Anyway— how disappointing it is that the majority in this thread refuse to question the Western narrative, even if it appears to them 99.9% obvious and certain. Given this is a philosophy forum and all. — Mikie
I read Descartes' "Cogito" as demonstrating nothing more than this: 'when doubting, one cannot doubt that one is doubting' (i.e. I thnk, therefore thinking exists.) :chin: — 180 Proof
His article argues that functionality can't be explained by examining the physiology of the CNS. Whether or not this is true has no bearing in whether a theory of consciousness is possible. — frank
At this point some are tempted to give up, holding that we will never have a theory of conscious experience. McGinn (1989), for example, argues that the problem is too hard for our limited minds; we are "cognitively closed" with respect to the phenomenon. Others have argued that conscious experience lies outside the domain of scientific theory altogether.
I think this pessimism is premature. This is not the place to give up; it is the place where things get interesting. When simple methods of explanation are ruled out, we need to investigate the alternatives. Given that reductive explanation fails, nonreductive explanation is the natural choice.
Although a remarkable number of phenomena have turned out to be explicable wholly in terms of entities simpler than themselves, this is not universal. In physics, it occasionally happens that an entity has to be taken as fundamental. Fundamental entities are not explained in terms of anything simpler. Instead, one takes them as basic, and gives a theory of how they relate to everything else in the world. For example, in the nineteenth century it turned out that electromagnetic processes could not be explained in terms of the wholly mechanical processes that previous physical theories appealed to, so Maxwell and others introduced electromagnetic charge and electromagnetic forces as new fundamental components of a physical theory. To explain electromagnetism, the ontology of physics had to be expanded. New basic properties and basic laws were needed to give a satisfactory account of the phenomena. — Chalmers, Facing Up to The Problems of Consciousness
Anyway, what I'm worried about is that we could be mistaken as to what the word "logos" means. Perhaps it doesn't have a meaning and is more like ... a reminder, a knot in the handkerchief. — Agent Smith
106. To God all things are beautiful, good, and right; men, on the other hand, deem some things right and others wrong. — ibid
I fail to see the John connection — Agent Smith
Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. — Meno, Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett
But the example he presents in the Theaetetus is as I describe it. My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering. He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful. — Ludwig V
I see. Is it disappointment I detect or is it elation? Perhaps that's irrelevant to a non-Christian or, contrariwise, even more so to one. — Agent Smith
What's important though, in me humble opinion, is what's implied by ॐ. Agree/disagree/don't give a damn? — Agent Smith
34. Fire lives in the death of earth, air in the death of fire, water in the death of air, and earth in the death of water. — Heraclitus, Philip Wheelwright collection
29. The universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any man or god, but it always has been, is, and will be---an everlasting fire, kindling itself by regular measure and going out by regular measures. — ibid.
1. God is one, supreme among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or in mind.
2. It is the whole of [of God] that sees, the whole that thinks, the whole that hears.
3. Without effort he sets everything in motion by the thought of his mind.
4. He always abides in the selfsame place, not moving at all, it is not appropriate to his nature to be in different places at different times.
5. But mortals suppose that the gods have been born, that they have voices and bodies and wear clothing like men.
6. If oxen or lions had hands which enabled them to draw and paint pictures as men do, they would portray their gods as having bodies like their own: horses would portray them as horses, and oxen as oxen. — Xenophanes, the collection of Philip Wheelwright.
78. When defiled they purify themselves with blood, as though one who had stepped into filth were to wash himself with filth. If any of his fellowmen should perceive him acting in such a way, they would regard him as mad. — ibid
Probably better not to go down that road in this thread. — Wayfarer
