubles truly concurring with you. Let me try to explain (slash simply ask you questions).

Firstly, I am not finding it self-apparent that your definitions of "distinctive knowledge" and "applicable knowledge" are mutually exclusive:

When you can hold onto your definitions of logic, and decide your outcome, this would be considered distinctive knowledge.

I suppose an induction which has a deductively concluded outcome is applicable knowledge.

Let me give you an example where I am finding these definitions problematic (and you tell me where I am getting it wrong, because I am fairly confident it is probably just me misunderstanding). Imagine I am contemplating the square root of 25. Let's say I immediately (without performing the math) assert that it is 6 (because I memorized the square roots of certain numbers previously and, albeit incorrect, associated my memory of one particular square root problem as being answered by 6 with it being the square root of 25). My assertion here is a belief (that it is 6), and is therefore an induction (my premises do not necessarily constitute the conclusion). To determine my assertions validity, I perform the necessary mathematical operations, which is how I am able to deduce that my inductive belief was incorrect (5 * 5 = 25, 6 * 6). Since this example abides by the form you have defined for "applicable knowledge", it was "application" (all of which was pure, abstract reason).

However, if I had never asserted anything (i.e. that it was 6), then it would have been "distinctive knowledge" because it was a pure deduction (which is entirely within my control, as it is abstract).

But in either case the belief (or lack thereof) was irrelevant. If I say 1 + 1 probably equals 2, and then perform addition to determine (deductively) that it actually is, then technically that is "applicable knowledge". If I merely hadn't guessed anything prior to the deduction of mathematical principles, then it would have been distinctive knowledge.

Furthermore, I think you are claiming that distinctive knowledge precedes (always) applicable knowledge, but in this case (depending on whether a belief is conjured) applicable knowledge could be obtained without using any prior distinctive knowledge (e.g. without asserting a preliminary belief, the deductive application of addition to 1 + 1 would produce distinctive knowledge, but with a preliminary belief it would have produced applicable knowledge without any preceding distinctive knowledge).

I think, if I am understanding you correctly, what you are more trying to convey is abstract vs non-abstract knowledge, and you seem to be arguing that line is drawn by what you do or do not control. But abstract knowledge under your definitions would not be exclusively distinctive.

Likewise, an induction that is verified via a deduction is not a "deduction which is not contradicted by reality": it an induction which is not contradicted by reality, but is distinguished from other inductions by the manner in which is confirmed (deduction). So it seems like distinctive and applicable knowledge do not, after all, utilize the same method (but nevertheless utilize pon). To make it more confusing on my end, it also doesn't seem like you are strictly claiming an abstract divide either, because the coining of a term in reference to an object in front of me would be a pure deduction (which pertains to something non-abstract) and, thusly, would be distinctive knowledge. Whereas my belief that some object that isn't in front of me is the same as the one that is would be merely an induction (that happens to be verified/unverified by means of a deduction), therefore applicable knowledge. And, moreover, when I go verify that that other object is indeed like the other one that I previously saw (thereby using deduction), that would be distinctive knowledge in the sense that it is a pure deduction. And my consideration of that object, grounded in a pure deduction, being that of the same as the previous object would be a purely abstract consideration (i.e. I am comparing the properties of this object, gathered deductively, to the previous properties I deductively found of the other object--none of this is non-abstract). It is almost like a pure deduction is always distinctive, regardless to what it pertains, and applicable is really the attempt to verify inductions. Don't get me wrong, I share many examples with you where this dividing line seems clear, but upon deeper reflection I am left with nothing but confusion. Did you not also distinctively know the two A's over there when you verified your inductive belief about them? Then didn't you abstractly compare those properties to the A's you conjured up in your mind (which is still within the realm of "distinctive knowledge")? When they abstractly matched (in essential properties) you thereby asserted it valid (wouldn't that be distinctive knowledge?). So really "applicable knowledge" is inductions which you distinctively know to be true, no?

As this is foundational, I'm trying to embrace definitions that any person could come to on their own. So in the beginning, reality is simple. If everything went according to my will, there would be no need for the identity of "reality". Everything I willed would happen. But, there is an existence which can counter my will. Sometimes it does. Sometimes it does not. Regardless, it has the capability to deny my will. Reality is the existence that can, or does not counter my will. That's all there is to it.

I admire your desire to keep it fundamentally easier to comprehend (and honestly that is your prerogative, I respect that), but I find your "will" incredibly ambiguous (I am gathering it might be purposely so?). For example, if "reality" is simply "what I do not control", then my body could very well not be apart of "reality". Moreover, my imagination may be apart of and not apart of reality (depending): what if I can't control my imagination, or maybe only particular aspects? What if I could control my breathing in my dream, but not the my arms movements: are my imaginative arms apart of "reality" but not my imaginative breathing? This also opens the doors to everything being consumed by "reality": if I will that my next thought be a continuation of the subject I am currently contemplating and the very next thought segues into something completely irrelevant, then my thoughts are also "reality", which inevitably begs the question of what isn't "reality"? All I have are thoughts, what is left? I think, like you are saying, at a surface level "control vs no-control" seems intuitive, but upon deeper reflection it isn't that solid (nor clear) of a distinction. Objects, regardless of who is willing their actions, are still objects. Objects are "reality". I am having a hard time seeing (beyond simply trying to keep it intuitive for the layman) how this distinction has any bearing on control? Even if my body always was aligned with my will, it would still be apart of reality. I honestly don't think what you are trying to convey really has any bearing on control either (unless I am just misunderstanding): abstract vs non-abstract knowledge is still a meaningful distinction regardless of who willed what. But at the same time, maybe you aren't making such a distinction (abstract vs non-abstract), because you definitions seem to be implying other things (a deeper divide) than what I am understanding (I think).

Abstract logic is something you create. You will that a particular definition means X.

I agree that we can create abstract logic, but it follows from necessary logic. IF X -> THEN Y is logically constructed in the sense that I can choose to reject the relation of X to Y (i.e. Y does not follow from X). In that sense I agree, but the form of IF THEN conditional logic is necessarily already there, and cannot be rejected. I can always innately, whether I like it or not, construct logic which is built off of a conditional (something not asserted as true, but assumed as such for further exposition). To even try to negate IF THEN in terms of its form, I would have to conditionally assume a hypothetical where I don't necessarily utilize IF THEN, which thereby solidifies its necessity. It is easier to see with pon: I can construct logic utilizing pon, but pon is necessarily the bedrock of logic itself. Maybe it should be distinguished as a different kind of logic (but then we might start getting into controversial terminology, such as transcendental logic or something like that, which we both may not agree with). But I see your point and agree: we can make up, built off of the fundamentals of logic, what we conceptualize as "logic".

In other words, no inductions are created and tested. This is distinctive knowledge.

Again, this I find problematic (see original examples: it seems, so far, to be a superficial distinction). Sometimes the induction conjured up doesn't matter at all.

Like tier 1 knowledge is distinctive while tier 2 is applicable. Instead of 'applicable', maybe another word? Processed? Gleaned? I'm open to suggestions!

Hopefully I've demonstrated that it isn't always tier 1, but application could be tier 1 as well. It really seems like you are distinguishing a deduction from an induction (that can only be verified by deduction--which would be thereby something verified distinctively). I still think, so far, that the only clear distinction here would be reason and everything referred to by it (aboutness vs about).

This is not the same thing as using your logical set to induce an outcome that you must then confirm. By this I mean you are holding onto your definitions of logic, but cannot decide the outcome

Again, if it is about being able to decide the outcome, then my original examples are distinctive knowledge, but if it is about whether it is an induction verified by deductions, then it is applicable knowledge. I can have inductions that do not pertain to objects (i.e. are abstract) which I can then thereafter determine whether they are true via abstract deduction.

Bob, I can't thank you enough for your keen and pointed comments on this. I always knew distinctive and applicable knowledge worked, but I always felt it lacked refinement or a clear way to explain and demarcate it. I think I've found that now thanks to you. I hope this clarifies this issue for you as well!

I am glad I was of service! However, although it did clear things up a bit, I still am not fully agreeing with it nor do I think it is a clear distinction.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

Bob, I admit, this tripped me up at first. I had to think a while on your post, to try to get to what felt like was missing.

I am glad that my responses are thought-provoking (and I assure you that I find yours equally so)! I would hate for our conversation to not be fruitful for us both.

I think I am still not quite able to pin point what you are conveying with "will" or the dividing line for distinctive vs applicable, so let me try to explain my position on the topic.

What I meant to convey was the only reason we can have a concept of reality as something separate from ourselves, is because there are things that go against our will. If everything went in accordance to our will, there would be no need for the term "reality".

If I am understanding you correctly, I think you are claiming that something being a member of "reality" must have at least gone against our will once before, which means that something that is apart of "reality" can go in accordance with our will but as long as it has gone against our will once before then it is a member of "reality". If that is not what you are claiming, then I am not quite following. Because you then stated:

No, I define reality as what is. Sometimes "what is" is when our will happens. Sometimes "what is" is when it does not happen.

This makes me believe the aforementioned is what you are claiming because, otherwise, "what is" that is in accordance with our will would not be a member of "reality" (but, rather, a member of ourselves). I'm thinking you are claiming that it is a member of "reality" regardless of whether it was in accordance with our will as long as it went against our will previously (at least once): am I correct here?

Moreover, I am also trying to hone in on what you mean by "will". When you say:

I will to wave my hand, and reality does not contradict that will. I will to fly by my mind alone, and reality contradicts this.

This makes me think you may be using "will" as one shared will between the mind and the body, but, given that the body doesn't have to abide by the will of the mind, I don't think this is what you are saying. I think you are trying to keep this a bit more high level, conceptually, than I am.

I make a distinction between the body's will and reason's will. The latter is that which manifests in the head in relation to reason (obtained by recursively analyzing reason on its previous manifestations), and the former is the will of the body extrapolated from its actions by reason. I think it was Nietzsche that first exposed me to a preposterous claim pertaining to "free will" being like that of a man who awoke in the morning, stepped outside, and "willed" the sun to rise. Seeing it rise, he determined it was from his will. Taking that example seriously, I honestly don't see how we can know whether any given object's (including the body) actions were from reason's will or whether it was simply assumed due to continual repetition. If the sun always rose every time I freely willed it to, would I thereby know that the sun actually abides by my will? Or is it that the action happened to correlate purely consistently with my will. Likewise, imagine two people who act in accordance to the exact same intentions, without any deviation. Do we really "know" whether they act in accordance to a shared will or simply two separate identical wills? In terms of inductions (and cogency therein), my best inductive belief is to side with the repetition (but I definitely still need to think about it more). So, on a daily basis, I believe that when I think "I should lift my right arm" and my arm actually lifts, that it was from my will (reason's will) even though I do not, in fact, "know" that. Likewise, there's actually, as you are well aware, incidents where my body doesn't abide at all to what I willed. Therefore, I separate them as two wills (body and reason) while holding the belief that most of the time, whether by repetitive happenstance or by actual accordance, my body's will aligns with my own (reason's).

Now, I think that you are getting at (correct me if I am wrong) is that I won't conceptually separate something else from myself if it abides by whatever I will (regardless of whether it is happenstance or in actual accordance). Honestly I am not convinced of this either. Let's take the two people acting in the exact same manner (intentions) (without deviation) example: if I were to claim that they are actually of the same will, then I would still identify them as separate objects with a shared subjective will (i.e. "those two objects are of the same will"--I would not refer to them both as one object). Likewise, if I were not analyzing two separate wills from me (to determine, like in the previous example, whether they are one or two wills), but, rather, analyzing this in accordance to mine, I would still distinguish the objects regardless of their connection to my will. If my intentions always align with my body's and some other body's, then, at best, i would connect them to my will but as two objects connected to one will. I don't see how the separation really, at a physical-objective level, dissipates. I only see that, at best, it dissipates at the level of the subject (or, to be more specific, reason). If there were two body's that abided repetitively to my will, my wanting to investigate the inner workings of those bodies would be abided by both, but I will still be acknowledging thereby (in wanting an investigation) that there's a separation of parts within the bodies (and the separation of me from those bodies).

Just to really hone in on this. Imagine I am walking on a concrete sidewalk and will that it become concrete. Is it now concrete because it already was or because I willed it to be? It was going to be concrete either way, but how could I "know" or "not know" that it didn't abide by my will? I think the same is true of bodily actions. I think "lift arm", arm lifts. Was the arm going to lift anyways or is it lifting because I willed it? How do I "know" or "not know" whether it did abide by my will? I separate them as two wills because I do think there is evidence that the body doesn't abide by my will, but can coincide with it most of the time. But the real question is whether or not I would be able to claim either way if the body always, without any deviation, coincided with my wants. If every time I command "lift the arm", the arm lifts, then would I claim that they are of the same will? Either way, the separation of arm and thoughts (object and reason) would be intact, wouldn't it?

Maybe, on the contrary, you are referring to everything having my reason? Everything concluding thoughts as if they are from me? I am presuming you mean is that my will from my reason as is were to always coincide with what happens in what we call "reality".

I think this could also derail into omnipotence dilemmas as well, but don't think that is the main focus of this discussion. But there's a level to this where the logical contradiction of "I want a square circle" is what I think you are referring to as "reality" going against my will. However, I don't think that reason's will (as manifestations in thoughts) has any provable bearing on the relation between objects. Again, how would I distinguish that which is repetitive coincidence and that which actually abides by my will. Reason is the aboutness, which pertains to conclusions about the objects and its relations. I can conclude a "belief" that my arm, when it lifted, actually abided by my will by accepting repetition as a more cogent belief than coincidence, but that's all just reason making connections pertaining to objects, not it actually doing anything in the physical world. I observe that my arm moved, I now try to analyze the connections to gather an explanation of that physical action. Does that make any sense? I'm not sure if I am explaining this very well.

I believe I understand a bit. In that case, would every living thing reason? At the most fundamental level, an organism must decide whether X is food, or not food. I'm not saying its advanced reason, but reason at its most fundamental?

Although I haven't pondered it nearly enough yet, I think this is fair and plausible. If an animal (or even plant maybe) decides whether X is Y, or is not, then it thereby used the principle of noncontradiction--which would entail some level of reason I would presume. This would get into solipsism though, as I would hold that reason can never verify other reason, only obtain an inductive belief that there are other "reasons" by means of analyzing it's body's actions in relation to another body's actions (to see if it makes sense that it has reason). Does that make sense? Just like how there is no distinction between repetitive coincidence and actual accordance, I cannot distinguish the two in other people or animals or plants either. I just believe it is the case.

When I introduced the idea of discrete experience to you, you had to distinctively know what I meant first... But if it is ever contradicted in application, while we will still have the distinctive knowledge of "distinctive knowledge", we would applicably know that it was contradicted in its application to reality, not contradicted distinctively.

I am not entirely sure what you mean here. I conclude that I must have differentiation, that distinctiveness, before I could even conclude anything in the first place. If the converse was concluded (legitimately), the closest thing I can conceive of would be oneness. If we concluded the converse with respect how even reason itself operates now, which is not unified into oneness, then we would simply be mistaken (probably haven't realized that the very thinking process requires differentiation). Is that what you mean? Distinctive knowledge would still be there even if we concluded it wasn't there because we are simply mistaken?

Do we need application to distinctively know things? No, distinctive knowledge it what we use to find if we can applicably know it.

I think I am following, and I agree. But that was also concluded. I can distinctively think that I should envision an elephant, but it turns out I envision a lion instead. But by application, I know that my reason manifested a thought which introduced a will to envision an elephant and I know that the object that appeared in my mind was not an elephant. Even to claim that I initially had to use that distinctive knowledge of wanting to envision an elephant requires, thereafter, application (consideration of that previous manifestation by reason). I don't hold that what is "in the mind" is equivocal to reason. I don't think that what "I" envision (or imagine) is apart of reason, it is, just like any other object, what is concluding about that envisioning that is reason. I think what you are trying to get at is that I hold this on principle to the fact that I don't control those images (or that they have gone against my will at least once previously). I think that even if what I want to will (in reference to visions) always repetitively comes to pass, there's still a distinction between the object (the about) and what is asserting the aboutness.

Distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge are both discrete experiences as is any "thing".

I apologize, I should have used my words more carefully. I think that you are making a meaningful distinction, but it is still, in my eyes, all application. I think that you are saying I distinctively know the words you right, but don't applicably know the contents of those words until I apply them to "reality" without contradiction: is that right?

But I could just distinctively know that 1+1=2 purely as a set of symbols. If later I see that set of symbols and state, "Ah yes, that is 1+1=2", then I applicably know that math if my claim is not contradicted.

I understand, and it is a meaningful distinction. But to claim to know a set of symbols purely as distinctive knowledge is application of reason. I have no problem with this distinction you are making though. I would also say that the abstract consideration of the operation of addition is applicable knowledge (in your terms)(and identifying the shapes again, like you said), but the recognition of the shapes of "1" "+" "1" "=" "2" is distinctive knowledge: is that correct?

The problem I have is that it seems as though you are claiming distinctive knowledge is not "application to reality without contradiction". How is it not? How did I not apply the recognition of symbols to reality? "reality" is just the principle of noncontradiction. I contradict the idea that I did distinctively recognize "1", then I didn't distinctively recognize "1". I can't, however, contradict the idea that I distinctively recognized some symbol, therefore I distinctively recognized that symbol. To you, is this all application to reality, with a meaningful subdivision?

Distinctive is simply knowing we have every logical reason to believe that we are experiencing the discrete experience itself. If however, the discrete experience implies something beyond the act of having the experience itself, this is when application occurs.

I understand your distinction here, but the claim that "the act of having the experience itself" I see no different than claiming something beyond the act itself. I must not be able to contradict it. Once I've obtained the act of having the experience itself as true, I can meaningfully distinguish that from whatever is utilizing that experience to attempt to derive something else (which I think is what you are getting at ). I am having a hard time distinguishing the two as not really the same thing (fundamentally).

Essentially, distinctive knowledge is the rational conclusion that what we experience, is what we experience..."I distinctively know 1 banana +1 banana =2 bananas, and I'm going to apply it to those two bananas over there," you can see this dividing line.

To me it just seems like you applicably know (not in your terms) that you distinctively recognize things, and then anything built off of that is "applied": but both were, no? Don't get me wrong, your distinction is something I distinguish as well (I hold that I distinctly recognize things as well).

If I conclude that I discretely experience, it is not by application to something beyond itself...
So we are not applying discrete experiences, when we are recognizing that we know we have discrete experiences in themselves.

I think this is the difference: you are making a subdivision in application in terms of what recursively refers to itself vs what refers beyond itself. I am pointing out that it is still application, albeit meaningful distinctions. And nothing ever refers to itself in a literal sense. The distinctive knowledge of 1+1=2 was analyzed by reference in a subsequent thought.

And logic on its own, is a set of rules we construct

I think there are fundamental rules of logic we do not construct.

When we are trying to assert more than the experience itself, such as applying the experience to another that we say results in X, we are applying.

Then applicable knowledge is always inductive then? I believe applying one experience to another will hold, but it may not.

A question for you Bob, is can you see this dividing line? Do you think there are better words for it?Do you think there is a better way to explain it?

I think some further elaboration would be useful: I don't think I am still quite understanding you.

Is it referencing contradictions of an abstract logic? Or is it the contradiction of reality against my will?

I think to properly address your elaboration into potentiality, I need to hear your feedback on what you mean by "will". I hold that there is one kind of "contradiction" and it is pon. There's no difference between a contradiction in abstract logic vs against my will. Is there?

Firstly, I don't think you can construct a distinctive context where something is at two places at once: it would be two identical things, which I don't think is the same thing. But let's say that I could imagine the same chair in two different places (and they weren't identical clones), then I would applicably know that my imagination can hold the same thing in two different locations and, when applied to objects outside of imagination, that there cannot be the same thing in two different locations in non-imagination.

A -> B
A exists.
Therefore B

It's more like:

A -> B
A is not contradicted, thereby true
Therefore B

The same thing in two different locations is not contradicted in imagination (hypothetically), but is in what you call "reality" (what I would call non-imagination to be precise). It would be a contradiction to transport the conclusion pertaining to the imagination to non-imagination because they don't hold the same identity in terms of essential properties (hence "non"-imagination). To hold that they are the same, would be contradicted by reason (potentially, someone may not ever realize it). Even if I could apply the same thing in two different locations as true in non-imagination and imagination, I would still have to deal with the contradiction that I they, by definition, are not correlated to one another: they share an unessential property.

It terms of your santa example, you know by application that modal statements like IF...THEN are true in terms of their form, but not necessarily that the IF conditional is automatically true. You and I had to conclude that we both implicitly utilize IF...THEN style logic even prior to us realizing it: that is application. I don't think we are ever knowing anything without applying to "reality" because reason recursively analyzes itself in the exact same manner.

I'll stop here for now: this is getting long!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Kuro,

To be completely honest, I am not sure if I agree or disagree. By "time never beginning", I am interpreting him to be positing an actual infinite, which, in that case, I would disagree. However, if he is stating that time is potentially infinite, as in change (and subsequently causality) is potentially infinite, then I agree. I haven't read up enough of on Aristotle, I do admit. Maybe you know which he is referring to? Likewise, I interpret "eternal" as "unchanging with respect to any notion of time/change", which is also (I would say) subjected to my same dilemma as previously depicted (potentially eternal or actually eternal?).

For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance.

Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here.

When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality.

Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. I don't think you mean it this way (correct me if I am wrong), but the epistemic impossibility of a square circle prevents a square circle "from being actualized in reality". If I am correct, I don't think this is what you are trying to convey: I think "reality" probably encompasses much more for you than I am envisioning. So a further elaboration on your definition of "metaphysical possibility" would be much appreciated.

Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles.

If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" (as you put it) that are in the physical world. Therefore, supposing that God is omnipotent, then God, being the metaphysical instantiator of the physical (thusly "laws of logic"), is the determiner of that very logic itself. Am I correct here? If so, I think the fundamental flaw here is that you are trying to posit via logic that there's a realm of which isn't constraint to that very logic. In other words, you are always inevitably, in even giving this argument (if I were to grant it in its entirety, hypothetically), utilizing the "laws of logic" to even put it forth (to conclude it is valid): therefore, at best, the metaphysical possibility of that which is illogical is only true (again, if I grant it here hypothetically) in relation to the logic utilized to provide the argument in the first place. You are essentially positing a Logic (I'm just arbitrarily denoting it with a capital L to distinguish it from the logic within the physical world) that exists completely separate from logic wherein God can metaphysically instantiate whatever she desires in the physical world because she can alter the "logic", but this entire argument is completely contingent on the logic utilized to get to that conclusion: positing something overlying or beyond logic completely is a contradiction in itself, because any argument given to attempt to prove it inevitably utilizes that very logic it is supposed to proving isn't required whatsoever. Likewise, when you say:

it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false

This is contingent, if granted as true (at best), on the principle of non-contradiction. You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible: thereby you are utilizing logic to try and prove something that is allegedly out of bounds of logic itself. Any argument either of us can utter is in relation necessarily to the principle of non-contradiction, therefore a truly completely separable Logic which allows for the principle of noncontradiction to be false is not even actually possible: that very argument just used the principle of noncontradiction, therefore it is still relative to the principle of noncontradiction. Furthermore, this is also evident in the claim that the law of non-contradiction can be false, since the falseness is contingent on there either being a contradiction or no contradiction in the argument. In other words, positing a realm in which logic is not fundamentally bound to the law of non-contradiction is impossible to even posit (without it being contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place).

Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.

This is completely fair enough, and I agree that we can claim there are no square circles without every empirically testing it everywhere.

For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist.

If you exist, then it is impossible for you to metaphysically exist unless you are referring to God revoking your life hereafter, but the very moment you "know" you exist, you "know" necessarily that it is not metaphysically possible for you not to exist right now. In terms of God maybe never metaphysically instantiating you, that would entail that you never existed at all (which you concede you exist).

Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction.

As noted earlier, if it is epistemically impossible for a square circle to exist, then it is metaphysically impossible necessarily. This is because any logically argument you can attempt to provide justification for a separate Logic which allows for different logics necessarily depends on logic itself. You thereby are always operating under one universal, fundamental form of logic which neither of us can escape. Likewise, you nor I can claim that the principle of noncontradiction can ever be false because that would require our argument to be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place, which would mean we didn't get any closer to negating it whatsoever.

THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.

This is not only disrespectful towards those who hold that logic at least fundamentally comes into play with omnipotence, but it is also unproductive. I don't mind if we end up never agreeing on anything, except the principle that we should treat each other (and others) with respect. Calling someone a "totalium idiotiums" is obviously insulting. I have no problem if you think that it is indeed a contradiction, but please do not start name calling. I am genuinely attempting to understand your position while equally trying to convey mine, with as much respect as I can possibly give: that's how philosophy should be.

What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'

Although I understand (I think) what you are trying to say, I don't think this is equivocal to what we were discussing (in terms of "metaphysical" vs "eptistemic" possibility). Although I originally misspoke in my first post to the OP maker (by claiming "square circle exists"), I quickly refurbished it to "square circles are possible". Stating that epistemic impossibility directly entails metaphysical impossibility is not to "go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'", it is to go from 'epistemically impossible that x" to "metaphysically impossible that x". "to 'x'" refers to it actually existing in the objective world (or in the mind as conjured by it in the imagination), whereas possibility simply notes that it could exist, not that it does. So if I am making some sort of mistake, it will be related to the relation between "metaphysical possibility" and "epistemic possibility", not "metaphysical possibility to epistemically true that it exists".

Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.

I think you have me confused with someone else: I never mentioned that example. I mentioned the example of God making a rock so heavy she/he/it/them cannot lift it (which you never responded to). But in relation to killing himself, the more pressing dilemma is: can God kill himself and then rise himself from the dead metaphysically? I think your answer is yes, which leads us back to the more fundamental dispute about positing Logic which allows for multiple kinds of logic.

Bob

@Gregory A,

Atheism as a non-belief in something never shown to exist is intangible in itself

This is a critique of theism, not atheism. Atheism is the lack of belief in God/gods. If you think that God/gods have never been shown to exist, then you would be an atheist (unless you choose to believe with, self admittedly, 0 evidence). Atheism cannot be tangible in a literal sense by definition, just like not-stamp collecting is just as real as the number zero: neither are tangible yet are very real.

Atheism is if anything a product of the Bible, a rejection of religion.

The Bible is not holistically religion. Atheism is the rejection of theism (or, more generically, yes, religion): not just merely Christianity.

Theism offers an explanation for our existence, atheism offers no explanations of its own, a weaker position.

It is not a weaker position because it doesn't positively assert anything (it is a doctrine of negations). Is it a weaker position to not-stamp collect, or be an avid stamp collector? Neither. Atheism is not meant to provide anything beyond simply lacking a belief in God/gods. This doesn't mean in the slightest that someone should be a theist because "atheism is a weaker position", nor does it have anything to do with naturalism.

Naturalism is the counter-position to theism

No it is not. Traditional physicalism or materialism would be an appropriate counter argument. Naturalism is a philosophical theory that rejects supernaturalism, while not necessarily negating metaphysics. Naturalism is not the claim that all there is is definitely the material world, it is the theory that all natural events must be explained by natural laws, logic, reason, etc.

atheism occupying a non-existent middle ground

You either believe something, or you don't (principle of noncontradiction). Therefore, each person either believes in God/gods, or doesn't. Theism is the belief in such, atheism is the negation. These are, in terms of beliefs, the only two options.

If atheism were valid, atheists would not be able to open their mouths.

Atheism is opening your mouth and claiming you don't believe, that is it. Other philosophical theories have to invoked to claim further. If I'm not a stamp collector, that is all I am going to be able to say about the matter, but that has nothing to do with other, completely unrelated, positions I may voice.

Atheism is in being a-theistic making them a-theists.

What exactly did you prove here? Atheist is the term for those who subscribe to atheism. I'm not following the logic here.

The invalidity of atheism does not validate theism, as naturalism may still be right, but atheism needs to be invalid for theism to be right.

It is not "theism" vs "naturalism". You can be an atheist and subscribe to metaphysical truths (you can also not be a naturalist and be an atheist). Likewise, naturalism is a philosophical theory pertaining to epistemic claims, theism is pertains strictly to belief. Not all theists claim to "know" God exists. Lots do, but some don't (some are agnostic theists). Some prefer, contrary to a 2 dimensional labeling system, a 1 dimensional representation: atheism - agnosticism - theism. However you fancy, none of it implies naturalism.

Anyhow, why should we listen to those who reject a God (a relatively simple addon) but then continue to believe in mermaids, unicorns etc.

Atheism does not necessitate that one should believe in mermaids. I honestly haven't met a single atheist that does, nor does it pertain to atheism in any way imaginable: that would be a separate assertion.

Atheism is a rejection of free-speech (primarily another element of the Left).

Not at all. Again, atheism is the negation of theism. Theism is the belief in God. Gnosticism (not in the sense of the gnostics) is the claim of knowledge (epistemically) either way, agnosticism the negation thereof. This has nothing to do with "Left" (I would presume you are referring to politics) nor free-speech.

On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.

A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this).

to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it.

If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. It is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist, therefore a being is not able to make a square circle. The idea of a square circle is a contradiction, metaphysically (whatever you are implying there) and physically (whatever may be implied there).

There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being.

There is if one is positing literally an omnipotent being. Can it create something so heavy it cannot lift it? Can it make a nonbrick brick? No. An omnipotent being is constrained or inherently supplied with logic.

If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.

I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle.

What I would ask you is: what distinction between metaphysics and eptistemology makes you think a square circle is possible in one, but not the other?

That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one

You are correct here: I should have said "possibility" not "exists". However, this doesn't negate my point whatsoever: I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument.

I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles

Fair enough. However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, therefore my point pertained to it being equivocal to claiming a square circle is possible. I would say a square circle cannot exist, not simply that it doesn't exist in the real world right now.

But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.

As I've hopefully demonstrated in my previous post, this is not the case when one dissects it at a much deeper level.

@Agent Smith,

Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)

I don't think your definition of "free will" is accurate. First of all, I am presuming that you are referring to libertarian free will, because compatibilism has no problem admitting that a being can have "free will" without ever being able to do whatever they want (i.e. soft determinism). Second of all, in relation to libertarian free will, at its most basic definition, it is not the ability to do whatever you want: it is the ability to do whatever you want in relation to oneself. I could, hypothetically, have full control over my own thoughts (thusly will them as I please) and yet have zero control over objects: I would still be an agent of "free will" even though I cannot do as I please in relation to the totality of existing things. Third of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists and, therefore, that is how odd, logically impossible, paradoxes arise (due to non-truth-apt claims being evaluated as if they are truth-apt): great example is can an omnipotent being create a rock it can't lift? This is only puzzling, just like asking "how far can I throw a square triangle", if one doesn't realize that it isn't truth-apt due to its logical impossibility. With regards to the latter interpretation of omnipotence, the rules of logic and reason dictate not that the being necessarily does or does not have "free will", but that it cannot "have and not have" "free will". I think a key aspect to consider here is the fact that tying will to complete power (as I think you did in your definition:"can do whatever it wants", so to speak) requires that we consider the motive when contemplating whether such a being would require "free will" or not (as it can't have both). Imagine there's two omnipotent beings: the first's will is motivated towards controlling the second's actions. As long as the second's will never fixates (becomes motivated) on breaking from the grasp of the other, there's no contradiction here to be found and, logically subsequently, the second would be omnipotent without "free will", whereas the second would have "free will" (as far as the given context provides). And since the first is omnipotent and is fixated on controlling the second, the second will will never become fixated on the first and, therefore, will never acquire free will as long as first persists. The reason this is the case is because when you define "free will" in relation to the will and its produced action, then it is a matter of what that being's will exerts, not that that being is aware of all the possibilities that it could, being omnipotent, exert. If the omnipotent being's will fixates on knowing all logically possible exertions it could perform, then it would necessarily acquire them. But, however, if that being's will never fixates on it, then it will not acquire such knowledge. In other words, a logically omnipotent being has full power to do as he wills, which is in relation to the motive behind that will: if the will manifests that action A should occur, then it will, but if it doesn't manifest it, then it won't. This means quite literally that an omnipotent being is necessarily of "free will" if it wills that it should be--prior to such, it is only known, given what I have hitherto stated, that the being either (1) has "free will" or (2) it does not (but not both).

Hello @tryhard,

I think that your OP is a notorious dilemma that many have and many will argue about. Unfortunately, it seems as though (for the most partl) the discussion reply posts have derailed quite swiftly into a heated insult match, which isn't very productive nor thought-provoking. Hopefully I can provide a bit of exposition into the problem of evil from my understanding of the issue. Now, I should disclaim that I am not a theist, but this would be my counter arguments to yours.

It seems that the problem of evil is the most powerful argument against the theist argument.

Personally, I don't find the problem of evil as the most powerful argument against theism, but this isn't the main focus of your OP, so I am not going to elaborate too in depth here (unless you would like me to). I think this is a great argument for very specific conceptualizations of a monotheistic God (typically within an abrahamic kind of God), but not all of them.

The support for the first premise is the assumption that God is a perfect being by definition.

I think it would be beneficial for you to specify exactly what you mean by "perfection". But for all intents and purposes, I am going to assume (correct me if I am wrong) that you are referring to a omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God.

God has the ability to remove evil, and the attribute of benevolence attached to his nature seems to compel God to remove evil.

I think this is where the first issue I would have lies: what is evil? and what aspect of omnibenevolence compels God to remove it? Both depend on one's definitions. The problem of evil, as I understand it, boils down to axiology. Likewise, I typically view it as an internal critique and, therefore, "evil" would not be defined by what the opponent (who is providing the argument of the problem of evil to the theist) deems is "evil", but, rather, uses the definition that the particular theist holds for "evil". I think this is important because, although i would agree with you that the examples you give throughout your post are acts of evil (e.g. holocaust), none of your examples are necessarily considered acts of 'evil' by a theist in relation to God. I've never met a theist that thinks that the holocaust wasn't 'evil' in relation to human on human atrocities, but I have met theists that do not hold God to the standard of which He himself commands: in other words, he is not a law giver and obeyer. It is not a contradiction to hold that God's commandments are with respect to humans, not himself. Therefore, it is not a contradiction to hold that God can strike people down where they stand, but a human cannot do such to another human. I think this starts involving what I would presume you meant by:

It seems that the only hope of combatting this objection is for the theists to justify evil's existence.

My complaint would be, although I understand what you are saying, that your statement here is using your definition of evil. If a theist does not hold God to the same standards he proclaims for human-to-human interactions, then it logically doesn't make sense to claim they are "justifying 'evil'" in relation to their own definition because there's no dilemma for them (thereby no justification required in the sense you are using it). An issue only arises if they accept your definition of "evil". Furthermore, their definition (as previously defined) shares your moral rejection of the holocaust (because it was human to human mass genocide, not God to human mass genocide), thusly the issue now refurbishes into a discussion of how/why God could/does allow human-to-human evil. My only emphasis here is that it is no longer about God's direct actions but, rather, his seeming negligence. So it becomes whether or not the theist now needs to justify God allowing evil with respect to humans performing actions on other humans (or, if we wanted to broaden it, animals, etc).

As you are probably already anticipating, if the theist holds that "benevolence" does not directly entail direct interference with human-to-human evil, then there's no dilemma (i.e. if "all-good" is equivocal to "all-loving" then it is a more complex task to discern whether or not a being that truly infinitely loves you would allow you to suffer or not). As you mentioned, if the theist holds a libertarian or compatibilist view of free will, then this may be the part where they start invoking God's allowance of 'evil' as necessary for us to choose to follow him. If "all-good" is "all-loving", a loving being would not force you to follow it: you must choose it (or, at least, that's how the argument goes). My main point here is that loving something is not equivocal (necessarily) to trying to always prevent that something from feeling pain or from suffering--whether that be psychological or physiological. For example, let's say my best friend is a drug addict and is at the point that they take pills simply to prevent unwanted suffering in the form of withdrawal. Now I know that, considering the trajectory, they will die if I don't intervene. To oversimplify it, let's say I have two options: let them overdose on opioids in the most painless (and most absence of suffering) death imaginable or have an intervention and put them in rehab. Considering I love my mate, I will choose the latter option although it will obviously cause tremendous amounts of pain and suffering as they take back their life from addiction in rehab (it's not an easy process getting one's life back together after addiction, let alone detoxification). Now this is obviously an oversimplification, but notice how it is not concrete that we try to always avoid suffering. Likewise, there are people who enjoy pain, but we could easily posit that the "best possible world" is not that which has no pain, but no suffering (where "suffering" is that which someone doesn't enjoy doing--or something to those effects). Therefore, maybe the "best possible world" is where the person who likes to stick themselves with needles can do so and those who don't never have to, etc. But then we inevitably end up with a dilemma of impeding wishes of individuals: in this "best possible world", does one person's enjoyment of raping people overrule the person's hate for getting raped? I think not! To keep this brief, positing linguistically a "best possible world" is a whole lot easier than actually coming up with a viable "best possible world" and, even in the event that you can do it, it would only be a relative "best possible world" (relative, at best, to what humans could best come up with, which can surely not be confidently posited as absolutely the best possible world).

Let me break down your argument's premises:

If God exists, he would have created the best possible world.

I would like to emphasize that, as God is posited typically in a theistic worldview, we would not have any clue what the "best possible world" is in terms of what absolutely is the best possible world. We could both agree on what we think would be best, but not the absolute "best" (which would require the perspective of a omniscient being). Likewise, as previously mentioned, it is not clear that a best possible world would be devoid of pain nor suffering.

There are cases where evil does not lead to the fruition of some greater good (ex: holocaust, starving children, etc.)

Although it was tragic and horrible, humanity did learn something, no matter how small or great, from the atrocities we have committed. Prior to the holocaust, people holistically didn't fully grasp how humans can be psychologically and sociologically manipulated into literally being complacent or, worse, an active participant in mass genocide (although there have been previous genocides to the holocaust, that one is generally the one that hit everyone's radar and is subsequently the most remembered). My main point here is that if a theist is positing an omniscient being, then we legitimately have 0 clue if there's no meaningful, worthy fruition of some greater "good" from the worst atrocities we can both conceive of. It is essentially a comparison of relative knowledge to absolute.

God could have created a world without these types evil

How do you know what God could have done? Maybe it is necessary for an all-loving God to allow evil. Again, theists typically posit a being that is "above our pay grade" in terms of knowledge and wisdom, so why should they concur that He could have done otherwise?

Therefore, God did not create the best possible world [2,3]

Again, what are you constituting as "best possible world"? Absence of pain? Suffering? Both? I would appreciate a little elaboration into what you mean here. Secondly, how do you know what the best possible world is without knowing all possible perspectives, contexts, and knowledge? Or are you merely referring to what would be better than our current world (which is also relative to what we know)?

Can anyone provide an argument that provides justification for the existence of evil while taking into account the unnecessary evils, or gratuitous evils, that we seem to observe throughout our life experiences?

Again, from a theistic perspective that asserts God as outlined previously, how are the 'evils' unnecessary? What logically contradicts the idea that they are necessary (from a theistic perspective)?

Bob