They are modular , but in a different sense than relative space-time location. The latter is a relativity defined as objective relations structured mathematically. Kuhn’s paradigmatic relativity isnt based on objective structures but subjective values systems. — Joshs

I'm thinking subjective values systems, almost by definition, are rooted in relativity, as subjectivity is always local to the individual. Paradigmatic subjectivity therefore implies zeitgeist, ethos. How does Kuhn separate his ideas from such?

So, our sense of good & evil, no less than our sense of true & false, gets instantiated by neural processing?

Does the literature of neural concept processing say anything about neural networks doing something akin to statistical analysis of individual instances of "right" and "wrong," leading to a model?

...numbers were invented for counting... — Sir2u

Since you've made this statement, do you acknowledge that material things are countable?

Could something be described mathematically if math has not been invented? — Sir2u

Could something be described fluxmatically if math has not been invented? Could something be described noxmixically if math has not been invented? Could something be described (fill in the blank with your own word) if math has not been invented? Could something be described...

Colors have always existed, drab brown being one of the worst ever imagined. But until someone invented a method of naming them. Now it has the illustrious name of Pantone 448 C. Could it be possible that the same has happened to numbers? — Sir2u

Since I can write a sentence in parallel to your sentence, do you acknowledge that if your sentence is valid, then my sentence is valid? See my parallel sentence below.

Numbers have always existed, 3.1415929... being one of the worst ever imagined. Then [but until] someone invented a method of naming them. Now it has the illustrious name of Pi. Could it be possible that the same has happened to colors?

We now use math to describe the universe... — Sir2u

Since you have made the above statement, do you think if follows that the universe, which pre-dates human math, has always been describable via the language of math?

we had to invent the math(numbers and equations) to explain it, to make the calculations fit reality. And a lot of explanations turn out to be wrong. — Sir2u

Do you agree that when you say, "humans had to invent the math to explain the universe," you are saying, again, that math was invented to explain the innately mathematical nature of the universe?

Do you agree that from this it follows that math expresses its form and content in connection with the form and content of the universe?

Do you agree that when you talk of math striving to fit reality, and sometimes failing, you imply that math fails in its core mission when it doesn't fit reality?

I have asked you if you would give 2-stone and 3-stone the same number. Are you unwilling to answer this question?

Since I acknowledge that humans spoke of the numbers of things (perhaps without using the word "number") thousands of years before they developed the writing of numbers, you, therefore, per your stipulation, acknowledge that humans put numbers onto material objects to describe what was already there before they developed the writing of numbers?

Does the Kuhn content you've quoted contain a component of relativity?

Is Kuhn's statement implying that just as the rate at which time elapses is specific to a local inertial frame of reference, so is an artistic or scientific paradigm (frame of reference) comprised of local beliefs and local evidence that warrant consideration on ther own terms, thus crediting such paradigms as being modular?

You say,

Modern neuroscience puts the idea that they cannot be accounted for to sleep, definitively. — Garrett Travers

I infer that they has moral values for its antecedent.

and then you provide us with,

By leveraging well developed computational models to interrogate neural mechanisms and representations, this work has significantly advanced our understanding of concept learning by characterizing the nature of the component mechanisms and their underlying neural machinery. The result is a converging neurocomputational account of concept learning that integrates brain systems involved in attention, memory, reasoning, cognitive control, and reward processing. — Garrett Travers

Is the above quote the section of your evidence that specifically accounts for moral values (through the lens of materialism-physicalism) neuroscientifically?

Is the upshot that moral values are one example of concept learning that is processed by the neural machinery of the brain?

Are the component mechanisms of concept learning physical or conceptual? I ask this question because "component mechanisms and their underlying neural machinery" suggests a bifurcation, with "component mechanisms" being conceptual and "underlying neural machinery" being physical.

↪Sir2u Sorry for butting in, but the universe was behaving in a mathematical way (physics + chemistry) long before humans (biology) even entered the fray so to speak. I dunno, just saying. — Agent Smith

:grin: :up:

Nothing has numbers as part of their make up, numbers were invented... — Sir2u

Seeing pile-of-2-stones and pile-of-3-stones, would you give each pile the same number? — ucarr

If it were discovered that Germany has already established Fluxmax-stones = 3-stones, would the equation 2-stones = Fluxmax-stones have to be changed to 2-stones ≠ Fluxmax-stones? — ucarr

That is sort of like asking if the cowshit you found was discovered to come from a bull would we have to call it NOT COWSHIT.
No, we would just call it bullshit. — Sir2u

Do you agree that COWSHIT ≠ bullshit?

When you look at 2 material objects, say, 2 stones, do you see 2 stones, or do you see the number 2 as it is written on paper?

Since writing first appeared thousands of years after human first started walking the earth, do you accept that 2 stones first appeared long before the first appearance of number 2 as it is written on paper?

And of course we see numbers everywhere, we put them there. — Sir2u

Do you acknowledge that the numbers we put onto material objects describe what was already there before human started writing numbers?

we do see number everywhere in the everywhere, — Janus

:up:

Giving them a label is the key there, if the number label where part of the stone no one will need to "give" them anything — Sir2u

Pile of 2-stones sits on a red square. Close by, pile of 3-stones sits on a green square.

Seeing pile-of-2-stones and pile-of-3-stones, would you give each pile the same label?

Do you think 2-stones can be replaced with Fluxmax-stones and would make no difference?
— ucarr

Of course it could be replaced with anything, as long as it is universally accepted. Fluxmax-stones could quite easily be 2-stones in some sort of technical language. — Sir2u

If it were discovered that Germany has already established Fluxmax-stones = 3-stones, would the equation 2-stones = Fluxmax-stones have to be changed to 2-stones ≠ Fluxmax-stones?

We were discussing the materialistic qualities of numbers, which is no existent. — Sir2u

What about the materialistic qualities of number?



There's a stone sitting on a red square. Close by, there's a stone sitting on a green square. A person sees them and gives them a label. Label = 2-stones.

Do you think 2-stones describes something that's there in the stones?

Do you think 2-stones completely different from stone on red square and stone on green square?

Do you think 2-stones is a label randomly given to stone on red square and stone on green square?

Do you think 2-stones can be replaced with Fluxmax-stones and would make no difference?

If you think the replacement makes no difference, what can be done to let people know
2-stones = Fluxmax-stones?

Ever read a biology book?

You've been debating me about pure math & how it's uncoupled from the material world & I've been arguing that applied math is about the material world & that pure math, being about how math logic works, is also, ultimately, about the material world because logic has no meaning outside of the continuity of interrelated material things.

Can you elaborate a bit more? I've been thinking that with more loops per fixed interval of time,
A. I. will become self aware.

If so, this leads me to thinking the self (maybe the soul) lives in the interstices of the loops, and is immaterial, epiphenomenally speaking.

The self is an associate of the material world, but is not local to it.

Indeed. An imagination is a simulation that is seen. With the minds eye? — EugeneW

Now you're talking about feedback looping with vertical stacking.

I would think that it would be impossible to have a man made physical object without there being a concept on which to base it.

But it would be impossible to form a concept of something natural without having at least some of the characteristics being known. — Sir2u

Let's reverse the order.

But it would be impossible to form a concept of something natural without having at least some of the characteristics being known.

I would think that it would be impossible to have a man made physical object without there being a concept on which to base it.

Human concepts are based on observations of surrounding natural forms. Proceeding from there, humans make alterations to their naturalistic concepts. These alterations are derivatives of the naturalistic concepts that preceded them. They are still natural forms because human nature, as the name indicates, stands as another form of nature, so the products of human nature, whether naturalistic or altered, also stand as other forms of nature.

The priest just wants to be remembered for his good deed. As he should. By doing so he shows that there exists something non-material, something non-explainable by material processes. Something contained in the matter. Call it love, hate, divine, good, or bad. — EugeneW

:up:

The theory involves the idea of ancient pedigree that, concomitant with the material brain, there exists also a distinct and irreducable non-material mind, this being proposed as the fundamental agent of our moral awareness capable of enabling a type of insight not explicable in terms of the neural processes... — Robert Lockhart

How is that different from what dualists have been saying for thousands of years? From your original post I had assumed that we are talking about physical evidence. — T Clark

In context, the claim seems to be about a certain type of human behavior i.e., moral behavior. Proceeding from there, the claim is that moral behavior is not traceable to cognitive operations rooted in neural networks.

So, the objective (physical) evidence of non-material cognitive operations is moral behavior.

As I see it, the argument now focuses upon whether or not moral behavior is traceable to cognitive operations of neural networks.

Suppose moral behavior is merely an effect of the logical operations of neural networks.

One counter-narrative to this supposition relates the example of self-sacrifice motivated by agape love, as in the case of the Catholic priest who took the place of a prisoner sentenced to death within a Nazi concentration camp. There's nothing blatantly self-serving or logical about such behavior.

An imagination is a simulation but a simulation doesn't need to be an imagination. They are both simulations. An imagination is an imagined simulation. A simulation is just a simulation. — EugeneW

I think EugeneW is saying there is, in the case of human, a SELF which has intentions, whereas, in the case of computer, there is NO self, and thus there are no intentions, just a programmed, logical continuity of coded commands.

A simulation "borrows" the selfhood & the intentions of the computer programmer, a human.

A computer simulation program is like an appendage of human, an extension, like an arm, under the control of human.

Each day recently arXiv.org has received about 200 research papers in math. Many of these are "uncoupled from empirical experience", yet thousands of math people find them intelligible. — jgill

As you may have seen in my statement to Sir2u above, pure math is concerned with the innate workings of the language of math itself. Any brief survey of the sciences with show you just how worldly is math in application to many, many real world events. An examination of how this language works by its own lights is thus an examination of our real world, although not directly.

But they both are only physical representations of concepts. — Sir2u

The connection you name above goes in both directions.

Concept - Philosophy - an idea or mental picture of a group or class of objects formed by combining all their aspects. -- The Apple Dictionary

Consider a) Mental representations of material objects; b) material representations of concepts

Which comes first?

Even when we form concepts of mental things i.e., concepts of concepts, the line of reality traces back to material objects within our empirical world.

Pure math is a language about how the language of math works logically.

What is logic? It is an examination of the continuity that connects events of our lives into an intelligible narrative. A narrative is intelligible when a group of people all recognize noteworthy actions & reactions of humans bound together within cause-and-effect relationships.

Apart from our conscious experiences within our daily world, logic has no intelligible meaning or value.

Since math & logic are interwoven into our daily experiences, a study of how math works logically, pure math, likewise is intimately interwoven into our daily experiences.

You should ask a pure mathematician whether their mind enters an immaterial realm while they're working.

These are very rigid statements that are beliefs, not facts. You should indicate as such. Should a philosopher state their beliefs as facts? — jgill

The key word in my statement is signification. I'm tempted to argue that my claims are true by definition, since a sign without a referent is like a material object without elements or compounds. I sense, however, that is a weak argument.

As for my etiquette as a person making claims (you compliment me with the title of philosopher), your response exemplifies what it denounces.

Saying,

These are very rigid statements that are beliefs, not facts. — jgill

Is like saying,

This statement is false.

What fun is philosophy without bold claims subject to refutation?

By the way, what is your refutation of my bold claims?

The positional grid is not a material thing, it is an abstract. — Sir2u

If I remember Battleship correctly, there is a plastic platform full of holes, the grid where a player's battleship moves to various positions.

Writing words and numbers down does not make them physical objects, it just makes it easier to transmit ideas. — Sir2u

No argument with you here. Yes, number symbols & words are signs that refer to material things.

I'm saying that number symbols refer to & derive meaning from material things whose set of attributes includes one particular attribute I call number. All of this verbiage is an attempt to say material objects are numericalizable because they have a built-in property of being movable, which is to say, positionable.

So physical systems, given satisfying conditions, can instantiate mathematical structures just as ideas in our heads can. — Kuro

Abundant thanks with much gratitude to you, Kuro. Your input here is tremendously substantial and, I presently like to think, more encouraging than otherwise. There's much in your input I must study further. If warranted, I hope additional input from you is forthcoming.

Will you go to my world devoid of spacetime and think about the role of numbers there?
— ucarr

There's not a lot to go on based on what you've said, but if by that you mean: are numbers real in the absence of reference to space-time?, my response would be again: 'well what about pure mathematics'? — Wayfarer

Pure mathematics is the study of mathematical concepts independently of any application outside mathematics.

...the appeal is attributed to the intellectual challenge and aesthetic beauty of working out the logical consequences of basic principles.

...presently, the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is more a philosophical point of view or a mathematician's preference than a rigid subdivision of mathematics. -- The Apple Dictionary

It seems to me -- especially in light of paragraph 3 above -- that pure math, in order to be intelligible beyond the circular reasoning of logical truth by definition, must trace back to material objects interrelated.

...almost all mathematical theories remained motivated by problems coming from the real world or from less abstract mathematical theories. Also, many mathematical theories, which had seemed to be totally pure mathematics, were eventually used in applied areas, mainly physics and computer science. -- The Apple Dictionary

...intellectual challenge and aesthetic beauty of working out the logical consequences of basic principles

Logic is continuity, which is to say, interrelationship, rooted in inference. Would anyone have any notion of continuity & interrelationship between material things without firsthand experience of a spacially-extended, material world that affords empirical experience?

Pure math, and all other forms of signification, once uncoupled from empirical experience, become unintelligible.

Numbers, uncoupled from interrelated material objects, become random, unable to signify anything intelligible.

Abstract thought is non-specific WRT our material world; it is not uncoupled from our material world.

I didn't say an abstract conception of a number is a material thing. I implied it is a sign that has a material referent.

I'll go to your references. Will you go to my world devoid of spacetime and think about the role of numbers there?

Looks like you see numbers as I do.

What is a number without a material referent?

It's just another material thing, but unlocateable.

Number = position. Only material things can have position.

What is counting without a world of material referents?

It's just a series of neural networks oscillating.

In a world without spacetime, do numbers have any meaning?

No. They're only graspable by an intelligence capable of counting. — Wayfarer

What does an intelligence grasp when it counts?

I say an intelligence grasps a material thing, as when it counts a line of stones, en route to understanding numbers & counting.

Even a written number symbol, let's say, ink on paper, exists as a physical thing as, in our example, ink on paper.

Are you saying the positional grid, a material thing, possesses the property of number?

Can someone please explain the OP to me ? — Hello Human

You pick up a rock & it weighs 1 pound.

You pick up another rock & it weighs 4 ounces.

The second rock weighs only 25% of what the first rock weighs. Holding each rock feels different because of their different weights.

Rock 1 pulls down on your left arm harder than Rock 2 pulls down on your right arm.

Weight, as you know, is a physical property of each rock. The weight of each rock gives you an impression of the identity of each rock.

I'm saying that another way to get an impression of the identity of the two rocks is by putting them into a line with other rocks & then counting up the total number of rocks.

Instead of the weight of the two rocks being experienced by you by holding them & feeling how hard they pull down on your arm, the number of the two rocks is being experienced by you by putting them into a line of other rocks & experiencing how the counting of the line of rocks changes after adding the two rocks.

With this idea, I'm just repeating to you things you already know.

What is slightly different here is how I'm asking you to look at what you already know.

Instead of looking at a number as a thing way over there, while a rock as another thing way over here, I'm asking you to look at a rock as being a physical number made of material we call granite or agate or diamond or (you fill the blank).

Hello Michael,

Sidebar - Is it true that OED = Oxford English Dictionary? Just want to get that clarified.

Herein we're both working with some pretty tough concepts. I'd like us to agree about what you & I mean, respectively.

Epiphenomenalism, I'm sorry to say, is nonsense. You don't get Consciousnesses except through Evolution in a Material Environment. — Michael Sol

Wait a minute. In your second sentence above, you give a causal description of consciousness that aligns closely with what I understand to be epiphenomenalism.

Here's a quote from my Apple dictionary,

Epiphenomenalism is a position on the mind–body problem which holds that physical and biochemical events within the human body (sense organs, neural impulses, and muscle contractions, for example) are causal with respect to mental events (thought, consciousness, and cognition). According to this view, subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body yet themselves have no causal efficacy on physical events.

If you're refuting instead of confirming the above definition, then you're handing my solipsism claim to me on a silver platter.

Immaterial mind's lack of causal effect is what separates it out from matter. It's immaterial because it's non-causal.

If epiphenomenalism, as defined above, is nonsense, then there is no separation-distintion between brain & mind, and thus the mental self is one with matter, and thus your matter is all proposition is all inclusive, making the material self the only thing extant within our universe.

Like it or not, you are wholly material until you show some axiomatic need or empirical proof that there is something that is not material, which you cannot do. — Michael Sol

Here, again, you argue in favor of my solipsism proposition. If I am wholly material, then my mind is material, so the material mind is part of the only thing that exists, matter.

Note - The existence of other material minds, with whom you interact socially, has, per your view, no bearing on our cosmic solitude, as the categorical material self is the only extant self.

I differ from you in that I believe, by choice, that, in addition to the categorical immaterial self, there is also a transcendent immaterial cosmic self. The gist of my journey through existence is that it is an interpersonal dualism of self & cosmic other, whereas the gist of your journey through existence is that it is a solipsistic monism of categorical material self.

Philosophy sure does truck with reductive materialism.

But I am epiphenominal!

Scratch matter & you disappear right along with it.

I am a distinct self, nearly, but not entirely material.

Saved by an adverb!

Assuming we posit that flights of fancy, via the human imagination, occur within nature as described above, what is the ontological status of flights of fancy? — ucarr

Note - This isn't a question concerning specific content of a particular flight of fancy. It is a question about the phenomenon of flight of fancy that departs from reason, eventually making claims that have no empirical verification. Since this phenomenon is an existing thing occurring in nature, examination of its ontology promises illumination of important attributes of reality. – ucarr

They are abstractions merely subsisting (Meinong). — 180 Proof

As for "the ontology status of flights of fancy", click on the link I'd provided "(Meinong)" to an article about "ontological status" and you won't find anything said or implied (by me) about "the content". I have answered both questions clearly, just maybe not with answers you'd expected (or over your head). – 180 Proof

You haven't answered my question. I'm not asking about the content of flights of fancy. I'm asking about the phenomenon of humans engaging in flights of fancy. To a large extent, this is a question about the psychology of a certain type of behavior, namely, flights of fancy. – ucarr

With the above, I’m trying to make a distinction between a mental construction e.g. “fancy,” and its materialistically real substrate “cognitive behavior (that generates the fancy).”

Let’s examine your quotation of the plural pronoun “They.” What is the antecedent of “They”? (Human) behavior isn’t a good candidate because its number is singular, not plural. Also, behavior isn’t an abstraction. It’s objectively real. Regarding “flights of fancy,” that has a plural number. Also, flights of fancy are mental constructions that can be construed as abstractions.

Your communication by citation appears to be a characterization of “flights of fancy,” not the behavior that supports it, a material reality.

As you say, to my question, as stated, it is a clear answer, to wit: They are abstractions merely subsisting (Meinong). — 180 Proof. Your citation is a meditation on the ontological status of the content of flights of fancy.

It is not an answer to my question as intended. I failed to state the question such that it makes a clear distinction between objects of fancy & the real behavior that causes them. I’m concerned with the latter, not the former.

The answer to my intended question, it turns out, is simple. The ontological status of the human cognitive behavior that gives rise to such things as square circles is that of a physical-material reality objectively verifiable.

And I am convinced, as per Darwin, that Consciousness infallibly denotes an objectively extant Material Universe, so I can hardly a Solipsist, can I? — Michael Sol

Are you claiming that consciousness is an emergent property of matter?

If your answer to the above question is "yes," then, regarding your identity as a self who is an attribute of the material ground, consider,

I believe that the Material Universe (as described by the Standard Model Of Cosmology see Cole and Ellis' Theoretical Cosmology) is all that exists — Michael Sol

If the Fundamental condition of any possible form of Reality is Matter.. — Michael Sol

So, you believe matter is all.

So, as an attribute of the one & only thing that is real, matter, and thus being nearly as one with same, how can you be anything other than a solipsist?

Why have multitudes embraced the Christian miracles, whereas myriad other miracle stories have been dismissed?

I'm not implying popularity equals verification; it doesn't. As you are well aware, multitudes believe in debunked falsehoods, as by your your estimation Christianity.

I'm thinking of the job of the philosopher. Isn't it to explain why one particular set of myths has staying power across two millennia? Maybe it's more the job of the psychologist, eh?

At any rate, something's going on with Christianity. Why are multitudes such fools for Christianity? Is the good book a supreme example of successful promotion?

Why haven't clever operators seized upon this example of selling myth with shelf life of more than 2000 years?

Don't say it! You think televangelists are doing just that.

Why do televangelists fall like bowling pins, whereas Jesus and other divines keep surviving? You can count their names on one hand.

You say Aristotle predates Jesus, and he's still going.

Well, scholars have worked across 24 centuries to promote Aristotle, and there's talk Jesus was one of his students.

Some of the Pharisees were contemporaneous naysayers of Jesus, and Judaism rejects his Godhead, but Jesus was a faithful Jew.

These antiquities are a philosophy perennial.

Your points here are good and I acknowledge their cogency.

I'm just saying that motivation counts for something. Of course all types of people from all manner of belief systems deny human Godhead, miracles & redemption.

The work of promoting same entails nothing supernatural.

Why hasn't this vast array of good news deniers done the work of creating & promoting a venerable book of denial, dating from the time of Jesus, or have they? Perhaps you think the history of science is a kind of bible of rational denial.

Do the naysayers of the Jesus Godhead have any contemporaneous accounts denying the alleged miracles?

I guess those supporting the allegations have worked harder to promote the miracles than those denying them.

I work from the assumption some contemporaries of Jesus were deniers. Where is their 2000 year effort to sustain a narrative of no miracles?

Pandeism- nature is a large scale mechanism operational within specifiable, obdurate boundaries. Its productions & their consequences are verifiable by means of evidence examined through the lens of materialist-physicalist premises. Philosophy of nature is propounded by exercise of reason as expressed in logical arguments supported by pertinent evidence.

What is your response to the following characterization of Pandeism? — ucarr

It's perfunctory and insufficiently speculative (re: by contrast e.g. ↪180 Proof). — 180 Proof

I understand your use of perfunctory. You think my characterization is superficial. Regarding insufficiently speculative, I don't understand. Speculative - engaged in conjecture rather than knowledge. Given this definition of speculative, saying my characterization is insufficient, you're saying it needs to be more conjectural. Isn't this backwards? Did you mean to say, excessively speculative?

Assuming we posit that flights of fancy, via the human imagination, occur within nature as described above, what is the the ontological status of flights of fancy? — ucarr

They are abstractions merely subsisting (Meinong). — 180 Proof

You haven't answered my question. I'm not asking about the content of flights of fancy. I'm asking about the phenomenon of humans engaging in flights of fancy. To a large extent, this is a question about the psychology of a certain type of behavior, namely, flights of fancy. The question is neither idle nor digressive because, in our context, we're examining human understanding of the general nature of existence & reality. Speaking epistemologically, human imagination & the Christian doctrine of faith are first cousins. I don't think science expels imagination from the scientific method. Do you think it does?

0. Deity (Boltzmann brain?) ...

1. Deity becomes – fluctuates until symmetry breaks – not-Deity aka "planck universe".

That symmetry breaks is axiomatic, without addressing question of cause & the problem of its temporality (cause, by definition, implies temporality)?

Planck universe = smallest possible quantum of material existence? Is this how the physicalist avoids the objective-idealist notion of a "point?"

2. "Non-planck universe" begins maximum degrees temperature and rapidly – explosively ("Big Bang") – expands as it cools off.

Advent of asymmetry + expansion, being embraced axiomatically, suggests imaginative speculation, not deduction from experimentally verified laws. This is a big deal since the transformation of the planck quantum as described leads to the general existence we call reality. Conclusion - Science can afford to expel neither time nor imagination.

3. Cosmic + thermodynamic entropy. (WE ARE nowHERE.)

Entropy is a primordial cause of the structure of general existence? How do you explain the increasing complexity of materialization we see all around us?

4. "Non-planck universe" ends eventually – dissipates completely – having become an absolute zero degrees vacuum.

So the physicalist looks forward not to transcendently real (self-other) LOVE, but, rather, black nullity?

5. Absolute zero degrees vacuum – total symmetry – is indistinguishable from Deity.

The abundant variety of creation arises from & returns to homogenous, black nullity?

0. "Omega point" > the universe (or multiverse) constitutes memories (or dreaming) of Deity (Boltzmann brain?)

This isn't how I interpret Susskind's Holographic Universe Theory. He wrenched a concession from Hawking regarding the preservation of 2nd Law of Thermodynamics through black hole gravitation. This victory puts the Big Bang Theory in doubt.

— 180 Pro0f's *pandeist fairytale* (in sum)
This is how I imagine, even contemplate (strange loop-like), Spinoza's 'natura naturans sub specie durationis'. :fire: — 180 Proof

What is your response to the following characterization of pandeism?

pandeism- nature is a large scale mechanism operational within specifiable, obdurate boundaries. Its productions & their consequences are verifiable by means of evidence examined through the lens of materialist-physicalist premises. Philosophy of nature is propounded by exercise of reason as expressed in logical arguments supported by pertinent evidence.

What is your response to the following question?

Assuming we posit that flights of fancy, via the human imagination, occur within nature as described above, what is the the ontological status of flights of fancy?

Note - This isn't a question concerning specific content of a particular flight of fancy. It is a question about the phenomenon of flight of fancy that departs from reason, eventually making claims that have no empirical verification. Since this phenomenon is an existing thing occurring in nature, examination of its ontology promises illumination of important attributes of reality.

I acknowledge that 180 Proof & Seppo are correct in saying that categorical refutation can be made with the support of sound logic &, moreover, in our context here, such logically sound, categorical refutations have been made. Now I fall back on argument from theory: theory can't be conclusively proven, but rather must ever withstand new onslaughts as they arise, as with Newtonian Physics.

Even in a logical environment, it's bad policy to seek after final answers, as the cusp of a categorical pivot into a new era will be obscured by categorically correct theory.

I don't want to choke off counter-intuitive connections that upwardly dimensionalize orthodoxy.