Why does God hide from us?

Yes, so your argument is from Divine Hiddenness. This assumes that it is better for God to reveal Himself constantly to people throughout history than for them to come to know Him from His effects/creation; and I am not so sure that is true, although I get the appeal.

That says nothing to me. To me, real means actually existing as a thing, whether it is different modes of experience or beings.

I am saying that some things exist but are not real: do you agree with that in principle?

"if God was good, could God have given a tribal, near eastern group like the Hebrews this sort of law, or would a "good God" necessarily have to give them a more enlightened law?

Not quite. As I mentioned to another person on this thread:

Firstly, endorsing a law that does not protect against certain evil is not the same as endorsing a law that protects evil. To use your example about pro-life voting, a pro-life law that explicates it is impermissible to abort after 6 weeks is not technically endorsing abortion prior and up to 6 weeks; whereas a law that explicates it is permissible to abort before and up to 6 weeks is endorsing abortion. The former is permissible for a person to vote for (assuming that’s the best law they can manage to get passed) whereas the latter would be impermissible. This is a subtle and seemingly trivial note but is really crucial.

I think you are focusing on the wrong part of the passage in Ex. 21:20-21: it declares it morally permissible to beat slaves because they are property: it states that explicitly. It doesn’t merely outline that beating slaves is immoral. The claim that beating slaves is immoral is true and there’s nothing wrong with endorsing that even if slavery is permitted under the current legal system (so long as you didn’t vote or comply with that being in place).

I would say God is acting consequentialistic, and so would you in the pro-life example if you endorsed the latter example I gave, because He is endorsing immorality as a means towards a good end; and this means that the action being intrinsically wrong is being ignored or denied (which is unique to consequentialism).
…
I am not endorsing abortion by voting in a bill that only explicates that abortion after a certain stage is immoral and illegal: if I could pass a law that banned it outright and I still chose to endorse this other option then it would imply that I find it morally permissible to do (all else being equal).

You are absolutely right that one is permitted to limit the evil effects of evil as best one can; but this does not include doing evil as a means towards that good end. If you go around arguing that abortion is perfectly fine up to the 6 week mark, then you are doing something immoral even if it is for a good end of mitigating the effects of abortion; and you don’t have to do that to endorse a bill that limits abortion without banning it outright.

Can you elaborate on this? I am thinking Christianity, the herd morality, is what is abolishing it. We don't have the stomach to kill people anymore.

Theology is not philosophy.

Theology starts with a conclusion, and seeks to explain how it fits in with how things are. It seeks to make a given doctrine consistent.

We don’t have to start with the question of whether God exists to decipher God exists. Aristotle just wanted to explain change…

Also, theology is a branch of philosophy. All branches of philosophy start with a central question and try to solve it.

There was a time when black people weren't thought of as having the same "dignity" as white people. Hence, it was ok to enslave them. This is another example of how doctrine blinds people to what's moral. The Pope gave his blessing on the beginnings of the Atlantic Slave Trade, one of many cases of all out moral failure.

Yes, and they were wrong. We don’t need to reject God’s existence to accept that that was wrong. We don’t even need to reject Jesus to accept that.

The catholic church has done a lot of immoral things: that’s true.

So all that was about restoring god's dignity?

Not all of it, but, yes, retribution is about restoring the dignity of the offended. Wouldn’t you agree? When some woman gets raped, a price must be paid to restore her dignity—retribution is required for justice. Justice isn’t just about rehabilitation: even if the rapist was sincerely sorry, all else being equal there is a price to be paid.

More seriously, can you see how to one who does not accept the tenants of faith, that post at least looks like self-justifying, ad hoc confirmation bias?

Sort of, to be honest. I didn’t appeal to faith; and as we have discussed before I don’t believe in God on faith: my belief in based solely on natural theology.

Also, it’s kind of belittling and dismissive, no offense meant, to me, when I give an elaborate explanation and it is written off as ad hoc. Nothing about it was ad hoc in all honesty.

I appreciate your thoughts!

Firstly, endorsing a law that does not protect against certain evil is not the same as endorsing a law that protects evil. To use your example about pro-life voting, a pro-life law that explicates it is impermissible to abort after 6 weeks is not technically endorsing abortion prior and up to 6 weeks; whereas a law that explicates it is permissible to abort before and up to 6 weeks is endorsing abortion. The former is permissible for a person to vote for (assuming that’s the best law they can manage to get passed) whereas the latter would be impermissible. This is a subtle and seemingly trivial note but is really crucial.

I think you are focusing on the wrong part of the passage in Ex. 21:20-21: it declares it morally permissible to beat slaves because they are property: it states that explicitly. It doesn’t merely outline that beating slaves is immoral. The claim that beating slaves is immoral is true and there’s nothing wrong with endorsing that even if slavery is permitted under the current legal system (so long as you didn’t vote or comply with that being in place).

I would say God is acting consequentialistic, and so would you in the pro-life example if you endorsed the latter example I gave, because He is endorsing immorality as a means towards a good end; and this means that the action being intrinsically wrong is being ignored or denied (which is unique to consequentialism).

Moreover:

Suppose I am a state legislator in a country where abortion is permitted up to "viability"

I am not endorsing abortion by voting in a bill that only explicates that abortion after a certain stage is immoral and illegal: if I could pass a law that banned it outright and I still chose to endorse this other option then it would imply that I find it morally permissible to do (all else being equal).

You are absolutely right that one is permitted to limit the evil effects of evil as best one can; but this does not include doing evil as a means towards that good end. If you go around arguing that abortion is perfectly fine up to the 6 week mark, then you are doing something immoral even if it is for a good end of mitigating the effects of abortion; and you don’t have to do that to endorse a bill that limits abortion without banning it outright.

I tell you that to prevent that I would have voted for a six-week ban with exceptions for rape and incest, and I'm no consequentialist

I see the appeal, but that would be a consequentialistic move. You are saying that you would endorse a bill that explicates that in the case, e.g., of rape it is not wrong to abort when you know it is wrong. It is intrinsically wrong to abort in the case of rape and subsequently immoral to advocate or permit abortion in the case of rape. To permit it anyways is to do something immoral as a means towards the good end of mitigating the evil of abortion.

Does this passage contradict the other (Ex 21:7-11)?

No, Leviticus is coinciding with it, in fact. The author is saying, just like Exodus, Israelites cannot own each other as slaves: they can, however, own other nations as slaves. This is a common practice and rule back then: we also see it in Islam.

Could we start with a definition of consequentialist?

I accept the definition you gave from standford. I would say it is a family of normative ethical theories that fundamentally posits that the intrinsic badness of an act is either irrelevant to or not real as it relates to evaluating wrong and right action.

1. What kind of consequentialist do you think the O.T. God would have to be?

I am not sure. Rule consequentialism is a phony version of consequentialism though: that one doesn’t really meet the definition you gave IMHO, although people would consider it one.

I am going to stop here and let you respond.

Probably or certainly!? If God fails to convey His message, then He is not God.

I don’t see why that would be the case. Although maybe you are getting at a divine hiddenness objection.

I would like to bring you to the crux of our discussion: You mentioned that evil exists, but it is not real. Don't you see a problem in this statement?

I see why you see an issue; but there is none. I distinguish between being and reality; and you don’t.

Something has being if it is; but something is real if and only if it is a member of reality.

For example, the color orange that I see, phenomenally, has being but is not a member of reality—so it exists but is not real. A chair is real because it has being and is a member of reality.

I would view darkness more like having being in the sense of the color orange and less in the sense of the chair; but granted it is an absence which is different than the color orange.

Well, I'm not an expert either. I see what you are saying: it is hard to interpret the texts. They seem disparate.

I would say Catholics and Orthodox Christians accept that not everyone is equal in heaven. There are plenty of refences in the NT to Jesus talking about people sitting at the right hand or left hand of the Father and alluding to it being more glorious and honorable.

It is also the basis for Saints being held in higher regard; and Mary being held in the highest regard among the blessed.

I don't think so, but Protestants would tend to agree with you.

CC: @Banno

Why does there have to be a punishment?

Punishment to the offender is not per se necessary: the final end of justice is bringing everything under the proper respect of the order of creation. This is why rehabilitation is a higher-focus than retribution for justice; but both are aspects of it.

Retribution is necessary for justice because the offended’s dignity has to be restored, and this may require punishment of the offended (although it doesn’t necessitate it); and this is the only aspect of corrective justice that is necessary. Rehabilitation is not necessary but is good for justice, because it should restore the offender back to the proper respecting of things; rehabilitation, however, without punishment is oftentimes mercy without justice because it omits retribution(but this is not always the case). The best option for corrective justice is to provide what is owed to the victim and restore the offender back to the proper respect of things.

ETA: Scratch that. Let's say we have two people, Bob and Alice. Alice is an atheist who lives a decent life and does no great harm to anyone, just minor sins here and there. Bob is a serial killer who's tortured and killed untold numbers of kids. On his deathbed, Bob accepts Jesus into his heart. Alice doesn't. What do Alice's and Bob's punishments look like?

This is an interesting, provoking, and common counter-example to the idea of mercy and acceptance of the Son—although it isn’t necessarily only facially applicable to Jesus’ forgiveness—and I understand where you are coming from here. I also used to think this way.

I would say, to be honest, that both would end up in heaven. Let me break down the general theory first and then address your questions directly.

1. I do not believe that one has to rigidly accept the Son of God (which may be Jesus if you would like) to be saved or that they have to participate in rituals (like baptism) to be accepted. As you alluded to with your example, someone can love God—love love itself: love goodness itself—without knowing the word “God”, having a concept of God that is robust, or having been exposed to some particular religion. God is judging us based off of our choices we make given the fact that we are not absolutely in control of ourselves (as natural organisms) and is evaluating how well we exhibited the virtues and, generally speaking, loved love (Himself).

2. For the vast majority of us, we have sinned before we die (although infants, e.g., haven’t if they are killed young); so for most of us we have offended God and, as I noted to @frank who ignored me, retribution is evaluated primarily based off of the dignity of the offended party (hence why shooting a rabbit illegitimately is lesser of an offense and deserving of less of a punishment than shooting a human the exact same way). With finite dignities, which are beings that are finitely good, there is a proportionate finite retribution (at least in principle) for every sin which one could, potentially, pay before they die (and thusly “serving their time” for the sin as it relates to the immanent victim—e.g., the human who was murdered). However, a sin is always also an offense against God and God is infinite goodness which is infinite dignity; so no proportionate retribution to something finite whatsoever can repay what is owed. This is why any sin, insofar as we are talking about the aspect of it that is an offense against God, damns us in a way where we ourselves cannot get out.

3. Loving love—being the a truly exceptional human being—will not repay the debt owed to an offended party with infinite dignity: Alice, or anyone of a high-caliber of virtue, is facially damned if they have sinned at least once.

4. God is all-just and all-merciful. He is all-just because He is purely actual and a creator, and so He cannot lack at anything in terms of creating; but to fail to order His creation properly is to lack at something as a creator. Therefore, God cannot fail to order His creation properly; and ordering His creation properly is none other than to arrange the dignity of things in a hierarchy that most reflects what is perfectly good—which is Himself. He is all-merciful because He is love and love is to will the good of something for-itself even when that something doesn’t deserve it. Mercy and justice, however, as described above, are prima facie opposed to each other: if, e.g., I have mercy on you then I am not being just and if I am just then I leave no room for mercy. To be brief, the perfect synthesis of the two is for a proper representative of the group of persons that has an appropriate dignity to pay the debt of their sins so that if they truly restore their will to what is right they can be shown mercy.

5. God must, then, synthesize justice and mercy by allowing a proper representative of humans to pay for our sins; but no human can repay it. It follows, then, that God must incarnate Himself as a human to be that representative. EDIT: I forgot to mention that God is the only one that can repay the debt because He is the only one with infinite dignity to offer as repayment.

6. The Son must be the one out of the Godhead that is incarnated because God creates by willing in accord with knowledge; His knowledge of Himself is what He uses to incarnate Himself; and the Son is His self-knowledge.

So, let me answer your questions with that in mind:

1. Alice and Bob have NOT committed equal sins: I don’t think that the fact that any given sin is unrepayable to God entails that all sins are equal. It just entails that all sins require something of infinite dignity to properly repay. Admittedly, it gets kind of weird fast working with retribution for infinite demerit. For example, in hell both of them will be punished for eternity but Alice’s punishment would be something far far less than Bob’s.

2. Since God saves us through His mercy (as described before), God does not have to punish us if we repent; and repentance is not some superficial utterance “I am sorry!” or, for your example, “Jesus I accept you!”. Repentance is normally through the sincerity of heart and through actions. A person who has never heard of God at all could be saved, under my theory, because they sincerely love love itself—God Himself—through action and this doesn’t need to be a perfect life that was lived (since God must sacrifice Himself to Himself to allow for mercy upon us). Alice, I would say, would be repentant in action and (most probably in spirit) for any minor sins she commits because she is such a good hearted person. If she were to do a lot of things that are virtuous but have the psychological disposition that doing good and loving her community, family, friends, etc. is horrible and something she despises; then she isn’t really acting virtuously. That’s like someone helping the poor as a practical joke or something instead of doing it out of love.

3. For Bob, it gets more interesting: your hypothetical eliminates the possibility of the good deeds part of what is normally a part of repentance since he is on his death bed when he has a change of heart. I would say that assuming he is not superficially saying “I am sorry (psst: hopefully I get into heaven this way!)”, then I would say that God’s mercy would allow him into heaven—at least eventually. Maybe there’s a purgatory faze where he is punished a bit for it first: I don’t know. However, what I do know is that Alice will be rewarded more than Bob; because reward is proportionate to the good deeds you have performed and goes beyond giving someone mercy from punishment. I do not believe that everyone in heaven is equal; or that God loves us all the same. That’s hippie bulls**t.

Let me know what you think.

:up:

Feel free to let me know your thoughts on Biblical slavery.

You didn't reply to my last post here, so I don't know what you think about it. The current discussion started from the point that I replied to your post, in which you were saying that OT is wrong.

I may have missed something: I apologize. I still don’t see the relevance of:

Why didn't Jesus Himself say that portion of the OT is false?

Given Jesus failed to address the OT’s mistakes and given him referring to himself as the messiah and that the OT is errant, it follows that Jesus probably wasn’t God.

With respect to your post you linked:

You do when you relate evil as privation of good. Good and evil are fundamental features of our experiences. We humans mostly prefer good over evil because of our genes. So we are biased.

Goodness is the equality of essence and esse; so it follows that badness is the privation (inequality) of essence and esse. So badness to goodness is like darkness to light.

You would have to provide a different account of goodness to make it work with your view that evil is some positive, real thing out there. My point was that I am a privation theorist about evil; so I do no think it is just as unreal as darkness.

Wait a minute. If God says masturbation or gay sex or eating the wrong thing is a sin that needs to be absolved, isn't that the end of the discussion right there? Even if I grant that other sins are legitimate and might need absolving, the God of the Bible, by declaring nonsinful actions sinful, is obviously not the entity to do it.

That’s an argument from external incoherence for the Bible; but that has no relevance to frank’s OP: they are asking about why God would sacrifice Himself for our sins.

My point was that we don’t have to agree on what is sinful to agree that if we sin then there must a punishment; and from there my argument begins.

Yes, I was providing a common Christian view to why Jesus had to die: I wasn't commenting on if I am a Christian or not. I clarified that to @frank and they ignored that too! :roll:

No we don't need to talk about it: all you need to concede is that there are some legitimate sins; then God would have to incarnate himself through hypostatic union to absolve those sins. We don't need to agree on specifically what is sinful.

BANNO. @frank ignored the Thomistic response I gave: even if you don't think that kind of response will be received as plausible by frank, they didn't even try to respond to one of the top answers historically to the very issue they wanted to address in the OP; and they continued to desecrate on the idea of God's sacrifice.

How can you not agree that that is intellectual vicious? It doesn't matter if at the end of the day you find it implausible: it's one of the most prominent responses to this issue.

Cc: @Banno @frank

:up:

I can tell now that neither of them want to have a productive conversation: they just want to straw man and desecrate on their "enemy". It's intellectually vicious and stupendous.

Then you need to refurbish your position. You said that God does not murder because when he kills us we don't truly die. This applies to all killings within your view.

You need to clearly define what murder is and then apply that standard to God's killings. So far you just keep ad hoc patching your view. You say God can't murder because you don't really die, but we both agree that's false; so now you are appealing to God just being special.

I'll ask you again: how do you define murder?

You just continue to be disingenuous. I'm done talking to you.

I wouldn't answer because it is irrelevant; but ok, I'll answer to further the discussion. I don't believe Jesus is the Son of God.

This is irrelevant because:

1. I was providing a view that is internal coherent and plausible within Christianity to address why God sent His Son to die on the cross; and

2. One could hold the view I gave and not be a Christian. Nothing about what I said actually entailed that Jesus was the Son of God. It entailed that the Son of God would have to incarnated at some point to be sacrificed for our sins in some way.

Asking me if I believe that Jesus was God is like:

1. Me asking "what are reasons someone would believe that we have a soul?".
2. You give me an exposition of one avenue someone could take to believe in us having a soul.
3. I ignore your exposition and ask you "do you believe that we have a soul?"

Well, that's irrelevant if you think about it: you could hold that we have no souls and that your exposition suffices to give a plausible account of us having a soul relative to some metaphysical theory.

 Do you really think that there was a chance of @frank accepting Thomism as an answer to his questions? Wouldn't he simple see it as a more verbose expression of the very same confusions? And indeed, with good reason.

@frank wrote in the OP:

The Catholic Church teaches that God Almighty came down from heaven to save us... from His own wrath... by allowing Himself to be tortured to death. And apparently this strategy worked in spite of the fact that he didn't actually die (people saw him walking around three days later), and most people didn't get saved.

Don't you agree this is a straw man? The Catholic Church does not teach this nor is it an iron-manned position on the topic. I think we all can agree that it is intellectually vicious to straw man positions when creating an OP; especially when it is written in a condescending way.

I would not think to purposefully desecrate and straw-man anyone's position in an OP on a philosophy forum: that's just disingenuine, closed minded, and dishonest. Can we agree on that? Can we not agree on being intellectually virtuous when discussing ideas on a philosophy forum?

I've suggested silentism as the most reasonable response to such issues - admitting that we don't know the answer.

I don't know what that means. Can you elaborate please?

You didn't just read it, frank, you ignored it and responded to low hanging fruits. I've given you many opportunities to engage and you refuse, which is your perogative; however, it saddens me that you go along with people in this forum in straw manning and condescending claims about views when people have and are willing to provide you with the real positions that you should be responding to.

I understand for @Banno Christianity probably holds no water and has every right to desecrate on it in here (although that also is disappointing); but you made the OP: there's no excuse. I responded to your OP with the Thomistic response and you ignored it and continued to act like no one can give any responses to what you are asking. Banno isn't obligated to read all the other posts in someone else's OP and respond accordingly.

All I am saying is why do you create an OP asking about a topic in a condescending and straw-manning way just to ignore anyone that gives you a response that is actually challenging for you?

What variables? You mean truth and the actual reality of the situation at hand? That's a bit of an abrasively dismissive way of describing such, wouldn't you say? But alright then.

When we discuss hypotheticals, they are in a vacuum: they are ceteris paribus. We add in variables to test our reasoning and decipher what we believe. You keep shifting the goal posts because you are not quite envisioning or appreciating this aspect of hypotheticals.

If I say “is it permissible to run a red light all else being equal?”, then it is not a valid response to say “it is permissible if its 1 AM with no traffic and your wife is bleeding out in the car while you rush her to the hospital”. Do you see what I mean?

And the officer responds, "oh you're just importing variables into the hypothetical". It is not a hypothetical. It literally happened. At least, allegedly, per the text we're discussing.

That’s not at all what’s happening. That’s adding context to a real scenario: these are hypothetical scenarios. Do you understand the difference between a hypothetical scenario and a real-life scenario?

Okay, so like I said. Maybe your premise is invalid. Simply, perhaps you're just wrong about one or more things. This is why religion is not generally a "hot topic" in the halls of philosophy. Because faith is belief, and belief is anything you deem fit. It's your right, after all.

Nothing about my definition of murder is faith-based or religious: I don’t know why you went there.

To be clear, if you reject that murder definitionally has to do with killing an innocent person then you are using a definition that is completely and utterly foreign to the modern justice system. A definition that includes killing guilty people would imply that there may be scenarios where what normally is considered legitimate self-defense is murder and scenarios where normal murder is not self-defense and yet not murder or manslaughter.

I don't see the relevance: can you elaborate on how this relevant to the OP?

Let me grant you that Jesus relates himself to the messiah from the OT which, in turn, is related to the God of the OT (the father). My argument demonstrates that the OT gets some stuff wrong about God because God can't do some of the things the OT claims God did; so those portions are false. However, it could be true that some of the other portions are accurate or none of it is. This argument certainly would jeopardize the standard Christian view that the Bible is inerrant.

Ok, thank you for the clarification. If you are using my definition and leveraging that God is not murdering people because they can't truly die, then no one ever commits murder. Are you accepting that? I want to make sure we are on the same page about the consistent conclusion of your position here.

If I kill an innocent infant, then the same logic would apply: I have not murdered them because they haven't truly died.

That's why I added in the "and a killing is to end the natural life of a being" since rational souls have a supernatural component that the stereotypical idea of killing does not apply.

My invocation of Thomism here was to give @Frank a reasonable Christian answer to their OP's blatant straw manning of Christianity; which doesn't necessitate that I accept the metaphysics.

On a separate note, I actually do find a lot of Thomism plausible. However, I know you have a lot of knowledge of philosophy and if there's alternatives that you would like to discuss with me then I am all ears.

I was talking about legitimate debt. Are you suggesting that the idea of sin is illegitimate?

You are making my point for me! In my example I am right that they are innocent because they are morally blameless as it relates to the incident; whereas you are right in your example that we could import variables into the hypothetical where they are not morally blameless in ways where it may be justified to kill them.

My point was that murder is considered normally killing someone that is innocent, although I would refine it a bit, and you were asking about what constitutes innocence. In both our examples, it is evident that innocence is about whether or not a person is morally blameworthy in a relevant way for the other person(s) to be justified in what they did to them.

I said you were shifting the goal-post because obviously innocence is a key component of murder: no one disputes that and my original comment was a definition of murder.

I didn't give a reference for that because I do not see the relevance. The OP is arguing that the OT depicts God in a light that is contradictory to God's nature. Even if the NT depicts God accurately or inaccurately, that is a separate issue.

You are just shifting the goal post to a discussion about what constitutes innocence. There is a wide consensus that unjust acts involve a victim and a victim, as the name implies, was innocent.

Innocence, I would say, has to do with being morally blameless as it relates to the incident at hand. Hence, an ex-convict would be an innocent victim if they were shot point blank on a sidewalk because someone didn't like the fact they had been previously convicted of a crime.

I don't think that is true. God may indirectly intentionally kill people or let them die; but He does not directly intentionally kill people (notwithstanding just punishment).

What definition of murder are you using?

It was an account through natural theology of why God would necessarily freely choose to sacrifice the Son (which doesn't necessarily have to be Jesus) and how it is out of love and not wrath. This is philosophical: it is not dependent on revealed theology.

Even if it were (as maybe I am providing why Jesus specifically had to be sacrificed), the part of the argument I gave is not a historical argument from revealed theology even if it presupposes some truths only derived from revealed theology.

E.g., I can make an philosophical argument for the metaphysics of a mind that presupposes some scientific claims which are not themselves philosophical; like so I can give an philosophical account of why Jesus would be sacrificed which presupposes Jesus was God through revealed theology which is not itself philosophical.

@frank is incapable of responding to my argument for some reason and insists that God meaninglessly sacrificed himself to himself out of wrath. It's just a shame they are unwilling to have a productive conversation.

Yep, that's why it has been historical seen as immoral and has been illegal. Same with assisted suicide.

If you don't agree with the definition, then please provide the one you are using and we can discuss with that one.

Because the OT claims God has done things that are evil; and God cannot do evil.

As I tried to explain to @frank (but they rudely ignored it), it is because God is all-just. To forgo the repayment required for an offense is to forgo justice. Oftentimes, mercy (viz., alleviating someone’s deserved misery) is contradictory to justice (viz., upholding what is owed).

God is all-just and all-merciful, so there is a necessary synthesis of both in God. The perfect synthesis of the two for God is to forgive our sins if we are repentant (viz., so as to be merciful) as long as a proportionate price has been paid for them by a representative of the group (viz., so as to be just). In this way, the price has been paid and an alleviation of misery can be done.

Imagine that you knew someone was in debt to you so much money that they never could pay it back. You could absolve them of the debt with the snap of your fingers, but you would be being unjust: they deserve to pay that back and you deserve that money, but you are forgoing it to allow someone to be in a condition that they do not deserve out of some motive (perhaps love or kindness). In this case, you would be having mercy on them, but at the expense of being just.

If you want to be just, though, you cannot do this; but if you make them continue to be in debt (to be just) with no way out, then you are not being merciful.

So, can you be both merciful and just? Is there a way to synthesize them? Yes. For example, in this case, you could take the money from a volunteer who is wealthy enough to pay the debt for this person and thereby absolve them of their debt when they don't deserve it (i.e., be merciful) and preserve the proper respect of desert (i.e., be just).

It's not a perfect analogy, but this is what God did.

GregW, murder is the direct intentional killing of an innocent person and a killing is to end the natural life of a being. By your logic, then, if I go and kill someone it isn't murder because they haven't truly died since their soul is immutable and ends up in heaven.

1. It is impermissible to indirectly kill an infant
2. Killing an infant's parents will indirectly kill the infant (if left to itself)
3. Therefore, it is impermissible to kill an infant's parents (for any reason, so long as you cannot support the infant)

Would you agree with that argument?

No, I wouldn’t. But let’s say I did: is your argument that if it is immoral to kill or leave the infant, then the lesser of the two evils (that should be picked) is to kill it? I do accept the principle that if one has to do evil that they should do the lesser of the evils; but wouldn’t this argument require that God had to do evil?

The reason I wouldn’t accept the argument, on another note, is for two reasons:

1. It is sometimes permissible to indirectly intentionally kill an infant. Going back to our discussion about the principle of Double Effect, the tactical bomber, e.g., is justified in bombing the military base even if he knows with 100% certainty one innocent bystander will be killed.

2. Omissions and commissions are evaluated morally differently, such that if one can only do immoral acts then letting something bad happen is always the permissible and obligatory option. If I can only murder someone else to stop the train to save the five or let the five die, then letting the five die is morally permissible and obligatory; however, all else being letting the five die would be immoral. If you either have to let the children starve or murder them, then letting them starve is bad but morally obligatory and permissible.

I think you would have to, at the very least, deny the principle in 2 that <if one can only do immoral acts to prevent something bad, then it is obligatory that they do nothing>.

that one is permitted to indirectly kill an infant in certain circumstances. In that case a command to kill infants could be reasonably interpreted as a command to indirectly kill infants by killing their evil parents.

Well, this cannot be true. 1 Samual 15 makes it clear God is commanding Saul to directly intentionally kill them all. It even goes so far to explicate that Saul did it but kept some of the animals and God was annoyed with Saul for keeping the animals BUT NOT for directly intentionally killing the people:

“He took Agag king of the Amalekites alive, and all his people he totally destroyed with the sword. 9 But Saul and the army spared Agag and the best of the sheep and cattle, the fat calves and lambs—everything that was good. These they were unwilling to destroy completely, but everything that was despised and weak they totally destroyed.”

 God is allowed to "kill," given that every time anything dies God has "killed" it. Life and death are in God's hands. Can God delegate such a prerogative to the Israelites in special cases, such as that of the Amalekites? If so, then this "mercy killing" of an infant is not per se unjust, and it actually provides the infant with the best option, given the alternatives.

Yes, this seems to be Aquinas’ answer; but then you are saying that murder is not the direct intentional killing of an innocent person OR that murder is not always unjust. Would you endorse one of those?

Note though that collateral damage is part of war, and that it bears on the question of directly intended killing versus indirectly intended killing. 

But this seems disanalogous. The tactical bomber is not indirectly intending to kill an innocent bystander if he successfully bombs the military base, notices he has another bomb leftover, and uses it on an innocent person riding their bike. Going in and winning a war against the Amalekites and then killing en masse the women and children is not indirectly intentional. Technically, one could argue that the women and children were all killed in the heat of battle; but how honestly plausible is that? When has that ever happened in war?

I have not. I haven't had the time to sift through all the posts in here.