Matter, in this sense, is still a constituent in a thing with parts; so either a composed being is composed infinitely or there is a part which is has (somewhere along the line) that has no parts itself.

I apologize: I forgot to respond.

What I don't see here is the alternative they should have chosen, how they could have known that was the better choice and did they have the capability and opportunity to choose it?

This wasn’t an analytic essay: the prose is provocative, pungent, and crude. I think provided explicated life paths would betray that prose.

Who decides whether they are well or sick, according to what criteria?

“The wellness makes them sick; and the sickness makes them well” is a purposeful equivocation for intents of an aphorism. It is supposed to get you thinking about what sense ‘wellness’ and ‘sickness’ are being referred here. How can a person that is well be sick? How can a sick person be well?

What do you think? When would a well person be sick? Or a sick person well? And why would one make the other?

What if most of us are common and content not to walk on flowers, but just look at them alongside the road?

Firstly, it still stampedes authenticity, individual profoundness, and deep thinking; so what you are asking is essentially “what if most of us are content with being inauthentic, dull, and intellectually shallow?”. To that, I say, secondly, that it will be a very shallow sense of happiness: it is not possible to acquire a deep sense of fulfillment that way; and it will tend to come back to haunt those people who are ‘content’ in this way. It’s almost like the short-term happiness makes them well, but also produces long-term misery……..

 If common folk were not a majority, how could they have trod a paved road?

There would be no common folk in the sense you mean if everyone was authentic; unless everyone was authentically the same, which is highly unlikely.

All the people I ever met had thoughts and lives and purposes...But I'm not happier for having chosen differently, and neither their or my lives made an impression on the universe.

Of course most people have purposes and lives—no doubt; however, many people, especially those that are young, walk a path given to them as the easy downstream path of the river of society. It’s so easy to survive and be immanently healthy (physically) following that path nowadays that many people never are slapped with any sort of struggle that forces them to contemplate the heavier, deeper questions in life.

I would say, as a side note, that happiness is not subjective. No, people are not just as happy doing whatever option they choose (out of the full list of options).

What is true meaning and how do you tell it apart from false meaning? What is an authentic self and how can you tell what someone else's authentic self is? What is a 'deeper thing than they're thinking about, and who gets to measure the depth?

Exactly! That’s what the passage that you quoted is trying to get you to think about.

Not always. Mining coal is hard, even if every man in your village does it for want of a better job. Active service in a war is hard, even if all your cohort is conscripted; bearing and feeding nine children is hard, even if every woman on the street accepts all the blessings God sends them.

Most jobs in the west are not like those you mentioned and more and more women are not having kids (or very few). The fact is that most people in the west, such as the US or Europe, have extremely comfortable lives even if they are drowning in debt. Outside of the West, there are plenty of places that have far worse living arrangements (to your point).

Old people have regrets, and some of those regrets are about not having pursued their passion. But they're just as likely to be about doing someone wrong or missing opportunities for happiness. If there are holes, they're particular and personal, not metaphysical.

A regret tends to be the shadow of the right intuition that one did not follow what is good.

Human beings, like sea lions and zebras, are individual, real, particular, unique - not generalities forming a dull backdrop against which the special ones suffer mental anguish and shine like stars.

I didn’t follow this part; but those of us that suffer in the right and proportionate ways for higher goods definitely shine brighter.

When God creates the intelligences (which being intelligences, are immaterial) he is bringing them into being with a certain whatness, through the granting of existence to form (not through generation, the informing of matter, but rather through creation from nothing) but these are not pure being (essence ≠ existence), and so they are subject to change

Again, this treats ‘matter’ as if it is a something that can be created by God to receive a form; and that, whereas, God can also create something which has form without creating this ‘something’ that receives the form.

I am merely asking:

1. What is this ‘something’?
2. How could form be imbued with being without requiring the creation of parts?

For number 1, my answer I have unraveled so far (by merely thinking about it) is that ‘matter’, this ‘something’, is merely that which is capable of receiving form; and only parts are capable of receiving form. So, it follows that the beings which preexist (at least atemporally) the form which is imbued into it are the only beings which can be said to be matter (relative to form). This, of course, leads to the necessary conclusion that composition is infinite and that there is a first cause outside of that infinity for the being of each part (which is God).

For number 2, I find this so far to be metaphysically impossible: Aquinas seems to be blundering by using a notion of some ‘matter’ that is ‘physical’ and trying to omit that for the sake of spiritual substances. However, even these spirits are made up of parts; for otherwise they would be purely actual; and this entails that they have matter in the sense that I defined it in #1.

I am not following why Aquinas is treating ‘matter’ as if it is more than just the potency preexisting beings have to receive form.

What I deny is your premise, that God is absolutely simple.

This isn't a direct counter to my point. If you have finite divisibility, then you will end up with multiple absolutely simple beings (even if they are just 'atoms') and this is impossible. To hold your view, you have to accept that two absolutely simple beings are not ontologically indistinguishable from each other.

Sure, but is existence a form received by an essence?

I would say the existence (being), essence/form, and matter of a thing are all different but related aspects of it. The being is just what makes it real; the form/essence is the universal idea of a thing that makes it the kind of thing it is (viz., provides its whatness); and the matter of a thing is the beings which receive the form through act.

Where it gets weird is that the beings which receive the form have the same setup; namely, they are form received by other beings (which comprise them) through act; and so matter is really just the preexisting being which receives the form ad infinitum.

Of course, if all there is causally is just this infinite regress of composition (of form and matter) then there would be no being; for each member lacks the innate ability to self-subsist (but rather gets it derivatively from another). Therefore, there must be a first cause which is purely actual (viz., self-subsisting being) which provides the being to the infinite regress of composition.

It must be an infinite regress of composition, as opposed to a finite regress, because (1) a finite regress would entail at least two absolutely simple beings (which is impossible) and (2) there would be no matter (since it is just preexisting being which has the potency to receive form).

This also means that God must create the infinite regression of (at least) His immediate creation simultaneously; and this preexistence of matter is merely atemporal.

If existence is a form and an angel receives the form of existence, then the angel must have matter, but I wouldn't really want to describe it that way.

If the form of a thing is its existence, then it can’t have parts; right? There would be nothing to receive the form (i.e., nothing previously which has being to receive it), so a pure form would be a being that is pure idea that self-subsistently exists: isn’t that God? Maybe even God isn’t this kind of being, because God really doesn’t have a form; for He is absolutely simple—we merely talk of Him having a form analogically.

 This also obscures the position which objects to Aquinas and says that angels do have proper (spiritual) matter.

This honestly makes his view even more confusing to me; because I thought he was arguing that Angels are each their own species because they have no matter whatsoever.

Also, how can there be a difference between mental (spiritual) and physical (material) matter? Both are ‘stuff’ that a thing is made up of which can be immaterial insofar as they are not in space or time.

Got it. So, if I am understanding correctly, Aquinas does believe that matter is NOT merely that which is capable of receiving form but also is something physical. If so, then that's fine: I am just using the term matter to refer to that which can receive form simpliciter.

Despite the fact that substance is the individual, which is a composite of matter and form, when you read his Metaphysics, you'll find that Aristotle determines that "substance" is properly assigned to form. This is because n the case of self-subsisting things, the substance of the thing cannot be separated from the thing's form. Therefore the thing's form and the thing's substance are one and the same.

Yes, that is perfectly fine; and does not really deny that substance is comprised of matter and form. It’s an analogical account of God. We say God has a ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ that is identical to His ‘existence’ analogically and not univocally. God doesn’t really have an essence because, as you noted, He is self-subsisting, absolutely unified, Being itself. An essence is tied to the form of a thing, and a form is an actualizing principle which gives the structure to a being; but structure, and this infusion, implies parts. God has no parts, so we speak of His ‘nature’ only as an analogy of comparison to describe Him.

Why do you say this? It is definitely not Aristotelian, as he clearly demonstrates why it s incoherent to assume infinite divisibility of anything substantial.

I am not claiming it is Aristotelian, and I demonstrated it to you here in a former post:

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. God is the only absolutely simple being (i.e., divine simplicity) and if God is the first member of the causal regress of the composition of an object (which would be the case if the composition is finite in parts) then there would have to be at least one part which is also absolutely simple which is impossible; therefore an objects composition must be equally indivisible and subsistent being of each member is derivative of God as the first cause outside of the infinite regress.

In short, if we have a causal series with God as the beginning for composition like [G, [P1], [P2], [P3], …, O] (where God is ‘G’, the ‘P’s refer to parts, and ‘O’ refers to the object/whole in question), then the immediate subsequent member of the causal chain from God must also be absolutely simple (which in this case is the set of parts containing one element/part, P1); for that part would be composed of either (1) God (which is an absolutely simple being so He would provide no parts to this part, P1) or (2) it’s own self-subsisting being (since nothing comes prior to it that has parts and is not from God). Either way, e.g., the set [P1] contains parts which have no parts. This is impossible because there would, then, be at least two beings that are absolutely simple; and two absolutely simple beings are indistinguishable ontologically. I am pretty sure you would disagree with the idea that ontological simplicity entails one such kind of being (as a possibility); but you get the point.

his is the reason you yourself stated " if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself".

I did say that, and it does not refer to what you are thinking of. The causality of everything bottoms out at God—e.g., if the set {E} contains everything that is caused, then the set of causality (including what causes, not just what is caused) would be [G, {E}]—but the causality of composition in terms of parts/whole is an infinite set; and this infinite set is identical to {E}. God’s very being is permeated through the infinite collection, which is what accounts for the being of these parts/wholes. As I noted in the quote you have of me, this we can know because an infinite collection of parts and wholes is insufficient to explain how they exist; for each member gets being derivatively from the other and yet no member has the intrinsic ability to be. This means there must be a cause outside of that chain of composition which being is derived from. This is true irregardless if one accepts the infinite divisibility of composition or not.

It does refute your hypothesis. With an infinite amount of time, which is what you allow, that being would necessarily affect and be affected, or else it would be false to say that it is capable of affecting or being affected.

Imagine a block in a room standing still. Imagine the air is removed from the room and you know with 100% certainty nothing will ever infiltrate into the room nor will anything in the room be changed by something in the room. This block, given infinite time, would remain that block in the exact manner it was and will also be.

Fair enough. However, isn't he, then, implying that matter is something which something with parts, in principle, does not necessarily have? If so, then how is this coheren with defining 'matter' as 'that which has the potential to receive form'?

Does Aquinas not think that an Angel's composition is that of recieved form? Namely, a form that is infused with its parts; afterall, the parts of an angel are parts of an angel and not parts of something else (or not parts at all) exactly because they are infused with a form that unifies them into a whole. Right?

Aristotle's Prime Matter (prōtē hulē) is conceived as pure potentiality. Imagine the most basic "stuff" of the universe, utterly undifferentiated and without any inherent qualities, forms, or properties of its own. It's not actually anything specific, but has the potential to become anything (to 'take form', so to speak).

Yes, but then matter, albeit not pure matter in the sense of prime matter, is something separable, in principle, as its own entity. For something which in-itself is pure potential to receive form is toto genere different than that which is actual (viz., has form).

I’ve already noted the non-beingness of prime matter objection; but I will also briefly note that another issue is that prime matter would be absolutely simple and Aristotle equally holds that pure actuality is absolutely simple; but two absolutely simple beings cannot exist because they are ontologically indistinguishable—not merely conceptually or epistemically indistinguishable.

Of course, someone could object that prime matter cannot exist on its own; but, then, there doesn’t seem to be any matter in the sense of being an entity capable of receiving any form—that would be a substance of its own even if it always must be conjoined with something that does not have or has limited potential (like actuality).

For change to occur, there must be something underlying that persists throughout the transformation.

But the annihilation of a substance (as a whole) is done by the actualization of potentials of its parts which are potentials that necessarily annihilate the form it had (thusly disbanding the whole-parts relationship). It seems like Aristotle would reject this and say that the parts of a thing do not have the potential to be actualized in a way that would annihilate its own form (e.g., modifying the parts of a tree by burning it to lose its form of a tree).

Without it, Aristotle argued, things would have to come into being from absolute nothingness, which he rejected as impossible ('nothing comes from nothing').

I agree; but pure actuality actualizing something out of nothing is something I would imagine Aristotle would accept; and this is how the entirety of the infinity of parts and wholes originate—out of nothing from God.

But because prime matter possesses no form or qualities

But if it is pure potentiality; then it has no actuality. Right? So it is non-being. Unless, are you saying actuality is not identical to being?

I had this typed from before the reveal -- updated the title @Bob Ross.

Thank you! That’s not your fault: I probably didn’t give you a title. I forgot about this exercise (:

Wondering who "she" is throughout the essay I kept feeling compelled to want to read

There’s purposefully many meanings to the narrator vs. the female dichotomy. You could interpret it as:

OK, now I'm guessing "she" is Oizys

Insofar as “she” is the extreme exemplification of misery, existentialism, etc.; but is there not something beautiful which emerges even out of the purest of evil? Are happiness and unhappiness not twins sisters that either grow up together or remain small together?

The kind of sunlight produced from evil isn’t better but is more awing and provoking than from good—don’t you think? It has a red stain to it...

I'm wondering about the voice of the author, though -- from where does the author see her? I wouldn't be wondering that except for when you say you abandoned her to the dead it

The easy interpretation is that she is her own betrayer. Remember, she is both predator and prey.

Another interpretation is what I told Amity:

There’s a saying by (I think) Nietzsche that “those who were seen dancing were thought to be insane by those who could not hear the music”. This short story flips it: “those who were seen entombing themselves were thought to be ill by those who could not hear the screams”. The ‘I’ who narrates betrayed her (ultimately) because they could not—were incapable of—hear(ing) the screams.

I find this one much more thought-provoking; but both are equally necessary to grasp the totality of the meaning behind the essay.

only because "I" is used -- if it hadn't been then I'd have kept reading this as a third-person impersonal essay.

Yes, and there’s a third interpetation: a personal touch. There’s an audience that will resinate with the essay more than others simply because they have drowned in the same waters; and, ultimately, this is a antidote being offered to them. However, the work is also meant to have meaning which can be applied to anyone. It gets at multiple levels of the illness---even for those who don't realize they have it.

It's not philosophy's soul that's like the dead sea, but the speakers, who sets out to no longer abandon her.

Right! Both she and the speaker are the dead sea in different respects. She cannot find solid ground: every idea she touches dies eventually—after much toil and sweat. The bird never lands for her. On the other hand, the speaker, the Judas, the ignorant passer-by, seeks to help her land but they are the very thing making her seek land elsewhere…. The bird does not land in the sea.

The style draws me into the world. I like that a great deal, but I think that the essay would benefit from something to help readers to grasp where you're going. I like poetics in philosophy, but I -- to speak poetically -- feel that there could be more of the "rational" side in this piece that, if incorporated, would strengthen the writing.

That’s fair. It’s hard to balance revelation and allowing interpretations of literature. I am trying to offer interpretations to people without giving the one(s) I intended.

it'd be interesting if you could tie Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Aurelius in your reflection. Then they'd look more like coherent references for your thoughts.

I agree and are when they come up. There’s a development of consciousness going on the work that I don’t think anyone has noticed yet; which ties to the different philosophers (which you missed two btw [; ) throughout.

She has walked the common path undisturbed, and exactly this wellness has made her sick: normality is a paved road—it is comfortable to walk, but no flowers grow on it 1.— Moliere


What happened to bring about this state of affairs? What should the author's soul have been walking on that he was prevented from walking? What prevented it?

Normality as a paved road is a quote from a philosopher (of which I forget the name): it refers to the fact that authenticity is stamped out by common norms. The common path is walked so much that a flower cannot bloom on it.

The common path can feel good because it is comfortable and undisturbing, but it this kind of ‘wellness’ that makes many people sick. They go their entire lives without finding true meaning, finding their authentic self, thinking about the deeper things, because doing what everyone else is doing in mainstream, practical life is so easy. Then they get slapped with the bill decades later and have to deal with the seeping hole in their heart. You’ve probably met people to some extent like this: they have no thoughts because it is easier to have them given to them—they have no life, because they won’t depart on their own path. They have no purpose, because they never fought for it.

They take the easy path and find temporary well-being, until it collapses.

This was a response to serious illness and a leg amputation - in a Victorian medical facility

That was a very captivating and interesting poem!

:up:

Prior to the quote, Kierkegaard writes:

I’ve always thought Kierkegaard was a subliminal exemplification of a diseased soul: someone that already put the nails in their own coffin, and yet still breathes. His reader-base he was intending to write for were the ‘fellowship of entombed lives’. He was the kind of extreme example of moder-day nihilism and mental illness (about purpose, meaning, and value); but conjoined with a genius intellect and strong will.

Ultimately, of course, Kierkegaard offers the reader blind, leap-like faith as the solution because he couldn’t reason his way out of his existential despair (I would say).

She slithers from nothing to nothing.

‘ex nihilo ad nihilum’ means ‘from [out of] nothing, to [towards] nothing’: I’ve found it to be a great way of referring to those that lack purpose. Those pure breeds of nihilism: a dark picture, but a necessary one.

Who is the 'I' who narrates? Who betrayed her (another inner self?). How?

There’s a saying by (I think) Nietzsche that “those who were seen dancing were thought to be insane by those who could not hear the music”. This short story flips it: “those who were seen entombing themselves were thought to be ill by those who could not hear the screams”. The ‘I’ who narrates betrayed her (ultimately) because they could not—were incapable of—hear(ing) the screams.

What kind of 'indifference'? The special Stoic kind or the common garden variety?

Stoicism doesn’t teach indifference: it teaches equanimity.

So, 'she', the counterpart of (presumably a 'he'?) has become captive, her spirit caged?

Συμπαϱανεϰϱώμενοι refers to the living coffins: those that have died well before their physical death.

'The greatest sacrifice one can give is to die; for her, it is to live.'

See Kierkegaard’s ‘The Unhappiest One’:

We whose activities are, if I am to conform with the sacred tradition of our society, experiments in aphoristic and accidental devotion, we who do not merely think and speak aphoristically but live aphoristically, we who live aphorismenoi and segregati, 3 like aphorisms in life, without society of men, not sharing their sorrows and their joys; we who are not consonants sounding together in the noise of life, but solitary birds in the stillness of night, gathered together only now and then, to be edified by representations of life’s misery, the length of the day, and the endless duration of time; we, dear Symparanekromenoi, who have no faith in the game of happiness or the fortune of fools, we who believe in nothing but misfortune. See how they press forward in their countless multitudes, all the unhappy! Yet, many though they are who believe they are called, few are the chosen. A distinction is to be established between them – a word, and the crowd vanishes; for excluded, uninvited guests are all those who think the greatest misfortune is death, those who became unhappy because it was death they feared; for we, dear Symparanekromenoi, we, like the Roman soldiers, do not fear death; we know of greater misfortunes, and first and last and above all – life. Yes, if there were a human being who could not die, if the story of the eternally wandering Jew were true, how could we scruple to call him the unhappiest?

https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/36ba381a-9850-4782-a471-dbe0bfa3c3b6/downloads/Either_or%20-%20S%C3%B8ren%20Kierkegaard%20(pdf).pdf?ver=1611846256813, page 177.

And then, the author gives us a break, a poem. Of resilience. Life and Death, Life and Death.

The poem is from a movie, The Grey, that was written by the main character’s father that was on the wall. He recites it right before battling to death with a wild wolf—to the death.

The red sun seeping

That which does not transmit light creates its own darkness; but not all light is the product of goodness in the way Plato thinks of The Good as the golden sun….

The heat of a righteous anger under intense pressure?

(:

How does being brutal avoid immorality?

When an organism faces extinction, it either goes to places its predator will not dare to join; or fights the predator head on. Remember, she is both the prey and the predator…

When you have to fight immorality like always having to walk with glass shards in your feet, what do you think will happen to your psychology outlook on your life?

Next up, Nietzsche on great pain burning slowly. Apparently, it compels certain philosophers to go down, deep, deep, down.
…
Why? How?

The deepest of battles is perpetual: it is long-sought and long-fought. It is the kind of suffering that strips you bare for all to see—the kind that forces no stone to be left unturned in your soul. You find out about who you really are, in that moment: you can’t hide.

Almost vampiric in the squeezing of life blood from her old self.

One cannot truly changes themselves by taking prisoners…

I guess my beef is that I don't see Marcus as an existentialist. He adheres to Stoic principles of which 'indifference' is one. However, he engages at a high level of engagement as Emperor of Rome. His actions appear to contradict Stoicism.

Re-read the short-story as a development of consciousness and tell me what you think.

What does it take or mean to know yourself, when there are so many competing selves?

What is eudaimonia? Which leads me to:

The myth of finding the Greek word 'εὐδαιμονία' in a chest, in your heart...
The word is not 'happiness' but the state or process of a spirit seeking wellbeing.

It just is well-being, it is soul living well, as understood through the prism of essences.

The author ends with words from Schopenhauer.
I am not well-informed. However, I think it relates to Seneca's idea that the will can't be taught.

You are onto it. It means ‘willing cannot be taught’. There’s two meanings Schopenhauer gives: that one can will but cannot will what he wills, and that one knows what they will not that they will what they know. I’ll leave you with that to chew on….

I hope it is not too haunting: it was meant to strike a cord with a certain audience, but still be meaningful for others.

More a poem than an essay. Which is ok. Poems can be good philosophy.

It’s literature: not a poem. Literature is the elegant way of making a point, as well as getting people to think for themselves. I prefer it over these ‘essays’ that you refer to, which are really analytic essays, because they are captivating, touch larger of an audience, toiling, and substantial.

I recognize your approach is impressionistic, but I admit I don't know what you're trying to tell, or maybe show, us.

It’s meant as a journey through a very common development of consciousness. Traveling impacts you far more than where you departed and where you end up. The result is the end process of the path you took, and this is one common path.

The title is quite misleading: that's my fault. I didn't give moliere a title for it (if I remember correctly). The title should be "Oizys' Garden": that is befitting.

Such an infinite regress is incoherent and therefore logically impossible

Blanketly asserting this doesn’t help further the discussion. I gave an elaborate account of why it is possible and necessary. Here’s what I gathered you mean by it being incoherent:

Infinite regress in such division is incoherent because it implies that there is no substratum, therefore no substance, allowing for infinite possibility, but this is contrary to empirical evidence.

A substance, in hylomorphism, is the form (act) and matter (parts) conjoined. There is no other substratum besides that; and matter as a substrate would imply it is it’s own substance, which is impossible because it would entail that (A) there is a substance of pure potentiality whereof potentiality is non-being and (B) that there are two absolutely simple beings (one being purely actual and the other purely potential).

You are partly correct, though: if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself. This is why it is necessary to posit a purely actual, self-subsisting being, to account for the being of objects; however, as I noted before, it is equally necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. This is not to say that an object does not have a finite series of causes. There can exist, and necessarily exists, an infinite chain of causality of parts; but that infinite chain is infused with being through God—pure actuality. Pure being permeates through the infinity of parts.

You do not seem to understand what "parts of a thing" means. To be "the parts of a thing", the existence of the thing is necessary

I understand that: you are right that the part of a whole is no longer a part (of that whole) if the whole is not there. I was just loosely referring to the objects which would or did comprise the whole in question: the matter that receives the form in question.

The incoherent infinite regress is avoided by understanding the priority of form in the creative act, and positing form rather than matter, as substance

Hyle (matter) + morphe (form) = substance. Neither are a substance themselves. They both exist intertwined together. A purely actual being, God, is neither pure form or matter: He is self-subsisting being itself. Being is what gives the form and matter together being as a substance; which is identical to pure acts of creation by way of thought/will of a form into matter.

I think that your argument is refuted by what is known as the principle of plenitude. If given enough time, every possibility will necessarily be actualized

That doesn’t refute what I said: in principle, hypothetically, a being could exist which is never affected by anything and yet is not incapable of change.

If it is 'a thing' then it has form. If it has no form, then it's not a thing.

Yes, but then there isn’t some other substance which can receive potentiality. ‘Matter’ is not a substrate which receives form. The ‘material’ out of which something is created is the already existed stuff (objects) which can be made into a whole (by way of it receiving the form of the whole); so each object is both comprised of form and matter only insofar as its parts are the matter and its form is the actualizing principle of the structure that makes those parts its parts. There is no substrate of ‘matter’.

Whether or not prime matter is said to exist, it could still function as a theoretical entity representing the conservation of matter (or in our terms, energy). Any such conservation principle requires something which is conserved, even despite the fact that everything observable changes. That "something" could be said to be prime matter for Aristotle. The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible.

My understanding of this would be to say that prime matter would just be being itself (permeated through forms); because matter is only ‘conserved’ in the sense that destroying the whole does not destroy the parts: it just makes those parts no longer parts.

It might be fun to consider a similar objection that Aquinas gives:

Yeah, I read his entire section on that and it just seems like he’s thinking of physical matter: not anything that could receive a form. Only things which have parts have potency; otherwise, there is nothing that can be affected. So Angel’s must have parts if they have potency.

Likewise, to say something is purely form doesn’t make sense to me: all form is purely form. When we have an object that is a substance comprised of form and matter, the form infused with the matter is itself purely form. To be fair, I am assuming he means ‘pure form’ as ~’something which has being with no matter and only form’; but, then, a form is the actualizing principle which has behind it a universal: it’s not identical to pure actuality. A universal is not a form without act; and act is not a form without being permeated in matter. Both are equally incoherent. Pure actuality, then, is just pure being self-subsisting; and pure act is the permeation of form in matter by way of the creation of matter with being out of nothing.

I appreciate your guys' thoughts on this. Here's what I am thinking.

"Matter" is 'that which has the potential to receive form'; and 'form' is the 'actualizing principle which gives a thing it's substantial structure'. In this sense, Aquinas' idea of a pure form that is not purely actual is patently false; for parts have the potential to receive form and all beings other than the actus purus have parts. So Angel's have matter: just not material matter.

The idea that matter is eternal seems false in the sense that prime matter could ever exist (yet alone eternally): if Aristotle thinks, as Leontiskos pointed out, that matter is eternal in the sense of never being created then he is using the idea of matter as if it is a separate substance and this eternal matter would be prime matter. On the contrary, the way I see it, that which has the potential to receive form (i.e., matter) is just the potential an already existent substance (comprised of actuality and potency: matter and form) has---the matter and form of a thing are like two sides of the same coin instead of two different substances; so each object has matter insofar as it is comprised of something(s) which have potency until we get to God as the utlimate cause which has no potency (i.e., is not comprised of anything). Consequently, matter, being the potential that the parts of a thing has, is not some separate thing conjoined with form that God creates: it is just a symptom of creating things with parts.

I believe Aquinas gets his critique of prime matter right (more or less) and I simply wasn't understanding how God creates matter with things; but I realize now I was treating it like a separate substance that God creates with things. Matter is must always coincide with form because they are two sides of the same coin: the parts (which have being) are what have the potential to receive form and the form is what gives those parts their structure towards the end. Matter, then, always existed and will always exist with creation because God must create His totality of creation as an infinite of things with parts upon parts upon parts upon ... interrelated to each other; for if we suppose that God creates an object which has a finite chain of parts that derive ultimately back to God (causally), then the very first part(s) after God (as the ultimate one) of the said object would have to also have no parts (since the only more fundamental cause has no parts which could comprise it) and two absolutely simple beings cannot exist. A finite series of composition results in an absolutely simple being creating at least two parts as the first element or member of composition for the object and these two parts would be atomic (i.e, absolutely simple) since they themselves have no parts.

To answer Count, the individuating principle, then, is parts: the stuff that has the potential to receive form; and thusly Angel's being immaterial would not change the fact that the individuation principle would equally apply to them as well. The only kind of being with pure form, then, would be a being which is purely actual; and this kind of being has no principle of individuation that can be applied since it has no parts (i.e., no matter).

I think I've clarified it now: let me know if I am missing anything.

Aristotle showed how this is problematic. Each part, if it was divisible, would itself be an arrangement of parts, and that would lead to infinite regress. And, if we assume that things are composed of fundamental indivisible parts, like the atomists proposed, this is also problematic. 

Atomism is false because it posits two or more absolutely simple beings and an absolutely simple being is ontologically indistinguishable from another.

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. God is the only absolutely simple being (i.e., divine simplicity) and if God is the first member of the causal regress of the composition of an object (which would be the case if the composition is finite in parts) then there would have to be at least one part which is also absolutely simple which is impossible; therefore an objects composition must be equally indivisible and subsistent being of each member is derivative of God as the first cause outside of the infinite regress.

There would be nothing to distinguish one indivisible part from another indivisible part, and all would be one.

Ultimately, reality is a giant infinite web of causality with God as the first cause; and these are both equally necessarily true. The difference between parts is that they are wholes which can be compared.

I think it would be more appropriate to say that the underlying substrate has received actuality. We are talking about what actually is, and this means it has form already.

Yes, but this does seem to posit that there is a real kind of being or substance, distinct ontologically from the parts of a thing, which has the capacity to receive form.

You'll find the answer to this question, in its most basic form, in Aristotle's Physics, where he defines "material cause", in Bk2, Ch 3 "that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists". Notice that the matter of a thing, is in a sense, independent from the thing itself

But this could be the stuff which is the parts of a thing—no? It fits the definition of “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists”. The parts persist when the whole perishes and the parts are out of which the whole is birthed.

All things made of matter were generated, and will perish, as their matter out lasts them.

I don’t see how this is necessarily the case. A thing could be made of some substance which is capable of receiving form, exist as the whole between the form and its imposition on that substance, have the potential to be affected by other things, and yet no other thing affects it; thereby remaining unchanged. It is metaphysically possible for a thing that is perishable to be in an environment where it will not perish.

If we’re asking, “what is matter?”, then one part of the Aristotelian answer is that matter is that which has the potential to take form

But then matter is something: it isn’t pure potency. There is a something that is receptive to change—fair enough.

If matter is just that which has the potential to take form and this is necessary for change and angel’s can change (e.g., by learning), then wouldn’t angel’s be made up matter?

The problem I have is that ‘matter’ seem to be referring to the mere ‘stuff’ that can receive a form AND material ‘stuff’. An angel has matter in the former sense, but not the latter.

As Count Timothy pointed out, the active intellect is “potentially all things,” yet it too is immaterial.

How is it potentially all things ontologically? It can know things by apprehending the form of a thing, but it doesn’t thereby become identical to it.

Yeah, it is strange haha. I submitted it a long time ago, forgot about it, and thought the title was something else. That's all I'll say for now: keep guessing.

I don't think mine in the list lol. There's 13 and 13, so maybe there's another person that participated?

I appreciate your response and that all sounds interesting, but right now I am trying to understand hylomorphism simpliciter (viz., the OG theory). I still haven't been able to wrap my head around what 'matter' is if it does not refer to merely the 'stuff' which are the parts that are conjoined with the form to make up the whole. As @Count Timothy von Icarus pointed out, many Aristotelian thinkers posited beings which are not purely actual but yet have no matter (like Angels and the intellect); and this suggests that matter refers to something other than composed being: it's some sort of substance only physical, or perhaps material, things have and it doesn't refer to 'having mass' either. So let me ask you: what is it?

Form is always actual, but there can be potential that isn't matter. The biggest example comes from De Anima. The intellect is immaterial, but there is distinction between the active (agent) intellect, and the potential (possible) intellect. The intellect can obviously change. We can merely potentially know French and then learn it, and actually know it. We actually get a gradient of first and second actuality.

This gets at the heart of my confusion: hopefully you can help clarify it. If the intellect, or anything, has no matter but has potential; then matter is not the substrate of being of a thing nor the parts which comprise it. So may main question to you is: what is matter?

It seems like matter is just the physical or perhaps material substrate of a thing—no? Aristotle wasn’t using the term matter in terms of ‘having mass’: so what is it? I can’t wrap my head around what it is supposed to be. If a thing is comprised of parts but has no matter (such as an angel, the intellect, etc.), then what is matter?

EDIT: or are you saying that Arstotle would deny that non-material things have parts? This seems to betray the idea of divine simplicity, but maybe Aristotle doesn't care about that.

They cannot be just the parts, or the replacement of parts makes them cease to be. They cannot be just the current arrangement, or else when the arrangement changes (when Socrates breaks his nose) he ceases to be and becomes something else

I think I see what you are saying here, now: I was conflating formality with 'structure of being'. The form of a thing provides the structure of a thing, but is not identical to it. Otherwise, you are right that what the thing is would not exist: it was just be 'that which it is' and this would change when its parts change.

To say, then, that a thing is pure form is to say it is without parts; which would then entail that God is pure form which has no structure (other than speaking about Him analogically) because He is One.

@Count Timothy von Icarus

Chewing over this more, here's what I'm thinking. What tripped me up is really Aquinas' view that a thing could exist that has form but no matter and NOT Aristotle's view that beings are composed of both matter and form (other than God).

The parts which receive the form are the matter, and the form is the arrangement of those parts towards some end. Angels have to have parts to be distinct from God, so they must have matter (if they exist). Otherwise, if they have no matter, then they have no parts; and if they have no parts then they are absolutely simple. But only one absolutely simple being can exist (God), so they can't be without parts.

It seems like Aquinas is incorrectly supposing that matter is some sort of material or physical substrate.

If I am correct here, then the substrate that bears the properties of a thing is its parts (matter) in conjuction with what is supposed to be (in form); and the ultimate substrate for this is Being itself (God).

I don't really disagree with what you said here; but then isn't the arrangement of parts the form and the matter is just the parts themselves?

Let's Angels for example, if an angel has parts and form but no matter and a chair has parts and form and matter; then that would suggest that matter is distinct from the arrangement of parts and the actuality of parts: it is a third thing. What is that thing?

@Leontiskos

I already asked Timothy this, but I am curious as to your thoughts as well:

Likewise, if God is pure actuality because He has no parts (and thusly no possibility of receiving any actualization) and actuality actualizes what is actual and matter is a substrate of potency, then how could God create matter? Wouldn’t the existence of matter, in this sense, necessitate that that which can receive actuality (i.e., matter) must be so different than what actualizes that it is coeternal with it?

What do you think?

All well and good, perhaps, unless or until we want to know what each thing is, how it is to be known as that thing and no other. In such case, the tracing back of its identity through time holds no interest for us.

Well, yes, but it is required for change to occur.

On the other hand, for that family of things of perfectly natural causality, the knowledge of which is contingent at best, as opposed to man-made assemblages of things in general for which knowledge is necessarily given, to trace the “mere causality of forms upon forms” inevitably leads to at least contradictions, and at most, impossibilities.

It seems like you are separate causality a prior from causality a posteriori; and I guess I don’t see the relevance. We use what is causally given to us to determine what actually is caused: they have a relation to each other—don’t they?

If matter is missing….what thing can there be? 

If I am understanding Aristotle correctly, form is actuality. It’s not like there’s being and this being is imposed with form: there’s some substrate of potential that is imposed with being (form). So this would mean that matter isn’t referring to being: it potential for being. This means that what would be, is some being that isn’t conjoined with a substrate of potential.

It’s confusing me, to be completely honest.

But you asked for a better Aristotle-ian hylomorphic understanding than your own, which I admittedly don’t have, voluntarily confined to the Enlightenment version of the matter/form juxtapositional attitude.

Not a worry at all: I always appreciate your input.

What does this mean, "it exposes it to having potentials that could be actualized"? How are you using "expose" here?

The arrangement of the parts which makes the whole that whole of this type is the form imposed upon parts (actuality imposed on actuality); and if this is true, then the parts and their arrangement are what dictate potential that a thing has—not some substrate of potential (viz., matter). There’s no extra entity called ‘matter’ going on here.

What would be the difference between having potential and being exposed to potential?

In the sense of what I think Aristotle means, I would say that ‘having potential’ is to have a substrate that can receive actuality in some way (viz., to have matter) whereas ‘being exposed to potential’ would be to have the possibility of being affected because of the parts and their arrangement that the thing has (viz., to have form composed of form). For me, composition entails potency; for Aristotle it seems like a substrate of potency entails potency.

If the apple doesn't have potential, but is exposed to potential, where would that potential exist other than within something else.

I agree that the potency of a thing is relative to that thing—not something external to it; but I don’t get what it would mean for their to be this extra ‘matter’ that is potency that is really conjoined with the actuality (‘form’) of a thing. To me, the parts expose the whole to the possibility of change; because parts can, in principle, be affected and in ways relative to how they are arrangement and what they are themselves. There’s no ‘matter’ and ‘form’ here: it’s just form composed of form.

A dead man is not really a man but a corpse, substantial change. So now the parts you have been relying upon are no longer parts of a whole. They aren't a "composite." The whole has ceased to be. But the body of dead Achilles is still the body of Achilles. There is a persistent identity here that matter explains.

My problem with Aristotle’s view seems to be that he posits some real nothingness (potency) which is conjoined with the actual thing; whereas I am thinking that the underlying actual parts in some arrangement (form) makeup the whole. So I would say that the man persists through time insofar as his parts still compose, by way of arrangement, that of a man; and a dead man is not in that arrangement that an alive man is in. I don’t see why we would need to posit a real potency in the sense of a substrate of potential as opposed to positing that ‘real potency’ is merely the ways something that is actual can be affected relative to what it is (i.e., it’s form as received by its parts).

But what receives form in generation without matter?

Like you said, an object is composed of other objects; so each part is composed of form composed of form. You would, at least insofar as you play Devil’s advocate, say that it’s also composed of matter upon matter. However, if form is what is actual and matter is what is potential; then form upon form is just actual beings upon actual beings: it is being composed. So, then, we can explain it this way: an actual object is composed of other actual objects in some arrangement. That arrangement is the actualizing principle of that whole (which composed of actual objects) which is it’s form. This form, or arrangement, is imposed (or received) by the actual parts of that object; and those actual parts, in turn, are made up of actual parts and their arrangement which makes of that whole is it’s form. So form is being imposed on form because being is imposed on being; until you get to God as the pure actuality that has no parts.

I guess one way of thinking about it would be that Aristotle would say there’s a substrate of potency conjoined with actuality; whereas I am thinking about it as an imposed arrangement (form) conjoined with actuality. I don’t see what this ‘magical substrate of potentiality’ is doing.

Likewise, potency is nothing: it is not actual, but what could be actual relative to the nature of a thing—relative to what its parts can receive. Therefore, real potency is a contradiction in terms: a substrate of potential is a nothingness that is real.

Likewise, if God is pure actuality because He has no parts (and thusly no possibility of receiving any actualization) and actuality actualizes what is actual and matter is a substrate of potency, then how could God create matter? Wouldn’t the existence of matter, in this sense, necessitate that that which can receive actuality (i.e., matter) must be so different than what actualizes that it is coeternal with it?

This goes along with the idea that you cannot change a rabbit into something like a frog

I agree that there is a persistence of identity through time and that change requires this; but I don’t see how this entails matter in the sense of real potency. The rabbit cannot become a frog because the arrangement of parts that produces a rabbit is contradictory to that of a frog; which, to me, is to say that the form of a rabbit and a frog are contradictory. Why tack onto this that the rabbit has a substrate of potential that is contradictory to the substrate of a frog?

You might be interested in what Aquinas says about angelic beings and intelligences.

Yes, this is what got me thinking about it more; because I started getting very confused with the idea that an angel is pure form but not pure actuality.

Form is supposed to be actuality that was imposed onto something; and that something is its parts; and Angel’s have parts—just not material parts—otherwise they would be purely actual. The very idea that an Angel can learn entails they have parts that can be affected. So what exactly does it mean for a being that has parts to be ‘purely formal’ in contrast to something that has parts but is ‘not purely formal’? I don’t get it.

For instance, every angel must be its own species because it lacks matter to individuate it.

This is a very interesting thought from Aquinas that I was recently introduced to. Don’t Angel’s have parts though? By ‘part’, I mean something which contributes to the whole without being identical to it. If an angel has no parts, then how is it not God (i.e., purely actual)? If it does, then there can be individuation between them just like material parts: two Angels could have the same Form imposed on different immaterial parts. What do you think?

There is both something that is common to the seed and the seedling (matter) and also something that is different (form)

But by ‘matter’ he is not referring having mass but, rather, a substrate of potential—right?

If so, then how does this seed’s actuality (form) conjoined with its potency (matter)? If it is potential, then it is nothing (non-actual); which would entail there is nothing conjoined with the form (the actuality). Otherwise, there is something that is real which is mere potential (matter) that is conjoined with what is actual (form); and this admits of a nothingness that is something—doesn’t it?

Where my head is at, I would say that seed and seedling are both different developments of the same plant insofar as the seed, as a whole composed of actuality (parts), is affected by something else (e.g, the water, soil, it’s own internal parts organically functioning, etc.). This view would entail that actuality affects actuality by realizing the potential an actuality has relative to the possible ways that actuality can be affected. For Aristotle, it seems like potency is this real nothingness that is conjoined with the actuality and I am not following how that would work.

Aristotle does not think it is right to say that there is only a change in form, with no underlying matter which accounts for the continuity between the seed and the seedling.

But isn’t it the actualizing principle that actualizes something already actual in a way that that actual thing (which was changed) could have been affected that accounts for change? Why posit some real potency which receives the form?

:roll:

:up:

@Banno

First becasue faith is not restricted to trust in authority, and second becasue any definition fo that sort will be inadequate, so should not be used.

I think the problem is that your approach doesn't even attempt to rise to the level of a conception from intuitions; and for me it has to in order to have a robust theory.

The mark of faith is that a belief is maintained under duress

Maintaining a belief (in general) under duress is wildly different than this:

The mark of faith is that when challenged, one's commitment is not to be subject to reevaluation, but to be defended.

Maintaining a belief that one believes they have good evidence to believe under duress is noble; but maintaining the belief because they have committed themselves to never subjected it to reevaluation is dogmatic and ignoble.

Your counter-examples are interesting though; for example, Job, prima facie, seems like he had good reasons to believe God had forsaken him and the moral of the story is to have unwavering faith. My response to this, is that:

1. Faith here is being used in terms of having trust in an authority, and more specifically a kind of unwavering faith that is despite the evidence: "unwavering" faith is a subtype of faith; and

2. Prima facie, Job, unless I am misremembering, should not have had faith, given the context in Job, that God had not forsaken him because his faith was against good counter-evidence (of distrusting the authority); and

3. Job, when taken literally, is an example of God being immoral because He discusses with and allows Satan to inflict evil on Job for a bet that has been placed between them. This is not like an allowance of evil in the sense of allowing the possibility of tornadoes given natural laws: this is a purposeful allowance of evil when it is completely unnecessary. This, under my view, when taken literally, is immoral of God and is impossible of God: God cannot will the bad of something and definitely cannot place a wager in that manner. God cannot nor would not use a bad means like Satan to prove a point about Job (let alone kill off his entire innocent family to prove a point); and

4. On a deeper note, I think we can know that God cannot forsake things and that evil is a privation. Consequently, these, if true, would be good evidence to support an unwavering faith of God even in terrible times (assuming that God didn't place a wager and allow Satan to do it in that kind of sense or something similar).

Faith, unlike ordinary belief or trust, is best understood through its persistence under conditions of strain, doubt, or suffering

True, but this doesn't imply having faith despite the evidence: it implies having good reasons to have the faith and not bending to will of others or to just any willy-nilly counter-fact that may place doubt in their minds. There some doubts I might have about the security of flying, but I wave them off not because I am dogmatically faithful to flying being secure but, rather, because I know my reasons against do not rationally outweigh the reasons for.

Is the word 'assent' in this post mean anything different than 'to agree or affirm'? I get the feeling it is doing more work here in your explanation than I am appreciating.

Yes, I think so.

Thank you for the recommendations! I will check those out.