I am currently unable to understand your ideas, and I am respectfully asking you to clarify them if you want me to remain engaged. — Philosophim

Okay.

How much time does it take for two + two to equal four?

An attack on answering this question can be made through the lens of the Idealization versus Measurement comparison. This comparison scheme is, in turn, part of the Abstractionism procedure.

So, the abstractionism procedure examines multiple empirical experiences and abstracts them from blooming creation down to a thematic pattern:

Syllogism: All humans are mortal; Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Pythagorean Theorem: For any right triangle, the square of the length of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the lengths of the legs of the right triangle.

The two above abstractions are measurements of multiple empirical experiences condensed into approximations of an open-ended volume of thematically linked possibilities. The process of abstractionism is thus an idealization of otherwise unmanageable, blooming creation.

Let’s now look at Idealization Versus Measurement:

Speaking intuitively, we don’t want to say that on the day Pythagoras discovered the Pythagorean Theorem, it became true. Doing so implies that on the day before his discovery, it wasn’t true. This distinction illuminates a parallel distinction: empirical measurement experiences have time locally attached to them; abstract idealizations have time absentially attached to them.

Now we have an argument for opposing the maxim: “The map is not the terrain.” By force of the Idealization Versus Measurement distinction, we can say, “Yes, it is.”

In point of fact, the brain depends upon the condensation to idealization of abstractionism for manageable navigation of blooming creation, i.e., the real world of empirical experiences at every moment leads to sensory overload if it isn’t filtered through the condensation of abstractionism.

QM backwards engineers abstractionism by showing us that the seemingly discrete material physicality of things in the phenomenal world is in reality a sensorially overwhelming networked convolution of non-local events. The Heisenberg Equations help us navigate this experiential plethora by means of statistical analysis of probabilities.

The Heisenberg Equations, being an increase of measurement precision for otherwise undetectable non-locality effects at the scale of human experience, through their advanced circuitry-logic, instruct us against concluding QM is just academic pettyfogging.

QM bolsters fantastically the not-now-but-future-spacetime-distribution design of absential materialism.

Logic embodies the diva Faubourg Saint-Germain elan of highest-form abstractionism.

We want to declare logical truth immaterial and immortal, but, alas, it is an idealization of empirical measurement within the phenomenal world of material physicality.

There is no time --contained or involved-- in something either. — Alkis Piskas

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then $e = mc^2$ is false?

Ucarr, I'm asking a question to understand what you're trying to say. Returning my question with a another question is just more confusing. :) In fact, all of my questions you just answered with questions. My questions are not statements, I'm just trying to figure out what you're saying. — Philosophim

Perhaps now you can better appreciate my efforts towards independent inferential thinking in response to what you write.

You did okay in your exam of my previous post. Keep going.

...the human mind seems to inherently "conceive" of consecutive Change as the effect of some prior physical input of Energy. It's a Belief, not a Fact. — Gnomon

After going to the doctor with mild symptoms, you're told your spinal column is infected with pneumococci bacteria. Since it's believed this infection causes spinal meningitis, you're advised to immediately undergo an aggressive program of antibiotics within the intensive care unit. Explain why you wouldn't dismiss this diagnosis as uncertain causal-belief-not-fact and go home untreated, or would you go home? Would you go home untreated, betting on fact-based-mind-over-uncertain causal-belief?

Are you saying that all a priori deductions don't take any time to realize? — Philosophim

Do a priori deductions take time to be true? How much time does it take for two + two to equal four?

Deduction does not require empirical observation. But we need to think through it right? — Philosophim

Are we thinking through something already there, or do you suppose thinking logically creates logical truth moment to moment?

Do you imply a something-from-nothing first cause becomes true only as we think about it?

Do you intentionally imply only thinking about first cause in time makes it real and thus pairs time as a contemporary with first cause?

Are you saying that abstract reasoning does not take time? — Philosophim

Are you supposing truth comes into existence in time during the time interval of our thinking about it?

Must two + two = four continually be recreated from non-existence across time by sentients thinking about it?

Can we observe things outside of time? — Philosophim

Are you asking if outside of time we can think through the experience of observing things?

With something from nothing, are you implying spacetime and matter_energy emerge as contemporaries?

Show me how you will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after you die; show me how the universe will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after all sentients die. — ucarr

Sorry. No idea what you are talking about. — jgill

If you are physical, and your mind, being connected to your physical brain, is likewise physical, how do you connect with non-physical math?

Another question (implied by my questions up top): How does a non-physical thing (you dead) connect with another non-physical thing (math)?

Non-existent is a concept. — Mark Nyquist

Agree

It does exist as brain state, — Mark Nyquist

Agree

Brain; (a concept) — Mark Nyquist

Agree

Brain; (a non-existent entity) — Mark Nyquist

Disagree, unless I distort your intended meaning

Also brains activate muscles so and concept can take affect physical matter. Like the result of a math problem.

That's the only way an abstraction, concept, mathematical construct can affect physical reality. — Mark Nyquist

Agree

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Premise: "If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there." -- Philosophim ⟹ Effects only propagate in time.

Counter Premise: A priori deduction ≠ a posteriori deduction along the measurement axis of time.

• If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

OR

• If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

NOT

If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

So,

Question A: Deduction can lead to knowledge only by empirical observation in time?

Question B: Deduction can lead to knowledge both by observation in time and by abstract reasoning?

Interpretation: A = F; B = T

So, by the conjunction logical operator: F & T = F and T & F = F. With this interpretation, the conjunction logical operator shows us that the two propositions cannot both be true.

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Since the above statement is true by definition, we know that we can arrive at knowledge a priori (by reasoning alone) when we apply a definition to a body of information that fulfills the definition.

Conclusion:

Proposition A:

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Proposition B:

If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there. — Philosophim

Regarding the two above propositions: A = T and B = F .

Is mathematics non-existent? Some might say yes. It's certainly non-physical. — jgill

Show me how you will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after you die; show me how the universe will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after all sentients die.

...non-existent... — Mark Nyquist

Non-existence is an abstract concept which has an empty content.

...logic says non-existent and non-physical things don't have any cause and effect relation. — Mark Nyquist

Non-physical things abstract things have cause and effect relations via the support of the brain: the brain's memory functions allow sentients to recapitulate empirical experiences and then organize them sequentially and thematically ⟹ logic and sets.

It means the effect already lies in the cause — LFranc

What does this even mean? — Michael

The existence of the cause implies the contemporaneous existence of the effect.

Example: Clouds saturated with water cause rain.

I think you are sincerely trying to grasp an Idealistic worldview*1 that is radically different from your own Materialistic worldview*2 — Gnomon

*2. Materialism :
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism — Gnomon

Handshakes across the aisle.

On p.1 of this thread back in 2022 (if you've missed it), I had posted very brief logical and physical objections to the OP's incoherent claim of "logical necessity of the first cause" (i.e. there was/is no "first cause"). FWIW, here"s the link to my post (further supplimented on the next few pages of this thread) containing two other links to short posts: — 180 Proof

I'm taking serious note of these links to additional thinking on some implications of the thesis.

In my acknowledgment above, I'm only addressing the error in my reasoning you brought to my attention: In attacking: There's no limit on what a first cause can be, I made the mistake of applying my accusation of paradox to There's no limit on what a first cause can be as if it said: There's no limit on that a first cause can be. This is not something Philosphim has claimed, so the attack -- at least in its present form -- has no bearing on the correctness of the thesis.

Through my acknowledgement I don't intend to imply I now think Philosophim's thesis correct. I'm just clearing away the debris of my erroneous attack.

If you've already assumed the gist of this clarification, please forgive my superfluity.

...prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." — Philosophim

Yesterday, I attacked this claim thus:

Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis? — ucarr

After writing this, I thought it a pretty good argument. However, proceeding with caution, I decided to ask 180 Proof to examine the argument for flaws. He got back to me quickly with this:

It seems to me your argument misses a significant distinction: 'that there is first cause' & 'what the first cause is'; "there is no limitation on what the first cause is', not in reference to 'that there was a first cause'. — 180 Proof

Correct.

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. For this reason, I evaluate the supporting premise as false.

From here it follows that if this supporting premise is false, and therefore not all of your premises are true, then your conclusion might still be true, but it's not a certainty.

I further underscore this point with sentential logic:

Consider: x = the (all of)-existence-is-necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die supporting premise (F)

The binary logical operator takes two input values -- x and y -- and converts them into a truth-content value: with x = all of existence is necessary (T) and y = a roll of a die examples inception of first cause (F), we get

(x ⟹ y) ⟹ (T ⟹ F) ⟹ F

So, truth does not imply falsity.

If you want to arrive at a conclusion that is certainly true, you must develop pertinent, probative premises, all of which are true.

You have said: "... before first cause, nothing."

How do your descriptions of the inception of first cause have anything to work with other than nothing?

Consider -- In a valid argument, when all the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.

Imagine a die with all possibilities. Now the die is rolled. Whatever lands is what is. If someone claims, "Its a six", we should be able to prove that it did roll a six. Once it is rolled we are out of the realm of possibility and in the realm of actuality. — Philosophim

Do you think your above premise -- rooted in something instead of in nothing -- avoids being evaluated as false and thus avoids casting doubt on the conclusion being true?

If you do, can you explain the avoidance?

Consider: x = the (all of) existence is necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die premise (F)

We see in the conditional operator truth table that when

x ⟹ y, with x = T and y = F, the statement evaluates as F

Do you think your above premise -- demonstrably false -- avoids plugging into the x ⟹ y implication such that the statement evaluates as False?

If you do, can you explain the avoidance?

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

No. Please explain how you came to this conclusion from what I wrote. — Philosophim

Here are the pertinent things you wrote:

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. — Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause? — ucarr

We're having a language barrier issue here. :) Think of it as a variable set Ucarr. I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. What actual first causes have happened over the lifetime in the universe is up for other people to prove. I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. — Philosophim

In the first statement above in bold -- yours -- you ask for an explanation of my question:

... Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

Your first quote above -- I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. -- is a logical descendent of: "There're no limitations on what a first cause can be."

My question was motivated by your second statement above in bold: "I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause."

Why is it not a contradiction of: "There're no limitations on what a first cause can be"?

The question is important because it's an essential supporting argument for your thesis.

On the same note: "A first cause is logically necessary." is the central focus of your thesis. Considering this, consider: Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis?

...we weren’t discussing brain activity. — Mww

You think thought and communication are divorced from brain activity?

That the self is impossible without the brain is given, but is at the same time far to general a proposition to be of any explanatory help. — Mww

Have you read the book linked below?

Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter

It is actually the self finding fault with an act a posteriori, as effect, but not necessarily with its antecedent judgement by which the act is determined a priori, as cause. — Mww

How do you reconcile your above with your below?

The assertion, then, reduces to either the conveyance, not of the content, but of the thought itself, to the self that has the thought, a contradiction, or, there is nothing whatsoever conveyed to the self regarding thought and its content, that doesn’t already reside therein, such that, ipso facto, thought is possible. — Mww

I, on the other hand, hold the self is reducible to a unitary, or singular, rational identity. — Mww

So at twenty years a memory-bearing person is just the same as that memory-bearing person at five years?

I’m familiar with arguments in which the self is both subject and object. This happens only in expositions of it, wherein what the self is in itself as object, is confounded with the manifestations of the self’s doings as subject. In other words, the self is necessarily reified when attempting to explain itself. Which gives rise to the inevitable absurdity of the self reifying itself. Still, conceptions, intuitions, morals, thoughts, subjects and objects and whatnot, are all required pursuant to expressions of the human kind of intelligence, but the self doesn’t use any of them to do what it does, except to manifest itself as subject. — Mww

How is your propositional content within your above paragraph possible -- especially through the noumenal section -- without your intentional and thoroughly functional reification?

So, yes, I submit the self not only isn’t aware of itself objectively, but is absurd to suppose it needs to be. In fact, I reject the notion that the self is aware of itself subjectively, hence the redundancy, while merely granting the availability of some mechanism by which it seems to be the case. — Mww

Reflexivity and redundancy are not synonymous.

Since you're a brain in a vat -- self-cognitively speaking -- spending the rest of your days in solitary confinement within a white room would be for you a matter of indifference.

I commend you on your durable patience with me.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes? — ucarr

My intention here is to understand that a first of all first causes, if it happens, holds no special status because first causes are independent.

The start of each chain is separate and independent — Philosophim

I've been striving to understand that the gist of your claim is to say each causal chain must have a first cause. In so stating, I understand you take no particular position on the ontic identity of a first cause and its following chain.

I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. — Philosophim

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent?

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept — ucarr

I don't care whether they're immaterial or not. Are they real? Yes. — Philosophim

Are you allowing that "real" names a comprehensive set of things that funds first causes and that whether or not this set includes both material and immaterial things is irrelevant to your work in this conversation? Do you agree your indifference in this situation leaves open the door for inferring that logical necessity of first causes is amenable to both material and immaterial causes? I ask this question because the ontic identity of first causes is not normally a matter of indifference within examinations of causation.

I can tell you that nothing has changed from our conversation in which I spoke to you Ucarr. So its best not to confuse yourself by trying to follow it [Philosphim's dialogue with Gnomon]. — Philosophim

You presume incorrectly my questions are darts aimed at your previous statements. I like to think I'm slowly improving my understanding of the intentions behind your words.

Are you advising me to stop undertaking my own independent inferential thinking because you think it [sometimes] erroneous?

In a concomitant action, are you trying to restrict the range of actions, techniques and approaches I can use in my interactions with you?

If you think you're repeating yourself in your responses, name the topic, tell me I'm repeating my questions thereof and I'll agree not to ask additional repeat questions on the topic.

First, if you remember a first cause cannot cause another first cause. — Philosophim

My mistake. I should've written: So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes?

Second, its possible that there was a first cause that happened, then other first causes happened later. Or it could be that two or more first causes happened simultaneously. — Philosophim

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes?

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. — Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause?

I don't even know what immaterial existence is. — Philosophim

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real?

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct! — Philosophim

Its completely irrelevant whether there is immaterial existence or not. — Philosophim

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it?

This is not a claim of any 'one thing' being a first cause. Its just a logical note that there must be a first cause, and that first cause has nothing prior that limits or influences what it should be. — Philosophim

So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes?

Are we looking at a concept of causation with potentially unlimited number of first causes and yet no first cause for the set of first causes?

Is immaterial existence even a thing? I don't know. If it exists, then its a thing. If not, then its not. — Philosophim

You've said you're not making a claim that a thing -- such as a God, or the Big Bang -- acts as the first cause. Also, you've clarified that your thesis only posits the logical necessity of a first cause. Now you say you don't know if immaterial existence is a thing. Is it pertinent to the content and intentions of your thesis to suppose you take no definitive position on the materiality or immateriality of the logically necessary first cause?

Okay: You're saying:

First Cause is necessary to chain of causation it's outside of and affecting. — Gnomon

Okay: You're saying:

My understanding of a logically necessary First Cause is a philosophical conjecture, not a scientific observation. So there is no "whereness" to specify. — Gnomon

So, First Cause is an abstract entity that inhabits the realm of mind.

Okay: You're saying:

...but like all fundamental Principles, the Prime Cause is a theoretical Concept, an Idea with "no material physicality". However, the referent is not an anthro-morphic deity located in space-time, — Gnomon

So, Prime Cause has a referent.

Okay: You're saying:

Deism is known as the "God of the Philosophers". As I said in the previous post : "But one sticking point seems to be confusing a logical First Cause (of some resulting chain of events) with an objective Thing or God operating in space-time". — Gnomon

So, our world is a causal chain following from an abstract entity that inhabits the realm of mind.

Okay: You're saying:

The scientific Big Bang theory understandably avoided the philosophical question of where the Energy & Laws of Nature came from. That's because those logical necessities for a Chain of Causation are presumably Eternal & Everywhere. — Gnomon

So, our world is an eternal following-causal-chain in the sense that its origin, Prime Cause, is an eternal logical necessity.

...it’s [our dialogue] become too psychological for my interests, so, thanks for the alternative perspective. — Mww

You've let me know you won't dialogue with me further. Okay. I'm posting the following responses for the record; I try to always respond to counter-narratives.

There isn’t any space in a thought, and if the self just is that which has thoughts, one is temporally inseparable from the other. — Mww

I think brain activity occurs in spacetime. Also, when someone thinks, they know they're thinking. The knowing person is not identical to his/her thoughts being examined, otherwise the knowing person couldn't do the evaluation.

The self judges, so it can’t be that the self is judged. — Mww

Guilt is an everyday example of the self judging its own actions and finding fault with itself.

…..b) a judging self is self-aware in its acts of judgment….. — ucarr

Tautologically true, but congruent with every other aspect of what the subject does…. — Mww

When a person drives a car, he/she monitors his/her judgments about time and distance in order to begin breaking in order to avoid hitting the car in front. Knowing you're stopping the car in time to avoid a collision is not circular reasoning.

…..and self-awareness requires a separation of self (…) from self….. — ucarr

I find it a mischaracterization of self, in its irreducible sense. — Mww

The gist of my thesis is that the self is not reducible to a unitary person.

Self-awareness is redundant. Awareness presupposes self, and, self is necessarily that which is aware. — Mww

You seem to be implying self cannot be objectively aware of self. Have you never primped in front of a mirror before making a public address?

If self separates from self, what then becomes of self-awareness? — Mww

Consider an imaginary experience of internal conflict: both of your divorced parents invite you to Christmas dinner and you're torn between visiting one or the other household.

Thought and judgement, because they are related to each other….communicate? — Mww

You're trying to persuade your significant other to join you at the resort lodge for skiing. At one point during your pitch, the other person frowns. In your mind's eye you think: "I pressed too hard on my point about them owing me for favors done on their behalf. I'd better back off a bit."

Given that there is no such thing as an empty thought, it follows necessarily that when a self has a thought, it must be that the content does not get conveyed to the self, but arises from the self in conjunction with the thought the self has. — Mww

Is there any differential in space and time separating the self and its thoughts? I ask this question for two reasons: a) a thought is about the judgment of the self in reaction to a perception of the world; judgement implies a separation of judge from judged; b) a judging self is self-aware in its acts of judgment and self-awareness requires a separation of self not only from world but also from self; if there is no separation of self from self, then there is no self-awareness and thus absent self-awareness absent self.

This structure of thought as being inherently self-referential raises an important question: can thought occur without communication? — ucarr

Are you denying a supposed self-referentiality of thought? This question is central to the gist of my thesis because it focuses upon the structure of thought as an interconnectivity with communication throughout the interconnectivity an essential attribute.

Since you say:

...it must be that the content does not get conveyed to the self, but arises from the self in conjunction with the thought the self has. — Mww

I say:

As to the structure of a thought as a judgment arisen from its content as the existential ground of the judgment, this inter-communitive relationship I posit as the central module of perception, thought, communication and language.

But one sticking point seems to be confusing a logical First Cause (of some resulting chain of events) with an objective Thing or God operating in space-time. — Gnomon

Correct. People seem to think I'm using this to claim the existence of some specific first cause like the Big Bang, God, etc. I am not... — Philosophim

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct! — Philosophim

I just want to be clear that a first cause as proven here is not outside of our universe, but a necessary existent within our universe. — Philosophim

Are you saying: a) the logical first cause has no material physicality; b) the logical first cause that has no material physicality exists within our universe?

So, if we are assuming that the chain of causation applies everywhere in the interconnected universe, then your immanent Cause could be its own Effect. For example the Cue ball is on the table, and can be impacted by the 8 ball. That's why my unique First Cause, or Causal Principle, is assumed to be off the table, outside the system affected. — Gnomon

Are you saying: a) unique First Cause is outside the chain of causation it affected?

I prefer not to specify where the imaginary Poolshooter is standing, and just call him an abstract-but-necessary Principle. — Gnomon

Are you saying unique First Cause is necessary to chain of causation it's outside of and affecting?

Can you elaborate additional details about the unspecified whereness -- positionally speaking relative to the whole -- of abstract-but-necessary Principle?

"I promise to fetch water for you if you give me some of that haunch" — Banno

Lady Killer on the make.

Can the content only ever describe the thinker more-so than what it is intended to describe? — NOS4A2

Yes. Language and meaning are always distillations of content. For this reason, language and its circumambient meaning are well done when heavy laden with concrete imagery that shows more than tells.

Try to refine your question to a single, focussed point of discussion. — alan1000

The center of my focus looks at a concept of the structure of thought as a complex of multiple parts. The essential parts are content, language and meaning. Content lies within the noumenal realm of things-just-are. Language is the transport for the meaning of noumenal content. Meaning is the interpretive narrative that hovers about the things-just-are noumenal content. When meaning comes into the picture, we're looking at narratives about narratives.

The complex of thought includes the noumenal content perceived through the senses plus what we think about our perceptions, the interpretive meaning supplied by the work done by thinking.

If narratives about narratives is an essentially correct characterization of thought, then it's clear thought and communication are inseparable. This is the gist of my argument against complete acceptance of Chomsky's argument rooted in the separation of the two.

Another important part of my focus is the characterization of the self as an irreducible complex that perplexes unitary characterizations of selfhood. So, self as emergent property of material physicality leads to a characterization of self as a distributed complex of interwoven fields.

Consciousness is the spinner thrown into the mix of interwoven energy fields. With the advent of consciousness within a material physicality based universe, the logic_science matrix of not-now-but-forthcomingness introduces absential materialism. The principle agent of absential materialism is abstractionism.

Mr. Abstraction -- A principle agent of thought who takes perceived patterns of material_physical phenomena and cognizes them into linguistic generalizations amenable to logical representation and scientific examination. The complex dynamical evolution of self-organizing systems gives an appearance of parallel realities, one extended and one unextended, but it's actually a distributed complex of interwoven fields.

This hypothesis doesn't seem valid to me even on its face, due to the fact that the individual has no existence independent of the collective (species). — Pantagruel

If you're referencing Chomsky's preference of language for thought over language for communication, I agree with your assessment. If there's anything essentially inter-personal and essentially communicative, its language, isn't it? Also, I'm guessing the infant learns to hear words and repeat them (or see visual patterns and connect them with ends) before forming intentional thoughts within a linguistic medium, whether verbal or visual.

Quantum physicist Karen Barad has produced a model of interaffecting matter that was inspired by the double slit experiments.

Phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without pre-existing relata. On the basis of the notion of intra-action, which represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality, I argue that it is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the ‘‘components'' of phenomena become determinate and that particular material articulations of the world become meaningful. A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the ‘‘apparatus'') enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object), erecting a separation between ‘‘subject'' and ‘‘object.'' That is, the agential cut enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy. In other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. (Meeting the Universe Halfway) — Joshs

Maybe you'll help me unpack the Barad definition:

• Classically measurable things are primatively real connections; they are connections without implications of supervenient principles.

• Intra-action -- action within as distinguished from action between -- represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality...

• ...through agency-mediated intra-actions boundaries and characteristic expressions of parts of classically measurable things become defined and, likewise, natural material systems featuring jointed parts become describable.

• A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of a complex, multi-part system) enacts an agency-mediated cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut - an inherent distinction - between subject and object), erecting a separation between "subject" and "object."

• ...the agency-mediated cut enacts a resolution within the clasically measurable real and narratable indeterminancy.

• ...related things do not preexist their grammatical organizing principles; rather, natural, related things classically measurable cyclically foreground via phase shifts through specific actions within.

Conclusions: a) subject_object is an intra-active phase-shifting dynamical process; b) intra-action nuances abstractly conceptualizable grammar of relations as emergent-property-of-material-things-
cum-foregrounded-interiority.

...any category of existing entities derives its sense and intelligibility from a wider context of relevance. This wider context of relevance comes first, and the meaning of the list of beings is derived from it. — Joshs

Is it correct to characterize your statement thus: abstract rules of organization have conceptual influence (the conferring of sense and intelligibility) upon concrete things?

Is it correct to infer from the above that in a reverse direction, concrete things make it possible to discern abstract rules emergent from concrete things?

Is it correct to induce a bi-conditional operator linking concrete things and abstract rules within a causal identity: concrete things imply abstract rules if and only if abstract rules imply concrete things?

Is it possible QM exemplifies a networked reality: wave functions and particle functions are interwoven within a universe that supports superposition regulated by probability measurements?

This is not a physics forum so I don't see the philosophical relevance of the quote cited... — 180 Proof

You don't see the philosophical relevance attaching to physical phenomena raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality?

...and conflating the Schrödinger equation with the 'Schrödinger's Cat' gedankenexperiment proves my point. — 180 Proof

You see no connection between the equation and the thought experiment?

What is the thought experiment about Schrödinger's cat?

He imagined a box containing a radioactive atom, a vial of poison and a cat. Governed by quantum rules, the radioactive atom can either decay or not at any given moment. There's no telling when the moment will come, but when it does decay, it breaks the vial, releases the poison and kills the cat.

The Schrödinger Equation -- As the QM counterpart to Newton's 2nd law in classical mechanics, it gives the evolution over time of a wave function, the quantum-mechanical characterization of an isolated physical system. — Wikipedia

The isolated physical system in the thought experiment is "the atom," whose decay the Schrödinger Equation predicts quantum mechanically. The equation demonstrates mathematically the uncertainty of the time of the decay, thus causing the cat's death. This being uncertain, the cat holds superposition as both dead and alive until the measurement effect of observation of the cat collapses the superposition.

Fundamentally, the Schrödinger's cat experiment asks how long quantum superpositions last and when (or whether) they collapse. Different interpretations of the mathematics of quantum mechanics have been proposed that give different explanations for this process, but Schrödinger's cat remains an unsolved problem in physics. — Wikipedia

Although originally a critique on the Copenhagen interpretation, Schrödinger's seemingly paradoxical thought experiment became part of the foundation of quantum mechanics. — Wikipedia

You, 180 Proof -- a science-savvy commentator -- in seeking to distance TPF from science tells me I'm doing something right in my approach to the association of science and philosophy.

I understand him (Schrödinger) to be making reference to Schrödinger's equation for a superpositionally dead & alive cat. — ucarr

My quote is unfortunately misleading without the addendum: Schrödinger developed the narrative of the dead & alive cat in order to mock the artless embrace of superposition without acknowledging its collapse under measurement.

I understand him to be making reference to Schrödinger's equation for a superpositionally dead & alive cat. — ucarr

:roll: — 180 Proof

You hold Schrödinger's linear differential equation in contempt?

As the QM counterpart to Newton's 2nd law in classical mechanics, it gives the evolution over time of a wave function, the quantum-mechanical characterization of an isolated physical system. — Wikipedia

What's your take on this?

a kind of metaphysical POV [ ... ] affords us a metaphysics of practice — ucarr

I heve no idea what you mean, ucarr. — 180 Proof

The satellite is supposed to be a practical application of systemic overview, my characterization of metaphysics.

Deacon sounds like he's espousing what C. Rovelli aptly calls "quantum nonsense"... — 180 Proof

I understand him to be making reference to Schrödinger's equation for a superpositionally dead & alive cat.

...T. Deacon's thesis seems to be 'nonreductive physicalist scientism'... — 180 Proof

No. The long slog through the statistical bias towards equilibrium, i.e., entropy towards the far-from-equilibrium states required of life is illuminated in detail by the scientific work of Deacon in Incomplete Nature, a game-changer in the mind/body inquiry.

The slow-paced dogfight by natural materials engineering and natural fluid dynamics engineering towards the self-organizing dynamical systems that aggregate attractors that statistically mandate phase shifts from random resource elements and compounds into reciprocally reinforcing morphodyanics is the critically important continuum that bridges across simple matter to absentially material mind. The autogen is an early distillation of selfhood in the form of self-generation, self-repair and self-replication.

The end-directed aboutness functionality of telodynamics as the operating system of mind, emergent from yet rooted within material thermodyanmics is spatially distributed, time-mediated complex materialism.

Deacon closes his report on the supple interweave of the multiplex of matter that knows itself with:

If quantum physicists can learn to become comfortable with the material causal consequences of the superposition of alternate, as-yet-unrealized states of matter, it shouldn’t be too great a leap to begin to get comfortable with the superposition of the present and the absent in our functions, meanings,
experiences, and values.

So, from Deacon we learn that mental abstractionism is a state that oscillates between an expansion/compression cycle within nature.

Consider a modern, telecommunications satellite, such as the one making our internet dialogs possible.

Launched from earth, it hovers above in the thermosphere_exosphere. It sees whole earth in overview, a kind of metaphysical POV. In this position, it's poised to connect the dots and understand events systemically. It affords us a metaphysics of practice with concrete value to the general public. No academic flights of fancy indulged.

Clear overview of complex systems has essential importance. It generates useful constraints in the form of boundaries known as rules. This necessary role of the referee notwithstanding, we don't say the orbital satellite looking down upon us created us. No. It emerged from us and remains tied to us in a delicate superposition of the present and the absent.

Deacon's report does not example science privileged above reflection. Instead, it does the hard work of elaborating the continuum linking reflection with its material foundation.

Hello, 180 Proof. I've been learning from you, and I very much appreciate your patient instruction. I'm very gratified to have some of your attention.

I think you stand on solid ground whenever you correctly ground your conjectures in science.

You can do yourself a favor by keeping away from metaphysics for now. Metaphysics is your enemy because it lulls you into complacecey about not being your better self.

Metaphysics is little more than the logical grammar undergirding the conceptual dimensions of science. It's neither beyond nor above science. It's something akin to an emergent property of science.

Some metaphysicians might tell you it's the other way around. Shrug them off before they lead you astray. Never doubt that metaphysics cannot breathe without science.*

I hope you'll start working toward longer intervals off the drug of metaphysics while slogging the trenches of philosophy's harsh mistress: science.

You show promise as a theoretician when you make observations such as the following: "The primary attribute of energy is causation." That's thinking like a scientist. Keep doing it.

*If you think logic a science, consider that philosophical ideas are vetted by logic. What does that tell you?

A first cause is an uncaused existence, that then enters into causality. — Philosophim

Is instantiation into existence instantaneous, or does the process necessitate elapsing of time?