It seems very difficulty to separate human thought from human language...animals have thoughts that don't seem connected with language. Danger. Safe. Food. Mate. Protect. We would have had at least as many before we developed language... — Patterner

All members of the animal kingdom make audible utterances in response to what they're experiencing. As cognitive capacity increases going upward along the food chain, the audible utterances in response to cognitive experiences become more complicated.

Audible utterances for a specific type of experience are repeated as that type of experience repeats. The mind of the creature takes memory impressions of a specific type of experience matched to a specific type of utterance.

At the human level, this same general process of memorization of audible utterance patterns matched to corresponding experiences generates words and sentences shared by members of the group experiencing these audible utterance_experience duets.. Language.

Human language is merely the more intricately detailed deluxe version of sound patterns matched to experiences practiced by the entire vocal subset of the animal kingdom.

Language, like human thought, is material_physical. The continuum running from the current_voltage variations of neuronal circuits to the vibrating vocal chords of utterance to the receptive hearing of listeners followed by their own symmetrical mirroring of same within themselves is material_physical.

Our current turn in the conversation is promising along the lines of further examining the relationship between subjective/objective.

What we don't know if whether the robot actually has a subjective experience of being a robot. Its does not have to be the consciousness of a human to have a subjective experience. — Philosophim

Right. Our necessarily subjective examination of the robot, like our examination of everything else, terminates in a simulation based upon what we perceive concerning its nature and behavior. Ultimately, we're compelled to put faith in the serviceable accuracy of our simulations of the agents populating the world around us.

It must be the case that our objectivity is populated by these simulations.

If a simulation necessarily differs to some degree from its referent, then we can understand that the interface linking self with other is a complicated amalgam of the two. One generalization derivable is that no sentient is totally isolated because even the sentient's own selfhood can be simulated asymmetrically, as evidenced by multiple personality disorder.

Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious. — Patterner

This is an intriguing conjectured phenomenon. One question raised by it that comes to mind is whether or not subjective experience counts as behavior. Usually, when a sentient experiences something, even if it's just observation, that subjective experience triggers physiological reactions that, by definition, are detectable. For example, if a sentient observers the approach of a powerful predator, typical physiological reactions include, acceleration of heartbeat and temperature, dilation of the pupils, and other symptoms of fear and stress. We don't suppose rocks can have such physiological reactions, but as soon as we imaginatively ascribe subjectivity to a rock, assumptions about fight or flight strategies for sake of survival enter the picture.

If the rock is conscious, but we don't know it, then the rock is far from being exactly what we think it is.

The difference is that a human has different behaviors that we ascribe to being conscious. But we cannot objectively know what its like for that other human to have the subjective experience of being themself. — Philosophim

If we use the Turing_Chalmers' argument to the effect: a cyborg externally programmed to behave like a conscious human will appear to be conscious i.e., have a selfhood without that actually being the case, then we cannot be certain that an observed person is really internally conscious i.e., in possession of a selfhood.

Let me reverse engineer my argument above to apply to what you also said:

We objectively do not know what its like to be that rock. What we do is look at the measurable existence of the rock and 'its behavior'. Since we do not ascribe anything the rock 'does' to an internal locus, we say it doesn't behave like its conscious. But do we objectively know it does not have a subjective experience? No. We simply assume. — Philosophim

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers.

This is why I claim that my selfhood and your selfhood, though non-identical, approximate each other sufficiently generically so that it's correct to say the difference between the two is by degree instead of categorical. For this reason, then, you and I do know, to some practical degree, what it's like to be the other person.

Sentient beings cannot navigate the natural world of other sentients without knowing to a practical degree what it's like to be another sentient. Of course there are many problems in our efforts to understand each other. For this reason, books both fictional and non-fictional are written in numbers counting up into the millions.

...some people are color blind. This means their subjective experience of green is so similar to another set of colors, that they can't really tell much of a difference. But can a color sighted person every objectively know what that's like? No. — Philosophim

I've underlined the part of your above quote wherein you describe what it's like to be a color blind person without being one yourself. How is it that you can do that? You have enough information, both from science and from descriptions given by color blind persons to approximate in your understanding what the experience of color blindness is like. There is presumably some degree of separation between what the actually color blind person experiences subjectively, and your cognitive simulation of that experience but, again, I claim the difference is by a navigable degree, not by an impenetrable categorical difference.

Existentialism, which is centered on “existence precedes essence,” gives us a way forward with our database of scientific disciplines and their methodologies. We, as existentialists, can assert that we don’t really know the world beyond realistic-seeming narratives that, ultimately, in the absence of epistemological certainty, we hold as true on the basis of faith. Going forward from there, we try our best to have integrity as we hold faithful to our realistic-seeming narratives. — ucarr

The undecidability of the question of an advanced cyborg having an innate unique selfhood as distinguished from a technology-based simulation of same might be insoluble.

I think AI will go forward to a technology-based simulation of selfhood. Can it somehow deviate from its programming into a unique sentience not programmed? In other words, can programming propagate an emergent and unique selfhood?

Moving towards Bladerunner 2049, can a technology-based emergent selfhood propagate another emergent selfhood in the mode of giving birth to a child? — ucarr

So, I predict that technology-based sentience will, per the above speculations, eventually spawn unique sentience not programmed which, in turn, will spawn emergent selfhood in the mode of giving birth to a child.

This tells us that the insuperabillty of subjectivity of selfhood will be preserved across objective propagation of selfhood. So, the seeming-immateriality of selfhood, preserved as technology-based selfhood, will persist, and organic humans will not be any more certain about what it's like to be an independently conscious cyborg than they are certain about what it's like to be another organic human.

There will be difficulties in the organic human_independent cyborg relationships, but these difficulties will, to some extent, parallel the human-to-human relationship problems.

We need consciousness to think, therefore we need consciousness to make any inference about consciousness, that's the problem. — Skalidris

You haven't explained why this creates a logical impossibility. — Baden

Skalidris seems to be saying that consciousness, in the form of subjectivity, holds insuperable. If so, then no objective perception of consciousness is possible, and thus the insoluble problem for developing technology that generates subjectivity.

The undecidability of the question of an advanced cyborg having an innate unique selfhood as distinguished from a technology-based simulation of same might be insoluble.

I think AI will go forward to a technology-based simulation of selfhood. Can it somehow deviate from its programming into a unique sentience not programmed? In other words, can programming propagate an emergent and unique selfhood?

Moving towards Bladerunner 2049, can a technology-based emergent selfhood propagate another emergent selfhood in the mode of giving birth to a child?

...you are...using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on... — Patterner

The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves" — Philosophim

Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." — J

And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim

I think your point above makes an important clarification: there's something about the native point of view of the sentient that obstructs, so far, our understanding how (or if) physical processes give rise to the subjective experience.

...we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim

As I understand you, you're implying that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable i.e., it is a container which has no exit. This claim, if true, leads us into the very complicated business of examining the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.

If it’s true that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable, that then calls into question the possibility of objectivity in general. If the sentient cannot know what it’s like to be beyond its own subjective being, then it follows that the sentient cannot know what it’s like for anything, other than itself, to be, whether a stone, a galaxy or another person.

Well, if objectivity in general is in doubt, then, as you all know, that lands us right back into the territory of solipsism: how can I be sure what I perceive is existentially independent of my perception of it? Indeed, how can I have such knowledge if I’m forever locked inside of my subjectivity?

So, we now see that the HPoC is another angle of view – a very complex and perhaps ultimately fruitful angle of view – focusing on the gnarly problem of the possibly inescapable self-enclosure of solipsism.

It sounds strange, but, in my context here, when we claim to know the chemical composition/interactions of a rock, we’re also claiming to know “what it’s like to be that rock.”

To be sure, knowing a rock by knowing its chemical composition/interactions is a much more simple phenomenon than knowing another person by knowing their consciousness, but the difference is a difference of degree, not a categorical difference.

If we’re locked out of objectivity because of insuperable subjectivity, then we’re thrown all the way back to securing our beliefs on the basis of faith rather than on the basis of science.

Existence precedes essence because science can only get started by assuming the existence of things prior to any possibility of analysis and its attendant logic and the subsequent scientific disciplines.

Existentialism, which is centered on “existence precedes essence,” gives us a way forward with our database of scientific disciplines and their methodologies. We, as existentialists, can assert that we don’t really know the world beyond realistic-seeming narratives that, ultimately, in the absence of epistemological certainty, we hold as true on the basis of faith. Going forward from there, we try our best to have integrity as we hold faithful to our realistic-seeming narratives.

I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization. — ucarr

This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief? — Philosophim

There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. — Philosophim

It is known by you what it's like to be a person.

It is known that the transitive property can be configured with word arrangements that make valid statements: If a = b and c = b, then a = c. I can take this word arrangement and apply it to you: If Philosophim = person and Joe Blow = person, then Philosophim = Joe Blow (to the extent of the standard of measurement known as person).

Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. — Philosophim

Two persons understand each other to a limited degree because they share important attributes common to personhood.

We share our stories because the bond of human identity allows us to walk a mile in each others' shoes. How much we relate to another person varies widely, but the connection rarely drops to zero.

...whether we do harm to things or not should be more than feelings. Just because I feel disgust at something doesn't mean I should kill it. Just because something makes me happy doesn't mean I should embrace it. For me, it is a respect for its agency, the fact that despite all the odds that get thrown at every life, it has survived until now. Why should I harm or end it over something as trivial as just an emotion? — Philosophim

From the above I understand the theme of your response to my first of two main conjectures to be "difference." My counter-narrative to your theme is "continuity."

So, your narrative propounds the discontinuity of extra-categorical modal difference whereas my counter-narrative propounds the continuity of intra-categorical intra-modal connectedness.

Let me attempt to translate the above sentence into plain-spoken English: with your theme, a collection of things are grouped into separate categories, with the assumption there is no connectedness between the categories. As an example, consider a group of apples in one category and a group of oranges in another category.

What you have done, I think, is equate feelings with apples for one of your categories and equate thoughts with oranges for another one of your categories.

In my counter-narrative, I claim that feelings and thoughts belong to one category: cognition. The difference between these members of one category is by degree, and therefore not by category.

To elaborate, to have a feeling about something means having thought about something with a relatively small amount of detail, or low resolution. On the other hand, to have a profound understanding about something means having reflected on something towards amassing a large amount of detail, or high resolution.

When we compare low-resolution feelings with high-resolution thoughts, it’s like comparing a low-resolution digital image of something with a high-resolution version of the same image. That they are the same image establishes their mutual membership within one category: a specific image. The difference between them is not extra-categorical and modal, but rather intra-categorical and extensional.

The fancy logical term for your theme of difference by category is “intentional:” the properties that something needs to have in order to be counted as a member of a specified category.

Your theme argues that feelings and thoughts are intentionally disconnected; my theme argues that feelings and thought are intentionally connected.

That your theme overstates the difference of feelings and thoughts by degree with respect to difference-as-disconnection is evidenced by:

There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life. — Philosophim

I assert this is an overstatement of the degree of difference_disconnection separating feelings from thoughts in terms of people understanding each other and moreover, it is therefore an overstatement of the degree of sameness_connection necessary for a human to know what it’s like to be a bat.

As you say, you can bond with another human without knowing exactly what it’s like to be the other person. Nonetheless, to a degree, you do know what it’s like to be another person. And likewise, to a degree, you do know what it’s like to be a bat.

Highly technical, very abstract thoughts about moral principles are directly connected to intuitive feelings about how we should treat other innocent beings. Without this direct connection, moral principles become empty and therefore meaningless.

I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.

I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization.

We can map the brain to your behaviors, and even note what you are thinking before you are aware of it. But we cannot know what it is like to BE you. To BE your consciousness. — Philosophim

What if there is not only individualized what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods but also a one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood both universal and constant?

With this supposition, we can say that what-it's-like-to-be a bat living in a cave is the same as what-it's-like-to-be a human living in a college dorm.

Speculating about this possibility doesn't necessarily imply the sense of a world populated by individual what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods is illusory. No. It's a point-of-view that allows us to ask what's the relationship between the one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood and the individual what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods.

In our speculation about the possible existence of a one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood, we can ask ourselves what's going on when we sympathize with the suffering of another person. Morals are about doing no harm to other innocent beings. How can we value this principle governing our behavior if we don't have some semblance of a one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood that we access and utilize to support the sympathy that fuels our moral thinking and behavior?

How is it that many humans easily shuttle between an individualized selfhood and the one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood that enables the bonding of friendship and love so important in their lives?

The edifice of the arts (literature, drama, music, dance, painting, sculpture) depends upon the interpersonal identification of artist, art work and audience. Is this not, to some observable degree, a communal experience wherein the one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood exerts a very useful and desirable power?

When we think about knowing what it's like to walk a mile in another man's shoes, we must acknowledge that, obviously, we're really experiencing what it's like to be ourselves being aware of what it's like to be another, separate self.

From this realization we see that, as already said here, our consciousness is, for each of us, insuperable. Well, what if the insuperability of individualized what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods can merge with all other insuperable what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods to form a universal and constant one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood also insuperable?

So, after all, maybe we really do know all what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods. Isn't this access to all what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods the underlying assumption that supports the edifice of morality?

Doesn't morality lose it's existential imperative within our justice-governed lives without it?

Another, possibly important speculation, goes as follows: the foundation of consciousness is memory. Memory consists of feedback loops traversing neuronal brain circuits that empower awareness of things and events via the initial perception of things and events in themselves repeated for comparison and re-presentation so that the thing in itself becomes a perceived thing in itself and, after another, vertically stacked feedback loop creating a higher-order feedback loop tower per unit of time, we arrive at the self knowing it's perceiving a re-presentation of a thing-in-itself, as based on an original thing-in-itself.

This higher-order feedback loop tower per unit of time is the necessary circularity of consciousness examining itself. So, the circularity of consciousness examining itself is the friend of our understanding of consciousness, not its enemy.

The friendliness of the circularity of consciousness examining itself resides in the conjectured phenomenon of consciousness itself being a possibly irreducible circularity making the selfhood of consciousness possible.

If this is the case, then, of course, examination of the nature of consciousness entails circularity.

Here’s the takeaways: a) let’s not assume that individualized what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods have impenetrable membranes. Maybe the membrane of selfhood is semi-permeable, as evidenced by human sympathy; b) let’s assume that the innate circularity of the self is part of a multi-tiered tower of levels of consciousness that can merge and divide such that the individualized what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods and the one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood are not mutually exclusive.

What I've learned from this conversation:

Summation

The existence of a material thing, when viewed outside the constraining scope of strategic incompletion, stands wrapped within a shroud of mystery at both ends of a continuum: neither the beginning nor the conclusion of material existence can be explained rationally because the practice of reason assumes the existence of material things as its necessary prerequisite.

Rationality and its language of logic therefore are contained within the continuity_continuum of existence. The continuity_continuum of existence being the sine qua non prerequisite for reason, it can make no start outside the material theater of action. Given this fact, there can be no rational explanation for existence-itself-in-general.

Naturalists take recourse to Deism, a doctrine that posits a cosmic creator who only actualizes material reality. In the wake of this rationally unexplainable act of creation, sentients are free to reason forward through material existence toward evolving phases of understanding and control of aspects of the material existence.

More specifically, through the powers of the arts and sciences, sentients are able to reason towards a concept of freedom post material creation. An operational presupposition claims humanity (so far as what is currently known) holds the highest position of freedom as material individuals who know both themselves and their environment.

According to this continuity, existence precedes essence. Per Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre, human, through personally designed action, creates its essence, and thus is responsible for it.

This continuity, then, posits mysterious existence prior to morality and its sets and their degrees of inclusion, both of which are chosen by the individual.

The ancient scribes, who wrote the grammar of morals for the eastern and western hemispheres, by claiming inspiration from an eternal cosmic sentience, clearly worked in terms of existence precedes essence.*

*If the Deist creator is eternal, then existence is eternal. Since more than one cosmic creator is co-eternal with a material manifestation thereof, the question of priority vís-a-vís existence/essence must be examined through the lens of another question: Does any type of existence assume a material component?

If so, then within the mysterious state of being of the Deist creator, existence/essence co-exist with existence holding the overarching position of priority.

Evidence supporting this consists in the mind being grounded in the brain, and therefore the mind/brain interface dwells within the scope of the material.

As the sentient individual evolves, the complexity and absential materiality of personally designed morals will continue to approximate, at the level of the material individual, the grammar of morals assigned by the ancient scribes to the cosmic creator.

a God-bearing universe is more interesting and more fun — ucarr

• The Crusades (11th–13th Centuries)

• Spanish Inquisition (1478–1834)

• Thirty Years' War (1618–1648)

• British Colonialism and the Spread of Christianity (17th–19th Centuries)

• Partition of India (1947)

• Rwandan Genocide (1994)

• Islamic State (ISIS) and Jihadism (2010s)

• Religious Nationalism in Myanmar (2010s–2020s)

• Salem Witch Trials (1692)

What is interesting? Consider the newspaper publishers' credo: "If it bleeds it leads."

existentialism | ˌeɡzəˈsten(t)SHəˌliz(ə)m, ˌeksəˈsten(t)SHəˌliz(ə)m |
noun
•a philosophical theory or approach which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free
and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will.

In fairness, 'interesting' has no moral valence. — AmadeusD

Although I believe the opposite of the above quote: interest is the fortress of moral valence, let me nonetheless dive deeply into the modulation populating the gravity well of human experience as it specifically relates to: The Long History of Violence in the Name of Religion.

From the bullet list above, we see that () for the individual immersed within the maelstrom of this history, there looms the threat of existential overload thrice: culturally, morally and physically.

Making peace within a God-fearing culture by paying lip service to it is an example of sampling the long history of life-threatening violence in the name of adaptation for the sake of survival. Keeping faithful to this adaptation is the practice of existentialism.

The dumb show of existential compliance is mainly what religion-manipulating dictators want from their subjects. The real story is more complicated, and the existentialist concedes that.

If we position this world of roiling upheaval beside the non-events belaboring the perfections of daily life within Eden pre-fall-from-grace, then I think a case for the superior interest of the history of violence in the name of religion can be made.

So, in the case of the long history of violence in the name of religion, we have dueling narratives: there's the real situation no one understands fully because it's too much for the wee small human brain to understand beyond sampling, and there's the fiction-with-integrity of the existentialist.

Here's the fun part: the existentialist learns to play the game of "compliance" instead of practicing real compliance.

Existentialist role playing opens up a personal freedom space that forestalls the toxic boredom and shame of subjugation

What are you wanting to talk about here? — AmadeusD

My title is my guide: Art Lies Beyond Morality. This is my premise, and I see now it is related to existentialism as I understand it... — ucarr

It isn't a premise. Once again, you do not know the words you are using. — AmadeusD

premise | ˈpreməs |
noun
•an assertion or proposition which forms the basis for a work or theory: the fundamental premise of the report.

verb [with object] (premise something on/upon)
•base an argument, theory, or undertaking on: the reforms were premised on our findings.
--The Apple Dictionary

Since I'm going along with the idea a God-bearing universe is more interesting and more fun than a Godless universe, I'm saying "has."

What are you wanting to talk about here? — AmadeusD

My title is my guide: Art Lies Beyond Morality. This is my premise, and I see now it is related to existentialism as I understand it: blooming creation leads to sensory overload for human unless he filters out, morally speaking, what's excess beyond what his brain can handle. The existentialist understands he's artificially simplifying reality, and he comes to terms with this lack of authenticity by making a pact with his conscience: I know my sampled reality is a sham replica standing in for the actual state of affairs of the world, but its the best that I can do in the way of acknowledgement, so I'll stay the course of my jury-rigged reality with as much integrity as I can muster. The foundation of my reality will be personal choices and my fidelity to them.

The above journey enfolds moral choices known to be ultimately artificial, with an overview of one's personal theater of action consequently seen as a rather sincere type of stage play. Objective moral truths, you say? Here on my little stage I want to be interested in what you have to say, and perhaps even more interested in what you do. If there's any measure of cosmic logic that connects my being good with getting what I want, then I'll try to injection mold myself into the various moral strait jackets we reach agreement upon.

Your formulations make no sense to me, provide no criteria and are just picking out random, badly-defined (and, in your world, completely stretched, unrecognizable) terms... So, even if you're going to invoke language-use to support some of these readings...no one but you, it would seem, could assent to what you're trying to say. — AmadeusD

AmadeusD, I know I have a better chance of winning the lottery than persuading you with anything I write. So now I thank you for your time and attention to what you feel compelled to dismiss after an extended period of time. Soldiering on through someone else's nonsense is commendable behavior on your part.

Because of your patience and endurance on my behalf, I got a mental workout that has aided me greatly in better understanding what I think and what I want to communicate to others in writing.

Probably it won't be long before I post another conversation, and considering your helpful participation in this one, I'll be looking forward to new posts from you.

Art isn't beyond morality any more than baking or dropping a nuclear bomb.
Even if you framed the latter as performance art it would still have purpose. — praxis

So, you think morals and purpose entwined. That positions us inside the frame of goals. Things in themselves as such have no goals. Once a sentient exists, he can pursue goals. The naked fact of existence cannot be inhabited through reasoning from the outside, as if non-existence can set the goal of becoming something.

Goals can't get started without the naked fact of existence. That makes existence prior to goals.

A cosmic sentient with unlimited powers may have created humans with their purpose in mind and therefore with human purpose built into their design. This leads to a human life with every action answerable to the innate design of human nature's moral imperatives.

The cosmic sentient may have assumed flesh and blood on earth. If this life was a perfectly moral journey, as needs be if sentient life is framed by innate purpose and morals, then the question of cognitive suffocation stands forward as a debatable mystery operating under the dome of freedom illuminated but not embraced, instead dancing out at the horizon, cavorting, as if ready to fall off the edge before capture.

Cognitive suffocation is blocked by disobedience to human nature's moral imperatives? Disobedience is necessary to human freedom? It is written that the cosmic sentient doesn't block human disobedience for love of human freedom. Is cosmic suffocation unreal, or is human freedom beyond purpose not written in the earthly covenant?

I’m not following at all. It seems to me that art beyond morality would be morally inert. It might happen to be completely inline with moral norms or be completely against them, or even more incomprehensible, be with and against simultaneously. — praxis

Your statement makes it clear you are following. If I stretch the meaning of "inert" a bit and construe "inactive" as being "neutral-adjacent," then life-and-art-beyond-morality are the sources and causes of morality. We can kind of imagine life and art without morality; can we imagine morality without life and art?

Now we're looking at the question: why does the world, capable of immense good, tolerate evil?

Art perceives the world in terms of human bias towards goals. If we can imagine existence outside of the bias of goal-oriented consciousness, then we can see that the non-living undergo all possibilities without bias. Through the lens of consciousness, many of these events are deemed evil because they are life-threatening.

The lack of restraint about events and outcomes in the non-living world becomes charged with emotional and, later, moral value when events and outcomes are perceived by sentients.

In order to continue your attack, you have to attack my defense quoted above. You have to show why my thesis is still contradictory, even in light of my defense. — ucarr

...your two claims are either empty, as they are the same claim... — AmadeusD

Even if they were the same, an identity is not empty, nor is it a contradiction. They are not the same claim; they are similar claims about two different parts of a unified whole.

...or literally contradict one another, I need do nothing else. — AmadeusD

Love and War are two sets, both of which contain marriage, home, family and community as members. The members are doubled by symmetry across two countries.

The two sets are not the same because one set partitions the symmetry and the other doesn't.

A set and its members is not an example of contradiction.

I can mentally separate art for art's sake and utilitarian-based art but to say that art lies beyond morality raises it to a Godly height. How is art lived beyond morality? — praxis

Life is lived beyond morality in that it is more inclusive. I base this claim on the assumption that we as humans, existentially speaking, are more than what we know ourselves to be. For this reason, new experiences and their eventual comprehension keeps history going forward without it being a repetitious loop.

Following from this, art, being more directly linked to and concerned with what human is instead of what human should, follows human-is more closely and non-judgmentally that does establishmentarian morality (the church).

Can human be understood, as opposed to being non-judgmentally observed, outside the context of morality? Maybe not. If not, the question illuminates something important about understanding: it's dependent upon models, that is, paradigms. We say something is right or wrong based upon conformity to a model or standard.

In contrast to this, being and doing, the theater of action of humans, cannot be constrained by a suffocating adherence to an established model; adaptation to an ever-changing world authorizes this transgression. From this truth we know that each newborn child is unique and thus congenitally at odds with moral standards. The eventual social acceptance of the newborn child depends upon his success in conforming to normative standards.

If the strong individual survives moral condemnation for being and acting differently, the chance increases that the gravitational force of this singular person will bend the establishmentarian moral standards to some degree of warpage to his willful state of being.

It is by the continuum of rebellion become revolution that revolutionary social movements push history forward.

The history of world-religion founders is the history of broken moral precedents.

For these reasons, I say that life, and art, lie beyond morality.

There is politics in the conservation/construction of any way of being, wherever there are priests and parishioners (politicians and the public) who are "relating to the citizens", promoting the rules and regulation of that way of being in dialectical good will. It's complicated for sure. — Nils Loc

:up:

If you mean art-in-itself or 'art for art's sake' and art weaponized, yes I've made that separation. — praxis

I'll venture to surmise from your statement above we agree that art lies beyond morality, the central theme of this conversation.

I'd like to move on to the weaponization of religion. Can religion be meaningful and propaganda simultaneously? — praxis

I think the weaponization of religion, unlike the weaponization of art (as propaganda), lies outside of the scope of this conversation.

I have a notion that religion and politics are either nearly or even exactly the same thing. There's a Gordian knot linking religion, politics and morality.

The founding fathers of the United States did a profoundly good thing when they configured a system of government that separates church and state. However, maintaining this separation in the practice of government requires navigation of considerable complexity of statecraft with a nuanced understanding.

If any of what I'm saying here is right, then this topic needs to become its own independent conversation. Do you want to start it? If you do, I'll join with these thoughts in mind.

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. — ucarr

Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

This is directly contradictory. If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former. — AmadeusD

In the above quote you make a claim about my [two-part] statement. Can you show that my statement is a contradiction? — ucarr

It is self evident. See:

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have
— ucarr

Is in contradiction to the very next phrase:

Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences.
— ucarr

You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role. They are contradictory (though, admittedly, indirectly so). — AmadeusD

I've underlined the first sentence in your quote directly above. It's the gist of your argument for refuting my two quoted statements at the top. Your refutation is false because, apparently, you've forgotten something. What you seem to have forgotten is reposted directly below:

Art and morality within the context of this thread reduce to four elements:

Love | War

Love -- Marriage, home, family, community

War -- Power & Money in service to Partisan: Marriage, home, family, community
— ucarr

As you can see, by my definition of Love and War, marriage, home, family and community are directly linked to Love and War. Therefore, making the same claim about each statement, namely that they are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences is not a contradiction because the two claims, in actuality, are about the same thing, albeit, the thing in question here is a unit articulated into two parts: concentric circles. The outer circle houses the two big parts: Love | War; the inner circle houses the smaller parts that fill in the big parts with pertinent details: marriage, home, family, community.

If I say a Swiss watch runs like a precision mechanism, and likewise, its sweep second hand runs like a precision mechanism, there's no contradiction because the two statements are talking about the attributes of two parts of one unit. — ucarr

I'm asking you to take the words in my statement and arrange them into a configuration that shows it is a contradiction. This would be an argument supporting your claim.
— ucarr

You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role. They are contradictory (though, admittedly, indirectly so).
— AmadeusD

in your quote directly above, you make an approach to arranging my words into a configuration that shows it is a contradiction: "You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role." But I counter-argue that statement by showing that two parts that combine to make a unified whole are not contradictory. Its the combination of the two parts that refutes your ascription of contradiction because contradictions cannot combine. — ucarr

What I've underlined immediately above is my defense of your attack:

Its the combination of the two parts that refutes your ascription of contradiction because contradictions cannot combine.[/quote]

Here's your latest reply:

It is not an argument. Your phrase contradicts itself. I've had to say nothing at all. Simply quote you. — AmadeusD

In your above quote I've underlined the gist of your latest attack; it's merely a repetition of your prior attack. Since your prior attack, I've defended my thesis. Now you have to attack my defense of my thesis. Merely repeating your attack gains you nothing.

Here's the gist of my defense of your attack based on contradiction:

Its the combination of the two parts that refutes your ascription of contradiction because contradictions cannot combine.[/quote]

In order to continue your attack, you have to attack my defense quoted above. You have to show why my thesis is still contradictory, even in light of my defense.

Can a song be musical art and propaganda simultaneously? — ucarr

Is there an aesthetics of human manipulation of context? — ucarr

Yes and yes. — praxis

Do your answers establish a separation between art-in-itself and art-in-itself weaponized?

Here's my argument; it invalidates your logic with an alternative interpretation establishing my example as a counter-example: — ucarr

So, love and war and the quartet (marriage, home, family, community) cannot be in a relationship of: If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former because they have much in common and thus there is no mutual exclusion. On the contrary, there is mutual inclusion because both sides have scarcely any important distinctions between them at all: American marriages_German marriages; American homes_German homes; American families_German families; American communities_German communities. The bone of contention creating the war consists in each side wanting to destroy the other side, and that too is something they have in common! — ucarr

By my definition, Love and War both include: marriage, home, family, community. If this is true, then they can't be contradictory when defined as I've defined them.

Can you show that, during WW2, it was not the case that there were married couples, homes, families and communities in both America and Germany? An example supporting your argument would have to show that in one country there were marriages, homes, families and communities whereas in the other country there were anti-marriages, anti-homes, anti-families and anti-communities.

I'm asking you to take the words in my statement and arrange them into a configuration that shows it is a contradiction. This would be an argument supporting your claim. — ucarr

You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role. They are contradictory (though, admittedly, indirectly so). — AmadeusD

in your quote directly above, you make an approach to arranging my words into a configuration that shows it is a contradiction: "You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role." But I counter-argue that statement by showing that two parts that combine to make a unified whole are not contradictory. Its the combination of the two parts that refutes your ascription of contradiction because contradictions cannot combine.

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have — ucarr

Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role. They are contradictory (though, admittedly, indirectly so). — AmadeusD

I've underlined the first sentence in your quote directly above. It's the gist of your argument for refuting my two quoted statements at the top. Your refutation is false because, apparently, you've forgotten something. What you seem to have forgotten is reposted directly below:

Art and morality within the context of this thread reduce to four elements:

Love | War

Love -- Marriage, home, family, community

War -- Power & Money in service to Partisan: Marriage, home, family, community — ucarr

As you can see, by my definition of Love and War, marriage, home, family and community are directly linked to Love and War. Therefore, making the same claim about each statement, namely that they are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences is not a contradiction because the two claims, in actuality, are about the same thing, albeit, the thing in question here is a unit articulated into two parts: concentric circles. The outer circle houses the two big parts: Love | War; the inner circle houses the smaller parts that fill in the big parts with pertinent details: marriage, home, family, community.

If I say a Swiss watch runs like a precision mechanism, and likewise, its sweep second hand runs like a precision mechanism, there's no contradiction because the two statements are talking about the attributes of two parts of one unit.

2. "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" (1861) – Julia Ward Howe
Context: Popular during the American Civil War, this song became associated with the Union Army.
Message: Its lyrics evoke a sense of divine justice and righteousness in war. It glorifies the idea of fighting for freedom, equating the Union's cause to the will of God. — Chatgpt

"With God on our side" mentality running high, battalions enter battlefields. Can a song be musical art and propaganda simultaneously?

Art can be a weapon, an olive branch, a medicine, whatever, or merely aesthetic. — praxis

Is there an aesthetics of human manipulation of context?

If ucarr is transgressing the bounds of implicit/explicit virtue/etiquette as an artist contra the philosopher, maybe he is the evil artist.

He must run back to church to give what that unanimous crowd demands, in an alignment of the sensible wills of such a peer group: good, clear, hygienic, rigorous and rational sense in selfless service. — Nils Loc

If God consciousness is a sub-division of human psychology (the savior was fully human), then I can advance an argument claiming that what the divine looks like to humanity needs continual fine tuning and updating, and that this work is the work of the artist.

Now, I've declared art being at risk of blasphemy as a natural part of the territory enclosing the artistic raison d'etre.

Are the masses of people entertained? If so, perhaps their pleasure can defuse my condemnation by the state.

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

This is directly contradictory. If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former. — AmadeusD

In the above quote you make a claim about my statement. Can you show that my statement is a contradiction? I'm asking you to take the words in my statement and arrange them into a configuration that shows it is a contradiction. This would be an argument supporting your claim.

Backing up claims with supporting arguments is the proper way of doing things here at TPF:

Here's my claim:

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

Here's my example; it takes what's abstractly expressed in my claim and fleshes it out with practical things configured according to the abstract pattern :

Example: When America went to war with Germany in 1942, both countries were fighting for the best quality of life for its citizens, and both sets of citizens consisted of married couples, their homes, their families and their communities. Both sets of citizens did similar things in the four categories. However, unlike during peacetime, which in our context here can be likened to love, during wartime, the similar ways of life of the two countries were partitioned off from each other as each side tried to slaughter the other side. — ucarr

Here's my argument; it invalidates your logic with an alternative interpretation establishing my example as a counter-example:

So, love and war and the quartet (marriage, home, family, community) cannot be in a relationship of: If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former because they have much in common and thus there is no mutual exclusion. On the contrary, there is mutual inclusion because both sides have scarcely any important distinctions between them at all: American marriages_German marriages; American homes_German homes; American families_German families; American communities_German communities. The bone of contention creating the war consists in each side wanting to destroy the other side, and that too is something they have in common! — ucarr

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

This is directly contradictory. If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former. Can you choose one? Is it love and war, or the series of personal opinions on marriage, home , family and community? — AmadeusD

As I've already stated, love and war are both about marriage, home, family and community. They share a large region of common ground. They stand apart on the issue of their approach to fellowship; love does not partition fellowship; war partitions fellowship into good and evil, with both sides demonizing the other.

Example: When America went to war with Germany in 1942, both countries were fighting for the best quality of life for its citizens, and both sets of citizens consisted of married couples, their homes, their families and their communities. Both sets of citizens did similar things in the four categories. However, unlike during peacetime, which in our context here can be likened to love, during wartime, the similar ways of life of the two countries were partitioned off from each other as each side tried to slaughter the other side.

So, love and war and the quartet (marriage, home, family, community) cannot be in a relationship of: If the former, not hte latter. If the latter, not hte former because they have much in common and thus there is no mutual exclusion. On the contrary, there is mutual inclusion because both sides have scarcely any important distinctions between them at all: American marriages_German marriages; American homes_German homes; American families_German families; American communities_German communities. The bone of contention creating the war consists in each side wanting to destroy the other side, and that too is something they have in common!

Imagine you did none of these things. You can still experience immense adventure, or war... — AmadeusD

A singular person who enlists in the armed services during wartime finds home and family within his platoon; he finds marriage through his belief in his country for which he jeopardizes his life; he finds community within the fellowship of related armed services divisions, and he finds community within the localities he protects as a soldier.

Love in theory is moral guidance on paper. — ucarr

Moral guidance on paper is merely a fictional story designed to align the wills of those charmed by it. — praxis

Are you charmed and deceived by the ten commandments?

Don't be polite. Tell it to me straight why building marriage, home, family and community as the important experiences of your life is a claim obviously false. — ucarr

Imagine you did none of these things. You can still experience immense adventure, or war. They have no logical connection to one another. THe claim is both faulty (in that you're not being consistent in what you're claiming) and utterly absurd, in that you are claiming there are two motivations for all behaviour. Patently ridiculous. — AmadeusD

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have. Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences.

Regarding the singular humans, such as priests, nuns, monks, old bachelors, spinsters, elderly shut-ins and even hermits, they oftentimes attach themselves to the four named categories: they attach to their parents, so that's their attachment to marriage, or, they're married to the higher power that frames the church; they attach to their nuclear family of parents and siblings, so that's their attachment to family; they attach to their extended family of cousins, uncles and aunts and also to friends and neighbors, so that's their attachment to community.

Some hermits attach to a spiritual higher power, so that's their attachment to marriage, to the family of believers, and to the world community.

The term 'adventure' here is nothing to do with what I've said, and I'm not sure what you mean by it. — AmadeusD

By "adventure" I mean taking action in the world towards a goal and gaining experience as a result.

What do you mean 'get away with'? How 'much' of what? What do you mean by 'much' even here? — AmadeusD

I mean how far can I go outside the established boundaries of acceptable behavior without incurring punishment from the state.

Love and war are the two big adventures. — ucarr

This seems to be so obviously false It's hard to respond to politely. Suffice to say: No, they aren't. — AmadeusD

I mean love is building marriage, home, family and community; I mean war is taking a partisan stance on behalf of one society of marriages, homes, families and communities in opposition to the same interests held by people in another society.

Don't be polite. Tell it to me straight why building marriage, home, family and community as the important experiences of your life is a claim obviously false.

Everyone who lives pushes against moral boundaries in their effort at living. — ucarr

No. Morality is within each person who lives. It isn't something that can be pushed up against. Your attitudes guide your behaviour. That's all that can be said. — AmadeusD

We've already agreed morality resides within the mind. So it's obvious I don't mean a literal pushing up against like pushing up against a stone blocking my path. Yes, my attitudes guide my behavior, and that's internal conflict that I, and you, sometimes push up against (speaking figuratively). We don't always want to do the right thing.

This attempt to lie, cheat, slip and slide our way out of moral boundaries in life, by my observation, is necessary, and that's what I'm trying to focus on here. — ucarr

...are nothing but our personal attitudes. There are no boundaries you could possibly point me toward that could fill that spot, for your utterances. Do feel free to try! — AmadeusD

Are you claiming never to have gone back on your commitment to do the right thing?

And thus the church shows its wisdom when it declares human nature corrupt from the git-go. — ucarr

No, it doesn't, in any way that could be conceived by a rational thinker. — AmadeusD

I mean to say that the moral guardians of the church are right in their expectation that humans will sometimes fail to faithfully carry out all of their moral commitments. Do you know any individuals who are perfectly faithful to their own moral commitments?

When the slithering demon comes on stage, that's when the interest begins. — ucarr

Nothing in this or hte previous part of your reply has any bearing on the concepts you're trying to discuss. — AmadeusD

Part of my effort in this conversation is defining "interest" as a kind of bias, or partiality towards one particular choice over another choice. So, when I say the slithering snake arouses interest, I'm talking about how the presumed evil of the snake is a type of bias away from the peace of equilibrium towards excitement and, unfortunately, murder.

Have you not found that a movie depicting a beautiful sun setting its glow over a vuluptuous woman with soul-stirring music on the soundtrack puts you to sleep after ten minutes if something doesn't go wrong, thus threatening the woman's — ucarr

I have to say, this sounds somewhat unhinged, in terms of trying to make any kind of point. — AmadeusD

I'm trying to say that either jeopardy or joy are necessary to interest because either state is far from the equilibrium - and dullness - of peace and stability too prolonged.

There is no 'sinful' in nature. — AmadeusD

Are you saying you believe crimes such as rape and murder have nothing to do with sinful perpetrators? What do you suppose motivates rape and murder if not being sinful?

If a man doesn't take delight in this rousing of the feminine will to survive, that man belongs in the vestry with the robes and the sashes. — ucarr

This fails, entirely, to answer the questions I put to you in clarifying what it is you're talking about. — AmadeusD

I'm herein trying to talk about the big experiences in life; they are the ones that promise great pain or great joy.

Still missing the point. — praxis

Art and morality within the context of this thread reduce to four elements:

Love | War

Love -- Marriage, home, family, community

War -- Power & Money in service to Partisan: Marriage, home, family, community
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
When we love we build: marriage, home, family, community.

When we war we partition marriage, home, family, community into segregated modules.

Love in practice is love on earth.

Love in theory is moral guidance on paper.

As we know, there is no perfect agreement between theory and practice.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Existential | The Social

The Existential -- Flesh & blood humans walking the earth

The Social -- Flesh & blood humans self-constrained to a social contract whose memorized contents are made existential by prescription.

When we act existentially, we are creatures of the natural world.

When we act socially, we are creatures of our own minds.

Pain (war) is another instrument of revelation. — ucarr

...I still don’t see war. — praxis

Some see life on earth as a time of tribulation before one's appointment with their final reckoning. Pain management, during the time of tribulation, holds center position in the determination of the final reckoning.

Does earthly life and its outcome boil down to each person's time management and pain management?

Did you find and attack the serious goals of your life in a timely fashion?

Did you make the world a better place by decreasing the pain of others when you were able?

The escape clause is either receiving a free ticket to The Louvre, or being granted a confession at the Vatican. — ucarr

Your option (b) is getting close.

Death is the human tragedy forestalled by the necessary oscillation between the two poles before finally succumbing. (There is a proffered escape clause, but nowadays that business is too controversial, so I’m leaving it out.)[/quote]

Above I've underlined a word that serves as a clue to the answer. When you realize what it is, the moment will be anti-climactic, as this escape clause is the most heralded news on earth.

Very simply, I think Morality practices 'nonreciprocal harm-prevention/reduction' whereas Art explores 'catharsis from existential limits/failures of morality' – they are complements (dialectical), not opposites (binary) – pace Nietzsche. — 180 Proof

This is excellent. Thank-you for making it available herein.

Yes, the existent makes adaptive choices for survival and otherwise and, of necessity, must sometimes compromise moral restrictions in conflict with doing so. The necessity resides within the fact blooming creation is too full of value to allow the sentient total passage through life without doing harm to the innocent.

So, the drama in life is no less about redressing wrongs than about avoiding them.

Now we come to the hard part: art is about seeking out the shrewd deformity that mysteriously and judiciously transforms the ordinary into the beautiful.

Singularity is the heart of aesthetics. As such, it produces a gravitational field around itself that bends, warps and distorts the conventionality of established morality. A viable singularity makes necessary an adjustment in the established morality. Morals must be modified and tailored to the new existential demands of the singularity.

The singularity has two aspects: positive/negative.

Just now we're witnessing singularity in its negative aspect: the ascension to power of a destroyer. The process is warping morality to an extent making the masses dizzy.

Two centuries ago, we witnessed singularity in its positive aspect: the ascension to power of a savior. The process warped morality to an extent making the masses dizzy.

The destroyer/savior switch is the lotus blossom in the center of the garden of the expression.*

The switch keeps us perplexed about the distinction between good and evil.

*The vital artist reaches beyond success to failure.

So existence without life is not interesting and besides, no human knows anything about it. — ucarr

Anything other than ideas in human minds carry nothing moral. — AmadeusD

This is a useless supposition because no human lives in a world without human minds. That being the case, the world outside of human minds is irrelevant to us — ucarr

Yet, it dismantles your premise. So, clearly, its relevant to us in demarcating what is moral...You seem to admit this, but deny its relevance? — AmadeusD

Why do you think setting the boundary of morality (within the mind) dismantles my premise (my quote at the top)? Of course what's interesting, or not, depends upon minds.

Here we have an opportunity to define "interest" in an interesting way: it is bias towards one thing or another. Bias presupposes a sentient individual with an enduring point of view accompanied by a set of needs and desires and goals. These things comprise interest and the interesting. I can artificially imagine a world without life. There's no interest and nothing interesting on such a world because there's no bias anywhere. When the wind blows the rocks hither and thither, there's no reaction, no goals achieved or thwarted. All events are a matter of indifference. In short, on a lifeless planet, there's no bias toward desires, no dramatic suspense awaiting outcomes, i.e., no interest, nothing interesting.

If anything, your demarcation of the scope of morality aides my premise by clarifying its theater of action: the mind. Thank-you.

Am looking forward to Robert Eggers Nosferatu, and the premise is related, pushed to the limit. A young bride is being possessed to the horror of everyone around her, by a really awful demon that wants to copulate with her and she with it (my assumption based on trailer). — Nils Loc

:up:

He [Girard] draws a line between unanimous expulsion of the scapegoat, to the sacrificial rites as what imbues archaic culture with its powers to keep order. — Nils Loc

Yes. The struggle is both external and internal. As for the external struggle, there's a monster out there lurking, on the hunt for victims (Frankenstein). Morality is correct behavior forestalling victimization.

As to the internal struggle, the monster dwells within and morality is stern repression of its emergence. (Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde).

When the existence of the monster is just being discovered, and it still evokes terror within the masses, it is the artist who ventures into the dark cave of destruction with open eyes, ready to escape after close observation, bringing back an account to the people (Oedipus).