They are not substances. If you recall Aristotle, and others, have written about things like substance, form, essence, etc., all within the template of space-time, and never outside of it. We cannot separate space-time from the universe, therefore we cannot separate space-time from existence. It is a zone -- a multi-dimensional zone in which things exist. To speak of space-time as thing in itself is nonsensical. A thing in itself is anything that has its own properties and dimension existing within space-time. Tangible objects are things. Humans are things. But a universe is not a thing.

It sounds like you are saying they don’t exist in reality at all, and then noting that we cannot think them away.

Then you're ascribing an identity to a thing in itself. There is no indirect or direct knowledge of anything about a thing in itself besides the fact that it is logically necessary that there be something for us base our conceptions off of. Anything more is using our conceptions.

So this just depends on whether one believes one can have knowledge of the things-in-themselves or not; and I think we are basically saying the same thing—but our schemas are different.

I would say we ascribe properties to the things-in-themselves conditionally [as conditioned by the human understanding]; whereas, you would say we ascribe properties to things and things-in-themselves are completely ineffable as a pure negative conception.

Either way, the OP is about whether or not space and time are properties of things or things-in-themselves (depending on which description you like best above) and what nature they would have.

Its real because it affects us despite our perceptions. That's the 'drop a rock game' :D

There is nothing about space and time in terms of literal extension and temporality that affects you despite your perceptions: an object affects you despite your perceptions of it—not space nor time.

We experience everything. If they mean the pure form of experience is something that does not represent reality, that's what empirical testing is for. They can claim space does not represent reality, but then we can test it and show that it is. If they're talking about something else, it sounds like its gobbledygook.

You do not experience space and time: they are the forms of your experience.

If by empirically test them you are referring to scientific tests of how space and time behave (e.g., special/general relativity), then none of it requires space and time to exist (e.g., time dilation is just one’s representative faculties representing temporal sequences differently depending on speed of light and gravitational displacement, etc.). There’s always to metaphysical ways of interpreting that stuff, at its core: there’s actual time and space that affect oneself (and one’s representative faculties are representing that) or one’s representative faculties represent things in space and time differently depending on what it is interpreting as there in reality).

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer. — Bob Ross

That's fine then, yes. But as I've noted, make sure you make explicit the other outcomes as well. For example, if the person works on cancer and saves billions of lives, but is more productive working on model planes and saves no lives, this is not all else being equal.

Good. My only point is that that is incredibly counter-intuitive to predominant ethics: pretty much everyone who studies ethics will agree that trying to find a cure for cancer has more moral worth than working on model airplanes even if one is more productive at the latter than the former.

If this is a bullet you are willing to bite, then so be it: I am just explicating the bullets you are biting.

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view? — Bob Ross

Not necessarily. Its because we're tearing a piece of paper into two, not creating two equal sizes of paper.

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it.

I have not made this explicit enough. Working out the math from an atomic level all the way up to humanity is outside of my purview. I do not have the time, interest, or mathematical skill to calculate things to precision

My point was not that you need to calculate every minute detail: it was that, in principle, it is impossible for you to; and, thusly, your theory is useless if you insist on demanding these calculations to determine what is right or wrong.

There’s two ways to raise this objection to your theory. The first, which relates to the quote above, is: if the unit of measure is something incredibly small, then one cannot calculate what is right or wrong in practical life—and to provide ‘general patterns’ requires you, by your own criteria, to make these incredibly large calculations with these incredibly small units.

The second is: if the unit of measure is ‘material existence’ (which is whatever fundamental entities exist) and one cannot have knowledge of ‘material existences’ (which by your own concession in your conversation is true) and one needs to use those units to calculate what is right/wrong, then it is impossible for them to calculate what is right/wrong—full stop. This simply follows from your own concessions.

With respect to your elaboration, which included more examples, my point here is that if the two formulations of my objection are correct (as explicated above), then it is not clear at all how you are calculating these general patterns.

I would like to stop there so that I can get you to address these points first, as the rest depends on your answers.

Bob

How would you know if something is an entity without knowing what it is?

It is an entity iff it exists.

That is not propositional logic. It is an EL (Epistemic Logic) operator which means, Agent "knows". It could have been "K" for knows in general, but the box implies knowing via observation.

Oh I see. I was interpreting it under modal logic, not propositional logic.

Nothing about what you said demonstrated my argument was circular. How was I begging the question?

Sure. Then use the predicate logic formulation I made.

If noncontradiction is not an objective stance, then there is no logic.

What is under contention in my quote was not the existence of logic, or its objectivity; but, rather, whether or not it is factual (objectively true) that “one should abide by logic”. This was the key assumption in their argument.

Your distinction between normative and metaethical confused me.

Normativity and morality are fundamentally about what one ought to do; metaethics about the nature of normativity and morality (e.g., what is the nature of ‘oughtness’, ‘goodness’, etc.; are moral judgments cognitive?; are moral judgments expressing something objective?).

That “one ought to abide by logic” is a normative judgment, which may or may not be expressing something objective even if it turns out to be true.

By objectivity, I mean that which exists mind-independently. Something is not objective simply because subjects unanimously agree upon it.

A moral realist theory would by one which posits that there are states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality that exist mind-independently which inform us of what is morally good or bad.

That is true, it should be C -> T.

'Nothing', as a concept, nevertheless must be definable if it is to be utilized in discussion. It cannot simply be equivalent to no "specific value".

Personally, I think 'nothing' is pure negation of all possible existence.

Is sounds like you are saying that you do not believe space and time are substances nor that they are objective relations or properties of objects, is that correct?

I understood your points and don't really disagree with them; but I am unsure as to whether you believe space and time are substances or not. What do you think?

My point is I don't think you need to introduce space as a 'thing in itself'

Space as thing in itself is a necessarily postulation for this OP, because it is explorer which position is best to take on that subject: should space to be considered purely our form of experience, a substance, or objective relations?

If it is a substance or an objective relation, then it is, in this sense, a thing in itself.

Anytime we try to define a 'thing in itself" beyond the barest logical necessity of its existence, we have to remember that we can't.

I think that our experience is an indirect window into reality and, as such, is indirect knowledge of the things in themselves; so we can say things about them beyond assigning them a giant question mark.

What is it for something to be purely relational? We have to relate something. And that thing has to exist somewhere in some form.

The objects, as they are in themselves, would exist without any literal motion, extension, or temporality; but, each object would be related to the other in such a way that they have temporal ordering, and spatial properties.

Back to the video game analogy, imagine a game with no code to render anything onto a monitor: instead, it just gives the player a prompt. Imagine this game is about a character that lives in a 3D world, so the character has spatial properties (like width, height, etc.) and spatial relations to other objects (e.g., 3 feet from the door, etc.). Even though there are spatial properties and relations, there is no literal extension because there is no monitor to represent it with extension: it just has a prompt.

Ah, that's your target. I don't think you need "a thing in itself" to prove this. All you have to note is that objects represent things in themselves, and that space is a property of objects

If space is only a property of objects, then space is not a substance and is not real; but, rather, the pure form of one’s experience.

I mean, all you have to do to a nihilist is ask them to volunteer to have a rock dropped on them from above if they don't think its real. :D
…

That's just silly then. A good ol' rousing game of "Drop the rock" will cure that.

Not at all. Neither nihilists nor transcendentalists deny that we experience objects in space and time. That’s not what is under contention here.

We can't know because we cannot identify or know a thing in itself beyond it correlation or violations of our perceptions and judgements.

We can nevertheless use our experience to ground sufficient justification for believing that space is a substance or not. Just because our knowledge is not 100% certain nor that it is contingent on our representative faculty, does not entail it is not knowledge.

We can't ascribe properties to things in themselves. We can represent thing as having properties, and that may, or may not match a thing in itself

If we consistently and collectively experience an object with a property and we have no good reasons to doubt that object has the said property, then we are justified in believing the object in-itself has that property.

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

No worries: I can relate to having an idea and finding that it is harder to convey to the audience (or a specific audience or individual) than (originally) expected.

Also, I apologize for my belated response: I have been busy and am trying to catch up on my responses.

Our dispute right now is just about the nature of hypotheticals, and I think we can find common ground here. A hypothetical is meant to posit a scenario, of which may or may not be actually possible, in which certain variables are specified and everything else is considered equal. This enables one to get a clearly understanding of what a position or claim actually entails without derailment.

For example, let’s say I claim that “anyone who commits a crime should be executed by fire squad”. You could validly ask “what if the person was convicted of petty theft, like stealing an apple?”. This is a hypothetical whereof all other variables are considered equal, so it is not valid for me to answer with (something like) “it would be if the person later uses that apple to choke someone to death”. This was not what the hypothetical was asking about, because all else is equal. If I really think (which I don’t, by the way) that “anyone who commits a crime should be executed by fire squad”, then a person who commits the crime of petty theft should be executed by fire squad: plain and simple. It is beneficial to contemplate these sort of hypotheticals because quite often people assert a principle, position, etc. and do not think through all the consequences of it (if they were to be consistent). This happens to all of us: we simply miss certain implications of what we say, and the more hypotheticals we contemplate the more refined and solid our position is.

This is what I am doing with your view: I am positing hypotheticals and seeing if the conclusions are what you actually intend them to be.

What does "more productive" mean? Give me an example please. Demonstrate the variables that are equal, then the variable that demonstrates more existence than the other.

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer.

It definitely wasn't intended to. I'm just trying to figure out what you're thinking about with this comparison. Are you including the purpose of a piece of paper?

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view? I think it plainly follows from your position; but perhaps I am misunderstanding.

You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise.

I honestly can’t think of a simpler example than whether or not two pieces of paper is better than one, all else being equal. It cannot get simpler than that.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

This just entails that it is impossible to actually calculate what is better or worse in any practical sense; but I digress.

So, lets just address the cutting of the paper issue, which is essentially molecular separation, and for now, keep it in the molecular factor. This is good question, because I haven't done this before.

It is not molecular separation: it is one piece of paper vs. two. If you insist in that we must analyze it in terms of molecules, then I will insist that we must analyze it in the smallest possible ‘particle’, which is a ‘fundamental entity’ (i.e., material existence), and then we cannot calculate it at all because (1) we have no such knowledge of any and (2), even if we did, it is not at all apparent how one calculates an atom-to-atom like comparison (let alone reach the conclusions you have made, such as life holding precedent to non-life).

Again, lets return to something simple. Lets start with molecules of paper. We have a situation in which right now 1 molecule alone, 2 molecules are together, and 3 are together. When they are together, there is a different type of expressed existence than merely "touching". We'll call it a bond. Let's calculate the total existence as it is now.

6 molecules + 1 bond in the two molecule and (assuming linear bonds for simplicity) 2 bonds on the 3 joined molecule. So 9 expressions total.

Nope. You have to do it with atoms, then. Actually, quarks. Actually, ? (because we have no such knowledge of fundamental entities).

If you insist that this must be analyzed in terms of molecules, then why not atoms? If not atoms, why not just the count of pieces of paper? This is arbitrary and impractical.

Same with the expressions: why expressions between molecules? Why not atoms? Why not <?>? Why not just pieces of paper? Arbitrary.

If two fundamentals express in such a way as to create a new identity between the two; two atoms become a molecule for example, that is a new expressed existence that will respond differently than the expressed existence of the two atoms in their singular state.

Everything that we know of is expressed existence then, correct?

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.

This is impossible for us to know.

2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.

This is all of known reality, and always will be.

3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

How are you anchoring this part of the calculation though? Is it the very next snapshot, the foreseeable farthest snapshot, the total net, etc.?

Bob

How's it circular? Demonstrate where I am begging the question.

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) There is no change when there is no time (From P1) (HP)
P3) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing (HP)
P4) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P2 and P4)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P3 and C1)

I see. Here’s my understanding of it in syllogisms (and let me know if I am misunderstanding):

P1: If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2: ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3: Change requires temporality.
P4: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5: ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something).

Firstly, I underlined ‘entity’ in P1 to denote that this sort of entity is not something but must be analyzed as if it were: it is the incoherent positing of something which is itself nothing—and there is no way, in language, to say it otherwise. Analyzing ‘nothing’ is a tricky endeavor.

Secondly, this whole argument rests on time (i.e., temporality) being identical to motion—which I have my doubts. I don’t see anything incoherent with positing that literally movement/motion is only a biproduct of how we represent the world and not something that is happening in the world as it is in-itself.

Thirdly, the crux of the argument is that in order for nothing to become something, nothing must change. I am fine with this, as long as you define nothing like P2.

Fourthly, and most importantly, none of this proves that it is logically impossible for nothing to become something.

Secondly, I think you are thinking that nothing being unrestrained by time entails it cannot spontaneously be involved with temporal sequences, which doesn’t necessarily follow. I don’t see why one would believe that. — Bob Ross
I cannot follow you here. Do you mind elaborating?

This is what I just spoke of with respect to time being identical to motion (in the sense of actual movement). I personally would go for a metaphysic of time where the temporal ordering of things is real (i.e., exists in reality mind-independently) but that the motion we experience is just a biproduct of the modes by which we intuit and cognize objects. In other words, I literally envision reality in-itself as a motionless web of relations, of which one of those relations is temporal ordering, and our brains-in-themselves are interpreting them, from the standpoint motionlessness, into motion. As odd as that may seem prima facie, I think there’s sufficient philosophical and scientific reasons to believe this. My point is just to give you a counter position to digest and chew on.

(1) Time is needed for any change and (2) Time is a substance.

I reject 2.

2) According to general relativity, time is a component of spacetime. Spacetime is a substance though. By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties. Spacetime's property is its curvature. Two phenomena confirm that spacetime is a substance or in other words confirm general relativity, namely gravitational wave and gravitational lens.

I think general relativitiy works fine without that metaphysical assumption. One can posit that temporal relations are real but that they exist as a giant block (a time block) (or even a space/time block) and, as such, the literal motion you experience is no where to be found—but the relations governing that motion are real.

If one goes the #2 route, then either (1) everything is in motion and extension or (2) space and time, as substances, exist in a void. #1 is less parsimonious than positing what I said above, and #2 is absurd.

How would a difference in size be established between two infinite sets when there is no counting involved?

Same way we determine a set is infinite without counting it: stipulations.

We cannot determine that a set, S, is infinite by counting the elements (as we would never be able to stop, and this doesn’t discern a set that is indefinite from one that is infinite). Instead, we could determine S is infinite either by stipulation—e.g., if we are considering the set of all natural numbers, then we thereby know that this set is infinite because there is an infinite amount of them.

Likewise, we cannot determine that S1 is larger than S2 by counting the elements; instead, we come to know it by understanding the stipulations of the sets themselves. If S1 is a set with size 2 elements ad infinitum and S2 is a set with size 1 of elements ad infinitum, then S1 > S2 (and I don’t need to count them).

Time is not ontological entity. Time is epistemic entity.

That doesn’t make any sense, unless you are just conveying that time is just the form of experience. — Bob Ross
It says what it means. It is a simple and clear statement which reflects the nature of time. I am not sure if it needs explanation.

There cannot be such a thing as a ‘epistemic entity’ because it is, when taken literally, a contradiction in terms: an entity implies something within the ontology of reality, and epistemology pertains solely to knowledge (and specifically not ontology).

□∀M -> □∃T
∃M1t1∃M2t2 →□Ag,T,M

I don’t know what this is supposed to be conveying. — Bob Ross
M = Motion
t = time
Ag = agent

Ok, so ‘□∀M -> □∃T’ is ‘it is necessary that every motion is ??? and that entails that it is necessary that there exists a time”. That doesn’t make any sense to me.

‘∃M1t1∃M2t2 →□Ag,T,M’ means ‘there exists a motion and time such that there exists another motion and time’ and that entails ‘it is necessary that there is an agento, time, and motion’. Again, I don’t know what this is trying to convey.

But ~∃x (x) is not well-formed - it doesn't say anything.

Is says “there does not exist any proposition x, such that is it true”; and this was not my original intention, admittedly, but it is nevertheless well-formed—unless you were referring to how it isn’t a successful parsing of nothingness into logic.

And ~∃x (Exists<x>)?

Predicate logic. “There does not exist any entity such that it has the property of ‘existing’”.

The thing about parsing is that one has to be specific about what one means, and that is absent in the OP.

Fair enough, and agreed.

:kiss:

Which part is odd? And why?

The size of an infinity is determined by the size of its elements, not the size of the collection (viz., it is not determined by how many elements the collection has but, rather, how many elements, including recursion, the elements have).

As a basic example, it is clear that a set of {1,2,3,...} is smaller than {{1,1},{1,2},{1,3},...}. Likewise, the largest infinity is the one with infinities as its elements all the way down recursively, which I cannot shorthand accurately, due to its nature, than {{*},{*},{*},...} where * represents an infinitely recursive set of collections.

So would you say matter is a substance, and motion, space and time are relations between material substances?

I would say that matter is the substance and motion, space, and time are relations of and between entities that are made up of that matter.

Time is not ontological entity. Time is epistemic entity.

That doesn’t make any sense, unless you are just conveying that time is just the form of experience.

□∀M -> □∃T
∃M1t1∃M2t2 →□Ag,T,M

I don’t know what this is supposed to be conveying.

That's what logical equivalence is

No. It is material equivalence.

The quantification to which I gestured is "U" and "∃". So "Nothing is red" parses as ~∃(x) (x is red), or as U~(x)(x is red), but "U" and "∃" cannot be used to parse

By my lights, one could parse nothingness as ~∃x (x) or ~∃x (Exists<x>).

I think it helps to define what space and time are.

Agreed—the entirety of which depends on one’s view on the nature of space and time, which is largely what is being put under contention in this OP.

. Space is the property we attribute to a things 'swell of existence'. Space is often seen as relational, though if there was one existent thing, its swell would be space.
…
Time is a measurement of a things state change

‘Swelling’ certainly, as a word, refers to something spatiotemporal, but not what space nor time actually are. In order to understand space better, I have split, conceptually, the concept into two: purely relational vs. actual space (i.e., a pure relation or a substance).

If space is purely relational, then the actual extension which is the form of your experience does not have a correlate in reality—it is just that: the form of your experience. However, that does not mean that space does not exist, as if it is purely relational then the spatial relations of an object are real properties of that object and are not, like nihilists or transcendentalists on space think, purely modes by which we intuit and cognize objects.

If space is actual (i.e., a substance), then, effectively, the extension (i.e., the depth)(e.g., the swelling of something) actually exists in reality just as much as what you phenomenally experience.

By analogy, imagine a video game: one can perfectly coherently code a game that deploys spatiotemporal relations between objects within the game while having no code to render actual extension and temporality onto a computer screen (e.g., imagine an old game that just has a prompt for a frontend interactive user interface).

A person who claims space and time are purely relational are claiming that the spatiotemporal relations between objects are real (just like the code in a video game gives reality to spatiotemporal relations in that game) but the actual extension and temporality are not (just like how the game could very well have no means of rendering any extension or temporal sequences for the player to see).

A person who claims that space and time are substances are claiming that the extension and temporality are real (e.g., the extension on the screen isn’t the only actual extension: it is a representation of the real extension out there in the real world).

My only quibble is breaking this down into two separate considerations of substances in reality vs things in themselves

There has to be an epistemic split, because our conscious experience is a representation. This opens the door to such conversations as this: is space and time purely relational or actual?

To my notion, a thing in itself is nothing that can really be understood except as a logical notation.

I am unable to parse this: could you elaborate? What do you mean by “logical notation”?

The logical necessity is basically that some 'thing' needs to be there for us to observe.

No. Logical necessity is when it is logically impossible to posit any contrary (i.e., one cannot posit any contrary without violating a law of logic): it has nothing to do with what needs to be there for us to observe.

I just think the separation of substance and things in themselves is unnecessary. You can simplify by stating that space and time are properties of things, and all of your points still work. A real 'thing' is always assumed to have a thing in itself behind it that we cannot identify, and thus is largely irrelevant unless we're in very specific discussion about knowledge.

Saying space and time are properties of things doesn’t entail itself what I argued in the OP: I am arguing that, beyond that, space and time are pure relations and not substances of things; because actual space and time are nothing more than the forms our experience and are not real, but that the spatiotemporal relations of which we represent are real. This distinction I am making doesn’t exist if you remove the consideration of phenomenality vs. nouminality.

Bob

You seem to be giving a sparknote of the landscape, but I am more interested in what your take is on space and time. What do you think?

The raw phenomenal experience is of a spatiotemporal world with things relating to things. Whether this phenomenon is informed directly by things in themselves or constructed in the mind, it remains the same, singular experience.

What I am trying to convey is that spatiotemporal relations exist in reality and our minds construct actual extension and temporality to represent those relations.

And I agree, space taken alone is not a substance. Time taken alone is not a substance.

I would simply add: or taken together or some other mixture of things. The actual extension—i.e., the depth—and temporal movements of things—i.e., the changes—are not real: they are the forms of our experience; but, the spatiotemporal relations between objects is.

The view I'm currently thinking about is that time, space, matter and motion are one substance (not each individual substances, but one substance). It's easy to see "matter" as the substance and then predicate it with space, time and motion. But really, time, space, matter and motion are different estimations of the experience of one substance (call it, physical reality). I can't assert one without all of the others. Experience is matter/space/time, which are motion.

Interesting, it seems like you are appealing to an unknown substance that is the combination of space, time, matter, and motion. I would say this still falls prey to my objections in the OP pertaining to positing space and time as substances (even though you are not considering them separate substances of their own). You are still, to some degree, positing extension (i.e., depth) and temporality (i.e., motion) as real: as actual.

if I say matter , whether I like it or not, I've said time, space and motion also, because these are really one substance.

I think you could perfectly coherently claim spatiotemporal relations exist between the things in-themselves and that the actual extension and temporal sequences do not exist. Positing that space and time exist as a relation is not the same as a substance (as far as I can tell). Therefore, you have not posited actual motion, space, or time when positing matter.

But Bob, you stated that the one was done more productively than the later, so its not equal. My point is the example is too vague. What do you mean by "all else being equal" when you then also say one is more productive than the other?

When someone posits a hypothetical with “all else being equal”, they do not mean that the variables at play are equal: they mean that there is a specified set of variables, or conditions, within the hypothetical and everything else that could be said of the hypothetical comparison should be considered equal.

That the one is more productive than the other is a variable within the hypothetical comparison, and it is exactly what is needed to demonstrate my point. Me saying ‘everything else being equal’ just means that anything I didn’t bring up about the two (being compared) should be considered equal: so one cannot bring up other, new variables I did not mention (which could impact the hypothetical).

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

If I needed confetti, it would be better to tear the paper into chunks. If I needed to print a document, it would be better for me to keep it whole. If I destroy all of my paper for confetti, I will be unable to print a document when I need it. And if there's not cause for the confetti, it most certainly would have been a waste.

It completely missed the point, and sidestepped the issue. You are importing a new variable, namely shifting the focus on the utility of cutting vs. not cutting the paper and, thusly, claiming that cutting the paper itself has no moral weight. However, under your view, which clearly claims in the OP, as well as in your responses (since then), that “more existence is better”: that entails that, all else being equal, cutting a piece of paper in half is better than leaving as one piece.

Likewise, if you are claiming that “more existence is better”, then it plainly follows that two pieces of paper is better than one all else being equal. — Bob Ross

Again, what does this mean Bob? I need clearer examples of what you're noting is equal here.

P1: More existence is better than less.
P2: Cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, creates more existence than leaving it in one piece.
C: TF, cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, is better than leaving it in one piece.

I don’t know how I could make it clearer than that (to be completely honest). It is not a valid response to introduce a new variable to P2 because I am stipulated all other (implicit) variables are equal.

No, they are not infinite. In each case we have a finite amount of matter that makes up that tree as well as time. Ash nor the tree will exist forever.

I can get on board with that, but I am just noting that this is the case if you are talking about ‘identifiable existences’ when you speak of expressive existences—it becomes nominal.

I see, though, how, in terms of concrete existences (as opposed to identifiable existences), something that is alive will have more relations between its parts.

Either I have not been thorough enough on the patterns of the building blocks leading up to this point, or you misunderstood or forgot the conclusion already established.

It is probably just me, but I think your view as evolved since your OP and some of your terms have not been clarified adequately. Here’s some questions that can help me understand better:

1. Is ‘material existence’ denoting fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality? Or perhaps something else?
2. Is ‘expressive existence’ denoting the relations between fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality?
3. Is more generic, fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities better when you say “more existence is better”?

Bob

Hmm. T is equivalent to C?

No, C is biconditionally implicated to T; not equivalent.

There isn't a way to quantify over "nothing", without treating of an individual. So "nothing is red" can be quantified, it might be parsed as

This is fair that one needs to explicate what they mean by nothing. I happen to believe nothing is just the systematic negation of things: it is a potential infinite of negations; and, to be charitable to the OP, I am interpreting their use of 'nothing' as an actual infinite of negativity.

So they can absolutely quantify over an entity of 'nothing' without admitting that that entity exists; as weird and uncomfortable as that is: we are constrained within our language to speak of nothingness in this way.

Likewise, I agree that a relation of 'nothing to something' is wholly unknown to us, but I wouldn't go so far as to claim positively that it cannot exist because nothing cannot be treated in a manner required in order to posit the relationship (which is what you seem to be saying).

Anyways, probably the biggest problem with the OP is that it doesn't prove it is logically impossible; even if the premises are granted.

Your pseudo-syllogism doesn’t produce a logical contradiction and, thusly, doesn’t prove the logical impossibility of nothing becoming something. Your argument, in its form (as best as I could infer), is:

P1: T ↔ C
P2: E → C
P3: N → !T → !C
C: E → (C & C!)

The conclusion doesn’t following from the premises.

Secondly, I think you are thinking that nothing being unrestrained by time entails it cannot spontaneously be involved with temporal sequences, which doesn’t necessarily follow. I don’t see why one would believe that.

Thirdly, P1 seems false to me or, at least, requiring further elaboration: I don’t think there needs to be an actual ‘change’ in the sense of a sequential, temporal movement of one thing to another thing even if the temporal relations are real. Time, in the sense of actual movement (of ‘change’ in terms of what you seem to be talking about) is simply a form of one’s experience: it is a mode by which your representative faculty intuits and cognizes objects—it does not exist beyond that.

With respect to your responses to my hypotheticals, all I can say (without reiterating myself) is that you have misunderstood the nature of them and, most importantly, their purpose. The reason one posits a hypothetical in which there are certain stipulations and all else is equal is to test the consistency and claims of the theory (or beliefs that a person has). It is not valid to sidestep the hypothetical by mentioning it is impractical, improbable, or to introduce new variables—and, I would argue, this is all you did in your entire response.

I think, so far, it stands that:

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

Your response completely ignored ‘all else being equal’, and also mentioned or alluded to the probability and practicality of the hypothetical: all of which is irrelevant.

In terms of the paper example, I don’t see how this doesn’t increase expressions of ‘existence’. Remember, you even agreed that material ‘existence’ is irrelevant: we don’t know what fundamentally exists. Likewise, if you are claiming that “more existence is better”, then it plainly follows that two pieces of paper is better than one all else being equal. I don’t see anyway around this under your view.

With respect to the ash and tree hypothetical, I was talking about whether or not, all else being equal, a burned down tree is better or worse than a healthy, growing tree under your view; and what justification you have for it. So let me address the part where you addressed this:

If it is in isolation from any other consideration, that a tree merely burned to the ground vs it would be alive, the expressed existences aren't even close. A guideline as I've mentioned is that life, per molecule, is a much more condensed set of existence over time than non-life. So alone, it is not the case that the dead and burnt tree has the same overall existence of its continued life and possible reproduction.

Again, material existence doesn’t matter; and expressions of existence are just identifiable entities and their relations. So I don’t see how there are more relations and identifiable entities in a healthy tree when compared to the ashes of a burned down tree. I am not saying you are wrong, I just don’t see it:

If you don't know why, think of all the chemical interactions in even just one cell of the tree. Think of its continued interactions with the soil and air that it breaths. Much more is going on per atom per second than ash on the ground and carbon in the air.

But in net total they have similar amounts of identifiable entities and relations thereof. What I am trying to express to you, in an nutshell, is that there are an infinite amount of identifiable entities and relations thereof; so they are effectively equal.

If, on the contrary, you are prioritizing the evaluation of or just evaluating relations produced from movement, then I see your point.

My apologies if I'm a little slow in responding, my other 'first cause' thread has been very busy lately so more of my time has been spent answering multiple queries.

Absolutely no worries!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Firstly, I want to disclaim that you are NOT aggravating me nor am I frustrated with you; and I apologize if my responses are giving you that impression. I have nothing but respect and admiration for anyone who is willing to genuinely discuss difficult topics with sincerity, an open-mind, and a respectful attitude. Even if we end up completely disagreeing on everything, I respect your endeavor to think more about these topics (:

With that being said, your responses are just typically very long, and seem divergent (in terms of the topics being brought up) and I personally have difficulty keeping track. Perhaps it is just an issue on my end, who knows!

In terms of your ethical theory, I would suggest that, if you want people to contend with it properly, you open a discussion board for that. I am more than happy to respond to whatever about your theory has relevance to my theory, but beyond that it just becomes pure derailment. If you create a thread for your theory, I will be more than happy to talk about it in full detail there.

In terms of your theory of truth, what is ‘truth’ to you? Is it ‘the whole of reality’? Is it ‘what is’? Is it ‘the correspondence of thought with reality’? Etc.

You say “truth to me is all that is objective”: I think everything that exists mind-independently is objective.

Likewise, it seems like you are associated immutability with truth, and I am not sure what you are exactly implying there: are you saying that, to you, truth is an existent object out there that is unchanging? Or just that truth is absolute?

By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’? — Bob Ross
Well, no. It does not change. So, to me you can also say, TF it is a law of the universe. It is truth or part of truth. And there are many such laws

If “Truth to me is all that is objective, “ and “Objective is the nature of truth, unchanging, eternal, conceptual.” then it incoherent for you to claim that objectivity has the property of immutability—unless you are just mentioning that it doesn’t just have that property with this response (quoted above).
What exactly does it mean, under your view, for something to be ‘objective’, then? You are clarified that truth is all that is objective to you, but not really what objectivity is to you.
Furthermore, a law is a definite behavior of nature; not something that simply does not change. E.g., an immutable cup is not a law.

Everything in reality, all iota of matter and even dreams, all of it, yes, everything, partakes of fear.

I do not know what this would mean other than that there is a universal mind or set of minds that are the fundamental building blocks of reality that are driven primarily by fear; and I don’t see any good evidence that this would be true.

Perfection is singular.

What does that mean? Perfection is a state of something where it ideal.

Again, truth does not apply to states.

That doesn’t make any sense. This would entail that it cannot be true or false that “I ran yesterday”.

Are you just noting that truth is absolute?

The physical reality we think we know, is not known. It is delusion. It is just emotion, just consciousness. The model I am getting to is a theoretical 'proof' for this truth

My friend, you are an idealist then. You are saying that reality is fundamental mind and not matter.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality

That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is. — Bob Ross
I agree. That is only because I am not saying it quite right. But, unlike logicians I am more comfortable with that. So, I need your help actually.

I want to learn how to say it right, if that is possible.

Unfortunately, I am still not following what you mean. It seems perfectly contradictory so far (with regard to the above quote). What are you trying to convey by it being everything and only one-third of everything?

I would also say that to think without existing is entirely incoherent. Why would you try to defend that? Yes, something exists because it can think. Any I that thinks, must exist.

It does not follow that if there are thoughts, then there is a soul, a unified mind that exists in reality.

I mean, I think I get you. I am not at all sure you get me. I would like to discuss the whole topic of objective morality.

Admittedly, I do not understand your position yet.

I tried to trim this down after the fact. It was like 3-4 times larger before. Hopefully its still succinct and coherent.

I appreciate it! (:

Bob

:wink:

In terms of “hiding” behind moral realism, it cannot be hiding if the OP is an exposition of a moral realist theory. If you have disputes with moral realism, or the underlying framework within metaethics, then we can discuss that.

He seem to use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘truth’ very differently than me and the contemporary literature, which is fine; but I need more clarity from you on what you mean by them. I have already explained what I mean by them.

Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.

By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’?

Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.

The purpose of this thread is to discuss the view outlined in the OP, not your ethical theory insofar as it doesn’t relate thereto. My position is a form of moral realism, and a part that is the affirmation of moral cognitivism. Are you a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist?

I consider myself both an idealist and a realist

By ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, I was referring to metaphysical, specifically ontological, outlooks—not whether or not you like following ideals. Idealism, traditionally, is the position that reality is fundamentally made up of minds, and realism is the view that it is fundamentally made up of mind-independent parts.

I was thinking perhaps you are an idealist, and that would explain why you seem to think that nothing in reality is mind-independent.

If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.

It cannot be defined by two different cultures in the sense that they are both correct about what flourishing is while simultaneously having contradictory accounts. There is only one way there is to be flourishing.

Moral objectivity is truth to me

So this would entail that what is true is equivocal to what is moral, which seems very implausible. If it is true that Gary raped that woman, then is it thereby moral? Of course not. If it is true that 1+1=2, then is it moral? Of course not.

Truth is correspondence of reality, or perhaps the whole, or what is, but certainly not equivalent to what is moral.

Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure

You are importing your own views and then simply demonstrating mine are incompatible with them; instead of analyzing my position on its own merits. This ‘perfectness’ being ‘goodness’ doesn’t exist in my theory: should it? I don’t think so.

1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.

I don’t know why morality is ‘represented by a perfect intent’, or what that means.

2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.

Again, this just equivocates truth with morality.

3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.

Why would this be a part of the thesis?

There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.

Hence why I thought you may be an idealist. Anyways, you are confusing ontology with epistemology: our knowledge of the world is always mind dependent, but that does not entail that what fundamentally exists is mind-dependent.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.

Ok, so you are an idealist.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality

That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is.

I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.

I mean that it seems as though, and we have good reasons to believe that, our minds are emergent from mind-independent parts and that the universe is fundamentally mind-independent.

The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:

I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.

This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.

It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.

I never was, nor will I be, arguing for the cogito argument. I don’t see the relevance of this to my moral realist position. I do not hold cogito ergo sum: I don’t buy the descartes argument for it. ‘I’ do not exist simply because something thinks.

For the sake of brevity, I am going to stop there for now; and see if that helps.

Bob

I think that my contentions with your view can be split into two categories: internal and external.

My external critiques originate from the fact that I simply hold a different ethical theory and I think most people do as well, of which the conclusions I fear that exist in your theory are incompatible: of course, this is not an internal issue with your theory. As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

As far as internal critiques go, it is straightforward enough that if it is objectively good to create more entities, then one should derive general rules for how to make that happen. However, beyond that, I am having a hard time understanding precisely what is meant. For example, you say the goal is to ‘maximize existence’: the term ‘existence’ here seems very ambiguous. Is it ‘identifiable entities’? Is it just the contextual building blocks? All else being equal, 26 lego blocks in a pile is equal to the amount of lego blocks when they are used to make a lego house (out of them), but the latter has more identifiable parts because there’s more to identify (e.g., the pile is just a pile of blocks, but the house is made of blocks, has walls, perhaps a window, is a house, has a roof, etc.). If you just mean that the best world is one with the most of a building block, then, all else being equal, the pile of lego blocks and the house made out of them are morally equivalent (and, not to mention, how many kinds of building blocks are there?): it is not more virtuous or morally correct for a person to advocate for their to be a lego house instead of just a pile of lego blocks. If you mean, instead, identifiable entities, then the house is better; but, now it is ambiguous what you mean by ‘identifiable’: this concept could easily explode into triviality. I can parcel up the lego blocks, the pile, and the house in an infinite amount of ways. Let’s say you make it contextual: to what? Let’s say your theory let’s people decide: then it is entirely possible that I could think the pile is better than the house and you vice-versa and we are both right.

Another way of thinking about this problem, is that of a simplified example. Take a piece of paper: now, all else being equal, me tearing it in half creates more identifiable entities in reality (because there are now two pieces of paper instead of one); and, thusly, under your view, is seems as though I am obligated to do this, all else being equal, because the goal is to maximize identifiable entities. As external critiques go, I would say that, even if this is true in your view, it seems utterly implausible that tearing the paper in half has any moral worth itself (all else being equal): it doesn’t seem like an action that has any intrinsic moral weight at all. In terms of internal critiques, all else being equal, people would be obligated to tear pieces of paper into as many pieces as possible unless there are good reasons to believe that doing so will overall decrease identifiable entities—but it seems clear (at least to me) that there are no good reasons to believe it will decrease it and, on the contrary, it seems obvious it will only benefit (in the vast majority of cases) increasing the sheer quantity of identifiable entities in reality.

I just need, first and foremost, some clarity on what kind of entities in reality you are trying to maximize, or what an ‘entity’ is under your view.

In terms of the destruction vs. construction, let’s take an example. Imagine a tree in perfect health vs. a tree burnt to the ground: what makes the former have more identifiable entities, all else being equal, than the latter? The molecules and atoms are probably about the same, and identifiable relations (i.e., ‘expressions’) between the parts is roughly equal. So what so you?

Material existence is fundamental existence. So for example, lets say that it was possible that an 'atom' could be erased from existence and never reformed again. This would be evil, as all further expressions and potential would be eliminated permanently. Fortunately for us, we have not yet discovered the fundamental building blocks of the universe, nor are we able to destroy said blocks. Even then, if some destruction of fundamental existence were needed prolong the rest of fundamental existence, it would be a necessary sacrifice.

So then you agree with me that material existence is doing no work in your theory (for determining what is good) and thusly can be thrown out?

You seem to be able to run your calculations and envision a best possible world without knowing in the slightest what a fundamental entity would even be (other than it being fundamental).

In terms of expressions, what exactly counts? I can identify an infinite amount of relations between entities. Just as an simplified example, imagine there are a spin top on a table. In scenario 1, it is spinning (on the table). In scenario 2, it is standing still (on the table). #1 and #2 have equal quantities of relations between the spin top and its environment (granted that each scenario is done with the same spin top, on the same table, and in the same room): the only difference is that each has one relation the other doesn’t have—making it an equal swap. i.e., the spinning spin top has a relation of spinning, of movement in a spiral rotation, in accordance to various laws; and the idle spin top has a relation of standing still in accordance with the same laws. It seems as though in both scenarios the expressions of entities are equal in quantity, but if this is true then it appears as though everything has equal expressions in any practical sense.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob,

As an external critique, I think it should be obvious that a human adult has more moral worth than a hurricane in every reasonably inferred scenario.
In terms of the examples you responded to that I didn’t address herein, I decided to swap them for more simplified examples that I presented here to avoid derailment and try to express my worries more clearly.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.

Any theory can possibly “describe” moral realism. That it is a form of moral realism depends on if it is purporting at least the following thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism].
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.

I agree with this. Rhetorically, even if the theory is a form of moral realism, people will not be convinced if it seems counter to moral realism.

I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.

Moral cognitivism is the metaethical theory that moral judgments are propositional, which is a required position for moral realists to take. You cannot reject moral cognitivism and be a moral realist.

1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)

Beliefs being fallible does not entail that moral judgments are non-propositional. Saying moral judgments are propositional means that one can formulate them into statements which are truth-apt. If you reject moral cognitivism, then, for example, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is incapable of being true or false.

This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.

They are defined such that they are foils to each other and, thusly, you have to either accept one or the other (or suspend judgment): you cannot sidestep the issue by claiming they have low practical utility—even if it is true.

They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed

That is logically impossible, because non-cognitivism is the negation of cognitivism. You are saying X and !X are both true, which is the definition of a logical contradiction.

Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.

Correct. Moral cognitivism and non-nihilism are metaethical theories which are not themselves the same as the debate about realism vs. anti-realism; rather, they are subcomponents of the moral realist thesis, and, for the sake of brevity and because I have already outlined them in full in my moral subjectivism thread, I refer the reader there. This OP is about a moral naturalist theory that presupposes moral cognitivism and non-nihilism and ventures to prove objectivism.

1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.

Are you an idealist? I am a realist (ontologically), so I think that most events are mind-independent.

2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).

To clarify this a bit, another way of thinking about it is that the Good under this view is identical to flourishing, and flourishing is objective. The methodological approach to determining that is two-fold: (1) the analysis of acts such that they are conceptually subsumed under general categories and (2) the semantic labeling of a particular category as ‘the good’.

That is what that paragraph of mine is getting at.

3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.

That which is mind-independent is not necessarily a law. A law is a force of nature that dictates particular behaviors of objects. The action of a cup smashing to pieces is a mind-independent state-of-affairs, but it is not itself a law.

I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.

At least those two, there could be more. Such as a neutral category.

So what precisely denotes good and what evil?

The good is flourishing, and the bad is the negation of that. In action, what is good is progressing towards The Good (i.e., flourishing) at its highest level (i.e., universal flourishing) and evil is the regression from it.

How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?

It will be whether or not the action progresses or regresses from a world with universal flourishing—i.e., the highest Good.

It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?

This has nothing to do with that quote of me, which was:

For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’

I was referring to, here, is that, in simplified terms, normativity is not objective; but the good is. The good is flourishing—which is the abstract category I was referring to—and this is objective. I do grant that I need to refurbish the OP to be more clear. If it helps, then use my summary I gave a couple responses back instead of the OP itself.

In the OP, I focused too much on the methodological approach to determining what goodness is and not in clarifying the end result (of it being identical to flourishing).

And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.

The problem with that is that you argued as if I was arguing for moral subjectivism, which is not what is happening in the OP. For those tracking my threads, of which many have been, I wanted to provide clarity on how I overcame my main argument for moral non-objectivism.

Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology

P1 wasn’t supposed to be incredibly elaborate: it was meant to re-iterate the syllogism from my moral subjectivism thread. The elaboration of that premise is found there.

As for your ‘anti-P1’, it doesn’t negate P1 and it isn’t tautological.

No they are not.

Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.

We have entirely different theories of truth and, subequently, of facticity.

Facts are statements that agree with reality.
Truth is the correspondence of thought with reality.
By states-of-affairs, I do not just mean temporal processes: I also mean atemoral arrangements of entities in reality.

Moral facts are morally signified statements which agree with reality.

Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.

This is a non-sequitur.

What is TF, true, false?

Sorry, that is shorthand for ‘therefore’.

By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises

C follows logically from P2 and P1.

You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.

One can define something and in the next breath claim that something cannot exist: there’s no logical contradiction nor incoherence with that.

Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.

It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone

Categories are conceptual, and conceptualization is the process of subsuming things under more general concepts. I never claimed everything came into being from thoughts.

It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'

That is not what the cogito argument means: it is not that “thinking is the one aspect of being”. It is the argument that one exists because they can think.

Bob

Ah, you've made an unknowing contradiction here. That which is productive is something that is useful and good. If you go into the garage and produce something with overall less existence, then it is not as good as if you could have produced something with overall more existence. That which produces more positive existence is more productive than that which does not

By “productive” I just mean the standard colloquial definition of (roughly) “having the quality or power of producing, especially in abundance”: I do not mean “something that is good or useful”.

With that in mind, I don’t think you answered the question: the hypothetical was positing that I am doing something in my garage, let’s say a hobby (like making model airplanes or something), that I am hyper-productive at (i.e., producing in abundance the goal which is here whatever my hobby is) but my productivity towards this hobby, even if it is greater, is not as important (morally) to working, for example, finding a cure to cancer.

The hypothetical here, to carve it out even more precisely (to avoid confusion), is that working in my garage making model airplanes has more moral worth than me working on a cure for cancer, under your view, IF my productivity in the former is greater than the latter. No?

And, I should mention, this is all else being equal: it is not a valid response to enlarge the context. I am asking if I am right in this inference, about your ethical theory, in this specific scenario.

Thank you Bob, you truly are a great thinker and once again I am delighted to have someone of your caliber to speak with! I know its a lot to ask and yet you patiently have awaited these points.

Same to you, my friend! I always enjoy our conversations, and I commend your creative thinking. It truly is a rare skill and gift in this world (:

I don't believe it is. For one, act-consequentialism is about maximizing human good, whereas this is about maximizing existence. Lets call it existentialism. :)

Not that semantics matters, but ‘act-consequentialism’ is not the view that one should maximize human good (as that’s a form of utilitarianism) but, rather, the analysis of what is right or wrong in relation to which act has foreseeable consequences which maximizes the desired goal. Even ifyou don’t agree with the semantics, I just want to stress this is how I was using the terms; so hopefully that clarifies a bit. Now, in explicating that, I realized that you probably will have a quibble with morality being act-centric; so I refurbish my claim to your position seeming to be a form of consequentialism—i.e., that one ought to determine what is right or wrong in relation to the foreseeable consequences that will maximize the desired goal. In your case, you have your own unique consequentialist view which has no title beyond that [other than “existentialism”, as you called (: ], and only one factor is required to get to your view (from consequentialism): that the goal one is maximizing is identifiable existences. It is like a existential-consequentialism (;

Again, I am not trying to stress the semantics but, rather, just convey where my head is at.

My point with bringing it up at all before was that consequentialism is highly controversial and most would agree one is biting a lot of bullets subscribing to it—and I say that not to stick you with a label that never came out of your mouth, but just that you seem to be advocating for it (in the sense of what I defined above). I will refrain from going into further detail, but will be happy to if you would like.

I think the main issue I see with your view, at its core, is that it is about creating more identifiable entities in reality and not producing better conditions for life. I am not saying it is internally incoherent for doing so, but I simply stress that it does not lead to what it seems you want it to—i.e., that humans are predominantly more valuable than other animals and non-life.

For example, let’s take your view of “wrath”:

Excessive anger and the destruction of things for one's own pleasure. This is different from anger, which is a natural emotion that can be channeled for a productive outcome. Wrath is about destruction for destruction's sake. It does not care about the end result beyond its own satisfaction. This destroys community in society, and violates the core precepts of existential morality.

Although I understand you have defined in a way such that wrath is never done for a higher purpose, it seems that the everyday sense of the term is perfectly compatible with and not necessarily in contradiction to your ethics: destruction creates more identifiable entities (more “existences” as you call it) than if what was destroyed was left in order. I don’t see how you can say someone is doing evil, if by evil we just mean hindering or reducing identifiable entities, by smashing up their house. We could appeal to a broader context and say that their destruction of their house hinders society; but then we must recognize that all else being equal it would be morally permissible (if not obligatory) on your view and that we could posit the same dilemma for society itself: the destruction of society could arguably produce more identifiable entities.

This segues into another worry I have, which is that it is not clear what kinds of identifiable entities you are wanting to consider morally worthy of obtaining: is it any?

Another worry is that it might to plausible that society burned to the ground has the same amount of identifiable entities as it in perfect health: there’s always an infinite amount of ways we can parcel up what exists. So what exactly counts here? You say material and expressive existences, but the more I think about it the more hazy those conceptions really are (to me). If by material existence you mean fundamental entities, then we don’t know of any. Atoms aren’t fundamental, and neither are quarks; and, even if they were, counting those should be roughly equal in a destroyed society vs. one in perfect health. If we then shift the focus to expressive existences (and its potential) as essentially the only factor that matters for this calculation, then if we just mean interacts with material existences—i.e,. those fundamental building blocks which we know not of—then this seems impossible to know as well. If, on the other hand, we extend our definitions to be more colloquial, by just claiming material is whatever is the most fundamental within the context (the most primitive building block in the context) and expressive as the interactions between those materials, then I am not seeing how a healthy society has more expressions of existence than a destroyed one. Remember, we are talking about all interactions, in this case, between the fundamental building blocks. Let’s take your example of atoms: are the atoms interacting more, or the things composed of them, in the particular arrangement of a healthy society in contrast to a destroyed one? This all seems very nebulous.

Now, I have no problem agreeing with you that humans should be prioritized over other animals because they are more complex (viz., more intelligent, rational, socially cooperative, conscious, self-conscious, etc.) but it is not because I have been able to calculate that a human has greater of a expressive existence, in terms of its chemical interactions and what not, than an elephant. As a clear example of what I mean, imagine an organism which had superior neural networks, and consequently processing power, than a human but wasn’t capable of having a mind—i.e.., a super-computer made out of organic material like what we are comprised of, but no mind. It very well may be the case that this super-computer non-subject is capable of much more expressive existence than a human being—e.g., perhaps for every 10 years of a human’s activities (of expressions), the super-computer non-subject organism produces 10x that in sheer neural network power of computations. According to you, this super-computer is morally worth more, all else being equal, to a human being. I disagree. Not saying your view is internally incoherent for that; but, still, I think most people agree with me here.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. Unless, perhaps, you introduces types or kinds of existences worth creating over others, as opposed to sheer (generic) expressions.

Also, just to throw out there a consequentialist dilemma, because it sounds like you are advocating for it (just not under that term): it seems perfectly plausible that, all else being equal, enslaving one percent of the population to force them to be hyper-productive would overall increase total expressive existences which, in turn, would plausibly be moral good under your view. Just food for thought.

I will stop there for now.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Firstly, I want to say that I really appreciate your responses, as I can tell you are putting in a lot of effort to convey as much as possible about your position to me.

However:

I mean you did not answer my earlier critiques and instead retreated back into your 'jargon' I prefer to believe I refuted, actually answering your comments
...
zI am not trying to derail the thread at all. I still intend to discuss it more, although I think I have made great points already that have been ignored because they do not fit the OP. But that is not correct, so, what am I to do?

I am having a hard time keeping up with the critiques you are making, because they are so sporadic. In order for us to continue discussing productively, I would like to ask you to give me one critique you have of the OP: any one of them--but just one; and then we can dive into it and, once we have discussed it at length, then we can move on to another critique (point) you have; and so and so forth. Does that sound good?

I am not trying to thwart your “attack” or beat-around-the-bush: I simply want us to have a productive conversation that I can manage; so that I can adequately respond to your thoughts. My brain operates very systematically: I need to be able to at least infer where to start and connect my way to where to end and, unfortunately, I am unable to sufficiently parse your responses.

I want to disclaim that I know, from your perspective, it may be frustrating that I am not responding to everything you are saying; but I started to (even in this last response you made I wrote up a draft) and there is just so much material I disagree with and most of it isn’t actually relevant (or perhaps it is and I have failed to grasp it yet).

For now, give me one critique, one point, you have with the theory; and I will do my due diligence to adequately respond. Then we can move on to the next, then the next, etc. I think that is a better plan, go forward, for us to tackle this conversation optimally. Let me know what you think.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

That is a part of ethics, the other is: what is good?

The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic.

I guess it depends on what you are referring to by 'egoism' and 'altruism'; and, to me, in a marriage one is acting for one's own sake and another's sake--so there is an element of egoism there (albeit it not narcissism). Acting truly as if the two partners are one organism isn't how marriage usually works in practice. E.g., one does not divorce their partner to save the marriage, like one would chop off their arm to save their body: they don't do this precisely because marriage presupposes that each partner is trying to find the right balance between themselves and the other person. Obviously, divorcing to save a marriage makes no sense, but if it truly is just a matter of two people being fused into one person, then they should have no problem sacrificing one for the sake of the other in a dire situation.

My point is just that marriages are about finding the right balance between one's own needs and another person's, not some relationship where egoism has been completely overcome.

I think it might be best if I give a brief elaboration of this moral realist theory, and see what you disagree with. So far, it seems as though most of your critiques and points are irrelevant to the OP.

This theory posits that morality is objective—i.e., that there are states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality that inform us of what is moral or immoral. It posits that what is good (viz., The Good, in the sense of an objective goodness) is flourishing—i.e., goodness is identical to flourishing. Flourishing is, at its core, the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. Flourishing is contextual and objective: it is contextual insofar as one must posit a context in which one is assessing flourishing (e.g., I am flourishing, you are flourishing, we are flourishing, society is flourishing, etc.) and objective insofar as it is a mind-independently existing relation between a purpose and fulfillment thereof (viz., one’s psychology has nothing to do with flourishing being identical to the fulfillment of purposes). This relation, however, contains an element of subjectivity insofar as purposes are subjective (i.e., what it means for something [within a context] to fulfill its purpose is relative to the psychology of one or more subjects): this does not make flourishing itself subjective but, rather, merely that that very objective relation is that of (subjective) purposes being fulfilled. Each context one could posit, for evaluating flourishing, which is infinite in amount, is hierarchical in the sense that larger contexts have more flourishing and smaller contexts have less flourishing (in total); and, consequently, the larger the context of flourishing, the greater the good (i.e., the greater the flourishing). Thusly, the highest good is universal flourishing, because it has the greatest amount of flourishing being the largest context. The highest good has the most good and is, therefore, the best good: it is the ultimate good. Therefore, if one is committed to being good, then they should strive for this best good, this highest good, this universal flourishing, instead of a lower one.

With that being said, what do you disagree with in that theory?

I would like to also disclaim that this position is not “fake”, as you implied multiple times in your response: by noting that I have a separate thread for moral subjectivism, I was not meaning to imply I am a moral subjectivist. Personally, I hold this theory instead; but I am more than happy to discuss moral subjectivism, as I think it gets a very bad wrap by most people who, quite frankly, do not fully understand the theory.

Normativity is (pardon) bovine poo revisionism for objective morality. It's just another way of saying moral subjectivism has merit in and of itself.

I don’t think removing normativity from the good makes moral subjectivism itself have merit. Instead, it just fixes a lot of problems with moral realist theories which posit the contrary and makes more realism more plausible.

Another thing I would like to disclaim is that when I say flourishing has that subjective element of being the fulfillment of a (subjective) purpose: I am referring to the depths of the soul and not whimsical day-to-day opinions or desires a person has.

It doesn't matter what people believe because what is good is a law of the universe, objective.

So, this is not something posited in my theory; and I don’t see any evidence to support the good being a natural law.

Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).

I didn’t follow any of this: what is a ‘quantum discrete part of goodness’? Virtues are habits of character that are good: they are not identical to goodness.

Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond.

Correct. I am not going to quote everything you say, because there is too much. I only tag the portion relative to what I am responding to, and trust you will be able to navigate your own responses.

I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants.

It is immoral to torture someone (or torture them absent of this ‘negative intent’ you mentioned) for the sake of building their virtue.

Beauty and accuracy are objective.

What do you mean by accuracy? Accuracy of what?

I don’t think beauty necessarily instantiates objective moral truth. Being ugly has nothing to do with what is moral or immoral. There could be a reality with universal flourishing and every person therein is uglier than a bat.

If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality

The first sentence is in principle correct, the second is not implied from the first. In the smallest, or one of the smallest, contexts of flourishing, of good, if one has the purpose of killing asians, then they would thereby flourish if they are sufficiently killing asians. However, the buck does not stop here: the highest good is universal flourishing, and killing asians clearly violates that. So, colloquially, my theory would state “it is immoral to kill asians for the sole sake of fulfilling one’s own desire”.

Nevertheless, flourishing is not subjective; so even in the example you gave, it does not follow that morality is subjective.

Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense.

No it does not. Objective morality (i.e., moral realism) is a three-pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism)
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.

Moral realism itself does not entail that moral anti-realism is internally incoherent, although a particular theory may advertise that, nor that it is nonsense; but, rather, just that it is objectively wrong to do so.

Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either

It is implied by the highest good: universal flourishing requires, nay presupposes, universal harmony.

Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.

You cannot claim that moral is objective and turn around and deny that objectivity is ‘that which is mind-independent’.

I will stop here for now, so that we can hone in on our conversation to the OP.